ShARED AND COORDINATED COgNITION IN ...

IJSEP, 2006, 4, 376-400 © 2006 West Virginia University

Shared and Coordinated Cognition in Competitive and Dynamic Task Environments: An Information-Processing Perspective for Team Sports Torsten Reimer , Ernest S. Park,

and

Verlin B. Hinsz

North Dakota State University

Abstract

From a groups-as-information-processors perspective, the notion of shared cognition is crucial to the understanding of team performance. This approach is used to comprehend the effectiveness of sports teams. Typically, sport teams are placed in a dynamic environment in which tasks are highly interdependent: Individual actions have to be coordinated with regard to the team objectives and with regard to the opponent team’s actions. Although sports are considered behavioral tasks by their nature, performance may be strongly affected by cognitive processes. We review studies and give examples that demonstrate that the degree to which cognitions are shared and coordinated among the members of such teams influences the extent to which the individual actions are coordinated. The sharing and coordinating of cognition pertain to the attention, information processing, and action phases of the decision making and behavior process. We also discuss how feedback and coaching can affect information processing in teams such that coordination of actions is more likely to arise. Key words: teams; sports teams; coordination; coordinated cognition; shared cognition; information processing; expertise; groups; team performance

[The Greek team was] ... more than the sum of their individual parts. Time and again they were confronted by superior teams ... [but] ground their opponents into submission.   George Caulkin on Greece’s victory in the European soccer tournament EuroCup 2004, times online, July 06, 2004. In a series of matches during the summer of 2004, Greece won the European soccer championship. Considering that Greece had never won a single international tournaCorresponding author: Torsten Reimer, Department of Communication, University of Maryland; Email: [email protected].

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Shared and Coordinated Cognition ment game before, this was one of the biggest surprises in soccer history (Le Parisien, France, 2004, July 5, as cited in Demetriou, 2004). The Greek team was composed of individuals who had almost no international reputation, some of whom only served as substitutes on their local teams in the Greek national league. So how did this Greek team manage to pull off one of the most sensational achievements in soccer history (Gazzetta dello Sport, Italy, 2004, July 5, as cited in Demetriou, 2004)? Sports analysts provided several explanations. For example, the success of the Greeks has been credited to the discipline of the team, their outstanding coach, and perhaps most consistently, to their team spirit. According to one of the offensive players, Mihalis Kapsis, the key to success was that the players were really united­—a team. “No one put himself above the team” (Ayiomamitis, 2004). In this paper, we try to further the understanding of what it means to be a “united” team by considering the possible cognitive factors that might lead a collection of individuals to develop into a coordinated team. More specifically, we offer a groups-as-information-processors perspective by applying a general model of information processing to sports teams (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997). We use this general approach and model to highlight a number of issues related to the cognitive influences on team sports. In particular, we will consider shared mental models as ways in which team members organize their views of their sport, their opponents, their tasks, and their interactions with teammates. We contribute to previous approaches by considering how members of teams coordinate their cognitions during an event, and also incorporate the influence of feedback and coaching to the recent perspective of teams as information-processing units. In our discussion of cognitive processes in sports teams, we also provide a limited review of relevant research that highlights the topics we consider-including research on information processing by expert athletes.

Information Processing in Sports Teams

Traditional approaches to studying sports teams, and teams in general, focus on performance on some task, often physical in nature (Starkes & Ericsson, 2003; Steiner, 1972). However, it is generally acknowledged that team performance often relies on the cognitive processes of the team members (Starkes & Ericsson, 2003). The ways that the team members think about their tasks, their teammates, their opponents, and even the sport itself will influence individual and interpersonal behaviors and interactions. There is ample evidence to suggest that team performance is dependent on the cognition of its members (Thompson, Levine, & Messick, 1999). For example, members’ self-efficacy regarding their capability to perform the requisite tasks during a sporting event does influence how well team members perform (Feltz & Lirgg, 1998). In this paper, we further explore the ways that cognitive processes influence the performance of sport teams. To provide a basis for our discussion, we first outline some conceptualizations of how individuals and teams process information for task performance. The information processing approach to performance has been very useful for understanding the behavior of individuals in sports (Tenenbaum, 2003) and other domains (Wickens & Hollands, 1999). In particular, it has helped to highlight the systematic differences between sport

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T. Reimer , E. S. Park, and V. B. Hinsz experts and novices in how attention is allocated, and how information from the environment is processed to anticipate effects of potential actions (Ericsson, 2003; Tenenbaum, 2003; Wickens & Flach, 1988). Moreover, the information processing approach of individuals can be also used as a foundation for conceptualizing the information processes of teammates and, thus, this framework has also proved to be quite helpful in understanding the performance of groups on various tasks (Hinsz et al., 1997). Consequently, we argue that our understanding of sports teams would also benefit from a consideration of the teams as information processors. In cognitive psychology, a variety of information processing models have been constructed (Hinsz et al., 1997). Many assume that individuals interact with the environments from which they acquire information. This information is then compared with information which the individual has already stored in memory, allowing the person to anticipate the potential effects of various possible actions. Consequently, the action itself affects the environment and situation, which provides the athlete with the opportunity to derive feedback (e.g., whether the action was successful). Within this representation of individual information processing, an individual is an active agent in the environment who derives information from the situation, as well as acts in that situation to attain some desirable goals. Information processing can be represented in a variety of ways (Massaro & Cowan, 1993). We use Figure 1 to display critical aspects of information processing that are relevant for sports teams. The attention phase describes the information to which the athlete directs his or her attention (Tenenbaum, 2003). This process is important in sports because if the athlete fails to notice or attend to relevant cues, this information cannot be processed. During the selection phase, some pieces of information are further processed and used to construct a mental representation of the relevant features of the environment. After the information is perceived and encoded, information is integrated with existing knowledge structures, allowing the individual to consider the newly acquired knowledge and to anticipate the potential consequences of various alternative courses of action (anticipation phase). Once the individual is able to conceptualize the various outcomes that might occur following the action alternatives that he or she is considering, a comparison between these choices is made. In the decision phase, the individual evaluates the alternatives to select a course of action. After the decision to act is made, the individual performs the action, receives feedback on this action from the environment (e.g., teammates, opponents, coach), and considers this feedback information for subsequent decisions and behaviors. The athlete’s goals and roles are assumed to be crucial influences on which features in the environment receive attention, the manner in which information is processed, and which potential actions are considered. The information-processing model emphasizes the phases that have been shown to be particularly relevant to the domain of sports (Tenenbaum, 2003). Before describing the different phases of the framework in detail, we will initially discuss the task features that sport teams frequently encounter. Our focus is on the prototypical team sports environment. Team sports are generally complex and highly interdependent, and require coordination on various levels. To help us understand the cognitions that teammates hold

