533161 research-article2014
GPI0010.1177/1368430214533161Group Processes & Intergroup RelationsDensley et al.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations Article
G P I R
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 2014, Vol. 17(6) 763–779 © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1368430214533161 gpir.sagepub.com
Social dominance orientation and trust propensity in street gangs James A. Densley,1 Tianji Cai,2 and Susan Hilal1
Abstract The present research demonstrates that social dominance orientation (SDO) and trust propensity provide a valuable theoretical framework and methodological toolkit with which to both assess the concept of “defiant individualism,” Sánchez-Jankowski’s trait theory of gang membership, and understand social-psychological gang processes. The research samples 95 gang members in London, UK, while looking at the effects of age, contact with the gang, and position in the gang on the presence of SDO and trust propensity. Using path analysis, the research demonstrates gang tenure and rank are strong predictors of high SDO and low trust propensity, independent of time spent in the gang, which also significantly predicts high SDO and low trust propensity. High SDO and low trust propensity in gangs are also positively correlated. Gang members, it seems, exhibit a “defiant individualist” social character and both selection and group socialization processes are accountable. Such, in turn, may help explain intergang relations. Keywords defiant individualism, intergroup aggression, social dominance orientation, street gangs, trust propensity Paper received 26 November 2013; revised version accepted 28 March 2014.
Introduction In recent years, the gang has become the focus of blame for street violence in British cities (Hallsworth, 2013). Debate now rages about the extent to which such gangs can be identified from the extensive U.S. literature (see Decker, Melde, & Pyrooz, 2013). Pitts (2008) argues complex processes of cultural and economic globalization resulting in sociocultural and racial exclusion have encouraged the creation of hierarchical gangs that not only seek to control territory and illegal markets, but also coerce “reluctant gangsters” into their ranks. Hallsworth (2013) takes
the opposing view that street violence is too complex and diverse to be reduced to the notion of the gang. Gangs, in turn, may be exaggerated and—at least partly—imaginary productions of 1Metropolitan 2University
State University, USA of Macau, China
Corresponding author: James A. Densley, School of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Metropolitan State University, 9110 Brooklyn Blvd., Brooklyn Park, MN 55445, USA. Email:
[email protected]
764 the predilection for “gang talk” among professors, police, practitioners, and policy-makers influenced by American gang stereotypes (Hallsworth & Young, 2008). Either way, in contrast to other areas in Britain (Medina, Aldridge, & Ralphs, 2011), only larger levels of gang organization are found in London (Densley, 2013; Harding, in press; Pitts, 2008); which is the site of the present study. Conspicuous by its absence in British “gang talk” is meaningful discussion of gang processes and intergroup relations. This is not entirely surprising. The psychological literature on group dynamics is extensive (see Goldstein, 2002), but beyond early radical notions that core gang members manifest sociopathic personalities (Yablonsky, 1962), criminological theories used to explain gang membership on both sides of the Atlantic rarely if at all acknowledge the socialpsychological processes associated with gang involvement (see Alleyne & Wood, 2010, 2012; Wood & Alleyne, 2010). One exception, often overlooked, is SánchezJankowski’s (1991) theory of “defiant individualism.” Arguing existing criminological theories about gangs “are really theories about delinquency and not theories about gangs” (p. 21), Sánchez-Jankowski proclaims defiant individualism, a type of “social character” (p. 23), as the missing theoretical link between socioeconomic environments characterized by fierce competition for scarce resources and involvement in delinquent gangs. He argues gang members are drawn from the lower class slums of the inner cities and the conditions of life lead to people growing up in such areas having a particular set of character traits—competitiveness, mistrust, self-reliance, emotional detachment, survival instinct, social Darwinist worldview, defiant air—which together constitute defiant individualism. The degree of specificity with which such traits are described, however, does not go much beyond what is given in the previous lines. Such a trait theory of gang membership is controversial, not least because the scope of SánchezJankowski’s (1991) work is unprecedented in gang research (i.e., three cities over 10 years) and his
