JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT, 84(1), 96–104 Copyright © 2005, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
SHAME CAMPBELL AND PSYCHOPATHY AND ELISON
Shame Coping Styles and Psychopathic Personality Traits Justin S. Campbell Department of Mental Health, Law, & Policy University of South Florida
Jeff Elison Department of Psychology University of Denver
The convergent validity of the primary and secondary psychopathy scales of the Levenson, Kiehl, and Fitzpatrick (1995) Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (SRPS) were investigated by contrasting correlations between the two SRPS scales and self-report adaptive and maladaptive shame coping scales. The results, from a sample of 305 undergraduates, supported the convergent validity of the SRPS primary (selfish, uncaring, manipulative interpersonal style) and secondary (impulsivity and self-defeating behavior) scales; both possessed small but significant negative relationships with adaptive shame coping and small but significant positive relationships with externalizing shame coping. An opposing pattern of convergent validity was evidenced by partial correlations (controlling for SPRS scale covariance) that indicated the SRPS primary scale had a negative relationship and the secondary scale had a positive relationship to internalizing shame coping.
Shame, or more accurately a lack thereof, has a long-standing relationship with the concept of psychopathy. According to Cleckley (1964), psychopaths are incapable of internalizing shame, the result of which is a tendency to externalize blame: The psychopath apparently cannot accept substantial blame for the various misfortunes which befall him and which he brings down upon others. … Whether judged in the light of his conduct, of his attitude, or of material elicited in psychiatric examination, he [the psychopath] shows almost no sense of shame. (p. 372)
The tendency to externalize blame continues to play an important role in the study of psychopathy as exemplified by the content of Item 16 on the “gold-standard” psychopathy measure, the Hare Psychopathy Checklist–Revised (PCL–R; Hare, 2003), which assesses a failure to accept responsibility for one’s actions. Item 16 of the PCL–R was designed to identify “an individual who is unable or unwilling to accept personal responsibility for his own actions (both criminal and non-criminal) or for the consequences of his actions” (Hare, 2003, p. 44). Instead of accepting responsibility for one’s actions, the psychopath produces “some excuse for his
behavior, including rationalizing and placing the blame on others” (Hare, 2003, p. 26). Despite the enduring assertion that psychopathy or psychopathic traits in the general population are associated with an inability to experience and internalize shame, the issue has received scant attention in the psychopathy literature. Even less is known about the relationship between shame experiences and the two subfactors of psychopathy referred to as primary and secondary psychopathy. Although multiple conceptualizations of primary and secondary psychopathy exist (Skeem, Poythress, Edens, Lilienfeld, & Cale, 2003), the most influential model was posited by Karpman (1941). According to Karpman (1941), primary psychopaths suffer from a core constitutional emotional deficiency, whereas on the other hand, secondary psychopaths exhibit behavior and traits outwardly similar to those of the primary psychopath yet different in terms of etiology, that is, the traits and behavior are secondary to neuroses or environmentally acquired pathology. Although subsequent models of primary and secondary psychopathy have been posited (Mealey, 1995; Porter, 1996), the majority hold that primary psychopaths are a discrete group devoid of emotional and affective responses, whereas secondary psychopaths are considered emotionally and affectively intact yet entangled in an antiso-
SHAME AND PSYCHOPATHY cial lifestyle (Skeem et al., 2003). Given that emotion is the foremost point of distinction between primary and secondary psychopaths, there is reason to believe that instruments, which purport to measure primary and secondary psychopathic subtypes, will be differentially related to both the capacity and type of experience associated with shame. To date, one study had addressed this issue. This study, conducted by Morrison and Gilbert (2001) with a British forensic sample, investigated their social-rank theory of psychopathy with regard to psychopaths’1 general shame deficit and shame coping differences between primary and secondary psychopaths. This theory contends that psychopaths in the Blackburn (1975, 1996) model are more reactive to social rank threats than nonpsychopaths and furthermore that primary and secondary psychopaths’ shame coping is differentiated as a consequence of the secondary psychopath’s self-perceived inferior social rank status. Briefly, social rank refers to one’s status within a social hierarchy. Social-rank theory is an evolutionary theory of behavior, cognition, and affect as they relate to strategies that improve one’s standing within interpersonal hierarchies formed by competition for limited resources relevant to reproduction (Fournier, Moskowitz, & Zuroff, 2002; Sloman, Atkinson, Milligan, & Liotti, 2002). The basic premise of Morrison and Gilbert’s (2001) psychopathy model is that all psychopaths share a heightened sensitivity to social rank threats. As a result, it is believed that neither primary nor secondary psychopaths employ responses that acknowledge their subordinate position when coping with threats to social rank. Subordinate response strategies involve acknowledgment of one’s shame and include attempts to conform, improve one’s self, apologize, or make amends (Gilbert & McGuire, 1998). This set of responses may also be characterized as adaptive coping, depending on the situation in which the responses are employed. Evolutionary perspectives on the adaptive nature of shame and its innate display relate the head-down, shrinking posture of shame to the communication of submission, which in turn affirms one’s relative rank in a dominance hierarchy (Gilbert & McGuire, 1998; Sloman et al., 2002; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Furthermore, submissive shame responses serve an appeasement function and convey acknowledgment of one’s wrongdoing. Morrison and Gilbert (2001) described the psychopath as “shame-intolerant,” and “disabled in coping with
1 We acknowledge that some may prefer to limit use of the term psychopath to represent only those individuals identified as such on the Hare (2003) PCL–R as well as limiting use of psychopathy to refer only to the construct hypothesized to be measured by the PCL–R. In acknowledgment, wherever possible, we refer to our findings in terms of psychopathic traits and features and refer to high-scoring individuals rather than label participants as primary or secondary psychopaths. Use of the term psychopath and psychopathy is retained in instances in which it either conveys previous authors’ intentions or suggests the extension of these findings to other models and measures of psychopathy not examined in this study.
