September 2007 Andreas Heinrich Poland as a

KICES Working Papers No. 9–10 – September 2007 Andreas Heinrich Poland as a Transit Country for Russian Natural Gas: Potential for Conflict

Koszalin Institute of Comparative European Studies (KICES) Koszaliński Instytut Europejskich Studiów Porównawczych ul. Zielona 13-1, PL-75-664 Koszalin www.kices.org

KICES Working Papers No. 9–10 (2007): Andreas Heinrich: Poland as a Transit Country for Russian Natural Gas: Potential for Conflict

September 2007 ISSN: 1895-0450 About the author: Dr Andreas Heinrich is a Senior Researcher at the Koszalin Institute of Comparative European Studies (KICES), Koszalin, Poland and a Research Associate at the Institute for World Economics and International Management (IWIM), University of Bremen, Germany. From September 2006 to May 2007, he conducted a project on “Eurasian Pipeline Politics: Conflict and Cooperation” as a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. The research for this working paper was made possible by a fellowship from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. The help and financial support is gratefully acknowledged. Special thanks goes to my research assistant Ewa Topor and the library staff of the Wilson Center.

Language Editor: Hilary Abuhove Technical Editor: Matthias Neumann

Opinions expressed in publications issued by the Koszalin Institute of Comparative European Studies are solely those of the authors. This publication may not be reprinted or otherwise reproduced – entirely or in part – without prior consent of the Koszalin Institute of Comparative European Studies. Authors and sources must be cited. © 2007 by Koszalin Institute of Comparative European Studies Koszalin Institute of Comparative European Studies ul. Zielona 13/1 PL-75-664 Koszalin Poland e-mail: [email protected] internet: http://www.kices.org

Content

1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 7 2 Theoretical Framework and Methods ......................................................................... 7 2.1 Stage Model of Conflict Communication .......................................................................... 7 2.2 Methods ........................................................................................................................... 15 2.2.1 Research Questions and Design of the Discourse Analysis ................................... 15 2.2.2 Frames of Discourse: Bringing History Back in .................................................... 15 2.2.3 Identification of Frames ......................................................................................... 16 2.3 Operationalisation ........................................................................................................... 17 2.3.1 Sources ................................................................................................................... 17

3 Main Actors: Poland & Gazprom...............................................................................18 3.1 Poland .............................................................................................................................. 18 3.1.1 Poland’s Energy Sector and Gas Consumption...................................................... 18 3.1.2 Political Debate about Energy Security and Diversification in Poland ................. 19 3.2 Gazprom and its Export Routes....................................................................................... 27 3.2.1 Gazprom’s Weakness: Transit Countries ............................................................... 27

4 Yamal Pipeline – How Poland Came into Play ......................................................... 29 4.1 The Bypass Pipeline – from Conflict Episodes to Identity Conflict ................................ 31 4.1.1 Poland Offers an Alternative Pipeline Route ......................................................... 32 4.2 Problems with the Yamal Pipeline ................................................................................... 34 4.2.1 Change in Poland’s Position towards the Bypass Pipeline ................................... 35 4.3 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 40

5 Nord Stream Pipeline – Identity Conflict .................................................................. 43 5.1 Massive Criticism from Poland and the Baltic States ..................................................... 45 5.1.1 Geopolitics ............................................................................................................. 47 5.1.1.1 Punishment for Poland’s Engagement in the ‘Orange Revolution’.............. 48 5.1.1.2 “… to Cement German-Russian Co-operation” ........................................... 48 5.1.1.3 Control of EU Politics .................................................................................. 49 5.1.1.4 Reduced Energy Security – Blockades and Price Manipulations ................ 49 5.1.2 Practical Concerns ................................................................................................. 50 5.1.2.1 Environment ................................................................................................. 50 5.1.2.2 Reducing Poland’s Role/ Influence in Europe’s Energy System .................. 51 5.1.3 Poland’s Perception ................................................................................................ 56 5.2.1 Meat Ban ................................................................................................................ 60

5.3 The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Crisis of 2005/ 2006 ........................................................... 62 5.4 Musketeers’ Pact .............................................................................................................. 65 5.5 Hitler-Stalin Pact ............................................................................................................. 66 5.6 Poland Vetoes the Framework Agreement on EU-Russia Relations ............................... 71 5.6.1 Russian Reactions: with the Kaczyńskis – the Language of Sanctions [с Качиньскими – на языке санкций] ................................................................... 73 5.7 Russian-Belarusian Oil Crisis 2006/ 2007 ...................................................................... 77 5.8 More of the Same – No End in Sight for the Meat Ban .................................................. 80 5.9 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 82

6 Conclusion – potential for conflicts........................................................................... 84 6.1 Conflict Structures ........................................................................................................... 84 6.1.1 Yamal ..................................................................................................................... 84 6.1.2 Nord Stream ........................................................................................................... 84 6.1.3 The Problem of Exclusion...................................................................................... 85 6.2 Facts and Figures – How Sound are the Polish Concerns? ............................................. 86 6.2.1 Gazprom’s Pipeline Plans ...................................................................................... 86 6.2.2 Energy as a “Weapon”?.......................................................................................... 88 6.2.3 Realpolitik – Poland’s Influence in Europe’s Energy System................................ 90 6.2.4 Environmental Concerns ........................................................................................ 90 6.3 Resumee .......................................................................................................................... 91

Literature ................................................................................................................... 92

KICES Working Papers .................................................................................................103 KICES Quarterly Electronic Bibliographies ................................................................. 104

List of Tables

3-1: Production and Import Structure of Polish Gas ....................................................... 19 3-2: Gazprom’s Natural Gas Production and Exports ..................................................... 27 6-1: Gazprom’s Export Routes ........................................................................................ 87

List of Boxes

3-1: Poland’s “History” Frame .........................................................................................21 4-1: Problems with Belarus ............................................................................................. 42 5-1: EU ............................................................................................................................ 46 5-2: Germany .................................................................................................................. 53 5-3: Meat Ban ...................................................................................................................61 5-4: The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Conflict of 2005/ 2006 ............................................... 62 5-5: German Attempts to Ease the Tensions around the Pipeline Construction ............. 68 5-6: A New Ally – Sweden ............................................................................................. 70 5-7: Another Meat Ban .................................................................................................... 76 5-8: Belarus, Again ......................................................................................................... 77

1 Introduction International energy trade has caused conflicts in the past. This study focuses on the potential for conflict and co-operation in Eurasian pipeline politics. The term ‘Eurasia’ is used in international politics to refer to the states of the former Soviet Union. Here it also includes the countries of Central Europe, which are major transit countries to one of the main consumer markets for oil and gas: the European Union (EU). The major oil and gas producer in Eurasia is the Russian Federation. In modern, industrial societies, which are mostly net energy importers, energy security has become essential for economic welfare and political stability. Therefore, energy policy, including pipeline policy, is strongly linked with security and foreign policy. In general, the use of economic means and cross-border trade as an instrument of foreign policy is neither new nor uncommon (cf. e.g., Hirschman 1945/ 1980). Gas transit is a sensitive issue, particularly in a crisis-prone region such as the area formerly known as the Soviet Union. Strategic power games and geopolitical issues seem to dominate ‘pure’ economic theory when it comes to determining transit fees, capacities, investment projects and other related issues. The intertwining of foreign and energy policy by Russia has often led to conflicts with countries in Eurasia. They have accused Russia of using its energy supplies as a “weapon” to undermine their independence. This working paper examines Poland’s role as a transit country for Russian natural gas to Western Europe and the involved potential for conflict. After the presentation of the theoretical framework and methods, the two main actors – Poland and the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom – will be introduced in Chapter 3. The following chapter describes how Poland became a transit country for Russian gas and how the conflict around the Yamal pipeline evolved. Chapter 5 focuses on Gazprom’s latest pipeline project, the ‘Nord Stream’ pipeline underneath the Baltic Sea.1 In the concluding chapter, the conflict structures are explained and the underlying mental models are elaborated upon.

2 Theoretical Framework and Methods These ongoing pipeline conflicts deserve closer scrutiny from an empirical as well as a theoretical angle. On the basis of a constructivist perspective and a discursive understanding of conflict, a stage model of conflict development has been developed. The model is based on the analysis of the societal reach of conflict communication in order to assess the relevance and intensity of conflicts.

2.1 Stage Model of Conflict Communication In this study, conflicts and their discursive nature are analysed following the theoretical approach of Heinz Messmer (2003).2 He examines the internal structures and dynamics of a conflict, which shape its form and outcome, rather than the external causes. His methodology entails the understanding of conflicts as a form of social communication. To this 1

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Even though the pipeline project started under the name ‘North European Gas Pipeline’ and the abbreviation NEGP, it was renamed ‘Nord Stream’ in October 2006. In the following, the current name (Nord Stream) is used. His approach has been applied to international relations before by Diez et al. (2004).

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end, the communication process in which and through which these conflicts have emerged requires scrutiny (Messmer 2003: 42, 44, 99, 277). This discursive approach provides a new perspective on international conflicts. Messmer (2003) aims to open the ‘black box’ of the conflict itself by analysing communication and its function in a conflict. Because conflicts arise in nearly every aspect of social interaction, Messmer aims to develop a theory that is both applicable to all kinds of social conflicts and empirically useful. Therefore, the definition of conflict is necessarily broad and rather abstract in order to capture all possible aspects of conflictual situations (Messmer 2003: 42, 44). Conflicts are thus defined as the articulation of incompatibilities (of expectations and/ or preferences) that are communicated to the other conflict parties (Messmer 2003: 119). This definition of conflict is based on Luhmann’s systems theory (1984 and 1995), especially on his communication of contradiction (Messmer 2003: 52; see also Kratochwil 1989). According to Luhmann, a social conflict occurs when “communication is contradicted, or when a contradiction is communicated”, i.e. when the response to a communication is rejection (Luhmann 1995: 388).3 Conflicts are dynamic in nature. In order to assess their relevance and societal impact, Messmer (2003) has proposed an ideal-typical process model of social conflicts consisting of four different stages: (1) conflict episodes, (2) issue conflicts, (3) identity conflicts and (4) subordination conflicts. These four different stages denote incremental increases in the frequency and intensity in conflictual communication and reflect the emotional content of the communication. The stages are characterised by different kinds of subject incompatibilities as well as by the different ways in which these incompatibilities are articulated (Messmer 2003: 85). Accordingly, escalation is not just intensification; rather, it is a change in nature as opposed to simply a change in degree (Zartman/ Faure 2005: 6). “Escalation is driven by changes within each of the conflict parties, by evolving patterns of interaction between the adversaries, and by developments affecting previously uninvolved parties to join the struggle” (Kriesberg 1998: 152). The conflict opponent is increasingly constructed as an existential threat against which special measures, regulated political interaction and ultimately physical violence become legitimised. In connection with this, the articulation of such incompatibilities increasingly tends to be linked to all forms of societal interaction and to overarch previously unrelated societal communications, which all become part of the discursive framework of the conflict (Messmer 2003: 96, 279). “Escalation may occur inadvertently, in a series of incremental steps without the opponents having carefully considered the implications of their actions.” But it can also be a calculated strategy of one of the involved parties (Kriesberg 1998: 152). Every stage of the process includes its own specific mechanism of escalation with unique characteristics and triggers. In practice, however, conflicts do not always develop linearly, but more often cyclically and reversibly (Messmer 2003: 95, 280). The conflict stages presented here are ideal-types that according to Max Weber do not exist in reality. Parties often skip particular phases or cycle through them multiple times, thus refuting cyclical

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“Conflict is a communicative act relying for its emergence on signals which are context-specific and subject to appropriate interpretation” (Jabri 1996: 73).

Poland as a Transit Country for Russian Natural Gas: Potential for Conflict

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or bell-shaped models of conflict escalation and de-escalation (Miall 2004: 69; Putnam 2006: 14). Conflict parties might also develop an asymmetric conflict perception; those involved may communicate with different degrees of intensity and emotional content. Because the conflict communication has not escalated in a symmetrical way, the parties therefore perceive the conflict differently (for an analysis of the process of de-escalation, see Azar 1972). The analysis of conflicts is exacerbated by the fact that it is difficult to precisely identify the instance of constitutive communication that marks the passage from one conflict stage to another. To detect the crossing of a stage boundary, help from other theoretical concepts and approaches, i.e. social psychology, is required (Messmer 2003: 98). (1) Conflict Episodes Conflict episodes are isolated instances of disagreement on a particular issue. They do not necessarily lead to a stabilisation of conflicts. In this contained stage of conflict, communication is primarily directed at exchanging information about expectations, preferences and mutual disagreement. The main aim of the articulation of incompatibility is to set boundaries and mark a position, but not to enforce this position. These kinds of conflict episodes also occur in seemingly ‘perpetual’ rivalries (Messmer 2003: 141; Risse 2000: 8). Messmer (2003: 119, 127, 137) proposes that conflict episodes consist of three communicative steps:4 (1) the articulation of an incompatibility by party A (imposition of meaning), (2) a rejection of the incompatibility by party B (contradiction of meaning) and (3) a counter-rejection by party A (rejection), which now insists on its position. These episodes serve to verify the incompatibility of expectations and/or preferences empirically. In general, however, affirmation is sought in order to create a co-operative relationship, in which politesse is an important tool (Messmer 2003: 110–111, 114; for the aspect of politesse, see Brown/ Levinson 1978).5 “[…] communication can incorporate elements that pressure the receiver towards acceptance rather than rejection. Such pressure is exerted in part by the anticipation and avoidance of conflict […]” (Luhmann 1995: 148). Both parties have a preference for agreement and try to affirm the other’s expectations to avoid disagreement as long as possible (Messmer 2003: 114, 116). However, if this is no longer possible, party B softens its disagreement and avoids explicit forms of disagreement. That gives party A the opportunity to reformulate its expectations and to lower them. This behaviour leaves both parties alternatives to avoid conflict (Messmer 2003: 114, 117, 119). In the third step, assuming that party B has rejected its articulation of incompatibility, party A must decide – bindingly – between submitting to B’s rejection, correcting its expectations and insisting on its position. The mere supposition that the other party might oppose one’s position can lead to the creation of a conflict (Messmer 2003: 125–126).6 4

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For simplicity’s sake, the existence of only two conflict parties (party A and party B) is assumed, whereby party A starts the articulation of incompatibilities. In reality, the existence of several conflict parties is possible. In family or intimate communication, different norms of politesse and tact apply (Messmer 2003: 131, footnote 19). Even when no stimulus for negative affect is present, thinking about aggression may trigger anger and aggression. This is called the ‘priming effect’ in social psychology. It explains why aggression is evoked in aversive conditions other than interpersonal conflicts (Geen 1998: 322; see also Berkowitz/ Heimer 1989).

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However, even in the event that a conflict occurs, limitation and containment of the conflict are the socially preferred and accepted reactions at this stage and therefore still the main objectives of the involved parties (Messmer 2003: 94, 110). Mechanisms for stopping an escalation (with or without the intervention of a third party) are agreement (submission to the other or a third party or explicit compromise) or non-response (no further communication of contradiction and implicit compromise or avoidance of compromise) (Messmer 2003: 138, 140–141). Due to the fact that the main aim in a conflict episode is mostly symbolic – i.e. to mark a position and set boundaries but not to enforce them – one (or both) of the involved parties is able to turn away from the conflict without aspiring to a solution. Reasons for a non-response might include the desire to avoid a disruption of the relationship, the high costs of a long-term conflict with the other party and the common knowledge that resolution will only become more complicated (Messmer 2003: 141–143). In a fourth response, both parties insist on their positions. When they attempt to convince each other of the truth and legitimacy of their respective positions, they shift the formerly contained conflict episode to an issue conflict (Diez et al. 2004: 9). (2) Issue Conflicts Issue conflicts arise when both parties insist on their position on a particular issue that they consider important. Both conflict parties attempt to convince the other side of the legitimacy and reasonableness of their respective position (Messmer 2003: 147, 150). However, issue conflicts are limited to argumentation about a specific issue. Conflict communication shifts from previously entrenched oppositional features to an approach of treating conflict issues between both parties as contested, single issues that can be dealt with and solved through arguing and compromise seeking. To seek a reasoned consensus, each conflict party must itself be prepared to be persuaded (Risse 2000: 9). Both parties attempt to ‘rationalise’ the conflict and to translate encompassing adversary identities into concrete issues that could then be solved through co-operation and dialogue between the involved parties (Messmer 2003: 156). Both parties are involved in a communication of respect (Achtungskommunikation) in which the formal rules of communication are affirmed and both sides grant each other the right to present argumentation. However, with communication becoming more extensive and complicated, it also intensifies, which could potentially lead to escalation (Messmer 2003: 154, 158, 181). If a solution is not found, especially because one of the parties obstinately adheres to its point of view, the conflict escalates. The parties start to fluctuate between co-operation and competition (Noll 2000). Attempts to soften disagreement as well as issue-based cooperation vanishes and the willingness to hear the other side’s argumentation decreases (Messmer 2003: 163, 169). The formal rules of communication become more and more destabilised by the parties: the rules themselves become the topic of discussion, the agenda-setting of the other party is undermined and interruptions of argumentation (act of communication) occur more and more frequently. Rules are only followed when it comes to the interpersonal communication of respect (Messmer 2003: 174–176). However, despite this element of formal interpersonal respect, personal attacks are launched and the rejection of the other’s argumentation becomes harsher (Messmer 2003: 178–179). Both parties know they have common interests, but their own wishes and the enforcement


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of their own position become more important. The temptation to leave the field of argumentation increases (Noll 2000). With the realisation that the other party cannot be convinced and one’s own unwillingness to compromise or listen to the other party any more, the issue conflict reaches a stalemate. The recognition of the stalemate adds to the frustrations that have already built up.7 Aggressive behaviour ensues in the form of an accusation of responsibility for the stalemate (and maybe the whole conflict). This accusation changes the issue conflict into an identity conflict. (3) Identity Conflicts In identity conflicts, a general suspicion about the other side’s motives replaces disagreement on a specific issue. Disagreement becomes explicitly personalised. The conflict is widened in its scope and negotiations are hampered by a general feeling of distrust. Identity conflicts are characterised by the diametrically opposed ways in which both sides experience the conflict, i.e. an increasingly self-referential perception of the conflict. Responsibility for the conflict is seen to rest with the other side, and both parties become ‘blind’ to each other’s fears, perceptions and motives. Communication is only used in a strategic mode in order to justify and reinforce the parties’ identities and preferences (Messmer 2003: 186; Risse 2000: 8). In the social dimension of communication, the respect for the status and identity of the other side is important; there is a division between issue and identity and between content and relationship.8 An intensification of the communication of contradiction is possible only to a limited extent without destroying this division and, consequently, the social dimension of communication. Over the course of the conflict communication, the involved parties start to relate the conflict personally to the other party. In this shift, the other party – and not the issue – becomes personally responsible for the conflict (Messmer 2003: 185–187). The accusation of being responsible for the conflict is caused by an ‘unhappy incident’, initiated by the other party (Messmer 2003: 187). An ‘unhappy incident’ is a negatively experienced event, like frustration or a misperception (of motives and intentions), and leads to aggressive behaviour or overreaction, respectively (Chilton 1997: 179). Moral judgements about the other party, which are inherent in an accusation, threaten the party’s identity and force it to be self-critical. A moral judgement deprives the party of respect and might cause a feeling of shame that undermines its self-respect (Messmer 2003: 201, 208; see also Scheff 1988). This establishes a relationship between the involved parties, which in itself becomes the object of a possible rejection (Messmer 2003: 191–192, 201). Motives are ascribed to the other party and negative categorisations serve to intensify the conflict. Supposed motives for creating a conflict increase the believed guilt and legitimise or even require the moral ostracism of the other party (Messmer 2003: 198–199). 7

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Frustration is an unexpected barrier to the attainment of an expected gratification. Any definition has to recognise that people are not necessarily frustrated when they are deprived of an attractive goal. They also need to have been anticipating the pleasures they would experience at reaching this objective (Berkowitz 1988). According to the theory of cognitive neo-associationism, frustration evokes an increased negative affect reaction that evokes hostile thoughts, anger and aggressive expressive motor patterns. This, in turn, is the first step in a mediational process that may eventually produce aggressive behaviour (Geen 1998: 322; see also Berkowitz 1989). The systematic differentiation between issue and identity conflicts goes back to Watzlawick et al. (1967).

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The ascription of motives is the most important mechanism for intensifying the communication of accusations (Messmer 2003: 225). The accused party can react with • •

a defensive justification: external reasons are alleged or the ‘unhappy incident’ is questioned (Messmer 2003: 201, 204), or an offensive justification: the justification becomes an accusation of the other party (Messmer 2003: 201).

At this stage of communication, an apology normally leads to a consensus. The accusation can still be taken back if, for instance, the justification of the other party is convincing. If a party does not react to an accusation, however, this is seen by the other party as a sign of guilt (Messmer 2003: 194, 201, 203). Ignoring an adversary’s contentious behavior often escalates a conflict, as the adversary resorts to more extreme conduct in order to arouse attention from the mass media and get a response from the opposing party that is acting inattentively. Nonresponse is often experienced as a denial of significance and is therefore humiliating (Kriesberg 1998: 169).

The structures of both parties’ conflict strategies gradually conform to each other; justifications become more and more related to the other party and resemble the accusations themselves. The relationship between the conflict parties becomes more and more symmetric. Therefore, the conflict increasingly develops a social dimension in addition to the issue at hand, which affects the social relationship between the two conflict parties (Messmer 2003: 208). Beginning at the stage of the identity conflict, the parties’ thinking reverts back to basic cognitive structures (so-called frames) that guide their perception and representation of reality to make sense out of each other’s behaviour. Every action of the other party is analysed through this frame. While the original reason for the conflict is pushed into the background, the behaviour of the other conflict party becomes the focus of the attention. This leads to a stabilisation of conflict in the form of a social antagonism (Messmer 2003: 209–210). Both parties fear that the ground for a common solution is lost. In other words, they lose hope for a reasonable outcome. Due to the fact that the accusations threaten their identities, the parties’ interactions become hostile. Finally, threats are explicitly uttered with the aim of subordinating the other party (Noll 2000). (4) Subordination Conflicts In the final stage, both parties try to solve the conflict through subordination of the other side. Negotiations are replaced by systematic punitive measures (economic sanctions and/ or military force). The projection of superiority legitimises the systematic use of violence. It is only when conflicts reach the subordination level that physical violence against the ‘other’ is seen as legitimate within the constituency or ‘in-group’ (Messmer 2003: 225– 226). Physical violence can occur at other conflict stages, but the lack of general legitimacy will ensure that these remain isolated cases (Diez et al. 2004: 12–13). At this stage of conflict, the communication between the parties uses generalisations and “extreme case formulations” in order to exaggerate the ‘wrong-doing’ of the other party. Stereotypes are applied as negative identifications of the opponent and each side considers itself a victim in the conflict (Messmer 2003: 229–230, 233; Noll 2000). While the relationship with the opposing party is experienced as hostile, hurt feelings, emotions and affects play a more dominant role in the perception of the ‘other’ and leaves plenty of room for overreaction. The conflict parties fall back on the aforementioned frames as their guid-


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ing cognitive structures to interpret the other party’s behaviour (Messmer 2003: 226, 235; Kriesberg 1998: 153, 169–172). Perceptual and cognitive processes become more and more crucial in the escalation and perpetuation of conflict and create barriers to redefining and resolving the conflict despite changing realities and interests. Two perceptual processes that characterize mutual images of parties in conflict can account for this effect: the formation of mirror images and the resistance of images to contradictory information […]

leading to selective perception (Kelman/ Fisher 2003: 325; see also Iklé 1971; Zartman/ Faure 2005). Mirror Images Mirror images produce a spiralling effect of insecurity and frustration (exemplified by the classic pattern of an arms race described by the ‘conflict spiral model’). [E]ach side interprets any hostile action by the other side as an indication of aggressive intent against which it must defend itself, yet its own reactions – whose defensive nature, it assumes, should be obvious to the enemy – are taken by the other as signs of aggressive intent (quotation from Kelman/ Fisher 2003: 327; Messmer 2003: 248, 251; see also North et al. 1964; Rummel 1976; Carlson 1995).

The ‘structural change model’ overcomes the shortcomings of the ‘conflict spiral model’ by explaining why a conflict escalates even during times when the other side does not conduct any actions. This phenomenon arises from the fact that the conflict has led to an enduring structural change in the perception of the ‘other’ (Messmer 2003: 251; see also Coleman 1957; Burton 1962). Selective Perception Individuals prefer homogeneity between reality and their belief systems, which leads to selective perception. The theory of cognitive dissonance (cf. Festinger 1957) suggests that in the interest of maintaining consistency, people tend to somehow neutralise or ignore information that challenges the validity of their existing beliefs and attitudes in order to justify their actions in their own mind (Kriesberg 1998: 153; Kelman/ Fisher 2003: 327; Messmer 2003: 36, 237; Zartman/ Faure 2005: 10). The dynamics of conflict interaction tend to entrench the parties in their own perspective on history and justice. Conflicting parties display particularly strong tendencies to find evidence that confirms their negative image of each other and to resist evidence that would seem to disconfirm these images […]. […] Parties whose interaction is shaped by the norms and images rooted in the history of the conflict are systematically constrained in their capacity to respond to the occurrence and possibility of change (Kelman/ Fisher 2003: 321).

Mental Capacities These two perceptual processes combined produce a competitive irrationality, “one of the phenomena most commonly associated with escalation” (Zartman/ Faure 2005: 10). Additionally, while the conflict dynamics become more and more complex, the degree of communication decreases; conflict parties tend to become increasingly isolated from each other and reduce the number of non-conflicting relations (Kriesberg 1998: 159). The increased stress in situations of crisis (e.g. time pressure) erodes the precondition for rational and efficient decision-making; it limits the number of alternatives that are considered and the

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decision-makers tend to simplify the conflict situation (Messmer 2003: 251, 254; Kelman/ Fisher 2003: 324). Stress not only limits the mental capacities but also leads to more frustration and aggression, which eventually leads to threatening the other conflict party. The exchange of threats is another caesura in the conflict communication. It has no link to the past, the original incompatibility or an ‘unhappy incident’ anymore; the communication of threats is futureoriented (Messmer 2003: 241). Emotional responses contribute to the reverberation of coercive acts between opponents. If one party is harmed or even threatened by a rival, it is more likely to respond with hostility than acquiescence (Kriesberg 1998: 157).

Hostility leads to a dehumanisation of the ‘other’, making it even more difficult to acknowledge and assess the perspective of the other party (Kelman/ Fisher 2003: 321). This dehumanisation of the ‘other’ builds the basis of legitimisation for violent actions against it (Messmer 2003: 237). The articulation of threats limits the alternatives of action and escalates the conflict (Messmer 2003: 243, 250). A threat is successful if it leads to an intended result. However, if it leads to no result (or not the intended one) the pressure is on the party that issued the threats (to remain credible, the party is forced to act). In the worst case, a threat is answered by a counter-threat (Messmer 2003: 240). Both sides feel forced into roles from which they see no escape (Messmer 2003: 249; Kriesberg 1998: 153). Power becomes important as empathy erodes. Finally, all logic is focused on action, replacing the fruitless and nerve-wracking discussions and accusations. Escalation results when one side commits an action that the opposite side takes as an affront (such as not reacting to its threats) (Noll 2000). The paradigm shifts towards the use of force and physical violence (Messmer 2003: 267); this shift is empirically noticeable through the occurrence of physical actions. At this junction, another category must be introduced: the ‘attached’ conflict. This category of conflict is defined as a conflict that is not connected – or not closely connected – but merely attached to an existing one to increase the pressure on the other conflict party. This conflict category also adds to the complexity of the main conflict by introducing new issues to the conflict communication. It makes resolution more difficult because it increases the degree of hostility within the communication and perception of the other party. In some situations, an attached conflict occurs after the original conflict has been solved. In this case, it functions as a vent for accumulated emotions and anger, or it can be used as a tool for retaliation. To sum up, these four stages identify an increase in the frequency and intensity (i.e. the emotional content) in conflictual communication. The conflict opponent is increasingly constructed as an existential threat, against which special measures, regulated political interaction and ultimately physical violence become legitimised. In connection with this, the articulation of such incompatibilities increasingly tends to be linked to all forms of societal interaction and to overarch previously unrelated societal communications, which all become part of the discursive framework of the conflict. This typology is useful not only for a better understanding of the development of conflicts but also for the engineering of conflict resolution and the design of a more co-operative energy policy.


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2.2 Methods The chosen theory, which emphasises the communication of incompatibilities in the development of a conflict, requires a specific empirical methodological approach. This approach must carefully specify the inter-relationship between different conflict stages in order to identify, at specific historical moments, the dominant forms of conflict communication (Messmer 2003: 91). To determine a ‘timeline’ of the conflict, the discrete stages of the conflictual situation have to be reconstructed. Here, a qualitative process-tracing case study of Poland as a transit country for Russian natural gas is used to study the potential for conflict in Eurasian pipeline politics across time. Process-tracing case studies are the qualitative analogue to time-series analysis; they scrutinise the historical record of events from bounded cases (Druckman 2005: 165, 202). In the attempt to systematically analyse language use as social practice (conflict communication), the analytical concept of Critical Discourse Analysis in the tradition of Norman Fairclough (1995a, 2003) has been chosen. Discourse can be defined as the fixation of meaning within a particular domain (Jørgensen/ Phillips 2002: 141). The starting point is that the discourses, by representing reality in one particular way rather than in other possible ways, constitute subjects and objects in particular ways, create boundaries between the true and the false, and make certain types of action relevant and others unthinkable (Jørgensen/ Phillips 2002: 145).

In this sense, discourse is constitutive of the social context; discursive accounts have social consequences (Phillips/ Hardy 2002: 2).

2.2.1 Research Questions and Design of the Discourse Analysis The actual design for the discourse analysis depends on the research question(s) and on the theoretical framework used (Jørgensen/ Phillips 2002: 141). The discourse analysis applied to the conflictual events within the aforementioned case study attempts to answer the following research questions: 1. What kind of behaviour patterns and strategies – co-operation, avoidance or conflict – can be distinguished among the actors involved on the country and company levels? 2. In case of conflict, how do these conflicts develop? 3. How has an energy policy to be designed to avoid conflicts and to ensure the energy security of the consumer countries? The analysis starts with basic information about the source that is investigated: (1) an actor (who makes the claim?), (2) a target (at whom is the claim directed?), (3) a time period (when and where is the claim made?), (4) an issue (what is the claim about?), (5) the form of the claim (how is the claim inserted into the public sphere?), and (6) the justification for the claim (why?) (cf. Azar 1975; Franzosi 2004).

2.2.2 Frames of Discourse: Bringing History Back in However, discourse becomes meaningful only through its interconnection with its social context (Phillips/ Hardy 2002: 4). An analysis must also therefore consider the ‘order of discourse’, i.e. the complex configuration of discourses and genres within the same social field or institution (Jørgensen/ Phillips 2002: 141). This “common platform of different discourses” (Jørgensen/ Phillips 2002: 144) can also be described as a ‘frame’.

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It was Goffman (1974: 10) who first developed a frame analysis in an attempt to “isolate some of the basic framework of understanding available in our society for making sense out of events and to analyze the special vulnerabilities to which these frames of reference are subject.” Frames can be defined as the basic cognitive structures that guide the perception and representation of reality. “Frames are principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters” (Gitlin 1980: 6). As semi-structured elements of discourse, frames invoke a particular image or idea that is often associated with a pre-conceived cultural code (Fisher 1997; Gamson/ Modigliani 1989: 2; Snow/ Benford 1988: 204). A frame describes and interprets an event (conflict) based on past experiences, knowledge, values and the assessment of the event as a threat or a potential benefit. Frames are usually not consciously manufactured but rather subconsciously adopted over the course of communicative processes. In the case of consciously manufactured frames, which organise the values, beliefs and the topics of discussion, individuals exercise considerable control over the framing process (Snow/ Benford 1988). These frames can be called discursive structural frames (Fisher 1997: 1.3–1.4). Subconsciously adopted frames are located within the discourse patterns that people learn as members of a culture. With these loose, socially-generated discursive structures, people organise information and groups develop ideological and political arguments around them. Located at deeper cognitive levels, individuals and institutions hold little, if any, direct control over the production of these frames (Fisher 1997: 1.4–1.5, 3.4). Cultural frames can be interpreted as a part of the ‘memory of language users’ (van Dijk 1980: 131). “People learn [to use both types of, AH] frames as they learn to fluently use a language and as they learn the narrative structures and ideologies present in the cultures which use that language. When people encounter new information or a new experience, they make sense of that information or experience by fitting it into an existing frame” (Fisher 1997: 4.36). People also tend to selectively perceive information, focusing on details that most readily fit into the frames they know (Triandafyllidou 1995: 7).

2.2.3 Identification of Frames It is the tacit rather than the overt elements of a frame that cause problems for its empirical identification. In practice, most framing studies (regardless of the discipline) use techniques borrowed from discourse analyses and sociolinguistics to identify frames. Accumulated experiences shape how any particular event (conflict) is interpreted or ‘framed’. These experiences and knowledge are ‘activated’ by one particular word or phrase (Macgilchrist 2007: 75). Therefore, it has to be asked: Which images are invoked by the words and phrases used in conflict communication? Keywords and key phrases can be used as indicators, even though frames are often latent and not necessarily literally outlined in the text. Yet it seems reasonable to assume that parts of frames become manifest in speech, which is usually enough to suggest or to recall the whole frame. An interpretative identification of relevant keywords is therefore needed (Donati 1992: 141, 149; Entman 1993: 53; Triandafyllidou/ Fotiou 1998: 3.7; König 2004: 4). Cultural frame analysis enables scholars to study how people understand an issue, and to track the way in which this understanding changes over time. No direct connections tie


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cultural frames to language. […] [Therefore], one must look for story-lines about what is to be comprehended (Fisher 1997: 6.2).

