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Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 741–748

Speech style and occupational status affect assessments of eyewitness testimony Sean J. Jules1, Dawn E. McQuiston2 1 2

Department of Psychology, University of Iowa Division of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Arizona State University

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Sean J. Jules, Department of Psychology, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA. E-mail: [email protected] These data were presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, Miami, Florida, March 2011. doi: 10.1111/jasp.12002

Abstract This study examined how speech style and occupational status affect mock jurors’ assessments of eyewitness testimony. Mock jurors (n = 120) watched a video of a man testifying about witnessing an attempted robbery. The eyewitness exhibited either a powerless or powerful speech style and reported either a high or low (or no) status occupation during his testimony. Results indicated that high occupation status and powerful speech style led to more favorable evaluations of the eyewitness’s testimony and of the case against the defendant than powerless speech style and low/no occupation status. Implications of these results on considerations of eyewitness testimony and future research are discussed.

A current focal point of both social and legal psychologists’ jury research involves how jurors react to testimony presented during a trial. For example, the efficacy of eyewitness testimony is of course dependent upon a juror’s assessment of the accuracy of the witness’s recollection. However, as Pansky, Koriat, and Goldsmith (2005) point out, the typical juror is naïve as to the subjective nature of memorial encoding and retrieval. Even if the eyewitness was paying enough attention to the events in question, the witness alone decides what information to report and how much detail to provide. In addition, phenomena like the misinformation effect (exposure to misleading information after an event resulting in the genesis of a distorted memory, e.g., Loftus & Greene, 1980) speak to the fact that memories are constantly subject to unconscious manipulation. Since jurors are mostly unaware of these issues, they typically take a witness’s testimony at face value unless his credibility is impaired or there are inconsistencies in testimony (e.g., McQuiston-Surrett, Douglass, & Burkhardt, 2008). Thus, it is important to note that how something is communicated is as significant as what is being communicated. The study of various heuristics (i.e., mental “shortcuts”) like the anchoring heuristic has obvious implications for understanding juror decision making. The principle of the anchoring heuristic is that individuals tend to rely on one factor or piece of information too heavily when making decisions. This explains how a novice can make a relatively uninformed or completely incorrect decision yet feel confident © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

about the veracity of that decision. For example, Blankenship, Wegener, Petty, Detweiler-Dedell, and Macy (2008) manipulated the cognitive load of their participants to induce high levels of thinking in some groups and low levels of thinking in other groups. Both groups exhibited the anchoring heuristic when they made decisions; however, the high-thought groups based their anchoring on more judgment-relevant background knowledge. Additionally, the high-thought group’s decisions persisted longer over time and were more resistant to subsequent exposure to social influences (i.e., they were less likely to change their decisions solely because of social pressures like being excluded from an in group). A fuller understanding of how jurors analyze information that is delivered during testimony can allow for improvements in trial processes (e.g., requiring note taking to ensure jurors are actively considering the information being presented to them, removing previously unidentified distractions, or implementing a prestructured deliberation process that encourages critical thinking). Researchers recognize that jurors need to believe that an eyewitness is a generally credible person before they will accept his testimony as accurate. Birch, Akmal, and Frampton (2010) found that even children as young as 2 and 3 years old look for and attend to nonverbal socio-cognitive cues of credibility. The children that Birch et al. (2010) worked with were able to correctly identify adult socio-cognitive cues of confidence and credibility and preferred to interact with adults who exhibited a greater number of these cues. If toddlers Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 741–748

