Social foundation of scenario planning

TFS-18853; No of Pages 10 Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2017) xxx–xxx

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Technological Forecasting & Social Change

Social foundation of scenario planning Nicholas J. Rowland a,⁎, Matthew J. Spaniol b,c,1 a b c

The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania, USA Danish Maritime, Copenhagen, Denmark Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 16 April 2016 Received in revised form 4 January 2017 Accepted 10 February 2017 Available online xxxx Keywords: Scenario development Scenario method Scenario use Science and technology studies Sociology of science

a b s t r a c t In this article, the authors establish that models of scenario planning typically involve a series of phases, stages, or steps that imply a sequenced (i.e., linear or chronological) process. Recursive models, in contrast, allow phases to repeat, thus, incorporating iteration. The authors acknowledge the concerns voiced in futures studies that while models based on practical experience are common in the literature, forming a theoretical basis for why those practices work is often considered elusive. This includes models that imply linearity and those that accommodate iterativity. With theory from science and technology studies (STS) on knowledge production, the authors explain transition from one phase to the next and iteration between and within phases based on social negotiation. To this end, the authors examine the interplay between the “scenario development” phase and the “scenario use” phase of a planning process with a non-governmental organization in Denmark. The upshot for facilitators is practical insight into how transition between phases and phase iteration in scenario planning can be identified, leveraged, and, thus, managed. The upshot for scholars is a related insight into why scenario planning is a kind of laboratory for futures studies wherein the future is experimented upon. © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction Review of the literature demonstrates how, with rare exception, models of scenario methods that are based on phases, stages, and steps imply a linear and chronological process. Some scholars observe and allow phases to repeat, thus, accommodating and incorporating iteration. In futures studies, scholars voice the concern that while models based on practical experience dominate the literature, forming a theoretical basis for why those practices work is often considered elusive. (Rowland and Spaniol, 2015). This concern applies to models that imply linearity and those that accommodate iterativity. With theory from science and technology studies (STS), the authors explain transition from one phase to the next and iteration between and within phases based on social negotiation. This explanation is adapted from the so-called “laboratory studies” literature about knowledge production and how socially negotiated consensus is achieved regarding “truth” during a scientific controversy. To focus analysis, the authors examine the transition between the “scenario development” phase and the “scenario use” phase through a case study at a non-governmental organization in Denmark. The authors demonstrate how some group-based interactions appear to facilitate the shift from the scenario development phase to the use phase, ⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (N.J. Rowland), [email protected] (M.J. Spaniol). 1 Matthew J. Spaniol is supported by Den Danske Maritime Fond project 2013-028 and by the Danish Ministry of Science Technology and Innovation grant 1355-00110B.

while other interactions appear to facilitate the iterative shift from the scenario use phase back to the development phase. Therefore, the underlying factor predicting transition between development to use and use back to development is socially negotiated consensus. Participants may establish consensus among members of the group with regard, for example, to the perceived “readiness” of the development stage of planning. The inverse is also suggested; during the scenario use phase, consensus regarding the status of a scenario – as ready or not – can also be called into question. The authors underscore the foundational notion – imported here from STS – that no developed scenario is ever definitively “ready for use” and, likewise, no developing scenario is ever definitively “too premature for use.” There is no inner quality of any scenario that makes it ready or not. Thus, to repeat, the underlying factor that facilitates transitions between development and use – or any phase, stage, or step – is socially negotiated consensus regarding the perceived status of the current phase for the practices associated with the subsequent phase. The upshot for facilitators is practical insight into how transition between phases and phase iteration can be identified as a matter of social negotiation, leveraged, and, therefore, managed. To this end, the authors adapt five techniques from literature in STS for managing transitions between phases. The upshot for scholars is a related insight into why scenario planning is a kind of laboratory for futures studies wherein the future is experimented upon (van der Heijden, 1996). In fact, recognizing the scenario method as “experimental” is inspired by claims from within futures studies. The scenario method is a planning tool for organizations;

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2017.02.013 0040-1625/© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Rowland, N.J., Spaniol, M.J., Social foundation of scenario planning, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2017), http:// dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2017.02.013

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N.J. Rowland, M.J. Spaniol / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2017) xxx–xxx

however, according to Ramirez et al. (2015), it might also be a research tool for testing theories, building new concepts, and gaining insight into alternative and innovative possibilities. The authors take the next logical step. By taking Ramirez et al.'s (2015) point literally, they empirically examine the scenario method with the same sorts of theoretical concepts used to study other “experimental” settings, namely, scientific laboratories. Research from STS, most notably from the sociology of science (Bourdieu, 1975; Gieryn, 1999; Merton, 1973) and laboratory studies (Knorr-Cetina, 1983; Latour and Woolgar, 1986; Lynch, 1985), prove to be fertile ground for such an endeavor. Also, in closing, the authors wish to underscore that they review two vast literatures; they had to be selective and acknowledge that some readers will be dissatisfied. 2. Phases, stages, and steps While scenario planning dates back to the Second World War (Morgan and Hunt, 2002; van der Heijden, 1996), Wack's (1985a, 1985b) influential Harvard Business Review articles are, according to Wright (2004: 5), widely recognized “as the starting point for any scholar interested in the use of scenarios-in-practice.” During the 1970s, leadership at Royal Dutch Shell was no longer satisfied with machineassisted planning strategies that computed single-point forecasts and, as a result, experimented with constructing narratives of multiple futures by acknowledging and modeling the role of uncertainty. Ever since, according to Jefferson (2012: 186), “[m]uch of the discussion of past scenario development in business has centered on [practice-oriented models indicative of] Shell's pioneering work in the 1970s.” Thus, at least since Zentner's (1982: 22) “Scenarios in Forecasting,” Linneman and Kennell's (1977: 142) “Shirt-Sleeve Approach To LongRange Planning,” or MacNulty's (1977) “Scenario Development for Corporate Planning,” scenario planning has been modeled after practical experience and, according to Ramirez and Selin (2014: 63), typically articulated in terms of “phases or stages or steps.” For example, O'Brien (2004) and others (e.g., O'Brien and Meadows, 2013: 643) use phases; their model consists of “[a] preparatory phase where the purpose and focus of the exercise is agreed and driving forces are identified,” “[a] development phase involving the development of the scenarios,” and “[a] use phase when the scenarios are used for their intended purpose,” thus, illustrating neatly Martelli's (2001: 57) foundational claim about building scenarios and their use later on, namely, that “the latter [phase] could not exist without the former [phase] as its necessary and logical premise.” Bradfield et al. (2016: 61), in contrast, use stages and steps; the model they present – “Intuitive Logics Standard Approach to Scenario Development” – consists of eight stages, and inside those stages are steps. Inside “Stage 2: Determining the driving forces,” for example, there are four seemingly chronological steps; consider, for instance, that “Step 1: Initial list of driving forces” is unlikely to precede “Step 2: Review of initial driving forces” (Bradfield et al., 2016: 61, 63). Thus, even steps nested in stages have an outwardly chronological character. The scenario method has two essential phases, according to Martelli (2001), development and use. The relationship between those phases has been articulated in at least two ways in the literature. Scholars can either see scenario use as the logical end (i.e., chief outcome or goal) of development or see scenario development as an end in itself (rather than the means to some other end), the former being more accepted by scholars in futures studies as compared to the latter. In fact, scholars often openly reject the notion that scenario development can function as anything other than as a means, although they do not always agree to what end(s). Godet (2000), for example, suggests that the value of development is contingent upon use later on, in particular, use that results in action; “[a] scenario is not an end in itself,” Godet (2000: 19–20) writes, “it only becomes meaningful when its results and implications are embodied in real action.” Durance and Godet (2010), years later, would re-specify the relationship between development and use with new emphasis on how development (the means) informs decision-