Identity frames, for instance, are implicitly constructed by a collectivisation process through the use of the words ‘we’ or ‘us’ (deictics) to create an in-group. Another typical speech element in which a part is used for the whole is a synecdoche. Generalising synecdoches are used to describe the out-group or the ‘others’ (Fairclough, 1995b: 145; Reisigl/ Wodak 2001: 57, 83; van de Mieroop, 2005: 112). Some frames – called master-frames – are based in meta-narratives that are critical for identity building (McAdam 1994: 41–43; Somers 1995: 255–257); they “resonate with cultural narration, that is with stories, myths, and folk tales that are part and parcel of one’s cultural heritage” (Snow/ Benford, 1988: 210). Some master-frames evoke enduring cultural themes, which are culturally resonant regardless of their empirical adequacy (Gamson et al. 1992). In a next step, therefore, the following elements of Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis are used in this study: • • • • •

broader social context, contextualisation; metaphors and wording used; ethos (how are identities constructed?); interdiscursivity = elements of other discourses/ linking to other discourses; relationship between discursive practice and its frame of discourse (which images are invoked by the words and phrases used in conflict communication).

2.3 Operationalisation In order to analyse conflict development, the theoretical framework directs the discourse analysis to find the boundaries of the single conflict stages, or to the turning points in the conflict communication that escalate and elevate the conflict communication onto a more intense level. The contained stage of a conflict episode – in which opinions are voiced – shifts to an issue conflict if at least one party insists on its position. The exchange of arguments within an issue conflict escalates to an identity conflict as soon as accusations are made. An identity conflict is further elevated toward a subordination conflict if a threat is voiced. A subordination conflict finally peaks in physical action. To summarise, these empirically visible turning points are (1) insistence on one’s position and the exchange of arguments, (2) accusations, (3) threats and finally (4) physical actions (sanctions etc.).

2.3.1 Sources Conflicts arise in the articulation of incompatibilities; these incompatibilities have to be made public and are therefore empirically noticeable. “Motivationally, each side is concerned with ‘looking good’ when blame for the conflict events is being apportioned […]” (Kelman/ Fisher 2003: 326). Conflict parties on the international level use mass media and other public media sources to do so; therefore, publicly available sources are used in this analysis. If one sticks rigorously to the level of discourse, the logic of the argument remains much more clear – one works on public, open sources and uses them for what they are, not as an indicator for something else (Wæver 2002: 26).

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Events are those “newsworthy” activities reported in newspapers (Azar 1975: 2). Very small or moderate events tend to be strongly underreported by the mass media (Koopmans/ Rucht 2002: 232). Smaller events in the middle or lower range are often only covered by regional sources. However, these remaining limitations seem to be unavoidable (cf. similar problems with other kinds of sources: Maney/ Oliver 2001; Davenport/ Ball 2002). Newspaper coverage of conflictual situations was used as the primary data source for the voicing of incompatibilities in this study. However, the national and international newspapers’ reportage is complemented by books, journal articles, electronic newsletters and journals (such as Pipeline News, Energy & Politics and NewsBase) as well as press releases issued by the involved companies and national governments, which might narrow the aforementioned limitations.

3 Main Actors: Poland & Gazprom 3.1 Poland 3.1.1 Poland’s Energy Sector and Gas Consumption In the early 1990s, coal accounted for about 75% of Poland’s primary energy consumption, compared to less than 20% in other European OECD countries. In 2004, coal was still the main source of primary energy in Poland (63%). Around 91% of the generated electricity and heat in 2005 came from power plants fired by coal and lignite (Gwiazda 1997: 133; PAIIZ 2006: 1; Lang 2006: 2). Natural gas was, therefore, a ‘fuel of choice’ in Poland. In November 1990, the Sejm (the lower house of the Polish parliament) decided to increase natural gas usage as one of the essential directions of Polish energy policy. It recommended an increase in gas supplies from domestic sources as well as imports (with diversification of suppliers) and the development of transit routes (Zalewska 1998). Even though the use of natural gas has increased since the early 1990s, the share of natural gas still constituted only 13% of the total energy consumption in Poland in 2006, whereas the average in the European Union (EU) was 25% (Gwiazda 1997: 133; PGNiG company information, http://www.en.pgnig.pl/ri/89.htm). Poland’s domestic natural gas production covers more than a third of its total gas consumption (PAIIZ 2006: 1). Until 1996, Poland had been importing natural gas exclusively from the Soviet Union and – after its dissolution – from Russia (Gwiazda 1997: 145–146). Today, the state-owned Polish oil and gas company Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo SA (or PGNiG for short) imports gas from Russia, Norway and Germany, as well as from Central Asian countries. Russia is responsible for around two thirds of Poland’s gas imports (PGNiG company information, http://www.en.pgnig.pl/ri/25.htm; Lang 2006: 2). Russia’s share in Poland’s gas imports decreased dramatically from 86% in 2002 to 62% in 2004 (PGNiG 2005: 25). However, gas from Central Asia is provided by a company in which the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom has a 50% interest (Łakoma 2005). Additionally, the small amounts of gas from Germany cannot serve as a substitution for Russian deliveries because they are merely re-exports of Russian gas (Gwiazda 1997: 140).


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Table 3-1: Production and Import Structure of Polish Gas (in bcm) 2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Domestic production

4.0

4.1

4.3

4.3

4.3

Domestic consumption

11.2

11.2

13.1

13.6

13.7

Imports

7.8 (100%)

8.6 (100%)

9.3 (100%)

9.6 (100%)

10.2 (100%)

Russia

6.7 (86.1%)

6.8 (79.1%)

5.8 (62,4%)

6.3 (65.6%)

6.8 (68.2%)

Norway

0.5 (6.3%)

0.5 (5.8%)

0.5 (5.4%)

0.5 (5.2%)

0.4 (3.6%)

Germany

0.4 (5.2%)

0.4 (4.7%)

0.4 (4.3%)

0.3 (3.1%)

0.5 (4.8%)

Central Asia 0.2 (2.4%) 1.0 (11.6%) 2.7 (29.0%) 2.5 (26.0%) 2.3 (23.4%) Sources: PGNiG 2006: 35–36; PGNiG 2005a: 25; PGNiG 2005b: 3; PGNiG company information, http://www.en.pgnig.pl/ri/25.htm; PGNiG 2007: 35; BP 2007: 27.

3.1.2 Political Debate about Energy Security and Diversification in Poland The usual definition of energy security is simply “the availability of sufficient supplies at affordable prices” (Yergin 2006: 70–71). However, energy security means different things in different countries. Energy exporters like Russia are striving to maintain the ‘security of demand’ and to reassert state control over ‘strategic resources’ (including pipelines and marketing channels). On the other hand, energy importers like the EU are trying to cope with their growing dependence on energy imports by diversifying their energy sources and suppliers (Yergin 2006: 71). In the EU, energy security means the security of supplies.9 Most energy supply concerns in Europe are focused on natural gas, not crude oil, because its transport is mainly pipeline-bound. Crude oil, for its part, is mostly transported by tanker. However, capital intensive infrastructure requires long-term commitment and cross-border agreements, and the agreements usually involve more than two parties – supplier, transit countries and consumers (Harks 2006: 48). Therefore, Poland’s role as a transit country in Gazprom’s export plans and the diversification of energy suppliers has loomed large on the political agenda for the last 15 years. While the necessity for diversifying energy supplies is commonly accepted, the issue of pipeline construction (including who will build them) has spurred intense competition among Poland’s the main political parties. This contest centred on the vast amounts of capital slated to flow to the winner of the pipeline concessions (Schoenman 2005: 61). The Polish media described the rivalry rather colourfully: Polish politicians look at the matter of energy security as an instrument of political fight rather than an economic problem. Waldemar Kuczynski described this instrument very explicitly: mace. Polscy politycy sprawę bezpieczeństwa energetycznego traktują bardziej jako instrument walki politycznej niż rzeczywisty problem gospodarczy. Waldemar Kuczyński ten instrument określa dosadnie: maczuga (Grzeszak 2004). 9

The EU’s Green Paper on energy policy defines the objective of security of supply as “tackling the EU’s rising dependence on imported energy through (1) an integrated approach – reducing demand, diversifying the EU’s energy mix with greater use of competitive indigenous and renewable energy, (2) creating the framework which will stimulate adequate investments to meet growing demand, (3) better equipping the EU to cope with emergencies, (4) improving the conditions for European companies seeking access to global resources, and (5) making sure that all citizens and business have access to energy” (European Commission 2006a: 18).

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Gas is a type of fuel that drives Polish politicians. Each of them has his own idea on how to free Poland from dependence on Gazprom and ensure the country’s energy security. Arguments continue, while new bizarre ideas are being born. In the meantime, we are stuck in the hands of a national gas monopoly and it does not look like this is going to change. Prices are increasing, and the winter may be cold. Gaz to paliwo, które napędza polskich polityków. Każdy ma wła-sny pomysł, jak wyrwać Polskę ze szponów rosyjskiego Gazpromu i zapewnić nam bezpieczeństwo energetyczne. Spory nie ustają, rodzą się księżycowe pomysły. My tymczasem tkwimy w szponach krajowego gazowego monopolisty i nic nie wskazuje, byśmy się z nich wyrwali. Ceny rosną, a zima może być ostra. All this feels like a war atmosphere is in the air. Gas investments are like country defence preparations. Politicians decide everything, while economic matters are taken off the immediate agenda. Wszystko to przypomina nieco atmosferę wojenną. Gazowe inwestycje traktowane są jak przygotowania do obrony kraju. O wszystkim decydują politycy, sprawy ekonomiczne odsuwane są na dalszy plan (Grzeszak/ Ostrowski 2006). Politicians seem to be one of the most serious threats to our energy security. Politycy wydają się jednym z poważnych zagrożeń naszego bezpieczeństwa energetycznego (Grzeszak 2004).

The issue of energy security has polarised Poland’s two main political fractions, whose basic structure has remained fairly stable over time. “The Left-Right cleavage is undoubtedly the dominant axis in Polish politics and the principle conflict visible in the Polish political discourse” (Zarycki 2000: 852, quote 854). “In Poland, […] political parties were engaged in a pitched competition and had roughly equal electoral strength” (Schoenman 205: 42). Until 2005, each side was represented by one major party: SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Deomokratycznej or Union of the Democratic Left) for the Left and AWS (Akacja Wyborcza “Solidarność” or “Solidarity” Election Action) for the Right, and had participated in all coalition governments. The fault-line in this division is the attitudes towards Russia and the communist past (Zarycki 2004: 597–598). The election victory of the right-wing PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość or Law and Justice) in 2005 left this general divide intact. “The Left is characterized not by a positive image of Russia but by a lesser fear of it and by greater support for economic contacts with Russia” (Zarycki 2004: 622). This becomes obvious in the discussion about the diversification of energy supplies. The Right constantly accuses the Left of collaboration, serving the interests of Russia and even spying for Russia – like in the case of former Prime Minister Oleksy (Zarycki 2004: 622).10

10 In March 2007, Poland’s deputy economy minister Piotr Naimski accused former Prime Minister Leszek Miller of lobbying Russia’s interests and sabotaging a Polish-Norwegian gas deal. After the Miller government assumed power in 2001, the country walked out of the talks with Norway and Denmark on gas supplies. Leszek Miller said the deal broke down because the prices offered were too high. Poland’s new officials, however, find these explanations unconvincing. The ruling PiS party has accused the previous government of keeping Poland heavily dependent on Russian gas. Naimski’s remark will surely politicise the case, as Miller is now virtually being accused of betraying state interests (Poland’s Ex-PM accused of gas treason, Kommersant, 6 March 2007, http://www. kommersant.com/p747730/r_500/Poland_Prime_Minister_Gas/). The deputy minister of economy added that the persons responsible should answer for that before the Constitutional Tribunal (Access to North Sea gas ‘a step towards Poland’s independence from Russia, 5 March 2007, http://www. poland.pl/news/article,Access_to_North_Sea_gas_a_step_towards_Polands_independence_from_ Russia,id,262418.htm).


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During the transition period of the early 1990s, Poland was confronted with the need to thoroughly redefine its foreign and security policy. In a situation characterised by a destabilised international environment and dynamic domestic transformations, it seems that the only relatively stable point of reference for the elaboration of the principles underlying the Polish raison d’état was historical experience. Little wonder, then, that references to the past significantly burdened both the discourse at the time and the decisions taken (Sokoła 2005: 133).

Historical experience and memories were used as a point of reference to explain current events and to support the current systemic changes (Sanford 2003: 178). Box 3-1: Poland’s “History” Frame Poland’s image of Russia is very much influenced and shaped by the contemporary Polish national identity discourse. Russia is often presented negatively, depicted as a less civilised country and an economic, political and military threat to Poland. “The negative images of Russia are not only widely shared, but after the fall of communism, they also became institutionalized in the formal discourse of textbooks and media” (Zarycki 2004: 595, quote 598).* Polish identity is based on a very strong victimisation ethos that emphasises external threats and the moral rectitude of the suffering nation. For obvious historical reasons, Russia plays a key role in “justifying that vision” (Zarycki 2004: 624).** Common features of the discourse about Russia in Polish society are: (1) rescaling Poland’s weakness and asserting Poland’s belonging to Europe, (2) Russia as an oppressor vs. Poland’s moral superiority, (3) Russia as a unifying threat, and (4) Poland as an expert on the ‘Russian mystery’ (Zarycki 2004: 599). (1) Rescaling Poland’s Weakness Russia’s key role in the Polish political discourse – directed both at the foreign and internal public – can be explained by its multifaceted function “[…] devised for compensation of Poland’s weakness in relation to the broadly defined West” (Zarycki 2004: 597). The Polish inferiority complex towards the West is compensated for by a high level of national pride and a contemptuous attitude toward its Eastern neighbours (Zarycki 2004: 601). Russia functions as a negative point of reference in Poland’s superiority complex towards the East. The combination of the post-colonial (Russian empire, Soviet bloc) and post-imperial syndromes (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) surfaces in the extensive use of history in attempts to sustain national identity, legitimise a special status for Poland in the international area (or at least in Central Eastern Europe) and prove Poland’s “European-ness” (Zarycki 2004: 600–601; see also Sanford 2003: 181). (2) Russia as an Oppressor vs. Poland’s Moral Superiority The leitmotif of Polish suffering at the hands of Russian oppressors plays a crucial role in Poland’s victimisation-based identity (Zarycki 2004: 614). Poles see themselves “as perpetual and blameless victims” (Sanford 2003: 198). The Polish security paradigm is steeped in history: Warsaw fears a resurgent Russia as well as German hegemony over Central-Eastern Europe. *

However, the opposition to the EU has developed a pro-Russian attitude. “[…] Russia is seen rather in pragmatic terms, as a potential partner in the geopolitical game, in particular as a counterbalance to Western domination […]” (Zarycki 2004: 598). ** To a lesser extent this is also true for Germany.

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Poland partly blames the West for its Soviet miseries; Poland was made prey for Soviet expansionism in the Yalta and Potsdam war conferences (Zarycki 2004: 614). Poland therefore regards West with a suspicious eye, especially regarding a potential Franco-German axis extended towards Russia (Bordonaro 2005). Poland is concerned by the lack of solidarity within the EU, in which the interests of particular countries are placed ahead of the goals of the European Union as a whole (Janiszewski 2007). The United States is seen as a counter-weight to the unreliable European West and the EU. Polish President Lech Kaczyński considers the US a difficult partner, but an alliance with it is absolutely necessary in light of Poland’s uneasy relations with Germany and France on the one hand and Russia on the other (Wiktor/ Subotić/ Janke 2005). (3) Russia as a Unifying Threat Poland’s historical security dilemma has been shaped to a great extent by its geopolitical position between its more powerful German and Russian neighbours (Sanford 2003: 178–179). Sokoła (2005: 134) describes the situation as a battle for survival against Germany and Russia, which are considered ‘eternal’ enemies. Therefore, “Poles are especially sensitive to any trace of Russian expansionism.” Russia is considered incapable of relinquishing its imperial legacy (Zarycki 2004: quote 607). From Poland’s perspective, Ukraine and Belarus, which were once a part of the former PolishLithuanian Commonwealth, are particularly sensitive areas (Zarycki 2004: 607). Polish decisionmakers consider Russia its main geopolitical rival and threat in these countries. Polish-Russian tensions “could be reduced to the conflict over control of the very same region: the borderlands between the two countries” (Zarycki 2004: 616). For Poland, the full integration of Belarus and Ukraine into the system of Western institutions would constitute a big step towards ending Russia’s grip on these countries. This explains why Poland actively supported pro-Western Ukrainian movements during the so-called ‘Orange Revolution’ in December 2004 (Bordonaro 2005). The current Russian threat is not military but political and economic; fear of it builds the backbone of Polish foreign policy, which drove its desire to join NATO and the EU (Zarycki 2004: 614; see also Sanford 2003: 181). The Soviet Union collapsed, but the possibility of political blackmail still remains in our minds. Związku Radzieckiego już nie ma, ale pamięć o możliwym szantażu politycznym pozostała (Wróblewski 2001b). A key debate in this context concerns the supply of natural gas by pipeline from Russia, an especially delicate issue politically, since dependency on Russian gas is often considered a major danger to Polish sovereignty (Zarycki 2004: 607). (4) Poland as an Expert on the ‘Russian Mystery’ “Russia seems also to be […] an object of alleged special competence of Poles” (Zarycki 2004: 616). While Poland claims to have first-hand knowledge about the ‘nature of Russia’, the “West is seen as naive in its fascination with Russia, and Western knowledge of Russia is often perceived as superficial and distorted by misleading Russian self-images successfully promoted abroad” (Zarycki 2004: 617). At the same time, Poles fear accusations of ‘Russo-phobia’ and “worries about credibility are a permanent element of Polish discourse on Russia” (Zarycki 2004: 620). However, Poland’s view and expertise on the subject are at least acknowledged and appreciated by some of the conservative German press (cf. e.g., Herzinger 2006).


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Poland and the Russian ‘Soft Power Imperialism’ Poland still considers Russia a threat; it is especially concerned by Russia’s economic and energy-driven “soft power imperialism.” While joining NATO and the EU has eliminated the military threat and has put Poland on a par with the West, Russia still does not take Poland seriously and considers it – as well as the other countries in Central Eastern Europe – to be in its sphere of influence. Janiszewski (2007) states that raw material reserves controlled by Russia are used by the government of the country to (1) rebuild its position as a superpower lost in the early 1990’s, (2) actively act and dominate the political arena in relations with the European Union (its particular member states). […] Russia seems to have a clear, long-term vision. Unfortunately, the European Union does not yet have a vision for its relations with Russia. Interests of particular countries are placed ahead of goals of the European Union as a whole. […] a new form of economic imperialism … the Russian empire is currently being restored according to the slogan “tanks yesterday, oil today.” […] nowy imperializm gospodarczy … obecnie na drodze gospodarczej następuje restauracja imperium rosyjskiego, zgodnie z hasłem „wczoraj tanki, dzisiaj ropa” (Kuczyński 2004). It is an illusion to think that membership in NATO and the European Union automatically protects Poland from Russia’s “economic imperialism.” Złudzeniem jest myślenie, że członkostwo w NATO i Unii Europejskiej automatycznie chroni Polskę przed „ekonomicznym imperializmem” Rosji (Sienkiewicz 2004). In Russia’s foreign policy, Warsaw is not considered an important, independent entity. Even though we are in the European Union and NATO, Russia still doesn’t take us seriously. W rosyjskiej doktrynie polityki zagranicznej Warszawa nadal nie jest postrzegana jako ważny, samodzielny podmiot. Choć jesteśmy w Unii i NATO, Rosja nadal nie traktuje nas serio (Łukowski 2004). In an interview with the Polish daily ‘Rzeczpospolita’, President Lech Kaczyński stated: The Russians can be expected to carry out policies aimed at regaining their influence in Poland […]. I am talking here about gas, oil, and so on. The Russians want this to be their zone of influence again, though of course on a different basis than in the past. They do not want full domination but rather an ability to exert substantial influence (Wiktor/ Subotić/ Janke 2005). Russian energy companies are always accompanied by Russian politics. Tam, gdzie pojawiają się rosyjskie kompanie energetyczne, pojawia się też rosyjska polityka (Sienkiewicz 2004). When oil or gas is sent to Western Europe, Russia’s goals are clearly economic. When dealing with Poland, Hungary, Slovakia or the Baltic States, Russia often realises its political goals along with the economic ones. Gdy ropa czy gaz są wysyłane do Europy Zachodniej, Rosja może sobie pozwolić na czysty rachunek ekonomiczny. Ale w takich krajach jak Polska, Węgry, Słowacja czy kraje nadbałtyckie obok celów ekonomicznych realizowane są również często cele polityczne (Kuczyński 2004).

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Andreas Heinrich

Diversification Plans In 1990, Poland faced a mounting debt to Gazprom, its main supplier of natural gas. Using his personal relationship with Gazprom’s management, the entrepreneur Aleksander Gudzowaty was able to secure a barter deal involving his company, Bartimpex: Polish goods in return for Russian gas debt and later, Russian gas supplies (Schoenman 2005: 61).11 Gudzowaty and Bartimpex presented a cheap and easy solution to Poland’s gas problems but created the strategic problem of Russia as sole supplier. “As the need to find a second supplier arose […] each [political, AH] party had its own variant of a program for diversification. In each case, the opportunity to extract rents determined preference for a given alternative” (Schoenman 2005: 65–66, quote 66). Potential candidates for the supply of gas were Norway, Denmark and Germany. However, results have remained meagre: Diversification of gas has been on the Polish agenda for years. Successive government officials promise that they will take care of the problem, criticising the actions of their predecessors. Then there are plans and announcements, which soon fall apart. O gazowej dywersyfikacji mówi się w Polsce od lat. Kolejne rządy składają obietnice, że się tym zajmą, nie zostawiając przy okazji na poprzednikach suchej nitki. Potem są plany i zapowiedzi, z których nic nie wychodzi (Grzeszak/ Ostrowski 2006).

The only pipeline connection from the West thus far is a gas link from Germany in the areas of Zgorzelec (Görlitz), with a total capacity of 1bcm annually, opened in 1992–1993 (Gwiazda 1997: 141). Since 1993, negotiations concerning the import of gas from North Sea producers have been in progress. However, Poland’s gas market is fairly small; it can import only 1bcm yearly in addition to the Russian gas delivered. Furthermore, Norwegian gas is far more expensive than Russian gas. Additionally, Norway wants to maintain good relations with Russia so as not to jeopardise its fishing rights in the Barents Sea or possible participation in the oil and gas exploration in that area; therefore, it is not too eager to compete with Russia over the Polish gas market (Gwiazda 1997: 141). After plans to import natural gas from Great Britain fell apart in June 1994, negotiations between Poland and Norway were terminated in September of that year (Czarnecki 1994). In 2001, the conservative Polish government was finally able to successfully negotiate supply deals with Denmark and Norway; Hungary and the Czech Republic also expressed an interest in this new connection to diversify their gas supplies. This solution would have strengthened Poland’s ever-popular role as a transit country. The Polish opposition and Aleksander Gudzowaty instead advocated a shorter connection from Bernau in Germany to Szczecin as an alternative to pipelines from Denmark or Norway. It was noted, however, that this pipeline would not resolve Poland’s problem because Germany is not a net gas producer. Instead, Poland would be purchasing Russian gas from the German company Ruhrgas (Schoenman 2005: 64). Gudzowaty asserted that the Polish gas network would be connected with Norwegian deposits via Germany. The relatively short 50km pipeline would be much cheaper than a gas pipeline running along the bed of the Baltic Sea (The Warsaw Voice, 20 February 2003, http://www.warsawvoice.pl/view/1321/). Generally, the conservative government was not to be convinced:

11 On the strength of these personal ties, Bartimpex maintained its exclusive and profitable position as mediator between Poland and Gazprom. Uncomfortable with having Poland’s supply of gas controlled by just one firm with close ties to Russia, various Polish governments have unsuccessfully tried to remove this middleman (Schoenman 2005: 62). With the construction of the Yamal pipeline, Bartimpex became even more important (see Chapter 4).


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Looking at other options [besides gas from Denmark or Norway] is considered to be sabotage among government officials. W sferach rządowych za nietakt albo wręcz sabotaż uważa się rozmowę na temat opcji innej niż norweska (Wróblewski 2001a). […] the government is afraid that any action taken toward Bernau might scare Norwegians – even though the more options we have, the stronger our bargaining position is. Zaś rząd się lęka, że jakiekolwiek zabiegi w kierunku Bernau wypłoszą Norwegów – chociaż na zdrowy rozum im więcej mamy opcji, tym nasza pozycja przetargowa mocniejsza (Wróblewski 2001a).

The SLD opposition stated that it would cancel the contract after the September 2001 elections, which it was certain to win (Schoenman 2005: 64). The same fate was assigned to a plan to build an underwater gas pipeline from Norway. Additionally, in order to be profitable, the Norwegian pipeline would have to carry at least 8bcm of gas annually; such huge amounts could not be absorbed by either Poland or the neighbouring countries (The Warsaw Voice, 20 February 2003, http://www.warsawvoice.pl/view/1321/). Eventually, both agreements were terminated under the SLD administration. Instead, it attempted to renegotiate an agreement for the import of gas from Russia, but this time, the conservative opposition disliked the idea (Wróblewski 2001b). This led Wróblewski (2001b) to ask: Do pipeline routes depend on geographical location or political preference? Czy kierunki przebiegu gazociągów zależą od geografii, czy od sympatii politycznych?

While none of the several diversification plans presented over the past several years has been implemented (Łakoma 2005), the new conservative PiS government – supported by President Lech Kaczyński from the same party – announced in late 2005 its intention to sign “irreversible” agreements on gas supplies from non-Russian sources. The government is considering gas purchases from Norway, Denmark, Central Asia, Iran and North Africa that would provide Poland with about 5bcm of gas per year – about 40% of Poland’s current gas usage (Kublik 2005b). The country’s Deputy Minister of Economy Piotr Naimski said in June 2006 that Poland’s long-term goal is to source one third of its gas from Russia, one third through domestic production and one third through a new pipeline from Norway.12 In October 2006, however, the project of building a second Polish-German gas pipeline was taken off the agenda (Grzeszak/ Ostrowski 2006). New officials of the Polish gas monopoly did not trust the idea [gas deliveries from Germany, AH], and the project plan disappeared. This time for a different reason: We are afraid of Germans too. Nowe władze polskiego gazowego monopolisty okazały wobec tego pomysłu dużą nieufność, więc projekt rury powędrował do szafy. Tym razem z innego paragrafu: Niemców też się boimy. We are concerned that the pipeline would be used by our German partner to take over the Polish market. Mamy obawy, czy taka rura nie zostanie wykorzystana przez naszego niemieckiego partnera do zdobywania polskiego rynku (Grzeszak 2006).

The conservative PiS government plans to invest EUR1bn, or US$1.26bn, to modernise the country’s transmission and distribution gas networks and reduce its dependence on

12 Poland looks to end reliance on Russian energy, Platts, 14 November 2006, http://www.platts.com/ Natural%20Gas/Resources/News%20Features/ukrainegas/index.xml.

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Russia. The financing, spread over five years, would be made available through the EU’s structural funds (Dempsey 2006c). Poland has started talks with Gassco, the state-owned Norwegian gas transport operator, about the possible extension of an off-shore pipeline project from Stavenger, Norway, to western Sweden. Poland, however, has to commit to buying a certain minimum volume of gas (Dempsey 2006c).13 The Polish government is also considering building a liquefied natural gas terminal at one of the ports on the Baltic Sea (Gdańsk or Szczecin) to allow gas shipments from a variety of producers (Dempsey 2006a). The government plans to complete the LNG terminal, the so-called Gasport, by 2010 (Dempsey 2006c). Gas pipeline and Gasport matters have already been decided, although experts have not finished their research on whether the projects are economically realistic and technically possible. Sprawy gazociągu i gazoportu zostały już przesądzone, choć eksperci nie zakończyli jeszcze badania, czy projekty są ekonomicznie realne i technicznie wykonalne (Grzeszak/ Ostrowski 2006).

Besides a pipeline from Norway, Poland has also gained access to natural gas and oil deposits in the Norwegian Sea. Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczyński has expressed confidence that the purchase of the deposits from Exxon will contribute substantially to Poland’s energy security. PGNiG has signed a contract for 15% of the deposits’ production volume, which is estimated at 36bcm annually. The sum involved is said to be roughly EUR250mn. The gas deposits are readily accessible and are operated by BP. Poland’s Deputy Minister of Economy, Piotr Naimski, considers access to the North Sea natural gas deposits as the first step towards Poland’s independence of supplies from Russia.14 He [Deputy Minister of Economy Piotr Naimski, AH] calls himself the main engineer of Polish energy policy. His concept is based on a vision of a dangerous world, in which whoever has energy sources also has power. In this world, everyone, including the East and the West, attempts to take over control of the Polish energy market. Nobody can be trusted, especially market mechanisms. That is why, for now, energy must remain in monopolistic structures under tight state control. Uchodzi on za głównego inżyniera polskiej polityki energetycznej. Jego koncepcja opiera się na wizji wrogiego świata, w którym ten, kto ma energię, ma też władzę. W tym świecie wszyscy dążą do tego, żeby przejąć kontrolę nad polskim rynkiem energetycznym: i ci ze wschodu, i z zachodu. Nikomu nie można ufać, a zwłaszcza mechanizmom rynkowym. Dlatego energetyka musi na razie pozostać w strukturach monopolistycznych pod ścisłą kontrolą państwa (Grzeszak/ Ostrowski 2006). Moscow has had an allergic reaction to every one of Poland’s attempts to diversify our gas supplies. Russia’s intention toward Poland is to keep the Polish economy dependent on Russian resources. Moskwa alergicznie reaguje na wszelkie próby zdywersyfikowania przez nas źródeł dostaw. Jeśli na czymkolwiek w stosunku do Polski jej zależy, to na utrzymaniu jak największego uzależnienia polskiej gospodarki (Łukowski 2004).

However, PGNiG gave up plans to build a 2–2.5bcm per year gas pipeline from Denmark to Poland on the bottom of the Baltic Sea for good in January 2007 (NewsBase, FSU Oil & 13 ibid. 14 Polish state oil signs deposits deal, 1 March 2007, http://www.poland.pl/news/article,Polish_state_ oil_signs_deposits_deal,id,261977.htm; Access to North Sea gas a step towards Poland’s independence from Russia, 5 March 2007, http://www.poland.pl/news/article,Access_to_North_Sea_gas_a_ step_towards_Polands_independence_from_Russia,id,262418.htm.


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Gas Monitor, No. 4, 31 January 2007). Still on the table are plans about the possible extension of an off-shore pipeline project from Stavenger, Norway, to western Sweden. Poland, however, has to commit to buying a certain minimum volume of gas. The Polish government is also considering building a liquefied natural gas terminal at one of the ports on the Baltic Sea (Gdansk or Szczecin) to allow gas shipments from a variety of producers. This alternative would not require a certain minimum volume of gas but it would involve huge investment costs.

3.2 Gazprom and its Export Routes Gazprom is known as the world’s leading natural gas company. Its gas reserves are estimated at 29.9tcm, i.e. 16.5% of the world’s gas reserves. Gazprom is responsible for around 85% of Russian and 19% of global natural gas production. In 1989, Gazprom became responsible for all enterprises directly involved in the production, refining, transportation and storage of natural gas. Until today, Gazprom has been able to preserve its export monopoly and it exports around one third of its annual total production. All of the company’s major exports markets are in the West. Gazprom has a 26% share of gas supplies on the European market and exports to 25 countries beyond the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Exports are controlled through Gazprom’s export division Gazeksport and various joint venture marketing companies in nearly all the countries to which Russian natural gas is exported (Gazprom company information; PFC Energy 2005: 6; Heinrich/ Kusznir 2005: 5–6). Table 3-2: Gazprom’s Natural Gas Production and Exports (in bcm) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005a 2006a Production 553.7 545.6 523.2 511.9 521.9 540.1 545.1 555.0 556.0 Exports 173.0 174.0 173.7 166.5 171.2 184.7 218.9 232.7 262.5 Ratio (in %) 31.2 31.9 33.2 32.5 32.8 34.2 40.2 41.9 47.2 Sources: Heinrich/ Kusznir 2005: 5; Gazprom 2006: 30; Gazprom 2007: 5; own calculations. Note: a) Including the gas production of Sibneft (later renamed Gazprom Neft).

