Self-censorship as a Socio-political-psychological

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Self-censorship as a Socio-political-psychological Phenomenon: Nature, Antecedents, Consequences Daniel Bar-Tal

Self-censorship as a Socio-political-psychological Phenomenon: Nature, Antecedents, Consequences

Daniel Bar-Tal

The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research

‫מרכז תמי שטינמץ למחקרי שלום‬

‫مركز تامي شتاينمتس ألبحاث السالم‬

Parts of this paper were presented as a keynote address presented in the Annual Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Herzliya, Israel, on July 10, 2013. The author would like to gratefully acknowledge the very helpful comments of Ruthi Pliskin, Rafi Nets-Zehngut, Amiram Raviv, Keren Sharvit, Boaz Hameiri, Eldad Shahar, and Ofer Shinar to the earlier drafts of this paper. The author would also like to acknowledge the financial assistance of the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research of the Tel Aviv University in performing the empirical studies that are reported in this paper. Correspondence regarding this research can be directed to Daniel Bar-Tal, School of Education, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel. Email: [email protected]. Key Words: Self-censorship, censorship, flow of information, democracy

Series editor: Dr. Ephraim Lavie Text editor: Naama Zohar Cover design: Yael Kfir, TAU Graphic Design Studio Graphic editors: Michal Semo Kovetz and Yael Bieber, TAU Graphic Design Studio

ISSN: 978-965-7001-53-0 © Copyright (2015) The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 6997801, ISRAEL

The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research which was established in 1992 is an interdisciplinary academic unit at Tel Aviv University. Its mandate is to promote academic activity related to conflict resolution and peace-making, with special reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Within this framework, the center:

¶ Initiates, encourages and supports research projects on subjects related to its mandate both in the Middle East and in other regions of the world.

¶ Holds research workshops and local and international conferences dealing with relevant subjects.

¶ Fosters academic collaboration with similarly oriented institutions in Israel and abroad.

The Tami Steinmetz Center’s research series This series includes reports on research projects conducted by the authors under the sponsorship of the TSC. The views presented in the reports however are the sole responsibility of the authors.

Table of Contents Preface

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Abstract

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Introduction

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The Importance of a Free Flow of Information

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The Nature of Self-censorship

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Elaborations on the components of self-censorship

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a. Information versus opinion

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b. Limitations of self-censorship

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c. Content of the withheld information

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d. Types of self-censorship

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Psychological bases of self-censorship

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a. The need to share

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b. Identification with a group

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c. Experiencing dilemma

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Motivations for Self-censorship

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Contributing Factors

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Context of the group

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Individual factors

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Type of information

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Circumstantial factors

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Self-censorship in a Violent Conflict

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Violence

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Threats

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Mobilization

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The need to maintain the official narrative

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Self-censorship as a barrier

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Research on Self-censorship in Israel

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Self-censorship in Israel: Prevalence

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Self-censorship in formal institutions

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Self-censorship in media

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Support of self-censorship in the Israeli-Jewish society

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Self-censorship in Israel: Antecedents

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Consequences of Self-censorship

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Conclusions

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References

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Biographical Note

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Figure 1: A Well-Functioning Democratic Society

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Figure 2: Decision-Making Process of a Self-Censor

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Preface The phenomenon of self-censorship has fascinated me since I first noticed this behavior many years ago, as a young soldier in 1965. Dozens of soldiers witnessed this particular incident in Almagor (a semi-military Israeli settlement near the Syrian border) together with me. We all saw how this particular violent encounter with the Syrian army unfolded. As part of the struggle with Syria over demilitarized zones, an Israeli armored tractor, driven by a soldier, entered a field that was in dispute, knowing that when crossing a certain line, which was considered by the Syrians as the border of the demilitarized zone, they would shoot. The IDF’s forces were well prepared for the encounter and ready with a massive fire. And indeed, as soon as the Syrians fired the first shot, Israeli artillery responded with a heavy fire towards the Syrian posts. An hour later I heard a report in the Israeli radio station, Kol Israel, which described an aggressive Syrian attack over innocent Israeli farmers, who were peacefully ploughing their field. It was one of the turning points in my life, realizing that the media is lying to the public in order to impart a particular official narrative, which may not correspond with the events that actually happened. But of equal importance is the fact that although so many individuals witnessed the events that day, nobody, including me, talked about the course of events, and we all imposed self-censorship upon us.The struggle over the demilitarized zone is one aspect of the violent encounters between Israel and Syria in the 1960s, but in the official presentations, well absorbed by the public, it is described as a Syrian intentional, unsolicited aggression against Israeli innocent civilian farmers. It was only years later that Moshe Dayan once broke the silence and referred to the causes for the violent affairs with Syria. He said in an interview in 1976 with Rami Tal that was published 21 years later in Yedioth Aharonoth, April 27:

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We (the IDF) used to send a tractor to plough some land where nothing could be grown, in the demilitarized zone, knowing in advance that the Syrians would start shooting. If they didn’t fire, we would order the tractor to advance until Syrians got angry and fired on it. And then we brought in artillery and later the air force as well Later, when I observed the events in Israel, I often noticed how selfcensorshipwas well institutionalized and practiced in our society.This selfcensorship reflects a well-established norm among Israeli Jews not to provide validated information that negates the official narrative, even when no rules of censorship apply. Self-censorship has been applied in most cases to maintain the positive, moral, and glorifying image of the society that is presented by the formal State institutions. For example, new information was published in recent years about mismanagement of battles during the Yom Kippur war, which caused unnecessary loss of human lives. This information was known to a considerable number of soldiers, who witnessed the events but decided to selfcensor it. Furthermore, hundreds of Jews witnessed an expulsion of Palestinians during 1948 war, but almost all of them decided to self-censor this first-hand knowledge. In later years, many people (policemen, Shabak personnel, lawyers, judges, and physicians) knew about the torturing of Palestinians over the years and kept silent, until Judge Landau of the Supreme Court told the public about the ongoing immoral and illegal widespread practice in 1987. Only in 1999 did the Supreme Court rule that the Shabak does not have the legal authority to use physical means of interrogation that are not “reasonable and fair”, and cause suffer to the detainees. The norm is powerful, and when it is broken, individuals pay a price, as indeed happened to the high-ranking Shabak officials (Reuven Hazak, Rafi Malka, and Peleg Raday) who broke the silence and went to the Prime Minister Shimon Peres to tell him about the illegal actions carried by the Shabak Head. More and more accounts, which have appeared in recent years, indicate the stronghold of the self-censorship norm in Israel – a norm that enabled the formation of false narratives concerning various events. The purpose of these false narratives was always to prevent a contradiction of the official narrative perpetuated by formal as well as many informal institutions, organizations, and media outlets in Israel. These institutions make every effort to justify Israel’s

Preface

11

goals within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and particularly the IsraeliPalestinian one; they strive to glorify the Israeli Jews and present them as the victims of the conflict and at the same time delegitimize their rivals – the Arabs and the Palestinians. In order to maintain this official narrative, individuals are encouraged to be conformist and obedient, and practice self-censorship. Whenever there are attempts to bring forward valid information that negates the official narrative, the formal and informal institutions and organizations use sanctions to silence them, as often happens with NGOs like Betzelem, Shovrim Shtika or Yesh Din. But, as noted, in recent years, more and more individuals have gained the courage to break the silence, and they are doing it in various ways: testifying before NGOs, appearing in documentary films, or providing information to journalists who publish it. These people carry an important task of providing knowledge to the public, opening its eyes, and enriching the public debates. Their courageous revelations serve as warning signs against self-censorship by demonstrating the extent to which the public is misinformed. Observing the prevalence of the self-censorships in Israel and other places around the world, I decided about 6 years ago to engage in a research of this phenomenon. As a first step, I turned to see what was already known about self-censorship in the academic literature, and I was startled. For reasons unclear to me, this human socio-psychological phenomenon has been almost absent from the socio-political-psychological accumulated knowledge. As part of my literature review I found that self-censorship is studied as a family secret, because it is well known that every family self-censors information. Organizational studies investigated self-censorship as part of the investigation of the costs of silence, defining those who break the silence “whistle blowers”. Some studies documented self-censorship of specific issues in mass media and cultural products as in the case of Turkey with regard to the Armenian Genocide, but I have not found any significant work in the macro-socio-politicalpsychological literature. This review convinced me that this line of research is required and must be pursued. Thus, about 4 years ago, I started to sketch the first ideas, asking why individuals do not reveal validated information, which is very relevant for their society, in spite of the fact that no formal censorship is exercised to prevent its exposure. Individuals decide, because of various reasons, not to reveal truthful information to their family members, close friends, colleagues, media

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outlets, leaders, or to fellow group members. In all these cases, these individuals believe that the revelation will take a toll, and therefore they choose to hide this information. In some cases, it is clear that the self-censored information may contribute to improving the performance of the society, correcting mistakes, and/or preventing its wrongdoing, but people still withhold the information and do not reveal its content to other society members; these cases are of special interest. The current paper focuses exactly on these cases – self censorship in a society – analyzing this socio-psychological phenomenon in the context of an intractable conflict, and providing evidence from the Israeli-Jewish society. This large-scale project would not be possible without the assistance and cooperation of many of my colleagues and students. I am very grateful for their dedication, which is still needed, since this project has not ended yet. We are currently in the effort of publishing a book that will elaborate on selfcensorship and solidify it as an important social behavior, which carry major individual and collective consequences. I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to Prof. Mordechai Tamarkin, the Head of the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, and Dr Ephraim Lavie, the Center’s Executive Director, for their continuous support, financial assistance, and encouragement, which made this project possible. Daniel Bar-Tal

Abstract Self-censorship of information, defined as an act of intentionally and voluntarily withholding information from others despite the absence of formal obstructions, serves as an obstacle to the proper functioning of a democratic society by preventing free access to information, freedom of expression, and the flow of information. While it is widely recognized as a necessity in some cases, the key implication of self-censorship in societies is blocking information that may shed new light on various societal issues. The present paper provides a comprehensive conceptual framework for self-censorship, describing its nature and psychological foundations, the motivations that underlie it, the conditions that facilitate its practice, and its societal and individual consequences. Then the paper focuses on the specific context in which self-censorship especially flourishes – the context of violent conflicts. The Israeli context of intractable conflict is examined in details, and a number of studies referring to the IsraeliJewish society are described. This part is followed by the discussion concerning the consequences of self-censorship, and finally conclusions are presented.

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“I, who am opposed to censorship, call on all of you to exercise self-censorship” (Limor Livnat, the Israeli Minister of Culture, writing to film directors, Haaretz, Feb 28, 2013).

Introduction One of the key socio-political psychological questions that should preoccupy human beings is why individuals do not reveal validated information even though no formal censorship is activated to prevent its exposure. This phenomenon, called self-censorship, takes place in every social space, beginning with the interpersonal, through the intra-organizational, and up to intra-societal settings. For various reasons, individuals decide not to reveal truthful information to their family members, close friends, fellow group members, colleagues, media outlets, leaders, or fellow citizens. In all of these cases, they believe that the revelation would take a toll, and therefore choose to conceal the information. In some cases, it is clear that the self-censored information may contribute to improving the performance of the society, correcting mistakes, and/or preventing its wrongdoing, yet people still withhold the information and do not reveal its content to other society members; these cases are of special interest. One example of self-censorship involved many thousands of French soldiers, who participated in – or witnessed – widespread torture of hundreds of thousands of Algerians, many of them innocent civilians, during the Algerian War. Branche and House (2010) noted in this vein: During the war, the French security forces used torture on a very large scale not only to fight against the nationalists…. Torture was, in essence, an everyday form of violence employed throughout Algeria for many years by French troops... Although impossible to count, the number of victims of torture was numerous, possibly hundreds of thousands. They were civilians and fighters indistinctly called ‘rebels’. Resorting to violence was routine and perpetrated far from foreign eyes or media attention and denied by the French state (p.117).

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Although torture is forbidden by law, these soldiers, silently supported by the French society and the French authorities, but with no formal censorship, self-censored this horrible experience for many years after the war, until well into the 1990s. With few exceptions, they did not talk about it, the mass media did not investigate it, novelists did not write about it, and film directors avoided this theme (for example, see Austin, 2007 regarding self-censorship in French films). The present paper focuses precisely on these cases of self-censorship in a society. On this macro level, the response to the posed question is highly important; it illuminates a particular aspect of societal (dys)functioning, since self-censorship serves as a barrier, blocking information that could potentially facilitate various constructive and functional processes of improving society. Since the paper focuses on self-censorship in society, it is important to first clarify the general value of a free flow of information. Following this, the paper provides a definition of self-censorship, discusses its nature and describes the psychological bases of this important phenomenon. The next section introduces the underlying motivational basis of the self-censorship, followed in the next section by its antecedents. Then the paper focuses on self-censorship in violent conflicts, describing their nature and the role of self-censorship in such settings. Based against this background, the paper then proceeds to describe the phenomenon of self-censorship in the Israeli-Jewish society, in the context of its intractable conflict1 with its Arab neighbors and the Palestinian population, by presenting a number of empirical studies. Finally, the paper discusses in short the consequences of self-censorship and presents conclusions.