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Shared and Coordinated Cognition

Figure 1. A framework of information processing for team sports.

in team sports, we will consider shared mental models as useful constructs (Hinsz, 1995; Rouse, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1992). Shared mental models aid our efforts to understand how teams can coordinate their actions in highly dynamic environments. When describing the different phases of the model, we will focus on how sharing cognitions influences each of the phases of information processing, and how this in turn affects coordination in teams. Both the benefits and costs that may arise when teammates share mental models will be highlighted. Finally, we will discuss how feedback and coaching may affect coordination in sports teams.

The unique features of team sports

Team sports may be described as dynamic, complex, and highly interdependent systems that require coordination on various levels. Team sports are dynamic because they are fast-paced with a constantly changing environment. For example, to pursue a certain goal, athletes must be able to adapt their strategies and behavior to the opponent’s behavior. They are complex because they involve different types of tasks—for example, an athlete has to perform a certain behavior but must be also able to predict the opponent’s actions. And they are interdependent because the effect of an action depends on the actions of other actors. For all these reasons, coordination in team sports is critical. To understand the complex nature of team sports, it is useful to consider a circumplex of group tasks (see McGrath, 1984). McGrath’s (1984) task circumplex makes

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T. Reimer , E. S. Park, and V. B. Hinsz distinctions between four general processes that occur to various extents depending on the task requirements: generating (planning and creativity tasks), choosing (decisionmaking and intellective tasks), negotiating (cognitive conflict and mixed-motive tasks), and executing (performance and competitive tasks). These four general processes define separate quadrants that may be arranged along two dimensions: Tasks are either based on conflict (negotiate) or cooperation (generate), and they are either conceptual (choose) or behavioral (execute). Using this classification scheme, team sports may be characterized as complex systems that comprise qualitatively different tasks. Team sports are behavioral tasks because they require specific physical actions to be executed and performed. However, team sports usually also involve the processes of generating, choosing, and negotiating. As with individuals, while the requirements of the particular sport dictate the degree to which each of these processes is more or less emphasized, teams at some point are involved in each of these processes to function effectively. In addition to the dynamic and complex nature of team sports, team sports may be described as highly interdependent tasks that contain cooperative intra-team demands as well as competitive inter-team demands. As a consequence, athletes must be adept at anticipating the intentions and actions of their teammates and their opponents (Tenenbaum, 2003). Interdependence may be conceptualized as the manner in which actors influence each other’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors during the course of their interaction (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Typically in sports, several types of interdependence exist. Interdependence can occur for team member’s goals, outcomes, and behaviors (Gully, Incalcaterra, Joshi, & Beaubien, 2002). Even though these types tap into a general interdependence factor (Gully et al., 2002), they affect coordination in different ways. Goal and outcome interdependence may improve coordination by enhancing team members’ motivation to coordinate their actions. If team members’ goals (e.g., winning a game) and outcomes (e.g., incentives based on team performance) are interdependent, team members may be more inclined to coordinate their actions than in a situation in which the individuals’ personal goals and incentives are independent. In contrast, behavioral interdependence increases coordination demands (Malone & Crowston, 1994). Coordination demands in team sports are high because an athlete’s behavior directly affects his or her teammates’ behavioral options. In other words, an initial action may dictate the subsequent behaviors of others. Importantly, we also suggest that interdependence should be considered at the inter-team level. This magnifies the coordination demands because team behavior must be adapted to the opponent team’s actions too. Taken together, because of the dynamic nature of team sports, the complexity of the tasks involved, and behavioral interdependence, coordination among team members is central in team sports (Malone & Crowston, 1994). But how can team coordination be enhanced? One effective means to coordinate actions is through direct communication. Through effective speech, teammates can communicate their intentions and plan accordingly. Since task-specific workload and time pressures vary, it is important that teams adapt their time management to the task demands by planning subsequent actions when time pressure is low (McPherson, 2000). Thus, communication itself must be organized

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Shared and Coordinated Cognition to improve coordination and effective actions when workload is high (Reimer, Neuser, & Schmitt, 1997). If done improperly though, communication in high workload situations can impair team performance (Johnston & Briggs, 1968). Coordination might be improved by communication. However, most sports are fast paced and teams do not have much time to discuss potential strategies or countermeasures. As a consequence, in sport environments, it is crucial to be able to implicitly coordinate actions and to have access to an effective communication system that enables team members to coordinate behaviors without extensive discussion. One critical factor that can influence coordination in these situations is the sharedness of mental models (Rouse et al., 1992; Tannenbaum, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 1996). Shared mental models are believed to enable team members to form adequate expectations about their teammates’ actions, and thus allow a team to implicitly coordinate actions and to adapt quickly to changes and demands in the environment.

Shared mental models

Mental models are knowledge structures or cognitive representations that people use to organize information (Smith-Jentsch, Zeisig, Acton, & McPherson, 1998). Mental models are used to describe, explain, and predict events (Rouse & Morris, 1986), and used to guide social interactions. Because people have different histories and experiences, their knowledge and opinions about some domain may differ (Hinsz, 1995; Rouse & Morris, 1986). Mental models are knowledge structures that help an individual understand how a system operates as well as to know what is expected from a system’s operation (Hinsz, 1995). For our purpose, we can see that a sport is a system, so athletes could have mental models about how a sport functions. Moreover, we can also see a team as a system so the members of the team would have mental models of how their team operates (Hinsz, 1995). As a knowledge structure, a mental model reflects people’s beliefs about how some system operates and functions. These beliefs relate one component of the system with another component. For example, an elaborate mental model of baseball would lead the second baseman to believe that if a ball was hit towards him, then the shortstop will cover second base. Likewise, a runner on first base will believe that he has to run to second base if a hit was a ground ball, but to hold up if it was a fly-ball. Experienced athletes will have a host of related beliefs about the sport, as well as their team and teammates which can be considered as mental models. These mental models do play vital roles in athletes’ performance in individual and team sports. For example, think-aloud protocols reveal that experts have more complex and refined mental representations than novices (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996), and are therefore faster and more accurate at recognizing and recalling typical patterns of a play (Starkes, 1987; Williams & Davids, 1995). In team sports, members’ mental models include beliefs, thoughts, and opinions about various aspects of the actions and interactions they undertake while playing. These beliefs might include a person’s knowledge and thoughts about how the sports works and about their teammates, what will happen next, what are important cues in the environment, and about their goals and roles (Hinsz et al., 1997). The team members’