3.2.1 Gazprom’s Weakness: Transit Countries The mighty gas company has one overarching weakness: it needs transit countries to export its gas. During Soviet times, the process of pumping natural gas from Russia to western Europe was a relatively simple affair. Transport systems were set up so that the Soviet government had control over the gas for the greater part of the journey via Soviet republics or Warsaw Pact states. After the Soviet Union’s dissolution in late 1991, conditions for the transport of natural gas from Russia to western Europe changed radically. Gas now had to pass from Russia through newly independent states, which have become important transit countries to central and western Europe, Gazprom’s main markets. Until now, Russian natural gas – for western Europe as well as for south-eastern Europe and Turkey – was exported mainly via Belarus and Ukraine. Transit pipelines through Ukraine used to carry more than 80% of Gazprom’s gas exports. The transit countries proceeded to introduce transit fees, which made Russian gas exports more expensive. In addition, they have often forced Gazprom to accept a compromise on

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their debts for natural gas deliveries. Ukraine in particular has tried to use its near monopoly position on Russian gas transit to offset its weak position as a customer for Russian gas and as a debtor to Gazprom (cf. e.g., Heinrich 1999; DeLay 2002b). These tactics have soured relations between Russia and Ukraine for more than a decade. Disputes about transit fees and Gazprom’s complaints that Ukraine never bothers to pay its gas bill in full or on time have gone on for years. Since the early 1990s, the importance of the former Soviet republics as an export market for Russian gas has been decreasing due to the widespread use of barter and a serious nonpayment crisis in most of the countries. While the payment situation improved in the mid1990s, barter was used until the end of 2005. Ukraine has settled its debts for the gas it has received from Gazprom by waiving the transit fees it would normally charge the company for using the Ukrainian pipeline grid. Despite the fact that this barter scheme is convenient for both parties, it links transit fees to gas supply, which has caused many quarrels in the past (see Box 5-4). Ukraine’s inability to pay for the gas it imports from Russia has led to very high levels of debt and resulted in the reduction of Russian gas supplies to Ukraine in October 1992 and in the following year. The reduction was aimed at restoring payment discipline.15 This in turn caused unauthorised diversions of the volumes in transit to European countries. This situation lasted only a few days; western consumers immediately panicked, causing Russia to back off and resume supplies to Ukraine in order to secure its deliveries to western Europe (Guillet 2002; Götz 2006: 15).16 Gazprom and Ukraine were unable to resolve the nearly continuous payment crisis for Russian gas. Gazprom also accused the Ukrainian government of turning a blind eye to the fact that gas had been siphoned off during transit. Local operators had developed the bad habit of removing gas designated for the European market from the transit pipeline and either redirecting it to the Ukrainian market or re-selling it to neighbouring countries and pocketing the profits. Officials in Kiev have complained that Gazprom has consistently overestimated the amount of its overdue gas bill. They have also accused the Russian government of using Gazprom as a tool to further the foreign policy goal of undermining Ukrainian independence. Due to these long-standing quarrels with Ukraine, Gazprom has developed plans for alternative transit routes to break Ukraine’s transit monopoly and to reduce transit across CIS countries as much as possible (Heinrich 1999; DeLay 2002b).

15 Until 1993, Ukraine paid US$42 per 1,000cm of Russian gas (around 50% of the price western European consumers had to pay) while Gazprom paid US$0.27 per 1,000cm per 100km in transit fees (Götz 2006: 15). 16 At this time, a shift to world market prices for both gas deliveries and transit fees was already under discussion (Götz 2006: 15; see also Preuss Neudorf 1996: 125).


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4 Yamal Pipeline – How Poland Came into Play One of the alternative transit routes is the Yamal-Europe pipeline (in the following simply Yamal pipeline) from Western Siberia, bypassing Ukraine and instead going directly through Belarus and Poland and further on to Germany (cf. e.g., Sahm/ Westphal 2002).17 It began operations in September 1999 and has a total capacity of 33bcm. Until early 2006, however, the pipeline did not transport gas at capacity, as it required the construction of additional compressor stations in Belarus and Poland (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 9, 8 March 2006). Since working at full capacity, Poland’s transit fee earnings have increased by roughly 30%, and these are estimated to rise to EUR380mn per year (Bimboes 2006: 20). Plans for the construction of this pipeline and a gas supply contract have been underway since the early 1990s. On 21 May 1992, the Polish and Russian presidents (Lech Wałesa and Boris Yeltsin) signed a friendship and co-operation treaty in which the construction of a pipeline was stipulated. Five days later, a letter of intent was signed for the construction of a transit pipeline connecting the gas deposits of the Yamal peninsula in Russia with Western Europe (Zalewska 1998). In December 1992, the Polish Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers (KERM) presented a report predicting Poland’s gas consumption in 2010 at 27–35bcm per year. KERM advised the Ministry of Industry and Trade to begin negotiations over a long-term gas supply contract with Russia that would use existing pipelines as well as the newly planned transit pipeline from Russia to Western Europe. KERM also recommended an increase in domestic gas extraction to cover around 4–5bcm of Poland’s gas demand. The document also envisioned gas imports from sources other than Russia (Zalewska 1998). An agreement was signed between Poland and Russia on 25 August 1993 to construct a transit pipeline through Polish territory, to supply Poland with Russian gas and to establish the company EuRoPol GAZ, which was supposed to build and operate the pipeline. EuRoPol GAZ was later formed as a joint venture of PGNiG and Gazexport, Gazprom’s export subsidiary. “However, according to Poland’s commercial code, shareholder companies must have at least three founders, and Gazprom insisted on the Polish company Gas-Trading, which was partially owned by Bartimpex (36%). With only 4% of EuRoPol GAZ’s shares, Bartimpex held the deciding vote between the Polish and Russian shareholders, which each held 48%” (Schoenman 2005: 62–63).18 A long-term supply agreement (the so-called ‘contract of the century’) between PGNiG and Gazprom was finally signed on 25 September 1996. According to the contract, Poland was to buy 250bcm of gas by 2020. When announced, it was hailed by the SLD government as 17 Victor/ Victor (2004: 34) state that the project made sense mainly on commercial terms for the markets it served. This can be seen as an additional reason, but not the main impetus: it could have been done more cheaply with an expansion of the existing pipeline system. For the Yamal pipeline, Gazprom collaborated with its German partner BASF/ Wintershall through their joint venture Wingas. To connect the Yamal pipeline with the European gas grid, it took Wingas from 1995 to 1999 to build a 338km long pipeline tunnelling beneath the Oder and Elbe Rivers – a technical challenge. However, the market in eastern Germany is dominated by Wingas’ competitor VNG Verbundnetz Gas, in which Wingas holds a 15.8% stake (Wingas company information). 18 Without the assistance of the state, Gas-Trading would not have been able to maintain its position in EuRoPol GAZ. Thus, the entrance of Bartimpex into the Yamal pipeline agreement occurred because Gazprom indicated Bartimpex as its preferred partner. However, this allowed Bartimpex to enter into a successful union with state capital via PGNiG, Poland’s oil and gas distribution monopoly (Schoenman 2005: 65).

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a major success for Poland, as it guaranteed continued deliveries for two decades. However, it quickly became clear that PGNiG had overestimated the demand.19 The contract meanwhile included a take-or-pay clause, which means the buyer agrees to receive a certain volume of gas per year or, alternatively, to pay for the portion of gas it does not want to receive (The Warsaw Voice, 20 February 2003, http://www.warsawvoice.pl/view/1321/). Nevertheless, the contract attracted strong criticism from the conservative opposition describing the contract as “gas Yalta.”20 Besides general objections against the increased use of gas, which ran the risk of displacing domestic energy sources like coal, and the construction of a new pipeline when two existing smaller pipelines could simply be overhauled, the biggest concern was that the Yamal pipeline and the supply contract would make Poland more dependent on Russian gas. To counteract this dangerous scenario, it was suggested that other suppliers of gas should be approached. Critics feared that even though Poland was poised to become a transit country for Russian gas to Western Europe, Russia could still terminate Polish gas supplies at whim. Additionally, the government was accused of not having used Poland’s bargaining potential as a transit country in its dealings with Gazprom: the contract included a take-or-pay clause, precluded the re-export of gas and credit guarantees were only required from the Polish side (Gwiazda 1997: 148; Zalewska 1998). The supporters of the gas supply agreement claimed that Poland’s role as a transit country would increase its energy security. Thanks to the Yamal pipeline, Poland would be no longer “at the end of the pipe” [Polska nie będzie już na „końcu rury”] (Czarnecki 1994). The transit location of Poland (reason for many of our tragedies) has its advantages as well. Our location at the beginning of the trans-European pipeline secures our energy supply. Even in times of crisis, the Russians cannot close the pipeline. Gas flows in one direction of the pipeline, but money in the other. Tranzytowe położenie Polski, przez wieki powód wielu naszych nieszczęść, ma w sobie i dobre strony. Położenie na początku transeuropejskiego rurociągu daje nam bezpieczeństwo dostaw gazu: przecież nawet w sytuacji kryzysowej Rosjanie nie mogą zamknąć kurka, bo w jedną stronę rurą płynie gaz, ale w drugą pieniądze (Wróblewski 2000).

Poland would also be able to demand substantial transit fees. As an added bonus, natural gas is more environmentally friendly than other energy sources, which would become important in the event of EU membership. Last but not least, it was pointed out that Russia delivers the least expensive gas, and while not permitting the re-sale of unused gas, allows it to be ‘turned over’ under the take-or-pay rule to cover an increased domestic demand in the future (Zalewska 1998). This domestic dispute did not go unnoticed by Gazprom. It led Gazprom’s CEO, Rem Vyakhirev, to comment that although the project’s benefits for both sides were obvious, misinformation about the deal had been spread in Poland. He assured detractors that Gazprom wanted to develop an “honest and normal” partnership with Poland (Rzhevsky 1998).

19 Gas demand projections, however, varied widely in Poland: from 43bcm in 2010 to 22–27bcm or only 18bcm (Gwiazda 1997: 148). Already in October 1995, the Polish government had adjusted its estimations for Poland’s gas demand in 2010 to 22–27bcm, down from 27–35bcm in its “Guidelines for energy policy of Poland until 2010” (Zalewska 1998). 20 This is a reference to the February 1945 Yalta conference in the Crimea, in which the Allied leaders of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States made various decisions about a post-war Poland. These decisions would ultimately lead to the establishment of communist rule in Poland. The document can be found in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations/ Department of State 1950: 27–34, especially 30–31.


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4.1 The Bypass Pipeline – from Conflict Episodes to Identity Conflict In late 1999, Gazprom announced plans for the construction of a bypass pipeline through Belarus, Poland and Slovakia.21 However, the Polish government refused the Russian proposal to construct a gas pipeline across Poland that would bypass Ukraine on the grounds that it would harm Ukraine’s economic interests. Poland was clearly interested in maintaining Ukraine’s role as a transit country (cf. Sahm/ Westphal 2002; Victor/ Victor 2004). The proposal for a bypass pipeline again caused a stormy debate in Poland along political lines. Leftist President Aleksander Kwaśniewski saw the construction of a bypass pipeline as an economic rather than a political issue; nevertheless, he asked Russia to take Ukraine’s interests fully into consideration. However, the conservative Polish government disagreed with his assessment and announced that it would not agree to such a bypass pipeline.22 After each remark about the [bypass, AH] pipeline in Poland, various political parties responded with various opinions: the Right accused the president of betrayal, because he had discussed the pipeline with [the Russian President Vladimir, AH] Putin; the Left recommended a cost and benefit analysis without national bias. W Polsce po każdej kolejnej wzmiance na temat gazociągu odzywały się, stosownie do orientacji politycznej, stanowcze opinie: od narodowej prawicy, która zarzucała prezydentowi Kwaśniewskiemu niemal zdradę, bo rozmawiał o rurociągu z Putinem – po lewicę, która radzi liczyć koszty i zyski bez narodowych uprzedzeń (Wróblewski 2000).

While Russia contends that its reasons for bypassing Ukraine are economic, Ukrainian politicians claim that the real reason is Moscow’s desire to exert political pressure on Kiev.23 Speaking at the 23 September 1999 ceremony to mark the opening of the Polish segment of the Yamal pipeline, Gazprom CEO Rem Vyakhirev announced that part of Russian gas exports pumped through the transit line running across Ukraine would very soon be rechannelled via Belarus and Poland. The pipeline was able to transport 14 bcm of gas a year at this point in time. Vyakhirev attributed the need to re-channel export flows to the “wear and tear of Ukraine’s pipeline system and the unsanctioned 2–3bcm of gas a year siphoned from the transit pipeline there” (Trilenko 1999). Gazprom did not like Kiev’s gas politics: the gas pump did not work efficiently, the pipes were not tight, Ukraine did not pay for its own gas supplies, and stole gas to be sent to other recipients […]. During the ceremony for the handing over of the first piece of Yamal pipeline […] Gazprom’s director Rem Vyakhirev stated in Warsaw that his company would “discipline Ukraine” in further plans for system development. Gazprom krzywym okiem patrzał na Kijów: nie dość, że przepompownie były niewydajne, a rury nieszczelne, nie dość, że Ukraina nie płaciła za dostawy gazu dla siebie, to jeszcze podkradała spore porcje […]. Podczas uroczystego oddania do użytku pierwszej nitki gazociągu jamalskiego […] szef Gazpromu Rem Wachiriew powiedział w Warszawie, że jego firma w dalszych planach rozbudowy systemu „zdyscyplinuje Ukrainę.” It is a bit uncomfortable for us to defend theft – Ukrainian politicians do not deny that a few percent of gas from Russia get lost on the way.

21 The pipeline proposal was officially announced only on 19 October 2000. 22 Polish president’s talks on pipeline from Russia bypassing Ukraine causes heated exchange in Poland, Warsaw PAP (in Polish), 11 July 2000, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 20 0303251477.1_448500124486c7fa. 23 ibid.

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Trochę niezręcznie nam stawać ostro w obronie złodziejstwa; ukraińscy politycy nawet nie zaprzeczają, że kilka procent tłoczonego z Rosji gazu rozchodzi się u nich na lewo (Wróblewski 2000).

Poland’s intention to “prohibit” the building of a gas pipeline on its territory that would enable the transport of Russian gas in way that would bypass Ukraine “will not upset Russia’s plans to create a risk-free system of supplying gas to Europe”, said Russian Deputy Prime Minister Victor Khristenko in July 2000. “Europe consists not only of Poland, but also of Germany, Italy, France”, Khristenko went on, adding that European countries are interested in ensuring energy security and stable supplies of Russian gas, which was now frequently being illegally siphoned off by Ukraine.24 Despite Poland’s rejection, Gazprom insisted on its pipeline proposal, which led to a conflict episode.

4.1.1 Poland Offers an Alternative Pipeline Route Because Russia was committed to building another gas pipeline to Europe that would avoid Ukraine, Poland recommended in September 2000 that a second line of the already existing Yamal pipeline (the so-called Yamal II pipeline) be run parallel to the first line and with the same capacity. However, this had already been stipulated in the original contract. Economy Minister Janusz Steinhoff stated that Poland was interested in having the second line of the Yamal pipeline go through Poland, but reiterated that it would not be permitted to have a negative effect on Ukraine. Poland did not agree with the proposal Gazprom made in late 1999 vis-à-vis the construction of the gas pipeline because “Poland wants to have good relations with Ukraine and we are therefore not interested in cutting off the transit of gas through Ukrainian territory”, Steinhoff said.25 On the other hand, President Aleksander Kwaśniewski stated that Poland would not support anything aimed against Ukraine or that was obviously anti-Ukrainian in character. However, in reality, he knew that the worst thing that could happen would be the exclusion of Poland and Ukraine from the new transit arrangements.26 Meanwhile, another Russian proposal lobbied for the construction of the pipeline under the Baltic Sea. By November 2000, Poland was aware of a new proposal for a Baltic Sea pipeline. However, it suspected that this plan was a bluff. The following press excerpt reflects the Polish point of view: Hearing the Polish stubborn ‘no’, a consortium of Gazprom and western companies constructs a pipeline from Petersburg to Rostok, also on the Baltic floor. Wobec upartego ‘nie’ ze strony Polski konsorcjum Gazpromu i firm zachodnich ciągnie gazociąg od Petersburga do Rostoku też po dnie Bałtyku (Wróblewski 2000). On the floor of the Baltic Sea? That is twice as expensive as on the ground, and it makes the route longer. […] Gazprom, acting in concert with the Russian government, seems to be bluffing. The company is bluffing to Ukraine, because it knows that the new pipeline

24 Khristenko says Poland’s intention to prohibit building gas pipeline to transport Russian gas will not ruin Russia’s plans for creating gas supply system to Europe, Interfax (in English), 24 July 2000, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200303251477.1_1b620005cdf07b8b. 25 Ukraine praises Poland’s stance on natural gas pipeline, Warsaw PAP (in English), 1 September 2000, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200303251477.1_991e0003ea680583; Economy Minister: Poland favors building stretch of Yamal gas pipeline, Warsaw PAP (in English), 21 July 2000, World News Connection, Document Number: 200303251477.1_ae1300087e0400ab. 26 Kwaśniewski says Poland will not support pipeline proposals ‘aimed against Ukraine’, Warsaw PAP (in Polish), 13 July 2000, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200303251477.1 _451200084bc993b1.


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will not carry 180–200bcm of gas per year (that’s how much the EU wants to buy). Therefore, it will have to transport gas through Ukrainian territory. Po dnie Bałtyku? Dwa razy drożej niż w ziemi i to jeszcze okrężną drogą do celu? […] Gazprom, który z pewnością działa w porozumieniu z rządem rosyjskim, zapewne blefuje. Blefuje i rząd ukraiński, bo wie, że do nowego rurociągu nie zmieści się całe 180– 200 mld metrów sześc. gazu rocznie (tyle chce kupić Unia), że zatem gaz będzie tłoczony i poprzez starą sieć przez jego terytorium (Wróblewski 2000).

Polish advocacy for Ukraine has substantially damaged its relations with Russia. The conservative Polish government was obviously willing to subordinate relations with Russia to those with Ukraine as evidenced by Warsaw’s interest in stabilising and expanding Ukraine’s role as a transit country. Besides resisting the bypass pipeline, Poland also promoted the transport of Caspian oil and the construction of the Odessa–Brody–Gdansk oil pipeline, which would have made both Ukraine and Poland less dependent on energy supplies from Russia (Lang 2004: 216–217; Victor/ Victor 2004: 29). While the Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko and his Fuel and Energy Minister Serhei Yermilov welcomed Poland’s objection to a pipeline bypassing Ukraine,27 Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma did not see the bypass as a threat for Ukraine. However, President Kuchma […] says something else: Ukraine will be OK, it could actually benefit from building a pipeline […]. Ale prezydent Kuczma, […], mówi inaczej: Ukraina da sobie radę, a nawet na budowie rurociągu mogłaby nieźle zarobić; […] (Wróblewski 2000).

In its pro-Ukrainian attitude, Poland seemed to have acted ill-consideredly in that issue (supporting an ally who did not think it needed support while simultaneously souring its relations with its main energy supplier). Warsaw cannot be more Ukrainian than President Kuchma himself […]. Ale Warszawa nie może być bardziej ukraińska niż sam prezydent Kuczma […] (Ostrowski 2001).

Russia for its part ignored Poland’s position (both its rejection of the bypass proposal and its alternative proposal) and went ahead with its plans – in co-operation with Western companies and without informing the Polish government. In the autumn of 2000, the Polish government learned from the newspapers that Gazprom had signed a letter of intent with large gas companies in Germany, France and Italy in order to double gas exports and to establish an international consortium to build a pipeline through Poland to achieve its agenda. Gazprom was also able to obtain support from some EU member states for this pipeline project (Wróblewski 2001a). As a reaction to Gazprom’s co-operation with Western corporations, the Polish press in November 2000 compared the agreement with historical pacts between Russia and Germany, such as the Rapallo Treaty28 and the Hitler-Stalin Pact29, which both symbolise 27 Ukraine praises Poland’s stance on natural gas pipeline, Warsaw PAP (in English), 1 September 2000, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200303251477.1_991e0003ea680583; Russia, Poland to begin Yamal pipeline talks, Warsaw PAP (in English), 12 July 2000, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200303251477.1_f1940001a06c7da2; Economy Minister: Poland favors building stretch of Yamal gas pipeline, Warsaw PAP (in English), 21 July 2000, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200303251477.1_ae1300087e0400ab. 28 The Rapallo Treaty of 1922 between Germany and the Soviet Union opened diplomatic relations between the two countries and also included a trade agreement. 29 The secret amendment of this non-aggression pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union from 1939 was the basis for the subsequent division of Poland by the two countries. (The pact is also known

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Poland’s isolation and endangerment. The feelings expressed below are based on historical experiences, which are used to explain current events (frame). Polish politicians are traditionally allergic to contracts with our neighbours: international pacts from Rapallo through Ribbentrop-Molotov, the allusion of Ulbricht and Honecker towards the Kremlin – they all predicted trouble. Therefore, a recent message that Gazprom signed in a letter of intent to build our new pipeline with the Germans, French and Italians caused an understandable state of panic in Warsaw. On top of that, Gazprom has already designed a route for the pipeline […]. Neither the West nor the East was kind enough to inform us about their plans. […] Deputy Prime Minister Janusz Steinhoff said on TV that he cannot respond to an offer he only heard about from newspapers. He also mentioned something about good traditions, which have been broken, but immediately added that Poland is interested in building a pipeline […]. Polscy politycy tradycyjnie uczuleni są na kontakty sąsiadów ponad naszymi głowami: od międzywojennego paktu z Rapallo poprzez układ Ribbentrop-Mołotow aż po umizgi Ulbrichta i Honeckera do Kremla zwiastowały one dla nas kłopoty. Toteż niedawna informacja, że Gazprom podpisał list intencyjny w sprawie budowy nowego gazociągu z Niemcami, Francuzami i Włochami, wywołała w Warszawie zrozumiały popłoch, tym bardziej że gazociąg miałby biec nie ponad naszymi głowami, a pod naszymi stopami i to szlakiem już przez Gazprom naszkicowanym […]. Ani Wschód, ani Zachód nie raczył uprzedzić nas o swoich zamiarach. […] Wicepremier Janusz Steinhoff powiedział w TV, że nie może się ustosunkować do propozycji, którą zna jedynie z gazet, wspomniał też coś o dobrych obyczajach, które zostały pogwałcone, ale pospiesznie dorzucił, że Polska może być zainteresowana budową gazociągu […] (Wróblewski 2000).

The use of the Hitler-Stalin Pact frame was essentially an accusation and led to a further escalation of the conflict to the identity level. Because the conflict parties did not negotiate over the pipeline proposal, the issue conflict level was skipped. However, this escalation occurred only indirectly (see Chapter 4.2). Neither officially involved nor notified, the Polish government opted to downplay the consortium agreement between Gazprom and the German companies Ruhrgas and Wintershall, the Italian SNAM and Gaz de France. It treated the agreement as a letter of intent only. However, it quickly became apparent that Poland would be saying ‘no’ to Russia and the European Union [Teraz „nie” Polska musiałaby powiedzieć nie Rosji, a Unii Europejskiej] (Wróblewski 2000).

4.2 Problems with the Yamal Pipeline More or less “ignoring” the developments regarding the bypass pipeline, Poland instead voiced its incompatibilities with the existing Yamal pipeline. While not reacting to the agreement directly, Poland broadened the conflict by adding new conflict issues in an act of “retaliation.” At the end of 2000, Poland complained that Gazprom had failed to disclose its plans for the construction of a fibre-optic cable along the Yamal pipeline. Poland considered the cable illegal, claiming that it could potentially be used for espionage. Due to their blatant disregard for Polish fears and interests, the Western companies were accused of displaying a lack of solidarity with the aggrieved nation. Without the knowledge and control of our officials, without a permit for its construction or benefits for our country, a modern telecommunication cable of large capacity now runs along the Yamal pipeline through the middle of Poland.

under the name Molotov-Ribbentrop pact after the countries’ foreign ministers who signed the pact.)


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Bez wiedzy i kontroli naszych władz, bez zezwolenia na budowę i bez korzyści dla naszego kraju biegnie przez sam środek Polski – wzdłuż rurociągu jamalskiego – supernowoczesny kabel telekomunikacyjny o wielkiej pojemności (Bosacki/ Kublik 2000). […] we discovered that an optical fiber cable runs through Polish territory, along the Yamal pipeline. Our hysterical feelings of alarm, i.e. that we have been spied on, isolated and sold, is a result of the aforementioned discoveries [Gazprom’s agreement with Western companies, AH]. […] do tego doszło odkrycie, że obok rury gazociągu jamalskiego przez terytorium Polski biegnie kabel światłowodowy. Poczuliśmy się osaczeni i temu chyba trzeba przypisać histeryczny alarm, że jesteśmy podsłuchiwani, inwigilowani, izolowani, sprzedani (Wróblewski 2001a).

This cable was laid along the pipeline by PolGaz Telekom, a company owned by Bartimpex, EuRoPol GAZ and Gaz Telekom, a subsidiary of Gazprom. The discovery of the cable ignited a heated public debate on the admissibility to allowing a private entrepreneur to control Poland’s access to such a vital strategic resource. The government commissioned an investigation, which eventually concluded that the cable had been lawfully built (Schoenman 2005: 63), or, in the words of Marek Zdrojewski, director of the Office for Regulation and Telecommunications: “We found no violation of the law.” But he added that his agency had already submitted a proposal to the communications minister to amend the telecommunications law, which would allow the special services UOP (Office for State Protection) and the WSI (Military Intelligence Services) to investigate whether national security was endangered (Majewski/ Morka/ Reszka 2001). According to the investment agreements, PGNiG was to be the sole operator of the Yamal pipeline. However, the report brought to light that PGNiG had lost control of key pipeline facilities to Bartimpex and Gazprom (Schoenman 2005: 63). This statement triggered a domestic debate about the shareholder structure of EuRoPolgaz. In December 2000, one of the preliminary findings of the government commission was that EuRoPol GAZ, which was building the Polish segment of the Yamal pipeline, had been established in violation of the Polish-Russian Agreement of August 1993. The company was supposed to have consisted of exactly two shareholders, Gazprom and PGNiG, each owning 50% of the shares. A third partner, Gaz Trading, was nonetheless let in (Majewski/ Morka/ Reszka 2001). During the negotiations, it was officially claimed by Gazprom and the Polish officials who signed the contract that co-opting a third partner was required pursuant to Article 308 of the Commercial Law Code, which states: “There should be at least three founders.” This is technically plausible because the Code does stipulate the minimum number of founders but does not regulate the number of shareholders (Majewski/ Morka/ Reszka 2001). It seems, however, that influential friends of Aleksander Gudzowaty took care that he received a lucrative share in the Polish-Russian gas business.

4.2.1 Change in Poland’s Position towards the Bypass Pipeline Since Poland’s rejection of a bypass pipeline in mid-2000, the energy relations between Gazprom and Poland had been strained. In December 2000, however, somewhat disappointed by Ukraine’s ambivalence on the bypass pipeline issue, the Polish stance was softened, particularly since the signing of a gas supply deal between Moscow and Kiev (Koulouris 2001).30 Poland modified its position: it was now opposed only to the specific 30 In December 2000, Russia and Ukraine signed a memorandum on settling the supply problem and resructuring Ukraine’s debt for gas deliveries. Russia agreed to add the US$700mn debt incurred by

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route but not to the bypass pipeline itself. Deputy Prime Minister Janusz Steinhoff even explicitly stated that Poland wanted a gas pipeline to cross its territory.31 However, the government still insisted that Ukraine’s interests would have to be taken into account if the pipeline were to be built. First, we greatly supported Ukraine so that the pipeline would not bypass its borders, then we supported our own interests by trying to settle the pipeline route […]. Najpierw ujęliśmy się bardzo za Ukrainą, żeby jej rurociąg nie omijał, potem za własnymi interesami, targując się, którędy przez Polskę gaz miałby iść […] (Wróblewski 2001a).

The Polish government officially opposed Gazprom’s proposed pipeline route on environmental grounds, arguing that it would pass through two of its national parks. To solve this problem, Poland proposed two alternative routes across Poland to Slovakia. However, many suspect the true reason for Warsaw’s opposition was that it would receive less transit revenue from the shorter Russian pipeline route (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 1, 10 January 2001; Nefte Compass, 12 April 2001). Not surprisingly, the Polish proposal was not well received by Russia. Gazprom retaliated by suggesting yet another route that would bypass both Ukraine and Poland by running under the Baltic Sea to Germany. However, this was seen in Poland as a simple case of political posturing, given that building such a pipeline would be several times more expensive than Gazprom’s originally proposed route to Slovakia (Nefte Compass, 12 April 2001). Poland set preconditions for the construction of a second pipeline through the country during Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov’s visit to Poland in May 2001. Poland seemed determined to solve all gas issues in a complex manner. If the second line of the Yamal pipeline were to run through Poland, it would be necessary to renegotiate the gas contracts concluded between Poland and Russia in 1993 and 1996. It would also be necessary to replace the management at EuRoPol GAZ (which in Poland’s opinion was not promoting Polish interests, as exemplified in the case of the fibre-optic cable) and eliminate Gaz Trading, a company linked to Aleksander Gudzowaty, from EuRoPol GAZ’s list of shareholders. As a result, the Polish and Russian sides would each hold 50% of the shares – just as the 1993 intergovernmental agreement had stipulated. Kasyanov extended his stay and discussed the issues with Poland’s Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek – at a meeting not planned in the original agenda (Reszka 2001). This can be read “between the lines” of the Polish pro memoria letter [stating Poland’s position, AH]. Another discussion on the inter-government agreements would offer us an opportunity to renegotiate the amount of gas supplied to Poland by Russia. Poland needs less gas than the agreement indicates, because it wants to make a contract for gas supplies from Norway (so that the country is not completely dependent on Russia). Można to wyczytać „między wierszami” polskiego pro memoria. Powtórne omówienie porozumień międzyrządowych dałoby szansę na renegocjacje ilości gazu dostarczanego przez Rosję do Polski. Polska potrzebuje mniej gazu niż zapisano w umowie, gdyż chce zawrzeć kontrakt na dostawy gazu z Norwegii (tak, by nie być uzależnioną od dostaw wyłącznie z Rosji) (Reszka 2001).

Ukraine in 2000 to the sum slated for restructuring over the next eight to 11 years. The memorandum also provided for the supply of 30bcm of Russian gas to Ukraine in 2001 and the formation of stand-by reserves consisting of 5bcm of gas. In addition, Russia would supply 2bcm of gas to Ukraine as a seasonal credit at US$80 for 1,000cm of gas (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 49, 13 December 2000). 31 Polish official pledges support for Russian gas pipeline, Interfax (in English), 14 March 2001.


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It was decided to inform the Russians politely but firmly what Polish interests are, that in order to reach an agreement, they would have to compromise. Serious talks with Norway have begun – Norwegian supplies will make us independent from Russia. Zdecydowano się grzecznie, lecz twardo powiedzieć Rosjanom, jakie są interesy Polski i że jeśli chcą coś uzyskać, muszą w niektórych sprawach ustąpić. Poważne rozmowy rozpoczęto z Norwegią – dostawy stamtąd uniezależnią nas od gazu z Rosji (Reszka 2001).

As a result of the Polish demands, Gazprom suspended further talks in summer 2001 (Aris 2002). “Construction of a Baltic Sea pipeline would attempt to counterbalance and erase the uncertainties over proposals to construct a new pipeline through Poland to Europe” (RFE/RL Business Watch, 27 July 2001). However, after the Polish government had changed and as President Putin’s visit to Poland was approaching, talks about the construction of a second leg of the Yamal pipeline were restarted. In December 2001, both sides agreed tackle the gas issue comprehensively. The Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller said that he was in favour of Russian gas transit through Poland: “Why should a gas pipeline be laid on the bottom of the Baltic Sea if there is a chance to transport Russian gas through Polish territory and give the partner an opportunity to make good money on it?.”32 The combination of Putin’s Poland trip in January 2002 and Gazprom’s lobbying on behalf of the Yamal pipeline suggested that the Kremlin was still interested in a Polish pipeline. “I believe that we can find the right kind of co-operation”, Putin told the Polish press. “Above all, this means infrastructure projects. In this way, Poland can play the role it has traditionally played in history – a bridge between the East and West, and I mean that in the best possible way” (Aris 2002). During negotiations in Moscow in January 2002, the Polish delegation was prepared to terminate plans to build the second line of the Yamal pipeline and agree to a new transit pipeline along the eastern border from Belarus to Slovakia (Łakoma 2002). At this time, Gazprom had apparently become ready to scrap plans for a bypass pipeline through Slovakia. Experts within the company shared the opinion that the company would do better to work out its differences with Ukraine than to build a pipeline around it. As such, the company was concentrating on other projects, namely the Yamal pipeline through Poland, the ‘Goluboi Potok’ (Blue Stream) line to Turkey and the trans-Baltic line to Scandinavia and Germany (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 6, 13 February 2002). After Gazprom had realised some of its goals in Ukraine, the bypass pipeline disappeared from the agenda. It can therefore be inferred that the bypass pipeline was more a means of disciplining Ukraine than a realistic pipeline route. Meanwhile, Poland had isolated itself in the bypass case – from Russia and Belarus as well as from Western European governments that supported the bypass (Lang 2004: 216–217; Victor/ Victor 2004: 29). In the end, a Polish agreement to the bypass pipeline could not be used as a bargaining chip anymore. During the gas negotiations with Russia, Poland had not been planning to insist on changes in EuRoPol GAZ’s ownership structure. Poland agreed to leave a Bartimpex-connected company as one of EuRoPol GAZ’s shareholders (Łakoma 2002). However, the Polish side was committed to renegotiating the supply contract. Poland was worried about the increase of Russian gas supplies, because it could not process the entire gas volume. It suggested that Russia extend the term of the 1993 contract, which provided for supplying 250bcm of gas until 2020, to 2029 (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 2, 32 Polish prime minister in favour of Russian gas transit through Poland, Interfax (in English), 19 December 2001.

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16 January 2002) and reduced gas supplies from 12.5bcm to 9bcm in 2010 (Łakoma 2002). The total amount of gas supplies between 1993 and 2029 would have remained unchanged at 250bcm, enabling Poland to import gas from Norway and Denmark (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 2, 16 January 2002). The proposal to extend the contract timeline and to decrease amounts of gas imported in the next few years may give a green light to sign an agreement with Norway – very important for our energy security. Propozycja wydłużenia w czasie kontraktu stulecia i zmniejszenia ilości gazu sprowadzanego w kolejnych latach może oznaczać zielone światło dla umowy gazowej z Norwegią, istotnej z uwagi na bezpieczeństwo energetyczne (Łakoma 2002).

