SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN BORNEO: A GENERAL ...

CHAPTER V

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN BORNEO: A GENERAL OVERVIEW *

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his chapter arose from a reflection, still at a preliminary stage, on the systems of social organization of Borneo. At the same time, it attempts to propose, within the framework of these systems, an evaluation of the concept of société à maison (“society of the house”). A few attempts have been made to classify the ethnic groups of Borneo. Whether focusing on linguistic, technological, or social criteria, none proved convincing. Let us mention those by Hose and McDougall (1912), Leach (1950), and recently Wurm and Hattori (1982). Borneo societies, varied and complex, have proved untractable to any labeling. For the subject that concerns us here, we should mention Appell’s attempt (1976), based on a criterion of “level of social and technological complexity”, which offers a simple and accessible view of the situation. Appell distinguishes between 1) the nomadic societies: forest nomads (Punan) and sea nomads (Bajau Laut); 2) the swidden rice cultivating societies, further distinguished between 2a) egalitarian societies (Iban, Rungus, Berawan) and 2b) socially stratified societies (Kayan, Kenyah); 3) the irrigated rice cultivating societies (Kadayan, Kelabit); 4) the Moslem sultanates; and 5) multi-ethnic modern societies. First, it should be noted that in all of Borneo’s traditional societies kinship is cognatic. I found the technological distinction between swidden and irrigated rice cultivation irrelevant for the present study. Besides, there is a wide range of mixed economic situations (swidden and irrigated rice cultivation, swidden rice cultivation and nomadic forest collecting, horticulture and fishing, etc.) and modern interference (cash crops, salaried jobs). Furthermore, we shall not concern ourselves here with the multi-ethnic modern societies, and little with the sultanates.

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The distinction between so-called “egalitarian” and “stratified” societies appears more relevant. The term “egalitarian” will hardly be used in the following, but I shall maintain a contrast between “stratified” and “nonstratified” societies. A few remarks must be made. First, strictly egalitarian societies probably do not exist in Borneo (with the exception of nomadic bands) and the so-called egalitarian societies generally function in a way that refutes any ideological principle of equality. Besides, a number of societies display a social hierarchy in various forms, either functional without being ideologically formalized, or ideal without being functional. For convenience’s sake, I shall call these societies “non-stratified”. Finally, some societies have a social stratification with formal classes that are named and functional: They are the “stratified” societies proper. The societies of Borneo In the following pages, I shall propose a rough, inexhaustive overview of the types of organization found in the societies of Borneo, which distinguishes between three major types: the nomadic band; the “stratified” agricultural societies (such as defined above); and the “non-stratified” agricultural societies (including so-called “egalitarian” forms and hierarchized forms). A fourth type, the sultanate, will be briefly considered for comparison purposes. • The nomads – The Punan The nomadic forest hunter-gatherers, known under various regional ethnonyms (Penan, Ot, Ukit, Beketan, Bukat), traditionally travel as bands of twenty-five to fifty people in the interior’s wide forest expanses, upstream from the farming peoples. They subsist on sago, a starch extracted from the marrow of several genera of palms, and also on hunting, forest collecting, and some fishing. The band, an egalitarian society and an economic unit, is self-sufficient for its subsistence but collects commercial forest products and maintains trade relations with its settled neighbors. In the last few centuries and, more particularly, in the last decades under the pressure of successive administrations, most bands have converted to a more settled way of life, more oriented towards certain agricultural activities; many groups, however, still widely practice forest collecting as part-time nomads (see Sellato, 1986). The Bukat, a traditionally nomadic group of the upper Kapuas, were organized in bands named after toponyms, each including an extended family, puhu’. The band is an economic and migrational unit composed of nuclear families, kajan. Each kajan lives in a separate hut, has a broad degree of freedom, and can leave the band at any time. The band head,

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lino tangoen, is one of the kajan heads, chosen for his (or her) competence. S/he has no actual power in decision making, relying usually on consensus. In particular, s/he has no authority to keep nuclear families within the band. No form of political, economic, or ritual organization exists above the band level; it is not certain, even, that the band itself is a political or ritual unit. The kajan household, a residential unit, disappears with the founding couple, as young couples leave it immediately to set up neolocal residence. The kajan holds exclusive ownership rights over only a few movable properties (weapons, tools, utensils), later shared among the founding couple’s children. Band affiliation being fluctuant, there is, therefore, no permanent social grouping (see Sellato, 1986). – The Bajau Laut The Bajau Laut (or Sama Laut) of Sabah are also called Sea Nomads and traditionally live as nomads, traveling continually on their boats between the coasts of Borneo, the Philippines, and Celebes. They subsist exclusively on fishing and marine life collection and trade their products to coastal peoples. Until around 1930 they were all still nomads, with no other bond to firm land than their cemetery sites. It seems that most nuclear families (dabalutu, likely named after their boat) now have a coastal house, luma’, owned in common with other nuclear families of the same extended family. The luma’ houses are clustered in neighborhoods, ba’anan, in a village, lahat. A luma’, under the responsibility of a household head, nakura luma’, is the unit of land residence, storage, and consumption. However, the dabalutu family often leaves the luma’ for offshore fishing and collecting expeditions, and then forms the unit of production and migration. The luma’ cycle shows a stage of growth after its foundation, then a stage of fission as young couples of the next generation leave to found their own luma’. Ultimately the luma’ is dissolved (see Sather, 1978). • The “non-stratified” agricultural societies It has to be stressed that these societies, in terms of population, form the bulk of the “Dayak” peoples of Borneo. They can be roughly distinguished, on ethno-linguistic and cultural grounds, among four large sets: the Barito groups, including the Ngaju, Ot Danum, and Ma’aanyan, in the southern half of the island; the northeastern groups, including the Rungus, Lun Dayeh, and Kelabit; the western groups, known as Land Dayak or Bidayuh, heterogeneous and ill-known (including the Selako); and the Iban and related groups, straddling the border between Sarawak and West Kalimantan. All these groups are mainly swidden rice cultivators (except for some local irrigated rice cultivation), while tuber,

