Sharing Perspectives Richard J. Boland, Anil K. Maheshwarl
Jr.
in Distributed David
Decision
G. Schwartz
Making
Ramkrishnan
V. Tenkasl
Dov Te’eni Featherhead School of Management Department.of Management Information and Decision Systems Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, Ohio 44106-7235
[email protected]
Department of Computer Engineering& Science and Center for Automation & Intelligent Systems Research Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, Ohio 44106-7071
ABSTRACT
like organization that is able to cope with changing tasks, technologies, and environments - what is called a learning organization or an organization of the future [20, 25, 39].
Complex organizations are characterized by distributed decision making, and require a sharing of perspectives among distributed decision makers if they are to coordinate activity and adapt to changing circumstances. This paper explains the process of perspective taking and its roles in human communication, mutual trust, and organizational learning. SPIDER is a software environment for enriching communication among managers by improving their ability to represent and exchange understandings of the situations they face. Cognitive maps linked to underlying assumptions are used as a basis for sharing their perspectives and enabling coordination of distributed decision making.
Decentralized organizations with differentiated sub units require mechanisms of integration, Organization sub units develop unique perspectives in response to the different tasks, goals and environments they face, and these different perspectives reveal ambiguity, paradox and conflict [32]. Integration is not achieved by a simple summation of different perspectives, but is instead found through dialogue in which conflicts are recognized and discussed, Lawrence and Lorsch [23] identify many of the ways that integration can be achieved, and they all ideally involve a sharing of perspectives among the differentiated sub units. Organizational arrangements such as liaisons, ad hoc problem solving teams and matrix structures are typical approaches to achieving integration among differentiated units, and each hopes to encourage the diverse perspectives within an organization to be surfaced and discussed more openly,
KEYWORDS Distributed organizational
decision learning,
making, perspective taking, mutual trust, cognitive maps.
INTRODUCTION Complex organizations are composed of many diverse, interdependent work groups such as product development teams, manufacturing planning, and marketing which all have unique decision domains, Managers act autonomously within their domains, yet they are affected by each others’ actions. We are designing computer support for the coordination of decision making in this type of complex organization, and ultimately, the support of organizational learning. We are not concerned with highly bureaucratic organizations which presume a stable task, technology and environment, and which control themselves through strict adherence to standard operating procedures. Instead, we are concerned with the kind of less hierarchical, more networkPermission granted direct
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This paper explores some of the issues involved in sharing perspectives among actors in a complex organization, and describes SPIDER, a software tool we are developing to enable perspective sharing. SPIDER is a software environment for enriching communication by improving each manager’s ability to represent an understanding of the situation he or she faces, and exchange it with others. We are working with business unit planners of a large manufacturing company, who will use SPIDER to exchange and critique their perspectives of the market they face in order to better understand hth the market place and their interdependencies.
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DECISION
MAKING
Much effort in computer supported cooperative work is oriented toward the phenomenon of a group decision [14, 24, 13, 31], A group decision is made by a set of actors who work together to achieve a common purpose in a very immediate and concrete way. There is typically a single,
for Computing requires
Weatherhead School of Management Department of Organization Behavior Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, Ohio 44106-7235
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identifiable outcome from the group process: a paper is written, a diagnosis is agreed upon, a budget is allocated, or a policy is set.
THE
PERSPECTIVE
TAKING
PROCESS
It has been argued that assumptions about what others know (and hence what is mutually known) are necessarily tentative and probabilistic. Because these assumptions are based on a variety of sources of information that will vary in credibility and relevance, perspective taking at any point in time can be viewed as tentative hypotheses that participants continuously modify and reformulate on the basis of additional evidence [27]. Each communicator acts in response to the hypotheses she has constructed through perspective taking, and revises them based on the outcomes.
In contrast to groups, decentralized organizations are composed of multiple autonomous actors in a distributed decision environment. Brehmer distinguishes distributed decision making from a group decision process in that the former concerns a situation “too complex for one person to understand in its entirety” [4, p. 3]. Agents in a distributed decision making setting “have limited models of the problem as a whole, and,.. may never achieve a global understanding of the problem” [4, p. 3].
Although many conceptualizations of the communication process assert the centrality of perspective taking as the basis for taking each other’s knowledge and background into account, there has been surprisingly little discussion of the process by which this might be accomplished [271.
