Standards, techno-economic networks, and ... - Semantic Scholar

Review of International Political Economy 17:3 August 2010: 507–536

Standards, techno-economic networks, and playing fields: Performing the global market economy Allison Loconto1 and Lawrence Busch2 Downloaded By: [Loconto, Allison] At: 20:32 17 August 2010

1

Institute for Food and Agricultural Standards, Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, 422B Berkey Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824, USA 2 Institute for Food and Agricultural Standards, Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, USA, and CESAGEN, Institute for Advanced Studies, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK

ABSTRACT This paper explores the construction of what the authors term a ‘tripartite standards regime’ (TSR) by looking at the pragmatic emergence of standards development organizations (SDOs) and national accreditation bodies (NABs). The authors explain how, through their network of audit, the TSR is entangling intermediaries and processes into specific supply chains. Moreover, they argue that the emphasis placed on the role of ‘metrology’ is overstated in the literature. Rather, the concept of ‘standards’ better captures the more complex, underlying processes involved in the construction of the TSR. They present evidence gathered through a review of data collected from SDOs’ and NABs’ websites, official documents, international trade agreements, and the directories published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the International Organization for Standardization. They argue that the TSR acts as a techno-economic network that is global in reach and serves a key coordinating role in facilitating international trade. As such they see the TSR as fundamental to the movement towards ‘governing at a distance’ that is part and parcel of the neoliberal shift from government to governance.

KEYWORDS Conformity assessment; standards; accreditation; governance; globalization.

INTRODUCTION ‘A world without standards would soon grind to a halt. Transport and trade would seize up. The Internet would simply not function. Hundreds Review of International Political Economy C 2010 Taylor & Francis ISSN 0969-2290 print/ISSN 1466-4526 online http://www.informaworld.com DOI: 10.1080/09692290903319870

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REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

of thousands of systems dependent on information and communication technologies would falter or fail . . . ’ (ISO, 2007b). Thus was announced the 38th World Standards Day by the heads of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) – three international bodies that coordinate most of the various national and regional standards in use today. An unsuspecting reader might ask, what are these standards that hold such power over the world? Our response would be that standards are the measures by which people, practices, processes, and products are judged (Busch and Bingen, 2006). Standards are ubiquitous; every aspect of human endeavor from education to agricultural practices to television sets is subject to the judgments implied by standards. In principle, all standards can be traced to the initial action of some person or persons; however, in practice informal standards are more likely the result of repetition, habit, and mimesis (e.g. putting the knife on the right side of the plate at dinner) than intentional action. Whereas informal standards are generally maintained through social interaction (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000; Mead, 1962 [1934]), formal standards usually require a governing authority which includes: (1) processes for certifying compliance, (2) processes for accrediting the certifiers, and (3) relatively clear sanctions for violation. These formal standards are thus intimately involved in what we have termed a ‘tripartite standards regime’ (TSR)1 i.e. a regime that includes standards-setting, accreditation, and certification. These processes are commonly referred to by technical professionals as ‘conformity assessment’ and in practice they traverse and integrate public and private spheres both within and across nations. In this paper, we explore the construction of this TSR by looking at the emergence of standards development organizations (SDOs) and national accreditation bodies (NABs). We argue that these organizations are increasingly influential in performing (MacKenzie et al., 2007) the current global economy by entangling (Callon, 1998) intermediaries and translations with socio-technical supply chains themselves (cf. Busch, 2007). In this way, what we reveal to be a TSR carries the attributes of what Callon (1991, 1992) calls a techno-economic network (TEN). Moreover, we expand on this ‘mysterious notion of metrology’ (Fine, 2003: 479), which we find to be a gloss for more complex, underlying processes involved in the construction of the TSR. Let us explain with the case of markets. Barry and Slater (2002: 181) claim that ‘calculativeness depends upon the separation or individualization of objects into discrete transactable entities, with (temporarily) stabilized properties, that can be placed within a frame of calculations’. However, this notion is not complete. As Hatanaka et al. (2006) have shown, standardized objects are indeed separated from others that are not equally standardized. However, they are also usually homogenized, rather than individualized. Hence, in 508