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T. Reimer , E. S. Park, and V. B. Hinsz beliefs about the sports and the team are the elementary cognitions necessary for team members to communicate and coordinate with each other. One critical concern for sports teams is the degree to which team members’ beliefs and cognitions are shared. A related concern is the extent to which team members are able to understand and predict their teammates’ beliefs (Hinsz, 1995, 2004). Do all members of a team define the situation in the same way? What portion of the team agrees that a change in strategy is demanded by the changes in the situation? Do team members have adequate knowledge about their teammates? Another aspect of shared cognitions to consider is how members of teams share their cognitions. That is, how do different members of a team convey their cognitions to others? Shared cognitions reflect both of these topics; agreement about the information and conveying the information (Hinsz et al., 1997). Research suggests that this sharing of information is a critical feature of information processing in groups that can strongly affect the outcome and performance of groups (Hinsz et al., 1997; Tindale & Kameda, 2000; Tindale, Meisenhelder, Dykema-Engblade, & Hogg, 2001). Research on teams finds that effective performance in dynamic environments is possible when members have a common and mutual understanding of the task, their teammates’ roles and expertise, and the context in which they operate (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Tannenbaum et al., 1996). The mutual understanding of the task and situation allows teammates to develop adequate expectations regarding their teammates’ actions and decisions, and enables team members to adapt quickly to changes and demands in the environment (Rouse et al. 1992; Blickensderfer, CannonBowers, & Salas, 2000). However, shared mental models will not always influence team interaction and performance; nor will shared mental models always improve performance when they do have an influence. Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, and Cannon-Bowers (2000) proposed that under conditions that allow team members to freely communicate with one another, shared mental models will not impact coordination and performance. When teammates have the opportunity to plan strategies and discuss their future actions, they do not need to rely on preexisting knowledge. When overt communication between members is difficult, for example, because of excessive workloads, time pressures, or the motive to conceal intentions from the opposing team, teammates are prevented from engaging in explicit strategic planning. In these cases, shared mental models become crucial to successful team functioning because they allow members to predict the actions and needs of their teammates, and allow members to adjust their behaviors accordingly (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998; Rouse et al., 1992). For effective performance, the sharedness of mental models alone is generally not sufficient; it is also necessary that mental models be appropriate and valid as well. If team members share an error-prone or inappropriate mental model, coordinated actions may occur but successful task performance may be impeded (Hinsz, 1995; Reimer, Bornstein, & Opwis, 2005). To understand the influence of shared mental models on coordination, it is important to consider the numerous arenas where cognitive agreement of the team members should be examined. For example, teams may vary in the extent to which members share goals,

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Shared and Coordinated Cognition task representations, knowledge about the distribution of roles and responsibilities, and the evaluation of different tactics and strategies. Whereas diversity in knowledge, skills, and abilities might enhance performance because the team members’ individual roles require specific knowledge and skills, coordination is likely to be impaired if team members do not share knowledge about how the team functions and how the responsibilities are distributed in the team. Moreover, it is conceivable that sharing cognitions in one domain influences information processing and coordination in unique ways relative to the other domains. For example, if teammates share the overall objective of winning, cohesion may develop but coordination of individual actions may additionally require that team members share a mutual understanding of the various roles and responsibilities of the team members. We will next outline how the sharedness of mental models can affect coordination by discussing the different phases of the information processing model depicted in Figure 1. Specifically, we will focus on team member goals and roles and on the attention, selection, and anticipation phases. Although we believe that the decision phase is important to team performance, this area has been discussed in previous work and reviews (e.g., Guzzo & Salas, 1995; Tindale, Kameda, & Hinsz, 2003) and therefore will receive less attention in this article. Finally, we will discuss how feedback from one’s coach and one’s own teammates might affect coordination.

Goals

Goals are the aims, objectives, and outcomes that we hope result from our actions (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Locke & Latham, 1990). Goals shape our attention in motivated and selective ways. They impact how we process information. And goals influence what potential actions we perform. Consequently, it is important that team members’ goals are coordinated by complementing and matching each other. Ideally, team members agree upon and share basic team goals. Moreover, teams hope their member goals will complement each other and be congruent with the team goals. To achieve this, team members need to have adequate representations of their teammates’ individual goals. Research on teams indicates that performance is generally influenced by the degree team goals are shared (Swezey & Salas, 1992). Typically, sport teams have an overarching goal that is shared: winning. However, this goal can be construed in different ways. For example, some team members may have the goal of winning more games in a season relative to the last season, while other team members may share the goal of winning a championship. If teammates do not agree on which goal they want to pursue, then difficulties in coordination may occur. Consider a team that leads the league in American football. Because this team is well ahead of other teams, they are guaranteed home-field advantage during post-season playoffs, potentially giving them an edge to win the championship (Bray, 1999). If the quarterback’s goal of winning the current game is more salient than the goal of winning the championship, he may be more inclined to throw risky passes to his receivers. This would result in a lack of coordination if his teammates assume such a pass will not be thrown, because the receiver would be exposed to hits of defenders making him vulnerable to injuries.

