Somalia humanitarian narrative - OCHA

The Somalia humanitarian narrative May 2014

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Summary

Somalia’s extremely fragile humanitarian situation is at risk of sliding back into crisis. Some 857,000 people, most of them displaced, are already in need of urgent life-saving assistance at least through June 2014. A further 2 million people are struggling to meet own minimal food requirements and are in need of livelihood assistance to withstand shocks. Early warnings indicate that the combination of the delayed April-June rains, a disrupted planting season and rising food prices in areas affected by an ongoing military offensive could further worsen the humanitarian situation in the country. The number of people in need may further increase if the main Gu rainy season (April to June) perform poorly. The next two months are critical; but a below average maize crop production is forecasted for major producing regions of southern Somalia due to the factors outlined above. Somalia’s basic humanitarian indicators are also shocking. These indicators should be measures against global emergency thresholds/standards, not with statistics from previous years as has been the case in Somalia. The 1 2 percentages of child malnutrition rate and mortality rate in Somalia are both among the highest in the world . 3 Malnutrition levels among IDPs in Somalia are well above emergency levels and very close to emergency levels among many rural communities. One out of every 10 Somali children dies before seeing their first birthday. One of 4 every 18 women dies due to pregnancy related causes . Safe access to water at just 30 per cent remains one of the lowest in the world. Yet, emergency levels which would be considered alarming and unacceptable in other contexts tend to be regarded as acceptable in Somalia. Conditions today are disturbingly similar to the pre-famine period in 2010 when the combination of reduced access, declining funds and consecutive failed rainy seasons led to Somalia's most devastating famine in 2011. Somalia remains one of the most hostile environments in the world to deliver humanitarian assistance. Aid workers have been targeted and access to populations in need is extremely challenging. Recent military gains have not translated into safe, unfettered and sustained access. Meanwhile, humanitarian partners are stymied in their response due to lack of funding. To date, the CAP remains woefully underfunded, with only 15 per cent, or $143 million, funded of the $933 million requested. This is alarming because normally half of the requested resources used to be received at this point in the year. Nearly all humanitarian agencies are facing significant resource gaps for 2014 and are struggling to meet the needs of affected people. Significant numbers of lifesaving programmes in water, sanitation and health services are on the verge of closing. UNICEF has warned that 30 of its NGO partners may end the delivery of primary health care to 3 million, many of them women and children within weeks due to lack of funds. The Water and Sanitation cluster has received merely 6.4 per cent funding and WASH activities at settlements in the Mogadishu IDP camp where the many displaced from the offensive are arriving have had to close. Adding to the situation, multiple early warning alerts that the food security situation is likely to worsen in the coming months were issued. This is a critical time and an injection of funding to the humanitarian operation is critical. However, despite numerous early warnings and appeals, no significant increase in funding was observed since the last Member State briefing in February 2014. Early warnings need to trigger early action. The momentum of assistance needs to be increased and sustained in order to ensure Somalia moves towards and not away from food security, remains polio-free and resilience of the population is supported. While access is a challenge, the key constraint remains lack of adequate funding. If funds are received, the humanitarian community will be able to surmount logistical and other access-related constraints through innovate strategies. An access strategy is being developed by the Somalia Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) to increase the footprint and reach of humanitarian partners.

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Under 5 mortality rate: Sierra Leone (185), Somalia (180). (Source: UNICEF global data). Percentage of prevalence of child malnutrition (Top five countries in the world): Timor-Leste 45.3; India 43.5; Niger 39.9, Eritrea 34.5 and Somalia 32.8. (Source: WHO global data). 3 GAM rates among the 1.1 million IDPs are as high as 15.8 per cent, slightly above emergency levels of 15 per cent. Among rural communities, the GAM rate is 13.2 per cent, which is close to emergency thresholds; while in urban areas, at 10.1 per cent it is still unacceptably high. 4 World Health Organization 2