LOCONTO AND BUSCH: PERFORMING THE GLOBAL MARKET ECONOMY

order for these objects to become transactable entities, there is indeed a need for differentiation, but also for standardization. Thus, in the case of most contemporary markets, ‘calculativeness’ depends on not only the weights and measures of metrology (as referred to by Callon), but also on reference materials, written specifications, conventions, codes of ethics, laws, and regulations – in other words, standards. Finally, in the TSR we see a form of governmentality (Foucault, 2007, 2008). Indeed, the TSR answers Foucault’s (2007: 248) rhetorical question: ‘What if the state were nothing more than a type of governmentality?’ It is revealed as a novel but increasingly powerful form of governance that aims to produce security through the market. What may appear as an institutionalization of mistrust in the global market economy – represented by the need for constant conformity assessment and auditing – is also a strategy of self-governance that pre-empts state-led regulation of markets. This, we argue, is both a result and a precondition for a TSR. It is thus through the entanglement of standards, intermediaries and technologies into the supply chains themselves that an alternative form of self-governance emerges. However, before we can arrive at this conclusion, the question remains as to how SDOs and NABs have been able to entangle intermediaries and translations into supply chains. Where and when were such organizations first conceived, and how far has their authority spread? What has influenced their emergence and what does this proliferation of similar bodies indicate for Callon’s notion of a TEN? The literature tells us about the rise of standards in specific sectors (e.g. electrical power (Hughes, 1983; Schaffer, 1992), bicycles (Bijker, 1995), language (Joseph, 1987), education (Apple, 2001), health care (Timmermans and Berg, 2003), agriculture (Bingen and Busch, 2006; Mutersbaugh, 2005a), telecommunications (Genschel and Werle, 1993; Schmidt and Werle, 1998), and within firms (Antonelli, 1998; Keohane and Nye, 1977). Likewise, a number of studies have looked at the rise of SDOs across sectors (Boli and ¨ 2004). There has been particular attention Thomas, 1999; Tamm Hallstrom, paid to the ISO and its role in global governance (cf. Murphy and Yates, ¨ 2009; Tamm Hallstrom, 2004, 2006). However, there has been a lacuna with respect to the growth in NABs and their role in bringing certifiers and standards-setters together in a TSR. In this paper we attempt to document the role of both SDOs and NABs in the shaping of a TSR so as to understand this current mode of performing the economy. ASSESSING CONFORMITY In recent years, formal standards designed by persons or committees have proliferated (cf. Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000; Higgins and ¨ Tamm Hallstrom, 2009). Standards are developed and managed by both 509



specialized and generic SDOs. SDOs are responsible for creating, updating and maintaining technical and scientific standards for the standardization of any number of people, processes and products. Moreover, if power is the ability to set the rules that others must follow, then formal standards are a form of codified power reflecting the interests and values of those groups with greatest access to and influence within standards-setting and enforcement processes (Busch and Bingen, 2006). Using the agri-food sector as an example, Hatanaka et al. (2005) and Busch et al. (2005) describe the complex set of relationships for conformity assessment that have emerged in much of the world over the last 25 years. Within this process, certification is used to enforce the standards that have been developed by SDOs. Certifications can now be found for everything R from day care centers (e.g. quality assurance by Child Care Aware ), to auto repair services (e.g. certification by the National Institute for Auto R motive Service Excellence), to food safety (e.g. certification by ServSafe ), to the authenticity of objets d’art (e.g. a Certificate of Authenticity (COA) or ‘Provenance’), to surgical procedures (e.g. certification by the American Board of Plastic Surgery). While some of these certifications are provided by first parties (sellers, e.g. warranties), and others by second parties (buyers, e.g. contracts requiring specific rules for the use of licensed objects), in most instances these certifications are provided by third parties (ostensibly neutral organizations that are not parties to the exchange). Moreover, most (though not all) of these certifications involve non-state actors that serve as intermediaries between parties to various economic and non-economic transactions. Collectively, they involve a dual shift of trust from highly personalized relations on the one hand, and from state-mediated relations on the other, to trust in the validity of the certification process (and by implication the SDO and certifying agency) itself.2 Thus, third-party certifiers (TPC) use various forms of audit (e.g. inspection of documents, tests of processes or products, examination of practices and facilities in use) to ensure the conformity of all sorts of people, products, practices, and services to particular sets of standards. There is significant variation with respect to the work of certifying organizations and what is certified (Cochoy, 2002). This diversity may be confusing, or permit outright fraud, leading to the need for accreditation. Moreover, those in need of certification may be financially burdened by multiple audits, because different users may insist upon different certifiers or certifications. Thus, accreditation has emerged as a mechanism to standardize and regulate TPC. This, in turn, has spawned the development of a new type of organization, now found in most nations of the world: the general national accreditation body (NAB). These usually public (or quasi-public) organizations (75% of our data set) provide a second line of trust guarantees by accrediting the certifiers. Put differently, they make the claim that one can trust the agencies that 510