1 Intractable conflicts are violent conflict, which are fought over goals that are viewed as existential. Such conflicts are also perceived as being of zero-sum nature and unsolvable, occupy a central position in the lives of the involved societies, require immense investments of material and psychological resources, and last for at least 25 years (Bar-Tal, 2007, 2013; Kriesberg, 1993).

The Importance of a Free Flow of Information One of the major values in any democratic society is freedom of expression, which guarantees the free flow of information (Dahl, 2006). The free flow of information is intimately related to the civil liberties that grant free expression (e.g., Barendt, 2005; Schauer, 1982). Where free flow of information is not encouraged and protected, these liberties are diminished. Freedom of expression is anchored in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states (Article 19): Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.2 In fact, this principle not only guarantees freedom of expression and protects the freedom to communicate in public, but also promises free and full access to information, and the free flow of information. Such unrestricted access to all necessary official information is a crucial dimension of freedom in general, and a precondition for the development of a free and critical political climate, enabling a well-functioning democratic society. The free flow of information 2 A new Human Rights Resolution was adopted by the United Nations in 2005, focusing on the right to know the truth in very specific situations of gross violations of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian laws. Specifically, the resolution stresses the “imperative for society as a whole to recognize the right of victims of gross violations of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law, and their families, within the framework of each State’s domestic legal system, to know the truth regarding such violations, including the identity of the perpetrators and the causes, facts and circumstances in which such violations took place”. This resolution goes beyond freedom of expression, in requiring disclosure of information that is often censored by authorities of a society and self-censored by society members. (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Resolution 2005/66, “Right to the Truth,” April 20, 2005, E/CN.4/RES/2005/66). 17

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and free access to information are also necessary conditions in every society3 for the development of open-minded, well-informed, knowledgeable, and critically oriented citizens, who know how to search for, process, use, and express information. This ability to receive information and evaluate it is crucial for the rational participation of citizens in democratic societies (Almond, & Verba, 1963). Moreover, full and free access to information affects the public interest and the well-being of a society in a number of important ways: 1. Free expression and critical thinking are highly valued and are given a key position; 2. the likelihood of developing free deliberative and open discussions is increased; 3 the scope of public discussions is expanded; 4. the accountability and transparency of the system are enabled; 5. leaders and individual society members are supported in making balanced, well-informed, and well merited decisions on societal issues; 6. society is managed according to moral codes, due to the avoidance and preventing of moral transgressions; 7. the system is efficiently and effectively controlled and supervised; 8. the election of an appropriate leadership is expedited; 9. dynamic change of opinions is encouraged; and 10. the development of tolerance is facilitated. In general, the free flow of public information in any social group is a sign of good governance, transparency, and assurance that those in power will not hide their misdeeds. It also assures moral conduct of the society in its intragroup and intergroup relations. Above all, it endorses effective participation of an informed electorate that can evaluate the goals, policies, and actions of those who govern and make decisions, as well as the views and behavioral intentions of the society as a collective. All these features provide one of the bases for the development of a well-functioning democratic society. Hence, free flow of information that allows provision of information is one of the hallmarks of such society (see Figure 1, page 15). It is axiomatic in the twenty-first century, that every member of a democratic society has the right to be informed and to inform others in order to enrich pluralistic societal public discourse. Freedom of information involves the right of the citizens to know the whole truth; it compels the disclosure of the authorities’ affairs, as well as matters of public interest; it emphasizes the need 3 This paper refers to an entire society of any state as a social unit, because it focuses on macro level analysis that refers to a societal phenomenon. I recognize that the outlined principles can also be applied to the analysis of micro level units.

The Importance of a Free Flow of Information

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Figure 1: A Well-Functioning Democratic Society Characteristics of the System

• Freedom of expression • Free access to information • Free flow of information

Characteristics of the Society Members Functioning Outcomes

• Open-minded, well-informed, knowledgeable, critically oriented individuals, who are able to search, use and express information

• Free expression and critical thinking are highly valued and are given a key position • The likelihood of developing free deliberative and open discussions is increased • The scope of public discussions is expanded • The accountability and transparency of the system are enabled • Leaders and individual society members are supported in making balanced, well-informed, and well merited decisions on societal issues • Society is managed according to moral codes, due to the avoidance and preventing of moral transgressions • The system is efficiently and effectively controlled and supervised • The election of an appropriate leadership is expedited • Dynamic change of opinions is encouraged • The development of tolerance is facilitated.

for transparency, responsibility, responsiveness, openness, and accountability of the authorities, the government, formal institutions, and public officials to society; it should be practiced for the public good (Raz, 1991). Thus, freedom of expression, free access to information, and free flow of information provide a set of criteria by which we can evaluate the functioning of a democratic society (Dahl, 2009; Raz, 1991). An uninformed society can easily become hard to govern, or, in contrast, obedient and totalitarian; information and knowledge are limited, censored, controlled, and manipulated, as described in Orwell’s 1984. But there is no need to go this far; even in democratic regimes, authorities and institutions often have a vested interest in restricting information and opinions, in order to prevent criticism, accountability, and transparency and maintain their power.

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Nevertheless, it must be recognized that there is tension between the free flow of information and its restraint in every group or society. An unrestrained flow of information may also harm a group or a society. In fact, even the most liberal, democratic, and enlightened states consider it necessary to suppress at least some information and opinions. The European Convention on Human Rights, after setting out the essential rights to free information and communication, states (Article 10): The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. (Council of Europe, 1950). This provision is not surprising, since societies cannot function well without some level of information limitation, particularly – but not solely – in security-related matters. Thus, any society controls and regulates the flow of information formally and informally (e.g., Halperin & Hoffman, 1976). Apart from institutions and organizations related to national security, these limitations may even apply to scientific publications, which could provide information leading to harmful acts (O’Loughlin, 2005). Other arguments have appeared in different societies during different periods, all advocating self-censorship and the suppression of particular types of information. For example, in societies that have experienced internal schisms with severe consequences, self-censorship has been suggested in order to avoid continued societal polarization. In other words, it was argued that the revelation of past misdeeds would lead to polarization and dysfunctioning of a society (e.g., Estmond & Selimovic, 2012). For example, in the case of Spain, many sectors prefer silence over the investigation of human rights’ violations during the Franco era, in order to avoid a new societal schism (e.g., Richards, 2002). Furthermore, the freedom to know sometimes collides with the right to privacy, when the revelation of specific information may harm individuals, including

The Importance of a Free Flow of Information

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leaders, and there are voices that support self-censorship in such cases as well (e.g., Volokh, 2000). Societies usually define the domains of information that should be kept secret, and adopt laws and rules to ensure that this information is not released. Individuals who violate these laws are punished, and various mechanisms – like censorship, for example – are often used to prevent the information from being disclosed (De Baets, 2002; Peleg, 1993). In this vein, I would like to suggest that almost all suppressed information can be considered as two things: either as a double-edged sword, meaning that the information revelation has both negative and positive implications, or as a one-sided blade, meaning that when the information is revealed, it can clean the malignant growth. History has taught us that in many cases, most censored information should and could have been revealed. Thus, the two opposing societal needs must be balanced: on the one hand, the need for freedom of expression and free flow of information as a basis for a well-functioning society and on the other, the need to hide specific information in order to ensure the well-being of society. Groups differ in the way they manage this tension between the two opposing needs. In some groups, there are less control and more flow of information than in others. Well-functioning democratic societies allow more freedom of expression and free flow of information than societies governed by authoritarian regimes. Societies of the formet type cherish the value of freedom, openly encourage free flow of information in public discourse, and even encourage freedom of expression through their educational system. And yet, the continuing tension between the two opposing societal needs characterizes every democratic society, as well as the ongoing struggle regarding what should and should not be revealed to the public. Eventually, in line with their worldviews, values, and normative behavior patterns, human beings decide the outcome of this struggle in their role as leaders or citizens. Thus, it is possible to postulate that freedom of expression and free flow of information in a specific society are dependent on the nature its regime, its political culture, the political socialization of the younger and older society members, and the context in which this society functions. One of the distinguishing contexts that have a major effect on free flow of information is that of a violent conflict. In such a context, the formal institutions usually limit free flow of information, giving top priority to security-related issues and

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assuming that the need to conceal such information supersedes the value of freedom of expression in importance. Nevertheless, it should be noted that free flow of information, freedom of expression, and free access to information are not only limited by formal laws, rules, and mechanisms, but also by socio-psychological limitations. People, acting as individuals and as members of collectives, limit free flow of information, free expression, and free access to information, even in the absence of any formal obstacle. For example, individuals may conform to the perceived pressure of the majority and refrain from expressing their opinions, or they may try to maintain their loyalty to an expected worldview of the authorities, and thus remain silent. These cases are some examples of one specific sociopsychological barrier to free flow of information and free expression, namely, self-censorship – the focus of this paper, which will now be defined and discussed at length.

The Nature of Self-censorship Self-censorship of information, defined as the act of intentionally and voluntarily withholding information from others in the absence of formal obstacles, is one of the socio-psychological mechanisms that often obstruct a well-functioning democratic society. Together with conformity and obedience, it should be considered as a socio-psychological barrier, which prevents free access to information, obstructs freedom of expression, and prevents free flow of information. Surprisingly, the social-psychological research has neglected the study of self-censorship, which takes place on an individual level in a social context, and which carries important implications for groups and societies. Researchers have been preoccupied with a number of areas, different in their interest and emphasis: investigating the factors that allow a minority to influence the opinion of a majority (De Dreu & De Vries, 2001; Prislin & Christensen, 2005); the conditions and effects of dissenting opinions in groups (Allen & Levine, 1969, 1971); and the degree of freedom to express critical opinions within a group (Hornsey, 2006; Packer, 2008). These directions do not touch upon the essence of self-censorship, and their focus is different, as they deal with opinions in their general form. However, self-censorship has been noted by other behavioral and social scientists. In micro social environments, and especially families, self-censorship is considered as one form of secret keeping, and family experts have discussed it extensively (Brown-Smith, 1998; Karpel, 1980; Petronio, 2010; Vangelisti, 1994). It has also been noted in the context of organizations, especially in the context of malfunctioning organizations and whistleblowers, who break self-censorship and reveal information (Gundlach, Douglas & Martinko, 2003; Morrison Wolfe & Milliken, 2000; Near & Miceli, 1996; Westin, 1981). Relatively little conceptual work has been done in the societal context, in spite of the fact that this phenomenon has been observed to be quite prevalent, mainly 23

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in the mass media or in other societal-cultural agencies (Antilla, 2010; Kenny & Gross, 2008; Lee & Chan, 2009; Nelkin, 1995). For example, Maksudyan (2009), who analyzed translations of history books into Turkish, demonstrated how writers, translators, and editors in Turkey censored themselves when addressing information involving the massacres of ​​the Armenians during World War I, either to avoid public censorship or to gain the approval of the dominant social sector. Maksudyan argued that self-censorship occurs “when the cultural agent censors the work [a publication with the narrative] voluntarily, in order to avoid pubic censorship or in order to achieve approval from the dominating sector in society” (p.638). Various conceptions of self-censorship have referred to the expression of opinions, feelings, or thoughts in their definitions (Gibson, 1992; Hayes, 2007; Horton, 2011). Hayes, Glynn and Shanahan (2005), for example, defined selfcensorship as “withholding of one’s true opinion from an audience perceived to disagree with that opinion” (p. 299). The broad definition, however, creates a blur between cases of self-censorship and those of conformity (see, for example, the tool developed by Hayes, Glynn, and Shanahan [2005] to assess self-censorship, and their definition of the term).