Additionally, Poland intended to increase transit fees paid for Russian gas transported to Western Europe (Łakoma 2002). On the other hand, the gas transit fees that EuRoPol GAZ charges to Russia are unusually preferential. Experts think they should be doubled. Z drugiej strony, opłaty przesyłowe, jakie EuRoPol GAZ pobiera od Rosjan za tranzyt gazu, są wyjątkowo preferencyjne. Eksperci uważają, że należy je podwoić (Łakoma 2002).

For its part, Gazprom demanded that Poland abide by the terms of its take-or-pay contract and accept the full amount of gas due. In addition, it also claimed that Poland had failed to fulfil its financial obligations, as it had only invested US$150mn of the promised US$350mn so far (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 44, 6 November 2002). In order to boost its throughput capacity from 18 to 28bcm of gas annually until the end of 2003, it would have been necessary to build two more compressor stations at a cost of around US$170mn. Financing was guaranteed by the Polish side (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 2, 16 January 2002). Gazprom accuses Poland of not complying with construction obligations, even though PGNiG has stated for a long time that Polish financial engagement in the investment is adequate. Gazprom zarzuca Polsce, że nie wywiązała się z zobowiązań dotyczących budowy, choć przedstawiciele PGNiG już dawno mówili, że polskie zaangażowanie finansowe jest adekwatne do realizacji inwestycji (Łakoma 2002).

Poland insisted that its investment was in proportion to the work done (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 14, 10 April 2002). Gazprom also complained that Poland raised the costs of the project by bringing into force a new property tax. Under the terms of the 1993 agreement between the two parties, it was agreed that the pipeline would have its own tax regime (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 44, 6 November 2002). On 11 April, Gazprom and Poland’s PGNiG agreed on conditions for financing the completion of the first section of the Yamal gas pipeline. The agreement would have made it possible to finish the construction of two pumping stations in 2003, which would increase the gas pipeline capacity to 28bcm per year (RFE/RL Newsline, 12 April 2002). EuRoPol GAZ would increase its equity capital by US$200mn (NewsBase, Russia Weekly, No. 16, 22 April 2002). The Russian side proposed equal participation in increasing EuroPolGas’s authorised capital. However, EuRoPol GAZ’s Polish shareholders did not agree to the scheme.33

33 Russian, Polish oil, gas companies disagree on funds for pumping plants, Interfax (in English), 26 June 2002.


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In October 2002, with the question of a financing source still unresolved, Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller said during a debate in Polish parliament on the review of the treaty on natural gas imports from Russia that Poland did not have to pay Russia for gas, because it did not fulfil its investment obligations (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 40, 9 October 2002). The threat to impose sanctions escalated the conflict to the subordination level. Additionally, the Polish gas company PGNiG was in discussions with its Lithuanian counterpart, Lietuvos Dujos and Denmark’s state oil and gas company DONG on proposals for the construction of an alternative gas supply pipeline across Poland, the so-called ‘Amber project’ (DeLay 2002a). While Gazprom’s stance on the Yamal II pipeline remained unclear, it had indicated that it might focus on a potential pipeline route across the Baltic Sea, in which several Western companies (Germany’s Ruhrgas, Dutch Gasunie and Finland’s Fortum) had expressed interest (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 44, 6 November 2002). Even though Russia was prepared to begin construction of a gas pipeline bypassing Poland, Russian Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko failed to persuade Poland to increase its gas transit (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 47, 27 November 2002). In November 2002, Poland threatened to take Russia to an international court of arbitration if it failed to obtain a review of the gas contract with Russia by the end of the year, as Polish Economics Minister Jacek Piechota said. Russia refused to review the terms of the contract, which provided for fixed gas supplies to Poland within 25 years even though economic estimates showed Polish requirements to be below the volumes set forth in the contract (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 44, 6 November 2002). As in October, Poland again threatened Gazprom with sanctions to push its position through. This behaviour eventually showed results. After a year of negotiations, a new agreement over a reduction of gas supply was finally reached in February 2003. Poland managed to persuade Russia to reduce gas deliveries and to sign an addendum to the existing gas contract. Under the addendum to the Yamal contract, Poland would import 143bcm of gas in 2003–2020, 74bcm less than originally stipulated. Instead, in 2021 and 2022, it would buy an additional 18bcm. This meant a 34.5% reduction in deliveries, taking into consideration the 2003–2020 period (The Warsaw Voice, 20 February 2003, http:// www.warsawvoice.pl/view/1321/). In January 2003, an agreement was reached according to which delivery was decreased by about 35%. However, in order to gain freedom in gas supply diversification, the contract would have to lower those amounts much more. For understandable reasons, Russia did not agree to that and Poland was not able to force this decision on Russia. W styczniu 2003 r. zawarto porozumienie, w którym między innymi zmniejszono rozmiary dostaw o około 35 proc. Oddalono w ten sposób groźbę płacenia za gaz niemożliwy do zużycia, a nawet odbioru (brak możliwości reeksportu i magazynów do przechowywania), ale wolna przestrzeń dla dywersyfikacji nie powstała, bo aby to osiągnąć, zmniejszenie kontraktu musiałoby być znacznie większe. Rosja, ze zrozumiałych względów, nie chciała się na to zgodzić, a Polska nie miała możliwości, żeby to na niej wymóc (Kuczyński 2004).

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The agreement set gas transport charges for the period up to 2019. There would be a charge of US$2.74 for carrying 1,000cm/ 100km for 2003, which would undergo a three-stage reduction to about US$1 by 2014.34 The terms also absolved Gazprom from the obligation to build the Yamal II pipeline, running parallel to the first line and with the same capacity. Under the original agreement, the second pipe was to become operational in 2002. Critics argued that Poland had not used its full negotiation potential as a transit country to ensure the construction (The Warsaw Voice, 20 February 2003, http://www.warsawvoice.pl/view/1321/; Lang 2004: 208–209). Janusz Steinhoff, former Minister of Economy under Jerzy Buzek’s administration, said that by signing the new agreement, Poland was granting Russia the de facto right to decide about the second segment (Jendroszczyk 2005). Russia and Poland announced their intent to consider the economic effects and time frame for building the second section of the Yamal-Western Europe gas pipeline before late 2004.35 In December 2004, Russian Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko said that the construction of the second line of the Yamal gas pipeline would depend on how efficiently the first Yamal gas pipeline functioned.36

4.3 Summary Tensions between Poland and Russia about pipeline issues jeopardised the countries’ energy relations. The first conflict arose with Gazprom’s proposal of a pipeline through Polish territory that would have bypassed Ukraine (the so-called bypass pipeline). Gazprom announced its pipeline plan at the end of 1999 without having consulted Poland. Poland generally rejected the pipeline proposal. Gazprom, however, insisted on its position and carried on the project during the year 2000. This resulted in a conflict episode. Poland made an alternative proposal to build a second branch of the Yamal pipeline (Yamal II) in September 2000 but stood firm on its rejection of the bypass pipeline. Gazprom, however, continued to ignore Poland’s resistance to a bypass pipeline as well as the Polish pipeline proposal. The Polish proposal, however, could not be considered a true alternative, because a second branch of the Yamal pipeline had already been stipulated in the original pipeline agreement between Poland and Russia. Interestingly, the conflict between Poland and Russia (Gazprom) skipped the issue conflict level because no negotiations between the two parties took place; Gazprom had solidified its position without consulting Poland. Poland, on the other hand, felt humiliated by being ignored and was also not buying Gazprom’s patter about the merits of a bypass pipeline. The conflict immediately jumped to the level of an identity conflict. Exclusion (in this case from consultation of the pipeline construction) is often experienced as a denial of significance and is therefore humiliating. Poland and its interests were not taken seriously, which caused feelings of humiliation. These in turn can escalate the conflict to the identity level. The “adversary resorts to more extreme conduct in order to arouse 34 Russia, Poland agree to terms for natural gas pipeline, Interfax (in English), 13 February 2003, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200303031477.1_a6c10004f21d8125. 35 Russia, Poland to discuss second section of Yamal-Europe pipeline by 2004, Interfax (in English), 20 February 2003, World News Connection, Document Number: 200303031477.1_3470000302c3df0a. 36 Russian Minister, Polish Deputy Premier Discuss Gas Pipeline at Moscow Talks, Itar-Tass (in Russian), 7 December 2004, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200412081477.1_ ede100060b7c1193.


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attention from the mass media and get a response from the opposing party that is acting inattentively” (Kriesberg 1998: 169). In November 2000, Poland accused Gazprom and the international pipeline consortium involved in the construction of the bypass pipeline of betrayal. Due to the fact that German companies were partners in the consortium, the co-operation was compared to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Having no influence over the proposed bypass pipeline, Poland retaliated against Gazprom indirectly by criticising the existing Yamal pipeline: it disparaged the ownership structure of the pipeline operator EuRoPol GAZ and raised concerns about Russian espionage in connection with an allegedly illegally built fibre-optic cable along the Yamal pipeline. In March 2001, influenced by the facts on the ground (i.e., Ukraine’s indifference to Poland’s resistance toward the bypass pipeline and the threat of alternative Russian pipeline proposals avoiding Poland as a transit country) Poland modified its general position on the bypass pipeline; it only opposed its concrete routing (proposing alternative, longer routes) albeit under the precondition of a comprehensive solution of all gas issues, especially supply contract. This move inspired negotiations between Poland and Gazprom; the conflict was de-escalated to the issue level. However, Gazprom rejected the new routing of the bypass pipeline. In May 2001, Poland voiced new objections to the Yamal pipeline (besides the ownership structure of EuRoPol GAZ, Poland wanted first and foremost to re-negotiate the gas supply contract) and demanded a comprehensive resolution of the bypass pipeline issue with respect to Poland’s complaints about the Yamal pipeline and the gas supply contract. In response, Gazprom suspended further talks in summer 2001. This suspension, however, did not escalate the conflict. In December 2001, both parties returned to the negotiation table to comprehensively discuss all gas issues and in January 2002, Poland was ready to skip Yamal II for the bypass pipeline and to leave the original ownership structure of EuRoPol GAZ unchanged. However, it insisted on renegotiating the supply contract and wanted to increase the transit fees for Russian gas. At this point, however, the agreement on the bypass pipeline was no longer a bargaining chip for Poland. Gazprom had already changed its priorities. Gazprom countered by accusing Poland of neglecting its financial obligations regarding the Yamal pipeline (under-investment). Poland reacted by accusing Gazprom of underinvesting in the Yamal pipeline project. These accusations brought the conflict to the identity level again. With no resolution in sight, Poland threatened in October 2002 not to pay for Russian gas deliveries. In November, Poland again threatened Gazprom with taking it to the international arbitration court to re-negotiate the supply contract. With its threats Poland escalated the conflict to the subordination level. In February 2003, an agreement on transit fees and gas supplies was reached; Poland prevailed on its position regarding the supply contract and the transit fees while the construction of the Yamal II pipeline was put on hold. Considering Gazprom’s reluctance to renegotiate its gas supply contracts, it can be said that Gazprom gave in and subordinated most of its positions to the Polish demands to avoid the consequences of the Polish threats. The whole conflict about the bypass pipeline is based on Russia’s misperception of Poland’s position and, as a result, ignoring it. Because the Yamal pipeline was already set to bypass Ukraine, Russia did not understand why Poland resisted the bypass pipeline so vehemently. Even the combined through-put capacity of the Yamal and bypass pipelines would not have

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been sufficient to avoid Ukraine as a transit country (even under the assumption that Russian gas exports were not increasing). Agitated by what they perceived to be belligerent rhetoric on Gazprom’s part (the explicitly broadcasted intention of bypassing Ukraine), the conservative Polish government made Herculean efforts to preserve Ukraine’s role as a transit country. Its resistance to the bypass pipeline was certainly fuelled by Poland’s perpetual geopolitical rivalry with Russia in an area considered a Polish sphere of interest and a buffer zone against Russia’s expansionism. On the other hand, conservative Polish governments harboured a general suspicion of Russia that was especially strong in energy and pipeline issues (which are considered questions of national security). These tensions made the fate of the Yamal II pipeline quite uncertain. While Poland was still interested in its construction, Russia had lost interest and was eyeing different transit options. Having decided to build the Nord Stream pipeline, Gazprom had put plans to build the second line of the Yamal pipeline across Poland on the back burner (Lang 2004: 207). Additionally, problems with the other transit country for the Yamal pipeline, Belarus, played against Yamal II. Box 4-1: Problems with Belarus Since its independence in 1991, Belarus has accumulated gas debts. In mid-1993, these debts amounted to US$100mn. Even though gas supplies to Belarus were reduced in 1993 due to nonpayment of its debts for Russian gas deliveries, Belarus was generally more obedient to Russia than Ukraine in the early 1990s. The government interpreted energy dependence on Russia not as a problem to be solved, but as a reason for closer co-operation with Russia and the multilateral reintegration of the Soviet economic area. As a reward for its pro-Russian policy, Belarus not only faced lower prices for gas, but also much more generous repayment terms from Gazprom (Sahm/ Westphal 2002: 273–275; Götz 2006: 14). In 1993, Gazprom suggested handing over control of the Belarusian pipeline operator Beltransgas against Russian gas supplies. However, the Belarusian parliament was not willing to approve such an agreement (Götz 2006: 14). In the following years, Belarus’ gas debts continued to rise. Nevertheless, Gazprom did not put pressure on the country because in 1994 Russia and Belarus had agreed on a common currency and the stationing of Russian troops in the country free of charge. Additionally, Gazprom planned the construction of the Yamal pipeline, increasing Belarus’ importance as a transit country. Therefore, the company was interested in harmonising the bilateral relations (Götz 2006: 14). In 1997, Gazprom increased its pressure on Belarus over gas debts because the company was forced by the Russian government to pay its own tax debts. Nevertheless, in 1999, Belarus succeeded in paying only the highly subsidised Russian domestic price for its gas deliveries from Gazprom. As a result, Gazprom had to reduce its price from US$40 to US$30 per 1,000cm of gas (Götz 2006: 14). However, Gazprom enjoyed preferential transit fees, which were around three times lower than the transit fees in Ukraine or Moldova (Konończuk 2007: 3). However, Belarus too was now causing problems for gas transit akin to those perpetrated by Ukraine. Gazprom and Belarus have struggled over gas prices, transit fees, payment delays and debt as well as gas illegally siphoned off from the transit pipeline (cf. Heinrich 1999: 23–24). As early as 2002, Gazprom announced that it was ready to suspend supplies to Belarus when it paid cash for only 8% of the gas it received. In fact, Gazprom reduced its deliveries and Belarus had to buy gas from the gas traders Itera and Transnafta at higher prices (Götz 2006: 14).


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In April 2002, Russia and Belarus agreed to establish a common gas company on the basis of Beltransgaz; 50% of the new company’s shares should be owned by Gazprom, which was in turn providing Belarus with low-priced natural gas. However, Minsk delayed the establishment of the joint gas company several times, which was one reason for the gas crisis of 2004 (Konończuk 2007: 3). In February 2004, after long and tough negotiations on the price of gas, the deal gave Gazprom a rate below its demands, while the transit fees collected by Belarus were raised. This – together with Belarus’ resistance to establish the joint gas company and the above-mentioned long-lasting problems – led to a gas cut-off. Simultaneously, Itera and Transnafta also stopped their supplies to Belarus due to delays in payment (Götz 2006: 14). However, the cut-off did not lead to the results Gazprom had hoped for. The company has since had to back down because Beltransgas siphoned off gas from the Yamal pipeline. Due to this accident, however, Poland was suspended from Russian gas deliveries for two days, causing great alarm (cf. DeLay 2002b; Gazprom 2004a; Victor/ Victor 2004: 3). A solution was found in mid-2004; Belarus paid the Russian domestic gas price of US$47 per 1,000cm while Gazprom’s transit fees were increased from US$0.55 to US$0.75 per 1,000cm per 100km. Belarus was able to bring the stationing of Russian troops and the aimed economic and political union between the two countries into play as well as its role as a transit country to negotiate this deal (Götz 2006: 14). Additionally, Gazprom has been trying for years to swap the transit countries’ debts for stakes in their gas infrastructure. This strategy has so far been successful only in Moldova. Belarus – like Ukraine – has ignored all related demands for geopolitical reasons. In December 2005, however, Gazprom believed itself to have gained control of a transit pipeline that crossed Belarus into Europe, giving the firm a tighter grasp over a route used to send its gas to European markets. Under the terms of the deal, Gazprom was to own the Belarusian section of the Yamal pipeline (Dempsey 2005). Eventually, Belarus ignored its promise to sell Beltransgaz to Gazprom again.

5 Nord Stream Pipeline – Identity Conflict37 To side-step its difficult energy relations with Belarus and Poland, Gazprom is building an underwater pipeline from the Russian port Vyborg to the town of Greifswald in Germany with possible extensions to the UK and Denmark. The pipeline, which stretches approximately 1,200km beneath the Baltic Sea, will be integrated into a pan-European pipeline network. The Nord Stream pipeline would avoid transit countries entirely – like the ‘Blue Stream’ pipeline underneath the Black Sea, which connects Russia with Turkey.38

37 Even though the pipeline project started under the name ‘North European Gas Pipeline’ and the abbreviation NEGP, it was renamed ‘Nord Stream’ in October 2006. In the following, the current name (Nord Stream) is used. The new name is supposed to reflect the project’s mission to develop an efficient gas transportation infrastructure for reliable natural gas supplies from Siberian deposits to Northern Europe (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 40, 11 October 2006). 38 The pipeline, however, will run through the Exclusive Economic Zones of Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany (Nord Stream, Press Release, 4 October 2006).

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The project has been under discussion since the 1990s. Feasibility studies have been undertaken by North Transgaz, which, until recently, was Gazprom’s joint venture with the Finnish Fortum and is now completely owned by Gazprom. The first meeting for the project implementation took place in February 2003, the very same month Gazprom finally reached a new supply agreement with Poland (Gazprom company information, http://www.negp. info/news/news14.html). The total costs were originally estimated at around US$5.4bn, but later valued at US$10.5bn. The price tag on the land section and marine stretch of the pipeline are estimated at US$6bn and US$4.5bn, respectively. The pipeline’s capacity has been set at 55bcm annually. It has two pipes, each with a 27.5bcm capacity. The first pipe is to start operating in 2010 (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 14, 12 April 2006; Nord Stream company information, http://www.nord-stream.com/project.html?&L=0). The EU has promised political and financial support for the project. As early as December 2000, the EU commission gave the project the status of a Trans-European Network (TEN). In 2002, it was even classified as a priority project, thus releasing EU funds for project studies. Conferring the TEN status on the project will make it easier to resolve questions surrounding its realisation on the territories of the EU member countries and help to attract financial backing (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 48, 4 December 2002 and No. 24, 22 June 2005; Götz 2004a: 17–18; Gazprom company information, http://negp.info/news/news2.html and http://negp.info/news/news3.html). In July 2004, Gazprom’s oldest partner in Germany and shareholder, E.ON/ Ruhrgas, announced that it would jointly finance the pipeline from Vyborg to Greifswald with Gazprom. In April 2005, however, Gazprom signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline not with E.ON/ Ruhrgas but with its German competitor, BASF/ Wintershall. Wingas, Gazprom’s joint venture with the BASF subsidiary Wintershall, will oversee the connection of this new pipeline to its own pipeline network as a matter of priority. Wingas is already a member of the working group set up to review the feasibility of the Baltic Sea pipeline. The memorandum also includes an increase in Gazprom’s share in Wingas from 35% to 50% minus one share, signalling its increased commitment to the European natural gas market. In return, both companies are stepping up their collaboration in the exploration and production of natural gas both in Russia and on an international scale. To this end, Gazprom and Wintershall are developing the Yushno Russkoye field in Western Siberia together. This already constitutes the second project for the joint production of natural gas in Western Siberia (BASF Press Release, 11 April 2005). BASF/ Wintershall is therefore the first and only foreign company to co-operate with Gazprom in the production, transport and marketing of natural gas from the well in Siberia to customers in Europe (Götz 2004a: 17–18). In early September 2005, E.ON/ Ruhrgas joined Gazprom and BASF/ Wintershall in signing a basic agreement on the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline. The three parties intend to set up the North European Gas Pipeline Company (renamed Nord Stream AG in October 2006) as a joint German-Russian venture, with Gazprom holding 51% and the German companies holding 24.5% each (Gazprom company information, http://negp.info/ news/news4.html). Construction of the Russian land stretch was launched in the Vologda Region in December 2005. This part of the pipeline is to run from Gryazovets to Vyborg, linking the marine section with gas pipelines operating in Western Siberia. This section was completed in


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October 2006 (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 14, 12 April and No. 40, 11 October 2006). The Nord Stream pipeline has some obvious downsides, such as its great expense, the technical complexity of the construction of the underwater stretch and the associated environmental risks. This complexity makes the pipeline at least twice as expensive as an onshore pipeline of the same length. A second line of the Yamal pipeline (Yamal II) or the extension of the Ukrainian gas grid’s capacity would be much cheaper. That leads to the assumption that the decision to construct the Nord Stream pipeline was not only economically but also politically motivated (Götz 2004a: 18–19; Götz 2005: 303). Gazprom’s interests are clear: it wants to avoid problems with transit countries. At the World Gas Congress in Tokyo in 2003, Gazprom’s chief executive, Aleksei Miller, gave details of the company’s strategy. Miller put diversification at the top of the company’s agenda. Gazprom’s main strategy will be to diversify its resource base, means of processing gas, sales markets and transport routes (Interfax, 4 June 2003). The Nord Stream pipeline would reduce Russia’s dependence on transit countries. As Gazprom bluntly announced, the Nord Stream pipeline neatly avoids the transit states along its route. It will decrease sovereign risks and costs of gas transmission, and at the same time may prove to enhance reliability of gas export supplies (cf. e.g., Gazprom 2004b).39 Referring explicitly to the Baltic Sea pipeline, Gazprom CEO Miller said in December 2005 “we should realise that this is a common interest of Russia, as the gas producer, and European clients in diversified routes of gas deliveries to Europe and the European Union.” With around 80% of Russian gas supplies to Europe transported through Ukraine, with the rest going through Poland, “[t]here have been problems on territories of transit countries, so new routes of Russian gas exports will upgrade the energy security of our largest clients and the EU gas market in general.”40 Implementation of the Nord Stream pipeline project would certainly postpone the construction of the second branch of the Yamal pipeline via Belarus and Poland.

5.1 Massive Criticism from Poland and the Baltic States Even though the proposed Baltic Sea pipeline is neither touching the territories of Poland nor the Baltic states nor their Exclusive Economic Zones, these countries have raised strenuous objections to the project. Poland and the Baltic states have urged the EU to consider alternative pipeline routes that would incorporate the interests of all EU member states. Already in March 2005, before the first MoU was signed, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland asked the EU for help in persuading Russia to build a large natural gas pipeline through their territories rather than under the Baltic Sea. The prime ministers of the three new member states wrote to European Commission chief José Manuel Barroso seeking support

39 “Russia has been seeking to secure the existing and create new export routes to improve consumer security. The latest major project in this department, the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP), promises an ultimate solution to the diversification problem. It will expand the capability to export gas to Western Europe, honouring the existing and securing future long-term commitments; the NEGP is, in effect, seen as a direct link between Russian and European gas systems” (Official website of the G8 presidency of the Russian Federation in 2006, http://en.g8russia.ru/agenda/nrgsafety/russianrole/). 40 Miller explains Polish, Baltic reaction to gas pipeline project, Itar-Tass (in English), 13 December 2005, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200512131477.1_472f001dd487073d.

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in the so-called ‘Amber project’ – a pipeline that would connect Russia and Germany via the three eastern European countries (The Moscow Times, 24 March 2005).41 Originally, the Amber project – proposed in October 2002 – was designed to supply Poland and Lithuania with gas from Denmark. Its main goal was to connect the Polish and the Lithuanian gas system with the EU network in order to ensure gas supply security to these countries, as well as possibly to Latvia, Estonia and Finland. However, the project was deferred because Poland’s natural gas demand turned out to be lower than expected (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 43, 30 October 2002). In their letter, the three countries asked the Commission to ensure that the route of a new pipeline be chosen taking into account not only commercial, but also security of supply and diversification criteria. The Amber project would cover the energy needs of four new member states, reduce their gas transit risks and would contribute to the integration of the EU internal gas market (Reuters, 22 March 2005). However, Poland’s protests against the undertaking have not brought any positive results. As of September, the letter was still unanswered (Trenkner 2005). This led to the following sober statement from the Polish side: It is difficult to gain support in the European Union. Old EU member states do not depend on Russian gas as much as Poland […] and welcome new supply routes with open arms. W UE trudno nam uzyskać zrozumienie dla naszych lęków. Stare kraje Unii w dużo mniejszym stopniu niż Polska są uzależnione od rosyjskiego gazu […] i z radością witają kolejne szlaki zaopatrzeniowe.42

Box 5-1: EU EU policy toward Russia reflects the unique character of the EU as a supranational entity. It has combined policies from the Union itself (and its various organs) with policies from member states. Ideally, the policies of the Union and its member states are harmonious. However, there is no common EU energy policy; this policy field is still dominated by the national interests of its member countries (cf. e.g., Westphal 2004). According to its principle of subsidiarity (established by the Treaty of Maastricht), which states that matters ought to be handled by the authority closest to the citizen, the EU may only act where member state governments agree that action by individual countries is insufficient and that action can be better undertaken at the Community level (House of Lords 2006: 14). The EU sees the reliability of energy transport as one of the pre-conditions for a stable and continuous energy supply. The further development and expansion of gas transport infrastructure between Europe (including the new EU member states) and the key gas suppliers – especially Norway, Russia and Algeria – is therefore of great importance for the EU. To increase gas exports to Europe from the main suppliers, the existing pipelines need to be upgraded and new pipelines will have to be built (European Commission 2006b). Since 1996, the EU has promoted the development of a trans-European energy infrastructure. In 1997, Gazprom began to work on the design of a gas pipeline beneath the Baltic Sea (Bimboes 2006: 20). 41 Polish experts say that such a pipeline would be much cheaper than the Baltic one. What is certain is that Poland’s proposal for a re-designed Amber project is definitely irritating to Belarus and will sour its relationship with Poland even further. Even though Poland recognises Belarus as a risk factor for energy transit, it does not consider itself as one (Poland calls Baltic gas pipeline Russian-German conspiracy, MosNews, 5 August 2005, http://www.mosnews.com/money/2005/08/05/polandpipeline. shtml; Bordonaro 2005). 42 ‘Gazowy fundament przyjaźni’ [Friendship built on gas foundation], Polityka, No. 42, 21 October 2006.


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Measures to secure an external energy supply consist mainly of consolidating links with suppliers, especially Russia. To secure the supply of oil and gas, in October 2000 the EU proclaimed a strategic energy partnership with Russia. Part of the deal was to create a new gas pipeline through Belarus, Poland and Slovakia, bypassing Ukraine. However, the EU has made no clear decision in favour of one pipeline route or another. Currently, the Union is supporting two Russian pipeline projects with priority status in the framework of the Trans-European Energy Networks (European Commission 2004: 26–27; Bimboes 2006: 20): The Nord Stream pipeline across the Baltic Sea, and simultaneously The expansion/ upgrading of the Yamal pipeline, which means the construction of the Yamal II pipeline. The EU seemingly has no official preference; it would in fact like to see both pipelines built to satisfy the growing demand for gas in Europe.

The core arguments of Poland and the Baltic states can be summarised as followed: •

•

First and foremost, the Nord Stream pipeline is not considered a profitable project due to its high costs; the decision for its construction was therefore politically motivated. Its critics assume that Russia has geopolitical intentions with the pipeline construction that will lead to reduced energy security for Poland and the Baltic states but also for the EU as a whole. Secondly, the critics – especially Poland – raise practical objections, such as the potential loss of transit fees, environmental concerns and the reduction of influence in the energy system.

5.1.1 Geopolitics Poland and the Baltic states believe that the plan for the construction of the Baltic Sea pipeline is politically motivated. They believe that Russia is pursuing geopolitical ambitions and goals. Is the construction of the Baltic pipeline a political decision? Russian oil and gas will never be an ordinary branch of the economy. Moscow is not hiding the fact that it wants to use raw materials to achieve its geopolitical goals – state Russian analysts. Czy budowa podbałtyckiego gazociągu to decyzja polityczna? Rosyjskie ropa i gaz nigdy nie będą zwykłą gałęzią gospodarki. Moskwa nie ukrywa przecież, że chce wykorzystywać swe surowce naturalne w celach geopolitycznych – mówią rosyjscy analitycy (Bielecki 2005).

In an interview for the Russian daily ‘Izvestia’, the Polish President Lech Kaczyński said: For Poland, Russian-German relations have never been just the affair of those two countries. Historically, our country’s interests have unfortunately not been taken into account. The North European gas pipeline is economically not profitable; its on-shore construction would be several times cheaper than off-shore beneath the Baltic Sea. The choice of the [off-shore, AH] option means that the participants in the project are not following economical but some other considerations. In the worst case, the intention is to put pressure on Poland – because our country depends on deliveries of Russian gas. Для Польши российско-германские отношения никогда не будут частным делом двух государств. В истории, к сожалению, были случаи, когда интересы нашей страны не учитывались. Северо-Европейский газопровод экономически нерента-

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белен: его строительство по суше обошлось бы в несколько раз дешевле, чем по дну Балтийского моря. Выбор именно этого варианта означает, что участники проекта руководствовались не экономическими, а какими-то другими соображениями. В худшем случае целью было оказать давление на Польшу – так как наша страна зависит от поставок российского газа (Popova 2005).

5.1.1.1 Punishment for Poland’s Engagement in the ‘Orange Revolution’ Poland and Russia both consider Ukraine and Belarus regions of special interest; they are geopolitical rivals. Analysts seem to agree that the immediate cause of tension between the two countries was the lead role played by Poland in the Ukrainian conflict of 2004/2005, when President Aleksander Kwaśniewski clearly sided against the Russian-supported presidential candidate and with the ‘Orange Revolution’ of Viktor Yushchenko (Bernstein 2005). […] tensions in Polish-Russian economic relations are a result of Polish foreign policy, which supports the process of gaining independence by Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia. Russia does not like that. […] napięcia w polsko-rosyjskich stosunkach gospodarczych to oczywisty skutek polskiej polityki zagranicznej, wspierającej dążenie do niezależności Ukraińców, Białorusinów, Gruzinów. Rosji to się nie podoba (Grzeszak 2006).

Jaroslaw Kaczyński, the leader of the conservative PiS at the time, said in an interview that Russia will simply have to take Poland seriously: a Poland with a strong position in Kiev and hopefully in Minsk, a Poland belonging to the six mightiest countries in Europe and having good relations with the United States. His brother, Lech Kaczyński, Poland’s then president-elect, said that the Kremlin leaders should finally understand that Eastern Europe is no longer part of Russia’s sphere of influence (Torbakov 2005). Poland considers the Nord Stream pipeline project punishment for its involvement in Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, in Belarus as well as for its criticism of Russian policy in Chechnya. Poland’s geopolitical rivalry with Russia does not come cheaply: it will suffer a significant loss in transit fees, because Russia would otherwise build a pipeline through Poland (Hanak 2005). The Kremlin has proven many times that it can use its natural resources to influence international politics (for example, by terminating Belarusian gas supplies) […]. The decision to construct a pipeline from Russia directly to Germany through the Baltic Sea was made taking into consideration events such as revolutionary movements in Ukraine […]. Kreml nieraz już dowodził, że potrafi posługiwać się swymi zasobami naturalnymi w polityce międzynarodowej (np. odcinając dostawy na Białoruś) […]. Decyzję o poprowadzeniu gazociągu z Rosji bezpośrednio do Niemiec przez Morze Bałtyckie podjęto m.in. ze względu na ruchy rewolucyjne na Ukrainie […] (Bielecki 2005). […] [Russian President Vladimir, AH] Putin justified the choice of route for the pipeline with “revolutionary movements in Ukraine.” […] Putin uzasadnił jednak wybór trasy „rewolucyjnymi ruchami na Ukrainie” (Kublik 2005a).

5.1.1.2 “… to Cement German-Russian Co-operation” Another alleged geopolitical goal is Russia’s intention to strengthen the economic and political ties between itself and Germany. Many Russian observers are convinced that the main political goal of the underwater pipeline is to cement political and economic co-operation between Russia and Germany. No matter who will govern Germany […].


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Głównym politycznym celem budowy podbałtyckiej nitki jest – w przekonaniu licznych rosyjskich obserwatorów – scementowanie politycznej i gospodarczej współpracy między Rosją i Niemcami. Niezależnie od tego, kto będzie rządził w Berlinie […] (Bielecki 2005).

The objection to a closer link between these two countries is based on the historical experience that a strong liaison between Russia and Germany might adversely affect Poland: The world is different. Europe is different. Russia and Germany are different. But, the Polish experience remains: whenever there was nothing but love and laughter between Berlin and Moscow, the Poles wept (Hanak 2005).