certify that others can be trusted. One characteristic of these organizations is that they tend not to be sector-specific. That is to say, the same accreditor may be involved in the accreditation of certifiers of day care centers, meat packing plants, and shipbuilders simultaneously. For example, the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) claims that


[s]ince standards exist in all market sectors and anything can be evaluated – products, equipment, people, organisations, systems, services or anything else – our expertise in accreditation and training is extremely wide-ranging and includes: asbestos, food and food production, fossil fuel burning appliances, toys and childcare products and writing instruments. (UKAS, 2009: 11) Accreditation is thus the process by which an authoritative organization gives formal recognition that a particular (usually third-party) certifier is competent to carry out specific tasks. It is one component of a more general system of governance that is becoming increasingly prominent throughout the world, particularly in global agri-food value chains (Gibbon et al., 2008; Kay and Ackrill, 2009). Here, governance is ultimately concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action (see also Jessop, 2002; Stoker, 1998). This form of governance has been noted as a shift from binding to voluntarist, neo-corporatist regulation through private standards and with varying levels of accountability (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004), which have a quasi-governmental function (Enoch, 2007). Governance is thus a network-based system of regulation, ideally functioning through processes of exchange and negotiation, rather than a state-led system of regulation (Carnoy and Castells, 2001). This new form of governance also includes public agencies that impose State regulations on the various stages of the value chain (e.g. maximum residue levels (MRLs) for pesticides, minimum wage, trade tariffs). These public agencies can be local, national, regional or international (e.g. Codex Alimentarius, IEC). More importantly, however, the use of standards in governance is a form of self-regulation (cf. Cashore et al., 2007) or governmentality (Burchell et al., 1991; Gibbon and Ponte, 2008; Higgins and Tamm ¨ 2007). Hallstrom, We are not suggesting that companies are solely self-regulating in the sense that they are autonomous. Rather, standards and the construction of the TSR are means through which a variety of actors re-regulate trade within a TSR that includes a range of practices that ‘constitute, define, organize and instrumentalize the strategies that individuals [or individual organizations] in their freedom can use in dealing with each other’ (Foucault, 1997: 300). Within a TSR, standards are attempts to reform existing production practices and trade systems, often as strategic tools of supply chain management (Busch, 2007; Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003). 511


This emerging system of governance is distinguished from other forms of regulation by its widespread use of complex oversight mechanisms (Mutersbaugh, 2005b). Specifically, it is characterized by the use of multiple tiers of audits and oversights (Power, 1997), which (claim to) ensure the integrity and credibility of actors at all levels. At the top tier, accreditor organizations also have their own programs audited through membership in a global organization of accreditors (e.g. the International Accreditation Forum) which sets standards for accreditors. This is designed to ensure the equivalence and competence of accreditor organizations, of accredited certifiers, and by implication, of the SDOs.