making in the present (an end); “a scenario is not an end in itself,” Durance and Godet (2010: 1489) write, “[i]t only has meaning as an aid to decision-making in so far as it clarifies the consequences of current decisions.” This brings Durance and Godet (2010) more in line with what is possibly the most traditional view on these matters held, for example, by Kahn (1971) and others (Kahn and Wiener, 1967), with emphasis on how anticipation shapes present-day decision-making. For Kahn (1971: 150), scenario planning is “decision-centered” in so far as scenario development is focused on identifying and charting forthcoming decisions. Using “a set of alternative futures and scenarios,” Kahn and Wiener (1967: 6) write, “one may see better what is to be avoided or facilitated, and one may also gain a useful perspective on the kinds of decisions that may be necessary.” Likewise, “[t]he scenario is a specific thinking tool strongly focused on decision-centered analyses,” Kahn (1971: 150) writes, “designed to aid the imagination, stimulate creativity, and reveal “novel possibilities” which would otherwise go unnoticed.” After all, as Mach (1976 [1897]: 452) claimed more than a century ago, “oftentimes, the thought experiment precedes ... [actual action] and prepares the way for it.” The apparent analytical advantage of rejecting development as an end in itself appears to be associated with a linear or chronological view of the planning process. Building on Godet's (2000: 19–20) insight that scenarios become “meaningful when ... embodied in real action,” Aligica and Tarko (2015: 179) state, “any deliberate real action of importance has to be preceded by a thought experiment that anticipates the possibility of its outcomes and implications.” The inverse also appears to be true. If development fails to render useful outcomes, the logic goes, then development is effectively not yet over, or, more critically, that the development stage was unsuccessful as a whole, and, thus, a failure. To wit, Wack (1985b: 147) writes, “[i]f the scenario process does not bring out strategic options, previously unconsidered by management, then it has been sterile.” Thus, scholars conclude that scenario development, no matter how effective – and no matter how much perceived value-added it lends to firms that plan ahead (Coates, 2000) and regardless of the fact that it garners relatively more academic attention than the other planning stages (O'Brien and Meadows, 2013) – is not an end in itself. Likewise, effective scenario use appears to be contingent upon quality development beforehand. Ergo, based on the literature, one may tentatively conclude that scenario development and use are related chronologically. This implicit, linear model, which is likely shared by practitioners of scenario planning and scholars of futures studies, is not the only model. In the next section, the authors examine iteration of phases in scenario planning. 3. Iteration in scenario planning Although phase, step, and stage diagrams dominate the literature, scholars also accommodate for iteration. For example, in Schoemaker's (1995: 30) step-based model, the final step confronts the practitioner with a proverbial acid test, asking, “[a]re these the scenarios that you want to give others in the organization?” and then responds, “[i]f yes, you are done. If not, repeat the steps and refocus your scenarios the way an artist judges the balance and focal point in a painting. Half of this is art, half is judgment.” This is a basic form of iteration in scenario planning. The steps are followed in more or less lock-step; however, if, by the final step, the scenarios are not deemed to be sufficient for sharing with others, then the multi-step process repeats, conceivably, with the previous efforts in full-view to inform the process as it re-occurs. Scholars have developed metrics for those “use or iterate” dilemmas, which, like Schoemaker's (1995: 30) model, come at the end of an otherwise linear process; these include: scenarios deemed implausible, especially if new questions, variables, or types of unknowns are identified (Peterson et al., 2003); scenarios deemed no longer useful due to timedecay (van der Heijden, 2005: 18); scenarios deemed “immature” (Kloss, 1999: 81); scenarios deemed too “unpalatable” for or by the user (van der Heijden, 2005: 239); scenarios deemed “failures” in that



they insufficiently address fundamental issues of the organization (Stone and Redmer, 2006: 13); and scenarios deemed incapable of producing or discovering new and unique entrepreneurial insights (van der Heijden, 2005: 65). Bood and Postma (1997: 634) offer a more flexible model; rather than acknowledge necessary space for iteration once the phases of development are complete, they accommodate iteration along the way; “in practice,” they claim, “construing scenarios almost automatically results in an iterative process wherein people move back and forth between the interrelated phases.” Whether or not iteration is accommodated for in otherwise seemingly phase-based models, scholars still claim that the scenario method suffers from limited – specifically, empirical – academic attention (Cairns et al., 2004; Chermack, 2003, 2005, 2011; Goodwin and Wright, 2001; Hodgkinson and Wright, 2002; Schoemaker, 1995). Advancements in the practice of the scenario method seem to have outpaced theory sufficient to justify the widespread use of scenario planning (Bradfield et al., 2005). But, after decades of “diminishing interest in the theoretical underpinning of futures studies, the past few years have seen the onset of a new concern with the foundation of futures studies” (Poli, 2011: 67). In response, this article develops new theoretical mechanisms that underpin the scenario method. 4. Social negotiation in science and scenario planning In the most general sense, the authors' contribution is set against the backdrop of an old debate in the sociology of science about social negotiation. As it happens, when scientific controversies emerge regarding the truth, then it is precisely the (so to say) “truthiness” of a claim under scrutiny that cannot be used to justify its status as fact, or, conversely, nullify the claim's status as false. It is, after all, the truth that is under investigation, and, thus, in need of adjudication in the context of a controversy. Resolution occurs, with rare exception, by employing technique(s) to achieve what scholars in STS refer to as “closure.” Social consensus with regard to the state of scientific truth is primarily achieved by appealing to the rhetoric of science or through persuading dissenters through negotiation (for example of case studies, see, e.g., Brante and Hallberg, 1991; Guice, 1998; Klintman, 2002; Rappert, 2001; Reno, 2011; Richards, 1991). The following techniques for achieving closure have been isolated by scholars in STS; though numbered, they do not exist in any sequential or chronological order; they include:

