Bott has defined social network as a set of social relationships for which there is ... The logical consequences of this observation for the social network.
Social Network as a Subjective Construct: A New Application for an Old Idea*
R O B E R T A. S T E B B I N S / MemorialUniversityofNewfoundl’and Bott a dCfini le rCseau social comme Ctant un ensemble de relations sociales qui ne posshdent pas de frontikres communes. Par ailleurs personne ne s’est prCoccup6 &explorer les rCpercussions qu’engendrent cette connexion entre ces deux concepts. En se basant sur la dC6nition WebCrienne d’une relation sociale ou interpersonnelle (IR), il devient 6vident qu’essentiellement c’est une orientation mutuelle entre deux individus; c’est une perception subjective ou une prhdisposition. Les conskquences logiques de cette observation par rapport au rCseau social sont examinks. On arrive i la conclusion que les rCseaux sont aussi des modeles subjectifs et, par voie de consCquence, ils possiident le pouvoir de guider la conduite dans une situation sociale. Bott has defined social network as a set of social relationships for which there is no common boundary. Yet, no one has ever bothered to explore the implications of this connection between these two concepts. By examining Weber’s definition of social or interpersonal relationship (IR) , it becomes evident that it is basically a “mutual orientation” between two persons; it is a subjective construct or predisposition. The logical consequences of this observation for the social network are considered, and it is concluded that networks are also subjective constructs and therefore have the potential to guide behaviour in the social situation. The ever-growing body of literature incorporating the notion of “social network” into its analysis is strong evidence for the fertility of an idea formally introduced into social science by J. A. Barnes (1954). The numerous studies which have appeared since that time have related social network to an extensive array of subjects. A majority of these have employed this idea as an explanatory factor, explaining or helping to explain such diverse phenomena as social change, efficiency of communities as melting pots, links between the various groups in a society, social class, maintenance of rural ties, and nature of contacts outside the family (Epstein, 1961; Gutkind, 1965; P. Mayer, 1962; Mitchell, 1966; Srinivas and Beteille, 1964; Bott, 1957; Nelson, 1966; Young and Wilmott, 1957; Barnes, 1954). A somewhat smaller proportion of studies or summaries has treated social networks as objects of explanation while investigating influences of rural to urban migration on networks, formation of interpersonal relationships as they atrect networks, types of networks, gossip and networks, and how networks originate (Frankenberg, 1965; Katz, 1966; Adams, 1967; Bott, 1957; Barnes, 1954; Hannerz, 1968).
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1 would like to express my gratitude to D. Ralph Matthews and Robert Paine for their valuable comments on a draft of this paper. Rev. canad. k. & Anth./Canad. Rev. Soc. & Anth. 6(1)1969
For the purposes of this introductory discussion we can accept Bott’s definition of social network as a “set of social relationships for which there is no common boundary” (Bott, 1957:59). In the strict sense of the word a network is not a structure, since it has no shared boundaries (boundaries recognized by everyone in the social network) and no commonly recognized hierarchy or central co-ordinating agency. Nevertheless, there are interconnections between others in the network in that some of its members are directly in touch with each other while others are not. Thus, it is also a characteristic of networks that their mesh may be “closely-knit” (many members having direct contact) or “loosely-knit” (few members having direct contact) (Barnes, 1954; Bott, 1957:59). Many of the studies mentioned above provide evidence for Bott’s definition of social networks as comprised of social relationships. A certain amount of confusion has sprung up among those who have endeavoured to consider the idea of network on a theoretical plane. This confusion is almost entirely centred in the question of whether a network should be approached from the point of view of a particular person (egocentred perspective) or from a more totalistic stance in which the component relationships are seen as a sum total of every person’s network (holistic perspective). The ego-centred perspective is like the standpoint used in kinship analysis, whereas the holistic perspective focuses less on any particular point in the network than on the total structure of relationships. What has happened, as Adrian Mayer (1966) recently observed, is that Bott used network in an ego-centred sense, a usage which Barnes originally reserved for the term “set” which he never developed to any definitive degree.’ Most subsequent writers have continued to follow Bott, and we shall do the same here. This definition has become established in the parlance of anthropologists and sociologists. Outside of these few attempts at conceptual clarification, there has been a regrettable paucity of theoretical discussion about the concept of social network. In order to strengthen the explanatory power of this idea, we shall examine its logical connection with the concept of interpersonal or social relationship (IR) and the implications which this link has for the network as an explanation. The set of statements below will serve as a sort of itinerary for the theoretical excursion which follows: 1. Interpersonal relationships as mutual orientations between persons are basically psychological predispositions to respond which guide behaviour in the social situation. 2. Interpersonal relationships are the component parts of social networks. 3. If one or more of a person’s IRs influence his actions as they are being carried out with reference to still another IR, then we can say that part or all of that person’s social network directly guides his situated behaviour. 4. Therefore, we can say that a social network is also a psychological predisposition to respond. 2
1 For a critique of the term “social network” and the closely related notion of “field” (also used by Barnes), which is somewhat contradictory to Mayer, see Jay (1964).