USING CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT TO FACILITATE TRANSLATIONS IN SUPPLY CHAINS Moreover, the conformity assessment process, or TSR, is used to create the infrastructure of what Callon (1991, 1992) describes as a TEN. A TEN is a dynamic organizational form resulting from links between a variety of heterogeneous actors ‘who participate collectively in the conception, development, production and distribution or diffusion of procedures for producing goods and services, some of which give rise to market transactions’ (Callon, 1992: 73). The construction of a TEN involves the creation of a network by enlisting new actors through a process of translation (Latour, 1987). However, translations are often partial and precarious (Cooper and Law, 1995), leading to a need for a more consistent infrastructure, or entangled networks, to allow these translations to occur. Let us explain. For Callon (1992), TENs are a way to link the ‘social’ and the ‘economic’. They do this by creating a boundary that separates them, as Marx first observed in his theory of the circulation of money as capital (M → C→ M ). For Marx, the capitalist process of production was assumed as a precondition for the first circuit of the money–capital interaction, rather than something outside it (Marx, 1956 [1893]). Similarly, TENs bring together economic theories about the circulation of intermediaries (e.g. money, contracts, technology), and sociological notions about how actors are defined through their relationships. What causes these transactions to circulate are discussions and contestations about appropriate forms of technology as well as acceptable translation of the monetary component. The purpose of this translation process is to make this exchange move with as little interference as possible. This can be achieved by removing some of the contestations that necessarily occur within the network of relationships (cf. Cronon, 1991). Let us explain using an example of conformity assessment. In rural areas of Tanzania, as in most of the rest of the world, seeds were traditionally saved on farm from one harvest to the next. When they were traded with 512



neighbors, it was through an informal market system where barter and exchange of services were considered valid objects of trade. When the ‘Quality Declared Seed System’ (QDS) was initiated in the late 1990s, seeds became economic objects that were to be bought and sold in a formal market where the only valid object to be exchanged for seeds was money (FAO, 2007). However, the QDS system not only brought seeds into a formal market; its system of conformity assessment determined aspects of quality, included additional information such as extension services, and provided a system of audits that displaced informal action into a formal space – the market. It was thus this process of conformity assessment that rendered the seeds ‘economic’ and animated a ‘market’ for them. In other words, a formal TEN was created. Moreover, a shift in power was also seen in this animation of a market, as only those seed suppliers, farmers, and traders who were entangled in the QDS system gained access to information, supplies and the market. This excluded a large number of small farmers, and enhanced the market power in the relationships among those in the TEN. Other authors have utilized empirically the dynamic nature of TENs to explain processes of innovation and scientific and technological development (Callon et al., 1992; de Laat, 1996; Green et al., 1999). Our purpose is different in that we are seeking to understand how it is that these dynamic networks are capable of functioning at all, given that translations are as precarious as Cooper and Law (1995) suggest. That is, what infrastructure is needed to create a dynamic network wherein the objects created through these interactions can be circulated, or translated, seamlessly? CONSTRUCTING THE PLAYING FIELD The notion of a global TEN is clarified by the development of the conformity assessment infrastructure. To employ a metaphor commonly used elsewhere (e.g. Busch, 2007), we suggest that the playing field on which global TENs are performed is constructed through the interactions in the creation of what we have called the TSR. While the formation of the World Trade Organization was hailed as a triumph of the neoliberal model of development, little public notice has been taken of the rise of the other numerous organizations involved in the TSR (cf. Murphy and Yates, 2009; ¨ Tamm Hallstrom, 2004). This lack of significant attention suggests that this regime is depoliticized, and functions purely as a means to flatten the playing field of the market. However, below we present evidence of the political nature of the coordination involved in maintaining the networks that hold this regime together and the implications of this for the performance of the economy. As we explained earlier, the TSR includes SDOs, NABs and certifiers. Our analysis is focused solely on SDOs and NABs because of the ubiquity 513