Elaborations on the components of self-censorship If we focus on societal cases, the definition of self-censorship is based on the following prerequisite: the self-censoring actor must have new information that has not been revealed to the public, must be aware that this information is valid, and must believe that this information carries implications for the society as a whole, for other society members, for another group/individuals, or for a widely accepted worldview. The act of censorship indicates that the individual intentionally and voluntarily decides to withhold ( not share) this information, in spite of the fact that there is no formal obstacle or external censorship, which would prevent him/her from sharing it. This behavior implies that individuals informally control and regulate the flow of information, or in other words, obstruct free access to information, freedom of expression, and free flow of information. A number of clarifications are required, and they will now be elaborated:

The Nature of Self-censorship

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a. Information versus opinion The presented definition limits the nature of self-censorship to information. That is, it focuses on withholding information, rather than an opinion. Information is viewed as a factually based knowledge, gained by the individual from personal or reported experience, research, or a document. This knowledge refers to something that actually happened and is considered verified and validated, that is, factual.4 In such cases, the individuals believe that the information is based on evidence and does not depend on personal views, and is therefore truthful. In contrast, opinion is a personal knowledge that goes beyond the data. It reflects inferences, attributions, evaluations, impressions, etc.. Legal experts make the same distinction between information and opinion (Schauer, 1982; Barendt, 2005). They consider information to be synonymous to facts, while thoughts, ideas, beliefs, or value judgments are viewed as synonyms of opinions. Thus, an opinion is an expression of a subjective view, which may rest on information, with the intention of elaborating and commenting on it based on personal understanding. Everybody is entitled to an opinion and there are many different opinions; therefore, the status of opinion does not possess the power of truthful information in the context of our current conception. The latter has a different status in the public eye, as it often does not have competition, and is frequently perceived as unequivocal in providing evidence. Since I am aware that the distinguishing between opinion and information may be based on subjective judgment, from a socio-psychological perspective, the definition of self-censorship requires a person to believe that the possessed information is valid and truthful and to decide not to reveal it based on this believe. b. Limitations of self-censorship Self-censorship, by its nature, is practiced only in cases where there are no formal obstacles to revealing information, and yet, individuals decide voluntarily to not to reveal it. The present definition excludes cases in which there is a formal institutionally established external obstacle that prevents sharing information, such as official censorship, orders, or laws (e.g., De Baets, 2000; Jansen, 1988; Tribe, 1973). In such cases, individual avoid sharing information because of 4 I do not intend to claim a positivistic argument, understanding that information may also be viewed subjectively. But at least it is always based on the solid ground of factual knowledge.

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formal directives, orders or rules, and hence the censorship is not self-imposed In some cases, an individual might think that there are formal obstacles to sharing information, while in reality there are none. Individuals may imagine the existence of various types of formal censorship, but the inclusion of these cases in our definition of self-censorship would broaden its scope extensively while blurring its boundaries. The proposed definition, however, does include cases in which there might be social sanctions against sharing information, despite the lack of official obstacles. Social sanctions may be applied informally by individuals, groups, or social agencies that disapprove of information disclosure. Thus, it is possible to differentiate between formally enforced silence and socially enforced self-censorship. While the former is excluded from the scope of self-censorship behavior, the latter is included. This distinction does not suggest that real or even imagined informal sanctions are inconsequential. Such social sanctions may be very damaging and punishing. Nevertheless, their scope is wide and it is impossible to evaluate their subjective severity, unlike formal sanctions that come to regulate behaviors through rules and laws; thus, when individuals avoid sharing information because of social sanctions, they should be considered as practicing self-censorship. . . c. Content of the withheld information The contents of the withheld information may touch on many different subjects, raging between negative and positive meanings, such as immoral acts (for example, atrocities, corruption, illegal behaviors, violations of rules and codes), embarrassing behaviors, scientific evidence, and even good deeds. In Poland and Bosnia, for example, individuals withheld information about providing help to members of other groups (e.g., Jews in Poland, Muslims in Bosnia) in order to avoid negative sanctions from their ingroup (see for example Broz, 2004). The behavior about which information is withheld may be carried out by an individual, an authority, a group, or even by nature itself, and can be performed intentionally and unintentionally for different purposes. In the vast majority of the cases, the person who has or gets the information believes subjectively that its disclosure would have negative implications; this is the key thought that leads to a personal dilemma and eventually, potentially, to self-censorship. The negative implications of information disclosure may include one of the following types: 1. negative implications for the individual(s)

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him/herself, in the forms of negative sanctions against him/herself, or a damage to his/her self-image or reputation; 2. negative implications for other specific individuals or a particular group, who carried out the inappropriate act; 3. negative implications for the ingroup some of its segments; 4. negative implications for a cherished belief – a particular idea, value, goal, or ideology; 5. negative implications for a third party – a person, a group, or a society, an ally, a strong person, etc. d. Types of self-censorship It is possible to differentiate between different types of self-censorship. One distinction is between self-censorship carried out by gatekeepers and the one carried out by ordinary people. The former are defined as individuals who hold positions in which they pass, transmit, and disseminate information to the public (politicians, journalists, teachers, filmmakers, etc. see Chang, & Lee, 1992; Easton, 1965). According to Pettigrew (1972), gatekeepers are those “who sit at the junction of a number of communication channels, are in position to regulate the flow of demands and potentially control decisional outcomes” (p. 190). Ordinary individuals may encounter information which, in their view, is important for the group, but they do not play a role that enables them to disseminate it. Another differentiation is between individuals possessing firsthand information, and those who’ve got second-hand information. First-hand information is acquired by the individual either through personal experience (participating in an event or witnessing it) or through direct exposure (e.g., reading an original document). Second-hand information is acquired through indirect exposure, by hearing it from another source or reading it in one. Thus, self-censorship in the former case involves withholding unequivocal truthful information, while in the latter, the information’s validity may be in question.

Psychological bases of self-censorship Self-censorship should be seen as a socio-psychological phenomenon, since it inherently involves intra-psychological processes. Individuals process information, get to know the content, become aware of its meaning, and then they have to decide whether to reveal it or not (Cook, & Heilmann, 2013; Horton, 2011). These processes are grounded in three psychological bases: The first is related to the fundamental human need to share knowledge, a need that is

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violated by self-censorship; the second is related to the individual’s identification with his/her society as a key restraining influence encouraging self-censorship on a societal level; and the third is related to the personal experience of dilemma regarding the act of withholding information. a. The need to share The first basis is related to a fundamental premise that human beings evolutionarily tend to share, communicate, and disclose information and knowledge that they form, observe, and/or collect. Many of the evolutionary characteristics that have enabled humans to adapt to a wide range of physical environments, such as omnivorousness and toolmaking, created a dependency on collective knowledge and cooperative information sharing – a kind of obligatory interdependence (Brewer & Caporael, 2006). In the words of Harber and Cohen (2005), “there is a universal, prehistoric, and quite powerful motive for people to socially share major events. Behaviors in line with this fundamental motive increase group and self-survival” (p. 384). In addition to these evolutionary needs, psychology recognizes that sharing troubling events enables their meaningful understanding, frees resources for coping with them, and also restores positive self-esteem (Harber & Cohen, 2005; Pennebaker, 1990; Stiles, 1987). Harber and Pennebaker (1992) proposed an additional three explanations for the human tendency to share information about significant events: a. it is based on emotional drive; b. it serves a therapeutic function; c. it carries important implications for the listeners. Similarly, Kubey and Peluso (1990) suggested that people pass on major news stories not out of an altruistic desire to inform others, but simply to relieve their own feelings (see also Stiles, Shuster, & Harrigan, 1992). I would add that society members who cherish democratic values are aware of the importance of a free flow of information, and thus of the importance of providing information that is relevant to societal life; hence, they feel the responsibility to reveal valid information to other society members. All these premises suggest that society members have a psychological and societal incentive to share information and not to practice self-censorship, especially in matters that are relevant and important for societal functioning. Thus, this psychological basis suggests that self-censorship generally go against natural individual tendencies and therefore, such behavior

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must be caused by a weighty motive. The next basis refers to this challenge, and presents one of the most important reasons for the behavior of self-censorship. b. Identification with a group The second psychological basis for self-censorship is, in many cases, identification with a group. Unlike the previous basis presented, this identification often provides an explanation for the practice of self-censorship. By this idea, which is of special interest for the presented conception, I would like to suggest that individuals, as group members, care about their group, try to maintain its positive image, and prevent acts or hide information that would have negative implications for the image of the ingroup. One of the main reasons for this effort is that individuals’ personal identity is partly based on their social identity, which also impinges on their self-worth. However, it should be noted that in some cases it is exactly this basis that may motivate people to reveal negative information, out of the belief that this revelation may improve the group functioning (Packer, 2008). Social identity is denoted as the “part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). The process of constructing social identity is an individual one, based on self-categorization process (Tajfel, 1978, 1981; Turner, 1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). It is a pervasive and central human cognitive process, which enables organizing the complex social world and turning it into a meaningful structure (Tajfel, 1969; 1981). This process includes a number of basic components: a. the feeling of belonging to the given group; b. the willingness to belong to the given group; c. the importance ascribed to this belonging by the person; d. the emotional attachment one feels towards the group; e. the commitment to benefit the group; f. considering the group as having highly valued qualities; and g. deferring to the group’s norms and cultural symbols (David & Bar-Tal, 2009; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008). Each of these components is unique and adds another layer to the identification as a comprehensive concept. To strengthen the argument about the power of identification with the group, we can add the concept of collective identity, which refers to the common consciousness of group members who share the same social identity (Melucci,

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1989; Klandermans & de Weerd, 2000). This “shared social identity is the basis of collective social power” (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2010, p. 60). Collective identification goes beyond the individual group member’s cognitive-emotional processes, and characterizes the entire collective. Of special importance are its two features: a sense of common fate and concern for the welfare of the collective and mobilization and sacrifice for its sake (David & Bar-Tal, 2009). The former pertains to the sense of unity and the feelings of mutual dependence that prevail among members of a collective. It is the feeling of “togetherness,” the “cement” that connects individuals and social groups in unity (Brown, 2000), and enables them to define themselves as belonging to the same collective, despite variability in values, beliefs, attitudes, and patterns of behavior. But the significance of shared fate goes beyond all that, and implies that the fate of each of the collective’s individuals is perceived as dependent on the fate of the whole collective (Kashti, 1997). Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1999) and Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (2002) have traced the links between the common fate of group members and their commitment to the group, i.e., the extent to which group members feel that they have strong emotional ties with the collective. They found that a high level of commitment is related to behavioral mobilization for the sake of the group (see also Reykowski, 1997). In addition, any society maintains norms and moral codes of what is accepted, allowed, and forbidden for self-protection. Society members learn these norms and codes, and may practice self-censorship based on them. In sum, identification is a major socio-psychological mechanism, which leads to protection of the ingroup. When certain contents are considered harmful to the group, society members are prodded either formally or informally to withhold them. To a great extent, this basis underlies the act of self-censorship in a collective. In their attempt to protect their group, group members try to prevent dissemination of information that may harm the group. Revealing information of such nature often disrupts the harmony, the structure, the well-established functioning, and the solidarity of a group. Thus, group members encourage and reward self-censorship, and they impose it upon themselves voluntarily to defend the group. In other cases, even if group members are initially willing to share the truthful information of potential negative consequences for the group, they know that the disclosure will entail penalties for other members and/or the group authorities who try to protect the group, and therefore avoid it.

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At the same time, it should be noted that identification with the group may lead to the opposite behavior as well. Loyal society members, who care about their group, may decide to reveal information that might initially shed a negative light on the group. Yet, they do it in order to change the group’s direction, its policies, or its actions (Packer, 2008). This is the case, for example, when some group members observe their group’s behavior as immoral, and they think that revealing these acts may impact the direction of the group’s behavior. Thus, whether it encourages self-censorship or disclosure, identification with the ingroup may have serious implications for self-censorship, and it is an important psychological basis for understanding this behavior. c. Experiencing dilemma The third psychological basis of self-censorship concerns the experience of dilemma. In the case of self-censorship, a person is aware of possessing new unexposed information, which is relevant to his/her society and should be revealed, but at the same time, he/she aware that revealing the information violates another principle, norm, dogma, ideology, or value, and might cause harm. The level of the dilemma may vary from person to person, and may be dependent on the type of information, the context, or other factors. But any individual faces at least a minimal level of dilemma when practicing self-censorship. By the general psychological rule, the information would be revealed, unless a person realizes that the information might hurt him/herself, another person, a group, or an idea. In all these cases, after facing the dilemma and entertaining the options, the person may decide not to reveal the information, thus practicing self-censorship. Additionally, this decision is always dependent on the self-deliberation of pros and cons as to whether or not to reveal the information, calculating potential costs and rewards for oneself, the ingroup, the outgroup, the system, or the idea, among others. When the costs exceed the rewards, the dilemma is resolved in favor of self-censorship (Afifi & Seuber, 2009; Omarzu, 2000). If a person does not experience a dilemma, thinking that there is no harm in revealing the information, he/she will share it without hesitation. Contrastingly, a person may think that the information has no value and is therefore not worth sharing. In this case, withholding the information does not indicate self-censorship.