5 . The observation that the network is a predisposition which can directly explain behaviour, although perhaps not wholly new, has received little or no systematic empirical or theoretical attention in the past. INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS
Max Weber I: 1947: 118) can be given credit for setting the basic theoretical foundation of the contemporary approach to social or interpersonal relationships: “The term ‘social relationship’ will be used to denote the behaviour of a plurality of actors in so far as, in its meaningful content, the action of each takes account of that of the others and is oriented in these terms. The social relationship thus consists entirely and exclusively in the existence of a probability that there will be, in some meaningfully understandable sense, a course of social a c t i ~ n . ”It~is clear from this quote and Weber’s subsequent discussion that “mutual orientation” is the essence of IR. In order to have a more concise definition at hand, which emphasizes this subjective quality, we shall redefine the interpersonal relationship as ego’s sustained orientation toward a particular alter which is perceived by ego to be reciprocated by that alter.3 Certain basic characteristics of IRS must first be discussed as a prerequisite to our later consideration of IRS as predispositions. Accordingly, we shall briefly review the intimate nature of IRS, their changeability, some of the reasons for their continuation, the relationship of sentiments to IRS, and the private culture of IRS. Interpersonal relationships are born in the prolonged interaction of two people, and it is not unusual to find that more than one has sprung up between them (Znaniecki, 1965:89).4Related to this observation is the fact that there is i l “strain toward totality” whereby “as time goes on, the flow of external events calls forth more and more of the total set of identities of the individuals involved” (McCall and Simmons, 1966: 186). Each of the parties in an IR recognizes the other as a distinct individual about whom he has some degree of prior knowledge (McCall and Simmons, 1966:169). This knowledge is not only historical knowledge about one’s partner but intimate knowledge as well, a facet of IRS which probably characterizes all but themarginal cases (Simmel, 1950: 12&127).j It is probably acknowledged by most participants in IRS that they are by no 2 Cooley (1922: 114-120) also approached IRS from a subjective point of view by treating them as clusters of sentiments attached to a symbol or image of another person. 3 Because IRS develop through sustained contact, it is probably safe to say that, in fact, they are reciprocated. There appears to be little likelihood that a normal person would see an IR between himself and another individual while the latter did not see one between them. Of course, the intensity of the sentiments involved may vary, as we shall see shortly. Evidence that IRS, in fact, are reciprocated can be found in Newcomb (1961 ). Schutz (1964: 111 ) presents what is basically an operational definition of an interpersonal relationship: “each of them [the partners in the IR] has the chance to reestablish the we-relation, if interrupted, and to continue it as if no intermittance had occurred.” 4 A common example of two IRS between the same parties is that of the father-son and employer-employee relationships. 5 Schutz (1964: 1 1 3 ) has also defined intimacy in an operational manner: “the degree of reliable knowledge we have of another person.”