of certification agencies. There are hundreds to thousands of certifiers per country, but no exhaustive list exists, and to date there has been no systematic data collection on this topic. For example, a simple search on Google for the phrase ‘Certification Agency’ returned 157,000 results – a large portion of which were organizations that contained ‘Certification Agency’ in their title. Many certifiers existed before NABs and most if not all countries have some types of certifiers. Therefore, as our data focus on national bodies, the inclusion of certification agencies would add little to our analysis. The data used in this study were collected through analysis of SDOs’ and NABs’ websites, official documents (e.g. ISO Guides 65, 67, WTO Agreements), and directories published by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We focus on the justifications (cf. Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006 [1991]) provided by the SDOs for their missions, goals and histories as well as data gathered as to the date of creation, type of organization and types of activities. A historical perspective necessarily locates this body of knowledge within the context of movements towards global consolidation. While the first general SDOs appeared in 1901 and numbers have grown since then such that nearly every nation now has one (Figure 1), over the last 30 years about 70 nations have formed general NABs that accredit certifiers for everything from meat packing to nursing homes (Donaldson,

Figure 1 Cumulative number of countries with SDOs and NABs. Source: NIST (1997); Donaldson (2005); ISO (2007a, 2007b). Note: List of countries is not exhaustive.

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2005). The nature of the SDO curve is a rather constant increase in the number of countries that have SDOs over time. The NAB curve reflects a rather dramatic increase beginning with a few in the 1970s and taking off dramatically in the 1990s. What might explain the rapid rise in NABs versus the steady growth of SDOs? We see the emergence of these two types of organizations as part of two waves in the development of a global TSR.


THE FIRST WAVE – THE RISE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS The current literature traces shifts from a regulation to a coordination role for SDOs; from a technical/scientific approach to a business approach in their management; from a focus on national and regional standards to international standardization; and from intergovernmental and other official organizations to private forums and consortia of standardization (Boli and Thomas, 1999; Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000; Genschel and Werle, 1993, ¨ 2009; Higgins and Tamm Hallstrom, 2007). Thus, we do not attempt to replicate here what has been said elsewhere. Rather, what we term as the first wave explores three themes in the focus on standards development: maintenance of measures and standards for technology translation, maintenance of consumer confidence, and facilitation of international trade. Maintaining technical measures and standards Prior to the establishment of the first general, national standards bureaus, technical committees of engineers had set a precedent for meeting to create standardized measures to ease the translation of the new technologies of the 19th century – electrical power, telecommunications, and mechanized production of products with interchangeable parts (Higgins and Tamm ¨ Hallstrom, 2009). Subsequently, the beginning of the 20th century was an invigorating time for the establishment of standards – two standards organizations were established within months of each other on opposite sides of the Atlantic. The British Standards Institution (BSI) claims that Sir John Wolfe-Barry (designer of London’s Tower Bridge) prompted the Council of the Institution of Civil Engineers to form a committee to consider standardizing iron and steel sections on 22 January 1901, which resulted in the first meeting of the Engineering Standards Committee on 26 April 1901 (BSI, 2007). For BSI, this marked the beginning of a ‘steady march towards standardization’, and resultant marks, such as the British Standard Mark (to R become known later as the Kitemark ), which indicated to buyers that goods were ‘up to standard’. By the start of World War I, ‘British Standards were used by the Admiralty, the War Office, the Board of Trade, 515