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vegetable, and fruit-tree cultivation, as well as hunting and fishing, play a part in their economy. They mostly settle along the middle courses of rivers, between coastal regions and mountain ranges. An overwhelming majority of these groups do not display a formal stratification system in named classes or ranks. In those that do, the stratification appears to have resulted from an earlier ideological borrowing and to not be really relevant and functional in daily life; I shall call this a “quasi-stratification”. On the other hand, we shall see that the so-called “egalitarian” societies are not really egalitarian in practice, and that many of them show a hierarchy, expressed or at least latent, between the politically-influential rich people and the poor. We should mention the existence of a servile category, in several of these societies, made of debt slaves and/or war captives. This category is relevant to the allpervasive opposition between free men and slaves and plays a role in the opposition between the rich (owning slaves, among other property) and the poor, but it is not essential per se to the system of social organization, which can exist without slaves. – The Barito groups In the societies of this ethno-linguistic group, political organization above the village level is rarely found, despite the existence of named ethnic groups and subgroups. These societies generally distinguish between free people and slaves, and no institutionalized system of classes seems to have ever existed, except among the Ma’anyan. The settlement pattern rarely features the longhouse (in the case of the Ot Danum), but rather small hamlets scattered near the farming areas. The minimal social, economic, and ritual unit is most often the nuclear family, rarely the stem family. The Ma’anyan focus their social, economic, and ritual activities on the nuclear family, dangau, which mainly resides near its fields. However, a village house, lewu’, is the focus of a descent group gathering several dangau descended from the founder of the lewu’. Whereas the dangau family disappears with its founding couple, the lewu’ group, owner of the house and some heirlooms (here defined as comprising all types of tangible or intangible inheritable assets or properties), perpetuates itself through dangau families of the next generation. A broader descent group, bumuh, overlaps the lewu’ and includes its out-married offspring, who maintain secondary rights in the lewu’ group. Yet another descent group, tambak, focuses on the container of the dead forefathers’ ashes. It forms a ritual unit, gathering several lewu’ descended from the same ancestor, and seems to perpetuate itself through the lewu’ of the caretaker of the tambak.


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Ma’anyan society shows traces of a now obsolete stratification in four classes, bangsawan (noble folk, among which are the ruling families), panglima (warriors, among which are the families of war chiefs), panganak ruma’ (commoners), and walah (slaves). The commoners were comprised of minor bangsawan and panglima families. This suggests that political and military roles were in fact differentiated within a single category of free people, itself sharply distinguished from the slave category. Furthermore, this stratification system as a whole and the related terminology seem to have been borrowed from the nearby Banjarmasin sultanate (on the Ma’anyan, see Hudson, 1978 and LeBar, 1972). The Ngaju distinguish between the free people, including the utus gantong (rich, influential people) and the utus rendah (the poor), and the slaves, including the jipen (debt slaves) and the rewar (war captives). The traditional leader, demang, is chosen from amongst the utus gantong for his competence. Besides, ritual specialists, basir (priests) and balian (priestesses), have a status apart. Hereditary noble titles of Malay origin have in the past been bestowed upon outstanding individuals. The Ngaju village is described as a mere juxtaposition of more or less autonomous family units. However, it seems that, like the Ma’anyan, the Ngaju have ritual-focused descent groups, meant particularly to hold funeral rituals (see Sevin, 1983). The Ot Danum, it seems, never had an institutionalized system of classes, but they had slaves. The village had a traditional leader, demang. In spite of the existence of village longhouses, betang, the Ot Danum live most of the year as nuclear families scattered at their farm houses, repau umo. In this neolocal situation, heirlooms are ideally shared equally among all the children (see Avé, 1972). – The Northeastern groups Data concerning the social organization of groups in Sabah are incomplete and sometimes contradictory. The Kelabit of eastern Sarawak distinguish between an aristocratic category and an inferior category. It seems, however, that this distinction dwells essentially on a question of inherited wealth, and that political power is rather diffuse. Among the Ida’an Murut of Sabah, no formal social stratification exists, but free people and slaves are sharply distinguished, and political power, based on wealth, remains within certain descent groups (see Prentice, 1972). It appears that these groups, as well as those described below, were traditionally living in longhouses. Among the Rungus, an informal hierarchy is based on wealth, but social organization is conceived of as egalitarian and there are no hereditary rulers. The Rungus are described as politically acephalous. The

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household consists of a nuclear family (angkob), the minimal economic and ritual unit. It is started by a young couple setting up neolocal residence and terminated by its founders’ death, with property being shared among the children. A household’s affiliation to a longhouse is impermanent and the longhouse itself, having almost no collective ritual activity, is hardly more than a residential association. However, the village as a whole collectively owns a territory and holds rituals (see Appell, 1972, 1978). The Lun Dayeh live in small villages (kapung) of one or two longhouses (ruma’ kadang). The household (uang ruma’ ) appears to consist in a stem family and is the production and consumption unit. It is not, as a rule, a group owning heirlooms. With young couples systematically setting up neolocal residence, the uang uma’ does not perpetuate itself and is finally dissolved and the heirlooms shared. Neither the longhouse nor the village collectively owns property, and no collective economic or ritual activity is found. A system of vague, fluctuating social hierarchy, apparently based on wealth, not formal categories, is said to have existed in the past (see Crain, 1978). – The Western groups The Land Dayak or Bidayuh include variegated and poorly known groups, collectively gathered under these ambiguous names. They generally live in longhouses that are often clustered in villages, and apartments house stem families that are economic and ritual units. Households form descent groups (turun) holding land rights. Some ethnic groups do not seem to discern ranks or statuses, while others select their chief, orang kaya (literally, rich man), from amongst certain descent groups, with this selection having to be confirmed by a council. Locally these descent groups may form a quasi-aristocracy, but the chief’s authority is limited. No socio-political or ritual organization exists above the village level. The Land Dayak are known for their “headhouse”, a special building forming the focus of male activities and rituals in the village (see Geddes, 1954, 1957; LeBar, 1972). The Selako probably deserve a separate place among the western groups. Selako society shows no stratification but distinguishes informally between the rich and the poor. The village (kampong) is a cluster of longhouses or hamlets (tumpuk), each composed of households (biik). The biik, sometimes a stem family, is described as a legal entity owning property and land rights and forming a production and consumption unit. It perpetuates itself through a ritual transfer of the house and heirlooms to one of the children. The tumpuk, a residential association of biik households related by blood or affinity, has political, economic, and ritual functions. These related households form a descent group