Distributed decision making involves a set of actors who are autonomous within their sphere of concern, and whal act independently based upon their own understanding of the situation they confront, but who recognize that they have interdependencies among themselves. Coordination in a distributed decision setting is more likely to emerge when the autonomous agents are able to take their interdependencies into account in deciding on their independent actions. This requires a sharing of tlheir different perspectives among themselves, in a process of perspective taking.
Clark and Marshall [7] describe several heuristics that speakers and listeners might use to establish their murual knowledge or the common ground of knowledge that they share, and know that they share. One such heuristic is the linguistic co-presence heuristic, in which, anything said at time T during the course of a conversation can be mutually assumed to be known at time T+l. However, others have argued that the reasoning communicators employ to assess what they and their co-participants mutually know is much more complex than such simple heuristics suggest [27]. But even with this simple heuristic there is a deep underlying problem, since the thing said at time T is a string of words, and what is assumed to be mutually held at time T+l is the meaning of that string, which may differ radically between communicators, This is the fundamental distinction between a signal which, by convention, indicates a specified action or objec~ and a symbol, which always carries a surplus of metaphorical referent and possible meanings [18].
PERSPECTIVES Much of social behavior is predicated upon assumptions an actor makes about the knowledge, beliefs, and motives of others. This process of perspective taking, is fundamental: in any communication, the knowing of what others know is a necessary component [3, 6, 22]. As Brown [5] observed, effective communicating requires that the point of view of the other be realistically imagined. Others such as Rommetveit have affirmed this poin~ “An essential component of communicative competence in a pluralistic social world...is our capacity to adopt the Perspectives of different others” [33, p. 126].
The task of assessing the knowledge held in common by members of a community, such as managers in an organization, is a complex one, and involves a variety of inferential and judgmental processes. Individuals may utilize a variety of knowledge structures, such as schemata, stereotypes, and inference heuristics to estimate what others know. Such structures can facilitate the task of drawing inferences, but they also can induce systematic errors and biases [21, 30]. For example, an actor may use the availability heuristic to assess what others know. The ready availability of his own perspective may lead him to overestimate the likelihood that the perspective will be shared by others. This false consensus effect, in which subjects assume that others are more similar to themselves than is actually the case [34], is a form of bias particularly relevant to the perspective taking process.
The fundamental importance of taking the other’s point of view into account is seen in Mead [27] who referred to itas taking the attitude of the other and equated our ability to be fully human with our ability to maintain an inmer conversation with a generalized other. Messages are formulated to be understood by a specific audience, and in order to be comprehensible they must take into acccmnt what that audience does and does not know, such as their knowledge, beliefs, preferences, suppositions and the like. Coordinated behavior of most kinds, including bargaining and similar structured interactions, requires that participants plan their own moves in anticipation of what their partner’s motives are likely to be [9]. Festinger’s [12] social comparison theory postulates that people evaluate their own abilities and beliefs by comparing them with how they assume abilities and beliefs are distributed in their reference population. Predicting the other’s moves requires extensive assumptions about what the other knows, wants,, or believes, which is the process of perspective taking.
Steedman and Johnson-Laird have proposed that “the speaker assumes that the hearer knows everything that the speaker knows about the world and about the conversation, unless there is some evidence to the contrary” [40 p. 129]. This heuristic should lead to overestimates of the extent to
307
which a speaker’s knowledge is shared by others, and studies support the existence of such a bias [10, 27].
process of learning, individuals first engage in a dialogue with their own representations, to help them self-reflect about their situation, developing improved understandings of it and of their role in effecting it. They also engage in dialogues with others in order to improve their self understandings, discover how others understand the situation, and understand how they interdepend in a larger organizational sense.
SPIDER, the software system we are developing, is designed to facilitate the perspective taking process by enabling actors to depict their understanding of a situation and exchange it with others. SPIDER enables each actor to build a cognitive map of the factors that influence his sphere of concern, and to link each factor to the documents (text, spreadsheets, graphs) that provide its background assumptions. A cognitive map is a directed graph whose nodes represent concepts or factors in the actor’s decision domain, and whose arcs represent cause-effect relationships between source and destination nodes. Thus, SPIDER is a tool for portraying an actor’s view of the situation with multiple layers of context so that others may better know what that decision maker knows when communication takes place.