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T. Reimer , E. S. Park, and V. B. Hinsz In addition, because individuals have multiple goals, such as personal and team goals, coordination losses may occur if there is a mismatch between the teammates’ individual goals and team goals. Typically, team members’ goals and outcomes are mutually interdependent (Gully et al., 2002). However, consider what might happen if this interdependence is low. For example, consider a basketball player who gets paid a monetary bonus for scoring a certain number of points in a season. If this player’s personal goal of receiving this bonus dominates the team goal of winning the game, then this player may be more inclined to shoot the ball in the hope of scoring. This could lead to coordination losses when teammates expect the player to do the more appropriate act of passing the ball rather than shooting. This example illustrates the importance of operating on shared goals, and importantly, on goals that are consistent with team goals. Related to the notion of shared goals are shared efficacy beliefs, which have also been shown to affect team coordination and performance (Gully et al., 2002). Collective efficacy refers to the degree to which teammates share the belief that they can win (Bandura, 1997; Feltz & Lirgg, 1998). Collective efficacy beliefs depict “the teams’ shared confidence in its ability to generate collective action and complete a sport task relative to a specific goal” (Magyar, Feltz, & Simpson, 2004, p. 136). Similarly, teamefficacy influences what actions members choose to do as a team, how much effort they exert during a task, and their degree of persistence when collective efforts fail to produce results (Bandura, 1997). A meta-analysis on the efficacy-performance relation supports the assertion that efficacy impacts goal setting, effort, and persistence (Gully et al., 2002). Even though perceived efficacy depends on prior team performance, it may predict future team behavior beyond the influence of a team’s prior success. Myers, Feltz, and Short (2004) conducted a longitudinal study in which they included past performance and found that perceptions of collective efficacy predicted subsequent offensive performance of collegiate football teams across weeks and across teams. Research reveals that this efficacy-performance relation at the team level depends on the extent to which the team members’ actions are interdependent (Ericsson, 2003). Interdependence moderates the positive relationship between team-efficacy and performance such that team-efficacy is more strongly related to performance when interdependence is high (Ericsson 2003; Gully et al., 2002). Gully et al. (2002) suggest that this may be because highly interdependent tasks and sports are likely to lead to the adoption of goals that facilitate cooperative strategies and coordination. Additionally, motivation to cooperate and assist one another should increase when personal goals match the team goals and when outcomes are interdependent. Moreover, it is important that group members have an adequate representation of their teammates’ individual goals. This knowledge will allow team members to recognize situations when goals are misaligned or incongruent. Knowledge about team goals and about the personal goals of one’s teammates are central features of members’ mental model of the team and team functioning.

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Shared and Coordinated Cognition

Roles

Roles within a team are similar to roles in a play. These positions are associated with a specific constellation of behaviors that are assumed to be characteristic of persons occupying the particular role (Biddle, 1979). Once cast in a role, group members tend to take on specific responsibilities, and perform certain actions and interact with members in particular ways. Therefore, roles structure and influence behavior by dictating the “part” members take as they interact. A factor that might affect team members’ goals and might strongly influence information processing and team coordination is role assignment. Athletes’ roles as offensive and defensive players on a soccer team will impact the specific goals they adopt. While they may share the overarching goal of winning, they will have different responsibilities that require different behaviors. Offensive players may have salient intentions of passing and shooting the ball, while defensive players may be more focused on clearing the ball and stopping the opposing offense. Appropriate role assignment can improve team coordination and performance. Because team sports consist of several different tasks (e.g., defense and offense), role assignment may enhance coordination through the development and implementation of a division-of-labor system. By assigning players to particular roles, coordination should be facilitated because ambiguity concerning who should be doing what will be reduced. If a player is assigned the role of a defender, she will know the responsibilities that accompany her role, and will not have to continually wonder whether her teammates are expecting her to be doing something else. Ideally, the team members’ roles are designed as a division of labor to complement each other and fit with the strategy the team wants to implement. Foremost, individual players must be able to execute their individual responsibilities. Thus, there should be a match between the individual’s skills and role assignment. Moreover, the team structure should allow for the provision of backup behavior and assistance. For coordination, it is important that team members have clear and shared expectations about what behaviors are expected from themselves, their teammates, and a shared understanding of how players’ behaviors influence one another. This sharedness can be achieved by understanding roles, and the responsibilities that accompany these roles. Coordination can be impaired if group members do not fully understand their own roles and the roles of their teammates. Research indicates that team members do not always have a clear understanding of their own roles. Role ambiguity is defined as a lack of clear, consistent expectations associated with one’s own position. Several studies demonstrate that team performance is negatively affected by role ambiguity (Beauchamp, Bray, Eys, & Carron, 2002, 2003). Across different domains, ambiguity has been shown to negatively affect perceived job satisfaction, increase anxiety and the willingness to leave an organization, and to decrease commitment and involvement in the workplace (Beard, 1999; Jackson & Schuler, 1985). In sports teams, role ambiguity will not only influence these variables, but will also impact the ability of teammates to correctly predict one’s actions. If a player does not have a clear understanding of what to do and when, then their behavior will be variable and unpredictable to their teammates. In highly interdependent situations, this will lead to an increase in miscommunication

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T. Reimer , E. S. Park, and V. B. Hinsz and a break down in coordination. This is one reason that teams may struggle when new players who have not been socialized are placed into a pre-existing team of veterans who already share a mental model of team functioning (cf. Eys, Carron, Beauchamp, & Bray, 2003). Role assignment may improve coordination and performance in teams if individuals understand their responsibilities and are able to perform them. In addition, team members’ personal goals and roles should be coordinated such that they complement each other in the pursuit of the specific team goals. Teams in which members have adequate mental models about the strategy and how individual roles and responsibilities fit into the team concept may be at an advantage for several reasons. Members in such a team will be better able to anticipate how their teammates will behave in a certain situation. This will enable members to notice when backup behavior is necessary. As a consequence, group members can assist each other faster and more efficiently.