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(katurunan) owning a territory. The tumpuk is headed by a tuha rumah, whose power resorts more to persuasion than to authority. Although the tumpuk has many collective functions, the biik’s affiliation to a tumpuk seems to be neither strictly necessary to its functioning (a biik can be isolated) nor really permanent (see Schneider, 1977, 1978). – The Iban groups The term Iban (or Sea Dayak) covers groups with a rather homogeneous culture and language, located north of the Kapuas and in Sarawak. Several related groups are referred to as “Ibanic” (Kantu’, Seberuang, Desa, and others) and live on the middle Kapuas. Iban economy is often oriented towards agricultural expansion in the primary forest. The longhouse (rumah), mostly gathering related families, is not a territory-owning group. An apartment (bilek) in the longhouse shelters a stem family, which is a legal entity owning heirlooms (the apartment, moveable property, and land rights) and perpetuating itself. Only one of the children remains in the bilek, as well as a large part of the heirlooms. A leader (tuai rumah) rules over or coordinates questions of customary law, while a religious specialist (tuai burong) is in charge of rituals. Each bilek, though it is represented in collective rituals, is an autonomous entity and free to split from the longhouse. Iban society is generally seen as “egalitarian” in the sense that it conceives of itself as such. However, leaders are often chosen (although not in a strictly hereditary way) from amongst rich and politically influential families (see Freeman, 1958, 1970; LeBar, 1972). Rousseau (1980) challenged the egalitarian character of Iban society by stressing that the same individual very commonly holds both the offices of tuai rumah and tuai burong, exercising strong de facto authority over his longhouse’s families. • The stratified societies We shall consider here the societies in which inequality is ideologically expressed by formal, named classes (or ranks) that are, furthermore, functional and relevant in social life. The economic base of these societies is globally the same as that of the “non-stratified” societies: prominent swidden rice cultivation, and hunting and fishing of varying importance. It seems that the stratified groups of Borneo can be reduced to two large regional sets, one including the Kayan, Kenyah, and Modang groups, the overwhelming majority of which live in East Kalimantan and interior Sarawak, and the other including the Maloh groups of the Kapuas. These stratified groups, particularly the Kayan and Kenyah, have passed their stratification system (or part of it) on to some of their

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neighbors. However, the Aoheng of East Kalimantan or the Kajang groups of Sarawak, for instance, have considerably softened the system that they borrowed, with the political power actually remaining in the hands of commoner families’ heads. Some groups of Sarawak, like the Kelabit (see above), have also been obviously influenced by their stratified neighbors. Finally some groups, like the Ma’anyan (see above), have been influenced by Moslem sultanates, which introduced noble or military titles. Groups showing such borrowed social features will not be taken into account here. – The Kayan, Kenyah, and Modang groups Among the many Kayan subgroups distributed in the island’s northeastern quarter, those of the upper Balui (Sarawak) have been described in detail. The autonomous village, home to a named subgroup, is typically made of only one longhouse (uma’ ), divided into apartments (amin). The household, generally a stem family, is the sole owner of the amin, its moveable property, and the product of its members’ labor. The village collectively owns a bounded territory, but there is no permanent land ownership connected with the amin. The amin perpetuates itself, even if the physical apartment has been moved or has disappeared. Amin membership is by birth, adoption, or marriage, but an individual may belong to only one amin at a time, and membership is rigid. Heirlooms, as a whole, remain with the amin. Kayan society is divided strictly into high aristocrats (maren), noblefolk (hipuy), commoners (panyin), and slaves (dipen). Any amin permanently belongs to only one of these classes, which tend to be endogamous. There is a further opposition between two ritual categories, the higher one including maren and hipuy, and the lower one including panyin and dipen. Chiefs are chosen exclusively from amongst the maren, and chieftainship is hereditary. Neither panyin nor hipuy (let alone slaves) can leave the village without the chief’s agreement, and the amin is, therefore, tightly maintained within the community. Conversely the maren, conforming to the class-endogamy ideal, often marry aristocrats from other villages, which enables them to play an important role in relations beyond the community and to control trade (especially with the nomads). They alone can own slaves, who work for them, and demand corvee from members of other classes (see Rousseau, 1978). The Kenyah live in large settlements (lepo) of several longhouses (uma’ ), sometimes gathering several thousand people. Regional chiefs extend their authority over several villages or a whole river basin. The household (lamin) includes either a nuclear, stem, or extended family. Young adults and young couples generally make separate swiddens, but


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the product of their labor is pooled in the lamin’s common granary and cooking pot. The lamin holds rights on lands opened by its members, and these rights, like other heirlooms, remain with the lamin. The lamin perpetuates itself and, in case of a split, the original lamin (lamin po’on) retains primary rights. Kenyah society is divided into five formal named classes: high aristocrats (deta’u bio), lower aristocrats (deta’u dumit), well-off commoners (panyin tiga), lower commoners (panyin ja’at), and the slaves and their descendants (panyin lamin). The chief of a village (paran lepo) or a longhouse (paran uma’ ) is chosen from among the aristocrats, although not on a strictly hereditary basis. To split off from its longhouse, a lamin needs its paran’s permission and must pay an indemnity—such cases seem very rare. A lamin perpetuates itself as a component of an uma’ even if the apartment itself has disappeared (see Whittier, 1973, 1978). – The Maloh groups The Maloh (or Taman) of the Kapuas live in rather large settlements (banua), sometimes of several longhouses (sau). The apartment (tindoan) is home to a nuclear or stem family (kaiyan), which is an economic and ritual unit. The village collectively owns a territory, and each kaiyan holds equal right of access to farm land and retains permanent rights on lands opened by its members. The kaiyan perpetuates itself, and membership in it is by birth, adoption, or marriage. An individual may belong to only one kaiyan. A descent group, kapulungan, with a vaguely defined affiliation gathers the descendants of a given ancestor and collectively owns land and heirlooms, as well as the apartment. However, the one among the descendants who remains in the apartment holds primary rights over land and fruit trees and retains most of the moveable heirlooms (jars and gongs). If the kaiyan splits in two, the young couple leaving the apartment to found a new kaiyan maintain bonds with the original kaiyan and, through (particularly) the kapulungan, retain secondary or residual rights over patrimonial property. Maloh society has four ranks or classes (ranakan): aristocrats (samagat), middle-rank people (pabiring), commoners (banua), and slaves (pangkan). A household’s affiliation to a given rank is permanent and each rank is ideally endogamous. A longhouse chief is always an aristocrat, and aristocrats hold a monopoly of economic, political, and ritual power (see King, 1978, 1985). • The Sultanates Soon after the coming of Islam to Borneo, a number of coastal sultanates emerged, such as Brunei in the north (15th-16th century);