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shame and in assuming responsibility,” and “other-blaming” (p. 334). Thus, according to Morrison and Gilbert, the psychopath is especially sensitive to a particular type of shaming situation (threats to social rank) and tends to be limited to shame coping styles that exclude the acknowledgment of reduced social rank. The finding that both groups of psychopaths in the Morrison and Gilbert study reported higher levels of anger (i.e., externalization) in response to provocation (e.g., disrespect, humiliation) when compared to a nonpsychopath controls but not each other is consistent with their model’s portrayal of psychopaths as being excessively sensitive to others’ behavior that might threaten social rank status. Pertaining to Morrison and Gilbert’s (2001) distinction between primary and secondary psychopaths, secondary psychopaths are believed to perceive themselves as subordinate in social rank when compared to primary psychopaths. Primary psychopaths “assume that they are dominant and expect others to treat them as such” (Morrison & Gilbert, 2001, p. 333) and perceive social threats as coming from subordinates who fail to show appropriate deference. On the other hand, secondary psychopaths perceive themselves as relatively inferior in social rank and have lower self-esteem. However, secondary psychopaths are resentful of their perceived status, strive for dominance, and thus are sensitive to threats both from others perceived as dominant and others perceived as subordinate. This second contention of the social rank theory of psychopathy was also supported by Morrison and Gilbert’s (2001) data that indicated secondary psychopaths were significantly more likely to internalize shame than either primary psychopaths or nonpsychopath controls. Because social-rank theory is applied to the general population, the social-rank theory of psychopathy offers a promising basis for establishing the convergent validity of the primary and secondary psychopathy measures developed for use in noninstitutionalized settings. That is, both primary and secondary measures should be negatively related to adaptive shame coping believed to represent acknowledgment of reduced social rank and differentially related in terms of their maladaptive shame coping strategies (i.e., secondary psychopathy scales should be more associated with internalized responses to shame). SOCIAL RANK PSYCHOPATHY THEORY AND EXPECTATIONS FOR NONCRIMINAL PSYCHOPATHY MEASURES Although the vast majority of psychopathy research has emphasized criminal psychopathy, it has long been recognized that criminality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient feature of psychopathy. For instance, Cleckley’s (1964) seminal work was conducted primarily with nonoffenders in the community. More recent, the leading psychopathy authority, Hare (1999), acknowledged subcriminal psychopaths are “to be found everywhere—in business, the home, the professions, the military, the arts, the entertainment industry, the
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news media, academe, and the blue-collar world” (p. 115). Similarly, Lykken (1995) noted, “Some psychopaths, however, are at least superficially socialized, some have learned the rules and do generally obey them. Especially if they are talented or privileged, they may do well in school, hold a job, succeed in a profession” (p. 22). Despite the theoretical acknowledgment that psychopaths are not limited to prisons and jails, the study of psychopathy was for decades limited to criminal populations with only a handful of exceptions (Widom, 1977; Widom & Newman, 1985). One explanation for this situation was the incompatibility between the PCL–R, the gold-standard psychopathy measure (Hare, 2003), and noninstitutional samples that often lack the detailed file information required to score the PCL–R. However, the recent development of several self-report measures of psychopathy (Hare, Hemphill, & Paulhus, 2003; Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995; Lillienfeld & Andrews, 1996) stands to advance the study of psychopathy in the general population. One such instrument, Levenson et al.’s (1995) Self-Report of Psychopathy Scale (SRPS) is the focus of this study. The SRPS was designed specifically for the assessment of traits indicative of primary and secondary psychopathy within noninstitutionalized samples that are analogous respectively to the personality factor (Factor 1 or F1) and behavioral factor (Factor 2 or F2) of the PCL–R (for a description of factors, see Hare, 2003). Brinkley, Schmitt, Smith, and Newman (2001) demonstrated an overlap between the SRPS and the PCL–R total score (r = .35, p < .01) and the two analogous factor scores of the PCL–R (SRPS Primary and F1 r = .30, p < .01; SRPS Secondary and F2 r = .36, p < .01) in a forensic sample. Moreover, both exploratory (Levenson et al., 1995) and confirmatory factor analyses (Lynam, Whiteside, & Jones, 1999) have supported the factorial validity of the SRPS primary and secondary scales in college samples. Furthering the claim that two discrete constructs underlie scores on the SRPS primary and secondary scales were results obtained from colleges samples (McHoskey, Worzel, & Szyarto, 1998; Ross & Rausch, 2001) indicating correlations in opposite directions between SRPS subscales and constructs such as anxiety, self-handicapping (+ for SRPS secondary; – for SRPS primary), and hypercompetition (+ for SRPS primary; – for SRPS secondary). Taken together, these findings indicate the SRPS primary and secondary scales share positive correlations with clinical measures of psychopathic behavior and personality yet exhibit correlations in opposite directions with constructs that collectively could be construed as indicators of social rank. More specifically, individuals with high SRPS primary scores tend to describe their personalities as competitive and free from anxiety, and they avoid self-handicapping strategies designed to boost low self-esteem; whereas on the other hand, individuals high on the SRPS secondary scale are likely to acknowledge anxiety, use self-esteem enhancing strategies, and consider themselves less competitive in contrast to their primary counterparts. Both types of individuals would, however,
share a similar tendency to engage in antisocial behavior, albeit noncriminal in severity. Although the SRPS findings discussed previously suggest the construct underlying the SRPS primary and secondary scales may be related to the social rank psychopathy model posited by Morrison and Gilbert (2001), what remains to be seen is whether the model’s specific predictions regarding shame coping are borne out in terms of convergent relationships between shame and SRPS scales, some of which are expected to be in opposite directions. In this study, we tested the convergent validity for the SRPS primary and secondary scales by applying predictions from the social rank theory of psychopathy with regard to shame. Depending on the criterion, both scales were expected to show an identical or an opposing pattern of convergent validity. That is, we examined whether the SRPS primary and secondary psychopathy scales converged in terms of negative relationships with adaptive shame responses and positive relationships with externalizing shame coping. These predictions are based on the belief that primary and secondary psychopaths share a heightened sensitivity to social rank threats that results in aggressive and hostile retaliation to the source of those threats. In the second thrust of the study, we investigated the opposing relationships between primary and secondary psychopathy with respect to internalizing shame coping, relationships believed to stem from social rank differences between those endorsing primary and secondary psychopathic traits. The expectation for the latter investigation was that SRPS secondary but not primary scales would be positively related to internalizing shame coping strategies, thereby reflecting the social rank psychopathy hypothesis that secondary psychopathy is associated with reduced social rank and therefore an increased tendency to cope with shame through internalizing strategies. METHOD Participants and Procedure The participants were 305 undergraduate educational psychology and introductory sociology students who volunteered to participate in the study for extra class credit. Participants were administered the two assessment instruments in group settings of 20 to 30 students. The majority of the sample was White (78%) and female (57%). The mean age was 21.27 years (SD = 4.12) and ranged from 17 to 47. Descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 1. Missing data or omitted responses were addressed by listwise deletion; thus, some analyses differed in terms of sample size. Instruments
Psychopathic traits: SRPS. The SRPS (Levenson et al., 1995) is a 26-item, self-report designed to assess psychopathic traits similar to those found in the two-factor model of
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SHAME AND PSYCHOPATHY TABLE 1 Sample Descriptive Statistics Description Age Range: 17 to 47 Sex Male Female Ethnicity African American Asian American Caucasian Hispanic American Other Note.