Somalia humanitarian narrative | version 2

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Humanitarian needs 5

Somalia’s humanitarian crisis remains one of the largest and most complex in the world. About 2.9 million people are in need of immediate life-saving and livelihood support. One in seven children under the age of five, or 203,000 children, is estimated to be acutely malnourished in Somalia. More than 50,000 of these children are severely malnourished and are at risk of death without sustained assistance. Meanwhile, poor basic social services continue to undermine the resilience and coping mechanisms of the vulnerable people. About 1.1 million IDPs in scattered settlements need support to meet basic minimum standards including education, health, shelter and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services. Millions of Somalis remain vulnerable to disease outbreaks due to the absence or weak state of health and WASH services. In some areas one in three children suffers from diarrhoeal 6 diseases. Furthermore, 2012 saw more than 22,000 cases of cholera and 2013, the re-emergence of polio. In 2014, about 1000 suspected cases of measles were reported. There is no protective environment for vulnerable people particularly women, girls and boys. As a result, gender-based violence (GBV) and violations against children are common and the level of response provided to victims is very low. Much of the incremental food security improvements observed at the end of 2013 were due to a combination of good rains and focused early response to early warnings of poor harvest in traditionally food basket areas of southern Somalia issued at the end of 2013. These improvements could be easily reversed if humanitarian agencies do not continue to strengthen the resilience of vulnerable Somalis or if the 2014 Gu rainy season turns out poor. This is a concern because not only are current needs significant, the gains made are fragile and reversals are common in Somalia, given stretched coping mechanisms and vulnerable people’s low capacity to absorb shocks. The current rainfall performance is mixed. The Gu rains has started on time in parts of the south and in northwestern Somalia and the same trend is expected to continue in most livelihood zones in these areas. However, 7 delayed rainfall is reported in most parts of north-eastern and central zones of the country . In agro-pastoral areas, early Gu planting started in most parts of the south, although the intensity of cultivation has been relatively low in conflict-affected areas of Lower Shabelle and Hiraan regions. The Gu harvest will largely depend on rainfall amounts and distribution, particularly in April and May. In addition, currently, pasture conditions are average in most parts of the country. However, delayed rains may cause rapid deterioration of pasture and water sources. This may in turn trigger an abnormal livestock migration, thereby affecting access to milk by poor households, especially by women and children. This, coupled with rising food prices in some areas due to AS’s blockage of commercial trade, may further aggravate the already dire nutrition situation in Somalia.

3.

Humanitarian impact of SNAF/AMISOM military operations against Al Shabaab (AS)

In March 2014, the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF), supported by the Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), started a military operation against Al Shabaab (AS) in southern and central regions of Somalia. The operation was envisaged to take place in nine regions: Bay, Bakool, Galgaduud, Gedo, Hiraan, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Lower Juba, and Middle Juba. By the end of April, the offensive had affected six regions of the nine, the exceptions being Bay, Lower Juba, and Middle Juba. The operation may bring a degree of political stabilization and peace in these troubled regions. Likewise, if it leads to the establishment of proper administrative structures in the newly controlled areas, it may provide an opportunity for humanitarian agencies to have a safe and predictable access to people in need in these areas. However, from the humanitarian perspective, so far the impact has been negative. The operation has led to loss of lives, displacement of people, and slowing down of planting activities in the affected areas. It has also led to an increase in food prices in towns affected by AS blockage of commercial supply routes, which will have adverse food security implications.

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Food security and nutrition figures and analysis in this document are provided by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) of FAO Somalia, unless stated otherwise. Demographic, Social and Health Indicators for Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, World Health Organization 2013. 7 Main areas of concern are: most of Bakool region; Hiraan region, particularly Bulto Burto, Jalalaqsi; parts of Galgaduud; pastoral Puntland and areas affected by the 2013 tropical storms; agro-pastoral and riverine areas of Middle Shabelle, especially Jowhar; and Lower Shabelle. 6