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Sambas, Sukadana, and Landak in the west; Banjarmasin in the south; and Kutai and others in the east. Most probably replaced earlier HinduBuddhist kingdoms connected to the Javanese kingdom of Mojopahit. After contacts with incoming Javanese, Malays, or Bugis, the conversion of these princes or coastal tribal chiefs to Islam allowed for the emergence of Moslem dynasties whose power dwelled primarily on economic bases: A harbor town, located at the mouth of a major river and open to maritime trade, controlled the trade routes of forest products from the interior. The colonial powers, on the scene as early as the 16th century, entered into competition with the sultanates for the control of trade and progressively abolished or placed them into tutelage. The existence of the kingdom of Kutai, near the mouth of the Mahakam, is attested by a Brahmanical inscription of ca. 400 AD, the oldest inscription ever found in the Indonesian archipelago. Islam imposed itself there around 1606, and the Dutch came into contact with Kutai around 1635. The sultans’ power, much more economic than political or religious, was based on a toll on all trade goods transiting through the harbor. The sultan was the sole recipient of this income and, besides, he levied taxes on opium, salt, and gambling. Although he had many wives and concubines, he was succeeded by the oldest of his legitimate sons. His very large family constituted by itself the sultanate’s whole aristocracy, while official positions (mantri negri and others) were granted, in a non-hereditary way, to influential persons, members of the sultan’s family or not. On the other hand, titles were given to leaders of the various ethnic communities that were vassal to the sultan (see Wortmann, 1971a/b). It is not necessary to enter into the detail of the sultanates’ social organization here. However, let us stress that, as is confirmed by Brown (1976) for Brunei, these harbor towns formed multiethnic communities in which social rank was conditioned by ethnic affiliation. Therefore, these societies are not traditional societies but, rather, “modern” societies with marked exo-Bornean features. The family and its social integration Let us review the distinctive elements of social organization as they appear in the various categories of the typology above. • In nomadic societies Nomadic societies, differing in their natural—forested or maritime— environment but closely similar in their economic bases, display traditional forms of functional organization at the level of the stem family and, more clearly, the nuclear family, since young couples


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regularly set up neolocal residence. No property belongs collectively to a group above the autonomous and mobile nuclear family, no social grouping perpetuates itself, and property is divided upon the founding couple’s death. Furthermore, there is no social differentiation. The nuclear family’s high degree of freedom entails a low degree of social integration and cohesion. The process of sedentarization of nomadic groups (Punan or Bajau Laut), in the modern context just like in historical times, has caused nuclear families to gather into extended families. However, the extended family, a residential and economic unit bound to a house, has no continuity through time, since neolocal residence remains the common practice and the nuclear families retain a broad autonomy. Extended families are the base for broader residential associations (hamlet or village). • In “non-stratified” societies What do these variegated societies, which we have gathered under the phrase “non-stratified societies”, have in common? According to these societies’ own varying conceptions and to the researchers’ varying approaches, several types of social organization appear to be found side by side, from an “egalitarian” type to a “quasi-stratified” type, via other types showing a more or less obvious inegalitarian character. These other types I call “hierarchized”. Among the “egalitarian” Iban, it is implicitly admitted that leadership is monopolized by the rich and influential families. Among the Ma’anyan, who seem to think of themselves as “stratified”, an indisputable differentiation in political and military roles cannot really be equated with a system of social classes, insofar as the “noble” families not currently in power are viewed as commoners. Between these two extreme cases, societies appear hierarchized into an upper and lower categories, on the basis of a unique criterion, that of wealth. In local terminologies, “upper” is equated with rich, noble, and “good”; while “lower” is equated with poor, commoner, and “bad”. Depending on the group, these categories are either formally acknowledged and named in terms of classes, or informally viewed through an empirical evaluation of wealth. In all instances, they boil down to a de facto contrast between the rich and the poor. The categories are only vaguely bounded and an individual’s or household’s affiliation to one or the other category is a matter for appreciation and can change through time following their respective destinies. It is necessary to distinguish such “hierarchizations” in vague and permeable categories (even if they are expressed in terms of classes) from real systems of social stratification in discrete, permanent, and mutually exclusive classes.

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In all these “non-stratified” societies, it seems sound to contemplate a unique class, within which an unstable hierarchy between the rich and the poor develops. In a number of them, a servile category also exists, but it should be stressed that a free man can become a debt slave after a reverse of fortune, to later buy his freedom back. The contrast between free persons and slaves would then, in many instances, be not so much a matter of class than of wealth, and would be encompassed in a one-class system displaying a more or less formalized but always fluctuating hierarchization in three terms, rich, poor, and slave. This remark may be groundless regarding war captives but these, in any event, are only “strangers”. Most often, in these societies, there is not really such a thing as political power but, rather, a political “influence” exercised by the rich families over the community. A rich family may, at some point, have a political influence and, some time later, be incapacitated by a setback and displaced by a formerly “poor” family grown rich. We should mention that the foundation of this “influence” may be more religious than political. In some (apparently few) societies, hereditary chief lines have emerged, always founded on wealth, but political authority remains diffuse or informal, and commonly unfit to prevent families from leaving the community. As the political agencies at the level of the local community are relatively weak, it should come as no surprise that, generally, no sociopolitical organization exists above the village level. The minimal social and economic unit, varying with the ethnic groups, is either the nuclear, stem, or extended family. Several welldocumented cases show a very autonomous nuclear family (e.g., Ma’anyan, Rungus). While the nuclear family is sometimes a ritual unit, it is not a perennial social grouping, since it is the product of a systematic neolocal residential pattern. With the stem family, we find a principle of perpetuation of a family group: only one of the children remains in the house, taking care of the aging parents and inheriting the bulk of the heirlooms. This is the case of the Selako biik and the Iban bilek. The extended family group as a residential unit (village house) does not have any perenniality if it practices regular neolocal residence, as does the Lun Dayeh uang ruma’ (like the Bajau Laut luma’): The nuclear families scatter and the heirlooms are divided. However, an extended family group can perpetuate itself, on the reproductive model of the stem family, if one or two (or more) of the children do not go away to a neolocal residence and remain in their parents’ house. This is the case of the Ma’anyan lewu’, a perennial house-owning and patrimony-managing group.