Statistic M = 21.27 SD = 4.12 111 (36.4%) 175 (57.4%) 8 (2.6%) 8 (2.6%) 239 (78.4%) 19 (6.2%) 10 (3.3%)
Percentages do not add up to 100% due to missing data.
the PCL–R (Harpur, Hare, & Hakstian, 1989). The primary scale contains 16 items that assess psychopathic traits analogous to F1 of the PCL–R. The secondary scale contains 10 items that assess secondary psychopathy analogous to F2 of the PCL–R. The SRPS was designed to avoid socially desirable response sets by wording items such that endorsement does not elicit social disapproval (e.g., Levenson et al., 1995, Item 10, p. 153, Table 1). The SRPS employs a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (disagree strongly), 2 (disagree somewhat), 3 (agree somewhat), to 4 (agree strongly). The internal consistency of the primary scale reported in five studies has ranged from .80 to .88 (Baird, 2001; Brinkley et al., 2001; Levenson et al., 1995; Lynam et al., 1999; McHoskey et al., 1998). In those same studies, the internal consistencies for the secondary scale have been consistently lower than the primary scale (range = .53 to .74). In this sample, similar coefficient alphas were observed: primary α = .83; secondary α = .66. The disparity between the internal consistency of the primary and secondary scale is attributable, in part, to the reduced number of items on the secondary scale. Applying the Spearman–Brown correction for the number of items, the internal consistency of the secondary scale, if it was the same length as the primary scale, would be .75 (based on this sample), which is acceptable but still less than that of the primary scale.
Shame Coping: CoSS. The Compass of Shame Scale (CoSS–4; Elison, Pulos, & Lennon, 2001a, 2001b, 2004; Yelsma, Brown, & Elison, 2002) is a 50-item self-report instrument designed to assess an individual’s use of the four styles of maladaptive shame coping described by Nathanson’s (1992) compass of shame model. The CoSS–4 contains a 10-item subscale for each compass of shame pole (Attack Self, Attack Other, Avoidance, Withdrawal) as well as a 10-item subscale for adaptive responses (Adaptive). The CoSS–4 presents 10 shame-inducing scenarios, each followed by five responses, one from each subscale. Item responses use a frequency scale ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (almost always). Responses are totaled for each subscale to produce five subscale scores. Additionally, the four scores
for the compass of shame subscales may be totaled for a CoSS total score, which reflects a total measure of defensive shame coping. The CoSS is available from us. The CoSS is well suited for the goals of this study, as two scales assess externalizing responses (Attack Other and Avoidance), two scales assess internalizing responses (Attack Self and Withdrawal), and the fifth scale assesses Adaptive responses. The Avoidance scale captures disavowal and emotional distancing or minimization; for instance, a failing student might disavow concern about a failing grade, claiming the course does not matter. Attack Other captures outward directed anger and blame; the failing student might angrily blame the teacher. Attack Self captures inward directed anger and blame; the failing student might react with self-disgust at his or her self-proclaimed stupidity. Withdrawal captures the tendency to hide or withdraw when shamed; the failing student might hide his or her failure from others, choose to be alone, or even dropout. Finally, the Adaptive scale captures acknowledgment of one’s shame and include attempts to conform, improve one’s self, apologize, or make amends; the failing student might acknowledge his or her lack of effort and choose to study more. Elison et al. (2001a, 2001b, 2004) described the development and validation of the CoSS–3. The four scales representing the four poles of the compass of shame showed a differentiated pattern of correlations with other measures of shame, self-esteem, anger, psychological symptoms, and coping. The CoSS–4 incorporates a number of small changes plus the addition of the Adaptive scale (Yelsma et al., 2002). In this study, alpha reliabilities for the six CoSS–4 scores were Total score = .93; Attack Self = .88; Attack Other = .84; Avoidance = .72; Withdrawal = .87; and Adaptive = 75.