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means totally static conditions even though some exhibit a greater constancy than others. Strauss notes that “involvements are evolvements - in the course of which parties and their relationships become transformed (Strauss, 1959:37). Thus, there are unevenly spaced high points in the career of any IR after which one is a difEerent person to the other and the other is difEerent to oneself. Such experiences along with less dramatic ones may actually effect the development of additional IRS, as when the boss invites his subordinate to accompany him on a fishing trip thereby initiating a sequence of interaction which may lead to a friendship relationship. It is also important for our purposes to recognize that while IRS quite frequently terminate, there are forces which may prevent this from happening. “Reward dependability” is a characteristic feature of many IRS and a major reason for their existence and continuation.6 Ascription, both desired and undesired, is a second compelling reason for maintaining a certain relationship, as well as for initiating it. Men may also be more or less forced to remain in an IR for reasons other than ascription. “Commitment,” as this process is sometimes referred to, is manifested by means of a variety of arrangements, such as the existence of pension funds and seniority rights which make it costly for a person to quit his job simply because he does not get along with his boss (Becker, 1960). Of course, the person may also become positively “attached” or involved in an IR.’ Furthermore, one’s investment in terms of time and other resources may operate to sustain a relationship. The effectiveness of these forces apparently depends somewhat upon the IR under consideration; for instance, kin relationships, at least for some segments of the population, are harder to break than others (Bott, 1957:93; McCall and Simmons, 1966: 179).
Sentiments and Interpersonal Relationships Essential to any discussion of IRS is the idea of sentiment, or the basic unit of organization of affect (Pear, 1964 :634-635 ) .8 A sentiment is the generalized feeling which one person has for the other in an IR, and it is to be identified through a pattern of response, rather than through any particular act (Shibutani, 1961:333). Thus, a man in love with a woman expresses different emotions according to the situation in which he finds himself; he expressesjoy in her presence, sorrow in her prolonged absence, fear when her life is in danger, and so forth. Sentiment organizes the appropriate emotions in the ongoing situation and it must be stressed that neither this underlying sentiment nor its emotional manifestations need always be positive in a relationship. One can have a negative IR with a neighbour or work superior, for instance, based upon the sentiment of hate, and it seems that this is especially likely to happen where he is committed to that IR. Although there is considerable empirical and theoretical work on specific negative relationships,
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6 Most of these forces are presented by McCall and Simmons (1966: 179). 7 For a further discussion of the distinction between attachment and commitment, see Stebbins (1969). 8 Some of the basic works on sentiment are those of Shand (1920), McDougall(1908), and Shibutani (1961).
general discussions of the nature of IRS tend to overlook this characteristic by by limiting their focus to relationships built on positive bonds 0nly.O Of course, the intensity of the sentiment in an IR varies from situation to situation for each person, as well as varying over the career of the relationship. Variation in the intensity of sentiments alerts us to the fact that sentiment is only part, albeit a very important part, of the meaning which an enduring IR may have for a person. An IR may also have rational, evaluative, and traditional meanings for those involved in them, and these forms of meaning may also vary from situation to situation and over the career of the relationship. If there were not several kinds of meaning contained in an IR, many relationships would probably disintegrate or come dangerously close to disintegration with each dip of the intensity of the supporting sentiment. We are assuming, of course, that no one will maintain an IR which does not hold some meaning for him.
The Private Culture Because IRS are basically subjectiveconstructs, it should be apparent that they develop from “virtual social identities” or the categories to which the parties of the relationship judge the other to belong (GofFman, 1963:2).1° These are to be distinguished from “actual social identities” or those categories to which one can be proved, by objective analysis, to belong and those attributes which one can be proved to possess. In the broad sense of the term, identities have roles attached to them; roles shall be defined here as sets of expectations of behaviour. This set of expectations can always be subdivided into a publicly-recognized component and a private component, the latter having been generated exclusively in the interaction of the two participants. The public expectations are generally acknowledged by members of the community to apply to those persons claiming to have or imputed to possess certain attributes and to those claiming to be or said to be members of certain categories. While there are always some community-wide or public expectations associated with them, for certain kinds of IRS (e.g., enemy, friend, and lover) the private aspect, nevertheless, is said tobeby farthelargest (Nadel, 1957:42). This private aspect of role is part of the larger “private culture” associated with the IR, which may include a rudimentary common language, common goals, memories of common experiences, and so forth. The recognition of a private culture associated with an IR contributes to the perception of the relationship as being unique among other relationships. Znterpersonul Relationships as Predispositions By treating interpersonal relationships as predispositions, we give them a more explicit psychological foundation, a foundation implied in the words “reciprocal” or “mutual” orientation found within the definitions presented 9 See, for example, S i m e l ( l 9 5 0 : 118-142) and McCall and Simmons (1966, chap. 7). 10 “Identity” is preferred over closely related ideas like “status,” “position,” and “rank” because of its apparently broader scope. For example, one can have the identity of neighbour, but we would not ordinarily call this a position or a status.