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 17(6) claims to have been jumped in to 37 gangs under investigation reads like an elaborate fiction (Sullivan, 1994). Still, it cannot be ignored. Sánchez-Jankowski invokes defiant individualism repeatedly to explain almost all aspects of gang behavior, particularly intergroup violence. Criminal propensity theorists emphasize similar static or time-stable characteristics expected to elevate involvement in gangs (one of many risky behaviors analogous to crime), including conduct disorders (Lahey, Gordon, Loeber, StouthamerLoeber, & Farrington, 1999), low self-control (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), impulsivity and risk seeking (Esbensen, Winfree, He, & Taylor, 2001), even psychopathy (Dupéré, Lacourse, Willms, Vitaro, & Tremblay, 2007; Valdez, Kaplan, & Codina, 2000). But Sánchez-Jankowski (2003) goes further, arguing people with defiant individualism select into gangs because gangs offer means to achieve paramount goals. Gangs, in turn, constitute “organized defiant individualism” (p. 202). There has been little attempt made to validate Sánchez-Jankowski’s theory in the two decades since its publication (cf. Jensen, 1996). Similar propositions exist in the literature. Bernard (1990), for example, describes a subculture of “angry aggression” that arises under conditions of social isolation. Anderson (1999) identifies a “street code,” or “set of informal rules governing interpersonal public behavior, particularly violence,” that operates above and beyond the compositional characteristics of neighborhood residents (p. 33). Parker and Coleman (2013) examine defiant individualism merely as an extension of strain theory, observing it promotes deviant associations, but also inhibits normative behaviors likely to ameliorate deviant behavior such as school engagement and academic achievement. The implication is that even if one accepts the premise of defiant individualism, the requisite character traits may be gained from entry into gangs not as prerequisites for entry. Many of the traits Sánchez-Jankowski associates with defiant individualism also bear a striking resemblance to other dispositional traits and social attitudes social psychologists study in relation to non-gang-specific interpersonal and
Densley et al. intergroup dynamics; specifically, social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and trust propensity (Rosenberg, 1956). Such concepts enable examination of SánchezJankowski’s theory with the sort of psychological precision gang research requires (Alleyne & Wood, 2010, 2012; Wood & Alleyne, 2010). Based upon a self-administered survey of 95 gang-involved youth, the present research explores the extent to which factors such as contact with the gang and position in the gang influence defiant individualism as measured in terms of social dominance orientation (SDO) and trust propensity. Social dominance orientation has been previously tested in UK prison gang populations (Wood, Alleyne, Mozova, & James, 2013), but this is the first study to explore it in an active UK street gang sample. The present research demonstrates that SDO and trust propensity provide a valuable theoretical framework and methodological toolkit with which to assess the theory of defiant individualism and understand socialpsychological gang processes.
Literature Review Social Dominance Orientation Social dominance is an intergroup theory of conflict and oppression (Pratto, 1999; Pratto et al., 2013; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In contrast to right-wing authoritarianism, which focuses on authoritarian submission, SDO refers primarily to authoritarian dominance (Altemeyer, 1998). SDO is an individual’s general preference for inequality and group dominance or equality and group inclusion (Pratto et al., 2013; Pratto et al., 1994). People high in SDO prefer hierarchical group orientations and perceive intergroup aggression as necessary for individual success, if not survival. High SDO individuals adhere strongly to a belief in a dog-eat-dog world where resource competition is zero-sum and winning is a necessity (Duckitt & Sibley, 2006). In other words, high SDO individuals may be Sánchez-Jankowski’s defiant individualists and vice versa.
765 The voluminous body of existing SDO research establishes both its strong construct validity (for a review, see Lee, Pratto, & Johnson, 2011) and its flexibility across diverse spaces and groups (Ho et al., 2012; Kteily, Sidanius, & Levin, 2011; Pratto et al., 2013; Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006; Pratto et al., 1994; Sibley & Liu, 2010; Sidanius, Mitchell, Haley, & Navarrete, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004). This mutually reinforcing set of attitudes, moreover, is relatively stable within subjects over time and predicts a number of socially and politically important behaviors— prison gang involvement, for example (Wood et al., 2013). Elevated SDO is predicted among street gang members (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). SDO is also postulated to explain intergang conflict (Wood & Alleyne, 2010). However, such hypotheses have not been empirically examined. The vast majority of gang members are young men who have been shown to react to masculinity threats with extreme demonstrations of (hegemonic) masculinity (Bourgois, 2003; Messerschmidt, 1993). Masculine traits, such as dominance and assertiveness, in turn, correspond to high SDO and the maintenance of social hierarchies. By contrast, feminine traits, such as empathy and communality, contribute to lower levels of SDO and women’s comparatively lower status (Lee et al., 2011; Lippa & Arad, 1999). Whereas men gravitate toward hierarchy-enhancing jobs and institutions that are also hierarchically structured vis-à-vis individuals within them (e.g., law enforcement), women tend to work hierarchyattenuating jobs in public services (Pratto, Stallworth, Sidanius, & Siers, 1997; Sidanius, Pratto, Sinclair, & van Laar, 1996). Why high SDO individuals join delinquent gangs over legitimate hierarchy-enhancing organizations may simply reflect notions of differential opportunity (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Social dominance theory holds the more consistent the experience of a competitive world is for a person, the higher their perceived necessity to compete (Duckitt & Sibley, 2006). Gangs, for example, strive to enhance or reinforce their status in comparison to other gangs in an arbitrary-set