Lloyd’s Register, the Home Office, the Road Board, the London County Council and many then colonial governments’ (BSI, 2007). During this early period, the British used standardization as a vital mechanism for technology transfer and economic development throughout their empire. As part of the movement towards the creation of the ‘Commonwealth of ¨ (2009) claim that BSI encouraged Nations’, Higgins and Tamm Hallstrom the development of national standards bodies in the ‘dominions’ through flexible licensing agreements and rights to conformance testing. One can see this trend in the early development of SDOs in the ‘Dominions’ of Australia (1922), India (1947), Ireland (1961), New Zealand (1932), South Africa (1945), Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon, 1965), and Zimbabwe (formerly Southern Rhodesia, 1957). On the other side of the ocean, the forerunner to NIST, the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) was established by the United States Congress on 3 March 1901 and was given custody of the standards of physical measurement in the United States and requested to solve ‘problems which arise in connection with standards’ (Lide, 2001). The theme of precise, accurate measurements runs through the history of NIST. It points to a specific focus on the science of standards development and adheres to Lord Kelvin’s notion that scientific knowledge is necessarily quantitative (cf. Lide, 2001). However, the US is somewhat unique in that it has left most nonmetrological standards to the private sector even when military preparedness was at stake (Garcia, 1993). Examples include the specific need for interchangeable parts in mechanized production (per Ford); or that of standardizing military technologies, which were found to be non-standard, and thus incompatible, during the Second World War (BSI, 2007). The US employed the private sector to coordinate the activity of 1,300 engineers, who worked on special committees to produce ‘American War Standards for quality control, safety, photographic supplies and equipment components for military and civilian radio, fasteners and other products’ (ANSI, 2008). Thus, the US is unique in its approach to standards development, in that there are now two different bodies responsible for the development and maintenance of standards. NIST is responsible for the metrological aspects of standards development, while what is now called the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) coordinates the development of voluntary consensus standards and represents the needs and views of (most) US stakeholders in international standardization forums since its founding as the American Engineering Standards Committee (AESC) in 1918. Unlike NIST, ANSI does not write standards; rather the Institute accredits standards developers that establish consensus among qualified groups in the form of private sector associations or consortia (ANSI, 2007). Higgins ¨ (2009: 2) claim that the IEC established the modus and Tamm Hallstrom 516


operandi in legitimate standards organizations: ‘one based on a plurality of interests represented’. Indeed, those involved in the creation of technical ¨ standards are hardly disinterested (Higgins and Tamm Hallstrom, 2009). Higgins (2005: 28–9) agrees, but claims that the democratic process of SDO technical committees allows experts to see beyond their narrow interests or disciplinary biases so that ‘the standards produced by the typical standards body crystallise the communicative rationality that Habermas has in mind’.


Maintaining consumer confidence A second theme in the literature suggests that SDOs emerged from an interest in maintaining consumer confidence. Part of the philosophy underlying the New Deal in the US was a ‘shift in emphasis from production to consumption’ (Agnew, 1934: 60). However, with consumption came the problem of selection of goods in the market. Coles (1932: 5) noted that: Consumers find the selection of goods in the market difficult for several reasons. First, machine production and specialization have placed before them an amazing array of goods from which they must choose. Second, the quest for profits has led to an attempt on the part of producers to guide demand, and has caused some to resort to misrepresentation and fraud. In the third place, the unspecialized character of household buying makes the development of efficiency difficult. These issues were a topic of concern during this period, particularly since the government-sponsored Consumers’ Advisory Board was making headlines in the mid-1930s through petitions for stronger standards to be used in industry and recommendations to consumers on the differences in consumer prices and quality of standardized products (New York Times, 1933a, 1933b, 1934, 1935). Ultimately, industrialists’ insistence that government should not intervene in such ‘market’ matters carried the day, and the idea of government-sponsored consumer product standards was abandoned. Similarly, in the UK, by the late 1950s and 1960s the marketplace was flooded with consumer goods, many of dubious quality. As a result, for R example, 1953 saw the Kitemark applied to domestic furniture, pressure cookers and motorcycle helmets to help consumers know whether goods were produced to certain quality standards (BSI, 2007). According to Garcia (1993: 32), consumer confidence in the US during the 1960s and 1970s shifted from concern over dubious quality in consumer goods to safety issues, prompted by ‘Ralph Nader’s revelations about car safety’. As a result Cochoy (2005) notes that ‘[s]tandardization thus slipped out of the purely industrial sphere into the marketplace, and the “customer”, 517


equipped with a new “standardizing” eye, became the target and basis for the whole procedure’. In light of the recent food scares, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is promoting the use of third-party certification as a means to ensure consumer safety and confidence while streamlining some of the regulatory functions of government agencies in international trade. To this end, Secretary Leavitt recently announced that ‘in the future, products from those firms that have standards and certification processes that we trust will be given expedited entry and access to U.S. consumers. The FDA will be freed to focus its enforcement resources on those suppliers that don’t have certified products’ (Leavitt, 2008: 6).