Attention

One of the initial decisions an athlete makes is to decide on what cues to attend to, and where to gaze to capture the most important features within the environment (Tenenbaum, 2003). In the dynamic, fast-paced environments in which team sports occur, the team’s attention might be distributed among the members. Therefore, it is crucial that team members coordinate their attention processes. However, optimal coordination of member attention may be difficult to achieve. Athletes can vary in the visual search strategies that they choose to implement (e.g., target versus context control; Tenenbaum, 2003), and they may differ in their assessments of what cues are considered more or less relevant. Because teams consist of members who have different roles, and these roles serve different purposes, not all cues will be equally relevant to each team member. Nonetheless, there are several ways that coordination losses can be reduced. In a team, it will be natural and even beneficial for athletes to attend to different cues. Therefore, it may not be functional when teammates have completely shared priorities of what information should be attended to, but rather that they have a shared understanding of which attention strategies are applied by which teammates. If all members of a hockey team only paid attention to the actions of the star player of the opposing team, then they would not ultimately be successful. But, if teammates have a shared understanding of each others roles and responsibilities, they would know who is attending to what and why. This type of shared knowledge would enhance coordination because teammates would be more coordinated in how they distribute their overall attentional focus (Hinsz et al., 1997). Team performance should be improved because team members will be able to divide the attentional demands appropriately, allowing them to devote more of their attention to their own duties. The distribution of attentional demands is analogous to conditions in which a transactive memory system is likely to develop (Wegner, 1986). A transactive memory system concerns the shared ways information is encoded, stored, and retrieved in group member memories, and the communication processes that take place in the group to access this information. Through the development of a transactive memory system, information

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Shared and Coordinated Cognition to be remembered is systematically distributed to various members of a group or team, oftentimes based on each person’s role or perceived level of expertise. Rather than being burdened with encoding all incoming information, transactive memory systems free members to encode only the information they are personally responsible for, and then for the remaining information, to only encode and store who knows what (Moreland, 1999). Team members can then be relied on to provide that information when it is needed. By effectively dividing up the information that is to be remembered, a team can enhance its collective memory. In addition, team members will exert less effort deliberately storing information that may be irrelevant to their particular role within the team. However, there is a potential cost in developing a transactive memory system or in dividing a teams’ attention focus based on roles. For example, if a transactive memory system operates in a group, and one member of the group leaves, then the information that was encoded by that individual will no longer be accessible to the remaining members (Moreland, 1999). Because the remaining members only stored who knows the information, rather than the information itself, they will not have access to the information and will not be able to retrieve it when the source is no longer available. In terms of sharing goals concerning what information should be attended to, if teammates distribute this load completely and do not overlap in their goals, they will be less able to recognize instances when fellow teammates need assistance. Because they will not be attending to cues that are relevant to their teammates, their awareness of the situation will be incomplete. If there is no overlap in goals, or back-up structure in place, then teammates will not monitor the environment for cues that are relevant for their fellow teammates, and will be ill prepared to define the situations when their teammates require help. It may thus be optimal for teammates to have a shared understanding of each others roles and responsibilities, and also to share to some degree the strategies of what information from the environment should be attended to. For example, a defender might not bother with attending to all of the information that concerns the offensive players, but perhaps should attend to cues that are relevant to his fellow defenders. Sharing attention strategies and goals should relate to team coordination because unless there is a degree of overlap in the attention phase, coordinated behaviors will be difficult to achieve because the information that is selected and the actions that are defined appropriate depend on what information is initially attended to and processed.

Selection

After information from the environment is perceived, it is then processed. At this point, the athlete selects information and focuses on the information that is relevant to his or her goals and objectives, and to future events. Information that is deemed irrelevant is ignored. On the basis of the selected information, the athlete modifies her mental model of the situation by incorporating the newly acquired information. Because knowledge about one’s team and team functioning, as well as knowledge about one’s opponent and opponent team’s functioning, are contained in the mental models, the athlete will be prepared to anticipate upcoming actions and events.

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T. Reimer , E. S. Park, and V. B. Hinsz Shared mental models are important during the selection phase for several reasons. First, because the selected information gets incorporated into one’s mental model of the situation, what gets selected influences one’s interpretation of the situation. Therefore, if teammates do not select critical cues in the environment, how they view the situation may vary. Even though the main focus of attention may vary among team members, it is important that central cues that affect the team’s strategy are processed by all team members who are involved in the respective action. If teammates see that one of the opposing players is slightly injured, but only one of the teammates selects and processes this relevant information, then the strategies that they choose to implement may vary. The player who selects this cue may consider the consequences of taking an aggressive stance, and may weigh this option favorably, thus being inclined to adopt an aggressive strategy to take advantage of the opposing team’s weakness. If the teammate who did not select this cue does not in turn alter his or her strategy as well, then their behaviors may not be coordinated. In team sports, members must have adequate representations of their teammates and their roles. If teammates do not agree on what cues and information are relevant, then they will form differing mental models and will be less accurate at anticipating each others actions and needs. For example, if a defender in soccer is watching an opponent confront her teammate, and fails to process the cue that signals the oncoming opponent is about to lob the ball over her teammates head, she will not anticipate the fact that the opponent will successfully pass by her fellow defender. Thus, she will not be prepared to reposition herself on the field, creating a hole in the defense. This will result in a lack of team coordination if the teammate expects the defender to be repositioned to meet the opponent who is retrieving the lobbed ball. Shared mental models are important to the selection phase and impact coordination because the information that gets selected directly influences which behavioral alternatives are anticipated and evaluated.

Anticipation

A central function of mental models is that they allow an athlete to build expectations and to anticipate consequences of actions. Studies show that abilities to anticipate intentions and behaviors are related to expertise (Ward, Williams, & Bennett, 2002; Williams & Burwitz, 1993). Experts typically have more elaborated representations of a game which enables them to make faster and more appropriate predictions than novices (see Starkes and Ericsson, 2003, for various examples). For example, Ward and Williams (2003) studied the development of perceptual and cognitive skills in soccer and found that both the ability to anticipate subsequent actions (i.e., appropriate use of contextual information) and knowledge of the potential array of future actions (i.e., integration of expectations stored in memory) were vital components of experts’ performance. In team sports, it is crucial that team members be able to predict their teammates’ preferences and behaviors. Theorists seem to agree that the formation of a team mental model and shared expectations are central elements to the development of team coordination in dynamic environments (e.g., Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Rouse et al., 1992; Tannenbaum et al., 1996). Accurate mental models must be shared so that members