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those “other” techniques; this, the authors claim, achieves closure. In contrast, during use, a scenario returns to development if questions are raised about the consequences of a scenario that have not been “explored” yet (i.e., “other” techniques in reverse, opening-up rather than delimiting discussion); this instigates controversy. From this vantage point, the shift from development to use or from use to development is negotiated rather than inherent. Even scenarios that seem to shift from development to use on account of an internal quality or essential attribute must, in principle, be seen as the outcome of social interaction, ergo, a scenario is either deemed “definitively ready for use” or “still in need of development” through social consensus with regard to the state of the scenario, which is, the authors contend, primarily achieved by appealing to the rhetoric of the planning process or through persuading dissenters. This implies that the shift from development to use or from use to development is also an emergent phenomenon. If that is the case, then, hypothetically, one might expect that the same scenario developed in precisely the same way may, in the hands of one group, be interpreted as “definitively ready for use,” while, in the hands of another group, be interpreted as “still in need of development,” despite being the same scenario or even the same scenario with the same group just at another time. In what follows, the authors translate known techniques for achieving closure in scientific controversy to the scenario method. These techniques to achieve social consensus, though numbered, do not exist in any sequential or chronological order; the authors propose: (1) Critically assessing narratives in support of the plan; (2) Bringing new examination procedures to bear on narratives for the plan; (3) Isolating an alternative-narrative as either less plausible or unethical2; (4) Demonstrating greater pragmatic utility of one narrative relative to another; or (5) Portraying non-mainstream plans and narratives as less relevant or reliable.

Likewise, these techniques can also be used, although in the reverse, to counteract previously established closure, and, thus, by calling consensus into question.3 Now, the authors turn to methods. 5. Methods

(1) Critically assessing core evidence in support of the claim; (2) Bringing new examination procedures to bear on evidence for the claim; (3) Isolating a counter-position as either less rigorous or unethical; (4) Demonstrating greater pragmatic utility of one position relative to another; or (5) Portraying non-mainstream viewpoints as less relevant or reliable (Sismondo, 2010: 130–32).

In all, a controversy reaches closure through interaction and negotiation, which involves establishing consensus among relevant scientists. This can be observed slowly, over the course of macro paradigmatic shifts (e.g., Kuhn, 1962), although research in laboratory studies indicates that this same sort of process can be ethnographically observed at the micro-level of laboratory work (e.g., Latour and Woolgar, 1986) and scientific claims-making that can be empirically analyzed through conversation analysis (e.g., Lynch, 1985). Also worthy of mention, techniques for achieving closure can also be used, although in the reverse, to re-ignite a previously stabilized controversy and, thus, call socially negotiated consensus into question. The authors make the same general argument here for the scenario method. During development, a scenario transitions to use if questions are raised during development are satisfied using one or more of

The authors are a research team, and, technically, they deploy two methods in this research endeavor. One method is applied; the scenario method deployed by the second author as an intervention technique in an organization. As a facilitator, the second author specializes in discussion-based long-term strategic scenario planning processes, primarily in Scandinavia and Northern Europe, and contributes professional experience to this endeavor. The other method is an empirical method; the ethnographic method deployed by the first author. An academic, the 2 Author 2 contends that scenario narratives, in and of themselves, are not typically subjected to ethical judgment, given that they are hypothetical; however, plans formed in conjunction with narratives are, and, thus, whether or not that is deemed a pressing concern during development is an empirical question. 3 The authors substitute “plan” for “claim” and “narrative” for “evidence,” respectively; the underlying logic being that a posited plan (like a posited claim) is supported by the narrative (similar to how evidence supports a scientific claim). Critically assessing the narrative, therefore, is a key mechanism for stabilizing a plan (i.e., achieving simulated closure); after all, consensus that a plan is the “right course” seems unlikely to be established if participants view the narrative as ostensibly “un-tested.” Alternatively, critically assessing a previously established narrative is also, for example, a viable mechanism for de-stabilizing consensus and calling into question the plan (i.e., re-igniting simulated controversy). Notice that the same mechanism can be used to stabilize or de-stabilize the plan; which is, in principle, merely a matter of which side of the “simulated controversy” one inhabits. Additionally, the authors interpret “position” and, ipso facto, “counterposition” to be a combination of evidence and claim, hence, the authors substitute plan or narrative for position and “counter-plan” or “counter-narrative” for counter-position.


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first author observes and shadows the second author, but does not participate in or facilitate the planning process. The second author applies the scenario method in order to develop multiple futures in a participatory setting and explore contingencies relevant to an issue, geographical area, or institution (van Notten et al., 2003). As an artifact of the method, scenarios, in their final form, are often formatted as narratives describing either a static snapshot in a fixed future or a timeline of events that occur as a result of the outputs of dynamic systems. Time horizons vary but are generally sufficient to allow for strategizing and planning under uncertainty in a number of futures. In this tradition, scenarios may include various quantitative indicators derived from assumptions that can be used as descriptors to provide qualitative richness to a scenario narrative. The first author deploys an observational approach to ethnography: the sociologically-informed “extended case method” (Burawoy, 1988).4 By establishing an “a-priori theoretical framing” for the project prior to observation and analysis, this approach affords the researcher the chance to deliver theory-driven ethnographic observations that illustrate otherwise abstract concepts, processes, or, in this case, mechanisms (Tavory and Timmermans, 2009: 244). The extended case method is a critical alternative to “grounded theory;” the purpose of which is to enter the field with the explicit aim of developing new theory from where none existed before. The analysis below is not of the applied scenario method but an ethnographic analysis of a series of facilitated scenario planning workshops. After describing their data, the authors demonstrate – with a series of vignettes drawn from practice – the micro-level human interactions wherein socially negotiated consensus, in the course of scenario planning, either unfolds or is called into question. The resulting analysis may appear overly descriptive to some readers; however, delivering theory-driven ethnographic observations of abstract phases and processes as they actually unfold during the application of the scenario method is a clear instance of what ethnography is designed to accomplish as an empirical method. In this case, the amount of time spent applying the scenario method was approximately 50 h, which is the same number of hours spent observing them. Observational data are informed by field notes and brief exit interviews but are primarily based on audio recordings, which were transcribed for analysis.