Motivations for Self-censorship A number of different but not mutually exclusive motivations may drive individuals to exercise self-censorship. Five of them are particularly salient: the motivation to protect the ingroup; the personal motivation to avoid external negative sanctions and gain positive rewards; the motivation to protect one’s self-image; the motivation to protect a belief; and the motivation to protect a third party. The first motivation is based on the assumption that the information possessed may hurt the group and/or its cause, and therefore it should not be revealed. The perceived harm can be of a different nature, such as damaging the group’s positive reputation by revealing information that sheds negative light on the ingroup, or impairing the mobilization of the group members for a specific cause or causes. The information may also damage the interests or activities of the group; it may cause physical harm, or hurt the dominant narrative, goals, ideology, policies, or leaders. The motivation to protect can refer to either a small group that has committed an immoral act, or to the society as a whole, because the act was carried out by its members. The most common motivations of this type are based on the desire not to harm the ingroup’s reputation. Thus, society members have avoided presenting information about immoral conduct, as in the cases of the Belgians in the Congo, the Americans in Vietnam, the British in Kenya, the Dutch in Indonesia, or Israeli-Jews in the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A study by Detlof von Winterfeldt and his colleagues at the University of Southern California (USC) in Los Angeles represents another example of this type of motivation. Their study focused on the likelihood and impact of a dirty bomb attack by terrorists on Los Angeles harbor, and they omitted some important classified material from the paper they posted online, in order to protect the ingroup from someone’s possible use of the material to build a bomb. The second distinguishing motivation focuses on self and reflects selfpreservation. Individuals practicing self-censorship are sometimes motivated by 32

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self-interest, and the wish to avoid external negative sanctions and gain positive ones. On the one hand, revealing information may lead to damaged reputation, delegitimization, and exclusion, or to a concrete punishment such as dismissal, imprisonment, or even physical violence (Horton, 2011; Nets-Zehngut, 2011; Papadakis, Peristianis, & Welz, 2006). This type of motivation is underlined by fear. In the case of journalists – who are considered gatekeepers – – these sanctions might include losing their official information sources (Elbaz & BarTal, 2014). Leaders may withhold information believing that it has negative implications for them personally. In Israel, for example, at least some of the soldiers who have carried out or witnessed violations of Palestinian human rights self-censor the information, because they do not want to get negative sanctions from their friends in the military unit, from their immediate social environment, from the army, and/or from the societal formal and informal institutions (Kimhi, & Sagy, 2008). On the other hand, hiding the information may lead to positive reinforcements, such as social approval, awards or concrete rewards, and even self-satisfaction. The third motivation is intrinsic. Individuals adopt self-censorship to maintain their positive self-view. Having a positive personal identity is a fundamental psychological motivation (Sherman, & Cohen, 2006); society members do not want to perceive themselves as slanderers and/or informants. In addition, society members draw the value of their personal identity from their membership in a group (Tajfel, 1981). If the group’s reputation is damaged, their personal reputation is affected as well. Thus, protecting the group’s image is also a protection their own identity. When French veterans or Israeli soldiers face themselves in their internal mirrors this motivations affect their decisions. Self-censorship may be also motivated by the desire to defend and uphold a particular idea – a value, dogma, goal, policy, ideology, or belief. Individuals who adhere to a particular view may be motivated to uphold it, even in the face of contradicting information. Nelkin (1995) noted that self-censorship is motivated by the desire to prevent exposure of “stories that run counter to prevailing values” or that are “politically charged” (pp. 111-112). For example, Antilla (2010) noted that the American press practiced self-censorship and did not fully reveal scientific information about global warming to the American public ostensibly in order to provide balanced reporting. This was done because “a highly organized and well-funded group of deniers of climate change has

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been exploiting the media in order to insert climate myths and questionable economic theories into the public dialogue” (p. 242). Finally, self-censorship may possibly be employed to protect a third party because of concern, interests, altruism, or other considerations. The third party can be a particular individual (who may be a leader or a friend), a small group, an interest group, or even a different society. Some states, for example avoid publicizing information about the Armenian Genocide in order to avoid offend Turkey (Hovannisian, 1999). To some extent, this motivation can be considered a protection of oneself or one’s own group, because the third party might harm the disclosing individuals or their group if the information is revealed. Yet, the boundaries of this motivation are blurred, and therefore I have decided to cite it separately.

Contributing Factors A focal question for understanding self-censorship is: What are the conditions that facilitate its occurrence? In trying to respond to this question, I would like first to propose the following categories of variables, which influence occurrences of self-censorship: the context of the group, personal characteristics of the information holder, the type (content) of the information that is the subject of potential self-censorship, and circumstantial factors. Each of the factors will be discussed below.

Context of the group Theories in social sciences have generally accepted the basic assumption, that the study of a social context is essential for understanding the functioning of societies (e.g., Giddens, 1984; Parsons, 1951). Recently, Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe (2004) have defined social context as the “general and continuing multilayered and interwoven set of material realities, social structures, and shared belief system that surround any situation” (p. 103). The significance of the collective context lies in the fact that it dictates the society members’ needs and goals, and the challenges that they have to meet in order to satisfy these needs and goals. This context also provides opportunities and limitations, stimulations and inhibitions, as well as the spaces and boundaries for human behavior. In this line of thinking, the study of macro contexts is of special importance. It is impossible to understand the functioning of individuals in groups without studying the context, since human thoughts and feelings are embedded in historical, social, political, and cultural contexts (Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2008). This embeddedness is a result of shared social experiences, which include constant and continuous communication, social learning, and interaction (Giddens, 1984; Parsons, 1951). In other words, the thoughts and feelings of individuals represent the norms, beliefs, values, and attitudes of their group under certain 35

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conditions and in a particular epoch, which together construct the particular context in which people live. This context includes two types of categories – one pertains to the political-economic-cultural characteristics of the society in which the case takes place, and the other refers to the particular situation in which this society exists. The first type refers to more stable characteristics of a democratic tradition or traditional culture, such as stratification, differentiation, authoritarianism, tolerance, closed climate, norms of information exchange, etc. One example is the self-censorship practiced by the Hong Kong media (Ngok, 2007), avoiding criticism of Chinese political repression. The second types of variables refer to a relatively limited situational context of man-made characteristics, which may last for a long period of time and affect the involved societies on both individual and collective levels (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013), such as an intractable conflict – a case that will be later elaborated at length – or a military regime. In a more limited public space, a closed system of communication, or intolerant society, threats and conflict, among others, provide a fertile ground for the evolvement of self-censorship. One example is the self-censorship exercised by the American media (Mitchell, 2002) and even academia (Bhattacharjee, 2006; Bowen, 2005) during the War on Terror declared and led by US President George W. Bush. In general, both types of context categories encourage or discourage the free flow of information, free expression, and free and full access to information, and thus affect considerably the scope and extent of self-censorship. In extreme cases, when there is no formal censorship, formal organs of an authority or informal organizations may use thugs and even hit squads to impose selfcensorship. The shooting of the Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya in 2006 in Russia, because she revealed information about the Chechen wars that damaged the state’s reputation, is a reminder of the possibility of establishing a fearful political climate.

Individual factors Self-censorship is also greatly influenced by the individual characteristics of society members. These characteristics include personality traits, general and specific worldviews, values, ideology, emotions, anxieties, attitudes, motivations, behavioral intentions, and more. These characteristics are relatively stable, but some of them can be aroused in a particular situation, in which an individual is

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deliberating whether or not to reveal specific information, and are thus situation based. These specific situation-based characteristics may include the need for closure, anxiety, authoritarianism, collectivism, conservatism, identification with the group, level of patriotism, and type of patriotism. In addition, the role and status of the information holder, as well as his/her level of involvement in the specific information and/or incident may be considered. This category may also include personal expectations regarding possible future sanctions. This variable is related to the level of experience and fear of damaged reputation, delegitimization, dismissal, imprisonment, and even physical punishment.

Type of information An important category of variables relates to the type of information held. This category includes, among other characteristics, the severity of the information, its reference time and its relevance to the present, the type of acts involved, the subjects of the information, and the issues impacted by it. All these variables have an effect on the way a person may handle the held information.

Circumstantial factors This category refers to variables that relate to the circumstances of collecting the information, such as how it was received, the number of people who know about it, and characteristics of the potential target audience for it (their identity, role, status, etc.). Of special importance is the time that has passed since a person or persons obtained the information, and whether or not they were personally involved in the events that relate to the information. As time passes, a societal norm may develop, enforcing the concealment of the particular information. This category of variables also encompasses the characteristics of a small group involved in particular acts, which are the subject of the withheld information. A group such as a military unit may be cohesive, imposing a great deal of selfcensorship on its members. Figure 2 (page 34) describes the decision-making process of an individual who is exposed to valid information with implication for the society, when he/ she has to decide whether to practice self-censorship or to reveal the information. As we can see in Figure 2, when a person receives valid new information that is unexposed to the public, and has to decide whether to reveal it or not, the decision is affected by the previously described four categories of variables:

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Figure 2: Decision-Making Process of a Self-Censor Individual Characteristics

Social Context

Information

Decision Making

Type of Information

Circumstantial Factors

Person

Considerations for Silence

Considerations for Revealing

Implications for Self, Others, In-group, Belief, Third party

Cost X Reward Calculation Dilemma (Dissonance)

Decision

Self-censorship

Revealing the Information

personal characteristics, social context, type of information, and circumstantial factors. In deciding what to do, the person considers the implications of revealing the information for him/herself, for other people in his/her immediate social environment (friends, coworkers, family members, etc.), the impact on the group, the effect on the particular societal belief for which the information is relevant, and any third party who may be affected by the revelation of the information. As part of this deliberation, the person calculates subjective costs and rewards for each decision, and then deals with the dilemma that had arised, resolving the dissonance. The outcome of these personal-subjective deliberations determines whether a person will reveal the information to whom, and what part of it will be revealed, or whether s/he will practice self-censorship.

Self-censorship in a Violent Conflict The context of violent conflicts, and especially long-lasting ones, is possibly one of the most conducive to the development of wide scope self-censorship, even in democratic states. Some of the violent conflicts at their extreme are intractable, which means that they last for a long period of time, are viewed by the parties as being of zero sum nature and unsolvable, and greatly preoccupy society members of the parties, who invest in them tangibly and psychologically in order to manage the conflict successfully. In such context of a violent conflict, self-censorship is often viewed as a necessary functional mechanism that protects the ingroup (Bar-Tal, 2013). Self-censorship is used in order to block information that is perceived as harming the ingroup’s goals and/or as smearing the ingroup’s image. The objective of this section is to limit the analysis of the self-censorship to the specific context of violent conflicts. The analysis will begin with the elaboration of the particular properties characterizing the context of violent conflicts, which greatly expedite self-censorship. Specifically, this part will first portray the nature of violence, followed by the analysis of different types of threats, and ending with the description of the narrative that is needed for mobilization of society members. Each of these elements will be tied to the phenomenon of self-censorship. Finally, we will discuss self-censorship as a socio-psychological barrier to peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Violence Violence indicates that group members are killed and wounded in wars, small-scale military engagements and/or terroristic attacks (see Brubaker, & Laitin, 1998). Violence, which almost always fuels conflicts, does not have to be continuous, but it does occur with fluctuating frequency and intensity in conflicts of this type. Violence often involves innocent civilians being hurt, which is viewed by the parties as particularly painful and harsh loss, because 39

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it is considered as the ultimate violation of the human moral code. In spite of the severe consequences, violence is viewed by the conflicted parties as a necessary means, which has to be used to at least withstand the enemy, punish the perpetrator for his aggression and atrocities, prevent further violence, and also to win the conflict. Violence increases the emotional involvement of parties engaged in an intergroup conflict. Group members are deeply, emotionally, touched when compatriots are killed or wounded, especially when the loss is sudden, untimely, and intentionally inflicted by the rival group. In this context, society members are expected to practice self-censorship to prevent information that might harm the group’s cause.