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Shared and Coordinated Cognition can develop similar predictions and expectations about their fellow teammates, the task demands, and the environment in which they are performing. The ability to anticipate teammates’ information and coordination demands are what allows a team to coordinate and function effectively (Tannenbaum et al., 1996). This is precisely why team training frequently has the overarching goal of fostering the shared understanding of the task structures, team members’ roles, and the processes that lead to and facilitate coordination. After relevant information is selected from the environment and processed, the athlete can generate various action alternatives and then anticipate the consequences of these potential actions. Mental models of the task, own team, and the opponents’ team will influence the anticipation process by shaping which alternatives get generated, and by shaping the perceived consequences of these actions. Shared cognitions and mental models impact coordination during the anticipation phase because the more teammates overlap in the consequences that they generate, the more likely they are to reach similar decisions concerning what actions and behaviors are appropriate. This process impacts the shaping of expectations, which need to be shared to achieve coordination. Consider the following situation in which teammates do not have a shared understanding of the sport. If one player on a tennis team thinks that the ball will be lobbed up in the air when the opponent hits it with her racquet face angled upwards, but her teammates thinks that that particular angle of the racquet face will result in a low and fast hit ball, then the teammates will be anticipating different shots from their opponent. Even if they initially selected the same cue to focus on, such as the racquet face of their opponent, coordination will not be achieved unless they both share an understanding of the influence of this cue. Because they do not share cognitions about how the angle of the racquet face impacts one’s shot, they will be expecting different outcomes. The player who expects a lob may therefore position herself to receive such a shot, while her teammate may shift to an inappropriate position on the court. This may result in a lack of team coordination because neither teammate will be where they expect each other to be. However, this example also shows that it is only functional to have shared mental models to the degree that they are adequate. If both players expect that the ball to be low and fast, their behaviors might match their mutual expectations but might yield poor performance (Reimer et al., 2005; Reimer, Opwis, & Bornstein, 2002). To facilitate coordination, it is also important for teammates to have a shared understanding of each others’ strengths and weaknesses (Tenenbaum, 2003). This allows them to appropriately anticipate actions because team members will know how players are inclined to behave, and will be able to anticipate when a teammate is more or less likely to need assistance. By knowing how players will behave, and by sharing this knowledge, expectations of potential actions will be similar. Again, imagine a doubles team in tennis. If Player A struggles with his backhand shot, he may choose to defer some shots that come to his backhand. If his teammate, Player B, is unaware of this weakness, he will not be prepared to move to the appropriate position to meet the ball: When Player A considers the response of hitting the oncoming ball with his backhand, he may anticipate that the consequence will be an erroneous return. Conversely, if Player B is unaware of his

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T. Reimer , E. S. Park, and V. B. Hinsz teammate’s weakness, he may anticipate a successful shot. Therefore, in the subsequent stage of information processing, their varying expectations may result in diverging evaluations of the same behavior. This will result in a lack of coordination because if Player A decides to defer the return shot to Player B, Player B may not be in position to make an optimal response because he is expecting Player A to hit the ball. This example also demonstrates that it is likely to be advantageous to have a shared mental model of the opposing team. If teammates have a mutual representation of how the opposing team operates, and how the actions of the opposing team influence one’s own team, then they will be better able to anticipate the responses and needs of their teammates. This is most likely why teams often study and review films of their opponent prior to a match. Imagine an opposing tennis player who is very skilled at dropping the ball close to the net. If teammates are aware of this strength in their adversary, then they will be more adept at anticipating the situations in which the opponent will hit drop shots. If Teammate A hits the ball such that a drop shot from the opponent is possible, then when Teammate A and B consider the potential actions of their opponent, they will both at least anticipate the potential for a drop shot return. Having a shared understanding will facilitate coordination because if they both interpret the situation similarly, then when one player advances to the net to meet the ball, his teammate can appropriately position himself to cover the court accordingly. This again, illustrates the highly dynamic nature of the team sports environment. In terms of team coordination, it might be easier to coordinate behaviors if there is not much variation in the team’s strategies because the development of shared cognitions will be facilitated. However, to the extent that the strategy of a team is easy to understand and apply for its own members, it is also easy for the opponents to perceive. Thus, there are trade-offs that accompany the sharing of cognitions. While teams should aim to share cognitions within their own team to a certain degree, they should also avoid being predictable to their opponents. Having both a few and simple strategies will facilitate the development of shared mental models within a team, but this approach may also make the team’s strategies easy to predict and defeat. A potential countermeasure consists of developing a model about the opponent’s model of oneself (i.e., a mental model of the opponents’ mental model of you). While predicting the opponent’s model of oneself seems like a peculiar process, empirical evidence suggests that more accurate modeling of an adversary can assist competitive success (Burns & Vollmeyer, 1998). Even though this might be an infinitive process, three levels of modeling have been shown to be useful: 1) knowledge of one’s own intentions, 2) second-order beliefs about intentions from others, and 3) third-order beliefs about the opponent’s model of one’s own beliefs. Research shows that the adequacy of third-order beliefs can be critical for success in adversarial situations (Burns & Vollmeyer, 1998). Anticipations play a crucial role in fast-paced team sports in which athletes frequently need to respond to actions and to develop intra- and inter-team coordination without the use of verbal communication. If verbal communication is used to facilitate team coordination, or used to give directions on how to defend against opponents, then the opposing team will have the opportunity to make strategic adjustments. Verbal

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Shared and Coordinated Cognition communication may also impede one’s ability to react in a timely fashion, particularly in dynamic and fast-paced environments (Tenenbaum, 2003). Shared mental models are adaptive because they facilitate coordination through shared expectations, and reduce the necessity of relying on explicit communication (Tannenbaum et al., 1996).

Decision

After potential actions and their consequences are anticipated, the athlete has to make a decision. In sports, decisions typically concern attention allocation and action choices. Athletes may also make decisions about acquiring additional information when more information is needed to anticipate the effects of an action. By allowing for refinement and modifications of behaviors, athletes will have the option to interrupt and alter their course of action when it is unsuitable or no longer optimal (Tenenbaum, 2003). Planning should occur when attentional demands are low, facilitating the anticipation process (Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew, 2002; McPherson, 2000). In team sports, members must additionally consider if an action is congruent with their role-specific goals and the overall team goals and tactic. Because some of the members’ goals will be related to a specific tactical maneuver, members must adjust their individual goals when the team changes its tactic. For example, in basketball, when a team is leading towards the end of the game, with each possession they may want to take as much time off of the clock as possible. This team tactic requires that some players adjust their individual goals and focus on moving and passing the ball rather than on aggressively scoring. Because of the dynamic and adversarial nature of sports, athletes constantly have to make tactical decisions depending on the game situation, their own teammates’, and their opponents’ actions. As a consequence, crucial for team performance is to coordinate when a change of the overall tactical strategy of a team is necessary. This includes that team members coordinate about when to communicate with each other (Reimer et al., 1997). Thus, in actuality, an athlete is typically confronted with several decision tasks simultaneously even though the information-processing framework prototypically distinguishes different phases that result in one action. Shared mental models impact team coordination during the decision phase because the more teammates agree on their evaluations of different actions, the more likely they are to agree on their decisions. Teammates that have a mutual interpretation of the situation are more likely to anticipate similar consequences of various actions. However, even if teammates consider the same action alternatives, and anticipate the same consequences for each of these alternatives, if they diverge in their evaluations, then they will incorrectly guess each others’ intentions and behaviors. For example, if a defender in soccer receives the ball, she might consider either clearing the ball or passing the ball to a nearby teammate. Her teammate might also consider these two action alternatives. If the defender with the ball concludes that the better option will be to pass the ball, but her teammate concludes that the better option would be to clear the ball, then when the ball is passed the teammate may not be ready to receive it because she expects her teammate to clear the ball down the field.