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earlier. Furthermore, as we shall see later, the proposition that IRS are predispositional is an essential part of the causal nexus linking this concept and that of social network to situated behaviour. Social relationships have traditionally been seen in this latter role of guiding behaviour, a view which can be traced back to Weber’s statement on this subject. However, their conceptualization as predispositions and, hence, as subjective constructs has never been clearly formulated. The usage of the term “predisposition”’ follows that of Campbell ( 1963:97-112). He limits his statement to acquired states, stressing the importance of the fact that predispositions (or as he calls them, ‘‘acquired behavioural dispositions”) are enduring and that they remain dormant until “activated” by situational stimuli. When activated, these products of past experience impinge upon our awareness, equip us with a specific view of the world, and guide behaviour in the immediate present. Values, attitudes, bits of knowledge, memory, habits, and meanings all have predispositionalqualiities about them. The use of the term “orientation” in definitions of the IR is itself a clue to the latter’s status as a predisposition. Webster’s Third International Dictionary defines an orientation in one sense of the word as the “choice or adjustment of associations, connections, or dispositions.” It is of interest that Campbell includes “adju~tment,’~ “orientation,” and “disposition” in his extensive list of acquired behavioural dispositions. In harmony with the definition of orientation as an adjustment of predispositions, there are several subsidiary presdispositions to be found in any IR. Knowledge about the other person, whether intimate or simply historical, may be considered as one such predisposition. The same is also true of the knowledge ego holds about alter’s expectations of him and other aspects of the private culture. Commitment or attachment to a particular IR is a predisposition and so are the sentiments and other meanings which are part of any relationship. Interpersonal relationships are also special views of the world; views which develop from their component subsidiary predispositions. It is perhaps this facet of IRS which explains best Nadel’s observation (1957:9) that there is a consistency about the many diverse acts which take place within them. Within wide limits “we may still say of persons in a given relationship that they act towards each other always in the same manner.” To the people in them IRS when activated have a very poignant reality which is manifested in at least three ways. First of all, the continuous interaction between the two parties works to emphasize the existence of the relationship. Secondly, the high points in the career of the IR also make the participants conscious of it. Finally, the basic sentiment and its various emotional expressions make the person aware of the relationship. T H E SOCIAL N E T W O R K
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As we have already observed, Bott’s definitionof social network ( 1957:59) indicates the importance of interpersonal relationships as the basic elements
of this construction. She viewed a social network as a “set of social relationships for which there is no common boundary.” However, we have also noted that the traditional approach to IRS is essentially predispositional which means that upon activation these mental states help guide behaviour in the immediate setting. Now., since most people have several relationships at any one period in their lives, there is a strong possibility that one or more of them will be activated during interaction with members of the community. Where the ongoing interchange is with one of ego’s relationship partners and his behaviour is at least partially guided by his reflection about one or more other IRS activated because they are relevant to the business at hand, we can say that all or a portion of his social network is influencing his actions. Because clusters of IRS, and perhaps not infrequently even the total set of IRS, can influence a person’s action in the situation, we are forced to conclude that the social network also has subjective or predispositional qualities.’l Awareness of the Social Network Like an IR, a social network as an activated predisposition must also be subjectively real to the individual whose network it is; that is, we are aware of activated predispositions. There is a considerable amount of theoretical discourse and empirical evidence in various social science fields which support this assertion. We shall briefly review some of them here. One of the ways subjective awareness is manifested is through the direct and indirect effects which IRS in a network have upon