Our view of the process of learning in distributed decision making derives from the work of Argyris and Schon [1]. They characterize the behaviors-in-use by most managers as self-sealing and inhibitive to learning. Most managers, they observe, develop patterns of interaction with others that try to keep themselves in control, try to impose their will on others, and try to ‘win’ at the expense of others. As a result, valid data is not produced, assumptions are not tested, and important feelings and preferences are suppressed. They label this interaction pattern as model 1 behavior.
Weick and Bougon [43] suggest that building a cognitive map can be evocative for the map creator, as well as informative to its recipient. The effectiveness of the cognitive mapping model is well documented and appears in the literature under a variety of names, including cause maps, influence diagrams, and belief nets. Creating cognitive maps can reveal personal cause and effect logic, which in turn forces the individual to confront the reasonableness and validity of previously tacit cause-effect assumptions. A cognitive map provides an occasion to think carefully, deeply and deliberately about a situation. Knowledge of a cause map gives knowledge about an organization. As Weick and Bougon put ic “The important thing to remember about a cause map is that it is the organization... The cause map contains the structure, the process, and the raw materials from which agr~ments and conflicts are built when people coordinate action” [43, p. 132]
They propose their model 2 as an alternative set of behaviors, that is more likely to result in mutually beneficial learning. In model 2 behaviors, each manager is recognized as an origin of valid knowledge, inquiry is seen as jointly produced through open interaction, and decisions are the result of free, informed choice by each individual. l%e availability of valid data is the key difference between model 1 and model 2 behavior patterns. In model 1, managers communicate inferences without explicit reference to the particular incident(s) or facts which have led them to that conclusion. They also make inquiries of others without revealing their background ultimate intention. In both giving and therefore, managers instigate a withholding relevant data, failing to being questioned, and inhibiting learning.
The uses of cognitive maps are quite diverse, beginning with Axelrod [2] using cognitive mapping as a tool for understanding political decision making, and extending to Cropper, Eden and Ackerman [8] applying computer-based cognitive maps to examine and compare conflicting accounts of an event. Cognitive maps have been encoded into matrices to allow quantitative analysis of a decision maker’s logic [41], Uses such as information requirements analysis [28], knowledge engineering and expert knowledge analysis [29, 36], and medical technology assessment [38] provide further evidence of the representational adequacy of the cognitive map. Our work addresses the use of the cognitive map as a graphic representation tool to aid in the communication of understandings among decision makers.
ORGANIZATIONAL
understanding and receiving messages, chain reaction of open themselves to the possibility for
Model 2 behavior, by contrast, emphasizes that inferences are always communicated along with the concrete incident(s) or particular facta on which they are based, and that inquiries of others are always accompanied by a statement of background understandings and preferences so that the intention of the inquiry can be more accurately apprehended and responded to. Overlaying the emiched contextual information that model 2 behavior includes in each interaction is an attitude of hypothesis testing and an openness to a challenge of the data, assumptions or interpretations that have led to a particular conclusion. Model 2 behavior, therefore, begins to resemble the type of learning process we associate with a scientific community. But instead of studying nature with a stance of objectivity, the managers are studying their organization and its environment with an explicit awareness of their own role as agents who transform both the organization and its environment through their actions. Conflict among perspectives leads to degenerative, self-sealing behavior under model 1, but leads to constructive problem resolution under model 2.
LEARNING
Work in organizations is profoundly social [26]. This is particularly true for that subset of work in organizations that is of interest to developmental efforts in computer supported cooperative work [35]. Distributed decision making, as a type of social interaction, will be effective to the extent that it is a social process of learning. In this
308
SPIDER, as a perspective sharing software, is designed to provide many of the features enabling a model 2 behavior pattern to emerge in an organization. First, unlike a group decision tool which might emphasize the construction of a single, common representation to be shared by all members of the group, SPIDER is designed so that each distributed decision maker is expected to have a representation of their own perspective. Each representation has an owner and only the owner can make changes to it. Other members of the distributed decision making set can mail reacticms, questions or suggestions to the owner of a representation, but they may not unilaterally modify i~
openness, SPIDER enables an increased realization of interdependence through perspective taking, associated with new possibilities for coordination of independent action and a resulting increase in trust and subsequent openness [171. Trust is built slowly through repeated cycles of interaction. Trust increases vulnerability to loss, be it loss of reputation or money [17, 46]. So people economize on trust, and trust only when needed, to keep risks within acceptable limits [15]. Goffman [19], using a dramaturgical approach to everyday life, highlights that we act out roles in social situations. These roles are based on a cumulative set of shared expectations and understandings among social actors. These shared understanding are created and refined over repeated interactions. Every such interaction reinforces our trust in others. Trust, in the form of shared expectations and understanding, enables social interactions, and new social interactions produce more trust [47]. Trust therefore stands in a reflexive, reciprocal relationship with social ‘Abnormal’ behavior, where an actor appears interaction. ignorant of this shared context of expectations and understandings, leads to a breakdown in social communication [16].