In October 2005, President Lech Kaczyński said that Poland wants “good relations with Russia and Germany. If you know history, you should be aware that the implementation of any plan without taking into consideration Poland’s interest has always been a cause for concern in Poland and in the Baltic Sea countries.”43 5.1.1.3 Control of EU Politics Stronger relations with Germany are only seen as the first step towards influencing and threatening the EU and all its member states. According to many Russian political scientists, Moscow wants to strengthen relations with Germany in order to gain influence over the politics of the European Union. This would weaken the meaning of EU institutions in negotiations with the Kremlin. It is a long-term strategy. Moscow is consolidating its power. In the future, Russia can use that position to benefit or harm Poland, Great Britain or Italy. Zdaniem wielu rosyjskich politologów Moskwa poprzez umacnianie związków z Niemcami chce wpływać na politykę Unii Europejskiej, osłabiając tym samym znaczenie wspólnych instytucji UE w negocjacjach z Kremlem. To długoterminowa strategia. Moskwa buduje swą siłę, pozycję. W przyszłości może ją wykorzystać na korzyść bądź niekorzyść Polski, Wlk. Brytanii czy Włoch (Bielecki 2005).

Considering Russia’s expansion and its assumed “evil intentions”, anybody could be the next victim. The Baltic pipeline is much more expensive than a pipeline running through the Polish territory. I am wondering why Russians are building the pipeline and I get chills thinking that one day they can threaten Holland too. Rurociąg pod Bałtykiem jest o wiele droższy, niż rura idąca przez Polskę, zastanawiam się więc, po co Rosjanie go budują, i robi mi się zimno, gdy pomyślę, że któregoś dnia mogą zaszantażować choćby i Holandię (Węglarczyk 2006).

5.1.1.4 Reduced Energy Security – Blockades and Price Manipulations In the Baltic states and Poland, the pipeline is seen as a threat to their energy security: Lithuanian Minister of Economy Kestutis Dauksys said it “reduces energy security of Lithuania”44, while Polish Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz believed that it “threatens Poland’s security.”45 43 Polish president-elect ‘interested in improving’ relations with Russia, Warsaw PAP (in English), 31 October 2005, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200510311477.1_ c9ea002a59ac6513. 44 Lithuania, Latvia displeased with Russia-Germany gas project, Itar-Tass (in English), 8 September 2005, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200509081477.1_894b0025182d7c3f. 45 New Polish govt to improve Russia relations – Marcinkiewicz, Interfax (in English), 20 October 2005, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200510201477.1_accf00322938acbf.

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The Polish authorities suspect Moscow and Berlin of entering into an anti-Polish conspiracy with the construction of the so-called Baltic gas pipeline.46 Poland fears that after a direct pipeline link is laid to Germany, Gazprom may suspend supplies through the Yamal pipeline. Gazprom will then be able to turn off its supplies of gas to Poland should any kind of crisis situation arise.47 Poland and Lithuania also have wider energy concerns about EU-Russia relations. Once built, the pipeline would allow Moscow to switch off Polish or Lithuanian gas supplies without affecting the richer EU states in the west (Rettman 2007b). Polish politicians have already labelled Russia’s energy policies “new economic imperialism.”48 Therefore, the Baltic countries and Poland want the gas pipeline to pass through their territories in the hopes of guaranteeing that Russia will not impose any power blockades on them or begin manipulating prices.49 Rational argumentation in Poland against the predicted scenario of cut-offs and blockades has not permeated the general discourse. This scenario is not threatening to Poland, because gas is transported from Russia to Germany through the Yamal pipeline and Gazprom is a co-owner of the pipe. The transit fee is used to pay off a credit taken by Russians to build the pipeline. Therefore, Russia is interested in using the Yamal pipeline to its maximum capacity. Nam taki scenariusz nie grozi, bo przez Polskę gaz do Niemiec płynie jamalską rurą, której współwłaścicielem jest rosyjski Gazprom. Opłata tranzytowa służy do spłacenia kredytu, który na budowę zaciągnęli Rosjanie, więc są zainteresowani, by rurociąg wykorzystać do maksimum (Grzeszak 2005).

One should add that Gazprom’s plans include increased exports to Western Europe. Thus, the Russian company cannot abandon the Yamal pipeline if it wants to fulfil its supply contracts.

5.1.2 Practical Concerns Poland and its Baltic neighbours say the pipeline not only deprives them of significant transit fees (under the assumption that Russia would otherwise build a pipeline through Poland; a pipeline passing through the Baltic states has never been proposed by Gazprom), but poses environmental risks and undermines their energy security (Hanak 2005).50 5.1.2.1 Environment In November 2005, environmental concerns were raised by the Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus, who demanded that the EU should force Russia and Germany to revise their pipeline project.51 46 The Polish weekly ‘Wprost’ (No. 27, August 2005) called the agreement the “Putin-Schröder Pact”, referring to the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939. 47 Poland calls Baltic gas pipeline Russian-German conspiracy, MosNews, 5 August 2005, http://www. mosnews.com/money/2005/08/05/polandpipeline.shtml. 48 Poland calls Baltic gas pipeline Russian-German conspiracy, MosNews, 5 August 2005, http://www. mosnews.com/money/2005/08/05/polandpipeline.shtml. 49 BNS – Baltic News Service, 26 October 2005, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200510261477.1_e3530031cc72aa96. 50 Poland hits out at Germany over gas partnership with Russia, Deutsche Welle (in English), 1 May 2006, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1986869,00.html. 51 EU should force Russia, Germany to revise pipeline project – Adamkus, Interfax (in English), 5 November 2005, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200511051477.1_b380003eb5d70bb3.


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Construction of the Russian-German pipeline through the Baltic Sea constitutes an enormous ecological threat for the Sea. Therefore, all EU member states should be involved in an assessment of this investment as well as supervision of the project – stated the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian presidents. Budowa rosyjsko-niemieckiego gazociągu przez Morze Bałtyckie stwarza wielkie zagrożenia ekologiczne dla tego morza i dlatego w ocenę tę inwestycji i nadzór nad nią powinny być zaangażowane wszystkie państwa UE – zgodnie apelują prezydenci Litwy, Łotwy i Estonii.52

Instead of just mentioning the Baltic Sea littoral states (and referring to the “Espoo Convention” on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context),53 the presidents of the Baltic states proposed that all EU member states should be involved. The environmental concerns emphasise the dangers of the chemical weapons and ammunition that were sunk in the Baltic Sea after the end of the Second World War. In a few days Polish authorities will address the European Commission, demanding an explanation for who will decide whether or not the construction of the Russian-German pipeline through the Baltic Sea constitutes an ecological threat for the Sea. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are warning that the construction could lead to an ecological catastrophe. After WWII about 300 thousand tons of German chemical weapons, containing about 50 thousand tons of gas, were sunk in the Baltic Sea. Za kilka dni polskie władze zwrócą się też do Komisji Europejskiej o wyjaśnienie, kto i w jaki sposób rozstrzygnie, czy budowa rosyjsko-niemieckiego gazociągu przez Bałtyk stwarza zagrożenie ekologiczne dla tego morza. Litwa, Łotwa i Estonia alarmują, że może ona doprowadzić do katastrofy ekologicznej. Po II wojnie światowej w Bałtyku zatopiono co najmniej 300 tys. ton niemieckiej broni chemicznej, zawierającej co najmniej 50 tys. ton gazów bojowych (Kublik 2005b).

As stated in the Nord Stream project documentation published in November 200654, on the instructions of the allies, nearly 11,000t of chemical weapons were sunk east of the Danish and Swedish islands of Bornholm and 1,000t near Gotland in 1947 and 1948. There is also speculation that some chemical munitions were simply thrown overboard while the transport ships were on their way to the burial zones. The volume of burials as well as their exact whereabouts were never reported, although it is known that they definitely took place (Grivach 2006). However, the chairperson of the Green parliamentary group in the Finnish Parliament, Heidi Hautala, stated: “Many of the environmental arguments against the pipeline have been put forward to amplify other, more directly political concerns. The environmental impact assessment may yet prove to be the only instrument to deal with these ‘larger’ aspects of the pipeline” (Hautala 2007). 5.1.2.2 Reducing Poland’s Role/ Influence in Europe’s Energy System Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski as well as President-Elect Lech Kaczyński criticised the pipeline decision as unilateral. Because Poland and the Baltic states were not

52 Gazociąg bałtycki: ekologiczna katastrofa? [Baltic Pipeline: an ecological catastrophe?], Gazeta Wyborcza, 4 November 2005, http://gospodarka.gazeta.pl/gospodarka/1,33406,3001239.html. 53 According to the Espoo Convention of 1991, all littoral states have to be involved in the environmental assessment of any pipeline project; decisions are made unanimously by all littoral states. For more information, see http://www.unece.org/env/eia. 54 For more information, see Nord Stream (2006) and the company’s website http://www.nord-stream. com/eng/project/regulatory_aspects/notification/.

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consulted (cf. e.g., Popova 2005), suspicions were aroused that the project was predominantly politically motivated.55 President Aleksander Kwaśniewski accuses Germans of making a deal with Moscow without anyone else’s opinion, especially since the investment will affect Poland. Prezydent Aleksander Kwaśniewski zarzuca Niemcom, że nie pytając nas o zdanie, dobili targu z Moskwą. Tymczasem chodzi o inwestycję, która ma konsekwencje dla Polski (Kublik 2005a).

Eugeniusz Smolar, president of Warsaw’s Center for International Relations think tank, considers the bilateral pipeline project “in contravention to the practice of the European Union. It [Poland, AH] was not consulted. It hit not only Polish economic interests, but also the feeling of security” (Donovan 2005). The plans to build a pipeline that will bypass their territory are insulting to many Polish politicians. They believe that the manoeuvre was designed to reduce Poland’s role in Europe’s energy system.56 The pipeline would cut out Poland and Ukraine, effectively destroying the countries’ main bargaining chip in their dealings with Russia (Elder 2006a). The exclusion of Poland and the Baltic states from the decision-making process dramatically reduces the new EU members’ influence. In the opinion of Latvian Foreign Minister Artis Pabriks, the method by which Russia and Germany agreed to build the gas pipeline negatively affects the interests of Latvia and of EU in general.57 It undermines EU efforts to produce a consistently common energy policy (PINR 2006). The Commissioner [Latvian EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs] said that he does not like the way the pipeline agreement was made, because EU countries must agree on energy issues. However, he finds the idea of the Baltic pipeline itself justifiable. Komisarz powiedział tylko to, że nie podoba mu się sposób zawarcia umowy w sprawie gazociągu. Bo kraje UE muszą w sprawach energetyki mówić jednym głosem. Natomiast samą ideę gazociągu bałtyckiego uważają za słuszną […] (Wieliński 2006).

The argumentation against the pipeline project has been elevated to the EU level. In the words of the Polish conservative opposition leader, Jan Rokita, “The Baltic Sea pipeline unambiguously violates the common interests of the European Union and its member states.” He demands that the pipeline issue be put on the agenda of negotiations between Russia and the EU.58 Poland and other Central European countries are concerned that the investment will disturb solidarity within the European Union. W Polsce i innych państwach Europy Środkowej ta inwestycja rodzi wielkie obawy, bo burzy solidarność Unii Europejskiej. We are concerned that the Baltic pipeline is a landmine set to destroy solidarity within the EU. From the perspective of the EU, the Russian-German project is not a positive under55 Direct Russia-Germany gas pipeline ‘political problem’ for Poland – leaders, Warsaw PAP (in English), 9 September 2005, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200509091477.1 _0203003328dcefda. 56 Poland calls Baltic gas pipeline Russian-German conspiracy, MosNews, 5 August 2005, http://www. mosnews.com/money/2005/08/05/polandpipeline.shtml; Direct Russia-Germany gas pipeline ‘political problem’ for Poland – leaders, Warsaw PAP (in English), 9 September 2005, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200509091477.1_0203003328dcefda. 57 Lithuania, Latvia displeased with Russia-Germany gas project, Itar-Tass (in English), 8 September 2005, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200509081477.1_894b0025182d7c3f. 58 Poland calls Baltic gas pipeline Russian-German conspiracy, MosNews, 5 August 2005, http://www. mosnews.com/money/2005/08/05/polandpipeline.shtml.


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taking, because it is excluded from the concept of common EU policy – stated [Poland’s President, AH] Kwaśniewski […]. Obawiamy się też, że gazociąg przez Bałtyk to mina podłożona pod solidarność w UE. Z punktu widzenia wspólnej polityki UE wobec Rosji to nie jest wydarzenie dobre, bo w istocie jest to projekt rosyjsko-niemiecki wyłączony z tej wspólnej koncepcji europejskiej – powiedział Kwaśniewski […] (Kublik 2005a).

The situation surrounding the gas pipeline construction project shows the lack of consolidation among the EU member states in their policy towards Russia, according to Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus. He stated: “It is time to resolve these problems, sit at the negotiating table and decide about the future of the relationship between Russia and the European Union.”59 President Adamkus has urged the EU to force Russia and Germany to revise the pipeline agreement, which he considers “unethical.” European decision-making should involve all member states and the EU “should speak with one voice […]”, he said.60 The argumentation took on a moral dimension when the Lithuanian parliamentary speaker Arturas Paulauskas asserted that Germany has disregarded the interests of other EU members.61 Adamkus added that “Germany has violated its obligations following from its membership in the European Union.”62 Box 5-2: Germany Germany plays an important role in all of these energy-related questions because it is one of the main consumers of Russian gas and the main pillar of Gazprom’s engagement in Western Europe (cf. e.g., Heinrich 2005b). Given the high prices and short supply of raw materials, the federal government and the industry are both eager to secure a sustained supply of raw materials at reasonable prices for the German economy. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder defended the German-Russian energy partnership during his tenure, warning that Germany needs politically stable supplying countries for reliable and affordable supply sources. While the EU has also put an emphasis on energy security since 2000, Germany has tried to use its traditionally good relationship with Gazprom to contain the influence of other EU countries and foreign companies. To ensure German participation in gas exploration projects in Russia, the German government has supported Russian proposals for alternative gas export routes. A strategic partnership was established, which includes the bilateral consultations of business leaders. In the particular case of the Nord Stream pipeline, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder announced agreement on the project at the Hanover Trade Fair on 11 April 2005. The two leaders strongly encouraged the pertinent gas companies to go ahead with the project. The Russian-German choice of an undersea route bypasses the Baltic states

59 EU should force Russia, Germany to revise pipeline project – Adamkus, Interfax (in English), 5 November 2005, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200511051477.1_b380003eb5 d70bb3. 60 ibid. 61 Lithuania Criticizes Germany Over Gas Pipeline Deal With Russia, Interfax, 14 September 2005, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200509141477.1_293c0022eb6ff6a4. 62 EU Should Force Russia, Germany To Revise Pipeline Project – Adamkus, Interfax, 5 November 2005, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200511051477.1_b380003eb5d70bb3.

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and Poland, despite these nations’ objections. However, the German Chancellor’s Office (which drove Germany’s policy toward Russia at this time) chose a go-it-alone course for Germany on this matter. The political decision was doubtlessly influenced by the good personal relationship between the two leaders (Thumann 2005; Götz 2005: 303).3 Energy security in the form of gas supplies might not be the sole motive for Germany’s support of the pipeline. Besides the high costs of the project, plans to deliver gas to the Kaliningrad region and to the UK cause one to wonder about the pipeline’s contribution to Germany’s gas supply. These factors make the enthusiasm of the German government for the pipeline hard to understand. The pipeline cannot be seen as an important element in Germany’s energy supply strategy. The German companies involved, however, see the pipeline only as a part of a larger strategy of participating in gas exploration in Russia – a price they have to pay to get a foot in the door. That gives the impression that the German government is supporting this strategy to strengthen the position of German companies in the Russian upstream sector (Götz 2004a: 19).

However, the position of the German government under Gerhard Schröder was domestically not unopposed; Germany’s main conservative opposition party, the CDU/ CSU, agreed with Poland in its critique of the Nord Stream pipeline using the same lines of argumentation. CDU foreign policy spokesman Friedbert Pflüger said that Russia and Germany have ignored the Central European countries and decisions have been made over their heads, which he described as a general problem of current German-Russian relations.63 To say that the planned pipeline does not concern Poland, the Baltic States and Ukraine would be a great understatement. The German-Russian “pipe” will exclude those countries from the transfer system between Eastern and Western Europe. Powiedzieć, że planowany gazociąg nie leży w interesie Polski oraz krajów bałtyckich i Ukrainy, to mało. Niemiecko-rosyjska „rura” odetnie w istocie wszystkie te państwa niemal od całego transferu gazu między Wschodem a Zachodem Europy (Trenkner 2005). The pipeline is an affront. Die Pipeline ist ein Affront. Gazprom could cut off its unloved neighbours’ gas supplies – as a threat, to collect debts or as an instrument of political pressure. However, in such cases Germany would be cut off from Western Siberian gas deliveries too. Gazprom könnte den ungeliebten Nachbarn einfach das Gas abdrehen – als Drohung, um Schulden einzutreiben oder als politisches Druckmittel. Doch damit wäre sofort auch Deutschland von der Erdgasversorgung aus Westsibirien abgetrennt. With the pipeline beneath the Baltic Sea operational it would be a different picture. Gazprom could interrupt supplies for its direct neighbour states without annoying its customers in Western Europe that are courted and pay on time. Ganz anders sieht es aus, wenn die Leitung durch die Ostsee in Betrieb geht. Dann kann Gazprom den direkten Nachbarstaaten den Hahn bei Streitigkeiten zudrehen, ohne die umworbenen und pünktlich zahlenden Kunden in Westeuropa zu verärgern.64

63 Bau der Ostsee-Pipeline besiegelt [Construction of the Baltic Sea pipeline sealed], Die Welt, 8 September 2005, http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article163881/Bau_der_Ostsee-Pipeline_besiegelt.html. 64 Röhre im Niemandsland. Warum Europas teuerste Pipeline durch das Meer und nicht durch die Nachbarstaaten führt [Pipe in no-man’s-land. Why the most expensive pipeline runs through the sea and not through its neighbour states], Die Welt, 9 September 2005, http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article 163965/Roehre_im_Niemandsland.html.


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Under the assumption of Russia’s “evil intentions”, the conservative German press also uses the same frames referring to Poland’s historical experiences (e.g., ‘axis’, ‘Rapallo’). [The German Chancellor Gerhard, AH] Schröder has had his eye on a special relationship between Germany and Russia, speaking of a Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis and ignoring the sorrows of the Central European countries. That Poland is feeling excluded, fearing a new ‘Rapallo’ and becoming trapped between the millstones of the big powers is not surprising. On the contrary, Warsaw’s fears are the result of Schröder’s foreign policy. Immer wieder liebäugelte Schröder mit einem deutsch-russischen Sonderverhältnis, sprach von der Achse Paris-Berlin-Moskau und kümmerte sich wenig um die Sorgen der mitteleuropäischen Staaten. Daß Polen sich nun ausgeschlossen fühlt, ein neues ‘Rapallo’ fürchtet und sich sorgt, zwischen die Mühlsteine der Großen zu geraten, ist nicht verwunderlich. Im Gegenteil, Warschaus Ängste sind ein Ergebnis der Schröderschen Außenpolitik (Schuster 2005). For years now two burdens have been weighing down Polish-German relations. […] The second case relates to Schröder’s Berlin-Moscow-Paris “axis”, which has […] brought Poland unpleasant historical memories. Dwie sprawy obciążają od kilku lat stosunki polsko-niemieckie. […] Sprawa druga to konstruowana przez Schrödera „oś” Berlin-Moskwa (plus Paryż), która […] musiała wywołać w Polsce niemiłe skojarzenia historyczne. Polish concerns are ignored in Germany to a large degree. This indicates that Germans are insensitive to what their Central European neighbours think and feel, and points to the fact that even one year after the EU’s enlargement, Berlin (if only Berlin?) still does not take new EU member states seriously. Polskie obawy są w Niemczech w znacznym stopniu ignorowane. Co dowodzi nie tylko braku wrażliwości na to, co myślą i czują sąsiedzi Niemiec z Europy Środkowej, ale także i tego, że choć rozszerzenie Unii Europejskiej dokonało się już ponad rok temu, to Berlin (czy tylko Berlin?) nadal nie traktuje poważnie nowych jej członków (Trenkner 2005).

Therefore, Poland has certainly appreciated the words of CDU leader and Chancellor-Elect Angela Merkel: “Every trip of a European politician to Moscow must start with a stopover in Warsaw!” (Hanak 2005). […] CDU leader Angela Merkel stated in Paris and Warsaw that her future government will try to achieve a Berlin-Moscow “strategic partnership”, but the “partnership” will never take place […] without the participation of the Poles and other nations of Central Europe. […] CDU Angeli Merkel, która podczas wizyt w Paryżu i Warszawie zapowiadała, że jej przyszłemu rządowi zależeć będzie wprawdzie na „strategicznym partnerstwie” BerlinMoskwa, ale że „partnerstwo” to nie będzie dokonywać się […] ponad głowami Polaków i innych narodów Europy Środkowej (Trenkner 2005).

Speaking in Vilnius, Merkel said she understood Lithuania’s concerns over the pipeline and that Russia “could try to use this project as an instrument of political pressure” (Donovan 2005). German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, however, contended that the treaty on the gas pipeline “is not spearheaded against anybody.”65

65 Lithuania, Germany to discuss North European Gas Pipeline, Itar-Tass (in English), 25 October 2005, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200510251477.1_ad26003e1a1fea52.

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Nevertheless, as the new German government under Angela Merkel took office, it soon became clear that it was going to continue its strategic energy partnership with Moscow (PINR 2006) and will not interfere in private companies’ affairs.66 [Germany’s President Horst, AH] Köhler’s or Merkel’s good intentions represent only once side of the coin. The influence that the German economy has on German politicians represents the other side. Angela Merkel will probably keep her promise and will not cherish the scandalous “friendship” with the perpetrator of the Chechen tragedy. Perhaps she will even be brave enough to criticise events occurring in “czar” Putin’s state. When it comes to business, Merkel’s government will most likely keep acting according to the policies of the departing green and red cabinet. When forced to choose between Russia and Central European nations, the German government has always chosen Moscow – that’s how it was in times of Bismarck and that’s how it is today […]. Bo dobre intencje Köhlera czy nawet Angeli Merkel to tylko jedna strona medalu. Strona druga to wpływ niemieckiej gospodarki na niemieckich polityków. Angela Merkel dotrzyma zapewne słowa i nie będzie pielęgnować skandalicznej „przyjaźni” ze sprawcą tragedii narodu czeczeńskiego; być może zdobędzie się nawet na krytykę tego, co dzieje się w państwie „cara” Putina. Ale tam, gdzie chodzi o twardy biznes, chadecki rząd raczej nie będzie prowadzić innej polityki niż odchodzący po siedmiu latach gabinet Czerwonych i Zielonych. Zmuszeni do wybierania między Rosją a narodami i państwami Europy Środkowej, rządzący w Berlinie wybierali zawsze Moskwę – tak było za czasów Bismarcka i tak jest dziś […] (Trenkner 2005).

5.1.3 Poland’s Perception Poland’s objections to the Nord Stream pipeline is that Polish territory will be bypassed in the construction. Poland will therefore wield no influence as a transit country. In the Polish interpretation, Germany is ignoring Poland’s interests (which would mean a landbased pipeline through Polish territory) and the EU is failing to intervene against the decision to build a pipeline that avoids Poland. The avoidance of transit countries – such as Poland – is the precise aim of the Russian policy (see Chapter 5.2). Therefore, Poland’s exclusion from the pipeline construction is not negotiable; there is no basis for an issue conflict. As mentioned earlier, exclusion (in this case from the pipeline construction) is often experienced as a denial of significance and is therefore humiliating. Poland felt that its interests were not taken seriously, causing a feeling of humiliation that escalated the conflict to the identity level. Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the conservative PiS, insists that “Russians will simply have to take […] Poland seriously” (Lavelle 2005). The exclusion from the pipeline construction and the underlying emotions of humiliation allow Poland to fall back on the historical frame of discourse towards Russia: through this prism, Poland views the pipeline with suspicion (because whatever Russia does is suspicious) and interprets the Nord Stream pipeline as Russia’s punishment for its support for the pro-Western government in Ukraine. The conflict about the Nord Stream pipeline constitutes an identity conflict for Poland (because it was excluded from the issue, it could not participate in negotiations about the construction or try to convince the involved parties of its position). Poland used the “history frame” towards Russia and Germany to voice accusations; it broadened the issue to the 66 Lithuania criticizes Germany over gas pipeline deal with Russia, Interfax (in English), 14 September 2005, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200509141477.1_293c0022eb6ff6a4.


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EU level complaining about a lack of solidarity and sees a common energy policy endangered by the pipeline construction. Adam Grzeszak’s article (2005) summarises these perceptions and interpretations rather nicely, even though he is critical of Polish perceptions. In Poland, the North European Gas Pipeline agreement […] is considered to be an unfriendly political act. We are upset that Germans ignore our interests, and that the European Union tolerates Germany’s egoistic attitude. We are also upset with the Russians, who instead of building a second branch of the Yamal pipeline through Poland have decided to construct a much more expensive sea route, bypassing our country. We suspect that the pipeline is a punishment for our support of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine as well as our refusal to construct “pieremychka” (a gas connector to transfer Russian gas through Poland, bypassing Ukraine). Podpisanie umowy o budowie Gazociągu Północnego […] odebrane zostało w naszym kraju jako nieprzyjazny akt polityczny. Dlatego mamy pretensję do Niemców, że lekceważą nasze interesy, i do Unii Europejskiej, że ten egoizm toleruje. No i oczywiście do Rosjan, którzy zamiast wybudować drugą nitkę wiodącego przez Polskę gazociągu Jamał, zdecydowali się na dużo droższą drogę morską omijającą nasz kraj. Podejrzewamy, że to kara za poparcie ukraińskiej pomarańczowej rewolucji i odmowę budowy „pieremyczki” (gazowego łącznika, którym rosyjski gaz mógłby płynąć przez Polskę omijając Ukrainę) (Grzeszak 2005).

Grzeszak links the Polish behaviour to the “history frame” of fear and suspicion towards Russia, depicted as a kind of paranoia. We are upset with Russians when they build gas pipelines, and when they do not want to build them. When they sell us oil for very attractive prices, we suspect that they do it because of their evil intentions. We start to panic when they want to invest in our country. Even when they say they do not want to invest, we still do not believe them because we know how sneaky they are. One can even be interrogated by the criminal investigation commission for discussing energy issues with Russians. One of the reasons for the current political storm circling around PGNiG’s privatisation is a suspicion that the process has a hidden goal – creating comfortable conditions for Russians to take over the Polish gas sector. Have we become schizophrenic? Mamy do Rosjan pretensję, kiedy budują gazociągi i kiedy ich budować nie chcą. Kiedy sprzedają nam ropę po atrakcyjnych cenach, podejrzewamy, że robią to w złej intencji. Wpadamy w przerażenie, gdy chcą inwestować w naszym kraju. Nawet kiedy deklarują, że nie chcą, nie wierzymy, bo wiemy, że są podstępni. Ba, za same rozmowy z Rosjanami o energetyce można stanąć przed komisją śledczą i prokuraturą. Jednym z powodów trwającej właśnie politycznej burzy wokół prywatyzacji PGNiG jest podejrzenie, że ukrytym celem tej operacji może być stworzenie Rosjanom warunków do przejęcia polskiego sektora gazowego. Czy przypadkiem nie popadliśmy w schizofrenię (Grzeszak 2005)?

In mentioning Russia’s use of “soft power” to rebuild its position in the world, Grzeszak is alluding to the Polish fear of Russian expansionism. He highlights the dichotomy between fear of Russian influence and the desire for cheap energy sources in Poland and the contradiction between economic interests and the frame of discourse. Russians do not hide the fact that not only do they want to sell us their raw materials, but they also want to enter our fuel-energy business. Similar expectations are presented to other EU member states. The Kremlin also does not hide the fact that, by using economic means, it wants to rebuild its position as a superpower. This spreads a sense of fear in Poland, and leads many politicians to hysterical reactions. On the one hand, we care about cheap raw materials, such as those offered by Russians, and on the other hand, we would prefer that those raw materials did not come from Russia. Rosjanie nie ukrywają, że chcą nam nie tylko sprzedawać swoje surowce, ale wejść do naszego biznesu paliwowo-energetycznego. Podobne oczekiwania zgłaszają wobec innych

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krajów Unii Europejskiej. Wszędzie budzą poważne lęki, bo Kreml nie tai, że za pomocą środków ekonomicznych stara się odbudowywać swą mocarstwową pozycję. U nas przeradza się to często w niepohamowany strach, prowadzący wielu polityków do reakcji histerycznych. Z jednej bowiem strony zależy nam na możliwie tanich surowcach energetycznych, czyli takich, jakie oferują Rosjanie, a z drugiej wolelibyśmy, aby nie były to surowce rosyjskie. Czyli kwadratura koła (Grzeszak 2006).

5.2

Russian Reactions to the Criticism

A pipeline beneath the Baltic Sea connecting Russia and Western customers had been under discussion in its various incarnations for nearly a decade. Therefore, Poland could have hardly seen it as a surprise. The Baltic pipeline construction plan has been discussed for about seven years. Every time Gazprom faced problems in Ukraine or Poland, the plan returned on Russia’s agenda. For example, when Jerzy Buzek’s government disagreed with the plan of building a pipeline through Poland to Slovakia, bypassing Ukraine. Plan budowy jest znany co najmniej od siedmiu lat i zawsze powracał, gdy Gazprom miał problemy na Ukrainie lub w Polsce. Tak było, kiedy rząd Jerzego Buzka odrzucił plan pieremyczki, czyli rurociągu przez Polskę do Słowacji, omijającego Ukrainę, choć Gazprom zawarł w tej sprawie wstępne porozumienie z zachodnimi firmami gazowymi (Jendroszczyk 2005).

In 2003, Gazprom placed the Baltic pipeline as the number one item on its agenda. If Polish officials had had any doubts about the construction of the Baltic pipeline, these should have vanished in December 2004 when the deadline for decisions about the construction of the second segment of the Yamal pipeline came and went and no decisions were made (Jendroszczyk 2005). Russia’s rationale was clear: it wanted to sidestep transit countries so as to avoid potential conflicts with them. Thus, it cannot be assumed that Russia was seriously considering other pipeline routes, especially those that would have increased the number of transit countries (like the ‘Amber project’).67 State Duma Energy Committee Chairman Valery Yazev said that the new pipeline would not be cheaper, but would “avoid political dependence” and would also “add to Russia’s instruments in political negotiations.”68 [Russia’s President Vladimir, AH] Putin denied that [the pipeline’s purpose was, AH] to punish Eastern Europeans for abandoning the empire. “I want to ensure gas transport security, diversification and savings”, he explained […]. Putin zaprzecza […] by ukarać mieszkańców Europy Wschodniej za to, że porzucili imperium. “Chodzi o bezpieczeństwo transportu gazu, dywersyfikację i oszczędności […].” He told Russian reporters about building new gas export routes to “ensure Russia’s independence from transport mediators.” Wcześniej rosyjskim dziennikarzom mówił o planach budowy nowych magistrali do eksportu gazu, aby „zapewnić Rosji niezależność od pośredników” (Kublik 2005a).

Gazprom Deputy CEO Aleksander Ananenkov had already stated in July 2005 that the North European pipeline project was not an alternative to the Yamal gas pipeline. He asserted that the Arctic zone, including Barents Sea shelf, would first and foremost fill the 67 Poland calls Baltic gas pipeline Russian-German conspiracy, MosNews, 5 August 2005, http://www. mosnews.com/money/2005/08/05/polandpipeline.shtml. 68 Russian Duma member: Northern Gas Pipeline to avoid political dependence, Interfax (in English), 12 September 2005, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200509121477.1_ d6d1001339940fdf.


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Nord Stream pipeline with gas, and that “the North European route is the best for delivering that gas to the European market.” The Yamal pipeline would be filled with gas from the Yamal-Nenets autonomous district.69 Gazprom spent more than 10 years studying the possibility of building a pipeline to Europe by the northern route. The need for a new corridor is dictated by objective factors – after 2010 gas extraction in Russia will begin to shift from the Nadym-Purtazovskiy region to Yamal and the shelf of the northern seas (first and foremost the Barents Sea, with its vast Shtokman field). While a new corridor is already ready for the export of Yamal gas – this is the first section of the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline through Belarus and Poland – future supplies from the shelf are basically ‘locked up’. Газпром изучал возможность строить трубу в Европу по северному маршруту более 10 лет. Необходимость в новом коридоре диктуется объективными обстоятельствами – после 2010 года добыча газа в России начнет смещаться с Надым-Пуртазовского района на Ямал и шельф северных морей (прежде всего, Баренцева с его гигантским Штокмановским месторождением). Если для экспорта ямальского газа новый коридор уже готов – это первая нитка газопровода Ямал-Европа через Белоруссию и Польшу–, то перспективные шельфовые объемы, по сути, находятся «взаперти». Apart from the option of a maritime gas pipeline from Russia to Germany, other transportation possibilities were also examined: via Finland and Sweden (with two short sea crossings), via Finland (with one sea crossing), and completely overland via the Baltic region and Poland (the ‘Yantar’ [Amber, AH] project). However, Stockholm and Helsinki could not make up their minds as to whether they needed significant volumes of Russian gas, since the first two projects proposed the gasification of these countries in passing. And the ‘Yantar’ [Amber, AH] project differs from the second section of ‘Yamal-Europe’ (whose construction has been shelved for the time being) only in terms of the number of transit countries, and for the worse – four instead of two. Помимо варианта с морским газопроводом из России в Германию рассматривались и другие возможности транспортировки: через Финляндию и Швецию (с двумя короткими морскими переходами), через Финляндию (с одним морским переходом) и полностью сухопутный через Прибалтику и Польшу (проект «Янтарь»). Однако в Стокгольме и Хельсинки так и не решили, нужны ли им значительные объемы российского газа, поскольку первые два проекта предполагали попутную газификацию этих стран. А газопровод «Янтарь» от второй нитки «Ямал-Европы», которую решили пока не строить, отличается только количеством транзитных стран, причем в худшую сторону – четыре вместо двух (Grivach 2006).