each other. Direct contact between others in the various IRS is especially likely where the social network is closely-knit. Under these circumstances what transpires between two people in one relationship may affect another relationship through transactions in the social network of the second person. In this way a chain reaction can be set up, becoming, for example, a form of social control (Epstein, 1961; Hannerz, 1968). This direct influence is also seen where a third party, an IR signific:ant in the network of both individuals, intercedes or threatens to intercede in the affairs of their I R . ’ ~For instance, Kemper (1968) found that wives arid parents influence ego’s response to alter in IRS established in a work organization. Another possibility of direct influence is seen in Newcomb’s A-B-x theory of the symmetry of orientation (1961, chap. 2). Where A is the central actor in an IR, B is his partner, and x is another person (for our purposes one with whom both have IRS), the following postulate may be advanced: “The stronger the forces toward A’S co-orientation in respect to B and x, ( a ) the greater A’S strain toward symmetry with B in respect to x; and ( 6 ) the greater the likelihood of increased symmetry as a consequence of one or more 11 Statements by B l u e r (1956), Cicourel (1964: 119), and Fenton (1968) all support
the belief that if structural variables can be said to influence ongoing behaviour, then they are mediated by the personal interpretation of the actor; and if personal interpretation has not been demonstrated, then any putative causal link between structure and behaviour may actually be no more than a chance correlation. 12 Nadel (1957:86-87) refers to this situation as the ‘triadization of roles.” See also Blau (l964:3 1-32).
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communicative acts.”13 The influencing force here is the desire on the part of the central actor to maintain some sort of cognitive equilibrium with respect to the elements of his social network through communication about this matter to his partner, B. The intensity of co-orientation determines which x’s will require symmetry. The possibilities of disequilibrium, and hence awareness of the network, are considerable when we remember that A may see himself in a positive or negative relationshipto B as well as to x. The various IRS also may have indirect effects through the person whose network it is. Much, if not all, of this can be fitted into one of the various balance theories, which are in many ways like Newcomb’s A-B-x model but do not involve communication with the actor’s partner. In general, a state of balance exists for the actor when the elements in the social network have noncontradictory relationships for him.The basic proposition in balance theory is that where there is imbalance a person strives to restore the state of balance. Udiie the A-B-x model the elements themselves are not, as a rule, in contact. Thus, when in one man’s social network his clergyman demands attitudes of racial equality whereas close friends in his neighbourhood demand attitudes of discrimination, a state of imbalance prevails. Balance theory hypothesizes that the individual in question will strive for balance, which may be achieved in various ways. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine these at the present time; our objective is simply to point out that the social network is very much a reality to the individual because of the pressures which originate within it.“ In addition to the pervasive influence of the component IRS on each other, the problems of trying to intermesh the daily and weekly routines associated with each relationship create an awareness of the over-all network. One comes to realize which IRS mean the most to him as he distributes his time to each. As McCall and Simmons (1966:246) put it, it is a concern of “agendaconstruction,” and one’s agenda “is not altogether a personal matter but must be interactively determined.” Because ofthe problems of agenda-construction connected with maintaining several IRS, the addition or loss of an IR also calls for a certain amount of planning, an activity which in itself makes one conscious of his network. Moreover, gaining new IRS or losing old ones may upset network balance or symmetry. It may be hypothesized that these problems are especially acute in what Bott (1957:95) has called the “transitional network”: where one is changing froma tightly-knit to a loosely-knit network, or vice versa. Finally, Moreno’s discussion (1960:W) about death in the social atom (see footnote 15) can be interpreted as illustrating these points: “If we happen to survive the ones we love or hate, we die a bit with them as we feel the shadow of death marching from one person in our social atom to another.”