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The nuclear family appears to be the basic unit of ritual activity, for it is a residential unit, either full-time (as among the Rungus) or part-time (like the Ma’anyan dangau, ritually independent from the lewu’ group). The existence of ritual activities involving a wider family group, however, enhances the cohesion of this group. But such a ritual unit may be perennial (the Ma’anyan tambak) or not (the Selako tumpuk). At the local group (village) level, there may be no collective ritual activity (as among the Lun Dayeh) or, on the contrary, such ritual activity may involve all the village’s households (among the Iban, all households are collectively in charge of rituals at the longhouse level; among the Land Dayak, the “headhouse” serves as a focus of collective ritual activity). Therefore, a relative autonomy of the family group vis-à-vis the local group (longhouse, hamlet, or village) appears to be a feature common to all the family groupings described above, and thus a specific feature among what I call “non-stratified” societies (as opposed to stratified societies). Most authors have stressed these family groupings’ economic autonomy, and I have noted the question of their involvement in the local group’s ritual activity, as well as the question of political power. It is important to stress the residential autonomy of these family groupings. The practice of post-matrimonial neolocal residence grants the nuclear family (Ma’anyan, Ot Danum, Rungus, Lun Dayeh) a certain degree of freedom as to the choice of their residence. Likewise, the Iban bilek can leave the longhouse at will to settle somewhere else, and the Selako biik’s affiliation to the residential grouping tumpuk is not permanent. More generally (with the Selako being a border case), we can consider the longhouse, hamlet, or village as a free association of households bound to one another primarily by blood, affinal, or friendship relations. This residential autonomy must be linked to the level of political and ritual organization of the local group. With no (formal) system of political authority and no collective ritual activities, the local group (longhouse or village) forms only a “residential association”, not a cohesive and compact social grouping. In this context, the family grouping, the household, maintains a large degree of freedom (of movement). Whenever some real, if informal, political authority and some collective ritual activities exist, the residential association becomes to a certain extent a social grouping. It should be noted that the political and ritual fields are sometimes intimately linked (as among the Iban). In the Iban longhouse, which forms a social grouping, all households must be represented and all play a part. The perennial nature of a family grouping must be connected with the household’s representativity vis-à-vis the local group.

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Fig. 8. Location of ethnic groups (scale: approx. 1:10,000,000)


LEGEND

NOMADIC GROUPS

A B

NON-STRATIFIED GROUPS

C

D E F

Punan 1 Bukat Bajau Laut Northeastern Groups 1 Rungus Dusun 2 Lun Dayeh 3 Kelabit 4 Kadayan 5 Murut Ida’an 6 Berawan Western Groups 1 1 Selako Iban Groups 1 Iban 2 “Ibanic” Barito Groups 1 Ngaju 2 Ot Danum 3 Ma’anyan 4 Groups of the Melawi 2

STRATIFIED GROUPS

G

1 Kayan 2 Kenyah 3 Modang 4 Maloh 3 5 Kajang 6 Aoheng 3

COASTAL SULTANATES

H

1 Kutai 2 Brunei 3 Banjarmasin 4 Sambas 5 Sukadana

Notes:

1. Also called Land Dayak or Bidayuh. 2. Culturally related to the Ot Danum. 3. Social stratification here is a borrowed trait.

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• In stratified societies Stratified societies, such as those described earlier, display true social classes, ideally endogamous, with a strictly determined mode of recruiting, and with strictly prescribed political, economic, and ritual roles. There is no ambiguity in an individual’s affiliation to a household, or a household’s affiliation to a local group, and no ambiguity in the definition of each individual’s or household’s rights and duties. The local group comprises several levels of rigid structures: The individual is included in a household, the household in a longhouse, and the longhouse in a village. Even at the regional (river basin) level, certain forms of socio-political organization have emerged. Even though the household may be an extended family, the principle for its reproduction is the stem family, allowing for the perpetuation of its structure through time, based on dominantly uxorilocal residential practices. The household’s affiliation to a social category is just as strict as its affiliation to a longhouse. An economic, social, and ritual unit, the household is represented at longhouse level as an intrinsic component, as is the longhouse at village level. Whatever the social class it belongs to, a household as a social entity has rights and duties in the community— except for the slave category, which only has duties. It exists in perpetuity and survives symbolically even after the material structure that housed it has ceased to exist. The aristocratic class holds a monopoly of political power. Leaders are chosen from amongst it, on a more or less hereditary basis varying with ethnic groups. Aristocrats also sometimes hold a monopoly of ritual power. But what is most important is that they monopolize economic power. Among the Kayan, they own slaves who produce for them, they may impose corvee upon members of the other classes, and they obtain substantial benefit from the control of trade. It should be stressed that, contrary to the situation in non-stratified societies, the slaves (war or raid captives) are here indispensable to the functioning of society. These societies, therefore, display very strongly integrated forms of organization in which the whole political, economic, and ritual power is formally appropriated by a ruling class. Within this very tight social fabric, involving all households in the political, economic, and ritual fields, the household - as well as the individual -- has a very low degree of freedom vis-à-vis the local group. The ‘house’ in Borneo We can now turn to the question of the ‘house’. Of the three criteria selected by Lévi-Strauss to define the ‘house’—the existence of a legal


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entity or corporate body (personne morale), its holding an estate of patrimonial assets, and its continuity through time—only the last appears truly distinctive in the Bornean context, and I shall examine it more in depth. Indeed, a legal entity, the holder of an estate of assets, likely exists in all instances, if only in its minimal form, a married couple. The question of whether such a minimal form is a political or ritual unit may be but a minor point. It always is a residential unit. But it is not always an economic unit, thus the ethnographic record may be viewed as ambiguous: among the Punan, which legal entity should be considered, the married couple of the nuclear family, which is an estate-holding residential unit, or the band, which is the economic (and possibly political) unit? Among the Ma’anyan, is it the dangau nuclear family, which is the economic and residential unit, or the village’s lewu’ descent group, which is the warden of a patrimony? On the other hand, the existence of assets in one or the other type of family group is established in all instances, if only consisting of the Punan’s weapons and tools or the Bajau’s fishing nets, which are owned by the nuclear family. The transfer of these goods from one generation to the next in no way presumes the perpetuation of a legal entity. Then it is, indeed, the question of the permanence of a family grouping as a legal entity that lies at the core of the problem and is crucial in establishing the existence of a ‘house’. Among nomadic societies, we have noted that no family grouping perpetuates itself. A large part of the non-stratified farming societies appear organized with no permanent family grouping. The Selako biik and Iban bilek alone, based as they are on the reproductive pattern of the stem family, seem to function as ‘houses’. As for the case of the Ma’anyan’s lewu’ group, an extended family in which membership rules are not strictly set, it remains ambiguous. Conversely, all stratified societies indisputably display ‘houses’, based on stem families. It is important to stress that, in these societies with a class system, all households in all classes (except for the slave category) are ‘houses’, functioning as residential, economic, and ritual units. Moreover, each such ‘house’, set in a tight social fabric, has, firstly, a role—more or less active varying with the class to which it belongs, and in any case a role of representation—in the political, economic, and ritual activities of the village community’s life; and, secondly, a symbolic existence as an intrinsic component of the community. At this stage, several conclusions may already be drawn. One is that the concept of société à maison can only apply to a small fraction of the