6. Case background The client organization is a non-profit, non-governmental organization (NGO) in Denmark. They serve vulnerable pregnant and young mothers with general counseling, legal help, networking, and educational training. The organization primarily receives funding from the public sector through contracts to deliver services that target groups as defined by municipalities, but also through private donations. Staff includes more than 1000 volunteers nation-wide and paid professional psychologists, social workers, and administration. The organization has evolved into a flexible service provider after many decades of shifting government priorities and ideologies that rewarded adaptability as an organizational disposition. In fact, the organization has been absorbed into the state apparatus on multiple occasions when public sector authorities deemed it to be either competition or redundant in the provision of government services. The organization has been an autonomous entity with regard to setting strategic direction for more than 30 years, but still relies heavily on public-sector contracts to maintain its professional social service and psychology staff. Leadership has a legitimate concern regarding organizational continuity given its off-and-on history as a state apparatus, and, as we shall see, this concern manifests itself in the forthcoming discussions. The planning process occurred as follows: Before engaging the client organization, the second author led a training seminar to expose 4

For a critique of this method, see Eliasoph and Lichterman (1999).

managers in the Danish NGO sector to scenario planning. The scenario method followed Schwartz' (1996) approach, where critical uncertainties were brainstormed, ranked for impact, and crossed to create a 2 × 2 matrix of four scenarios. Facilitating that training seminar and interviews prior provided the facilitator with practical knowledge about the contemporary Danish NGO context. The second author later solicited a CEO of a Danish NGO, citing experience given the training seminar, who agreed to undertake a demonstration together with his top four executive officers. The demonstration included a walk-through of the trends, uncertainties, and 2 × 2 matrix generated at the training seminar. Time was limited, so the facilitator had the executive committee focus on engaging with the labeled – but otherwise empty – axis and to suggest content for each of the scenarios. The framing question was, “what would each of these worlds, in the year 2025, look or feel like?” and discussion ensued. After the initial meeting, the second author was then asked – and subsequently agreed – to repeat the demonstration for the 12-member board of directors. The first vignettes (I and II) are drawn from this demonstration. After the demonstration with the board, 5 full-day workshops for managers were contracted and conducted over a period of 5 weeks. Workshop participants were paid professional managers; they constituted a cross-section of departments in the NGO, and totaled 15 participants per session. The vignettes are drawn from the second day (III) and the fourth day (IV) of this workshop. The final vignette (V) is based on a follow-up, post-planning interview with the NGO's CEO. 7. Vignette I: “… how about [Municipality X]?” Once the group was fully assembled, the facilitator was asked to leave the conference room while the other author remained silently in the corner. The board conferred over minor business, mainly reminding everyone who the facilitator was and what the “end-goals” of the meeting were, namely, that this was going to be a demonstration of scenariobased thinking and that afterward the board needed to decide if contracting the facilitator for a series of workshops for managers was reasonable. After five minutes, an assistant called the facilitator back in. The lights dim. Having set-up slides and a projector in advance, the facilitator, still standing amid the seated board members, begins the demonstration. Within a few minutes of introductory remarks, and without meta-narration of the scenario method, the facilitator advances to a slide with “predetermined” axes (i.e., wherein an already established axes with labels) that had been “constructed and vetted in the earlier training seminar and [in] a brief encounter with [your] executive officers.” The facilitator asked the board members if they could “name” each quadrant with a conceptual or metaphorical “title.” The group sits in silence for 8 to 10 s. The facilitator is also silent, surveys the room, although it is unclear for what. The facilitator turns around, back to the room, reaches for a whiteboard pen, and replicates the slide on the whiteboard. “Remember we are way out in the year 2025.” The facilitator narrates the labels and quadrant “logics” out loud as he draws. Board members seem to be either squinting in concentration up at the empty matrix or fiddling with whatever they have in front of them. One has pulled out their smartphone; the glow conspicuously reflecting back up on the board member's face. The silence is broken when a member of the board states “for quadrant B,... how about [Municipality X]?” The suggestion was met with half-suppressed, complicit laughter from some of the other participants. The facilitator intervened immediately: Facilitator: Okay, wait a second. Up here, in B? [points to quadrant B] Municipality X? That one located on the outskirts, just ... [outside] of Copenhagen?Board Member 1: Yes [more chuckles; smiles and eye contact exchanged among the board members].Facilitator: Okay, I've been there [pause]. But why that particular municipality – what is it about Municipality X that fits here?Board Member 1: Well, let's just