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place such a premium on these understated behaviors, it follows that adults serving on a jury would also take stock of those same behaviors when observing testimony. For example, Davis, Markus, and Walters (2006) asked participants to ascertain whether 20 short statements given by a defendant during a confession were true or false. The participants’ overall accuracy (for both truth and lie detection) was highest when they listened to an audio transcript of the defendant versus reading a written transcript. These results show that jurors do not solely focus on the content of testimony; they are also looking for (or in this case listening for) how the information is being communicated. In 2003, Golding, Fryman, Marsil, and Yozwiak found that a display of emotion from a witness can affect guilt ratings in a simulated first-degree rape trial. In the written trial summary, jurors were presented with the testimony of a child victim. The child was described as calm, teary, or hysterically crying during testimony. Golding, Fryman, Marsil, and Yozwiak (2003) found that the teary condition resulted in the highest number of guilty verdicts and the highest level of trust in the child in contrast with the calm and hysterical conditions. On a subtler note, Mendoza, Hosch, Ponder, and Carrillo (2000) studied the effect of slight hesitations and hedges on jurors’ verdicts. Participants observed a prosecution witness testify in English or in Spanish through an English interpreter. In the experimental groups, the speaking style of the witness systematically featured hesitations and hedges. In the Spanish-interpreted condition rife with hedges and pauses, jurors metered “Guilty” verdicts 34% of the time. When hesitations and hedges were absent from the Spanishinterpreted condition, jurors trusted the witness significantly more and handed out convictions 47% of the time. These slight speaking alterations resulted in a significant disparity in “Guilty” verdicts. It is quite clear that jurors pay a great deal of attention to the communication style of a witness. The results of these studies demonstrate that aspects of a person’s communication style can impact how credible he/she seems. Because speaking styles are so pervasive and difficult to ignore, the present study was designed to examine how one’s general speaking style impacts an assessor’s judgment of his/her credibility (and to an extent, his/her ability to persuade the assessor). Erickson, Lind, Johnson, and O’Barr (1978) previously examined speech style; specifically, they compared what they referred to as “powerless” and “powerful” speaking. A powerless speech style is rife with hedges and hesitations while a powerful speech style is marked by almost no incidences of hedges and hesitations. Erickson et al. (1978) found that mock jurors believed a prosecution witness was more credible when the witness used a powerful speech style versus a powerless speech style. This finding was consistent whether the jurors read a trial transcript or listened to an audiotape of the trial proceedings. Vinson and Johnson (1989) later replicated these results; however, they found © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Speech style and occupational status

that there was a significant difference in credibility ratings between the written transcript and audio transcript. While credibility ratings were still quite low when the witness exhibited a powerless speech style, jurors who listened to audio transcripts rated his testimony as more credible than jurors who read the same testimony in a trial transcript. The present study builds upon Erickson et al. (1978) and Vinson and Johnson (1989) by asking mock jurors to assess a video of an eyewitness’s testimony so they can take nonverbal behaviors into account just as real jurors would. The present study examined an additional extralegal variable in the form of the eyewitness’s occupational status. This was done in order to determine whether a person’s perceived level of occupational authority mitigates, enhances, or eliminates the effects of speech style on a juror’s judgment of eyewitness testimony. People often defer to experts and authority figures as a type of mental shortcut when they (1) do not know what decision to make in a given situation or (2) have placed a premium on seeking truth and accuracy in a particular matter (Kenrick, Neuberg, & Cialdini, 2007). In most cases, a truth seeker/decision maker assumes that an expert or authority figure can be blindly trusted because that person has much more experience with the subject at hand. It is also assumed that the expert or authority figure will have done his/her due diligence and verified all of the details involved. This blind trust could impact an assessor’s expectations and interpretations of speech style when an expert or authority figure is involved. Specifically, an authority figure’s use of a powerless speaking style could be interpreted in two diametrically opposite ways. Some people might interpret powerless speaking as the authority figure taking stock of the situation and reflecting on prior experience/knowledge in order to make the best possible decision. Others may expect the authority figure to be able to respond immediately and would view a powerless speaking style as an indicator of a lack of confidence or competence. Thus, the occupational status variable was included in this study in an attempt to discern whether “baseline” reactions to speech style are enhanced or reversed in the presence of an expert/authority figure. The current study was designed to examine (1) whether speech style impacts jurors’ assessment of eyewitness testimony and defendant culpability, and (2) whether the eyewitness’s occupational status mitigates, enhances, or eliminates the effect of speech style in evaluating the eyewitness. Based on the trends from Vinson and Johnson’s (1989) work and Kenrick et al.’s (2007) review of the influence of authority figures, it was predicted that (1) a powerless speech style will degrade mock jurors’ evaluations of the eyewitness’s accuracy and the prosecution’s case in comparison with a powerful speech style (i.e., there will be a main effect of speech style), (2) high occupational status will lead to more positive evaluations of the eyewitness and prosecution’s case than low occupational status or a control group (i.e., there will be a Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 741–748