RESULTS SRPS Mean Comparison With Other Published Sample Means To provide a point of comparison between the SRPS scores observed in this sample and those reported elsewhere for college students, Cohen’s standard effect size d (Rosenthal, 1991) was calculated to describe the difference between SRPS primary and secondary scale means and those reported by Levenson et al. (1995) and McHoskey et al. (1998). Because all samples were college students, no significant mean differences were anticipated. Means and standard deviations reported by Levenson et al. and McHoskey et al. (1998) were weighted for sampling accuracy before being combined. The difference between the SRPS primary mean of this sample (M = 28.3, SD = 7.30) and the weighted mean of the Levenson et al. and McHoskey et al. samples (Mweighted = 31.38, SDweighted = 8.23) was small but significant (d = .39, p < .01). Comparison of this sample’s SRPS secondary mean (M = 20.21, SD = 4.35) with the weighted mean of Levenson
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et al. and McHoskey et al. samples (Mweighted = 21.59, SDweighted = 4.68) also resulted in a small but significant effect size (d = .30, p < .01). The significant findings were contrary to expectation and indicated that on average, this sample’s SRPS primary and secondary scores were less than those reported for other college samples. Correlation Analyses To evaluate relationships between shame coping and psychopathic traits as continuous variables across the entire sample, Pearson’s r and partial correlations between the CoSS and SRPS scales were calculated. As recommended by McHoskey et al. (1998), partial correlations were utilized to examine the unique relationship between SRPS primary and secondary scales and CoSS scales after controlling for the covariance between the SRPS primary and secondary scales (r = .47, p < .001). All predictions were directional, and therefore, one-tailed tests of significance were employed for correlations that addressed predictions. Due to the opposing predictions between SRPS primary and secondary scales with respect to internalization, no predictions were made for the relationship between SRPS total scores and CoSS internalizing scales. Similarly, due to the opposing predictions between CoSS internalizing and externalizing scales with respect to the SRPS primary scale, no predictions were made for the relationship between CoSS total scores and the SRPS primary scale. Two-tailed tests of significance were used for these correlations. The zero-order correlations between the CoSS Adaptive scale and the primary (r = –.23, p < .001) and secondary (r = –.28, p < .001) SRPS scales (Table 2) supported the prediction that primary and secondary psychopathic traits would possess convergent, inverse relationships with adaptive shame coping styles. Both correlations were significant after partialing the shared variance from the psychopathy scales: primary (r = –.12, p < .05) and secondary (r = –.21, p < .001). These results support the prediction that those who endorse
psychopathic traits are less willing to acknowledge shame, communicate deference, and make amends in comparison to those who do not endorse such traits. Two types of externalized shame coping were assessed, Attack Other and Avoidance; these were predicted to be positively correlated with both SRPS psychopathy scales. The primary and secondary SRPS scales had significant, positive, zero-order correlations with CoSS Attack Other (r = .27 and .37, respectively, p < .001; Table 2). The correlations remained significant after partialing the shared variance from the psychopathy scales: primary (r = .11, p < .05) and secondary (r = .30, p < .001). Similarly, the primary and secondary SRPS scales had significant, positive, zero-order correlations with CoSS Avoidance (r = .17, p < .01 and r = .23, p < .001, respectively). However, after partialing the shared variance from the psychopathy scales, only the correlation with secondary SRPS scale remained significant: primary (r = .07, p = .12) and secondary (r = .17, p < .01). In sum, the results indicated those who endorsed psychopathic traits of all kinds also endorsed one form of externalizing shame response characterized by outward-directed anger and blame. In addition, those who endorsed secondary psychopathic traits also endorsed an externalizing approach to shame coping exemplified by attempts to disavow or minimize feelings of shame. SRPS subscale scores displayed correlations that differed significantly with respect to internalizing shame coping. Specifically, the SRPS secondary scores displayed significant and positive zero-order correlations with CoSS Attack Self (r = .19, p < .001; Table 2) and Withdrawal (r = .23, p < .001) scores. In contrast, zero-order correlations indicated SRPS primary scores were unrelated to CoSS Attack Self (r = –.06, ns) and Withdrawal (r = –.01, ns) scores. A statistical comparison of the dependent correlations (Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992) indicated the correlations with SRPS secondary scores were significantly greater than correlations with the SRPS primary scores for both Attack Self (z = 4.05, p < .001) and Withdrawal (z = 3.90, p < .001). Indeed, after
TABLE 2 Pearson Correlations Between CoSS Shame Coping Scales and SRPS Psychopathy Scales SRPS Primary Scale CoSS Total Adaptive Externalizing CoSS scales Attack Other Avoidance Internalizing CoSS scales Attack Self Withdrawal
Zero Ordera
SRPS Secondary
Partial r Controlling Secondaryb
SRPS Total
Zero Orderc
Partial r Controlling Primaryb
Zero Orderd
.10 –.23***
–.05 –.12*
.31*** –.28***
.30*** –.21***
.21*** –.30***
.27*** .17**
.11* .07
.37*** .23***
.30*** .17**
.36*** .22***
–.17** –.12*
.19*** .23***
.25*** .26***
.04 .10
–.06 –.01
Note. CoSS = Compass of Shame Scale; SRPS = Self-Report Psychopathy Scale. an = 279. bn = 274. cn = 288. dn = 277. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. All one-tailed.