In reaction to the severe criticism, however, Russia and Germany opened up the pipeline project to third countries in December 2005, especially targeting Poland and the Baltic states. “Russia will happily accept investors from other countries, including Poland, in the construction of the Russian-German pipeline through the Baltic Sea”, stated the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, after his meeting with […] [his German colleague, AH] Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that access to the pipeline should be open to third parties. She said that a special Polish-German working group would be organised to take care of pipeline matters. Rosja z zadowoleniem przyjmie udział inwestorów z innych krajów, także z Polski, w budowie rosyjsko-niemieckiego gazociągu przez Bałtyk – oświadczył w sobotę minister spraw zagranicznych Rosji Siergiej Ławrow po spotkaniu z szefem dyplomacji Niemiec Frankiem-Walterem Steinmeierem. Dzień wcześniej w Warszawie kanclerz Niemiec Angela Merkel stwierdziła, że dostęp do gazociągu powinien być otwarty dla stron trze69 Europe gas pipeline alternative, Interfax (in English), 18 July 2005, World News Connection, Document Number: 200507181477.1_e6130023799996f7.

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cich i zapowiedziała powołanie specjalnej polsko-niemieckiej grupy roboczej, która zajmie się problemem gazociągu (Kublik 2005c).

However, the offer included only branch lines from the subsea pipeline to the aforementioned countries. These branch lines would not have made them transit countries; therefore, the offer was rejected. “Poland is not interested in connecting with the Russian-German Baltic pipeline”, stated representatives of the Ministry of Economy after talks with EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs. Polska nie jest zainteresowana połączeniem odnogą z rosyjsko-niemieckim gazociągiem przez Bałtyk – stwierdzili przedstawiciele Ministerstwa Gospodarki po rozmowach z komisarzem UE ds. energii Andrisem Piebalgsem. “The Ministry of Economy prefers to remain distant from branch pipeline ideas. Poland is not interested in constructing a branch pipeline through the Baltic Sea. We have enough gas from Russia and do not have to order more”, stated Deputy Minister of Economy Piotr Naimski at a press conference. Ministerstwa Gospodarki z dystansem podchodzi do takich pomysłów. – Polska nie jest zainteresowana budową odgałęzienia gazociągu przez Bałtyk. Mamy wystarczającą ilość gazu z Rosji i nie musimy go brać więcej – powiedział na konferencji prasowej wiceminister gospodarki Piotr Naimski (Kublik 2005c).

5.2.1 Meat Ban The relations between Poland and Russia further soured when Russia imposed temporary import restrictions on a number of Polish meat products (beef, pork, pork by-products, poultry and other semi-finished meat products) on 10 November 2005. The Russian Foreign Ministry said in its statement that Poland had failed to prevent frequent instances of serious violations of Russian veterinary and phytosanitary norms by the export of falsified documented meat products to Russia. “Russia insisted that Poland adjust its meat exports to Russian standards, but no changes have been made” said Federal Veterinary and Phytosanitary Control Service (Rosselkhoznadzor) Director Sergei Dankvert. The Foreign Ministry’s statement went on to say that Poland had admitted to violations in its supply of meat products and had urged Rosselkhoznadzor to conduct urgent talks with relevant agencies about the matter. Temporary restrictions would also be introduced on a number of Polish plant products as of 14 November.70 In reaction, the newly appointed Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Meller expressed his hopes that Russia’s ban on Polish meat and plant imports would be a temporary measure; otherwise doubts would arise concerning the technical validity of the issue.71 We know that some Polish exporters engage in fraud. Our administration will take measures against these people. However, there are very few crooks of this sort. For that reason we do understand the reaction of the Russian veterinarian and phytosanitarian administration. Мы знаем, что некоторые польские экспортеры являются мошенниками. Наше правительство примет соответствующие меры против этих людей. Но таких мошен-

70 Russia bans meat imports from Poland Moscow, Interfax (in English), 10 November 2005, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200511101477.1_8bb60013f694bf1f; Polish meat import restrictions not politically motivated – Foreign Ministry, Interfax (in English), 10 November 2005, World News Connection, Document Number: 200511101477.1_9893001720ff30ad. 71 Poland hopes Russia will lift meat, plant ban soon – Foreign Minister, Interfax (in English), 14 November 2005, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200511141477.1_c4dd0039 cef931a6.


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ников немного. В целом мы понимаем реакцию представителей российских ветеринарных и фитосанитарных служб (Abdullina/ Golovanova 2005).

Box 5-3: Meat Ban However, a solution was not reached; instead, Ukraine also started to ban Polish and Belarusian meat in March 2006 due to doubts about the quality of imported sausage and to a lack of appropriate documents. Moscow banned imports of meat and dairy products from Ukraine on 20 January after inferior meat had been supplied via Ukraine to Russia (Stetsyura 2006). At first, it seemed that the matter could be solved and embargo would be removed. The lack of care (i.e., quality control and enforcement of regulations) on our part that the Russians pointed out has been rectified. However, during another series of talks, new demands were made. Those demands, however, must be reviewed by the European Commission. In effect, not only was the embargo never removed, but it was expanded to include other agricultural products: fruits, vegetables, flowers, and wood. What is even worse is that acting under Russian pressure, Ukraine banned the import of Polish meat as well. Ukraine found itself in a difficult situation: the Russians were claiming that Polish meat was being smuggled through Ukrainian territory, and they threatened with sanctions. As a result, meat exports decreased by more than 10% and the export of general agricultural products by 24%. Losses are great – they are estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars. It is difficult to give an exact sum, since no one knows how to estimate the value of losing market and business contacts as well as finding new consumers that would buy products prepared especially for Russian and Ukrainian clients. W pierwszej chwili wydawało się, że sprawę da się jakoś rozwiązać i embargo zostanie zniesione. Wytknięte przez Rosjan zaniedbania (głównie natury formalno-kontrolnej) zostały usunięte. Jednak w trakcie kolejnych rozmów pojawiały się nowe żądania, wchodzące w obszar, o którym decyduje już Komisja Europejska. W efekcie embargo nie tylko nie zostało zniesione, ale rozszerzono je na wiele innych produktów rolnych: owoce, warzywa, kwiaty, a także na drewno. Co gorsza, pod naciskiem Rosji zakaz importu polskiego mięsa wprowadziła Ukraina. Była w trudnej sytuacji, bo Rosjanie twierdzili, że przez jej terytorium przemycane jest polskie mięso, i grozili sankcjami. W sumie eksport mięsa zmalał o kilkanaście procent, a towarów całej branży rolno-spożywczej – o 24 proc. Straty są duże, szacuje się je na kilkaset milionów dolarów. Trudno je jednak dokładnie wyliczyć, bo nie wiadomo, jak szacować utratę rynków zbytu i kontaktów handlowych oraz kłopoty ze znalezieniem nabywców na produkty przygotowywane specjalnie pod kątem odbiorców rosyjskich i ukraińskich (Grzeszak 2006). In the course of the unsuccessful negotiations, Poland called the ban a politically motivated response to Warsaw’s support for Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (Elder 2006a).* Poland also saw a clear link between the ban and its stance on the pipeline issue. It seems that for our Russian discussion partners meat is smokescreen. It is energy that they are interested in. Wiele wskazuje na to, że dla naszych rosyjskich rozmówców mięso to temat zastępczy. Tak naprawdę chodzi im o energetykę (Grzeszak 2006). Whether or not Russia’s meat ban had a hidden agenda was a matter of speculation. For Poland, the meat ban certainly qualified as a sanction; however, it did not conduct any counter-sanctions, and the conflict thus remained on the identity level. *

Ukraine said that it would lift its ban on Polish meat on 25 November 2006; it had cited health concerns when it followed Russia’s lead in banning the meat in the previous year (Elder 2006a).

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“We still hope to terminate the prohibition of Polish exports. We are carrying out talks on this issue. Unfortunately, Polish politicians are not being supportive, and their antiRussian statements complicate our situation even more”, explains Witold Choinski, director of the Polish Meat Union, an organisation bringing together Polish meat producers. After their first aid declarations, EU’s governing officials left Polish companies on their own. They concluded that the matter is between Poland and Russia, not the EU and Russia. Besides, producers from other EU member states, including Denmark, replaced Poland. „Wciąż mamy nadzieję, że zakaz eksportu uda się znieść. Prowadzimy w tej sprawie rozmowy. Niestety, brakuje nam skutecznego wsparcia ze strony polskich polityków, a ich coraz częstsze antyrosyjskie wypowiedzi dodatkowo komplikują naszą sytuację” – wyjaśnia Witold Choiński, prezes Związku Polskie Mięso, organizacji zrzeszającej krajowych producentów mięsa. Władze Unii Europejskiej po pierwszych deklaracjach pomocy także pozostawiły polskie firmy na łasce losu. Uznały, że to sprawa polsko-rosyjska, a nie unijno-rosyjska. Zresztą na opróżnione przez Polaków miejsce weszli producenci z innych krajów Unii, m.in. Duńczycy (Grzeszak 2006).

5.3 The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Crisis of 2005/ 2006 The January 2006 gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine fuelled Poland’s rhetoric against Russian policy. Following the gas crisis (which entailed the suspension of Russian gas deliveries for Ukrainian consumption), there was consensus within the Polish government that Russia could no longer be considered a reliable supplier of energy, even though Economic Minister Piotr Wozniak described supplies of Russian gas to Poland during this crisis as fairly normal, adding that there was no risk for Polish fuel consumers.72 Polish Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz contended that the problems that had arisen during the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis demonstrated that it was an issue that needed to be dealt with at the European level. Urging a diversification of gas suppliers, the Polish premier warned: “I say we can no longer trust Russia alone.”73 These statements include a moral judgement and imply a breach of trust by Russia. Box 5-4: The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Conflict of 2005/ 2006 The gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine, which resulted in the suspension of deliveries for Ukrainian consumption in January 2006, did not spontaneously erupt, as was widely believed by outside observers. On the contrary, the actual gas dispute started back in March 2005, when Ukraine challenged parts of the supply and transit contract with Russia. In 2002, both parties had signed a supply and transit contract that was supposed to be valid until the end of 2013. According to the terms of the contract, the payment for the transfer of Russian gas through the Ukrainian pipeline grid was to be made in the form of barter exchange. By agreement, up to 15% of gas pumped through Ukrainian territory was to be taken by Ukraine in lieu of payment for gas transit. On 9 August 2004, the two companies ratified Addendum No. 4 to the supply contract from 2002, according to which the amount of gas given as a payment was to be calculated based on the tariff of US$1.09 per 1,000cm/ 100km transported; the

72 Polish minister says no reasons for worries about gas supplies, Itar-Tass (in English), 1 January 2006, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200601011477.1_edd8000c8dc038d2. 73 Polish PM proposes European ‘musketeers’ pact on energy supplies, EU Business, 27 January 2006, http://www.eubusiness.com/Energy/060127083014.z7qaagkr/.


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retail price of the natural gas itself was set at US$50 per 1,000cm. According to the addendum, the price was not subject to change until the end of 2009 (Stern 2006: 3). In June 2005, Gazprom took steps to increase its prices for natural gas sold to countries of the former Soviet Union (excluding Belarus) and Poland (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 46, 23 November 2005). Within three years, gas prices were supposed to reach a “European” level. Gazprom justified this price hike with rising exploration costs, investments in infrastructure and the strongly increasing world market prices for energy. To disconnect gas supplies and transit fees in the case of Ukraine, Gazprom planned to reduce deliveries of Russian gas to Ukraine, to be compensated by deliveries from Central Asia (Gazprom 2005a). In August 2005, Gazprom started negotiations with Naftogaz Ukrainy over a new gas contract. Upon studying Ukraine’s proposal from March 2005, the company received the impression that Ukraine was also eager to renegotiate. Russia insisted on a new contract that would charge Ukraine about US$160 per 1,000cm. While the Ukrainian side staunchly opposed any increase in gas prices (NewsRu.com, 26 November 2005, http://www.newsru.com/finance/26nov2005/ukr.html), Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko later agreed to some concessions whereby the price would be gradually increased over time. A few days later, Russia agreed on 29 November that the transit tariff would be increased from US$1.09 to US$1.74 per 1,000cm/ 100km (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 47, 30 November 2005). In response to Ukraine’s hesitancy, Gazprom threatened on 13 December that if an agreement about the new price was not reached before 1 January 2006, it would cut off supplies of natural gas to Ukraine (RFE/ RL Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 232, 14 December 2005). The following day, Gazprom finally demanded US$230 per 1,000cm, claiming that this price reflected the trends in world markets (Korrespondent.net, 23 December 2005, http://www.korrespondent.net/ main/140219; NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 50, 21 December 2005). To summarise, during the final three months of 2005, negotiations between Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukrainy failed to make substantial progress. Gazprom was demanding “European prices” of US$160 and later US$230 per 1,000cm unless Ukraine was prepared to consider allowing Gazprom an equity stake in its transit pipeline network. Ukraine was prepared to pay market prices for gas but felt that they should be phased in gradually and that the maximum price should not exceed US$80 per 1,000cm (Stern 2006: 6). Gazprom’s unwavering position on the US$230 per 1,000cm price was backed at the highest political levels in the Kremlin. On 8 December, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted in a harshly worded speech that household consumers in Ukraine received gas for much lower prices than their counterparts in Russia (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 49, 14 December 2005). On 29 December, Putin offered Ukraine a US$3.6bn loan to cover the cost of transition to market prices for natural gas. Two days after Ukraine rejected this offer, Putin offered to postpone the price increase until April 2006 if Ukraine immediately agreed to the new prices. However, the Ukrainian side rejected this suggestion too (AFX News, 1 January 2006, http://www.forbes. com/work/feeds/afx/2006/01/01/afx2422361.html; Stern 2006: 7). As a result of Ukraine’s rejection of Russia’s attempts to sweeten the deal, Gazprom cut off gas supplies for Ukrainian consumption on 1 January 2006. The cut-off had an immediate impact on European countries. Ukrainian companies had been diverting gas from the pipelines, so the cut-off resulted in the falling pressures and non-delivery of gas reported by European companies on 1 January. The fall in volumes delivered to EU countries caused an outcry across Europe. By 4 January, Russian gas deliveries to Europe were back to normal levels (Stern 2006: 8–9).

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On 4 January 2006, Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukrainy announced an end to the dispute with the signing of a 5-year contract (the full text of the document was published in Ukrayinska Pravda, 5 January 2006, http://www2.pravda.com.ua/ru/news/2006/1/5/36448.htm). A Politically Motivated Dispute? Many observers around the globe endorsed President Yushchenko’s position that Russia’s price hike constituted an act of blatant political retaliation for Ukraine’s moving out of Russia’s sphere of influence and for its pro-Western policy. Some analysts suspected the Russian actions as a Machiavellian attempt to influence the upcoming parliamentary election campaign in Ukraine, in which pro-Western forces were bound to face a challenge from opposition parties dedicated to tightening Ukraine-Russia relations. These same analysts further allege that the move to increase gas prices during the winter season may have been intended to decrease the popularity of the Ukrainian president and his party among the electorate (cf. e.g., Finn 2006). The suggestion that Russia’s motives in its dealing with Ukraine were in fact political gains credibility from a comparison with the other countries facing a gas price increase. Having either left the Soviet Union, such as the Baltic states, or electing pro-European rather than pro-Russian governments, such as Georgia, these nations were also confronted with higher gas prices. Some observers point out that Gazprom’s behaviour is economically inconsistent; the prices it charges seem to exhibit a direct correlation to the degree of the purchaser’s political compliance (cf. e.g., Buckley 2005). However, Russia dismissed the accusation that there had been any political motivation behind its gas prices. Gazprom had, after all, implemented price increases for all CIS countries in 2006 (Stern 2006: 11). The company underscored the fact that the Russian ally Armenia paid the same gas prices as Georgia, whose relations with Russia are frosty at best (Martirosian 2005). It argued that all former Soviet republics had benefited from discounted gas prices in the past and still did. Indeed, for the most part, these countries are able to buy their natural gas at prices well below world market levels. Nevertheless, the price of Russian gas to Ukraine was substantially higher than for other CIS countries. In the final weeks of negotiations, Gazprom suddenly raised the price from US$160 per 1,000cm (which is what Moldova is charged) to US$230 per 1,000cm (Stern 2006: 11–12). Only Belarus continued to pay the same price of US$46.7 per 1,000cm in 2006 that it had paid in 2005 (nearly the same level as Russian domestic customers). Gazprom justified these rockbottom prices on the grounds that a prospective economic union between the countries was in the works, and that – in sharp contrast to Ukraine – Gazprom considered itself the owner of the Belarussian section of the Yamal pipeline. Interestingly, it turns out that the deal with Belarus in 2006 was the one that was politically motivated. The price changes that Gazprom introduced into a range of other former Soviet countries (with the exception of Belarus) represent a paradigmatic shift in Russia’s energy relations: the evolution from political to market pricing (Stern 2006: 13; Pace Global Energy Services 2006: 2). Additionally, the company was able to negotiate that the transit fee paid in cash rather than in gas would now be legally and financially separate from the gas prices for Ukraine. Conclusion Throughout the entire CIS, Gazprom’s customers were required to make the leap to marketbased prices fairly rapidly, unless they were prepared to sell a significant equity share in their gas transportation assets to Gazprom. The company’s motivation for taking such a hard line with Ukraine (and other CIS countries) was overwhelmingly economic. Gazprom and the Russian government were no longer prepared to provide gas at subsidised prices to former allies


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unwilling to make commercial concessions in the form of shared property rights to infrastructure. Stern (2006: 17) interprets the gas dispute as a “watershed in Gazprom’s commercial strategy: a small, but highly significant, step towards a future in which Russian gas sales to CIS – including Russian domestic – customers become as profitable as (and with the saving of transportation costs potentially more profitable than) gas exports to Europe.” Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the election of President Yushchenko in 2004–2005 contributed to the deterioration of the relations between the two countries to some extent. His victory might have complicated the reaching of a price accommodation between Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukrainy. However, President Putin’s proposal of a three-month grace period in the application of the new price regime, which would have protected President Yushchenko from any effects of the price increase until after the March 2006 elections, “could be regarded as a conciliatory political gesture” (Stern 2006: 13). Despite the fact that the Russian gas monopoly will remain heavily dependent on Ukraine as a transit country in the future, Gazprom has been able to break off the contractual link between transit fees and gas supply in the Ukrainian case. Transit fees as well as gas supply volumes and prices will be negotiated separately in the future. This might put the gas relationship between the two countries on more commercial terms.

As a reaction to the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis, Poland started talks with Norway as a step toward diversifying its energy sources and the government proposed the creation of an “energy NATO”, also called the “musketeers’ pact.”

5.4 Musketeers’ Pact In January 2006, Poland’s Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz called on EU partners to form an alliance to secure energy supplies, amid bottlenecks in Russian gas. The proposed European energy pact would be modelled on the three musketeers’ pact: one for all and all for one. The pact would revolve around the diversification of supply sources, the creation of reserves and increased energy exchange within Europe. “I feel it is clear that the European Union must swiftly look at a diversification of its sources of supply if it wants to limit its dependency”, Marcinkiewicz added.74 The EU would promote the interconnection of the member states’ gas transmission networks to protect Eastern and Central European countries in the event that Russia were to interrupt deliveries again. The EU was also urged to develop a system in which member states could borrow reserves from one another during emergencies, such as extreme shortages, including those caused by unusually cold winters. According to Deputy Minister of Economy Piotr Naimski, who oversees Poland’s energy policy, a “common EU energy policy is crucial” for European energy security (Dempsey 2006b). The government of Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz proposed the first large international initiative in many years: he addressed 32 countries (NATO and the European Union) with a letter proposing an Energy Security Treaty. Rząd premiera Kazimierza Marcinkiewicza wystąpił z pierwszą od lat w tej skali polską inicjatywą międzynarodową: do 32 krajów (NATO i Unii Europejskiej) premier skierował list z propozycją zawarcia Paktu Bezpieczeństwa Energetycznego (Ostrowski 2006).

74 Polish PM proposes European ‘musketeers’ pact on energy supplies, EU Business, 27 January 2006, http://www.eubusiness.com/Energy/060127083014.z7qaagkr/.

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Marcinkiewicz said that the issue of a common European energy strategy had been dismissed as the product of a Polish obsession or “alleged Russophobia” for too long. “The gas war between Russia and Ukraine, and Gazprom’s failings in recent days75, have brought a stark spotlight to bear on a problem that we have been raising for a long time without really being heard”, he added.76 Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia joined Poland in urging the EU to draw up a common energy policy (Dempsey 2006b). The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis evidently fuelled the perception – not only in Poland but internationally – that “Moscow uses economic pressure to reach its political and imperial goals”, which, if true, would mean that Europe’s energy security is very fragile indeed (Renik 2006). After the “gas war”, the EU started to realise that “Europe’s further dependence on Russian gas was like playing Russian roulette, a dangerous game. Moscow, whose imperial ambitions are coming to the forefront, has been tempting the West with the prospect of gas supplies, a trap similar to the one prepared for Ukraine – first, by making the country increasingly dependent on Russian supplies, then dictating a price and finally turning off gas when the new prices were rejected” (Renik 2006). The EU was urged to take measures to diversify its energy supplies and to adopt regulations to prevent individual EU countries from ensuring their own energy security at the expense of other EU members (Renik 2006). This statement was doubtlessly aimed at Germany, which has been accused of betraying its fellow EU members.

5.5 Hitler-Stalin Pact Polish relations with Germany, which soured under former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, received another blow in April 2006. After German Chancellor Angela Merkel had refused Warsaw’s request to renegotiate the Russian-German pipeline agreement, Polish Defence Minister Radek Sikorski likened the deal to the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939 during a round table discussion on energy in Brussels on 30 April (Dombey 2006).77 Warsaw is afraid that Russia will gain a tool to threaten its neighbors with closing land gas pipelines, without causing Germany any harm. Sikorski stated that “Poland is especially sensitive when it comes to corridors78 and agreements going beyond our reach.” –

75 A few days after the crisis, Gazprom had to curtail gas deliveries to Europe due to severe cold weather. This resulted in one third reduction in supply for Poland’s chemical industry, one of the nation’s largest consumers of imported gas (Dempsey 2006a). 76 Polish PM proposes European ‘musketeers’ pact on energy supplies, EU Business, 27 January 2006, http://www.eubusiness.com/Energy/060127083014.z7qaagkr/. 77 The secret amendment of this non-aggression pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union was the basis for the subsequent division of Poland by the two countries. (The pact is also known under the name Molotov-Ribbentrop pact after the countries’ foreign ministers who signed the pact.) The same comparison was also used in 2000 regarding the bypass pipeline through Poland avoiding Ukraine (Wróblewski 2000) and in 2005 by president-elect Lech Kaczyński, who called the RussianGerman pipeline agreement a new Hitler-Stalin Pact. However, at this time the statement was barely noticed (Polish president-elect ‘interested in improving’ relations with Russia, Warsaw PAP (in English), 31 October 2005, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200510311477.1_ c9ea002a59ac6513). 78 Minister Sikorski refers to the road connection (called ‘corridor’) between the main territory of the German Reich and East Prussia through Poland after the First World War.


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“Such was the tradition of Locarno79, and it is the tradition of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. We do not want any reoccurrences.” He also said that Poland asked Chancellor Merkel to stop the investment, but without any success. Warszawa obawia się, że w ten sposób Rosja zyskuje narzędzie pozwalające szantażować sąsiadów zakręceniem kurka w gazociągach lądowych nie czyniąc przy tym szkody Niemcom. Sikorski stwierdził, że „Polska jest szczególnie wrażliwa na punkcie korytarzy i porozumień ponad naszymi głowami.” – „To była tradycja Locarno, to jest tradycja paktu Ribbentrop-Mołotow. Nie chcemy powtórki” – mówił. Powiedział też, że Polska bezskutecznie prosiła kanclerz Angelę Merkel, by wstrzymała inwestycję (Wieliński 2006). Taking the decision first and consulting afterwards is not our idea of solidarity. Germany is an important partner for us. We are astonished that Germany would do something which doesn’t benefit the consumers and whose geopolitical objective is to be able to cut off Belarus and Poland without cutting off Germany,

he said.80 Europe’s attempts to forge a common energy policy had suffered a serious reversal due to Minister Sikorski’s comparisons said the European Commission (EC). EC spokesman Johannes Laitenberger also said, however, that EU member states had to do more to coordinate their energy policies.81 “We are all aware that Poland is concerned with the pipeline. But the language used by Sikorski is not helpful or adequate”, said Johannes Laitenberger. „Wszyscy jesteśmy świadomi, że w Polsce są obawy dotyczące tego gazociągu” – powiedział główny rzecznik KE Johannes Laitenberger. „Ale użyty język nie jest ani pomocny, ani adekwatny – stwierdził” (Wieliński 2006).

The EC’s comment caused distress in Poland and led to new accusations against Germany. Although the European Commission does not comment on statements made by representatives from EU governments, this time it decided to make an exception. Zirytowana jest też Komisja Europejska choć ta zazwyczaj nie komentuje wypowiedzi przedstawicieli rządów unijnych. W przypadku Sikorskiego postanowiła jednak uczynić wyjątek. Polish sources of “Gazeta Wyborcza” state that Germans are behind the criticism. They were supposed to pressure Brussels to condemn Sikorski. Germans deny their involvement, and felt offended by references to Hitler. Polskie źródła „Gazety” twierdzą, że za tą krytyką stoją Niemcy, którzy mieli naciskać Brukselę by potępiła Sikorskiego. Niemcy zaprzeczają, ale nawiązaniami do Hitlera poczuli się urażeni (Wieliński 2006).

German politicians indeed expressed outrage at Sikorski’s comments.82 “The minister [Sikorski, AH] used an unspeakable polemic. The kind of absurd comparisons that the Minister used is not good for Polish-German relations”, said Ruprecht Polenz, chairman of the Foreign Relations Commission of the German Bundestag in the Bild Zeitung. 79 Conference in Locarno (Switzerland) in 1925, in which Germany guaranteed the post-First World War borders in the West and acknowledged the borders in the East but without contractual fixation. It also agreed to resolve all contested issues in a peaceful manner. 80 Poland hits out at Germany over gas partnership with Russia, Deutsche Welle (in English), 1 May 2006, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1986869,00.html. 81 EU criticizes Poland’s nazi pipeline comment, RFE/RL, 2 May 2006, http://www.rferl.org/features article/2006/05/6eca53e0-0e24-48bc-9a90-afdc96a6e870.html. 82 ibid.

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„Minister prowadzi niebywałą polemikę. Ten rodzaj absurdalnych porównań szkodzi stosunkom polsko niemieckim” – oburzał się na łamach ‘Bilda’ Ruprecht Polenz, szef komisji ds. zagranicznych w Bundestagu (Wieliński 2006). “The Weimar Republic, Hitler’s regime and today’s Federal Republic – they are all the same. Germany has remained Germany – that is clearly how Minister Sikorski sees history.” (Berliner Zeitung). „Republika Weimarska, reżim Hitlera i dzisiejsza Republika Federalna – to wszystko to samo. Niemcy pozostały Niemcami – tak najwyraźniej min. Sikorski widzi historię” czytamy w komentarzu redakcyjnym ‘Berliner Zeitung’ (Wieliński 2006).

Box 5-5: German Attempts to Ease the Tensions around the Pipeline Construction Sikorski’s accusation came as a surprise for Germany. Since December 2005, Germany had been trying to make the pipeline agreement more inclusive for Poland and the Baltic states. In an attempt to improve the offer of branch lines to these countries, Germany had initiated the creation of a Polish-German working group. In Germany the level of irritation is even higher, since in the last few months Chancellor Merkel has attempted to solve gas pipeline issues. Polish and German governments have even started a working group for that purpose. During the works there was an idea of connecting the German ending of the pipeline with the Polish energy system, so that Russia could not terminate Polish supplies. Except that Warsaw is not interested in the idea – German diplomatic circles have stated. W Niemczech irytacja jest tym większa bo od kilku miesięcy kanclerz Merkel usiłuje polubownie rozwiązać sprawę gazociągu. W tej sprawie rządy Polski i Niemiec powołały nawet grupę roboczą. Podczas tych prac narodził się pomysł połączenia niemieckiej końcówki gazociągu bałtyckiego z polskim systemem energetycznym, tak by Rosja nie mogła odciąć Polski od dostaw. Tyle, że Warszawa w ogóle nie interesuje się jej pracami – słyszy się w kręgach niemieckiej dyplomacji (Wieliński 2006). The German proposal would provide the kind of energy security Poland had been asking for: with Germany as a transit country, Poland would be protected against feared Russian supply interruptions. Speaking after her talks with the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, Polish Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga said in early October 2006 that Poland had no plans to join the construction or use the Russian-German gas pipeline slated to be laid on the Baltic seabed. Lavrov replied that the gas pipeline construction plan “envisages the participation of other countries if they express interest.” He admitted, however, that following his conversation with Fotyga “the positions of both parties (Poland and Russia) have not changed.”* At a meeting with Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel on 30 October, Polish Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczyński rebuffed her offer to arrange for an offshoot of the Nord Stream pipeline from the German coastal city of Greifswald to northern Poland, to be used in case supplies were ever cut off through the Yamal pipeline currently bringing Russian gas through Belarus and Poland to Germany.** Kaczyński did not consider this a viable solution. “We would become *

Poland not to join construction of Baltic seabed gas pipeline – minister, Warsaw PAP (in English), 5 October 2006, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200610051477.1_85d8 0024c1ed1881. ** Poland looks to end reliance on Russian energy, Platts, 14 November 2006, http://www.platts.com/ Natural%20Gas/Resources/News%20Features/ukrainegas/index.xml.


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even more dependent on Gazprom gas than before”, he told a news conference. Poland was determined to cut its dependence on Russia to the absolute minimum.*** Instead, Merkel promised to push for the creation of a “collective energy market” within the EU, hooking up Poland and the Baltic states to EU electricity and gas grids. “The idea presented by the chancellor is that in case of a threat (of Russia cutting off gas supplies), Poland will be assured of receiving gas from western countries”, in particular Norway, Jarosław Kaczyński announced. He accepted this as a move that would help prevent Russia from using “energy as a weapon.”**** *** ibid. **** ibid; Germany assures Poland gas supply in case of ‘threat’, AFP, 30 October 2006, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200610301477.1_3bd40038610405d7.

On the same day as Sikorski’s statements, a spokesman for the Polish Defence Ministry announced that the original Reuters report had misinterpreted the meaning of the Minister’s comment. The Minister did not place the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the pipeline agreement on the same level. He referred to painful historical events to explain Poles’ sensitivity to agreements made without their knowledge. He used the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact to illustrate the emotions raised by the construction of the pipeline. Minister nie stawiał znaku równości między Paktem Ribbentrop-Molotow, a budową gazociągu, tylko wyjaśniał, w kontekście bolesnych zaszłości historycznych, wrażliwość Polaków na kwestie porozumień zawieranych ponad ich głowami. W takim szerszym kontekście, aby zobrazować emocje, które budowa projektowanego gazociągu wzbudza w Polsce, został przywołany Pakt Ribbentrop-Molotow (Paszkowski 2006). Minister Sikorski echoed the comment of Germany’s President [Horst Köhler] […], stating that democratic Germany would never settle above its neighbours’ heads. The Minister’s remarks on the need for a common EU energy policy corresponded closely to the position expressed by EU officials, including the European Commission President José Manuel Barosso. The debate showed that the European Commission approved of the necessity to increase co-operation in creating a new system of market and raw material transit agreements. Minister Radosław Sikorski powołał się na wypowiedź prezydenta Niemiec […], o tym, że demokratyczne Niemcy nigdy nie będą się układały ponad głowami swoich sąsiadów. Uwagi ministra, wygłoszone w trakcie konferencji, o potrzebie wspólnej polityki UE w dziedzinie energetyki blisko korespondowały ze stanowiskiem przyjętym przez obecnych na konferencji przedstawicieli władz UE, w tym Przewodniczącego Komisji Europejskiej Jose Manuela Barosso. Debata wykazała, że Komisja Europejska aprobuje konieczność zwiększenia współpracy w tworzeniu nowego systemu uzgodnień i powiązań w zakresie rynku i przesyłu surowców energetycznych (Paszkowski 2006).

Criticism within Poland of Sikorski’s remarks, however, such as in Ernest Skalski’s article (2006) was an exception: More than sixty years since the end of the Second World War, Minister Sikorski’s comparison of the construction of a gas pipeline along the Baltic Sea floor to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact “is absurd, if not stupid.” The political elite’s thinking lingers back in the epoch of policy involving a European ‘concert of powers’, the blocking of contrary interests, and seeking counterbalance and unreliable alliances. This Europe came to an end in September 1939 (Skalski 2006).

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Sikorski’s remarks were generally interpreted as retaliation for the meat ban and the refusal to renegotiate the pipeline project within the framework of the geopolitical rivalry between Poland and Russia (and to a lesser extent Germany). Poland repaid in kind. Defense Minister Radoslaw Sikorski did not hesitate to call the pipeline under the Baltic Sea bottom another Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and President Kaczyński backed Kiev’s efforts to set up GUAM (the association of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova were supposed to develop into a transport corridor for Caspian energy resources) as an alternative to the Commonwealth of Independent States (Kościński/ Reszka 2006).