Drafted by OCHA Somalia


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According to UNHCR, about 72,000 people have temporarily moved due to the operation. The pattern of displacement has mostly been short-term as people left towns and moved to outlying villages as a pre-emptive measure to avoid being caught in the conflict. On the other hand, some of the temporarily displaced people have reportedly returned to their areas of origin, such as Maaxas and Bulo Burto districts in Hiraan, Waajid and Xudur in Bakool, and Bur Dhuurbo of Gedo. In addition to displacement, the conflict has also affected the intensity of planting activities, particularly in parts of Lower Shabelle and Hiraan regions, while a trade embargo imposed by Al Shabaab in Bakool region resulted in a significant monthly surge in food prices in Xudur town in March 2014. The military operation is taking place in potential return areas for IDPs and refugees willing to voluntarily return to their home areas. However, the conditions are not conducive for voluntary returns due to the increased insecurity in these return areas and on routes. This has also slowed down return programmes designed to provide durable solutions to IDPs. While not widespread and verified, there are anecdotal evidences of rights violations following the military operations. Cases of SGBV and grave violations against children, including forced recruitments by armed forces and militia groups were reported. Similarly, children were killed in Qoryooley, Garas Jeereed and Bulo Sheikh of Lower Shabelle during the month of March. Displaced people arriving in Baidoa town from different locations were reportedly looted and attacked by armed groups. According to these reports, the displaced people’s belongings were taken, some displaced families were physically assaulted, and children were separated from their families as displaced people tried to escape attacks. There are about 500,000 children in areas that were under AS control that have not been vaccinated against polio since 2009. Thus, displacement bears additional risks of transmission of polio and other communicable diseases. However, in the absence of needs assessments due to lack of access to AS-held rural areas, it is difficult to quantify the full health related impact of the displacement. The scale of disruption on the provision of basic services, such as health, education, and WASH is also not fully known. While SNAF/AMISOM has gained some more territories through military action, this has not yet translated to increased humanitarian access. If new areas become accessible, this may not lead to scaling of response activities as agencies already face significant funding gaps. On the positive side, aid organizations have been supporting people where there they can access, including with medical supplies and personnel, household items, shelter and water and hygiene supplies. In two of the newly accessible areas, Xudur and Waajid in Bakool, medical, nutrition and WASH supplies were delivered.

4.

The humanitarian agenda in a political and peace-building context

Since the establishment of a post-transition Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in 2012 and related political gains, the political narrative about Somalia has been positive. Indeed, Somalia continues to move forward politically, security-wise and economically, but progress cannot be taken for granted. The political and security improvements witnessed have not translated into an improvement of the humanitarian situation. Yet, attention on the political and development support to the FGS through the implementation of the “Somalia New Deal Compact” has inadvertently diluted the focus on the humanitarian situation. The effect of this has been waning donor attention and appetite to sustain the levels of humanitarian funding required to address the most critical humanitarian needs. At the end of last year, only 50 per cent of the 2013 needs were funded. In addition, by the end of April 2014, the Somalia Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) received $116 million or 12.5 per cent of the $933 million requested. Likewise, only four of the nine clusters had received slightly above 13 per cent of their requirements. Critical lifesaving clusters such as Health, WASH, Shelter and NFIs have received less than 7 per cent of their requirements. As indicated earlier, the clearest example of the impact of lack of funding is the closure of health programmes. This kind of funding shortfalls, as well as delayed Gu rains and the ongoing military operations in parts of the country, risks undermining the humanitarian strategy which, in addition to saving lives, seeks to strengthen the resilience to shocks of the vulnerable populations.



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Some donors have also started to exhibit the pre-2010 trends of extreme caution and risk tolerance appears to have waned. The need for accountability and risk mitigation cannot be understated in the operating environment and humanitarian organizations have taken several steps to ensure resources allocated to people in need in Somalia reach their target. The Risk Management Unit (RMU) enhanced due diligence measures which increased the ability of the humanitarian community to identify and redress misuse and diversion of assistance. However, donors need to take the exceptionally difficult operational context in Somalia into account and should continue to demonstrate some degree of flexibility. There seems to be more tolerance for the risks that humanitarian personnel have to take to operate in such an environment than the risks of delivery of aid in the same environment. A balanced trade-off between accountability and the humanitarian imperative which obligates the provision of assistance to people in need is also required.

5.