SHAME AND PSYCHOPATHY partialing the shared variance from the psychopathy scales, the SRPS primary scores became a significant negative correlate of Attack Self (r = –.17, p < .01) and Withdrawal (r = –.12, p < .05) scores, whereas the correlations between SRPS secondary scores and Attack Self (r = .25, p < .001) and Withdrawal (r = .26, p < .001) scores increased. Thus, the hypothesis was supported; the relationships between internalizing shame coping scores and the SRPS subscales were in opposite directions, as the SRPS secondary scores were positively related and the SRPS primary scores were negatively related to both internalizing shame coping scales. Categorical Analyses With regard to internalizing shame coping, significant differences in correlations calculated from the entire sample were not necessarily indicative of differences in the participants we were most interested in, namely, individuals scoring high on the psychopathy scales. Therefore, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to evaluate mean differences in internalizing shame coping between groups scoring high on the two SRPS scales. Three mutually exclusive groups of people who were high on the SRPS primary, secondary, or both scales were created. The two groups representing elevated primary or secondary SRPS scores included individuals scoring (a) above the 70th percentile on one SRPS scale and (b) below the mean on the opposing SRPS scale. The high-primary group (N = 30) scored 32 or > on the SRPS primary scale and 20 or < on the SRPS secondary scale; the high-secondary group (N = 24) scored 23 or > on the SRPS secondary scale and 28 or < on the SRPS primary scale. The third high scoring group (high on both; N = 52) was comprised of individuals whose score was above the 70th percentile on both SRPS scales. In the ANOVA, four cases from the high-primary group and one case from in the high-on-both group were dropped due to missing data on the dependent variable. Using a forensic sample, Brinkley et al. (2001) identified cut scores for high (≥ 58), medium (48–57), and low (≤ 47) SRPS total scores that corresponded to similar cut scores on the PCL–R. In their study, 33% of the participants who scored high on the SRPS total score also scored above the PCL–R cut score (≥ 30) for diagnosing psychopathy, whereas 54% of the sample who surpassed the PCL–R’s cut score also scored high on the SRPS total score. The high-on-both group in this study (SRPS total M = 63, SD = 5.07, range = 55 to 79) contained 44 individuals who met or exceeded the Brinkley et al. (2001) high cut score. No cut scores for the individual primary and secondary scales were examined in the Brinkley et al. study, and the high-scoring group formation procedure suppresses total scores by definition, thereby making comparison with the Brinkley et al. sample difficult. Nonetheless, the high-primary group (SRPS total M = 53, SD = 3.64, range = 46 to 62) contained four individuals who met or surpassed the Brinkley et al. high cut score,
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whereas the high-secondary group (SRPS total M = 49, SD = 4.02, range = 41 to 55) contained no individuals at or above the Brinkley et al. cut score. The SRPS high-scoring groups in this study should not be equated with PCL–R defined psychopaths. Instead, the high-scoring groups represent the tail end of SRPS total and subscale distributions. Comparing these groups offers another approach to establishing the opposing patterns of convergent validity for the two SRPS subscales. Namely, if the primary and secondary scales are distinct, then the groups formed from the high end of the subscale distributions should also evidence distinct relationships with external variables. Because the between-group predictions involved internalizing shame coping of all types, a combined score (internalizing-combined) was created by summing scores for Attack Self and Withdrawal. The combination of CoSS scales is supported both theoretically (Nathanson, 1992) and empirically.2 The mean internalizing-combined scores of the high-scoring SRPS groups were compared using ANOVA. As can be seen in Table 3, the ANOVA comparing CoSS internalizing-combined mean scores across groups was significant (F = 4.835, p < .05). Dunnett’s T3 (Glass & Hopkins, 1996) pairwise comparisons, equal variances not assumed, were used for post hoc comparisons of the internalizing-combined ANOVA. The post hoc analyses (Table 3) painted a picture similar to that of the correlation analyses. That is, participants in the high-primary group were, on average, significantly (M difference = –11.93; p < 01) less likely to endorse internalizing shame coping (internalizing-combined: M = 29.7, SD = 12.78) compared to participants in the high-secondary group (internalizing-combined: M = 41.6, SD = 10.18). Although the mean difference was not significant (–5.05, p = .34), individuals from the high-primary group were also less likely to endorse internalizing shame coping even when compared to participants in the high-on-both group (internalizing-combined: M = 34.7, SD = 15.29). In addition to the Dunnett’s T3 (Glass & Hopkins, 1996) post hoc comparison of mean differences, three-group focused contrasts were conducted (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1996). Although the social-rank model of psychopathy stipulated the high-secondary group would score consistently higher on internalizing-combined than the high-primary group, there was no guidance as to the relative magnitude of internalizing-combined scores for a high-on-both group. Therefore, two contrasts were conducted, the first placing the high-secondary group internalizing-combined scores above the high-on-both group and the second reversing that order. In both contrasts, the high-primary group was hypothesized to have the lowest internalizing-combined scores. The first contrast was significant and positive (r = .30, p < .01), supporting that hypothesis
2
The correlation between Attack Self and Withdrawal in this study was .76 (p < .001). In addition, the two scales demonstrated similar relationships to each SRPS scale in the correlation analyses.