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main effect of occupational status), and (3) an interaction between speech style and occupational status will emerge demonstrating that the eyewitness and the prosecution’s case are viewed most favorably when a powerful speech style is combined with high occupational status.

with only the eyewitness appearing on screen; the attorneys’ questions were asked off-camera. This was done to maximize the participants’ focus on the various qualities of the eyewitness’s testimony about which they would later be asked. A male actor played the part of the eyewitness in the video.

Method

Independent variables

Participants One hundred fifty students enrolled in psychology courses at Arizona State University participated in this study. Of this number, 30 participants failed a manipulation check question regarding the occupational status variable (What is the profession of the eyewitness?) and were excluded from statistical analyses, resulting in a final sample of n = 120 mock jurors.1 Participants consisted of 24 males and 96 females ranging in age from 18 to 52 years (M = 23.26, SD = 6.78). The majority of participants were either White or Hispanic. Participants received partial course credit in exchange for their participation.

Materials Video The case revolved around an eyewitness (the home owner) coming home in the middle of a break-in and accidentally interrupting the robbery. The eyewitness reported the crime and later identified the defendant from a photographic lineup. No other evidence was presented during the case as the home was not protected by a security system, there were no other witnesses, and the robber (who was wearing gloves) dropped the stolen goods upon being discovered. No forensic evidence was left behind. The video of this criminal trial featured initial jury instructions, the attorneys’ opening statements, direct and crossexaminations, closing arguments, and final jury instructions. The filming was done from the perspective of the jury box (the camera was at a leftward slant). The initial and final jury instructions, opening statements, and closing arguments were filmed as voice-overs with a still image displayed on the screen. The prosecution’s direct examination and the defense’s cross-examination of the eyewitness were filmed 1

The occupation status manipulation was deemed ineffective for 30 participants (five participants from each condition) who could not correctly report the eyewitness’s profession. However, the number of exclusions from the two high occupation status groups may be artificially high. During the video, the eyewitness reported that he was a “physician.” The relevant answer choice that was listed for participants was “doctor” (see Table 1, question 16). Some participants could have been confused by the difference in terminology and may have subsequently misreported the eyewitness’s profession. Regardless, 20 participants remained in each of the six experimental conditions, thus sufficient statistical power was achieved in our analyses.

© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

This study was a 2 ¥ 3 between-groups factorial design with Speech Style (powerless vs. powerful) and Occupational Status (control—not mentioned vs. low—cashier vs. high— physician) as the independent variables. In the powerless speech style conditions, the actor incorporated pauses (i.e., taking a deep breath before or during speaking), filler speech (i.e., “Um . . .” or “Well . . .”), and physical demonstrations of hesitation (i.e., touching of the face while speaking or looking off to the side) into his responses to questions. In powerful speech style conditions, the actor responded to all questions in a matter of fact tone without pauses, filler speech, or physical demonstrations of hesitation. The transcript of the video was the same in all conditions except for the manipulation of the occupational status variable. In the control occupational status condition, the eyewitness was not asked to indicate his job. In the experimental conditions, an extra question asking the eyewitness to indicate his job was inserted at the beginning of the prosecution’s direct examination. In the low occupational status condition, the eyewitness indicates he is a cashier at Target, while he states he is a physician in the high occupational status condition. Dependent measures questionnaire Participants answered a 16-item questionnaire, of which two questions served as manipulation checks. See Table 1 for the full questionnaire. The core 14 dependent variables measured aspects of the defendant’s culpability and the eyewitness’s accuracy and credibility. Thirteen items were measured on a 10-point Likert scale, while the remaining item was dichotomous.