In June 2006, Poland made clear that it would block any financial or other support from the EU for the pipeline project. Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga voiced opposition towards the possibility of “controversial” energy projects being financed from the EU budget.83 Polish Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz said: We will always ensure that this gas pipeline under the Baltic never wins the support of the European Union nor of any institution the EU is involved in. The EU should support projects that help everybody and which are aimed against no one.84

Box 5-6: A New Ally – Sweden Protest against the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline also issued from Sweden. In August 2006, the then Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson expressed his concern over the environmental repercussions the pipeline construction project might have. The pipeline runs the risk of disturbing mines and chemical weapons that were dumped in the Baltic Sea after the First and Second World Wars. Persson called for the reconsideration of an onshore pipeline (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 33, 23 August 2006; see also Larsson 2006). Jan Eliasson, the Swedish foreign minister, stated in August 2006 that Sweden would like the big project to be considered from an ecological and political point of view. At the same time, he added that the Swedish government had not formally discussed the construction of the pipeline, and had not carried out any talks with the Russian-German consortium (Kublik 2006). Of all the countries whose permission must be obtained in order to implement the project, thus far a fierce debate has broken out only in Sweden. All summer, politicians and experts in that country were frightening each other with the ‘Russian pipe’, which could cause irreparable damage to the marine ecosystem and even become a bridgehead for intelligence activities on Swedish territory. Из всех стран, разрешения которых предстоит получить для реализации проекта, пока только в Швеции разгорелась ожесточенная дискуссия. Все лето политики и эксперты этой страны пугали друг друга «русской трубой», которая может нанести непоправимый ущерб морской экосистеме и даже стать плацдармом для разведывательной деятельности на шведской территории (Grivach 2006). “There are new wounds festering among Europeans”, Alyson Bailes, director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, said. These include disputes between Germany and Poland and between Germany and Sweden over the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline by Germany and Russia planned to run under the Baltic Sea. “This project is seen as undermining the national interests of Warsaw and Stockholm”, Bailes said (Dempsey 2007). Sweden is concerned that a planned maintenance platform for the pipeline near Gotland could be used for espionage. 83 Poland opposes EU financing for Russia-Germany gas pipeline, Warsaw PAP (in English), 12 June 2006, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200606121477.1_62440026adb73af6. 84 Polish PM slams German-Russia gas pipeline project, AFP, 15 June 2006, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200606151477.1_501d002634ef1c22.


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Adam Grzeszak’s article (2006) described the situation in Poland in September 2006 as an atmosphere of war. Are we already at war? Czy to już wojna? Officially, we are not at war. We just have to resolve our problems. Every conflict trigger has a rational explanation. Oficjalnie wojny nie ma. Są tylko pewne problemy do rozwiązania. Każdy punkt zapalny ma przecież jakieś racjonalne uzasadnienie (Grzeszak 2006).

In October 2006, Polish President Lech Kaczyński again summarised Poland’s concerns about the Russia-German pipeline project in an interview with British newspaper ‘The Times’. Times journalists Maddox and Thomson concluded that “President Kaczyński wears history heavily on his shoulders, answering many questions with references to Poland’s particularly tortured past” (Maddox/ Thomson 2006). There is still not much rejoicing in Poland’s relationship with Germany. It is hard to escape the shadow of history, he said. “You must realise the enormity of the German crime perpetuated on Poland” in the Second World War. “Six million Polish nationals were killed. Half of them were Polish Jews. That is hard to forget. It is fresh in the minds of a generation who may not now be in the best of health, but still have their full senses.” History “does not drive our current relations with Germany”, he hastened to say. But the pipeline deal that Germany has struck with Russia to bring gas to Germany around the Baltic coast, bypassing Poland, is an open sore. Mr Kaczyński regarded it as not just a corporate deal “but two countries coming together.” He added: “We will do what we can within the framework of law” to protest against it (Maddox/ Thomson 2006).

5.6 Poland Vetoes the Framework Agreement on EU-Russia Relations In his 6 November interview with ‘The Financial Times’, President Lech Kaczyński announced counter-measures against the Nord Stream pipeline on the EU level in the form of a Polish veto. FT: Do you expect that Germans will understand Poland’s issues when it comes to energy? Kaczyński: We do understand the need for compromise, but it cannot be that in this area, a single European country, even a very powerful one, decides on a particular solution, almost as if it had stepped momentarily outside of the Union, and then says it will not change even if that solution contradicts the interests of other EU countries. FT: Do you mean the northern pipeline? Kaczyński: For example. FT: Does Poland have any chance of stopping this project or is it too late? Kaczyński: I think there other countries besides Poland that are not particularly interested in it. We want to resolve problems in a rational way, however we cannot accept the idea that Poland’s role is basically signing up to the priorities of other countries because we have our own interests. FT: That is difficult to accomplish in a situation where Poland is not among the largest or the wealthiest countries of the Union. Kaczyński: […] We will not accept this point of view. In the EU in certain areas there is a principle of unanimity. I know that it is very uncomfortable in the Union to be alone but that does not mean we are afraid of that (Cienski/ Wagstyl 2006).

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At a press conference in London on 7 November, Lech Kaczyński made Russia’s ratification of the European Energy Charter and especially the transit protocol a precondition for the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, a framework agreement on EU-Russia relations:85 We believe that Russia inevitably has to ratify the Energy Charter. […] We think that these are rational terms (!) for the start of negotiations about a strategic partnership. Мы придерживаемся мнения, что России необходимо и неизбежно следует ратифицировать Энергетическую хартию. […] Мы полагаем, что это рациональные условия (!) для начала переговоров, касающихся стратегического сотрудничества (Petrovskaya 2006).86

On 13 November, Poland blocked the start of negotiations on the Partnership Agreement. The decision, made at a meeting of EU foreign ministers, threatened to launch further negotiations about EU-Russia relations (Elder 2006a). Polish Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga announced that Warsaw would block the talks until Russia ratified the European Energy Charter87, which would open its pipelines to third-party competition and lift restrictions on the import of Polish agricultural products.88 The current Partnership and Co-operation Agreement’s 10-year mandate expires at the end of 2007, but it will automatically be extended annually until the new one comes into force (Medetsky 2007b). Since the mandate must be endorsed by all EU member states, the other EU countries now have to seek a compromise with Poland. The new agreement is also due to reflect Russia’s expected status as a WTO member. But EU officials warned that Moscow still had work to do before it would be allowed to join the trade body (Elder 2006a). According to analysts, Poland was putting up a fight and splitting from its European allies to register its fears over Russia’s role as a reliable energy supplier and to focus EU attention on what it saw as increasingly acrimonious relations with Russia (Elder 2006a).

85 According to the transcript of the press conference, Kaczyński said: “We take the position that it is relevant and indispensable that Russia should ratify the Energy Treaty, which it has signed already although it has not yet ratified that treaty. Secondly, there is the transit protocol; in other words, we believe that these are rational terms for launching negotiations regarding a strategic partnership that goes beyond the issues of energy” (Press conference with the President of Poland, 7 November 2006, http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page10383.asp). 86 The Russian source emphasises the word ‘terms’. 87 Russia has made it plain more than once that it will not ratify the European Energy Charter in its present form, because the document protects the interests of energy importers and transit states at the exporter’s expense. However, Russia does not reject the charter’s underlying principles (Medetsky 2007b). President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia was ready to consider several EU energy concerns in a new partnership agreement and was not against including individual energy co-operation provisions in the future document. “We have no objections to the principles, which the Energy Charter stipulates, but we believe some provisions of the Charter should be taken into account or a new document should be drafted on the basis of the selfsame principles that were laid in the foundation of that document, because cooperation cannot be lasting perspectives if the interests of all the partners are not taken into account”, Putin stated (Russia foresees difficulties in drafting new agreement with EU, Itar-Tass (in English), 14 November 2006, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200611141477.1_9d0b00abee1dad4a). However, Brussels recently dropped its insistence that Russia ratify the Energy Charter Treaty before the start of talks on the new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (Elder 2006b). 88 Chizov: Poland’s decision to block talks with Russia ultimatum to EU, Itar-Tass (in English), 13 November 2006, obtained World News Connection, Document Number: 200611131477.1_05af0043a9b3 5352.


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President Kaczyński further announced on 13 November that Poland could not agree to a situation where EU-Russian agreements ignored Poland. He accused Russia of disobeying the present EU’s Partnership and Co-operation Agreement and cited Russia’s ban on Polish meat imports and the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline as being counter to Poland’s interests.89 The Polish veto of the partnership agreement between Russia and the EU was essentially tantamount to a sanction against Russia, which escalated the conflict to the subordination level. With the veto, Poland had finally launched some counter-measures against the Russian meat ban introduced In November 2005. However, President Kaczyński did not explicitly link the announcement of the veto to the meat ban; he couched the veto in terms of energy issues. But when Poland officially vetoed the start of negotiations with Russia, Polish Foreign Minister Fotyga mentioned the ban. That gives the impression that a veto on the ratification of the Energy Charter or against the Nord Stream pipeline alone could not have been justified in the public eye or to the EU. Therefore, the veto apparently also had to be linked to the Russian meat ban. However, later in November 2006, Poland no longer demanded that Russia opens its gas pipelines to third parties as a condition for the start of partnership talks, finally aligning itself with the EU position (Parker/ Cienski 2006).

5.6.1 Russian Reactions: with the Kaczyńskis – the Language of Sanctions [с Качиньскими – на языке санкций]90 Presidential aide and Russia’s special representative to the EU Sergei Yastrzhembsky said on 14 November that negotiations on the partnership agreement should begin without any strings attached. “It would be strange if these talks became hostage to nation-specific problems that exist between Russia and certain EU members”, he said (Elder 2006a). The Polish problems and Warsaw’s claims were between two countries only (Russia and Poland) and were none of the EU’s business, and he hoped to achieve understanding on this matter. “We are interested in the elaboration of a new agreement, just as our European partners are, but not a jot more than they. Russia cannot put up with the language of blackmail”, Yastrzhembsky concluded.91 Deputy Chief of the Russian delegation at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Leonid Slutsky commented that “Poland is blackmailing both Russia and the European Union. Period.”92 Poland’s decision to block the EU-Russia talks was more of an ultimatum to its partners in the EU than to Russia according to Vladimir Chizov, Russia’s permanent representative to the Union. He said the lack of a mandate for talks with Russia was “an internal problem of the European Union, for it to decide.” Chizhov saw no “reasons for the Russian side to take vigorous steps in this situation.”93 89 EU-Russia agreements must not ignore Poland – president, Warsaw PAP (in English), 14 November 2006, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200611141477.1_d2240016a6c40b7b. 90 Petrovskaya 2006. 91 Russia foresees difficulties in drafting new agreement with EU, Itar-Tass (in English), 14 November 2006, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200611141477.1_9d0b00abee1dad4a. 92 Russian official says Polish stance on talks angering EU, Itar-Tass (in English), 14 November 2006, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200611141477.1_4b380041dcfbb161. 93 Chizov: Poland’s decision to block talks with Russia ultimatum to EU, Itar-Tass (in English), 13 November 2006, obtained World News Connection, Document Number: 200611131477.1_05af0043a9b35352.

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Russia reacted to the sanctions with moderation; it insisted that the meat ban was not an EU matter but had to be resolved bilaterally. It argued that Poland was merely trying to broaden the scope of the issue. Russia did not make any counter-threats and tried to re-direct the action towards the EU. The head of the State Duma energy, transport and communications committee, Valery Yazev, described Poland’s urgent demands for Russia to sign the Energy Charter and ban gas pipeline constructions on the Baltic seabed as ‘paranoid’.94 The Polish authorities, as is well known, are highly critical of Nord Stream. And they have already presented Moscow with some elements from the arsenal of ‘asymmetric responses’ by blocking the talks on a new strategic agreement between Russia and the EU. Польские власти, как известно, весьма критически настроены по отношению к «Северному потоку». А кое-что из арсенала «ассиметричных ответов» они уже предъявили Москве, заблокировав переговоры о новом стратегическом соглашении между Россией и Евросоюзом (Grivach 2006).

On 21 November, Sergei Yastrzhembsky said that Poland’s démarche “undermines confidence in the European Union as an institution capable of developing and pursuing a consolidated policy.”95 Here again, Russia tried to put pressure on the EU to get Poland in line. “Poland’s ultimatum-like demands concern narrow national problems. For instance, the problem concerning the export of animal products is not within the EU’s jurisdiction. We have even warned our European Commission partners that other states could make similar démarches”, he said.96 State Duma speaker Boris Gryzlov blamed Poland for the escalation of the conflict and the meat ban in general and accused it of un-constructive behaviour. He said that Poland’s decision to veto the commencement of talks on a new partnership agreement between Russia and the EU was “unacceptable.” “We understand that it is easier to issue ultimatums than to conduct a constructive dialogue and talks,” was his sarcastic barb to Poland.97 A summary of the Russian position is quite simple: Poland had not done enough to resolve the problems that had led to the Russian meat ban. Yastrzhembsky said the problem of Poland’s meat supply to Russia was fairly technical and that “the Polish authorities could have settled it long ago.” Russia called on the Polish side to put things in order with respect to control over meat and meat products brought into Poland from third countries and later finding their way into Russian territory. “Poland has agreed with all these claims,” he said. “It is not accidental that 24 lawsuits have been brought in Poland on cases of forged documents, which shows that Poland was in agreement with Russia on such cases at that time,” the presidential aide said. “So instead of urging the EU to deal with this problem, it would be very easy to settle the matter within the Polish administration,” he said (Smelov 2006).

94 Russia may sign Energy Charter, if EU cancels some provisions-view, Itar-Tass (in English), 17 November 2006, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200611171477.1_6ba700208 cacfa17. 95 Brussels may not persuade Poland to lift veto on talks with Russia before summit Kremlin aide, Interfax (in English), 21 November 2006, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 2006 11211477.1_23090062878ea546. 96 ibid. 97 Gryzlov says Poland’s stand on Russia-EU talks ‘unacceptable’, Itar-Tass (in English), 22 November 2006, obtained via East View, http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=10409381


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On 22 November, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the Polish side would know perfectly well what it should do. It was illustrative to him that several days ago, after the Polish side had announced its veto, all 24 of the criminal cases were abruptly dismissed by Warsaw with no explanation. For the minister, these methods violated the norms of a law-governed state and did not correspond to EU practices. “I hope that the EU will be able to bring their partners to reason. After all, it is one thing when there are real problems and quite another when they are fabricated.”98 Lavrov said the problem of Russia’s import of Polish meat could be resolved expeditiously and that its solution depended entirely on Poland (Kartsev 2006c). Lavrov too urged the EU to bring Poland in line. In contrast to Russia, Poland felt that the EU could and should help. In Brussels, Polish Agriculture Minister Andrzej Lepper raised the issue of the Russian embargo on Polish meat products’ supply with European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection Marcos Kyprianou. Lepper said that Poland was losing about one million euros every day due to the Russian embargo and that Poland had no intention of changing its attitude with respect to its veto of the beginning of talks on a new partnership agreement until Russia “gives a clear signal on its readiness to lift the embargo” (Kartsev 2006a). Kyprianou said that the European Commission believed that Russia’s embargo on Polish meat supplies was an inappropriate measure. However, Finland, which was currently presiding in the EU, regarded the problem of Polish meat as a technicality and therefore recommended settling it at the “technical level” (Kartsev 2006a). On 21 November, Lithuanian Premier Gediminas Kirkilas announced that his government backed Poland’s stand on blocking the start of EU-Russia talks on concluding a new basic partnership treaty, adding that Russia discontinued oil deliveries along the Druzhba oil pipeline to the Mažeikių Nafta refinery. Therefore, we should act jointly with Poland so as to convince Moscow to make a compromise. This item should find a place in a new EU-Russia treaty.99

Polish Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga confirmed on 23 November that Poland, if necessary, would retain its veto position even at the cost of its reputation. “In our view, certain Russian actions pose a serious threat to Poland’s key interests. […] That is why we are asking EU states to show solidarity,” she told journalists (Kartsev 2006c). Fotyga said that Poland had made every effort to resolve the conflict over the meat ban bilaterally. “That is why we had to use the possibilities we enjoy as an EU member country,” she added, later saying that Poland might lift the veto if a compromise on the meat ban were reached (Maloveryan 2006). In a letter to the EU, the Polish government wrote that is was awaiting “a special statement from the European Union” promising that Brussels would help it in its efforts to have the Russian embargo of Polish meat lifted (Dubrovin 2006). Warsaw demanded not only guarantees that its grievances would be solved at the Russia-EU summit, but also sought the approval of “a concrete schedule of measures” that the European community could take against Moscow (cf. Niklewicz 2006). 98 Polish veto on Russia – EU agt talks casus inside EU – Lavrov, Itar-Tass (in English), 22 November 2006, obtained via East View, http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=10409274. 99 Vilnius backs Poland’s veto on Russia-EU talks on new treaty, Itar-Tass (in English), 21 November 2006, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200611211477.1_8c08001a801461d1. Russia switched off a branch line of the so-called Druzhba oil pipeline supplying Lithuania’s Mažeikių Nafta refinery in July 2006 for alleged technical reasons after Lithuania sold the plant to a Polish firm instead of a Russian bidder.

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European Commission spokesman Johannes Laitenberger countered that Russia’s ban on Polish meat was a matter between the two countries because the European Commission had no direct authority to rule on animal product exports to third countries (Kartsev 2006c). The Polish argumentation presented by Foreign Minister Fotyga linked the veto to solidarity within the EU. Poland seemed to be trying to elicit solidarity from the EU by means of its veto power to protect Polish interests. Its behaviour almost lent credibility to Russia’s assertion that Poland was essentially blackmailing the EU. Box 5-7: Another Meat Ban On 23 November, the European Commission announced – two days before a summit where the two sides were set to appear for fractious talks over their future co-operation – that Russia had informed the European Commission on 3 November of their intention to ban all imports of animal products from the EU starting 1 January. Russia cited concerns over food hygiene standards in Romania and Bulgaria, which were due to join the EU on 1 January 2007, as the reason to impose the EU-wide ban. The ban would affect all meat, fish and dairy products. “The EU’s step, on the eve of the summit, to publicize the Russian threat seemed to indicate that tough talks lay ahead” (Elder 2006b). The threat of another – this time EU-wide – Russian meat ban cannot be seen as a reaction to the Polish veto because it had already been issued on 3 November – before the veto. With its publication two days before another meeting on EU-Russia relations in Helsinki on 25 November, the EU gave the impression that Russia had escalated the conflict (i.e., the Russian meat ban on Poland was answered by the Polish veto, which was followed by a Russian retaliation in the form of another meat ban on the whole EU). With this measure, the EU put pressure on Russia, trying to make it more co-operative towards Polish demands by claiming the moral high ground for the EU. Russia was indirectly accused of blackmailing single EU member states and the Union as a whole. The EU also issued a counter-threat: A proposed Russian ban on EU meat exports could jeopardize Russia’s aspirations of joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO), warned the EU Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson. Several of the 25 EU member states were growing weary of Russia’s trade tactics and could move to block its WTO bid. He emphasised that the EU supported Russia’s WTO accession in principle and that he did not want to link the Russian meat ban to Russia’s WTO prospects, though EU states could do so (Bilefsky/ Dempsey 2006). “This is not the only trade irritant between us and Russia – there are at least half a dozen – and this latest ban is bound to affect the attitude of member states,” toward Russia’s aim of joining the WTO. “We can’t have so many of these trade irritants hanging over us”, Mandelson said (Bilefsky/ Dempsey 2006). In order to join the organisation, Russia would have to gain the approval of each of the 149 WTO members. President Vladimir Putin had made WTO membership one of his key economic objectives. Eventually, EU Health and Consumer Protection Commissioner Markos Kyprianou placated Moscow by agreeing in the interim to exclude Bulgarian and Romanian meat products from EU exports to Russia (Daly 2007).

On 22 November 2006, President Putin raised his concern that Poland and other Eastern European countries, which are traditionally more suspicious of Russia than their western neighbours, was running the risk of creating “fresh division lines in Europe” by treating Russia as an enemy instead of a long-term strategic partner (Parker/ Cienski 2006). Putin


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hinted that some countries were trying to fit EU-Russia relations into “the obsolete model of friend or foe.” Such stereotypes have little grounding in reality, he suggested, but their persistent influence on political thinking and practice were threatening to divide Europe. In his opinion, the growing interdependence between the two sides was nothing to fear. “Future talks should not deteriorate into an exchange of complaints” Putin said (Parker/ Cienski 2006; Elder 2006b). Putin’s statements seemed intended to urge the EU to take measures to rein Poland in. Putin considered the problem of meat supplies from Poland on the Russian market a technical question that “should not be dramatised and politicised” but solved. “It is not a matter of Polish meat quality; Polish producers are doing their business perfectly”, he emphasised. In his view, the problem was that the objectionable meat products were “supplied to Poland from third countries.” These meat products were banned not only in Russia, but also in the EU, he argued. The Russian president again expressed his readiness to settle this problem, which was of a “technical nature.”100

5.7 Russian-Belarusian Oil Crisis 2006/ 2007 The Russian-Belarus oil crisis of January 2007 triggered another heated debate in Europe about energy security (including Russia’s reliability as an energy supplier) and EU-Russia relations. Box 5-8: Belarus, Again In December 2005, Gazprom believed itself to have gained control of a transit pipeline that crossed Belarus into Europe, giving the firm a tighter grasp over a route used to send its gas to European markets. Under the terms of the deal, Gazprom was to own the Belarusian section of the Yamal pipeline (Dempsey 2005). Ultimately, Belarus ignored the promise to sell Beltransgaz to Gazprom, just as it had before (see Box 4-1). Although the negotiations on transferring a part of Beltransgaz shares to Gazprom were de facto halted. Belarus purchased gas for about US$47 and avoided price increases, which affected other post-Soviet republics in the beginning of 2006 (Konończuk 2007: 4). However, as a consequence of its failed attempt to establish control over gas distribution assets, Gazprom offered Belarus natural gas for 2007 at significantly higher prices. Following March 2006 Belarusian presidential elections, Gazprom unexpectedly announced that it was going to raise gas prices for Belarus up to the ‘market level’ starting in January 2007. The new prices would be between US$140 and US$200 depending on whether Belarus would agree to sell 50% of Beltransgaz shares (Konończuk 2007: 4). In response, the Belarusian government announced that it was ready to hand over 50% of its shares in Beltransgaz to Gazprom on the condition that Belarus would obtain access to gas producing assets in Russia (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 20, 24 May 2006 and No. 21, 31 May 2006). On 9 May 2006, President Putin issued a special decree that would end all Russian subsidising of the Belarusian economy, both directly or indirectly. The decree encompassed both subsidised gas deliveries and the re-export of Russian oil by Belarus. Belarus perceived Putin’s decree as an ultimatum and reacted with a counter-threat announcing that Belarus might revise its conditions for Russian military facilities in the country (Konończuk 2007: 4). 100 Polish meat supply problem in RF should not be politicized, Itar-Tass (in English), 24 November, 2006, obtained via East View, http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=10430593.

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In the second half of December, the gas dispute erupted into an open conflict. Gazprom threatened to cut off gas supplies to Belarus by 1 January 2007 if a new agreement was not signed (Konończuk 2007: 5). Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko accused Russia of blackmailing his country and threatened to raise the transit fees for Russian gas exports to market levels, too. The president described Russia’s position as un-constructive. “The pressure started early this year, but we kept working and were patient. Our ministers spend half a day at Russian reception rooms. This is an insult, this is politics.”* Belarus issued a counter-threat to siphon off gas from the Yamal pipeline (Konończuk 2007: 5). Gazprom Deputy CEO Alexander Medvedev said that Russia “did not, is not and simply could not blackmail Belarus. On the contrary, Belarussian officials were blackmailing Gazprom and Europe with threats to interrupt Russian gas transit through Belarus […].”** On 26 December 2006, Gazprom unexpectedly lowered the proposed gas price from US$200 to US$105 per 1,000cm, out of which US$75 would be paid in cash and US$30 with Beltransgaz shares. However, Belarus rejected this offer and instead proposed to pay US$45 in cash and US$30 in shares. The negotiations reached an impasse (Konończuk 2007: 5). Finally, on 31 December, an agreement regulating gas deliveries and gas transit to Western Europe until 1 January 2011 was reached. The agreement included the creation of a joint gas company on the basis of Baltransgaz in which Gazprom would acquire 50% of its shares by 2011 for US$2.5bn in four instalments per year. Belarus would pay US$100 for 1,000cm of gas. “However, in the subsequent years it is going to amount to 67% of the market price in 2008, 80% of the market price in 2009 and 90% of the market price in 2010.” A definition for ‘market price’ was not given. Additionally, transit fees through Beltransgaz’ pipelines would jump from US$0.75 to US$1.45 per 1,000cm/ 100km. However, it remained unclear whether the transit fee was fixed for the duration of the contract or would increase gradually in line with the price of gas (Konończuk 2007: 5; NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 1, 10 January 2007). Oil Export Duties While the gas conflict was resolved at the last minute without sanctions, a conflict about oil export duties soon escalated between the two countries. Since April 2006, Russia had asked Belarus to share at least 50% of the export duties for petroleum products manufactured from imported Russian crude oil it collected. Moscow referred to Article 4 of the Customs Union Agreement of November 30, 1995, which stipulated that Belarus was to transfer 85% of the duties collected, when oil products made of Russian crude were exported, to the Russian budget. Under the customs union agreement it was possible to import Russian oil and gas into Belarus duty-free. However, the receipt sharing requirement never worked out. In 1998, Minsk ceased transferring the duty income to the Russian budget completely (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 37, 20 September 2006; Konończuk 2007: 5–6). In September 2006, the Russian government laid tougher claims to the division of receipts from export duties. It insisted on 85% of export duty receipts. Under this division, Belarus would lose between US$1.5–2bn per year (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 37, 20 September 2006). *

Russia doesn’t blackmail Belarus at gas talks – Gazprom (4), Itar-Tass (in English), 29 December 2006, obtained via World News Connection, Document Number: 200612291477.1_164f0051190b0e6f. ** ibid.


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President Putin threatened in November 2006 to cut oil exports to Belarus, unless it shared the profits it was raking in from exporting oil products made with Russian crude. If no progress was made in the course of negotiations, “some restrictions will have to be imposed”, Putin warned (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 43, 1 November 2006). To bring the export duty on oil products in line with the export customs duties in Russia, the Belarussian government raised them on 14 November from US$71.9 to US$92.9 per tonne (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 46, 22 November 2006). However, the Russian export duty amounted to US$180. On 12 December 2006, the Russian government announced that it would impose a duty on oil exports to Belarus from 1 January 2007 onward regardless of the customs union. The resolution was supposedly aimed at protecting “Russian economic interests.” From January 2007 on, a standard US$180 per tonne of oil was to be paid when Russian oil was exported to Belarus (Konończuk 2007: 5; NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 50, 20 December 2006). Belarus offered to transfer 30% of its income from export duties, later proposing to split the duties equally between the two countries which Moscow in turn rejected. On 3 January 2007, Minsk imposed a duty of US$45 per tonne on the transit of Russian oil through Belarus. The Belarusian foreign ministry openly called it a ‘retaliatory measure’ and the crisis escalated. Belarus refused to purchase the Russian oil at the new price and started to siphon off oil from the ‘Druzhba’ transit pipeline. Consequently, the Russian pipeline operator Transneft stopped oil deliveries to Belarus on 7 January 2007 (Konończuk 2007: 6). The interruption of supplies to Belarus also affected consumers in the EU on 8 January, Poland and Germany most of all. Both sides came under strong pressure from European Union figures to rethink the stoppage. A telephone conversation between the two countries’ presidents resulted in the 10 January 2007 announcement that the transit duty has been abolished. In turn, the rate of the Russian export duty was reduced from US$180 to US$53 per tonne, to be imposed only on crude oil that was to be re-exported after refining in Belarus. On 11 January, Russian oil supplies to Europe via the Druzhba pipeline were resumed on a full scale (Konończuk 2007: 6–7; NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 1, 10 January 2007 and No. 2, 17 January 2007). On 12 January, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov and his Belarusian counterpart, Sergei Sidorsky, signed a formal agreement. In addition to the terms stated above, Belarus would retain the full income from the export duties it imposed on petroleum products. Meanwhile, the Belarusian export duty rate was raised to the Russian level (Konończuk 2007: 7; NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 2, 17 January 2007).

In reaction to Russia’s standoff with Belarus over oil transit, EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso deemed the cut in oil supplies from Russia “unacceptable.” He insisted that the EU “must actively develop a common external energy policy to increasingly ‘speak with one voice’ with third countries.” Presenting a sweeping new energy policy, the European Commission urged member states to stand united before external energy providers like Russia as a way to ensure the security of supplies and competitive prices. The common policy should seek to lessen dependence on Russia and seek alternative suppliers, Barroso said in presenting the strategy, titled ‘An Energy Policy for Europe’ (Medetsky 2007a). With this gesture, the EU had finally responded to an old Polish demand (‘Musketeers’ Pact’). In a bid to ease the EU’s concerns over the country’s ability to act as a dependable energy supplier, President Vladimir Putin announced that he would seek to speed up the construction of pipelines delivering oil and gas directly to European customers. Putin’s comments reinforced the Kremlin line that Russia’s neighbours Ukraine and Belarus were to blame

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for the pipeline cut-offs that had caused oil and gas shipments to Europe to dip twice in the past 12 months (Elder 2007). Alexander Medvedev, the head of Gazpromexport, contended that recent deals with Ukraine and Belarus had “increased the security of Russian gas to Europe” (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 4, 31 January 2007). During her first visit to Russia, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who had also taken over the presidencies of the EU and Group of Eight on 1 January 2007, took Putin to task for failing to inform EU leaders that their energy supplies would be affected by spats with neighbouring transit country Belarus (Elder 2007; Dempsey 2007). Known for her pragmatism, Merkel criticised Gazprom’s information policy but not its actions as such.

5.8 More of the Same – No End in Sight for the Meat Ban In January 2007, representatives of Poland and Russia met at the International Green Week2007 exhibition in Germany to discuss the Russian ban on Polish meat. Russian Ambassador to Germany Vladimir Kotenev told a news conference that Russia’s embargo on the imports of Poland’s meat had been “extremely and deliberately politicised.” He recalled that when Poland had imposed a veto on a new partnership agreement between Russia and the EU, the issue of Russia’s signing the European Energy Charter was placed first and meat exports second. Kotenev also played down the Polish losses from Russia’s ban on meat exports.101 However, Russian Agriculture Minister Alexei Gordeyev failed to clinch a deal during talks with his Polish counterpart, Andrzej Lepper, and European Health and Consumer Protection Commissioner Markos Kyprianou (Elder 2007). Nevertheless, the parties agreed that a team of Russian and EU veterinary specialists would jointly inspect Polish meat processing factories.102 In early February 2007, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told top EU officials that he hoped stalled talks on a new partnership agreement with the EU would begin soon (Medetsky 2007b). However, only one day later, the Russian newspaper ‘Kommersant’ reported that Moscow was planning to introduce drastic import restrictions on a range of goods from Poland. This would mostly concern plastics, building materials and medicines. According to estimates, the value of Polish exports to Russia would drop from US$4bn to US$2–2.5bn (Ratajczyk 2007). […] in Moscow, the assumption is that in disrupting the EU-Russia negotiations, the Polish government ‘crossed the line’ beyond which there may be a collapse of Russian-Polish relations, mostly economic. Since Poland has not come to its senses in the two months that have passed since the Russia-EU summit in Helsinki, it seems Moscow has decided to take countermeasures. The Kremlin leans towards the position that “Polish businesses should pay for the lack of prudence on the part of the Kaczyński brothers” […]. […] в Москве исходят из того, что руководство Польши, сорвав начало переговоров России с ЕС, «перешло черту», за которой может последовать обвал в российско-польских отношениях, прежде всего экономических. Поскольку в течение двух месяцев после саммита РФ-ЕС в Хельсинки Польша не одумалась, в Москве, похоже,

101 Theme of Russia’s embargo on Poland’s meat too politicised – envoy, Itar-Tass (in English), 19 Januray 2007, obtained via East View, http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=11372984. 102 EU, RF specialists to inspect Polish meat processing factories, Itar-Tass (in English), 20 January 2007, obtained via East View, http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=11373963.


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решили принять ответные меры. В Кремле склоняются к тому, что «за безрассудство братьев Качинских должен заплатить польский бизнес» […] (Sysoev 2007).