Second, and following ffom the principle of ownership, it is expected that there will be a multiplicity of representations, each being a hypothesis, open for refinement through dialogue. Thus, SPIDER creates an environment of multiple, competing hypotheses and because each hypothesis represents the perspective of art autonomous sphere of concern, there is no expectation that they must be collapsed into a single, universal view. Conflicts, contradictions and paradoxes among perspectives are to be expected, Third, the links in a representation-are explicit recognition of the underlying assumptions, background facts, or prior beliefs that serve as the context for a decision maker’s position. Following a link in a representation is a movement into the context of a factor in a cognitive map, or the numbers in a spreadsheet row,
Trust is manifest when a person is self-revealing without fear of being misinterpreted [17]. The motivation to trust is affected by the context of the situation where one has to make a decision to trust or not [44]. By supporting an environment conducive to model 2 behavior, we anticipate SPIDER will increase levels of trust among distributed decision makers. In our evaluation of SPIDER, we will explore its impacts on both the improved coordination of disrnbuted decision making, and the increased levels of trust and openness among managem.
Finally, it should be remembered that a SPIDER representation, unlike a report that may be filed and forgotten, is a live document that an author continues to work on over time. As long as a distributed decision maker is engaged in acting in a certain decision domain, the representation he or she makes is actively being updated, discussed and tested against emerging conditions. A decision, which would be the end point of a typical group support system, merely punctuates the process of developing a SPIDER representation. It is an occasion for reappraisal, refinement and further dialogue; the beginning of learning, not the end of it.
BUILDING
MUTUAL
REPRESENTING SITUATION
AN
UNDERSTANDING
OF
A
The key to a robust communications environment is recognizing the tentative nature of the communicative hypotheses framing managerial dialogue. The impromptu, ad hoc nature of the understandings the decision makers wish to represent, requires flexibility in both the representational structures made available, and in the ways these structures can be created, shared, and modified. In creating an environment to foster richness of communication through the sharing of perspectives, there are two primary representational issues to be addressed: 1. What are the structures to be used in the formation of a perspective? 2. In what ways and through which tools should users be able to present their perspective for their own introspection and for the use of others?
TRUST
Trust is implied whenever two persons interact in any way. Trust enters our personal lives and our working lives. ‘We trust others not to harm us, or else we would be paranoid, and we trust others to adhere to agreements and contracts, or else we would not be able to plan and conduct business. We believe that SPIDER has important implications for building mutual trust in a distributed decision setting through the revelation of formerly private or tacit understandings. Trust is generated by and in turn leads to open, reciprocal communication. We argue that SPIDER, as an enabling tool for richer communication among distributed decision makers, can contribute to developing mutual trust. Beginning with a given, minimum level of uust and
309
Multimedia integrated document tools are beginning to proliferate, however we do not see these tools as appropriate for our task. Most of these applications focus on a textbased document that is enhanced through the inclusion of a picture, graph, table and even voice and video. Although appropriate for the creation of formal reports, documentation, and presentations, they do little to promote the communication of the fundamental underlying thoughts
perspective from the overall decision rationale, as pictured by the cognitive map, to some important numeric details, as presented in the spreadsheet.
and concerns of the creator of the document. Even the expressive power of voice and video cannot be harnessed for the analysis and refinement of a decision rationale, Other more structured decision aid systems, such as Stella II, Sibyl [24] or Ibis [45], provide powerful representational tools but orient the user to a mathematical modelling paradigm that is neither conducive to flexible, impromptu thinking, nor amenable to the rich communication between colleagues that we seek. To support a rich and flexible form of communication, SPIDER allows an actor to easily build and modify a layered understanding of the situation he or she faces,
COGNITIVE MAPS, SPREADSHEETS NOTES LINKED AS A PERSPECTIVE
The links give rise to a web of ideas, assumptions, data, and supporting arguments, each appearing in the form most conducive to its clear expression, and assembled as layers of context easily reached by following the links. An example can be seen in figure 1.