Procedure Participants were run in small groups and watched a video of a criminal trial surrounding a breaking-and-entering and attempted robbery. Participants were advised that they could take notes during the course of the video if they felt it was necessary. At the end of the video, participants individually completed a 16-item questionnaire that asked about aspects of the case, as well as several demographic questions.

Results Several statistical analyses were used to examine the effects of the speech style and occupational status variables on core Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 741–748

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Table 1


Dependent Measures Questionnaire

1. How strong is the case against the defendant (Lance Robinson)? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Extremely weak Extremely strong 2. How credible is the eyewitness (Joshua Drake)? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Not at all credible Extremely credible 3. How confident do you believe the eyewitness is about the accuracy of his testimony? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Not at all confident Completely confident 4. Did the eyewitness take time to reflect on the answers to the questions he was asked before answering them? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 He did not take He really thought about time to reflect his answers before speaking 5. How intelligent is the eyewitness? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Not at all intelligent Extremely intelligent 6. How accurate is the eyewitness’s recollection of the details surrounding the break-in? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Not at all accurate Completely accurate 7. How trustworthy is the eyewitness? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Not at all trustworthy Extremely trustworthy 8. How strongly do you believe the eyewitness is accurate in his identification of Lance Robinson as the burglar? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Not at all accurate Completely accurate 9. How likeable is the eyewitness? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Not at all likeable Extremely likeable 10. What is the likelihood the defendant is guilty of breaking and entering and attempted robbery? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Not at all likely Extremely likely 11. In general, how reliable do you believe eyewitness testimony is? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Not at all reliable Completely reliable 12. Assume that the defendant was found guilty. What type of a sentence would you advocate for him? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 None; He is innocent The harshest sentence possible 13. Assume that the defendant was found guilty. What do you think the defendant’s chances of successfully appealing his conviction would be? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very poor; His conviction would stand Very good; His conviction would be overturned 14. Do you believe the eyewitness had a good opportunity to observe the burglar? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 He did not get a good look at the burglar He got a great look at the burglar 15. Do you believe the eyewitness correctly identified the burglar? Yes No 16. What is the profession of the eyewitness? ____ He is a cab driver. ____ He is a cashier at Target. ____ He is a doctor. ____ He is a lawyer. ____ He is unemployed. ____ He wasn’t asked.



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Table 2

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Means and Standard Deviations for Dependent Measures Powerful speech style

Strength Credibility Confidence Reflection Intelligent Recollection Trustworthy Accuracy Likeable Guilt Reliability Sentence Appeal Observe

Powerless speech style

Control

Low occupational status

High occupational status

Control

Low occupational status

High occupational status

5.65 (1.90) 6.25 (1.99) 7.25 (1.86) 6.00 (2.34) 7.15 (1.60) 7.00 (1.95) 7.10 (1.86) 5.70 (1.98) 7.00 (1.83) 5.65 (2.08) 5.55 (2.16) 5.70 (2.32) 5.60 (1.93) 5.05 (2.44)

6.40 (2.50) 7.10 (1.71) 7.60 (2.19) 5.95 (2.56) 6.50 (1.15) 7.40 (1.31) 7.00 (1.41) 6.95 (2.09) 6.70 (1.84) 7.10 (2.38) 6.85 (2.30) 5.45 (2.72) 5.20 (3.09) 6.10 (2.84)

5.75 (2.31) 6.90 (2.10) 7.85 (1.87) 6.25 (2.69) 7.95 (1.39) 7.30 (1.38) 7.60 (1.76) 6.80 (2.44) 7.15 (1.69) 6.60 (2.60) 6.75 (2.22) 6.15 (2.13) 5.95 (2.46) 6.30 (2.59)

4.85 (2.23) 5.75 (2.02) 6.20 (2.21) 7.55 (1.47) 6.35 (1.14) 6.15 (2.01) 6.00 (1.75) 5.30 (2.27) 5.75 (1.45) 5.55 (2.44) 5.85 (2.18) 4.45 (2.23) 7.10 (1.65) 4.85 (2.49)