Threats Violent conflicts usually revolve around goals that are viewed as important and often even as indispensable for the group’s existence and/or survival. Many of the goals are related to the basic ingredients of social identity, and many have also an important symbolic value (Coleman, 2003). These goals usually concern territory, self-determination, autonomy, statehood, resources, economic equality, cultural freedom, free religious practice, central values, etc. Since the goals of the other party stand in direct contradiction to the goals of the ingroup, the level of contradiction is perceived as immense, and it often involves a fear – called collective angst – which arises when group members appraise a situation as potentially harmful to the future of the group, especially coupled with the violence mentioned before (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). It is thus not surprising that the context of violent conflicts is also characterized by a high level of perceived threats, which is a key experience for the society members involved. The experience of threat in a violent conflict includes not only the perception of potential harm by another group, but also the feeling that the threat cannot be completely eliminated, and therefore the harm is expected to reoccur at some point. This is a chronic threat, which touches various layers of human beings’ life; it leads to fear, stress, and insecurity. This threat does not even have to be perceived as aimed at oneself; sometimes it may be perceived as aimed at other ingroup members, or as targeting the ingroup goals or needs, in an attempt to cause deprivation. Stephan and his colleagues (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan, Renfro, & Davis, 2008) presented two types of threats, which play a major role in intergroup relations – realistic and symbolic, on both group

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and individual levels. Realistic threats are beliefs regarding possible human losses, or regarding losses and damages to territory, resources, economy, power, status, or general welfare, while the symbolic threats refer to the perceived potential damages to religious, political, moral, and/or cultural system of beliefs, attitudes, and values. Thus, the chronic threat guides the functioning of a group that tries to protect itself with all the available means. Pettigrew (2003) noted that in situation of intergroup conflict, a threat diminishes cognitive capacity and increases emotional influence; the threat increases the reliance on group stereotypes, narrows the latitude of accepting other attitudes and expands the latitude of rejection, as well as intensifies the conformity to group norms and authoritarian behavior, “often in the name of ‘patriotism’” (p. 70). Recently, Fritsche, Jonas, and Kessler (2011) proposed that a perceived threat not only increases the identification with the ingroup, but also foster ethnocentric behavior, expressed in favoritism and support of the ingroup, and at the same time, intolerance and derogation of the rival group. Often, society members also experience threat to their identity. When group members believe that their identity is denied, threatened, harmed, or is in danger, they tend to develop strong feelings of deprivation and mobilize for a collective action of defense (Brewer, 2011). It is this context that also encourages self-censorship, as a mean to protect the ingroup from potentially damaging information. Moreover, the context of violent conflict often leads to behaviors that violate moral codes, and society members who are aware of these violations may experience distress as a result of moral emotions (e.g., guilt, shame, moral outrage). These feelings pose a threat to their positive social identity, as well as their personal esteem. Society members do not have to actually perform the immoral acts in order to feel that their identity is threatened; being part of the group whose members carry these acts is sometimes enough for people to feel this way. These types of threats serve as a fertile ground for the demand not only to be loyal to the group, but also to protect it actively via various behaviors, including self-censorship. Society members try to prevent the flow of information that presents their misdeeds as a way to protect their image. Thus, they support norms of self-censorship to prevent such information from being revealed.

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Mobilization The mobilization of society members and their participation in the conflict, passively and actively, is of crucial importance in the context of a violent conflict. Mobilization means not only that individuals identify with the group, but also that they accept the goals related to the conflict, and the direction of actions and means taken by the group and are willing to take part in various needed actions on behalf of the group, including military operations, in order to initiate the conflict and keep it alive. Active participation in violent conflicts naturally requires tremendous personal sacrifice. Active participants have to give up their routine of normal existence, incur economic, personal and familial costs, endanger their lives, and sometimes even endanger the lives of others around them (van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009). Behaviors that negate the mobilization efforts are often sanctioned in such context, and society members are expected to conform, be obedient, and practice self-censorship.

The need to maintain the official narrative Successful mobilization requires the development of a narrative, which provides explanation, rationalization, legitimization, and justification for the eruption of the conflict and its continuation (Bar-Tal, Oren, & Nets-Zehngut, 2014). This narrative contains a number of themes, and the most important among them for the purpose of the current analysis are justness of the conflict goal, patriotism, positive self-collective view, and security. First of all, societies involved in violent conflicts have to believe that they have just goals that must be achieved, even violently. It is assumed that human beings will not be prepared to carry out activities, particularly collective ones, if they believe that their goals are unjustified and unsuitable. Society members need to know why the goals are important to them, individually and as a collective, and they must be convinced that these goals are of just nature, and realistic. The narrative has to provide unequivocal, understandable, and meaningful picture, which serves as a determinative factor for the mobilization of society members. The narrative also arouses emotions that are needed in order to motivate and energize society members (Halperin, 2014). Sometimes, the goals are presented as moral convictions, which are given a high level of priority and cannot be compromised (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). This framing motivates society members to engage in the conflict in order to change the undesirable situation. It is so,

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because violated moral convictions, when they are in fit with the content of a relevant social identity, fuel collective action against collective deprivation (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2011). Second, societies in violent conflicts need to be patriotically inclined. Patriotism lingers on people’s desire to belong to a society, which is positively evaluated by them. That is, patriots want to be part of their society, define themselves as its members, and feel some kind of “we-ness” (De Figueiredo, & Elkins, 2003; Huddy, & Khatib, 2007). In times of conflict, the development and maintenance of patriotism are of key importance, because of the heavy costs in terms of human lives, as well as material resources, which are involved in intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2003). In the name of patriotism, society members are asked to give up their personal comforts, desires, or even their basic needs, to help achieve society’s goals (Bar-Tal, & Staub, 1997; Somerville, 1981). In times of violent conflict, patriotism even demands the ultimate sacrifice – the lives of society members. Without patriotism, conflicts cannot be managed successfully, and the group will lose (Ben-Amos & Bar-Tal, 20040. Societies invest efforts in socializing their members towards patriotism at all times, but this socialization becomes essential in times of conflict. In the context of a conflict, only those who support the goals of the conflict, its continuation, and the accompanied narrative, are considered as patriots. Society members who have different goals and/or carry alternative narratives with their societal beliefs, are sometimes considered even as traitors. Third, societies engaged in violent conflicts develop and maintain societal beliefs that formulate and support a positive collective self-image (Sande, Goethals, Ferrari, & Worth, 1989; White, 1969). The amount of effort required, the need for mobilization, and especially the perpetration of violent, aggressive, and immoral acts (sometimes even atrocities), all require the maintenance of a stable positive self-image and social identity. This is a very challenging task, because violent conflicts involve behaviors that violate moral norms. At the very least, these conflicts involve killings human beings in the battlefield (i.e., soldiers, fighters, and so on). Often, however, such conflicts also include gravely immoral acts against civilians, who are not part of the violent confrontations. These acts may include murder, rape, injury, expulsion, torture, violation of basic human rights – like preventing free movement and other basic activities – humiliation, and destruction, and are often extended to massacres, ethnic

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cleansing or other atrocities. Society members who carry these acts have a strong need to view themselves as human being of good nature. Thus, groups involved in violent conflicts engage in intense self-justification, self-glorification, and self-praise, as well as moral disengagement. These beliefs also play an important role in the group’s self-presentation before the international community, which judges acts from a moral perspective. This judgment is often a precondition for receiving political and material support. Fourth, violent conflicts stress the importance of personal and collective security, and outline the necessary conditions for their achievement. The theme of security appears in every society at all times, but it becomes of vital importance in times of violent conflicts, because the context raises many different security issues for society members as individuals and for the society as a whole. Society members are concerned about their personal ability to live or even survive under hardship, the continued existence of their group, the collective losses, the opponent’s military and political gains, the economic hardship, the threats to the group’s cultural values, and so on. Maintaining security becomes one of the central societal objectives in times of violent conflict. Thus, security issues are raised to the top of the agenda of a society involved in an intractable conflict, and beliefs about security play a more central part in its collective identity. The societal beliefs concerning security in this context refer mostly to the level of insecurity experienced by society members on both personal and collective levels, the sources of the insecurity as perceived by society members, and the conditions that could secure their personal and national survival. The above analysis suggests that societies involved in a violent conflict make every effort to maintain the dominance of their narrative, and prevent or at least minimize the dissemination of counter narratives and information that supports them among the society members (Bar-Tal, Oren, & Nets-Zehngut, 2014). Under such conditions, self-censorship is greatly encouraged, in an attempt to withhold information that may question the goals related to the conflict or present the society in negative light. As noted, the vast majority of societies involved in a violent conflict carries wrongdoings and violates codes of moral and acceptable behaviors, and society members are encouraged to hide this information. In addition, information that suggests a possibility of resolving the conflict peacefully by compromises might be suppresses because it negates the wish to achieve the conflict’s ultimate goals. Thus, society members are formally

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and informally reminded that they must withhold any information, which may damage the effort of the group to win the conflict. This code of behavior assures that the mobilization for supporting and participation in the conflict is not impaired. In order to assure the maintenance of this code, the official authorities may exercise methods of censorship, and the societies themselves often develop social norms that encourage self-censorship. First, the societal institutions propagates the norm of self-censorship, until it is internalized by at least some segments of society, and then social sanctions are used in order to reinforce it. Individuals who break silence and provide information that negates the dominant narrative are negatively sanctioned and even punished. On the other hand, those who keep in line with the narrative are rewarded.

Self-censorship as a barrier In fact, self-censorship in times of violent conflicts should be viewed as one of the socio-psychological barriers that prevent free flow of information. Selfcensorship is joined by individual selective, biased, and distortive information processing, which inhibits the penetration of new information that can contribute to facilitating the development of a peace process (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). But while this processing is automatic and unconscious, self-censorship, together with conformity (compliance), are performed voluntarily, intentionally and consciously. In these cases, individuals prefer to abstain from negative sanctions and/or try to protect their ingroup, and thus choose not to express their opinions or expose valid information they possess. As a barrier, self-censorship blocks the appearance and dissemination of information, which can provide an alternative view of the conflict, the rival, the ingroup, and/or the conflict’s goals: The alternative information, which legitimizes and humanizes the rival; sheds a new light on the conflict by indicating its high costs to the ingroup, the inability to win, or its futility; suggests that goals can be compromised; that there is partner on the other side with whom it is possible to achieve peaceful settlement to the conflict; that peace is rewarding, while the conflict is costly; that the continuation of the conflict is detrimental to the society; and may even provide evidence that the ingroup is also responsible for the continuation of the conflict and, that it has been carrying immoral acts. Overall, I recognize the fact that societies vary in their need to close themselves to information, because they vary with regards to the level of moral

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responsibility for being involved in an intractable conflict, as it is perceived by the international community and by segments of the ingroup itself. Societies differ with regard to the formal obstruction carried by societal institutions, and to the psychological obstruction that society members, with the help of the societal institutions, impose upon themselves. My basic premise is that in order for an intractable conflict to last, some level of obstruction of information need to be practiced; a level that would allow the prevailing of the dominant themes, which propagate the continuation of the conflict. Extensive dissemination and eventual dominance of alternative ideas about peaceful resolution of the conflict, may lead eventually to its termination in a democratic society. Northern Ireland is an example where a well-established movement that carried messages of peaceful resolution of the conflict was active as early as the 1970s. Organizations such as Women Together and Women Caring called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, while the country was dominated by violent confrontations between Catholics and Protestants. These voices carried a determinative influence on the agreement that was achieved years later, in 1998 (Fitzduff, 2002; Frazer & Fitzduff, 1986). Nevertheless, in many societies involved in violent conflicts, the conflict-supporting narrative is hegemonic, and therefore constitutes a major barrier to the conflict’s peaceful resolution. Societies involved in a violent conflict, and especially an intractable one, use societal mechanisms to block alternative information and narratives from entering the various social spheres, and make an effort to reject these narratives and information when they successfully penetrate, so society members would not be persuaded by their evidence and arguments (Bar-Tal, 2007b; Horowitz, 2000; Kelman, 2007). The societal mechanisms can be activated by the formal authorities of the ingroup (leaders, governments, army, etc.). These mechanisms are of different forms, and a formal censorship is one of them. Censorship on information occurs when the authorities exercise formal control of information, deciding what can be publicized and what can’t. When censorship is exercised, information relating to the conflict has to be submitted to approval by an authority before its publication. This mechanism exercises formal power to assure that no alternative unwanted information will be presented. As one example, the government of Sri Lanka, in its struggle against the Tamil minority, enacted in 1973 the Press Council Bill, which formed a censoring council. The council’s members authorized considerable limitations on public