COMMUNICATING
RATIONALES
Manipulating an understanding of a situation to reveal the unique perspectives of the decision rationale being employed at a particular moment in time is of primary importance, Richness of information is found in the use, manipulation, and structure of information and not just in its quantity [37]. A manager’s representation, including one or more documents, can be mailed to other managers who are system users. Such a mailing can include the complete representation or a subset of the documents in a representation along with their links.
AND
Understandings of a situation are developed in a linked set of documents that we refer to as a representation. A representation consists of cognitive maps, spreadsheets of supporting numeric data, and textual notes, linked as a multi-layered depiction of a complex understanding, Cognitive maps are structured representations of an understanding which can be depicted as a visual graph, or in any number of graph theoretic representations such as an adjacency matrix. We choose the former for humancomputer interaction, and the latter for computer-intensive analysis. Arcs are labeled: + to indicate that a positive change in the evaluation of the source concept causes a positive change in the evaluation of the destination concepc or - to indicate that a positive change in the source node has a negative influence on the destination node. The extent and nature of the effect of one node on another is subjective and must be defined for each individual concept/node.
To provide an overview of a potentially complex web of document links, we use a SPIDER roaalnup. This roadmap gives a global perspective of the entire representation and allows the user to navigate through the document space. A roadmap is comprised of a set of labelled icons (one for each document in the representation) connected by lines (one for each document linkage) in a network-like diagram. Shifting from the global perspective to a local, or document-focused perspective is accomplished by selecting one of the documents from the roadrnap, making it the current focus of attention.
We begin by placing a cognitive map as the focal point of our representation, this being a guideline rather than a restriction. A graphically depicted cognitive map, consisting of factors and their causal relationships is drawn by a decision maker, using an interactive drawing tool developed specifkally for cognitive mapping (see [42] for a more detailed description of the system). Each factor, or the map as a whole, can be linked to other maps, spreadsheets of supporting data, descriptive notes, or arty combination of the above. Links are recursive in that a note can be linked It is these to another note, map, spreadsheet, etc. spreadsheets and notes that provide the background, explanation, and elaboration of the understanding of causal relations shown in an accompanying cognitive map.
ANALYZING A REPRESENTATION The analysis of a representation by its author and readers is made possible by shifting perspectives in three levels of 1. A global perspective is provided by the abstraction. roadmap as described above. 2. At the document level, a user can display one or more documents at the same time to examine similar cognitive maps, understand a factor relationship in light of a descriptive note, or question the data underlying a relationship. 3. Within a cognitive map document, levels of detail can be hidden or revealed by applying special functions to portions of a displayed map. This quick shift of focus allows the user to concentrate on the currently relevant aspect of the representation.
The framework is both structured and fluid. The structure provided by a cognitive mapping framework as opposed to a generat drawing tool, serves to focus the user on expressing the key factors in his or her model. The fluidity provided by the links to and from spreadsheets, notes, and other cognitive maps give rise to an ever changing picture of a decision scenario. What is seen by the reader of such a scenario depends on the perspective from which the web of documents is viewed, A document created with a cognitive map at its center, two supporting spreadsheets and a note, may be entered and viewed entirely from the spreadsheet rather than the originating map. This allows a quick shift of
Our future development plans include the use of graph theoretic techniques to automate the analysis of different cognitive maps, drawing on previous work mentioned above [8, 4, 11, as well as enhanced visual tools to depict characteristics such as preferences of outcome and action in a more robust cognitive representation [42].
CONCLUSION Viewing distributed decision making as conflicting yet interdependent activities has helped identify the key issues of creating and sharing perspectives. The dynamic nature of these perspectives in a learning organization indicates the
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importance of tools to support their development and exchange. Concrete results of such an effort will be seen in a deeper understanding, cooperation, and trust among decision makers. SPIDER and its underlying theory is a beginning in what we hope will be an extended effort to develop tools of self reflection and dialogue among managers in large, complex organizations. Environments such as SPIDER, through enriching perspective taking and communication offer a significant hope for moving beyond bureaucratic, procedural models of organizational control, and enabling the adaptive, learning types of organization structures needed for the future.
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This research was funded by National Science Foundation Grant #9015526 and Digital Equipment Corporation External Research Grant #111 1.
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