4.60 (2.44) 5.25 (2.15) 6.00 (2.75) 7.20 (2.28) 6.20 (1.44) 5.35 (2.23) 6.15 (2.21) 4.05 (2.44) 6.30 (1.72) 5.15 (2.52) 4.85 (2.58) 3.65 (1.81) 7.00 (2.85) 3.70 (2.34)

5.58 (2.04) 6.89 (1.76) 7.47 (1.87) 7.84 (1.67) 8.26 (0.93) 7.26 (1.56) 7.68 (1.34) 6.58 (2.04) 6.79 (1.65) 6.63 (1.89) 6.63 (1.77) 5.74 (1.99) 6.26 (1.97) 5.84 (2.91)

Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

dependent measures of impressions of the eyewitness’s accuracy, aspects of the eyewitness’s credibility, and the defendant’s culpability. See Table 2 for the means and standard deviations of participants’ responses to these measures. In cases where post hoc comparisons were necessary, we only reported and discussed statistically significant comparisons.

Manipulation check A manipulation check measured the strength of the video actor’s representation of the speech style manipulation. Participants were asked if the eyewitness took time to reflect on the answers he was providing during his testimony before he spoke. Mock jurors who observed a powerful speech style (M = 6.07, SD = 2.50) indicated that the eyewitness reflected on his answers significantly less than mock jurors who were presented with the powerless speech style (M = 7.45, SD = 1.90), t(118) = 3.41, p < .05. These results show that participants correctly interpreted the actor’s behaviors.

Impressions of the eyewitness’s accuracy Three of the 14 dependent measures related to mock jurors’ impressions of the eyewitness’s accuracy (quality of the look the eyewitness was able to get of the burglar, the accuracy of the eyewitness’s recollection, and the accuracy of the eyewitness’s identification of the defendant as the burglar) were highly correlated (rs > .54, ps < .01), thus a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) examined the effects of speech style and occupational status on these measures. The analysis revealed a significant effect of speech style, F(3 112) = 3.51, p < .05, h2 = .09 and a marginally significant interaction between the speech style and occupational status © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

variables, F(6, 224) = 1.96, p = .07, h2 = .05. There was no significant effect of the occupational status variable, F(6, 224) = 1.56, p > .05, h2 = .04. A series of univariate ANOVAs was conducted to determine the effects of the speech style variable. These analyses revealed significant omnibus effects on all three accuracy measures. When asked about the quality of the look the eyewitness was able to get of the burglar, participants who observed a powerful speech style (M = 5.82, SD = 2.65) believed the witness got a significantly better look than those who observed a powerless speech style (M = 4.82, SD = 2.68), F(1, 114) = 4.43, p < .05, h2 = .04. When asked about the eyewitness’s recollection accuracy, participants who observed a powerful speech style (M = 7.23, SD = 1.56) rated the eyewitness’s recollection as significantly more accurate than those who observed a powerless speech style (M = 6.25, SD = 2.06), F(1, 114) = 9.29, p < .01, h2 = .05. Finally, participants rated the eyewitness’s identification accuracy, F(1, 114) = 7.52, p < .01, h2 = .06. Mock jurors who observed a powerful speech style (M = 6.48, SD = 2.21) were more confident in the witness’s identification than those who observed a powerless speech style (M = 5.37, SD = 2.50). These main effects were qualified by two significant interactions between the speech style and occupational status variables. The first was an effect on the recollection accuracy measure, F(2, 114) = 3.25, p < .05, h2 = .05. Occupational status significantly impacted only the ratings of mock jurors who observed a powerless speech style, F(2, 59) = 4.83, p < .05. Tukey’s honestly significant difference test showed that these mock jurors who observed high occupational status (M = 7.25) rated the eyewitness’s recollection as significantly more accurate than those in the low occupational Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 741–748