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CAMPBELL AND ELISON TABLE 3 ANOVA of High Scoring Psychopathy Groups Compared on Internalizing-Combined Scores With Dunnett’s T3 Post Hoc Comparisons and Three-Group Focused Contrasts
Internalizing-Combined Scores by Group High primary High secondary High on both
M
SD
29.7 41.6 34.7
12.78 10.18 15.29
CoSS Internalizing-Combined ANOVAa Multiple-Group Mean Comparisons for Internalizing-Combined High primary, high secondary High primary, high on both High secondary, high on both
MDiff
SE
–11.93** –5.05 6.88
3.254 3.296 2.983 Focused Contrast Weights
Three-Group Focused Contrast High primary High secondary High on both r contrast
Contrast 1
Contrast 2
–1 +1 0 .30 (p < .01)
–1 0 +1 10 (p = .30)
Note. High primary group (n = 26) and high secondary group (n = 24) are comprised of individuals whose score was (a) above the 70th percentile on one SRPS scale and (b) below the mean on the opposing SRPS scale. The high on both group (n = 51) consists of individuals whose score was above the 70th percentile on both the SRPS primary and secondary psychopathy scales. Four cases in the high-primary group dropped due to missing internalizing-combined data, one case in the high-on-both group dropped due to missing internalizing-combined data. Internalizing-combined is the sum of the CoSS Attack-Self and Withdrawal scales. ANOVA = analysis of variance. aF(2, 98) = 4.835, p = .03.* *p < .05. **p < .01.
that the high-secondary group possessed the highest internalizing-combined scores followed by the high-on-both group and last the high-primary group. The second contrast was not significant (r = .10, p = .30), thereby failing to support the hypothesis that the high-on-both group would have the highest internalizing-combined scores. In all, the results of the categorical analyses were consistent with those of the correlation analysis in supporting the hypothesis that SRPS scales possess opposing patterns of convergent relationships with internalizing shame coping. DISCUSSION In summary, continuous and categorical comparisons of CoSS shame coping scales supported the convergent validity of the SRPS primary and secondary psychopathy scales. Convergent validity was demonstrated by the inverse relationships between adaptive shame coping and the two SRPS scales as well as the positive relationship between externalizing shame coping and the SRPS scales. These effect sizes were small (rs = .17 to .37), but significant. An opposing pattern of convergent validity was demonstrated by the opposite direction of linear relationships between CoSS internalizing scales and the SRPS scales. Specifically, scores on the SRPS secondary scale were positively correlated with both internalizing shame coping scales, whereas the same relationships for the primary scale were negative. Again, the effect sizes were small (rs = .19 to
.23) but significant. Moreover, when the SRPS was used to identify individuals who scored high on either the primary or the secondary scale, the two groups of individuals differed significantly with respect to their internalizing shame coping scores. Post hoc analyses revealed individuals high on SRPS primary were significantly less likely to endorse internalizing shame coping strategies compared to persons scoring high on the SRPS secondary scale. Several limitations should be considered when interpreting these findings, the first of which being that the sample was limited to college students. PCL–R-defined psychopaths, even within the populations of persons diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), are but a small subpopulation (Hart & Hare, 1997) and are thus likely to comprise smaller percentages of the general and student populations. Thus, despite the presence of 48 individuals in this sample whose SRPS total scores met or surpassed the Brinkley et al. (2001) high cut score, the high SRPS scoring individuals in this study should not be equated with PCL–R psychopaths. Instead, the high–low group distinction is best thought of as an artificial distinction employed for contrasting SRPS scales in terms of their utility for differentiating between groups at the tail end of the SRPS total and subscale distributions—groups hypothesized to possess distinct relationships with external variables. Although our interest was in noncriminal populations, it nevertheless remains to be seen whether the results will generalize to PCL–R defined criminal psychopaths or nonstudent populations.