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T. Reimer , E. S. Park, and V. B. Hinsz Team decision making is a coordinated activity. Team members must evaluate the potential alternative actions, hopefully in similar ways such that it is clear which action to execute. To the degree team members share cognitions about the situation, consensus about the team’s choice should be easier (Hinsz, 2004). However, given that team members may have different roles and responsibilities, they may have attended to different cues and selected to focus on different features of the task environment. In this case, divergent perspectives of the situation may make it difficult to agree on the course of action the team should pursue. Nevertheless, shared and coordinated cognitions that are applied in the decision making phase will make it easier to implement strategies and courses of action (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993).

Action

In sports, actions are what matters because they determine the outcome of the game. However, as we have illustrated, it is important to recognize that actions result from the cognitions that precede them. Direct evidence supports this claim. Research indicates that differences between experts and novices in information processing appear to anticipate differences in actual behavior. For example, Pherson and Kernodle (2003) showed that skill-based differences in problem representations between experts and novices in tennis were consistent with those retrieved by the players during actual competition. Their participants were initially presented with a set of scenarios. Experts accessed information beyond what was presented in the scenarios and developed a representation that included more tactical components. Subsequently, in actual competition, over 80% of experts’ serve and shot selections were considered tactical in the context of a given situation according to the players’ position, the opponent’s position, and position of the ball. In contrast, less than 50% of novices’ serve and shot selections were considered tactical. One reason expert sport teams might coordinate their actions more efficiently and optimally is because experts are more likely to have shared cognitions and more elaborated mental models about the team. Not only will experts have a more clear and appropriate understanding of the situation (McPherson & Kernodle, 2003), they will also often have less variability in the actions they consider. Novices who are not well coached may not be aware of which strategies and behaviors are more or less effective. For example, novices may not always recognize when time is a crucial factor in a game. If a team of novices is losing a game, they might not be aware of when it is necessary to start playing more aggressively. Or, they might switch to an aggressive strategy earlier than needed. If novices do not have an accurate understanding of when time is more or less of a factor, their strategies and behavior will be more variable than those of experts who do have a clear understanding. Similarly, if novices are more variable in their assessments of what information is relevant, are more variable in their anticipations of the consequences of potential actions, and are more variable in their evaluations of these potential actions, then their mental models will be less shared than a team of experts. Therefore, novices will have a more difficult time anticipating each others’ intentions and actions, which will increase miscommunication and decrease coordination.

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Shared and Coordinated Cognition In team sports, actions result in observable behaviors that are generally performed to fulfill goals. Information processing dictates which actions are pursued by each member of a team. We argue that because shared mental models influence the phases of information processing, they are important to consider when discussing coordination. Imagine two basketball players running down the court on a fast break. They have passed by all but one of the defenders. As they are running down the court, they are collecting and processing information. If they both recognize that the defender is moving backwards and is a little off balance, and they both consider this as a relevant cue, then they may coordinate their actions. The player without the ball may see this as an opportunity to receive an alley-oop pass, and may run past the defender towards the hoop. If they have a shared interpretation of the situation, the player dribbling the ball will be able to anticipate his teammates’ intentions and will understand that his teammate is expecting such a pass. The alley-oop pass will only be successful if the defender commits to the player with the ball, so the pass should be thrown only after the defender makes this decision. Once the defender commits, then the pass is lobbed towards the basket, and the teammate receives the pass in the air and proceeds to score. In this situation, shared cognitions are important because both teammates have to understand the play. Both have to first recognize that the situation permits the opportunity for the alley-oop pass. Then, both teammates have to be aware of and anticipate exactly when the pass will be thrown. Furthermore, they should have a shared understanding of exactly where the ball should be thrown so that the pass can be received. Because the player receiving the ball often has to jump towards the hoop as the pass is thrown, anticipation of the teammates actions must be accurate. With the alley-oop pass, if timing between teammates is not coordinated, the pass will most likely be missed and end up out of bounds. Shared cognitions are necessary for this type of play because its execution requires that the teammates do not communicate explicitly. If the passer signals to the receiver that the ball will be lobbed towards the hoop, the defender can easily reposition himself to either intercept the pass or to block the path of the receiver. So, the player passing the ball often has to look away from the receiver to fool the defender. This example illustrates why shared cognitions and shared mental models are important for coordinated actions.

Feedback

A result of a team’s actions during sports play is feedback regarding those actions. Feedback impacts information processing because it serves as information about the relative effectiveness and appropriateness of the decisions and actions that were made. Feedback can be received in practice, during the game, and after the game. This feedback can be delivered in various forms from numerous sources, such as the coach, teammates, and the opposing players. It is through this feedback that players can learn more about their thoughts and actions as well as develop more expertise. When shared mental models of teamwork processes are accurate, the influence of feedback on the team correction process will be enhanced (Smith-Jentsch et al. 1998). If teammates share accurate mental models, they will be better able to (a) identify

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T. Reimer , E. S. Park, and V. B. Hinsz performance trends and diagnose deficiencies, (b) focus their practice accordingly on specific goals, and (c) generalize the lessons they learn to new situations. Therefore, it is important that team coaches, trainers, and leaders facilitate the development of accurate and shared mental models of teamwork processes and functioning (Smith-Jentsch et al., 1998). Although much has been written about coaching, we next discuss it through shared cognition theory in order to illustrate how this approach can augment and improve extant work in this area.