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societies of Borneo and cannot portray the region’s global social reality. Another is that the ‘house’ is an ubiquitous organizational principle in stratified societies and is also found in certain non-stratified societies. Obviously, the existence of the ‘house’ is to be linked to the principle of social reproduction through the stem family, rather than to the egalitarian or stratified nature of a society. Yet another conclusion can be drawn from the empirical finding that there is a relation between the condensed and permanent nature of settlements and the presence of ‘houses’. The economic circumstances of a nomadic hunting-gathering society, particularly settlement impermanence, are not conducive to the emergence of the stem family, all the less so because the estate to be inherited includes neither a tangible building nor land rights. Likewise, to some extent, the rather scattered settlement pattern of certain non-stratified groups and the high autonomy of their nuclear families inhibit the emergence of ‘houses’. This autonomy is expressed in a low degree of organization and cohesion at the local group level. Only in societies in which collective life sets family groupings in a close social fabric is the existence of ‘houses’ observed. This close social fabric can be found expressed in the practice of compact settlements (the longhouse probably is a favorable factor, although it seems to not always be a sufficient one); in the performance of collective ritual activities; in the crystallization of political authority; in the ideology of social stratification; or in a combination of several of the features above. This leads us to more closely examine the question of the integration of the household into a broader social grouping, the longhouse or the village. We must first consider the relation between the individual or, rather, the minimal family grouping (the nuclear family) and the house as an inhabitable material structure. In all instances where post-matrimonial residence is regularly neolocal—that is, where all of the founding couple’s children leave home to build their own house—the estate of patrimonial assets, including the house itself, obviously will be more or less scattered. The nuclear family’s affiliation to a broader kin group may occur, based on a social entity focused on patrimony management, ritual activity, or political influence, or may not occur at all. Thus, kin groupings are found, some permanent, such as the Ma’anyan tambak ritual grouping, and some impermanent, such as the Selako political and ritual tumpuk grouping. It is with the stem family as a principle of social reproduction that a family grouping’s perpetuation in a permanent inhabitable structure may occur. Whatever the rules governing membership (descent, adoption, marriage) and post-matrimonial residence (uxorilocality, virilocality, or


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utrolocality), and their strict or flexible nature, the principle is that only one of the children remains in the house. This child takes care of the aging parents and inherits rights, either exclusive or primary, over an estate of patrimonial assets that remains bound to the house itself. In all instances, an individual’s (and, therefore, a married couple’s) affiliation to a household is strict and exclusive. The individual obtains, through adoption or marriage, new rights in the household of which s/he becomes a member and, at the same time, s/he loses the rights s/he used to hold by descent in his/her natal household (or only maintains secondary rights). Varying with ethnic groups, this individual inherits or acquires in the household of which s/he is a member a given wealth situation, a political or ritual role, a social status, as well as a more or less extensive set of rights and duties vis-à-vis neighbors and the community. Here a second point may be articulated on the above: the degree of the family grouping’s integration to the local group. All, then, rests on the existence of collective political, economic, or ritual activities involving the various component households and, in the final analysis, on whether or not the local group is a legal entity. Some of the non-stratified societies listed above have been described as performing no collective economic or ritual activities at all. Even though they may display collective political or military activities together with their neighbors (e.g., for defense), the local group remains only a simple residential association. Most often, the concept of village territory seems absent, and land ownership, if it exists, is in the hands of family groupings. We then have here “amorphous” societies, which may display some hierarchy based on wealth but do not constitute social groupings of a higher order at village level. Political or ritual power remains informal, relying on influence rather than authority. The Iban show a certain degree of involvement of component households in the ritual workings of the longhouse. There is a ritual leader, recognized by all households, and each household is represented in the longhouse’s ritual activities. Likewise, among the Selako, households associate together on a residential basis to form a broader entity with political and ritual functions. It is with the existence of such political or ritual “roles” of the household within a wider residential association that the latter becomes a social grouping, and functions as such. It is important to remark, however, that the households’ affiliation to a social grouping is impermanent, and that the social grouping itself has a limited life time. Indeed, the Iban household, at least among some groups, seems free to leave the longhouse and Freeman stressed that the Iban longhouse is an “open” group and

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only constitutes a legal entity in a limited way, i.e., in the ritual field. Among the Selako, the local tumpuk group seems to be a legal entity (see Schneider, 1977), but it appears to be dispensable and not perennial. Among stratified societies, we find, on the one hand, a strict and permanent affiliation of households, perennial family groupings, to the longhouse, which is itself a perennial social grouping; and, on the other hand, a differentiation of political, economic, and ritual “roles”. This differentiation is expressed in the ideology and practice by the existence of a class system. In this highly and strictly organized social grouping, an individual has no choice in his/her affiliation to a household, and likewise the household can choose neither its social rank nor its affiliation to a longhouse. It should be noted that the longhouse, a set of ‘houses’, is itself a ‘house’, insofar as it collectively owns a territory and may be politically and ritually represented at a higher level, that of the village or cluster of longhouses. The longhouse is symbolically embodied by its aristocratic ’house’ and its head, like the household is embodied by its family head. More importantly, the longhouse perpetuates itself, even in abstentia, as a coherent and compact social group, particularly through its name. To summarize, the followings points can be made. First, from the methodological angle, it is important to take into account not only the familial residential unit, the household, but also its social and political framework, the local group. We find that, when the local group does not work as a unit of collective action (economic, political, ritual), then it is only an amorphous “residential association” made of contiguous “residential atoms”, which are not ‘houses’. In some instances, with the emergence of political and ritual roles of households in the local group’s life, ‘houses’ functioning as intrinsic components of a true social grouping develop, based on the perennial stem family as a principle of social reproduction. A much stronger social integration is found among stratified societies, in which the ‘house’ is an intrinsic component, in all fields (economic, political, and ritual), of a very tight social grouping, the longhouse, itself being a ‘house’ within a higher organizational level, the village. Political, economic, and ritual roles are formalized in a strict and rigid ideology of social classes. From the nomadic band to the stratified farming society, it is the degree of social integration of the minimal family grouping to the local group that, by setting restrictions on the household’s freedom of movement, determines the existence of the ‘house’. Social stratification— that is, true stratification, both formalized in the ideology and functional