766 system (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999); competing for illegal resources, such as bragging rights, members, turf, market share, and profits (Densley, 2013; Sánchez-Jankowski, 1991; Venkatesh & Levitt, 2000). In-group identification and entitativity simultaneously mediate the normative expectations of gang membership (Hennigan & Spanovic, 2011; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Gangs adopt common names and other conventional signals (Gambetta, 2009) to create superior/inferior boundaries of membership. In-group members use “common knowledge” (Chwe, 2001) to identify other in-group members, but also euphemistic language (e.g., referring to murder as business) and “techniques of neutralization” to dehumanize out-group members and rationalize aggression toward them (Sykes & Matza, 1957). As Thrasher (1927) famously observed, gangs are “integrated through conflict” (p. 46). More than a collection of individual persons, gangs are coalitions that perpetrate acts of intergroup aggression (Vasquez, Lickel, & Hennigan, 2010). Group processes enable gang members to do things—particularly violent things—they would not do alone (Decker, 1996; Decker & Pyrooz, 2010; Decker & van Winkle, 1996; Hughes, 2013; McGloin & Decker, 2010; Melde & Esbensen, 2012; Short & Strodtbeck, 1965). Drawing on Gould’s (2003) theory of interpersonal violence, for example, Papachristos (2009) demonstrates how violence among gangs arises from disputes over dominance. When gangs get caught in dominance contests, he argues, the normative and behavioral precepts of the code of the street facilitate the social contagion of violence. One gang may claim precedence, which, in turn, forces another gang to challenge that gang either to retain their honor or reassert their reputation (Howell, 2012). Violence begets violence because an attack on one gang member is an attack against all members. The result is a closed “feedback loop” of retaliation and revenge (Decker & van Winkle, 1996, p. 186).
Trust Propensity One key aspect of defiant individualism is “The lack of trust that gang members have of people
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 17(6) in general” (Sánchez-Jankowski, 1991, pp. 105– 106). Any exploration of defiant individualism, therefore, must account for notions of generalized trust (Stack, 1978) or trust propensity (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Trust propensity refers to a general disposition to trust people in life (see Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998), mediated by expectancies of individual behavior rooted in the past (Deutsch, 1958; Garfinkel, 1963). There is not the scope here to review the vast trust literature at length, suffice it to say trust propensity is typically measured using attitudinal survey questions, such as the Faith in People Scale (Rosenberg, 1956) or through experiments that use real monetary rewards (for a review, see Camerer, 2003). Trust games, in turn, typically follow Coleman’s (1990) concept of trust as situational behavior rather than personal characteristic or trait, whereby: (a) trust implies that the truster freely transfers assets to another person, without controlling the actions of that other person or having the possibility to retaliate; and (b) there must be potential gain in order to have an incentive to trust. Trust is an essential component of all enduring social groups (Seligman, 1997), especially groups such as street gangs that engage in antinormative or illegal behavior (von Lampe & Ole Johansen, 2004). Gangs are constrained by illegality—if crime is integral to the raison d’être of the group (see Klein & Maxson, 2006) then disputes within it cannot be settled by an external third party as established by the rule of law (Dixit, 2004). Problems of trust are exacerbated in the underworld (Gambetta, 2009). While violence assists in enforcing contracts and maintaining hierarchical authority (Campana & Varese, 2012), gang codes of loyalty and boundaries between groups help reinforce ties between members (Densley, 2013).
The Present Study Using SDO and trust propensity as standardized proxy metrics of defiant individualism and in their own right, this research samples gang members at different ages and stages within their organizations to examine whether or not core
Densley et al. gang members or gang members with longer tenure have higher SDO and lower trust propensity than the periphery members and vice versa. The research is guided by two research questions: 1. To what extent do gang members exhibit a defiant individualist social character as proposed by Sánchez-Jankowski? 2. What factors contribute to defiant individualism in a gang context?