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13 The term “a-orientation” or “simultaneous orientation” is equivalent to “attitude” in the more inclusive sense of refemng to both cathectic and cognitive tendencies. “Symmetry” refers to the similarities of A’S and B’S orientations to x. 14 For a further discussion and bibliography of some of the various balance models, see
Brown (1965,chap. 11).
size is also an important factor for agenda-construction;only so many IRS can be properly maintained in any given period of time. Thus, we can say that size makes the network subjectivelyreal by curtailing the addition of new relationships and by pushing the claims on one’s time resources to the limit. After assessing a variety of IRS, Jennings (1950:309)discovered that the typical maximum number was twelve. Nelson (1966) has provided some evidence from his study of families that tightly-knit networks are more demanding of time than the loosely-knit ones. Another important observation on the factor of size is supplied by Goodenough ( 1965:7) to the effect that the number of IRS depends upon how many are available, and this may vary from one culture to another. Finally, we may note that even if further expansion is possible from the point of view of the agenda, the psychological necessities of maintaining balance and symmetry set or strongly favour network growth in particular directions, directions which are compatible with the existing IRS. It would seem, in light of this last statement, that people also become at least partially committed to networks, as well as to certain IRS. Social Networks as Predispositions If social networks are to be accepted as predispositions, then we must be able to demonstrate this characteristic of them in a way independent of the dispositional nature of their component IRS.Just because each individual IR in the network is a tendency to respond is not reason enough to assert that the network as a whole or any subpart of it also has this quality when activated. What features of a social network and its various segments give it the alleged predispositional character? We can answer this question by pointing out that, like an IR, a social network is an orientation or an adjustment of subsidiary dispositions. The knowledge which a person has about the direct influence which IRS in his network have upon each other may be taken as one of these dispositions. Imbalance stemming from the presence of contradictory elements is definitely a state of mind which also predisposes a person to respond. Conflict of the daily and weekly routines associated with each IR not only creates awareness of the over-all social network but activates an adjustment disposition which is manifested in agenda construction. The same sort of conflict emerges when one attempts to increase the size of his set of IRS. Adjustment, in this case, may be simply to refuse to interact with the person in question, thereby preventing the development of a relationship. Bott’s earlier definition of social network while noting the role of IRS does not adequately convey this subjective characteristic which we have been discussing. It has been pointed out that she generally takes an ego-centred approach. A social network from our perspective is not ego-centred, in that the individual is merely the point from which analysis may begin, but personcentred: it is seen from the subjective standpoint of the individual whose network it is. Thus, we can now redefine social network as the orientation which develops from considering all or a portion of one’s interpersonal relationships.
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Formulated in this way this notion differs from several related ones which have appeared in the sociological and social psychological literature.ls SOCIAL NETWORK I N EXPLANATIONS OF BEHAVIOUR
The principal use to which networks have been put in the past is that of help ing to account for the pattern of distribution of values, attitudes, or some sort of information. The kind of content conveyed may be gossip, rural values in the city, news about kin, or any number of other interests which can be spread by human contact. Recognizing and treating the social network as a predisposition does not in any way supplant this approach, but rather the predispositional point of view complements the communicationsnetwork stance by opening up a new avenue of application: the direct explanation of behaviour in the social situation. Just how “new” this use of social network actually is could be a matter of conjecture. Observations like the following from Elizabeth Bott’s study (1957:94)have, no doubt, appeared from time to time in the network literature: “But although external people may help the elementary family, close-knit networks may also interfere with conjugal solidarity. A wife’s loyalty to her mother may interfere with her relationship with her husband. Similarly her relationship with her husband may interfere with her relationship with her mother. A man’s loyalty to his friends may interfere with his obligations to his wife and vice versa.’’ The point which should be stressed is that there has been no explicit formulation of a predispositional or subjective approach to networks. And, such an approach has utility as an explanation for certain kinds of human action as it is played out in social settings. We can begin by asking when is this predispositional point of view of social networks and IRS called for in explanations? Or, perhaps, why is it needed at all? Is not the ordinary objective stance adequate? In answering these questions we may note that first of all, the predispositional point of view is required when the object of explanation is human social action of some kind: e.g., migration to an urban centre or the channels of gossip, to name two
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15 The formulation which comes closest to being synonymous with our version of social network is Moreno’s “social atom” (196052-54). However, the following two features of social atoms disqualify them as social networks from our point of view. (1) Moreno states that actors can be related to others even when those others do not know it. However, the best evidence to date suggests that IRS, as we have been discussing them in this paper, are reciprocated (Newcomb, 1961). ( 2 ) Moreno includes wished-for relationships in his social atom, while the idea of social network as developed in this paper is comprised only of ongoing IRS. Other similar formulations like Merton’s “status-set’’ and “role-set” (1 957:368-384) or Znaniecki’s “social circle” (1965:203-209) focus on one role or identity of the individual actor, while a social network encompasses all of the actor’s identities and roles as long as there are established IRS involved. Finally Kemper’s “reference-set’’ ( 1966) should be mentioned since it includes the total aggregation of others from whom one derives central notions about oneself. Certainly any social network would include many of these, but it would, at the same time, exclude certain reference others with whom there are no IRS established (e.g., the prominent baseball star for the ten-year-old boy) and it would include certain non-reference others (e.g., the hated superior or the hostile neighbour).