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in the whole set of social relations—seems to only exist based on a system of ‘houses’, but does not appear to be absolutely necessary, since certain social forms with a lower degree of integration (e.g., restricted to collective ritual activities) may also be associated with a system of ‘houses’. Different levels of ‘houses’ It is beyond the scope of this study to consider the factors underlying the establishment of a high or low level of social integration. We can, however, parallel this concept of social integration with that of the “closure of the group” (see Rousseau, 1985), which rates an individual’s or a family’s freedom to leave their local group and join another. For Rousseau (1985: 42), this closure of the group is not per se the reason for social inequality but it brings about a social environment that makes it possible. This would suggest that the existence of ‘houses’, beyond a certain degree of social integration, allows for the emergence of formalized inequality (classes) founded on ideology—instead of informal inequality, as an ad hoc rich vs. poor contrast. I have shown elsewhere (1986), by examining the social processes by/through which forest nomads settle down, that Punan band chieftains’ attempts (seldom successful) at imposing the stratification system (or, at least, hereditary chieftainship) for their own benefit commonly led to intensified social integration of nuclear families in the local group settling in a hamlet. It then appears that, in some instances, formal inequality— including, at least, the emergence of a ‘noble’ line, from which chiefs are recruited in a hereditary way—borrowed from neighboring stratified societies may play a part in the families’ social integration to the local group and, therefore, in the transition from a ‘residential association’ to a true ‘social group’. This brings us back to the ‘house’ and, especially, the different levels of ‘houses’. In stratified societies, as noted above, both the household and the longhouse are ‘houses’. Very likely, in Kenyah villages comprising several longhouses (and several thousand souls), the village itself, as a local group performing collective political, economic, and ritual action and owning a territory, is a ‘house’, represented by its highest aristocrat (paran lepo) and symbolized by this leader’s apartment (his ‘house’), family line, and sacred heirloom objects. We are then led to consider a system of ‘houses’ encased in one another, like a nest of Russian dolls. This system closely parallels the system of social integration described above, which is strict and rigid. An individual’s affiliation to a household is exclusive and strict at any point in time, but may change through adoption or marriage—likewise his/her

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affiliation to a social class may be altered through anisogamic marriage. However, a household’s affiliation to a longhouse and, possibly in a less obvious way, a longhouse’s affiliation to a village are ideally strict, exclusive, and permanent. A key to this system may be the principle of representation of a social entity by its chief vis-à-vis a higher-order social entity in the latter’s collective activities. Thus, a household head represents his/her household in longhouse-level political, economic, or ritual activities (note that a woman may play this part). Likewise, a longhouse head represents his/her longhouse in village-level collective activities. Finally, the village head him/herself plays a role of representation abroad. This pyramidal system of representation clearly replicates social hierarchy. Any individual (except from the slave class) is a representative at his/her own level and is represented at the higher level by the head of his/her social entity. Another key, to be linked to the one above, is the symbolic nature of representation. A family head does not only represent the members of his/her household, but s/he also and mostly represents the perennial ‘house’ of which s/he is in charge, and which is part and parcel of a whole, the longhouse. The longhouse, in turn, is symbolized by its leader’s line and apartment, which is also a ‘house’, but a ‘noble house’, morally and politically responsible for the component households, the owner of a territory and holder of sacred heirloom objects, and responsible for the longhouse’s rituals and spiritual welfare. This ‘noble house’ is the longhouse. Through its leader, this ‘noble house’ is represented to the ‘high noble house’, that of the village leader, which in turn symbolizes the village in alliances or transactions with other villages. It is the symbolic nature of representation that endows the social fabric with its potency and allows the social group to view itself as a whole, a unit, all component parts of which are indispensable. Therefore, ‘houses’ exist at different levels: The village, just like the household, is a ‘house’. The household of the village head and that of the lesser commoner may be comparable and on the same level in terms of their internal workings—despite some notable differences, such as the presence of house slaves and the corvee system that guarantee the noble household’s economic efficiency—but they cannot be compared at the symbolic level. The commoner household only represents the minimal legal entity, whereas the leader’s household represents the village, a higher-order legal entity. It should be noted that this pyramidal symbolic system and the related high level of social integration are responsible for most of the social group’s feeling of identity, from the longhouse to the village and the


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ethno-linguistic group. In societies with a low level of social integration (non-stratified groups) and, even more so, in nomadic or newly-settled bands, ethnic identity undergoes considerable shifts, through assimilation to neighboring groups or due to vague ethnic or linguistic boundaries. In stratified societies, however, a strictly bounded territory, strong traditional ideals, and lack of inclination toward mixing or borrowing (all of which make them “closed” societies), specific dialectal and cultural features persist within the group to grant it a very strong ethnic feeling. Before concluding, the case of the sultanates should be briefly reviewed. The sultanate is in Borneo an anomalous, imported social type—this type of polity includes Indian and Moslem elements—and, furthermore, it is multiethnic. Strictly speaking, there is no social stratification: the sultan and his family constitute an aristocratic category with vague boundaries; a certain number of official positions are often granted to members of one given ethnic category, but often are not hereditary; and the people are a multiethnic crowd of fleeting residential and political affiliation. In this trade harbor situation, the social fabric appears loose, with a low level of social integration. While the sultan’s palace is probably a ‘house’, and one endowed with a high symbolic (religious) value since the sultan is a descendent of the Prophet, this symbolic value vouching for the sultan’s legitimacy could not always secure the social and political order or economic functioning, which had to depend on special categories of civil servants and military. What we have, then, is a ‘town’, the raison d’être of which is trade and which, while not necessarily more populous than a large Kenyah village, works on the basis of market economy in a very ‘open’ group rather than on those of a social ideology in a ‘closed’ group. This urban organization does not display the various levels of symbolic representation found among Borneo’s traditional stratified societies. Sultanates, thus, are “modern” systems of social organization, quite distinct from endoBornean systems. Conclusion The concept of société à maison, as has been noted, can only apply to a part of Borneo’s societies: stratified societies, coastal sultanates, and some non-stratified societies. It cannot account for the general situation of the island. Likewise, we should question Leach’s suggestion to discern, among certain principles of Dayak social organization likely to define “a Bornean type of pattern of organisation” (1950: 57), a politically influential “house-owning group” present in societies with marked class distinction and in more egalitarian societies alike (1950: 61). Both these