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SHAME AND PSYCHOPATHY The second limitation is with instrumentation; all measures were self-report, traditionally an undesirable methodology in the study of psychopathy (Hart & Hare, 1997). For the CoSS, socially desirable responding may be an issue; however, only the Attack Other scale has been found to be significantly related to impression management (Elison & Campbell, 2001). According to Levenson et al. (1995), socially desirable responding to the SRPS is reduced by the manner in which the items were constructed (e.g., item endorsement does not openly convey social disproval); nevertheless, the susceptibility of the SRPS to desirable responding remains unexamined. A separate limitation specific to the SRPS is that counter to most models of true or primary psychopathy, the SRPS primary psychopathy scale is positively related to trait anxiety (Lilienfeld, 1998), a finding reported in the first study with the SRPS (Levenson et al., 1995). However, Levenson et al. failed to account for covariation between primary and secondary SRPS scales when assessing their correlation with anxiety measures. In this study, such a control was executed. Last, the internal consistency of the secondary psychopathy, Adaptive, and Avoidance scales were lower than desired (.66, .75, and .72, respectively). This would attenuate the observed correlations involving these three scales. Although this presents a limitation in terms of the accuracy of the reported correlations, it also suggests they represent a lower bound. Because all three hypotheses (e.g., adaptive, externalizing, internalizing) involved one or more of these scales, effect sizes in all cases would be expected to increase with increased reliability, particularly for the hypothesis pertaining to the SRPS scales’ opposed relationships to internalizing shame coping. When considering the implications of this study, it is useful to consider the relationship between theory and measurement noted by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994). Namely, evidence of measurement validity simultaneously supports the theory that specifies the structural model applied to investigate the instrument’s validity. Applying this reasoning to this study, the convergent relationships observed for the SRPS primary and secondary psychopathy scales support both the validity of the SRPS as well as the potential utility of Morrison and Gilbert’s (2001) social-rank theory, which specified the structural model of the SRPS primary and secondary scales. The predictions of the social-rank theory of psychopathy (e.g., convergent interpersonal hostility for all psychopaths and the opposing pattern between primary/secondary in internalizing shame coping) have now been observed with two separate measures of primary and secondary psychopathy applied in forensic (Morrison & Gilbert, 2001) and noninstitutionalized settings. If the assumption is made that the SRPS does indeed tap the psychopathy construct, one can also draw on the findings to make inferences about the quality of shame coping likely to be associated with subtypes of psychopaths. In particular, one would expect primary psychopaths to avoid an internalizing response to shame. Oppositely, secondary psychopaths may be expected to be more volatile in their
coping strategies and thus capable of both internalized and externalized shame coping, with socially and psychologically destructive consequences. In contrast to the true Cleckley (1964) psychopath who externalizes blame because of shame insensitivity, the results imply secondary psychopathic behaviors and possibly secondary psychopathy in general are sometimes the consequence of a heightened sensitivity and associated antisocial reaction to shame. However, these conjectures should not be taken as implying secondary psychopathy is necessarily a more pathological condition than primary psychopathy, as shame sensitivity and related maladaptive responses may be just one feature of secondary psychopathy. Another potential insight generated by this study is that it contributes to the understanding of the relationships between shame, shame coping, and psychopathic traits. The results are consistent with Cleckley’s (1964) belief that psychopathy is associated with an inability to internalize shame and a tendency to respond to shame inducing situations with anger and blame externalization. Given the lack of shame acknowledgement in those exhibiting psychopathic traits, Lewis’s (1971) notion of “bypassed shame” seems fitting. Social rank threats, criticism, rejection, and failures may be defended against to the point in which the experience of shame is not conscious. These events automatically elicit coping in the form of disavowal or outward-directed anger, employed to conceal shame from the self and others. In light of this automaticity, questions remain regarding the use of shame-coping strategies by criminal psychopaths, the utility of self-report measures with criminal psychopaths, and the applicability of the shame-coping model to interventions. In conclusion, the results from this study support the convergent validity of the SRPS primary and secondary psychopathy scales in college samples. This finding, in conjunction with those reported by Morrison and Gilbert (2001), suggests shame coping is an important consideration when assessing psychopathy in both criminal and noncriminal populations. Furthermore, these findings lend indirect support to the social-rank theory of psychopathy as a model for structuring comparisons between measures of primary and secondary psychopathy. The findings and their implications encourage greater consideration of shame coping and the social-rank theory of psychopathy when investigating psychopathy both in and outside of institutions.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Preliminary analyses of data in this study were presented at the annual meeting of the Rocky Mountain Psychological Association, April 2000, Reno, Nevada. Authors are listed in alphabetical order. We thank Steven Pulos, Norman Poythress, Kevin Douglass, and reviewers at the Journal of Personality Assessment for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
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Jeff Elison Department of Psychology 2155 Race Street University of Denver Denver, CO 80208 Email:
[email protected] Received December 11, 2003 Revised May 25, 2004