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debates in the mass media regarding issues related to the way the conflict was handled (Tyerman, 1973). In another example, Harrison (1964) described in his study various acts of the French government during the Algerian War, which were meant to censor and limit the freedom of the press in reporting about the war. The final example refers to Israel, where the state practices censorship of various journalist products (e.g., newspapers articles, TV and radio channels, and official publications) whose content challenges the themes of the dominant narratives (Peleg, 1993). In Israel, censorship is mainly conducted by a special IDF unit, based on a law that predates the establishment of the State of Israel. In many occasions, the Censor has blocked the publication of information, which contradicted the official conflict-supportive narratives, and the media practiced self-censorship (Caspi & Limor, 1992; Negbi, 2005). During the Gaza wars in 2008, 2012 and 2014, for example, Israel enforced a tight control of the media. In 2013, Israel was ranked 112th place on the Freedom of the Media Scale (out of 179 countries; Press Freedom Index, 2013). Additionally, the state may prevent the exposure of documents stored in archives (especially state archives), which may contradict the dominant narrative (Brown & DavisBrown, 1998). This prevention can be comprehensive – applying to all people and all documents – or selective. In Israel, the 1955 Archives Law prohibits the exposure of archival documents that can endanger Israel’s security or its foreign affairs for a period of 30-50 years. In practice, however, many documents of formal institutions are not transferred to the State Archives at all, and among those that are transferred, most are not declassified for public view (Presiko, March 12, 2009; Office of the Israeli State Comptroller, 2000). In 2010, the classification of archival documents was extended for 20 more years, extending the total period to 70 years in which these documents must remain classified (Protocol of the Supreme Archives Council, 2010). Self-censorship exercised by gatekeepers in different social institutions and ordinary members of a society is a complementary mechanism to that of the official censorship. It can be practiced by gatekeepers in every societal system – mass media, education, and even culture – who may believe that they protect society by practicing self-censorship. These gatekeepers can be journalists, TV or radio personalities, internet information providers, authors of history school textbooks, authors of history books, biographies, and autobiographies, writers of information brochures for governmental offices, officials of different

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institutions, and so on. Each of them has a role of providing valid information, but as a result of self-censorship, they sometimes knowingly withhold it, without intervention of formal censorship. Nevertheless, in most of the cases, self-censorship is practiced not only as a result of a specific individuals’ desire to block information, but rather within a particular societal climate, which nourishes norms of limiting the flow of information. In this type of climate, the society negatively sanctions individuals or organizations for not exercising self-censorship and revealing information that is perceived as damaging to the group. In times of conflict, significant portions of society members support self-censorship as a method of restricting the flow of information and protecting the ingroup. Thus, the views of the society concerning censorship and self-censorship are important factors, which can explain practices of self-censorship in a society. We may assume that in societies that support limitation of free flow of information and self-censorship, it would be possible to find a wider scope of its actual practice. The described societal barriers illuminate the context in which society members function on an individual level. Nevertheless, it is important to note that although these mechanisms appear, to some extent, in every society, societies involved in violent conflict differ with regard to their use. Furthermore, the appearance of these mechanisms depends on various cultural, political, societal, and even international determinants. One of the important categories of variables that influence the development of these processes is structural characteristics of a society, and particularly its political culture (Almond & Verba, 1989). Specifically important are its level of openness, pluralism, tolerance, and freedom of speech, which have determinative influence on information control, freedom of expression and openness to alterative information, free flow of information, availability of free agents of information, access to global information resources, and so on. The higher the level of control the society exercises over its members, the less freedom of expression there is to consider alternative information – the greater is the closure. A society of such nature prevents pluralism, skepticism, or criticism – any emergence of alternative ideas, which may promote a peaceful resolution to the conflict (see, for example, the case of the Russian society and the conflict with the Chechens). The above analysis suggests that in the context of violent conflict, selfcensorship used by society members is one of the socio-psychological

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mechanisms, which obstruct the advancement of peace building and the optimal functioning of the democratic society, while encouraging conformity and obedience. Self-censorship prevents free access to information, freedom of expression, and free flow of information. It is suggested that self-censorship is one of the factors that lead to the continuation of the conflict. Self-censorship plays a functional role by protecting the hegemonic narrative and preventing alternative information from being revealed, and also fulfills a destructive role by maintaining the conflictsupporting narrative. It is one of the mechanisms that lead to closure, against the actual needs of society. In many of the cases, especially when the opportunity for peace occurs, a society in conflict needs a flow of new information concerning the conflict, the rival, and the ingroup, a climate of openness and tolerance for public discourse and debate, and destabilization of the hegemonic conflictsupporting narrative, in order to enable the development of a counter, peacesupporting narrative. But these requirements go against the very essence of the developed climate in the context of intractable conflict. This context requires blind adherence to the conflict-supporting narrative, supporting and maintaining it, while preventing the free flow of information.

Research on Self-censorship in Israel The Israeli society has been involved in a bloody and lasting conflict with the Palestinians and the Arab world for more than a century. In this context, the Israeli authorities have made an effort to maintain the official narrative about the conflict through the decades, practicing different societal methods, which limit the free flow of information. Formal institutions have been controlling the dominant narrative by disseminating information about the conflict that sustains the dominant conflict-supportive narrative, while suppressing information that might challenge its hegemony (Oren, Nets-Zehngut, & Bar-Tal, in press). This is done, for instance, by preventing journalists or monitoring NGOs from entering particular areas in the occupied territories during Palestinian violent and nonviolent demonstrations, or during Jewish settlers’ violent acts against Palestinians. Furthermore, the Publicity Branch in the IDF’s Education Corps distributes the conflict-supportive narrative mainly to soldiers, using publications, and educational seminars (Eshkol, 1995). In general, the Israeli public is openly encouraged to practice self-censorship, as exemplified by the recent appeal by Limor Livnat, the Minister of Culture, to film directors ““I, who am opposed to censorship, call on all of you to exercise self-censorship” (Haaretz, February 28, 2013). There are many indications that the norm of self-censorship is well internalized in the Israeli Jewish society. The conflict is still alive, and society members, in order to protect the image of their society, keep silent even regarding the events of 1948 war (see, for example, BenZe’ev, 2010). Morever, the fear of social sanctions for breaking the silence is a strong enough to prevent people from revealing valid information even in cases in which the rules of the Israeli censor do not apply. Members of the Jewish-Israeli society prefer to practice self-censorship with regards to events they experienced or heard about, and information they got. In this section, I’ll present a number of studies that were carried out in Israel and fall into two categories: Some of them trace the phenomenon of the 50

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self-censorship in Israel, and others illustrate the components of the general conception.

Self-censorship in Israel: Prevalence Self-censorship in formal institutions The first study, by Nets-Zehngut, Pliskin, and Bar-Tal (in press), investigated the prevalence of self-censorship in Israeli formal state insitutions: the Publications Agency at the National Information Center, the Israel Defense Forces, and the Ministry of Education.5 Specifically, the study focused on self-censorship practiced by gatekeepers in these formal institutions regarding historical information dealing with the 1948 Palestinian exodus. This exodus is one of the key events in both the Israeli-Jewish and the Palestinian collective narrative of the conflict. In this exodus, some 650,000 Palestinians left the area held by Israel at the end of the war, thus creating the Palestinian refugee problem. Since 1948, the refugee problem has been a major issue in the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian relations, and the Arabs and Palestinians have conducted a wide-scale diplomatic campaign against Israel, demanding the refugees’ return (Ghazi-Bouillon, 2009; Lustick, 2006). The conflicted parties hold different narratives regarding the causes of the exodus. The main Palestinian narrative maintains that by and large, all the Palestinians were expelled (Abdel-Jawad, 2006; Nets-Zehngut, 2011a). In contrast, the Israeli-Jewish Zionist narrative, disseminated in Israel through various channels, including formal institutions, takes no responsibility for the exodus, denying expulsions and arguing that the Palestinians fled on their own accord, mainly because of their leadership’s blanket calls, and those of Arab leaders, to leave their localities, and due to fear (Caplan, 2010; Ghazi-Bouillon, 2009). For example, a 1971 Publications Agency pamphlet states: The refugees were not expelled by Israel in 1948. They largely left of their own will, following the calls by the Arab leadership, who asked them to leave their homes in order to make it easier for the Arab armies to destroy the Jews (Rupin, 1971, p. 27). 5 For further reading see: In general: Bar-Tal, 2007; Caplan, 2010; and specifically regarding these three formal institutions: Nets-Zehngut, 2008, 2012a, 2013. As for the Ministry of Education, we refer here to textbooks approved by it to be used in the educational system.

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Similarly, a 1979 IDF publication states that: ...the Arabs of Eretz-Israel6 started collapsing quickly. This collapse was combined with the calls of the Arab countries to the Eretz-Israel Arabs to leave their localities, in order not to interfere with the operations of the Arab armies...and it was most evident in the mass flight of the Arabs from their localities to the Arab countries (Hakrav, 1979, p. 9). Until the late 1970s, these formal institutions were extensively supported in their dissemination efforts by the publications of informal Israeli-Jewish institutions (e.g., scholarly studies, newspapers articles, 1948 war veterans’ memoirs, and various history textbooks used in the education system without having been formally approved by the MOE).6 In the late 1970s, however, various informal Israeli-Jewish institutions began challenging the Zionist narrative’s hegemony within Israel. Many scholarly publications and newspaper articles presented a narrative (“critical narrative”) that contradicted parts of the Zionist one. This trend was based on the exposure of new documents, oral accounts of veterans, publications of new biographies and autobiographies of individuals involved (Nets-Zehngut, 2011, 2012).7 According to this emerging narrative, while some of the Palestinians indeed left on their own (e.g., due to fear, societal collapse, or calls by the leadership for a partial and temporary evacuation), others were forcibly expelled by the Jewish and later Israeli combat forces. This informal change intensified in the late 1980s, with the commencement of a historical revisionist period commonly referred to as the “New Historians” era (Caplan, 2010; Ghazi-Bouillon, 2009). The informal critical activity influenced one formal institution in Israel – the educational system. Since the year 2000 and at least until 2004, all history textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education presented the critical narrative (Nets-Zehngut, 2013). For example, Eyal Naveh’s textbook asserts that:

6 Generally, Nets-Zehngut, 2012; and specifically regarding the research community – Nets-Zehngut, 2011; Ram, 2011; and regarding unapproved textbooks – Firer & Adwan, 2004; Podeh, 2002. 7 The “critical” narrative of the exodus is a specific Israeli example of an “alternative” narrative, as discussed above. It was presented as an alternative to the Zionist narrative of the exodus, which was dominant in Israel in its early decades.

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During the battles over the land, hundreds of thousands of the local Arabs were expelled or fled to the neighboring countries [. . . ] Some of them fled before the Jewish forces reached a village or an Arab neighborhood in the city, and some of them were expelled by the conquering force (Naveh, 1999, p. 138, p. 143). The Information Center and the IDF, however, continued to present the Zionist narrative, at least until 2004 (Nets-Zehngut, 2008; Nets-Zehngut, 2012).8 The study reported in this paper included interviews with 33 key individuals, who worked in the three institutions between 1949 and 2004, covering this period almost fully (e.g., heads of the IDF Information Branch, directors of the Information Center, and history team leaders in the Curricula Branch at the Ministry of Education). Of the 33 interviewees, 20 were found to have practiced self-censorship, with the vast majority admitting to this practice explicitly. This practice was identified unequivocally on the basis of either explicit use of the term “self-censorship” by some of the interviewees, or based on their testimonies indicating a decision not to present the critical narrative in the publications. All of these 20 interviewees admitted they knew that expulsions had taken place, but they did not want to expose this fact voluntarily.9 They did so despite the fact that at the relevant times in the past, they were not given explicit orders to censor the critical narrative, and even though they were all aware of the critical 8 This was determined by examining all the relevant publications produced by these three institutions in the years 1949-2004. 9 Of the remaining 13 interviewees, three did not self-censor themselves, and they were the authors of three critical textbooks from 1999, which were approved by the Ministry of Education in 2000. As for the remaining ten, they may have practiced self-censorship, but we found no evidence of this practice. It is hard to know why these ten people did not say in the interviews that they self-censored themselves. It might be because they actually did not do so: they present the Zionist narrative rather than the critical one, because they believed the former was the true one. This, however, does not seem a very plausible explanation if we take into account the common practice of self-censorship in these institutions (see below),which did not present the critical narrative almost throughout the entire research period (except for the Ministry of Education, since 2000). A more plausible explanation is that these people just refrained from admitting the practice of self-censorship, since they were ashamed of something that nowadays is perceived by many as inappropriate, especially since the critical narrative of the exodus is so prevalent today in Israel.