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status (M = 5.35) and control (M = 6.15) conditions, ps < .01. A significant interaction also emerged on the identification accuracy measure, F(2, 114) = 4.86, p < .01, h2 = .08. Follow-up tests revealed a similar pattern; occupational status only significantly impacted the ratings of mock jurors who observed a powerless speech style, F(2, 59) = 7.01, p < .01. Mock jurors who observed high occupational status (M = 6.75) rated the eyewitness’s identification as significantly more accurate than those in both the low occupational status (M = 4.05) and control (M = 5.30) conditions, ps = .001. One additional dependent measure asked participants to indicate if they definitively believed that the eyewitness correctly identified the burglar and they were presented with a yes/no option. Chi-square tests were used to determine whether the speech style or occupational status variables impacted the mock jurors’ responses. When occupational status was high, 69.2% of jurors definitively believed the witness correctly identified the defendant as the burglar, compared to 40.0% in the low occupational status condition and 47.5% in the control condition, c2 (2) = 7.27, p < .05. The speech style comparison was not significant, p > .05.

Impressions of eyewitness credibility Five of the 14 dependent measures answered by participants were related to mock jurors’ impressions of various aspects of the eyewitness’s credibility and were highly correlated (rs > .43, ps < .01). A MANOVA examining the effects of the speech style and occupational status variables on impressions of the eyewitness’s credibility, confidence level, intelligence, trustworthiness, and likability was conducted. The analysis revealed a significant effect of occupational status, F(10, 220) = 4.69, p < .001, h2 = .18. There was no significant effect of the speech style variable, F(5, 110) = 1.77, p > .05, h2 = .08, nor was there a significant interaction, F(10, 220) = 1.23, p > .05, h2 = .05. A series of univariate ANOVAs was conducted to determine the effects of the occupational status variable. These analyses revealed significant omnibus effects on two of the five aspects of credibility that were measured. First, there was a significant difference in participants’ ratings of the eyewitness’s intelligence, F(2, 114) = 20.76, p < .001, h2 = .27. Participants in the high occupational status condition (M = 8.13, SD = 1.18) rated the eyewitness’s intelligence as significantly higher than those in both the low occupational status (M = 6.35, SD = 1.29) and the control (M = 6.75, SD = 1.43) conditions, ps = .001. A similar pattern was observed in participants’ ratings of the eyewitness’s trustworthiness, F(2, 114) = 4.97, p < .01, h2 = .08. Those in the high occupational status condition (M = 7.62, SD = 1.53) rated the eyewitness’s trustworthiness as significantly higher than those in both the low occupational status (M = 6.58, SD = 1.88) and the © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.


control (M = 6.55, SD = 1.87) conditions, ps = .001. Mock jurors’ ratings of the eyewitness’s credibility, confidence level, and likability showed no statistically significant effects of occupational status.

Impressions of the defendant Four of the 14 dependent measures were related to mock jurors’ beliefs about the defendant and were correlated (rs > .36, ps < .01). A MANOVA examined the effects of the speech style and occupational status variables on ratings of the strength of the case against the defendant, the likelihood the defendant is guilty, the sentence the defendant deserves if he is convicted, and the defendant’s chances of winning an appeal if he is convicted. The analysis revealed a significant effect of speech style, F(4, 111) = 3.43, p < .05, h2 = .11. There was no significant effect of the occupational status variable, F(8, 222) = 1.56, p > .05, h2 = .05, nor was the interaction significant, F(8, 222) = .87, p > .05, h2 = .03. A series of univariate ANOVAs revealed significant omnibus effects on three of the four measures. When asked about the strength of the case against the defendant, participants who observed the powerful speech style (M = 5.93, SD = 2.23) believed the case was significantly stronger than those who observed the powerless speech style (M = 5.02, SD = 2.23), F(1, 114) = 5.05, p < .05, h2 = .04. When asked to indicate the severity of the criminal sentence the defendant should receive if he was convicted, mock jurors who observed the powerful speech style (M = 5.77, SD = 2.38) recommended the defendant receive a significantly harsher sentence than those who observed the powerless speech style (M = 4.60, SD = 2.15), F(1, 114) = 8.32, p < .01, h2 = .07. Finally, mock jurors who observed the powerful speech style (M = 5.58, SD = 2.51) rated the defendant’s chances of successfully appealing a conviction to be significantly lower than those who observed the powerless speech style (M = 6.80, SD = 2.19), F(1, 114) = 7.87, p < .01, h2 = .07. There was no statistically significant effect of speech style on mock jurors’ ratings of defendant guilt.