Hypotheses We predict a significant effect of both selection and group socialization, with defiant individualists (that is, people high in SDO and low in trust propensity) selecting into gangs according to Sánchez-Jankowski’s original model, but also gangs facilitating and, in turn, enhancing defiant individualism as the individual adjusts to and internalizes gang norms (Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte, Smith, & Tobin, 2003). While there are neither active offenders nor nongang members to compare gang members to in the present study, we expect their SDO mean item number to be equivalent to prison gang members (Wood et al., 2013) and higher than other comparable male research samples (e.g., Graham-Kevan, 2011). We further expect individual position in the gang to predict levels of SDO and trust propensity. Position in the gang is an important indicator of individual immersion within the gang or “embeddedness” (Pyrooz, Sweeten, & Piquero, 2013). Position in the gang is also an intergroup phenomenon, with certain high-level classes within gangs dominating lower level classes (Densley, 2013; Levitt & Venkatesh, 2000; Pitts, 2008; Sánchez-Jankowski, 1991; Venkatesh & Levitt, 2000). Like corporations in the formal economy, for example, gangs often operate a twotier system of “good” jobs for the privileged few and low-wage, high-risk, dead-end jobs for the majority (Levitt & Venkatesh, 2000). To explain gang members’ desire to hold a high-risk role that pays little, Levitt and Venkatesh (2000, p. 755) compare gang involvement to a competitive “tournament.” Tournament winners, in turn, achieve an equilibrium that balances
767 enough intergroup aggression to enhance individual and gang reputations without attracting too much police scrutiny and rival predation to jeopardize intragroup cohesion (see also, Densley, 2013). Thus we expect gang members high in rank to be higher in SDO than their lower ranked counterparts, but not as high as the sandwiched middle ranks because those in the middle of the gang are most likely to engage in intergang violence (i.e., they are more entrusted with the authority to act than low-ranking gang members, yet still do more of the grunt work than highranking members, see Densley, 2013; Harding, in press). To further test whether the gang environment enhances SDO and reduces trust propensity, we also include the independent variables of age and time in the gang in the model. We hypothesize older gang members will have higher SDO scores and lower levels of trust propensity and the length of time an individual has spent in a gang will be related to higher SDO and lower generalized trust, further highlighting socialization effects. Research demonstrates SDO is acquired during socialization processes (e.g., imposition of specific doctrines) and through the experiences of maintaining and breaking trust in the day-today community (Duckitt & Sibley, 2006; Nicol, Charbonneau, & Boies, 2007; Sibley & Duckitt, 2009). According to what SDO embodies, therefore, we anticipate (a) gang members with higher SDO to exhibit lower trust propensity and (b) trust propensity to mediate rank on SDO because trust is a key component of social cohesion (Putnam, 2000).
Method Sample The “consensus Eurogang definition” (durable and street-oriented youth groups whose involvement in illegal activity is part of their group identity [see Klein & Maxson, 2006, p. 4]) is sufficiently general to capture the essence of gangs described here. Participants were drawn from a network of allied gangs in one inner London borough. This ethnically diverse borough is in terms of average
768 deprivation in the 10% most deprived (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007) and is recognized both in the media and in the literature as being inhabited by gangs and with relatively high rates of serious violence (see Densley, 2013; Harding, in press). The sample is all male with an ethnic identity associated with the English Census category “Black or Black British.” A young Black male sample is expected given the purposive sampling strategy common in gang research (for a review, see Petersen & Valdez, 2005). The disproportionate representation of young Black males reflects both the gender and racial/ethnic composition of gangs in London and the fact current resources— and therefore the starting points for the sample— are almost exclusively focused on the Black community (see Metropolitan Police Service, 2012). Gangs are not a specifically Black phenomenon, but rather reflect the ethnic make-up of the neighborhoods they represent. Likewise, although girls associate with gangs in London, which has important implications (Densley, Davis, & Mason, 2013), they are rarely seen as bona fide gang members and there is little support for the presence of autonomous girl gangs (Hallsworth, 2013).
Procedure The first author recruited sample participants from a local gang intervention project using existing networks and access brokered during a 2-year ethnographic study of gangs in London (Densley, 2013). Such provided a check on internal validity. Two outreach workers familiar with the gang network assisted with the distribution and collection of the questionnaires. All members of the gang network were invited to take part in the study. The relevant ethics committee approved the study and those who participated all gave informed consent.1 Questionnaires were distributed in gang “set space” (Tita, Cohen, & Engberg, 2005) during two large group gatherings (one at a recreation center and one at a local eatery) in the summer of 2010 and following a full verbal briefing regarding the purpose of the research. Respondents
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 17(6) thus completed the questionnaire individually but in a group setting, which presents a potential source of bias but is common in gang research (e.g., Esbensen, Melde, Taylor, & Peterson, 2008). Distributing the questionnaire in this way also helped control for the standard vagaries of sampling gang members in conventional school settings where they are underrepresented due to age, truancy, or exclusion (Esbensen et al., 2008). Participants were all told their responses were confidential, participation was voluntary, and they could leave the study at any time without penalty. The gang members were asked to place the completed or uncompleted questionnaire into a blank envelope provided which the two outreach workers then collected and returned unopened to the first named author. No identifying information was requested. Of the 125 questionnaires distributed to gang members and associates, 107 were returned substantially completed (85% return rate). After screening for missing data and normality, a further 12 questionnaires were omitted, leaving a sample size of 95 to be used in the subsequent analysis. While this sample is small it remains comparable to samples in other SDO studies (see Pratto et al., 2013; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), bearing in mind that gang members are naturally a small, reticent, “hidden population” (Heckathorn, 1997).