Humanitarian access

Safe and predictable access is a fundamental pre-requisite to effective humanitarian action. However, in most parts of southern and central Somalia and pocket areas of the north i.e., Sool and Sanaag regions, humanitarian actors’ ability to reach people affected by crisis, as well as affected people’s ability to access humanitarian assistance and services is severely constrained. Due to lack of safe, unimpeded and predictable access, humanitarian partners in Somalia have found it difficult to establish operations, move goods and personnel where they are needed, implement distributions, and provide services. Affected people have also not been able to fully benefit from the assistance and services made available. The ability to deliver humanitarian assistance to Somalis in need has also been constrained by the application of stringent accountability and risk management procedures. Similarly, inadequate funding has also led to a situation where areas with significant humanitarian needs are not reached. In addition to presence, ability to deliver and funding, two other critical considerations also come into play when defining humanitarian access in the context of Somalia: (i) the trade-off between the humanitarian imperative to assist people in need and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel; and (ii) adherence to humanitarian principles in a situation where the humanitarian community is perceived to be partisan by one side of the conflict. Throughout southern and central regions, attacks and threats against humanitarian organizations and personnel continues to hamper the delivery of humanitarian assistance to many vulnerable Somalis. AS’s warning on 15 January 2014 that all Somalis working for international organizations will be targeted has limited the movement of UN and NGO Somali staff. AS also forced the shutdown of internet services in parts of south and central. These actions reduced the ability of humanitarian personnel to reach vulnerable people and monitor response programmes. Access thus remains constricted in south and central regions. The presence of humanitarian 8 agencies in some of the “garrison towns” in south and central Somalia has slightly improved access to people living in these towns. However, the presence of the UN and international NGOs does not extend to overlaying rural areas where most of the people in need reside. AS controls most of the vital routes to these towns, making the delivery of humanitarian supplies by road difficult. UN agencies and most international NGOs are banned from operating in AS held areas. There are also few reliable local partners working in these areas. Due diligence and risk management measures also limit the amount of resources that can go to these areas as donors are reluctant to fund projects in areas where effective monitoring systems do not exist. Taxation, kidnapping and detention of humanitarian staff are another access impediments observed in these areas. The combined effect of these challenges has led to inadequate humanitarian response to these areas. Yet, access has also depended on the type of assistance provided. While it has been possible to provide polio vaccination to children in these areas, implementing other interventions has been problematic.

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The security situation in these towns remains fluid with some of the towns changing hands at times. Lack of proper administrative structures and the existence of competing political interests in most “garrison towns” also complicates humanitarian agencies’ operations in these towns. For instance, in some of these towns, such as Dhuusamarreeb in Galgaduud, there are multiple authorities who ask humanitarian agencies to report to them. ASWJ is in control of the town, but there is also an FGS-appointed local governor. They both instruct humanitarian agencies to report to them. Likewise, in Baidoa, self-proclaimed authorities from the two versions of “South Western State of Somalia” issue letters requesting for humanitarian assistance while there is also a regional governor appointed by the FGS. This confusion and lack of clarity causes unnecessary delays and sometimes brings humanitarian programmes to a halt.



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In Somaliland and Puntland, indirect taxation through registration of NGOs, interference with the operations of humanitarian agencies by local authorities, and bureaucratic impediments remain the main access challenges.

6.

Way forward

1. Humanitarians urgently need adequate and sustained funding to consolidate gains made on the humanitarian side in Somalia. Somalia's political transition must not be conflated with humanitarian recovery. While there have been incremental improvements, the humanitarian situation in Somalia remains very fragile. Many Somalis need continued humanitarian assistance; however, funding to support and strengthen resilience necessary to break the cycle of crises has been insufficient. As a priority, funding pipelines for food security, nutrition, Health, and WASH services must be maintained. 2. SNAF/AMISOM’s territorial gains through military action do not immediately translate to increased humanitarian access. While the offensive has created an opportunity for the delivery of vital humanitarian assistance such as polio vaccinations in some previously inaccessible areas, it has also resulted in new displacements and loss of lives. The Somalia Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) will continue to reiterate the need for upholding humanitarian principles and international humanitarian law with FGS and AMISOM leadership. OCHA has shared the HCT guidelines on civil-military coordination and will advocate for adherence to these guidelines. 3. Humanitarian agencies will continue to provide assistance on the basis of assessed needs and will not be party to preconceived stabilization agenda of “winning hearts and minds”. Where military operations provide an opportunity for a safe and predictable access, humanitarian agencies will utilize the space to provide assistance without compromising on the principles of neutrality and impartiality. 4. The challenges humanitarian agencies face in delivering assistance in an environment with high security risks and restricted access for effective monitoring needs to be underscored. Consequently, an endeavour should be made to strike a balance between saving lives and implementing oversight mechanisms.