recent foci of network studies. More specifically, and this is the second point, it is needed when structural or cultural explanations or both fail to d o their job adequately - when there is variation in social action which these frameworks cannot: account for. When this happens we may be sure that personal interpretation has entered the picture. This personal interpretation has been referred to as the definition of the situation (see Stebbins, 1967b); the combination of internalized (and therefore previously interpreted) elements of culture and social structure, of personality, and of the situation which when reflected upon and defined in the ongoing setting can lead to behaviour that is to some degree different from what is categorically expected. The significance of the process of interpretation for the social sciences has been clearly stated by Herbert Blumer in his critique of variable analysis: “In my judgment, the crucial limit to the successful application of variable analysis to human group life is set by the process of interpretation or definition that goes on in human groups. This process, which I believe to be the core of human action, gives a character to human group life that seems at variance with the logical premnses of variable analysis. ... Any scheme designed to analyze human group life in its general character has to fit this process of interpretation” (1956:686). The definition of the situation is basically an interrelation and interpretation of other predispositions which have been activated by certain situational factors. It is our contention that among the person’s predispositions will be found specific IRS and all or a portion of his social network, where activated. Thus, the strength of this predispositional view lies in the fact that it enables us to study people’s social networks at the situational level where it is hypothesized that on some occasions these networks modify culturally expected behaviour. Research utilizing these concepts in this way should not be diflticult. Interpersonal reIationships can be inferred in a variety of ways; such as, by length of time in which ego has known alter, by amount of contact between the pair, by ability to predict the other’s behaviour, as well as by the chances of reestablishing the relationship as suggested by Schutz and cited earlier in this article. Whether or not any particular IR was influencing behaviour in a given situation could easily be discovered by in-depth interviewing with regard to alter’s salience at that time. Social networks could be determined by getting the respondent to report all interpersonal relationships of sufficient length, intimacy, and frequency of contact in various spheres of life: occupational, familial, recreational, neighbourly, religious, political, educational, commercial, and governmental. The activation of one’s social network in any specific situation coulld be uncovered by a question like “were there certain things you wouldn’t do with or say to certain other persons present because you were afraid it would get back to a mutual acquaintance?” Information about the respondent’s awareness of the incompatibility of expectations stemming from various IRS as they affect his behaviour indicates influence of the network as does awareness of a conflict of routine.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Our main purpose has been to examine the logical connection between the concept of interpersonal or social relationship (IR) and that of social network, and to determine the implications of this link for network as an explanation. On the basis of the observation that since Weber’s time IRS have been regarded as reciprocated orientations between two people, we presented a definition which more adequately conveyed this subjective or predispositional nature of the relationship. It followsthat because of their status as predispositions IRS influence actual behaviour in the social situation. Bott’s definition of social network as a set of relationships was assessed from this point of view. If one or more of a person’s IRS influence his actions as they are being camed out with reference to one or more other IRS, then it is possible to conclude that part or all of that person’s social network directly guides his situated behaviour. Therefore, we can say that a social network is also a psychological predisposition. This observation that the network is fundamentally a subjective construct which can be used as a direct explanation of behaviour, although perhaps not wholly new, has received little or no systematic empirical or theoretical attention in the past. Yet, such an application of network could be very fruitful in helping to account for why men d&e situations as they do and hence, why they act as they do. Moreover, as Boissevain (1968:546-9) has pointed out, non-group phenomena like networks help to free social anthropology from the grip of functionalism, thus opening new vistas for research and explanation. REFERENCES
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