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narrative and viewed it as the true historical account. As one of the interviewees, who worked in the Information Center, said very explicitly: The topic of expulsions was not mentioned […] we practiced selfcensorship about what could have been written and what not. We practiced self-censorship about controversial topics. And another working in the Chief Education Officer’s Headquarters said: The general premise was that we all do not deviate; we are all patriots, all Zionists, do not want to admit that we expelled refugees. In addition, using content analysis of the interviews, the researchers identified the following five major motivations for self-censorship reported by the interviewed officials in the three institutions: 1) Protection of Israel’s positive image. The first motivation identified was the desire to protect the ingroup, and specifically to prevent negative use of the information by the Arabs, as well as maintaining a positive image of Israel in the eyes of the international community. The officials in the three institutions stated that they had concealed the information about Jewish expulsion of Arabs to prevent its falling into the hands of Arab states, the Palestinians, or third parties in the international community, and then being used by them for their political goals. 2) Mobilization of the Israeli Jewish citizens. The second major motivation was also an intention to protect the ingroup – this time within the Israeli society. The officials thought that it was their role to prevent a negative image of the State among the Israeli-Jewish public, who were the target audience of the publications issued by the three institutions. The officials stated that Israel was facing serious challenges and needed the complete devotion of its citizens and their mobilization to successfully cope with them. 3) Protection of the Zionist ideology. The third motivation was to protect the Zionist narrative, which is a major part of the Zionist national ideology, by not presenting contradictory information. Considering themselves Zionists, the interviewees felt that this was the right prism from which to view the events. 4) Institutional norms. The officials in these state institutions adopted norms, determining that it was their role to represent the state and thus present its narrative. This was a kind of bureaucratic motivation, which indicated

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identification with the institution that one works for, and then internalizing its views. This motivation represents the desire to protect the state, feeling part of its organizational fabric. 5) Fear of sanctions. This motivation reflects the wish to protect oneself. Officials of the three institutions reported that fear inhibited critical writing and led them to censor themselves preemptively, thinking that they might be sanctioned by dismissal, denunciation, and ostracization, although this behavior was based on speculation, since no formal instructions had been issued by the authorities to direct the content of the publications. Self-censorship in media In a similar study (Elbaz & Bar-Tal, 2014a), the practice of self-censorship during a particular military encounter (i.e., the Second Lebanon War in 2006)10 was investigated, based on the finding that during this war, the Israeli media presented mainly the official narrative of the government and the army (Elbaz & Bar-Tal, 2014b). The study consisted of 30 in-depth interviews with current and former prominent Israeli journalists, who were responsible for covering the military and political domains in Israeli media outlets. As gatekeepers, they were asked to illuminate the manner in which self-censorship was practiced. The results showed that throughout the war, the Israeli editors and reporters internalized the formal military censorship, even when it was not necessary. The media outlets practiced self-censorship intentionally and voluntarily, and by doing so, journalists distorted the reality of the war. The interviewed military correspondents and other journalists explicitly referred to the complete “mobilization” of the mediain favor of the military campaign, talked about widespread self-censorship and unquestioning acceptance of the official narrative from governmental and military information sources. Quantitatively, of the 30 interviewees, 18 talked explicitly about practicing self-censorship. Twelve other interviewees referred to this practice indirectly by citing similar journalistic practices, such as providing misinformation or withholding truthful 10 The second Lebanese war began on July 12, 2006, following Hezbollah’s artillery attack on the Israeli population and an ambush in which eight IDF soldiers were killed and two were kidnapped. These actions led to retaliation by Israel - first by air bombing Hezbollah’s strongholds in Lebanon, and then by carrying out an attack by ground forces on Hezbollah’s positions in south Lebanon. The war lasted 34 days (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008; Shelah & Limor, 2007).

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information. A content analysis of the interviews revealed the existence of an all-embracing media support of the political and military elites. From the very beginning, even before the IDF entered Lebanon, journalists urged the government to initiate a military operation that would restore the peace in the regions near the northern border. The media ignored essential and important questions, such as: Does the attack by Hezbollah require a war from different aspects? Might it be desirable first to analyze the situation in depth before giving way to emotional reactions? Was a war desirable and necessary to Israel at this particular time? Was the army prepared for combat with Lebanese armed militia? Was the home front sufficiently protected from missile attacks? What could be the outcomes of such a war? These questions were absent from the press and television reports during the early stages of the fighting. Harsh criticism of the government was found only at the margins of media coverage, and failed to stimulate public debate. We identified five motivations for self-censorship during the War in Lebanon, three of them pertaining to the protection of the ingroup: maintaining national consensus, mobilizing citizens, and fear of damaging the motivation among the soldiers; the other two referred to self-protection: fear of personal sanctions, and fear of severing the relations with information sources within the government and the military elite. The mass media journalists practiced self-censorship, out of the belief that they had to rally the public to support the military campaign at times of war, and not to divide it by presenting information that could lead to disagreement with the governmental decision to go to war and its implementation. The journalists also thought that they had to mobilize the Jewish-Israeli population for active participation, and not to reduce the public morale when facing such serious war challenges. Finally, they did not want to undermine the motivation of the soldiers, who were performing the dangerous mission, since their motivation was crucial for the success of the war. Yet, the journalists also described self-centered motivations, aiming at self-preservation, of avoiding possible sanctions of their superiors or the public. In addition, they understood that in order to receive information from governmental and military sources, they had to report their narrative the official narrative, otherwise they would be punished and disconnected from their information sources. Here are some of their statements:

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I would like to say: when I was asked to join Channel 1 for as long as the war continued, I went to strengthen hands and not to let go of hands. So my current thoughts are not relevant (Yossi Peled, a military commentator of Channel 1) Once the war begins, everyone feels an obligation to be united. Suddenly, all party barriers fall, and people want to be together. The manifestation of this is the well-known expression: ‘be quiet, we are shooting’ (Eitan Haber, a columnist in Yedioth Ahronoth) It was clear that Yedioth Ahronoth wholeheartedly supported this war. Whoever wrote differently was ‘exiled’ to less prominent pages, further from the first pages (Yael Gvirtz, an editorials writer in Yedioth Ahronoth). Support of self-censorship in the Israeli-Jewish society One of the key questions that can be asked in the study of self-censorship is what the public’s view about this practice is. Does the public accept it or reject it? Such a study was carried by Hameiri, Sharvit, Bar-Tal, Shahar, and Halperin (2014), who longitudinally investigated views of a large sample of Jews in Israel between February 2012 and January 2013, during which another cycle of violence in Gaza Strip erupted in November 2012. In this study, a number of indexes for the support of self-censorship were employed: General Support of Self-censorship (for example: “The media should publish reliable information regarding immoral actions of governments or militaries, even if this information might harm the society or state in which this information is being published’); Support of Self-censorship During Israel’s Operation “Pillar of Defense” in the Gaza Strip (for example: “To what extent do you think that the soldiers who participated in the operation should [have] pass[ed] on reliable information regarding harm to Palestinian civilians?”; Support of Self-censorship in Other Nations – this index measured the participants’ support of self-censorship practiced in other nations, such as Russia and the United States, rather than Israel. (for example: ”The media in other nations, such as Russia and the United States, should publish reliable information regarding immoral actions performed by the government”).

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The findings suggested that armed confrontation significantly increases the support of self-censorship in comparison to times of relative peace. Hence, the support of self-censorship is derived from the desire to protect the society at times of conflict, by blocking the dissemination of information, which is viewed as damaging to a society that is threatened by the rival group, and is coping with acute challenges in a violent conflict. This increased support reflects the very general phenomenon of rallying behind the leaders during violent confrontations. When a society struggles to prevail in a violent confrontation, society members feel obliged to refrain from criticizing the official narrative and disseminating information that might hinder the general efforts. This norm is well established in Israel, where there is an ongoing governmental campaign to silence critiques regarding the State’s conduct in the conflict, and especially silence those individuals and NGOs, which provide information about wrongdoings by the Israeli army (Lomsky-Feder, & Ben-Ari, 1999; Oren, Nets-Zehngut, & Bar-Tal, 2014). Indeed, the findings of this study showed that during the military operation in Gaza in 2012, the support of self-censorship regarding the operation was higher than the general support of self-censorship, which did not change over time. Thus, while self-censorship was constantly supported to a moderate extent in Israel, against the background of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict, this support was increased in times of a violent escalation, and remaind high for as long as the hostilities lasted. Moreover, the findings demonstrated that the general support of self-censorship was a significant predictor of the specific support for self-censorship regarding the Gaza Operation, suggesting that while the support of self-censorship regarding specific incidents in the conflict may change over time, it is also derived from a more general orientation toward self-censorship. In addition, the findings revealed that personal characteristics (e.g., authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, siege mentality11) predicted support of selfcensorship, which, in turn, mediated the effect of personal characteristics on the support of peace negotiations with the Palestinians and of providing humanitarian aid to the suffering residents of Gaza. The findings thus indicated that the support of self-censorship serves, in this sense, as one of the expressions 11 Siege mentality is defined as a societal belief denoting perception of being under siege – that is, the feeling that the rest of the world has highly negative intentions towards the ingroup (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992).

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of conservative political ideology, which supports the maintenance of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013). Indeed, our findings demonstrated that the general support of self-censorship assessed during the period of violence predicted reduced support of negotiations and humanitarian aid to the Palestinians three months after the operation. This result remained significant even after controlling for the outcome variables assessed at an earlier time. These results suggested that the support of selfcensorship is not merely a byproduct of an ongoing conflict, but a significant process, which acts as a barrier to the conflict resolution. It is a mechanism of closure that aims to block information, which may potentially shed new light on the conflict and the rival, and thus lead to a change of views by society members and possibly a change of policies regarding the conflict Of interest in this study is the finding that Israeli-Jews did not support selfcensorship in other societies, such as the USA or Russia, probably since they realized that self-censorship jeopardizes the functioning of the democratic system by preventing free flow of information. This finding reflects double standards and moral hypocrisy, whereby individuals expect other people and groups to uphold certain moral standards, while excusing themselves and their own groups from upholding the same principles, based on various rationalizations (Ashmore, Bird, Del-Boca, & Vanderet, 1979; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007). Individuals tend to apply different standards of judgment while evaluating similar behaviors by their own society versus another society. While the behavior of the ingroup is judged positively, the same behavior by another group is often judged negatively (Oskamp, 1965; Sande, Goethals, Ferrari & Worth, 1989).

Self-censorship in Israel: Antecedents Three studies have examined the effects of circumstantial, informational, and personal variables on self-censorship (Shahar, Hameiri, Bar-Tal, & Raviv, 2014). Specifically, they examined the effect of the following factors: the characteristics of the potential audience, the type of information that pertains to the social role of the parties involved in the relevant event, the level of consistency with the official narrative and the effect of the conflict-related personally held ideologies. The research employed an experimental role playing method, in which the extent of the participant’s willingness to self-censor was assessed as a dependent variable. In the first study, Israeli-Jews were ostensibly asked to evaluate the

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clarity of different news that presented Israelis (i.e., the ingroup) in a negative way. Following this evaluation, they were given a hypothetical option to share the provided information with four categories of recipients, who differed with regard to their proximity to the participant. The results showed that the participants’ willingness to self-censor was the strongest in cases of outgroup audience (i.e., outgroup NGOs) and significantly weaker in cases of ingroup close recipients (i.e., family and close friends). Thus, it seems that reporting ingroup transgressions to outside individuals, organizations, or authorities is often considered a serious violation of the implicit rule that forbids group members from criticizing their ingroup in front of outsiders. As Elder, Sutton, & Douglas (2005) noted: …it seems that an in-group critic speaking to an in-group audience is seen as ‘clearing the air’ by highlighting the group’s weaknesses, thereby promoting growth and improvement…, but when speaking to an out-group audience, he or she is perceived to be ‘airing the group’s dirty laundry (p. 240-241). In the second study, Israeli Jewish males were asked to read a vignette that described an individual who witnesses harm done by Israelis to Palestinians. The participants were then asked to try and step into the shoes of that individual – “to try experiencing what he feels and thinks when he witnesses the described events”. In each vignette, we manipulated the role of the actors (i.e., the Israelis committing harm to Palestinians), who could be civilians or IDF soldiers, and the role of the observer (i.e., the role playing target), who could be a civilian or an IDF soldier. Then, the participants were asked about their willingness to reveal the observed event. The results revealed two significant effects of the social role of the people involved in the event (that is, the content of the information): First, the participants were significantly more inclined to self-censor the information when they played the role of a soldier observer in comparison to when they played the role of a civilian observer. Second, the participants were also significantly more inclined to self-censor the information presented in the vignette when the actors in the scene were soldiers in comparison to civilians. This effect confirms a well-established phenomenon, granting soldiers and security forces a unique and meaningful status in the Israeli society, as a society involved in an intractable conflict (Lomsky-Feder & Ben-Ari, 1999). One can assume that jeopardizing the soldier’s image will be strongly perceived as a