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concepts, as far as Borneo is concerned, clearly bear the stamp of the prejudice created by the ethnography of Sarawak, where groups with ‘houses’ are indeed widely dominant. There is no single model of social organization that would be typically Bornean. Studies on Philippines societies suggest that the same comment holds true for that archipelago as well. It is important to reposition Borneo societies within the broader framework of Southeast Asian cognatic societies. By examining not only the family group but also its inclusion in the local group, I have shown that it is only beyond a certain level of social integration of the household in the village—through dense settlement patterns, the family groups’ restricted autonomy and intense involvement in collective activities, and possibly also the ideology of social stratification—that ‘houses’ come into existence, which perpetuate themselves based on the social reproductive principle of the stem family and which only make sense within the framework of the local group. I have also shown that the local group changes from a simple residential association into a true social group with collective political, economic, and ritual action in stratified societies, and that, through a system of symbolic representations of social entities of a given level to the higher level, the longhouse, representing a group of ‘houses’, is itself a ‘house’, and likewise the village, representing several longhouses. There are, therefore, several distinct levels of ‘houses’ that, while comparable in their internal workings, are not comparable at the symbolic level.

NOTE *. Translated from “Notes préliminaires sur les sociétés ‘à maison’ à Bornéo”, p. 1544 in Ch. Macdonald et les membres de l’ECASE (Eds): De la Hutte au Palais. Sociétés “à maison” en Asie du Sud-Est insulaire, Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1987, 218 p.

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Illinois University: Center for Southeast Asian Studies (“Special Report”, 12), 158 p. AVÉ, J. 1972a ‘Kalimantan Dayaks’, p. 185-187 in F. M. LeBar (Ed.): Ethnic Groups of Insular Southeast Asia, Vol. 1, New Haven: HRAF Press. 1972b ‘Ot Danum Dayaks’, p. 192-194 in F. M. LeBar (Ed.): Ethnic Groups of Insular Southeast Asia, Vol. 1, New Haven: HRAF Press. BROWN, D. E. 1976 ‘Social structure, history and historiography in Brunei and beyond’, p. 44-50 in G. N. Appell (Ed.): Studies in Borneo Societies: Social Process and Anthropological Explanation, Northern Illinois University: Center for Southeast Asian Studies (“Special Report”, 12). CRAIN, J. B. 1978 ‘The Lun Dayeh’, p. 123-142 in V. T. King (Ed.): Essays on Borneo Societies, Oxford: Oxford University Press (“Hull Monographs on South-East Asia”). FREEMAN, J. D. 1970 Report on the Iban, New York: The Athlone Press (“London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology”, 41), 317 p. HOSE, C. and W. MCDOUGALL 1912 The Pagan Tribes of Borneo, London: Macmillan, 2 vol. HUDSON, A. B. and J. M. 1978 ‘The Ma’anyan of Paju Epat’, p. 215-232 in V. T. King (Ed.): Essays on Borneo Societies, Oxford: Oxford University Press (“Hull Monographs on South-East Asia”). KING, V. T. 1978a ‘Introduction’, p. 1-36 in V. T. King (Ed.): Essays on Borneo Societies, Oxford: Oxford University Press (“Hull Monographs on South-East Asia”). 1978b ‘The Maloh’, p. 193-214 in V. T. King (Ed.): Essays on Borneo Societies, Oxford: Oxford University Press (“Hull Monographs on South-East Asia”). 1985

The Maloh of West Kalimantan, an ethnographic study of social inequality and social change among an Indonesian Borneo people, Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 252 p.

KING, V. T. (Ed.) 1978 Essays on Borneo Societies, Oxford: Oxford University Press (“Hull Monographs on South-East Asia”), 256 p. LEACH, E. R. 1950 Social Science Research in Sarawak. A Report on the Possibilities of a Social Economic Survey of Sarawak, London: H. M. Stationary Office for the Colonial Office (“Colonial Research Studies”, 1), 93 p. LEBAR, F. M. (Ed.) 1972 Ethnic groups of Insular South-East Asia, Vol. 1, Indonesia, Andaman Islands and Madagascar, New Haven: HRAF Press, 226 p., 10 maps. PRENTICE, D. J. 1972 ‘Idahan Murut’, p. 154-158 in F. M. LeBar (Ed.): Ethnic Groups of Insular Southeast Asia, Vol. 1, New Haven: HRAF Press.

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ROUSSEAU, J. 1978 ‘The Kayan’, p. 78-91 in V. T. King (Ed.): Essays on Borneo Societies, Oxford: Oxford University Press (“Hull Monographs on South-East Asia”). 1980

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SATHER, C. 1978 ‘The Bajau Laut’, p. 172-192 in V. T. King (Ed.): Essays on Borneo Societies, Oxford: Oxford University Press (“Hull Monographs on South-East Asia”). SCHNEIDER, W. M. 1978 ‘The Selako Dayak’, p. 59-77 in V. T. King (Ed.): Essays on Borneo Societies, Oxford: Oxford University Press (“Hull Monographs on South-East Asia”). SELLATO, B. 1986 Les Nomades forestiers de Bornéo et la sédentarisation, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Paris: Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 570 p. WHITTIER, H. L. 1973 Social Organization and symbols of social differentiation: An ethnographic study of the Kenyah Dayak of East Kalimantan (Borneo), East Lansing: Michigan State University (Ph.D. thesis, authorized facsimile printed by University Microfilms International), 259 p 1978

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WORTMANN, J. R. 1971a ‘Milestones in the History of Kutai, Kalimantan-Timur, Borneo’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 3 (1) : 5-6. 1971b ‘The Sultanate of Kutai, Kalimantan Timur: A Sketch of the Traditional Political Structure’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 3 (2): 51-55. WURM, S. A. and S. HATTORI (Eds) 1983 Language Atlas of the Pacific Area, Part II: Japan Area, Philippines and Taiwan, Mainland and Insular Southeast Asia, Canberra: The Australian Academy of the Humanities, and Tokyo: The Japan Academy.