say they do things a bit differently than the other municipalities. They are unique [more snickers].Facilitator: Can you explain why?Board Member 2: They are certainly not famous for their competence.Facilitator: What are they famous for? Are they corrupt?Board Member 1: No, no. Not at all; that is not what I am saying.Board Member 2: No, of course not.Board Member 1: They just do things [pause]. They have their heart in the right place, but they can be rather unpredictable. No real logic to the decisions they make. There is no, no kind of consistency to the programs; it is like they are stuck; they are decades behind. Facilitator writes the name of Municipality X on the whiteboard (upper-right quadrant), and then, after a brief pause, gestures to the orthogonally opposite quadrant (bottom-left): “Okay, well how about this one down here, then? What municipality would represent this quadrant?” After almost no pause, Board Member 2 offers, “That would be Municipality Y.” Nods around the room; utterances of agreement. The room quiets. The facilitator pens the name [re: Municipality Y]. Through the facilitator lens: This vignette (I) is a demonstration of the 2 × 2 axis—an exercise in dialectical thinking; rather than elaborate on the process or the underlying theory, showcasing the method provides a tour of the thinking required to scenario plan. It is a process that requires participation and the vignette describes a moment of tension when working with a new group – waiting for one or more individuals to overcome their reluctance to participate openly and seriously. Once participation ensues, the facilitator never really knows how well a suggested title registers with the group; in this case, the participants gravitated toward municipalities as a point of reference. “Municipality” is a multifaceted framework that invites comparison and is familiar to the board. The group then reacts to suggested titles or metaphors in an effort to judge their fit and suggest refinements or alternatives. Thus, for social consensus to exist at all regarding suggested titles, participants must – and we say this without irony – participate. To elicit participation, the facilitator endeavors to identify a “workable” frame of reference that is rich, familiar, incites comparison, and acts as a wellspring for producing understandable examples. It is upon those workable frames that consensus can grow or be called into question. Through the STS lens: In this vignette (I), the facilitator posits the procedure (i.e., the scenario method) as a useful form of inquiry for the organization to discover future contingencies. This implies showcasing the procedure itself and demonstrating how results from the scenario method are constructed, the primary goal of which is to have the scenario method be taken seriously in the first place. In STS terms, the facilitator has instigated a kind of controversy, rupturing facets of the status quo, by suggesting to board members that the organization supplement current planning procedures with the scenario method (mechanism #1). The facilitator must create social consensus with regard to at least two issues, namely, establishing that the organization has a series of open, unanswered questions in need of careful examination and that the scenario method can play a role in organizing and managing these questions. In seeing parallels between the scenario method and experimental scientific methods, according to Sismondo (2010: 105): The most straightforward attempts to discriminate among positions start from criticisms and questions about such things as the consistency and plausibility of positions, the solidity of experimental systems, and the appropriateness of experimental or observational procedures. To be taken seriously in the first place, an experiment must be designed so that there are few obvious unanswered questions that could affect how results are interpreted. At the moment in the vignette that the half-suppressed, complicit laughter unfolds, though it is counter-intuitive, the facilitator is being taken seriously as is the scenario method. The facilitator, in turn, leverages the shared, sustained attention on the scenario quadrants, and,

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with that, works to build additional consensus surrounding the utility of the method. 8. Vignette II: “That it not possible; that will never happen.” Shortly thereafter, the group agrees on titles; the facilitator pens them into each of the four quadrants on the whiteboard. Social consensus momentarily stabilizes, and the facilitator pivots, addressing the group once again: Facilitator: So, let's go back to scenario B up here. What if all of Denmark's municipalities start behaving like this municipality [gesturing to the upper-right quadrant], what would be our reaction? Again, imagine we are ahead out in the year 2025: What would we be doing differently? What services do we provide? What services are we no longer providing?Board Member 3: That it not possible; that will never happen.Facilitator: Why not?Board Member 3: The whole country's municipalities? All of them? They would never transform into that.Facilitator: Why not?Board Member 3: We are beyond that. That is simply not going to happen.Facilitator: What would it take? What would have to happen, for all of the municipalities to start behaving like the way that Municipality X does? After a pause, another board member offers an explanation of some contingencies for how such an outcome could conceivably unfold. Another pause; participants seem to ponder the plausibility of the explanation. Observing this, the facilitator states: Remember that this is, at heart, only a thought experiment. No one knows for sure what the future may hold. We are here to explore and to examine a range of future possibilities. But first we need to be able to suspend our disbelief because only by exploring these quadrants we can expand our foresight. Hey, [Board member 3], of course, you're right. We all know that. [Board Member 3 still grimacing; short pause] But that's not the point. It's not. After all, this is only a game – so just try to play along for a minute [the board sits in attentive silence]. So, how would we react? What would we do? The facilitator, in effect, forces the question. The objector (i.e., “that will never happen”) is neutralized; seemingly unsatisfied, but still silent. Board Member 3 momentarily withdraws from participating. The facilitator re-focuses the group: “So, in this scenario, what services do we provide, or, which do we no longer provide?” … and the process continues. Through the facilitator lens: Critical moments occur when the process itself is called into question. Detractors must be dealt with on the spot and with great care, especially when limited time is permitted to complete the demonstration. Boards and top-level management often make decisions on a consensus basis, so these moments require a balanced hand. The value of the objector's comments must be validated; however, experience tells the facilitator that no objector should be allowed to stifle the whole process. While asking detractors to play along is only a temporary fix, it is, oftentimes, a more optimal solution than engaging, pleading with, or confronting them – publicly, and in the moment – to change their opinion. Through the STS lens: On the surface, this vignette (II) is instructive in understanding how easily consensus can be called in question; in this case, by portraying the scenario method as an unreliable source of useful results (mechanism #5). After all, “that will never happen” is not merely an indictment of the facilitator's inquiry; it calls into question the method itself, as if to say, “if this is how the method works, then the method is not useful.” Still, at a deeper level, the vignette reveals something else. In attempts to neutralize the objector, the facilitator does not achieve consensus in what one might call an “organic” way. The objector is not brought into the pack, but isolated from it. The facilitator makes a number of moves to deflate the situation: the planning process is called a “thought experiment,” thus making the objector seem unreasonable;