Measures Gang membership. To designate between gang members and gang associates (i.e., those who offended with gang members and were associated with them by law enforcement and criminal justice agencies or community information but neither recognized themselves nor were recognized by others as gang members), respondents were asked simply, “Are you currently a gang member?” Those who responded “yes” were then asked to identify their position in the gang they were claiming: (a) low, (b) middle, or (c) high. Those who responded “no,” by contrast, were coded as gang “associates” and ranked at 0. Rank categories were recoded for analysis as continuous variables. As
Densley et al. supported by a large number of gang studies using diverse methodologies, self-nomination is a robust measure of gang membership (for a discussion, see Esbensen et al., 2001). Social dominance orientation. The 16-item SDO scale measures the extent to which individuals view the unequal distribution of power and resources as natural and good. The social-psychological scale is widely applied and refined, demonstrating validity and internal consistency, with a Cronbach’s α coefficient of above .80 in over 30 studies (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Cronbach’s coefficient alpha is .92 in the current sample. The scale asks respondents to indicate their attitudes towards 16 pro and contra trait statements or phrases using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = very negative, 7 = very positive) that reflect either support for group-based hierarchies (e.g., “Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups,” “To get ahead in life sometimes you need to step on other groups”) or endorsement of equality (e.g., “Group equality should be our ideal,” “No one group should dominate society”).2 Items measuring the endorsement of equality are reverse keyed to control for acquiescence. After reversing the necessary items, the 16 items are totaled to form a scale ranging from 16–112, with high scores indicating high SDO. Trust propensity. Trust propensity was measured using the five-item Faith in People Scale (FIPS), which assesses “attitudes toward human nature” by contrasting faith in people and “misanthropism” (Rosenberg, 1956, p. 690). The instrument utilizes a Guttman scale of two forced choices (e.g., “Would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to look out for themselves?” and “Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can’t be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?”) and three agree/disagree statements (e.g., “If you don’t watch yourself, people will take advantage of you,” “No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it,” and “Human nature is fundamentally cooperative”). The first forced-choice
769 question is one of the most commonly used measures of trust propensity, to the extent it appears in the American General Social Survey, European Values Survey, and World Values Survey (Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1991). Responses are totaled to form a scale of 0 (high trust propensity) to 5 (low trust propensity). While an imperfect measure of generalized trust, in part because the choice for some questions may be between trust and caution rather than trust and distrust (for a review, see Yamagishi, Kikuchi, & Kosugi, 1999), the coefficient of reproducibility for the original FIPS was .92 (Rosenberg, 1956), responses seem to be consistent and stable over time, and evidence shows the variables present almost the same values even when controlling for respondents’ experience (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000; Miller & Mitamura, 2003; Nannestad, 2008; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2008). The α for this five-item scale was .869.
Results The mean age of the sample is 19.89 years (SD = 3.72, range 15 to 30 years). Half the sample (n = 47) has been in contact with the gang for 1–3 years, 24% has been in contact for 4–6 years and the rest has been in contact either less than a year (6%) or more than 6 years (20%). In terms of position in the gang, 11% are high rank, 41% are middle, 32% are low, and 17% are associate or peripheral figures. In terms of the extent gang members exhibit a defiant individualist social character as proposed by Sánchez-Jankowski (1991), results in Table 1 show that overall, the mean item score for SDO was 4.41 (SD = 1.76), which is comparable to 4.43 for UK prison gang members (Wood et al., 2013), but significantly higher than 3.22 for UK prisoners (Graham-Kevan, 2011) and 2.5 on average for other young adult male samples (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The implication is street gang members demonstrate one of the highest recorded generalized orientations toward group-based hierarchy. The extremely high scores among the middle-ranking group (item mean
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations for SDO and trust by rank, age, and time. Variable
Category
Rank
Age
Time
Associate Low Middle High 15–17 18–20 21–24 25–27 ≥28