Perceptions of the reliability of eyewitness testimony A final dependent measure asked mock jurors to indicate their general impressions of the reliability of eyewitness testimony. An ANOVA indicated a significant interaction between the speech style and occupational status variables, F(2, 114) = 3.14, p < .05, h2 = .05. In breaking down the interaction, only participants’ ratings in the powerless speech style condition were statistically significant, F(2, 59) = 3.55, p < .05. Jurors in the high occupational status condition (M = 6.70) believed that eyewitness testimony was significantly more reliable than those in the low occupational status condition (M = 4.85), p < .05. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 741–748

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Discussion This study was conducted to examine how jurors react to an eyewitness’s speech style and occupational status when giving courtroom testimony. Results showed that a powerless speech style negatively affected assessments of the eyewitness’s testimony. This supports work done by Erickson et al. (1978), and is also consistent with Wright (1987), which demonstrated that a powerless speech style results in low ratings of two qualities that enhance persuasion: attractiveness and authoritativeness. Mock jurors in the present study who observed a powerless speech style believed that the witness’s identification was less accurate, the witness’s recollection of the details was less accurate, and that the witness had less opportunity to view the burglar than those who observed a powerful speech style. It is likely that jurors viewed the presence of a powerless speech style as an indication of the witness’s lack of confidence and assuredness regarding his testimony. If a powerless speech style is being decoded in this manner during communication, it is easy to see why its presence negatively affects impressions of accuracy. The presence of a powerless speech style might even be interpreted as an indication of a witness who is anxious or deceptive. While a powerless speech style hurt impressions of the eyewitness’s testimony, it enhanced assessments of the defendant’s innocence. Participants who were exposed to a powerless speech style believed the case against the defendant was weaker than those who observed a powerful speech style. They also assigned less harsh criminal sentences and believed the defendant would have a stronger case for a successful appeal when told to assume the defendant was found guilty. The implication here is that the participants felt other (future) jurors would share their aversion to powerless speech style and would respond in a similar manner. This aversion might be a learned social response rather than an individual-difference factor. Interestingly, this negative impression of powerless speech style was generalized: Those who observed a powerless speech style rated the evidentiary reliability of any eyewitness testimony as less reliable than those who observed a powerful speech style. It would be interesting to examine whether reactions to speech style are based on individual personality differences or a social norm. Though speech style clearly affected mock jurors’ impressions of the eyewitness’s testimony, it is important to note that speech style ultimately did not drive mock jurors’ verdicts. This seems to be an atypical finding given the literature on the influences of witness confidence on mock jurors’ judgments (e.g., Cramer, Brodsky, & DeCoster, 2009; Whitley & Greenberg, 1986). This literature has demonstrated that when mock jurors’ perceptions of a witness’s confidence increase, perceptions of the witness’s credibility increase and verdicts are driven in the direction of the witness’s © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