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the method requires that participants “be able to suspend ... disbelief,” thus making the objector appear unable to do so; planning is metaphorically likened to a “game,” thus making the objector look unwilling to even “play along.” The facilitator, then, carries on with the demonstration. From the STS lens, what is striking is that consensus was not achieved; it was simulated. The facilitator simulates consensus by portraying the board member's position as unreasonable and, thus, renders their objection less than legitimate (mechanism #3). 9. Vignette III: “So, what would we do in such a scenario?” A few months later, on the second workshop day with the managers, the facilitator spends an hour and a half recapitulating the first workshop day that essentially repeats the 2 × 2 matrix demonstration conducted previously with the board (see Vignettes I and II). At this point, managers agree on titles for the quadrants; no further objections arise. The facilitator then passes out a three-page worksheet squarely in front of each participant, divides the room into four small groups, and assigns each group a quadrant. The worksheet contains a series of questions to be answered in the context of the assigned quadrant. The facilitator allocates nearly three hours; the worksheets, once completed, serve as input for later scenario drafts. In what follows, the reader is introduced to a brief portion of these activities, wherein social consensus is first established within a small group and their work is presented to the broader group. The second task on the worksheet, after writing in the title of the quadrant that was proposed in plenum, is to “define” (i.e., assign or create) a newspaper headline appropriate for the circumstances established in the quadrant for the year 2025. Participants slowly start to participate in the exercise. The headline is a well-understood formula for mass communication and it embeds the quadrant title in a broader, more public operating environment that is not limited to the internal dynamics and logics of the planning organization. The following dialog unfolds between managers Felix and Astrid on planning day two: Felix: [smiling] Okay, so what might be a headline from the future? [pause]Astrid: Perhaps something about how the welfare state has eroded[?], that “Sun Has Set Over Welfare State” [spoken slowly while writing it down on the worksheet].Felix: Okay, changes in the welfare state. Jah, makes sense. “End of the Danish Welfare State” [also writing on worksheet]. So, the state is dead as we know it. [Reading from the worksheet] Next question: “How does that impact us?” How can't that impact us? [laughs]Facilitator: [walking by, facilitator interjects] The state. Good. So with that headline, what would this would be like? What would this world feel like? What does your stomach tell you?Astrid: Well, if people are more individuals, then they want less direct government intervention into their daily lives. In some ways, that's fine. There would be more dependence on charities and NGOs, so a smaller government, that is interested in maintaining high levels of social services, which Denmark would be, would need more third sector partners than before. The slow march to hollow the welfare state happens in between now and 2025. That is the world we would be living in.Facilitator: Okay, so: you are in 2025, what can we do about it?Felix: Why do we need to do anything about it? We will have adapted by then, eh? [shakes head]Astrid: Well [raising hand, possibly to interject or quiet Felix], to start, we emphasize that we are experienced in this sort of partnership with the state in our outgoing communications and marketing materials. This would work for us double-duty, telling the state we are good partners and telling citizens how accustomed we are to this new form of the delivery of services and that we work well with what is left of the state to help them. From there, … [Astrid goes on; lays out an impressive vision] Once each small group establishes their headline(s) for 2025 over a period of five to ten minutes, the facilitator addresses the group as a

whole indicating that it was time to share headlines. The facilitator points to Felix and Astrid's assigned quadrant. Astrid responds, “that was our quadrant. We were assigned that one …” and repeats, nearly verbatim, previous discussion with Felix, this time to the whole group. Astrid describes the limited role of local government into the provision of some social services and related marketing techniques, followed by her opinions about the quality of service possible under such circumstances. “What else might be true in this scenario?” the facilitator inquires. “Would anyone like to elaborate on this?” The room is now silent. The facilitator waits, scanning the room. “Is this the case? Does everyone agree, at least for now?” the facilitator asks. Managers look at one another; nods of consent around the conference table. The room is still silent. Felix interjects, “Yeah, but, so what do we do with it? … so, what would we do in such a scenario?” The facilitator smiles; points at Felix: “Good question.” Through the facilitator lens: It might be counterintuitive to some readers that social consensus is facilitated by breaking the larger group into smaller groups. Assigning quadrants to small groups and giving them time to develop scenario content allows them to become specialists of that content. Dividing up the scenarios puts each group on a trajectory, and because strategy is relative to context, the group also specializes in the strategy for the assigned future. Provided that consensus can be achieved through negotiation within smaller groups, this splitting process facilitates social consensus by creating de facto champions in support of each quadrant (once the group reunites in order to share their work). Asking participants to present their ideas, and then having them defend and elaborate on them in question-and-answer exchanges, further establishes each small group as their scenario's champion. Additionally, while title and headline might appear nearly synonymous, they serve two different exploratory functions in practice. In previous vignettes (I and II), “municipality” constituted a workable frame for establishing titles in the matrix overall because the most productive titles are context-relevant and incite rich comparison across quadrants; newspaper headlines are yet another title-based framework for exploration; however, in this vignette (III), they frame the narrative for specific quadrants rather than the matrix overall. Through the STS lens: In the previous vignette (II), readers observed what might be called simulated consensus; the facilitator isolated the objector, renders their objection less than legitimate, and asks participants to suspend their momentary disbelief, thus, simulating rather than achieving consensus in the group. In this vignette (III), readers observe the laborious process of achieving social consensus organically. In the context of a conversation aided by a worksheet, consensus is slow to build. Participants (e.g., Felix) may be reluctant to take the production of headlines seriously, for example, by mocking the process or resisting the facilitator (mechanism #3); other participants (e.g., Astrid) may persist in the task, effectively un-phased by the reluctant peers, and press on in their contribution (mechanism #4). This frustrating, meandering process is what achieving social consensus looks like when it happens in real-life situations. The process unfolds in this fashion until a participant utters some variation of Felix's question: “So, what would we do in such a scenario?” Questions like this mark a tentative shift in the planning process – provided Felix is not challenged – away from further development into use (provided “do” implies “use” in Felix's question). Also, notice that the facilitator is reluctant to shift from development to use – instead, repeatedly beseeching the group to voice their criticisms – until the facilitator is convinced that the group agrees on the scenario. This is in stark contrast to previous vignette (II) wherein consensus was simulated in quickstep for the purpose of demonstration. 10. Vignette IV: “It is not so much that they are wrong; I mean, they can be better, I think ...” After two Fridays of scenario planning with the managers, the axes “[w]ill NGO effectiveness be evaluated through measurable impacts



OR by brand perception?” and “[w]ill Danish society be recognizable through social cohesion (sammenhængskraft) OR individualism?” stabilize. On the fourth Friday, however, the pattern did not repeat. The authors now demonstrate how this situation transpired. A manager fittingly summarized the experience, saying, “I cannot be the only one who feels, somewhat ironically, uncertain about these uncertainties – I mean, am I right, or?” Another manager, in response, “... going forward, obviously, all these uncertainties have a high-impact on all Danish NGOs; however, are these the uncertainties that are useful for us right now, that we want to plan with? It is not so much that they are wrong; I mean, they can be better, I think, or [trails off].” A single Danish term was isolated and identified for tinkering; a semantic discussion unfolds: Manager 1: Collective versus togetherness? I just don't get it. After all, sammenhængskraft is meaning more like the sense connection.Manager 2: No, sammenhængskraft is more or less the opposite of individualisme, it is fine, that's togetherness.Manager 3: No, that is not the point, the change is not needed in individualisme.Manager 1: Jah, sammenhægskraft is like, emotional; it is an emotion-based idea; a feeling of togetherness. That is not the point here; we are not talking about emotional states in these things. Otherwise individualisme would need to be something like [pause] isolation or loneliness or something.Manager 3: Yeah, it is more like fælleskab. Without sammenhægskraft there is not fælleskab. That is really what we are talking about: fælleskab. So, if sammenhægskraft is emotion-based, fælleskab is people-based. It is more like a description of like social networks, trust, norms. Without sammenhægskraft there is no fælleskab; fælleskab is the real opposite of individualisme. Why would we build scenarios around this? [group nods, nearly in unison] It only takes a moment, but the facilitator makes impromptu changes in the presentation slide while the image of the slide is still projected on the screen [thus, shifting from the left to middle tile of Fig. 1]. The group nods in approval. “So, fælleskab and individualisme,” the facilitator states inputting the terms. Manager 3 continues, completing the facilitator's statement: So, sammenhængskraft is the measuring stick between individualisme and fælleskab, it is literally like the density of human connections or preferences for connectiveness and social trust rather than feelings associated with them, which generate the connection. So, weak saæmmenhængskraft is individualisme, or it creates it, it is complicated; sammenhængskraft is the measuring stick; yeah, strong sæmmenhængskraft [pause], that is fælleskab. Re-examination, however, is not yet over; the titles change again. While simulating controversy surely upsets previous consensus, closure is still incomplete. It continues: Manager 3: Still, is anyone else really happy with individualisme? Sure, it is an alternative to fælleskab, but that is not capturing the