“If Russia wants to use economic sanctions against Poland, it means sanctions against the EU. Poland will never agree to be treated like a country that does not constitute a part of the European Union. […] If it is going to use them [sanctions, AH], Poland will definitely not withdraw its veto”, said Polish Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński (Ratajczyk 2007). However, experts said such restrictions were unlikely because they would bury the chances of Russia’s entry into the WTO. The European Commission was also surprised by the Kommersant article stating that information in Brussels did not confirm the report. A spokesman said that for now these were press reports and that Russian government officials had not said anything about the matter (Ratajczyk 2007). On 30 March 2007, the European Commission transmitted a new dossier on Polish meat export standards to Moscow in the hope of breaking an 18 month deadlock on RussianPolish trade. Commission spokesman Philip Todd stated that all questions raised by Russia had been addressed comprehensively and “the replies should enable them to lift the embargo.” Both the Commission and Polish authorities believe the Polish food system to be safe (Rettman 2007b). However, “since Poland’s veto last November, Russian food experts have asked for fresh inspections in Poland and file after file of European Commission studies” (Rettman 2007b). EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson also began making reference to the Polish meat issue when talking about the process of Russia’s World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership. EU officials explained that this was not a ‘quid pro quo’ situation of EU support for WTO accession in return for lifting the meat embargo, but they suggested that any politicisation of trade issues would be not in accord with WTO rules (Rettman 2007b).103 In April 2007, the EU and Russia again failed to break the impasse over Moscow’s meat ban. EU Health Commissioner Markos Kyprianou said that the two sides were unable to move beyond simply identifying the points of disagreement and committing to continuing discussions. Russian Agriculture Minister Alexei Gordeyev said that more steps needed to be made. Russia therefore put forward its draft of a joint plan of action for resolving outstanding issues. “[…] our prime interest is in restoring order in the meat markets, in particular with respect to Polish products. Our first task, the way we see it, is to make sure that the meat market is free of fraud”, Gordeyev said. Kyprianou said the Russian side was responsible for the failure to reach an agreement at this stage and said that based on the progress done, “we could have had some immediate results by now.”104 Polish Deputy Prime Minister Roman Giertych said the failure of the meeting was a bad sign: “This means that Russia firmly stands on its position, which contradicts the Rus103 After the cut-off of Russian oil supplies for Lithuania’s Mažeikių Nafta refinery, Vilnius was disappointed by the lack of EU solidarity on the issue and also threatened to veto the EU-Russia talks. Joint Polish-Lithuanian pressure led to European Commission President Barroso promising in a letter of 8 March that he would raise the Mažeikių Nafta problem at the highest level with Russia (Rettman 2007b). 104 Russia, EU fail to agree on Polish meat ban in weekend talks, MosNews, 23 April 2007, http://mos news.com/money/2007/04/23/meatbanfail.shtml.

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sia-EU accord. This means that we are already entering a period of ‘icy’ rather than ‘cold’ bilateral relations.”105 At the same time, Polish Agriculture Minister Andrzej Lepper said that Russia’s refusal to lift the ban was politically motivated. “It is obvious that this is still a political problem and even more political [than before],” he said, meaning Poland’s consent to discuss the U.S. plans to deploy a missile base on Polish territory as part of a missile defence system in Central Europe as well as energy issues.106 Here the Polish government presented yet another reason for the alleged punishment of Poland (besides Poland’s opposition of Nord Stream and its support for the ‘Orange Revolution’): the planned deployment of the US missile defence system to Poland. Ignoring Russian invitations to further bilateral talks, Polish Agriculture Minister Andrzej Lepper said in May 2007 that Poland would not hold any bilateral talks on its ban on imports of Polish meat because it was an EU-Russia problem by now.107 The European Commission in turn offered to hold expert talks (“technical talks”) with Russia in a bid to persuade Moscow to lift its long-standing embargo on Polish meat exports. EU Health Commissioner Markos Kyprianou said the matter would be treated with urgency.108 The meat embargo was on the agenda of the May EU-Russia summit in Russia, but German Chancellor Angela Merkel was unable to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to lift the ban. However, Mr Putin ordered his government to step up negotiations with the EU on resolving the row.109 In June 2007, Russian Agriculture Minister Alexei Gordeyev proposed to solve the problems step by step, including a repeat inspection of Polish meat-processing facilities. The Polish side did not consent to this.110

5.9 Summary Plans for an offshore pipeline beneath the Baltic Sea have been in the works since the mid1990s. This pipeline plan was brought to Poland’s attention in November 2000. At this point in time, Gazprom had already introduced the sub-sea pipeline as an alternative to a onshore pipeline, one that would enable the company to avoid transit countries altogether. Gazprom used the plan as a means to pressure Poland to quit its resistance towards the bypass pipeline that avoided Ukraine. Gazprom did not consider a second branch of the Yamal pipeline (Yamal II) as an option, despite Poland’s urging (see Chapter 4.2). The first meeting for the project implementation took place in February 2003, the very same month Gazprom had finally reached an agreement with Poland over the contested issues in their energy relations. Although the problems with Poland had been resolved, Gazprom’s decision to construct a pipeline that would avoid transit countries altogether had been set in stone by this point.

105 ibid. 106 ibid. 107 Poland rules out talks with Russia on meat ban, Xinhua (People’s Daily Online), 19 May 2007, http:// english.people.com.cn/200705/19/eng20070519_376015.html. 108 EC, Russia set for Polish meat ban talks, RTÈ News, 21 May 2007, http://www.rte.ie/news/2007/0521/ russia.html. 109 ibid. 110 Russia to discuss ban on Polish meat in July, New Europe, 30 June 2007, http://www.neurope.eu/ view_news.php?id=75577.


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In March 2005, Poland – in collaboration with the Baltic states – urged the EU to take measures to prevent the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline through the Baltic Sea. Poland voiced its disapproval of the pipeline; however, it did not raise the issue with Gazprom (or its German partners in the project). The conflict stayed on the conflict episode level for several months. Neither Gazprom nor the EU reacted to Polish concerns about the pipeline construction. With the signing of the basic agreement on the pipeline construction in September 2005, the conflict was escalated by Poland to the identity level. Feeling humiliated by its exclusion from the issue, Poland started to accuse Russia and Germany of an “anti-Polish conspiracy” alluding to the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939. In November 2005, Russia banned Polish meat imports due to violations of veterinary and phytosanitary standards. Poland admitted that some objectionable meat deliveries had been made to Russia. Over the course of the unsuccessful negotiations over the lifting of the ban, however, Poland called it a politically motivated move. Poland interpreted the meat ban as punishment for its opposition to the Nord Stream pipeline and support for Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. Even though Poland linked the meat ban to energy issues (which would place the conflict on the subordination level in our schema), its reactions remained on the level of an identity conflict. Poland did not conduct any counter-sanctions. Obviously surprised by the criticism and the strength of Polish opposition, in December 2005 Russia and Germany offered Poland and the Baltic states a chance to participate in the project and to be connected with the Nord Stream pipeline via branch lines. Russia and Germany were eager to bring the conflict to an issue level and ‘rationalise’ the emotional discussion. However, Poland refused the offer of a branch line, arguing that the country would already be receiving more than enough Russian gas. The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006 triggered ‘militaristic’ rhetoric from Poland towards Russia (e.g., gas war, energy weapon, energy NATO). Poland urged the EU to implement an energy policy that would foster more co-operation and a greater diversification of energy suppliers. In April/ May 2006, Poland again compared the pipeline project with the Hitler-Stalin Pact; this time, however, it caused an outcry in Germany and seriously damaged the relations between the two countries. In a reaction to the Russian meat ban and the Nord Stream project, in November 2006 Poland blocked the start of negotiations for a new partnership agreement between the EU and Russia. This counter-sanction indicated that the conflict had reached the subordination level. However, Russia’s reactions stayed on the identity level; it tried to re-direct the pressure to the EU and urged it to bring Poland in line. Even though sanctions had been imposed, they did not lead to a subordination of one of the conflict parties. This situation can be called a “sanction stalemate”; neither Poland nor Russia gave in. Both sides have continued to act on an identity level in this conflict ever since. The EU, which should play the role of a mediator, seemed to be siding with Poland because Russia created new demands every time there was a meeting to solve the old ones.

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6 Conclusion – potential for conflicts In the following sections, the structures of the scrutinised conflicts will be elaborated upon and Polish concerns will be tested against the facts of Gazprom’s export plans and its historical experiences with and behaviour towards transit countries.

6.1 Conflict Structures 6.1.1 Yamal Gazprom’s plans for a bypass pipeline resulted in a conflict episode. Interestingly, the conflict between Poland and Russia (Gazprom) skipped the issue conflict level because no negotiations between the two parties took place; Gazprom had solidified its position without consulting Poland. Poland, on the other hand, felt humiliated by being ignored. The conflict immediately jumped to the level of an identity conflict. Having no influence over the proposed bypass pipeline, Poland retaliated against Gazprom indirectly by criticising the existing Yamal pipeline. In March 2001, however, Poland modified its general position on the bypass pipeline. This move inspired negotiations between Poland and Gazprom; the conflict was de-escalated to the issue level. In early 2002, however, accusations brought the conflict to the identity level again. With no resolution in sight, Poland escalated the conflict with threats to the subordination level. In February 2003, an agreement was reached; Poland prevailed on its position and Gazprom gave in, subordinating most of its positions to the Polish demands to avoid the consequences of the Polish threats. The whole conflict about the bypass pipeline is based on Russia’s misperception of Poland’s position and, as a result, ignoring it. Because the Yamal pipeline was already bypassing Ukraine, Russia did not understand why Poland resisted the bypass pipeline so vehemently. Even the combined through-put capacity of the Yamal and bypass pipelines would not have been sufficient to avoid Ukraine as a transit country (even under the assumption that Russian gas exports were not increasing). Agitated by what they perceived to be belligerent rhetoric on Gazprom’s part (the explicitly broadcasted intention of bypassing Ukraine), the conservative Polish government made Herculean efforts to preserve Ukraine’s role as a transit country. Its resistance to the bypass pipeline was certainly fuelled by Poland’s perpetual geopolitical rivalry with Russia in an area considered a Polish sphere of interest and a buffer zone against Russia’s expansionism. On the other hand, conservative Polish governments harboured a general suspicion of Russia that was especially strong in energy and pipeline issues (which are considered as questions of national security). Even though the conflict around the Yamal pipeline, triggered by plans to build a bypass pipeline, was finally resolved in February 2003, its aftermath negatively influenced energy relations between Poland and Russia. With that it also affected the conflict over the Nord Stream pipeline.

6.1.2 Nord Stream The first meeting for the project implementation took place in February 2003, the very same month Gazprom had finally reached an agreement with Poland over the contested


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issues in their energy relations. Although the problems with Poland had been resolved, Gazprom’s decision to construct a pipeline that would avoid transit countries altogether had been set in stone by this point. In March 2005, Poland – in collaboration with the Baltic states – urged the EU to take measures to prevent the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline through the Baltic Sea. Poland voiced its disapproval of the pipeline; the conflict stayed on the conflict episode level for several months because Gazprom reacted to Polish concerns about the pipeline construction. With the signing of the basic agreement on the pipeline construction in September 2005, the conflict was escalated by Poland to the identity level. In November 2005, Russia banned Polish meat imports. Over the course of the unsuccessful negotiations over the lifting of the ban, Poland called it a politically motivated move. Even though Poland interpreted the meat ban as a sanction (which would place the conflict on the subordination level in our schema), its reactions remained on the level of an identity conflict. Surprised by the Polish opposition, Russia and Germany tried to bring the conflict to an issue level and ‘rationalise’ the emotional discussion (i.e., de-escalate the conflict to the issue level). However, Poland refused to buy into that attempt; the conflict stayed on the identity level. The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006 triggered ‘militaristic’ rhetoric from Poland towards Russia. In April/ May 2006, Poland again compared the pipeline project with the Hitler-Stalin Pact. In a reaction to the Russian meat ban and the Nord Stream project, in November 2006 Poland blocked the start of negotiations for a new partnership agreement between the EU and Russia. This counter-sanction indicated that the conflict had reached the subordination level. However, Russia’s reactions stayed on the identity level; it tried to re-direct the pressure to the EU and urged it to bring its member in line. Even though sanctions had been imposed, they did not lead to a subordination of one of the conflict parties. This situation can be called a “sanction stalemate”; neither Poland nor Russia gave in. Both sides have continued to act on an identity level in this conflict ever since. The EU, which should play the role of a mediator, seemed to be siding with Poland because Russia created new demands every time there was a meeting to solve the old ones.

6.1.3 The Problem of Exclusion The analysed conflicts converged; conflicts about the Yamal and bypass pipelines were the precondition and trigger for the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline leading to the next conflict. Arrogance and a feeling of supremacy led Gazprom not to consult a transit country for a new pipeline project. This kind of conduct would lead nearly automatically to conflicts in any given situation. Poland felt humiliated and was in general suspicious about Gazprom’s plan to build a bypass pipeline (due to its geopolitical rivalry with Russia over Ukraine). In the case of the Nord Stream pipeline, Gazprom again did not consult Poland. However, this time Poland was not supposed to be a transit country. Due to the aforementioned conflicts, Poland was explicitly not involved in the Nord Stream project. Gazprom (and its German partners) certainly did not anticipate the Polish reactions. Poland again felt (this time intentionally) excluded and humiliated; it interpreted the exclusion as punishment for its geopolitical rivalry with Russia (over Ukraine among others). However, it did not link the

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Nord Stream pipeline with the conflicts about the Yamal/ bypass pipeline and its behaviour as a transit country. In both analysed conflicts, Gazprom did not consult Poland, causing a feeling of humiliation that immediately escalated the conflict to the identity level. Poland, for its part, subordinated its energy policy to its geopolitical ambitions and its interpretation of current events was strongly driven by its history frame (see Box 3-1 for details). Both parties are still mentally trapped in history; Poland’s history frame (Poland as Russia’s victim) and Russia’s historical feeling of supremacy (fuelled by the Russian empire and the Soviet Union) are still the dominant lenses through which the two countries perceive each other. These mental models lead to an incapability to communicate with each other in a rational way; conflicts, therefore, escalate to the identity level without a rational competition about the issue.

6.2 Facts and Figures – How Sound are the Polish Concerns? Due to the high costs, Poland did not consider the Nord Stream pipeline a profitable project but a politically motivated conduit for Russia’s geopolitical intentions. Poland interpreted the Nord Stream pipeline project as punishment for its involvement in Ukraine and the geopolitical rivalry between the two countries in general. Another alleged geopolitical goal is Russia’s intention to strengthen the economic and political ties between itself and Germany. Stronger relations with Germany are seen as only the first step towards influencing and threatening the EU and all its member states. Thus, in essence, Russia’s alleged geopolitical intentions would cause a direct threat to the energy security of Poland and the Baltic states as well as to the EU as a whole through possible pipeline blockades and gas price manipulations. Poland fears that after a direct pipeline link is laid to Germany, Gazprom may suspend supplies through the Yamal pipeline. Gazprom will then be able to turn off its supplies of gas to Poland should any kind of crisis situation arise. Once built, the pipeline would allow Moscow to switch off Polish gas supplies without affecting the richer EU states in the west. Therefore, Poland and the Baltic countries want the gas pipeline to pass through their territories in the hopes of guaranteeing that Russia will not impose any power blockades on them or begin manipulating prices.

6.2.1 Gazprom’s Pipeline Plans However, bearing in mind the Russian Energy Strategy until 2020, the fear that Gazprom may abandon the Yamal pipeline appears to be unfounded. Gazprom plans to extend its exports to Europe by more than 20% (or around 31bcm) to a total around 165bcm per year (Götz 2004b: 16). Gazprom’s export plans got even more ambitious: it plans to export 310bcm per year by 2030 according to a blueprint the company approved in May 2007 (NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 20, 23 May 2007). Gazprom’s alternative routes are not sufficient to fulfil the supply demand in the West – neither Ukraine (as feared by Poland in the negotiation of the bypass pipeline, see Chap. 4) nor Belarus (and therefore Poland) can be avoided as transit countries. Thus, the Russian company cannot abandon the Yamal pipeline if it wants to fulfil its supply contracts. Pipeline projects like Nord Stream are necessary just to keep up with its delivery contracts.


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Table 6-1: Gazprom’s Export Routes Pipeline

Route

Brotherhood/ Union Russia – Ukraine – (Soviet pipeline grid) Central Europe Polar Lights (Soviet pipe- Russia – Belarus – Ukraine – line grid) Central Europe Trans-Balkans (Soviet Russia – Ukraine – Balkans pipeline grid) Finland Connector Russia – Finland (Soviet pipeline grid, extended in 1999) Yamal-Europe (in operaRussia – Belarus – Poland – tion since 1999) Western Europe Blue Stream (in operation Russia – Black Sea – Turkey since 2002) Nord Stream pipeline (if Russia – Baltic Sea operational in 2010 and – Germany 2012, respectively) South Stream (if operaRussia – Black Sea – Bulgaria tional in 2012) – Austria/ Italy Total export capacity to Central and Western Europe

Capacity 2006 130bcm



25bcm

25bcm

25bcm

20bcm

20bcm

20bcm

20bcm

20bcm

20bcm

33bcm

33bcm

33bcm

16bcm

16bcm

16bcm

—

28bcm

56bcm

—

—

30bcm

244bcm

272bcm

330bcm

In 2006, around 93% of Gazprom’s export capacity to Central and Western Europe (excluding Finland) relied on Ukraine, Belarus and Poland as transit countries (see Table 6-1). Therefore, the geography of Russia’s existing pipeline export infrastructure to Europe cannot be abandoned. The construction of the ‘Blue Stream’ pipelines has alleviated Gazprom’s dependency only slightly. Even when the first pipe of the Nord Stream pipeline is in operation in 2010, transit countries will still be responsible for around 83% of Russia’s gas export capacity to Central and Western Europe. In the unlikely case that both the second branch of Nord Stream and the South Stream111 pipeline are operational in 2012, only around one third of Russian gas would be exported without the involvement of transit countries. However, it is not very likely that Gazprom will extend the Yamal pipeline (Yamal II), at least not in the short term. Gazprom’s priority list favours the Nord Stream pipeline to a 111 In 2006, Gazprom decided to set up a joint venture with Italy’s Eni to build a second leg of the Blue Stream pipeline (the so-called Blue Stream II) across the Black Sea to northern Turkey. The second Blue Stream link would specifically target the European market (DeLay 2007; NewsBase, FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, No. 18, 9 May 2007). However, during the course of negotiations, the project was changed. In June 2007, Gazprom announced a new pipeline that would transport Russian gas to Italy and Austria. The 900km pipeline, called ‘South Stream’, is to cross the Black Sea directly into Bulgaria without running through Turkey as originally planned (as Blue Stream II). From there, two onshore branches, one going to Austria and the other to Greece and then to Italy will be considered. The pipeline will have a capacity of 30bcm per year and will take three years to build. Gazprom expects the work to start in 2008 or 2009. The new pipeline would bypass traditional transit states such as Ukraine and Belarus. In addition, it supersedes plans for the enlargement and/or extension of the Blue Stream gas pipeline through Turkey (Russia announces new pipeline construction, Platts Turkmen Gas, 16 August 2007, http://www.platts.com/Natural%20Gas/Resources/News%20Features/turkgas/ russia.xml).

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renovation of Ukraine’s export grid and to the Yamal II pipeline. Therefore, Poland will not increase its role as a transit country for Russian gas in the short term. A re-designed Amber project is highly unlikely because it would prolong the transit route and increase the number of transit countries significantly.

6.2.2 Energy as a “Weapon”? The above-mentioned concerns about the possibility that Gazprom may abandon the Yamal pipeline are rooted in deeper fears about the Russian gas business, which are common not only in Poland but all over central Europe (cf. e.g., Vilemas 2002; for the Polish perception see Box 3-1). The exploration and trade of “strategic” resources like natural gas inevitably tend to involve state actors and state interests. Therefore, energy policy, and, by extension, pipeline policy is strongly linked with national security and foreign policy. The intertwining of foreign and energy policy by Russia often leads to conflicts with countries in central and eastern Europe. They have repeatedly accused Russia of using its energy supplies as a “weapon” to undermine their independence. Russian energy companies like – and especially – Gazprom have been seen as a tool of Russian foreign policy. Gazprom has a long history of conflicts over transit fees and gas prices with its transit countries, especially Ukraine. Already in 1992–1993, Russian gas supplies to Ukraine and Belarus were reduced to restore payment discipline (see Chapter 3.2.1 and Box 4-1). All prejudices about Russia seemed to have been reconfirmed when Gazprom stopped the supplies to Belarus via the Yamal pipeline in February 2004, an event which also left Poland without gas from this pipeline. The cut-off was triggered by Gazprom’s struggle with Belarus over gas prices and the illegal siphoning off of gas from the transit pipeline (Götz 2006: 14). Gazprom warned all its customers of possible drastic gas supply restrictions and tried to find alternative ways of delivering gas. For instance, Germany and Poland received gas via the Ukraine. Certain difficulties arose in Lithuania, as gas inflow from Latvia only partially covered its gas needs. In February 2004, Moscow learned that the instruments it could use vis-à-vis Minsk were very limited. In order to strengthen the negotiating position of Gazprom, Moscow cut the supply of gas to Belarus, paradoxically making its closest ally the first victim of its energy weapon in the former Soviet Union (besides reduced gas supplies to Ukraine in 1992– 1993). Belarus’ president, however, immediately authorised the siphoning off of gas from transit pipelines, mobilising consumers in Europe and Kaliningrad against Moscow. He was able to teach Russia a lesson on the power of transit states relative to producers. The blockade lasted less than 20 hours, and then Moscow had to withdraw and admit defeat (Lang 2004: 210; Victor/ Victor 2004: 3). This protracted conflict with transit countries reached a new, dramatic high in January 2006 with the temporary suspension of gas shipments for Ukrainian consumption. However, Russia had to restore the supply after four days under international pressure because the cut-off caused unauthorised diversions of the volumes in transit to European countries. Gazprom’s actions of January 2006 were widely condemned as politically motivated, orchestrated by the Russian government in retaliation for the policies of the new westernoriented Ukrainian government. While Victor/ Victor (2004: 34) claim that gas supplies had not been used as a “weapon” against transit countries in the past, there are also plausi-


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ble reasons to believe that Gazprom’s motivation for taking such a hard line with Ukraine (and other CIS countries) was overwhelmingly economic (see Box 5-4 for details). In all the cases, Gazprom had to admit defeat. This highlights the importance of transit countries. While Gazprom understands its dependency on transit countries and their bargaining power only too well, some authors (e.g., Kalicki/ Elkind 2005) refer only to the dependence of Belarus and Ukraine on Russian energy imports without taking their role as transit countries into account. “[…] these two post-Soviet states have become increasingly dependent on Russian supplies and, thanks to their accumulated gas debt, vulnerable to Russian pressure” (Kalicki/ Elkind 2005: 153). The power Belarus, Ukraine and Poland enjoy as transit countries of Russian gas is completely ignored. Already in 1945, Albert O. Hirschman (1945/ 1980: 33) emphasised the potentially strong position of transit countries: “On the one hand it would seem that transit trade can always be replaced by direct trade and that therefore the country handling the transit trade is in a rather weak position. But if the replacement of the transit trade is impracticable for geographical, technical, or contractual reasons, transit trade is immediately seen to be an ideal means of increasing power by trade” (a more recent study on pipelines and the leverage of transit countries based on the example of Belarus was conducted by Hancock 2006). Nevertheless, the stricter state control over the Russian oil and gas sector in the last few years, fuelled by a newly acquired self-esteem from Russia’s economic recovery and soaring oil prices, has to be taken into consideration (cf. e.g., Yakovlev 2006). After the failed merger between Gazprom and the state-owned oil company Rosneft in 2004, the Russian government acquired a controlling stake in Gazprom on the stock market through the state-owned vehicle Rosneftegaz in June 2005 (Nash 2005). Many observers interpreted the manoeuvre as a harbinger for increased influence over the company and increased use of Gazprom as a tool of Russian foreign policy. However, it has to be kept in mind that even before mid-2005 the company had been under governmental control. By mid-2001, President Putin had gradually replaced the old Gazprom management with his allies. Thereafter, the company lost its status as a semi-independent economic actor due to the increased enforcement of state control. Russia has always used economic pressure as an instrument to reach its foreign policy goals. New is that its goals (and in the course its means) have become bolder and more obvious in recent years due to the personality of its president and an awakened Russian self-esteem (cf. e.g., Rosner 2005; Wenger et al. 2006). This is unlikely to change in the near future and might cause some more consternation in Europe and the US, which interpret Putin’s policies as a divergence from western norms and values (Trenin 2006). The cut-offs in 2004 and 2006 sparked off a discussion about Poland’s energy security. The debate drew attention to the fact that Poland had no alternative gas suppliers and underscored the Polish concern that Gazprom might use energy as a “weapon”. Demands for a diversification of gas supplies to diminish energy dependence on Russia were made. Until now, the domestic demand in Poland has been too low to diversify its gas supplies effectively. However, diversification would probably lead to higher costs, because Russian gas is cheaper than, for example, Scandinavian gas (see Chapter 3.1.2 for details). However, as a member of the EU, Poland’s gas supply is not endangered even without alternative suppliers. Stoian (2007) argues that EU membership is the best way to provide ‘soft security’ in political and economic matters, while NATO is providing ‘hard security’ for countries in Central Eastern Europe. But Poland seems to have a different perception, especially when it comes to energy:

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It is an illusion to think that membership in NATO and the European Union automatically protects Poland from Russia’s “economic imperialism.” Złudzeniem jest myślenie, że członkostwo w NATO i Unii Europejskiej automatycznie chroni Polskę przed „ekonomicznym imperializmem” Rosji (Sienkiewicz 2004).

However, the EU is Gazprom’s most important and most profitable market. The company’s major objectives in this market are to maintain its presence and to increase its market share. In order to achieve these objectives, Gazprom has to ensure the stability and reliability of gas supplies. Gazprom needs the export revenues and has to maintain its reputation as a reliable provider of natural gas. The company will not set at risk its good relationship with its main customer, the EU.

6.2.3 Realpolitik – Poland’s Influence in Europe’s Energy System However, Poland seems to know about the influence a transit country can exploit. That is why it was so interested in an onshore pipeline to Germany. Since December 2005, Germany had been trying to make the pipeline agreement more inclusive for Poland and the Baltic states. In an attempt to improve the offer of branch lines to these countries, Germany proposed an offshoot of the Nord Stream pipeline from the German coastal city of Greifswald to northern Poland, to be used in case supplies were ever cut off through the Yamal pipeline. The German proposal would have provided the kind of energy security Poland had been asking for. However, the offer was rebuffed. This decision gives the impression that Poland’s concerns are not so much about its gas supplies (at least not about Russian supplies) but about the influence it could exploit as a transit country. The Nord Stream pipeline would cut out Poland, which would not strengthen the country’s main bargaining chip in its dealings with Russia. Poland’s existing role as a transit country would only be marginally affected, however; even if all planned pipelines were to be built by 2012, Poland would still have a 10.6% stake in Gazprom’s exports to Western Europe (decreased from 14.7% in 2006). [Once the Nord Stream pipeline is built, AH] the means of transit fees cannot be used by the former member of the Warsaw Pact as a political and economic weapon against Russia. Der Hebel Transitgebühren kann von ehemaligen Mitgliedsstaaten des Warschauer Pakts nicht mehr als politische und wirtschaftliche Waffe gegen Russland eingesetzt werden (Bimboes 2006: 21). Poland wants to create dependencies via transit pipelines through its territory. Polen will durch Transitpipelines auf seinem Staatsgebiet Abhängigkeiten schaffen (Bimboes 2006: 22).

This leads to the conclusion that Poland’s real concerns are about its geopolitical bargaining power towards its regional rival and to a much lesser extent about its energy security.

6.2.4 Environmental Concerns Poland raised practical objections to the proposed pipeline, such as environmental concerns. These emphasise the dangers of the chemical weapons and ammunition that were sunk in the Baltic Sea after the Second World War. Environmental concerns are the only reasons that cannot be refuted even though they are not really taken seriously by most the involved parties. However, as the chairperson of the Green parliamentary group in the Finnish Parliament, Heidi Hautala, stated: “The environmental impact assessment may yet prove to be the only instrument to deal with these ‘larger’ aspects of the pipeline” (Hautala 2007).


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6.3 Resumee The countries in Eastern Europe are still influenced by the Soviet legacy. Gazprom, as well as the transit countries, likes to play strategic power games (domination vs. resistance). While Russia still likes to dominate the former Soviet republics and former satellite states and has some problems accepting their independence, these countries try to resist Russian influence. This resistance and anti-Russian resentment have resulted in a mistrust against Russian motives and intentions that clouds economic interrelations (cf. e.g., Vilemas 2002). These conflicting attitudes have often caused friction in the relationship between Gazprom and transit countries and gas consumers in Eastern Europe, i.e. conflicts where co-operation would be in the best interest of both sides. On the other hand, these conflicts have increased Gazprom’s desire for more control of the gas infrastructure in its transit countries, which again has strengthened the mistrust these countries feel towards Russia. A vicious circle appears to be in force. The long-lasting quarrels with its transit countries have led Gazprom to look for alternative transport routes to avoid transit countries entirely. Inspired by the quite successful ‘Blue Stream’ pipeline that connects Russia and Turkey via the Black Sea, Gazprom is now building another underwater pipeline from Russia through the Baltic Sea to Germany. However, due to their limited capacities, neither will be able to replace the existing pipelines. The energy relations between Poland and Russia are also characterised by two contradictory forces: mistrust and co-operation (Lang 2004: 203): • •

On the one hand, Poland is attempting to reduce its energy dependence on Russia by diversifying its imports. It is also seeking to increase Ukrainian independence and to deny Russian capital access to the Polish energy sector. On the other hand, Poland is aware of the advantages deriving from co-operation with Russia. It would like to strengthen its role as a transit country for Russian energy exports to western Europe.

These goals are at least partly contradictory and have led to the situation that Poland will not be able to increase its role as a transit country. “Nevertheless, it is likely that conflicts of interests with Russia over Belarus, Ukraine or EU-Russia relations will continue” (Stoian 2007: 193).

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Heinrich, Andreas (2005a) Gazprom’s pipeline plans: opportunities and risks for Poland. Presentation at the international conference “The European Oil and Gas Transit System: Poland’s Place in the Network”, Warsaw, Poland, 1–2 September 2005. Heinrich, Andreas (2005b) Russian companies in old EU member states: the case of Germany, Journal of East-West Business, 11(3–4): 41–60. Heinrich, Andreas/ Kusznir, Julia (2005) Independent gas producers in Russia. Koszalin: KICES (KICES working paper No. 2). Herzinger, Richard (2006) Hört auf die Polen! [Listen to the Poles!], Die Welt, 24 November, http:// www.welt.de/politik/article96858/Hoert_auf_die_Polen.html. Hirschman, Albert O. (1945/ 1980) National power and the structure of foreign trade. Expanded edition. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. House of Lords, European Union Committee (2006) 41st report of session 2005–06: the Commission’s Green Paper, ”A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy”. Report with evidence. London: The Stationery Office. Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting (2003) Is the Ukrainian gas consortium in the economic interest of Ukraine? Kiev: IER (Policy Paper S33). Jabri, Vivienne (1996) Discourses on Violence. Conflict Analysis Reconsidered. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Janiszewski, Hubert A. (2007) W co z Unią Europejską gra Federacja Rosyjska? [What kind of a game is the EU playing with the Russian Federation?], Rzeczpospolita, 19 January, http://arch. rzeczpospolita.pl/a/rz/2007/01/20070119/200701190124.html?k=on;t=2007011920070119. Jendroszczyk, Piotr (2005) Gazociąg ominie Polskę [The pipeline will bypass Poland], Rzeczpospolita, 9 September. Jørgensen, Marianne/ Phillips, Louise (2002) Discourse analysis as theory and method. London: Sage. Kalicki, Jan H./ Elkind, Jonathan (2005) Eurasian transportation futures, in Kalicki, J.H./ Goldwyn, D.L. (eds) Energy and security. Towards a new foreign policy strategy. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 149–174. Kartsev, Alexei (2006a) Poland loses 1 mln euros/day due to Russia meat embargo – official, Itar-Tass Daily (in English), 21 November, obtained via East View, http://dlib.eastview.com/ sources/article.jsp?id=10405045. Kartsev, Alexei (2006b) Poland wants EU to help in lifting of Russian meat embargo – paper, Itar-Tass Daily (in English), 22 November, obtained via East View, http://dlib.eastview.com/ sources/article.jsp?id=10409367. Kartsev, Alexei (2006c) Poland intends to retain veto on RF – EU talks on new agreement, ItarTass Daily (in English), 23 November, obtained via East View, http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/ article.jsp?id=10415161 Kelman, Herbert C./ Fisher, Ronald J. (2003) Conflict analysis and resolution, in Sears, D. O./ Huddy, L./ Jervis, R. (eds) Oxford handbook of political psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 315–353. König, Thomas (2004) On frame and framing. Anti-semitism as free speech: a case study. Paper presented at the IAMC Annual Meeting, Porto Alegre, Brazil, 25–30 July 2004. Konoñczuk, Wojciech (2007) Belarusian-Russian energy conflict: the game is not over. Warsaw: Batory Foundation. Koopmans, Ruud/ Rucht, Dieter (2002) Protest event analysis, in Klandermans, Bett/ Staggenborg, Suzanne (eds) Methods of social movement research. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 231–259.


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Working Papers of the Koszalin Institute of Comparative European Studies ISSN 1895-0450 No. 1 The Political Economy of Coal Industry Restructuring in Ukraine By Heiko Pleines (December 2004) No. 2 Independent Gas Producers in Russia By Andreas Heinrich and Julia Kusznir (September 2005) No. 3 Corporate Governance in the Oil and Gas Industry. Cases from Poland, Hungary, Russia and Ukraine in a Comparative Perspective By Andreas Heinrich, Aleksandra Lis and Heiko Pleines (December 2005) No. 4 A Simple Question of ‘Pragmatism’? Sovietophilism in the West Ukrainian Emigration in the 1920s By Christopher Gilley (March 2006) No. 5 Regulatory Agencies in Economic Governance. The Polish Case in a Comparative Perspective By Giandomenico Majone and Aleksander Surdej (June 2006) No. 6 Informal Networks and Political Corruption in Post-Socialist Societies By Julia Kusznir (ed.) (September 2006) No. 7 Representation of Polish Interest Groups at the EU Level By Joanna Einbock, Gesine Fuchs, Heiko Pleines (December 2006) No. 8 Polish-Russian Relations With contributions by Cornelius Ochmann and Alexey Ignatiev / Petr Shopin (March 2007) KICES Working Papers can be downloaded free of charge at: www.kices.org

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