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direct damage to the ingroup image and stance against rival groups, because the soldiers perform a formal role representing the state. In the third study, Israeli-Jewish participants were seemingly asked to help a group of researchers in the validation process of a curriculum concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Specifically, the participants were presented with a series of images that portrayed this conflict. Some images represented the conflict-supporting narrative, presenting the ingroup (Israeli-Jews) as moral and the outgroup (Palestinians) as vicious and immoral; others were narrativeincongruent, presenting opposite mirror-image of the first group of images. Each participant was then asked to decide whether or not each presented image should appear in the planned curriculum (checking the participants’ willingness to selfcensor the information), which would be presented to different audiences (Unlike study no. 1, the information recipients’ conditions were manipulated as a betweensubjects variable). As expected, the findings suggested that the willingness to self-censor is influenced by the type of information presented. Thus, participants in the study were more willing to self-censor official narrative-incongruent information in comparison to official narrative-congruent information. These findings showed the desire of the ingroup members to protect their image and to actively block information that sheds negative light on the ingroup. In addition, personal variables were employed in each of the studies. The analyses demonstrated that the willingness to self-censor was related to the following personal characteristics: right-wing political orientation, adherence to the ethos of the conflict,12 and blind patriotism. This finding corresponds with 12 The ethos of conflict is defined as the configuration of shared central societal beliefs, which provide a particular dominant orientation to a society in the present and for the future in the contexts of intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2007a, 2013). The ethos is composed of eight major themes concerning issues that are related to the conflict, the in-group, and its adversary: (1) societal beliefs about the justness of one’s own goals, which outline the contested goals, indicate their crucial importance, and provide their explanations and rationales; (2) Societal beliefs about security, which stress the importance of personal safety and national survival, and outline the conditions for their achievement; (3) Societal beliefs of positive collective self-image, which concern the ethnocentric tendency to attribute positive traits, values, and behavior to one’s own society; (4) Societal beliefs of victimization, which concern the self-presentation of the in-group as the victim of the conflict; (5) Societal beliefs of delegitimizing the opponent, which concern beliefs that deny the adversary’s humanity; (6) Societal beliefs of patriotism,

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the results of the research in the field of political ideology, which indicated that individuals who hold right-wing ideologies such as hawkish political orientation (Arian & Shamir, 2002), strong adherence to the ethos conflict (Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Halperin, & Zafran, 2012) and blind patriotism (Staub, 1997) tend to glorify and defend the ingroup, have a stronger adherence to the group’s norms, and are less open to information that contradicts the dominant narratives (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003). In another experimental study by Shahar, Hameiri and Bar-Tal (2014), participants were exposed to a story about Israel’s violation of human rights of Palestinian children (which was revealed at that time), and were asked to evaluate the informers (Israelis who worked in the Israeli detention center) under different conditions. It was found that the participants viewed more negatively ingroup members who informed a non-Israeli organization (UNICEF) about ingroup immoral acts, than when they informed an Israeli organization (The Israeli Council for the Well-Being of Children). In addition, it was found again that the participants were more willing to censor negative information about the ingroup when the audience was more distantly related (NGOs and media) than when the audience was closer (friends and family). This study showed that in a society involved in intractable conflict, individuals who reveal information to outgroups are not appreciated, and are viewed as jeopardizing the ingroup’s image and goals.

which generate attachment to the country and society, by propagating loyalty, love, care, and sacrifice; (7) Societal beliefs of unity, which refer to the importance of ignoring internal conflicts and disagreements during intractable conflicts to unite the society’s forces in the face of an external threat; and finally, (8) Societal beliefs of peace, which refer to peace as the ultimate desire of the society.

Consequences of Self-censorship Self-censorship practiced by society members has a number of effects, which can be detected on the individual and collective levels: With regard to the negative effects on the individual level, self-censorship may cause personal distress, as the person may be aware that the withheld information is relevant to the well-being of his/her society, or that norms of free flow of information are violated by hiding it. In addition, the content of the information may itself be stressful, and withholding it prevents healing or dealing with the traumatic experience (Harber & Pennebaker, 1992; Kubey & Peluso, 1990). Individuals may feel guilt and shame for not revealing the information, which may come from different sources, evoked by moral values, patriotic feelings, and/or adherence to certain values. On the collective level, self-censorship blocks relevant information, and thus decreases access to information and reduces the free flow of information. It leads to ignorance of the public regarding issues of importance to society, and later leads to impaired decisions, based on missing information. Sel-censorship impoverishes the public debate; it jeopardizes transparency, blocks critical views, and thus blocks changes and at the same time reinforces the reproduction of particular dogmas, norms, and practices, which could have been changed had the information was not withheld. It may also lead to moral deterioration, because it prevents information about societal misdeeds. A study by Bar-Tal, Hameiri, and Shahar (2013) investigated the perceived consequences of practicing self-censorship. We provided a vignette about an anonymous state in South America called X (no name was noted), supplying the same information about this state to all the participants, yet half of them were told that the state had a norm of self-censorship (describing it properly in line with the definition), while the other half was told that it had a norm of openness. Participants were then asked to evaluate the particular state on different characteristics related to societal consequences. The results showed 63

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that when self-censorship was instituted, the participants noted the shortcomings of the system on scales. They noted that a state with self-censorship has significantly fewer democratic values, less openness and less pluralism than the state without it. Thus, it can be assumed that when society members decide to adopt self-censorship, they are also aware of the costs that a society might pay for their practice. Nevertheless, there are also positive consequences of self-censorship. It allows the maintenance of a positive image and a positive social identity, prevents potential damage to the ingroup from outside parties, and increases unity and solidarity by preventing disagreements, controversies, and schisms. Those are important consequences, which often motivate society members to practice self-censorship and withhold what they consider to be a potentially damaging information.

Conclusions The present paper has introduced the concept of self-censorship as well as proposing a conceptual framework for its understanding. In addition, the paper focused on the practice of self-censorship in the context of violent lasting conflict, with elaboration on the Israeli-Jewish society. It was presumed that self-censorship is a unique and important phenomenon, which carry societal implications, and therefore should be studied. The conceptual framework has located the concept within a societal analysis of freedom of information, freedom of expression, and free flow of information, all crucial ingredients for developing a democracy and a well-functioning society. But self-censorship has two faces, as described in the paper. It leads to public ignorance, impoverishes the public debate, jeopardizes transparency, leads to moral deterioration, impairs decisions, blocks change, and encourages the reproduction of norms, ideas, and beliefs that may even be detrimental to a society. But it also has positive functions, as it enables the retention of positive self-collective image and positive social identity, and in some cases it even strengthens solidarity and cohesiveness of the group. Moreover, it is recognized that in some cases, self-censorship is required for maintaining security, preserving the well-being of a society, and safeguarding the privacy of society members. I recognize the dialectical approach to this important social phenomenon. On the one hand, many well-documented cases have indicated that self-censorship was detrimental to the society and prevented exposure of information that was essential for its well-functioning. For example, thousands knew about the futility of the Vietnam War, but only Daniel Ellsberg and a few others had the courage to break the silence and tell the American nation about the lies of politicians and military commanders. Thousands practiced self-censorship to hide information concerning the atrocities committed by the Belgians in the Congo, the British in Kenya, or the Dutch in Indonesia. In Spain, as previously noted, individuals 65

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still practice self-censorship about the dark period of Franco regime, and Israeli officials openly encourage artists and journalists to practice self-censorship to cover Israeli moral misdeeds carried out against Palestinians. Furthermore, many Israeli-Jews practiced and still practice self-censorship regarding crucial events related to what is widely called in Israel “security matters”, and specifically issues related to the Israeli-Arab conflict. This self-censorship not only increases ignorance and prevalence of misinformation, but also prevents productive and fruitful deliberations on key issues that are of interest to all society members, because they are relevant to the basic security needs. The same detrimental effect exists with regard to self-censorship that covers corruption or other types of misdeeds. But it is also clear, on the other hand, that there is a need for self-censorship when information can harm a society in the present or in the future. Especially regarding the security-related issues, society members practice wide ranging self-censorship to protect their nation. But the borders between things that should be exposed and things that should be kept secret with self-censorship are very blurred. The recent case of the information revealed by Edward Snowden, concerning massive violations of civil rights in USA and other countries by the National Security Agency of United States, provides evidence of how grey and equivocal the use imposed self-censorship is. Nevertheless, there are other motivations that lead individuals in different organizations and groups to adopt self-censorship. Self-censorship was defined here as being employed only when there are no formal rules that prevent the exposure of information. Yet, as noted, people also break rules for patriotic reasons. They care about the well-being of their society, exactly because the borderline between information that benefits society and information that damages it often depends on the subjective view of the leaders, which are sometimes not sufficiently supported by hard evidence. Citizens must constantly be on their guard. Leaders in different societies, including in Israel, are often deeply interested in preventing a free flow of information for reasons irrelevant to the functioning of the society and the state. With this paper, I hope that the public discussion about self-censorship – its enforcement by formal and informal agents, the needs and motivations of those who practice it and those who socially enforce it, the conditions that facilitate it and its boundaries – will contribute to strengthening the democratic functioning of societies.

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Biographical Note Daniel Bar-Tal is Professor of Research in Child Development and Education at the School of Education at Branco-Weiss, and formerly the president of the Walter Lebach Institute for Jewish-Arab Coexistence through Education, Tel Aviv University. He served as a coeditor of the Palestine Israel Journal. He served as the President of the International Society of Political Psychology (1999-2000).He was awarded the Otto Klineberg Intercultural and International Relations Prize of SPSSI in 1991 and again in 2009, and the Golestan Fellowship at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Science in 2000-2001. His book, coauthored with Yona Teichman, Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict: Representations of Arabs in Israeli Jewish Society, published in 2005 by Cambridge University Press, received the Alexander George Award of the International Society of Political Psychology for the best book in Political Psychology in 2006. In 2006, he also received the Peace Scholar Award of the Peace and Justice Studies Association for an excellent scholarship and hard work in studying conflicts and peace making. In 2011, he received the Lasswell Award of the International Society of Political Psychology for “distinguished scientific contribution in the field of political psychology.” In 2012, he received The Nevitt Sanford Award of the International Society of Political Psychology for engaging in the practical application of political psychological principles, and creating knowledge that is accessible and used by practitioners in their efforts to make a positive difference in the way politics is carried out. In 2013, he received honorary membership in the Polish Society of Social Psychology. In 2014, he received Morton Deutsch Conflict Resolution Award of the Society for the Study of Peace, Conflict, and Violence (Division 48 of the American Psychological Association) – awarded to an individual who has made notable contributions to the integration of theory and practice in the field of conflict resolution.

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His research interest is in political and social psychology, studying sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts and peacemaking. Specifically, he studied the evolvement of the socio-psychological infrastructure in times of intractable conflict, and infrastructure that consists of shared societal beliefs of ethos of conflict, collective memory, and emotional collective orientations. He examined their contents, acquisition, and functions, the societal mechanisms of their maintenance and institutionalization, as well as their contribution to the crystallization of social identity and development of conflict culture during the conflict. As part of this work, he also examined the required changes in this socio-psychological repertoire for conflict resolution and reconciliation. Specifically, he proposed a conceptual framework for the evolvement of reconciliation, for the development of peace education, and eventually of peace culture. He authored Group Beliefs (Springer-Verlag, 1990) and Shared Beliefs in a Society (Sage, 2000), Living with the conflict (Carmel, 2007. in Hebrew), Intractable conflicts: Socio-psychological foundations and dynamics (Cambridge University Press, 2013) in which he summarized his ideas and empirical work of the last 30 years. He co-edited the following volumes: The Social Psychology of Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 1988), Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (Springer-Verlag, 1988), Stereotyping and Prejudice (Springer-Verlag, 1989), Patriotism in the Lives of Individuals and Nations (Nelson Hall, 1997) Concerned with Security (JAI, 1998), How Children Understand War and Peace (Jossey-Bass, 1999) and Patriotism: Homeland love (Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 2004, in Hebrew). Recently he edited Intergroup conflicts and their resolution: Social psychological perspective, which is a handbook in this field (Psychology Press, 2011) and co-edited Effects of lasting occupation: Lessons from the Israeli Society (Oxford University Press- 2013). In addition, he has published over two hundreds articles and chapters in major social and political psychological journals, books and encyclopedias. Over the years, Bar-Tal has lectured on his work in many different countries, and worked as Visiting Professor at Vanderbilt University, Nashville; Brandeis University, Boston; Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris; University of Muenster, Germany, University of Maryland, College Park, Polish Academy of Science, Warsaw, University of Palermo and Australian National University, Canberra.

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One of the highlight of his professional life is the establishment (in 1999) and leading a ‘learning community”. This community consists of 10-15 graduate students, mostly doctoral candidates, who come from different disciplines and different universities to study about conflicts and their resolution. The ”learning community” serves as a framework for learning, reflecting, debating, and developing; carrying conceptual and empirical studies; socialization for academic career and societal involvement; and for social support.