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experience of the consumer in the economic environment, in prescribe … [groans], in describing their response to the environment.Manager 1: What do you mean?Manger 3: So, like what is it about being an individual that makes you think about services differently? Is there really something about being individual? Individualisme, it's like being unique or being yourself. That is not the driving force for the consumer; they will not look to our product rather than our competitor's because our product allows them to express their individuality. Do you see what I am saying here?Manager 1: Yeah, but individualisme is being an individual, being alone.Manager 3: Precisely, that's right, as a consumer you are on your own. Instead of relying on social services, you are stuck all by yourself.Manger 2: Are you saying adjust individualisme (individualism) to be selvstændigt (self-sufficiency)?Manager 3: Yes, yes, yes. That is what we want. We need to think of the consumer's relationship to the product, not their emotional state or nonsense about uniqueness. It is not about uniqueness. The consumer's POV [pointof-view], that is what we need. It is about reliance: do we rely on the group, fælleskab, or do we rely on our self, selvstændigt. That is it. Yeah, fælleskab and selvstændigt. The group faces the facilitator who is, once again, amending the slide [the right tile of Fig. 1]. The choice negotiated here is a choice of terms. Through the facilitator lens: The pairing of uncertainties, whether by trial-and-error, by ranking, clustering techniques, or voting for “highest-impact” and “most uncertain,” provide different pathways towards the same goal: To establishing a consensus around an axis. The axis that will eventually be decided upon will serve the needs of the group by allowing them to have the conversation that they want to. In the micro-negotiation of terms, managers re-jig the matrix, creating a new stable formation to build consensus around. While some of these seemingly superficial, semantic discussions might seem fickle, for individuals with agendas, these intense moments of negotiation can open space for maneuvering. Through the STS lens: This tinkering, similar to the calibration of an instrument, allows the group to readjust the previous plans and narratives supported by the scenario framework (mechanism #2). This emergent process brings into being a framework deemed more appropriate for examining a set of future possibilities particular to that moment, as compared to other narratives treated as less relevant and less useful (mechanism #4). This is what dynamic iteration looks like between and within phases. Participants go from use to development to use again; during the development stage, the group develops multiple matrixes, compares them, and selects between them. The matrix that is ultimately selected is it not “correct” or “ready for use;” it is simply the one deemed satisfactory to that group in that particular planning process. 11. Vignette V: “... rotate [our core staff] out [and replace them with] enthusiastic volunteers.” A year has passed since the planning interventions and the facilitator visits the new office premises of the case company in the end of 2016. They recently relocated to a part of town known for precarious,

Fig. 1. Three iterations.


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unsavory activity. Given their mission to serve young vulnerable mothers and families, this new location put them “in the middle of the action.” The facilitator questions the CEO about the strategy and development path of the organization. About forty minutes into an hourlong interview, the CEO recalled a moment in the scenario workshop. CEO: … ahhh, there was a profound moment in that scenario.Facilitator: What was it?CEO: We were doing the timeline for the “Sun sets on the welfare state” scenario, and we found some rather disturbing events that would drive that scenario [pause]. Fear, economic decline [pause]; a drop in all factors; I mean, from the radicalization and terror would bring about more populism [pause]. Do you remember that?Facilitator: Yes, I remember.CEO: So, what am I going to do about it, ... [names himself]? That was very interesting to prepare for a very different situation. And the answer is, well, we would have a very different strategy. ... We would put a lot more emphasis on the voluntary part. And I would have to design the organization differently. … You see, our move, for better or for worse, would have been to ride that wave, establish our place, and that would require redesign [of the organization]. We would have to rethink the whole. We would rely on our volunteers more; bring them into the core of the organization.Facilitator: To replace core staff?CEO: Yes, rotate [our core staff] out [and replace them with] enthusiastic volunteers.Facilitator: What's the problem?CEO: We would first have to get it through the organization and the board. Then, what it would take would be to refocus HR to recruit and train volunteers instead of paid staff. But it would have been the right move [pause]; and still it seems to be the winning strategy, regardless of the scenario. The interview continues with the CEO self-blaming for not spending more time on that scenario, for not being braver, for not getting colleagues to consider what implementation would require. The CEO elaborates on contingencies; that even if the board approves such a strategy, there would be protest not only from the staff, but also the fundraising units, the volunteers that have relationships with core staff, municipality service procurement officers, and other untold constituents. The CEO voices the need to be careful when presenting new ideas, to keep undue stress off of the organization, and that it is better to communicate strategic change incrementally rather than radically. If one phrase lingers, it is “regardless of the scenario.” Under the circumstances of broad populist sentiment, a reasonable, legitimate response would be to “rotate [our core staff] out [and replace them with] enthusiastic volunteers.” However, for the CEO, the planning process brought with it another insight about staff and volunteers. As the CEO later revealed, rotating out staff and rotating in volunteers would also make sense “regardless of the scenario” (i.e., even if not as part of a response to an economic decline or a populist shift, and, instead, a strategic response to business as usual). As van der Heijden (2005: 65) predicts, the scenario was deemed to be a kind of “success” in that it produced new entrepreneurial insight for re-envisioning the structure of the NGO; however, the CEO had no stated intention to pursue it at the time of the interview. Through the facilitator lens: There are limits to the scenario method; about which inquiries into the future can and cannot, will or will not be examined. Such an instance is shown here: The CEO uncovers circumstances under which paid staff could be replaced with volunteers; however, the CEO would need to conduct planning with managers to implement such a strategy. The CEO envisions the infeasibility of such planning; it is not impossible from within the planning process; it is a perceived impossibility of the planning process as a socially negotiated endeavor. Thus, although a winning strategy may have been identified, the CEO elects not to explore further the strategy. The limitation is neither the desire to know nor the method for knowing; the limitation is social. Through the STS lens: It is perhaps no coincidence that this particular planning concern was raised outside the confines of the formal planning