Facilitating trade A focus on trade facilitation can be traced back to 1946, when ISO was created from the union of two organizations: the International Federation of the National Standardizing Associations, established in New York in 1926 and administered from Switzerland, and the United Nations Standards Coordinating Committee, established in 1944 and administered in London (Latimer, 1997). The main purpose of the original organizations, and thus also of ISO, was to facilitate trade and technology transfer. The member bodies were national SDOs, such as ANSI and BSI, on the basis of one member per country. The ISO is a non-governmental organization that claims to form a bridge between the public and private sectors by virtue of their member organizations. Some are part of the governmental structure in their countries or are government mandated. Others, however, are purely private, having been established by national partnerships of industry associations (ISO, 2007a). This nature of ISO membership is reflected in the information gathered for this study. We found that 72% of national standards organizations are public, 22% private (including non-profit), and 6% quasi-public. ISO serves as an international body that coordinates standards across nations, in an attempt to ‘standardize the standards’. Its work has been influential in the spread of SDOs globally. Murphy and Yates (2009: 68) claim that the ‘greatest spur to the expanding business of conformance assessment has been ISO’s publication, in 1987, of a quality management standard, ISO 9000’. Management systems standards have bridged the gap between metrology, product standards and the social and ethical process standards that are becoming increasingly common in the global market. ‘Quality management’ standards are intended to improve all aspects of organizations’ processes so that eventually all of the features of all of its products will improve. Thus, ‘effective environmental standards, labor standards, and human rights standards push firms toward different overall business strategies’ (Murphy and Yates, 2009: 69), which in turn changes some of the terms of negotiation within a TSR. 518



The World Trade Organization (WTO), following in the footsteps of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) before it, supports ISO’s objectives to remove trade barriers through the development and use of international standards (Latimer, 1997). This is most evident in the case of the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreement, which seeks to coordinate global trade and facilitate market transactions. At the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979, 32 GATT Contracting Parties signed the multilateral TBT agreement. The Standards Code, as this Agreement was called, defined the ‘rules for preparation, adoption and application of technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures’ (WTO, 2007). According to the WTO, the difference between a standard and a technical regulation lies in compliance. While conformity with standards is voluntary, technical regulations are by nature mandatory. They have different implications for international trade. If an imported product does not fulfill the requirements of a technical regulation, it cannot be sold on the market. In the case of standards, non-complying imported products are allowed on the market, but their market share might be affected if intermediate or final consumers prefer products that meet the standards. The updated TBT Agreement (signed in 1994) strengthened and clarified the provisions of the Tokyo Round Standards Code. Negotiated during the Uruguay Round, it is an integral part of the WTO Agreement and more importantly, has reinforced the use of standards and conformity assessment in global trade, as is shown by the steady climb in the numbers of SDOs during the 1980s (Figure 1). Furthermore, despite the often voluntary nature of the standards referred to in the TBT agreement, the WTO has tended to turn these into mandatory standards, using both law and the market to sanction those firms/nations that do not play by these rules (Bonanno and Constance, 1996; Marlin-Bennett, 1993). These tendencies have pressured all countries to develop SDOs that can keep up to date with current trade standards. It has also placed even greater importance on creating NABs within the context of global markets. This is the second wave to which we now turn. THE SECOND WAVE – THE RISE OF NATIONAL ACCREDITATION BODIES We characterize the emergence of general purpose National Accreditation Bodies (NABs) as pragmatic responses to the need to coordinate (and harmonize) international standards for trade purposes. The rise in importance of conformity assessment, which can be seen in the 1990s with the emergence of ‘management systems’, emphasized the role of NABs in their coordinating function. This shifted the entire system closer to the realm of regulation, while remaining in the form of governance. Moreover, these largely quasi-public organizations transcend national, regional 519


and international boundaries. NABs provide a link between international standards and the other private sector actors in the TSR (SDOs and certifiers) through their networks of bilateral and multilateral recognition and cross-accreditation activities. In this section we present evidence of when and why these NABs were first developed and how they have gained importance in international trade.