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testimony. Given how speech style was operationalized in the present research, it seems that speech style should have impacted assessments of the eyewitness’s confidence as well as assessments of his credibility. Accordingly, speech style should have also driven guilty verdicts. We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to our attention. Subsequent simple linear regression analyses showed that while a powerless speech style did degrade impressions of the eyewitness’s confidence, b = -.983, t(118) = -2.478, p < .05, it did not impact verdicts, b = -.638, t(118) = -1.581, p > .05. Since speech style did impact judgments of credibility and confidence in the way that the witness confidence literature would predict, it would seem that our manipulation of speech style might need to be enhanced in order to obtain the previously demonstrated effect on verdicts. Toward this end, future iterations of this work should seek to strengthen the speech style manipulation. The other variable of interest, occupational status, was found to also impact mock jurors’ assessments. Participants believed the eyewitness correctly identified the burglar most often when occupational status was high. A high level of occupational status also resulted in higher ratings of the eyewitness’s trustworthiness and intelligence versus a low (or ambiguous) level of occupational status. This seems intuitive. People who have higher levels of occupational status are often experts in their fields who are highly educated and entrusted with more responsibilities than people with lower levels of occupational status. Interestingly, high occupational status interacted with a powerless speech style when mock jurors rated the accuracy of various portions of the eyewitness’s testimony. Although the overall ratings were low due to the negative effects of a powerless speech style, mock jurors found the eyewitness to be most accurate in the high occupational status condition. High levels of occupational status impacted the participants’ ratings of the eyewitness most when decision ambiguity was high (i.e., when the powerless speech style caused mock jurors to doubt the accuracy of the eyewitness’s testimony, they gave more weight to the eyewitness’s occupational status). This is in line with Kenrick et al.’s (2007) overview of the influence of authority. Based on these results, one could assume that when experts exhibit a powerless speech style while discussing facts, people do not interpret that behavior as a sign of a lack of confidence or assuredness. It appears that when experts are exhibiting a powerless speech style, people give them “the benefit of the doubt” and assume the experts are engaging in a form of internal fact checking. A more specific look into the intricacies of the perception of speech style is warranted. A growing number of studies (including the present one) have identified that a powerless speech style is perceived negatively, but there is still much to learn. For example, how does a person decide that a speaker’s use of an individual aspect of powerless speaking (e.g., saying Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 741–748

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“Um” often) is a conversational quirk of the speaker versus a marker of the derided powerless speech style? Arciuli, Mallard, and Villar (2010) examined this notion. They asked participants to rate various speakers on the veracity of their statements. The speakers were instructed to use different preselected filler speech phrases that often arise during normal conversations between friends (e.g., “Um” and “Like”). The authors found that the phrase“Um”garnered the least accusations of deception. Thus, it appears that different facets of a powerless speech style may be viewed as more negative than others. However, work by Rockwell and Hubbard (2004) has shown that mock jurors can interpret a particular behavior to be constructive to certain aspects of credibility while it simultaneously damages other aspects (and vice versa). Future research should examine which of the components of powerless speaking is most damaging. It would also be prudent to examine if occupational status (or other relevant variables) can counteract individual aspects of a powerless speech style.

References Arciuli, J., Mallard, D., & Villar, G. (2010). “Um, I can tell you’re lying”: Linguistic markers of deception versus truth-telling in speech. Applied Psycholinguistics, 31, 397–411. Birch, S. A. J., Akmal, N., & Frampton, K. L. (2010). Two-year-olds are vigilant of others non-verbal cues to credibility. Developmental Science, 13, 363–369. Blankenship, K. L., Wegener, W. T., Petty, R. E., Detweiler-Dedell, B., & Macy, C. L. (2008). Elaboration and consequences of anchored estimates: An attitudinal perspective on numerical anchoring. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 1465–1476. Cramer, R. J., Brodsky, S. L., & DeCoster, J. (2009). Expert witness confidence and juror personality: Their impact on credibility and persuasion in the courtroom. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 37, 63–74. Davis, M., Markus, K. A., & Walters, S. B. (2006). Judging the credibility of criminal suspect statements: Does mode of


Overall, this study contributes to a literature showing that people’s judgments are highly influenced by how information is framed or presented. While the present study focused on the measurable impact that speech style can have in legal situations, understanding reactions to speech style in other societal contexts is important as well. For example, consider employment opportunities: Job applicants may unknowingly sabotage themselves during interviews if they display a powerless speech style while discussing their previous work experience. Whether these behaviors are expressed intentionally or not, it is imperative to learn how and why people react negatively to them.

Acknowledgment We thank Jessica Bolinger and Lindsay Perez for their assistance with data collection. We also thank Todd Benefiel and Angela Newman for their roles as actors in the experimental video.

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