process. These sorts of discussions, when coming from leadership and which rupture the status quo, are suppressed in the workshop setting. This, the authors contend, is likely the case for internal political reasons; even when simulated, asking participants to plan for a future that systematically harms, marginalizes, or excludes them is unlikely a fruitful context for achieving social consensus. That said, post-planning interviews might generate data useful for these sorts of analyses. In this case, the CEO portrays the non-mainstream plan as correct but untenable and, thus, as unsuitable for development (mechanism #5). 12. Conclusion In this article, the authors identify sequential (i.e., linear, chronological) and recursive (i.e., iterative, repeating) models of the scenario method. Both models are based on practice, yet neither model has a sufficient theoretical foundation, which is a general concern in the futures studies literature (Rowland and Spaniol, 2015). From within the futures studies literature, namely, Ramirez et al.s (2015) call to see the scenario method as a research tool and van der Heijden's (2005) call to see scenario planning as a sort of laboratory, the authors sought-out theoretical justification for sequential and recursive models in futures studies from literature in STS based on knowledge production. With emphasis on research tools and laboratory settings, the authors articulate a socially negotiated understanding of the scenario method in order to explain transitions from one planning phase to the next (in sequential models) and iteration between and within planning phases (in recursive models). To examine this possibility, the authors examined the interplay between scenario development and use through a series of vignettes drawn selectively from a planning process with a Danish NGO. There are implications for practice and scholarship. The upshot for facilitators is practical insight into how transition between phases and phase iteration in scenario planning can be identified, leveraged, and, thus, managed. The social foundation of the scenario method rests on interacting negotiators wielding mechanisms to challenge and debate knowledge produced during the planning process. The authors identify the relationship between development and use as co-constitutive and, possibly, co-dependent; the multifaceted, familiar, and comparable, when called into question, are reexamined and replaced. It is participation in the negotiation, not presence nor process, which builds-upon and replaces knowledge generated by previous planning with new or alternative information. The authors find that ideas developed through planning practices might be developed sequentially or recursively, depending upon the group or the day; however, one constant remains: linear or iterative, they all develop through negotiated trials. We find that asking participants to defend ideas they generate during the course of scenario development lends collateral legitimacy to the scenario method by creating de facto champions. The authors also showed how even “winning” or “right” strategies, if deemed to be unacceptable to plan for, would not be developed for social reasons unrelated to the ability or desire to do so. Should facilitators, in light of the social foundations of scenario planning, do away with linear models? Absolutely not. The authors cannot underscore enough the practical utility of presenting – to potential clients – an unambiguous process that unfolds according to a linear arrangement of phases, stages, or steps. The authors know that scenario projects are mostly facilitated by external experts, consultants, or academic-practitioners, and that such projects, in practice, will be subject to time and budget constraints; therefore, to convincingly showcase the scenario method to potential clients, contents and outputs must be disclosed, hence, the utility of a linear description of “phases” serves to frame the scenario process as a whole. The upshot for scholars is a related insight into why scenario planning is a kind of laboratory for futures studies wherein the future is experimented upon. To borrow a phrase from Merton (1959: xxvixxix), the study of laboratory experimentation is a “strategic research site” for examining the conduct of science. If scholars in futures studies



conceive of the scenario method in similar terms (i.e., as overtly experimental), then insight into “experimental systems” becomes germane. According to Rheinberger (1997: 28), experimental systems: … are systems of manipulation designed to give unknown answers to questions that the experimenters themselves are not yet able clearly to ask … They are not simply experimental devices that generate answers; experimental systems are vehicles for materializing questions. They inextricably cogenerate the phenomena or material entities and the concepts they come to embody. By extension, the scenario method can be conceptualized as a “system of manipulation” and vehicle for “materializing questions” that – and this is the leap – “inextricably cogenerate the phenomena ... they come to embody.” This notion of co-production, or how scientific knowledge and social order typically aid in the production and extension of one another, is a core insight from STS (Jasanoff, 2004). The coproduction hypothesis could be applied to scenario planning in future(s) research, especially with regard to articulating how planning contributes to social order and social order shapes planning. In all, the application potential of literature in STS for use in futures studies is ample. In closing, the authors would be remiss not to consider various limitations and possible liabilities for future(s) research. If scholars interpret Ramirez et al. (2015) and van der Heijden's (2005) claims from knowledge production literature, then some awkward realities set in, especially associated with reflexivity (Passoth, Rowland, 2013). The preoccupation with reflexivity in STS is fixated on the production of scientific accounts, in particular, in the production of scientific accounts about producing scientific accounts. The practice, which is at the core of STS, raises significant concerns not easily overcome. Latour and Woolgar (1986, 275–6) conclude Laboratory Life, a seminal text in laboratory studies, by asking if social scientists can “go on being instrumentally realist in … [their] own research practices while proclaiming the need to demystify this tendency among natural scientists?” Thus, if one calls into question the account-making practices of scientists, then one should also be willing to call into question one's own account-making practices that capture the account-making practices of those very same scientists. Outside of this light, it is hard to fully appreciate the radical – and radically productive – implications of Ramirez et al. (2015) and van der Heijden's (2005) claims. Research tools are fact-making devices; laboratories are exploratory settings for the discovery of reality. If the scenario method and scenario planning, respectively, are viewed through this prism, then scholars conducting empirical research about the scenario method must begin to make sense of the type(s) of truth production practices they observe and take precaution in confronting how their truth production practices square-with the type(s) of truth production practices they observe. While future(s) research in this area is ripe with open questions, simply consider the STS conundrum if it were fully embedded within futures studies: what theoretical, analytical, methodological, epistemological, and ontological issues might be raised in applying the scenario method to the scenario method or, on balance, examining the laboratory of scenario planning from inside the laboratory of scenario planning? This is not merely postmodern claptrap or wordplay. Such a radical consideration is the next logical next step in a research trajectory outlined by Ramirez et al. (2015) and van der Heijden (2005).

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