Coaching

Coaches provide important functions in team sports. They are responsible for developing the mechanisms that facilitate coordination among teammates. Thus, the coach creates a framework within which deliberate styles of practice and performance occur (Deakin & Cobley, 2003). With novice players, the majority of time spent in practice relates to technical and skill-based instructions (Deakin & Cobley, 2003). With more advanced athletes, the time spent on instructional advice declines and is replaced with tactical instructions. Interestingly, case studies show that coaches frequently spend an equal amount of time emphasizing team-specific and opponent-specific tactical instructions (see Deakin & Cobley, 2003). This suggests that analyzing an opponent’s play can form a mental model of the opponent. This mental model can then be used to formulate a number of possible response alternatives that each athlete could pursue in the upcoming competition (Deakin & Cobley, 2003). During a game, an important source of feedback for coordination are teammates. Feedback may foster perspective taking, which, in turn, can improve team members’ accuracy in predicting their partners’ subsequent behaviors (Reimer, 2001). Feedback can also foster the development of a shared mental model because expectations and explanations of the task and roles become increasingly shared (Blickensderfer, CannonBowers, & Salas, 1997). Thus, in future games teammates are able to anticipate each others’ actions more readily. When miscommunication occurs, players frequently look to one another to diagnose where the coordination process collapsed. In many sports, when one player passes the ball to another and the receiver does not move into place to receive the pass, the players frequently confer as soon as possible. They communicate what their intentions were so that they can minimize future miscommunications. This type of feedback and communication facilitates coordination because teammates essentially share their thoughts in attempts to “be on the same page.” By having the coach explicitly categorizing the potential actions of one’s teammates and opponents, the number of possible behaviors that might occur during a game can be identified. And, by providing instructions about what strategies, actions, and responses are appropriate under specific conditions, teammates can form clear expectations, facilitating the sharing of cognitions (Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Milanovich, 1999). This may occur prior to a game, or even after a game. Frequently, teams will review tapes of their performance in a debriefing session. By watching these tapes and reviewing decisions, coaches and teammates can discuss what behaviors and responses were appropriate and inappropriate. Through this type of process, players can then develop

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Shared and Coordinated Cognition more refined representations of the game situations which should ultimately help them to make faster and better decisions (Ericsson, 2003). Coaches can also enhance team members’ ability to form adequate expectations and to anticipate what will happen next in a game by clearly defining team members’ roles. Fletcher and Hanton (2003) suggest that individual and team goals should be discussed openly within the team, thus minimizing any feelings of disenchantment at a later stage. If everyone knows his or her role within the team, then it is more likely that the team will run effectively and smoothly. According to Beauchamp, Bray, Eys, and Carron (2005), the coach is the primary source for defining role-related expectations in sport teams. We have highlighted the importance of clear and shared expectations on coordination. From this basis, role ambiguity is likely to be an important problem in team sports. While role ambiguity declines over the course of a season (Eys et al., 2003), coaches and teammates should be active in addressing this issue from the start. Explicit clarification regarding player positions, responsibilities, leadership expectations, and an understanding of one’s role within the interacting framework of the team should be emphasized. One potential cost to having a team operate on a system dependent on clearly defined and distinct roles is that members may not be highly inter-changeable (Moreland & Levine, 1988). This may become a problem when a player gets injured, replaced, or leaves the team. However, this problem can be minimized by having substitute players understand the necessity for them to comprehend the system. If substitute players are properly trained and develop accurate mental models of how the team functions, then they should be prepared to step in when needed. In sports, because processing goals and objectives frequently change, feedback is also instrumental for coordination because it can be used to inform members of the team when changes are occurring. For optimal coordination, teammates should periodically monitor one another and the coach to ensure that they receive this vital information. By monitoring ones’ team and the coach, teammates are more likely to have shared goals and objectives because they will have a mutual understanding of what type of strategies need to be implemented. If players all see the coach urging them to hurry, then they will all realize that time is of the essence. If they fail to notice these cues, or if only some players notice these cues, then coordination will be more difficult to achieve. To minimize miscommunication and to facilitate the sharing of cognitions, it may also be instrumental for teams to develop a set of shared terminology (Levine & Moreland, 1991; Tannenbaum et al., 1996). Because sports are often fast-paced, feedback from the coach and other players may be most effective if it can be delivered quickly and efficiently. By having shared terminology that can be easily understood, yet incomprehensible to one’s opponents, then feedback can be incorporated effectively and coordination enhanced. Many sports, such as baseball, already incorporate the use of elaborate systems of nonverbal signals to convey information.

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Conclusions

Team sports take place in dynamic environments that require athletes to be adaptive and responsive. Because in team settings players are also interdependent, coordination among members is necessary for effective performance. We argue that the cognitions that team members share plays an important role on how teams and their members behave during sporting events. To further this consideration of cognition in team sports, we offer the perspective of these teams as information processors, outlined in Figure 1. The information processing framework is useful in understanding how shared cognitions have an influence on each of the phases that precede an athlete’s decision to act. We believe this perspective provides a host of benefits when considering coordination in sports teams. While shared cognitions increase coordination, other benefits are also likely to occur. It seems plausible that the more teammates have a shared understanding of their situation, the more cohesive the team will be. When athletes speak of “united” teams, they may be referring to a sense of “we-ness” that is felt (Carron & Hausenblas, 1998; Carron, Widmeyer, & Brawley 1985). We do not suggest that shared cognitions and a high level of cohesion have only benefits (see Carey, 2005, and Hardy, Eys, & Carron, 2005, for potential costs of high cohesion). For example, shared mental models may only improve performance to the extent that they are adequate (Hinsz, 1995; Reimer et al., 2005). However, we suggest that this feeling of “we-ness” is often a result of coordinated actions and cognitions, and their consequences. When a soccer player positions himself to receive a pass without even having to indicate to his teammate where he is going and when he will get there, and when he receives the pass at the precise moment he expected to and then scores a goal, those coordinated cognitions and actions might make the teammates feel “united.” If this is true, then it makes sense that the Greek soccer team could win the European soccer championship without any international stars on their roster. Team coordination and effective performance may be less about star individuals, and more about shared cognitions among team members.

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Acknowledgements

Preparation of this article was supported by grants to the third author from the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (F49620-02-1-0234 and F49620-03-1-0353).

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