Emergence of NABs The first NAB on record was founded in Australia in 1947 largely the result of the need for ensuring standard weaponry (NATA, 2007). In fact, when NATA was created, SDOs themselves were still in their infancy (35 existed out of 158 that were registered in 2007). Telarc was established in New Zealand (1972) 26 years later, as the second national laboratory accreditation system in the world. Denmark was the third country to establish a national scheme in 1973, followed very soon after by other countries in Western Europe and North America. NATA was involved in the development of these systems, as it received inquiries and visitors from several national measurement bodies in the United States and Europe, ‘who were keen to understand the role and operation of NATA in Australia’ (NATA, 2007). This interest continued to grow throughout the mid-1970s and led to the first International Laboratory Accreditation Conference (ILAC) held in Copenhagen in 1977. This conference brought together laboratory accreditation bodies and other interested parties from around the world to contribute their ideas and support for the forum. Before 1980 there were only a handful of NABs worldwide. By 1987 21 such organizations had been established, many with NATA assistance (see Figure 1). Of particularly import is that many of these bodies, particularly those in developing nations, went through numerous revisions resulting from changes in national law, government reorganization, or privatization. We see this as evidence of the pragmatic nature of the rise of NABs. Many accreditation activities grew out of specialized departments within public SDOs, and were reformulated as separate entities. In Central America an initial attempt to create a regional SDO in the 1950s was unsuccessful due to ‘too much politics, too far from particular needs, too centralist, [and] too low participation’ (Vasquez, 2005: 1). This failed attempt led to the creation of national bodies in the 1970s, which subsequently took on accreditation activities. For example, in Costa Rica the original law that established the National Office for Norms and Measuring Units (ONNUM) was passed in 1973; after a number of restructurings and reorganizations, CR-NQS emerged in 2002 as the institutional frame to cover all aspects of the conformity assessment process (Vasquez, 2005). Likewise in Belgium and in France, restructuring took place in the early 1990s to create 520


‘Euro-compatible’ systems, in conformity with European and international practices (COFRAC, 2008).


Mutual recognition of accreditation For most countries, the involvement in ILAC was reinforced by the establishment of a series of bilateral mutual recognition agreements (MRAs or MLAs) with national bodies in overseas markets (NATA, 2007). More recently, however, there has been movement beyond bilateral agreements towards regional cooperation and recognition of accreditation. For example, within Europe, bilateral agreements became less favored as the European Union gained more political and economic clout. In June 2000, the European Cooperation for Accreditation (EA) was formed and registered as a non-profit association in the Netherlands. The creation of EA has represented ‘a noticeable step forwards in the political and technical process of consolidation of the European accreditation infrastructure’ (Thione, 2006: 3). For the EA, mutual recognition agreements represent important steps in ‘the building of trust in the marketing of safe goods and ensuring better protection of the fundamental rights of the European citizens’ (EFTA, 2009: 1). Similar regional cooperation bodies are found in Asia (Asia Pacific Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation), Latin America (Inter American Accreditation Cooperation), Africa (Southern African Development Community in Accreditation), and Central Asia (Central Asian Cooperation on Metrology Accreditation and Quality) (ILAC, 2008). The acceptance of accreditation conducted by NABs in other countries is another interesting aspect of the international cooperation involved in the construction of these networks. As the conformity assessment system is used to facilitate trade, there is a need for mutual recognition of the accreditation component, particularly as a means to verify the ‘validity’ of the accreditation itself. Therefore, accreditation granted by any NAB, in any country, is accepted by most other countries’ conformity assessment systems. Put simply, certifiers seeking accreditation have numerous NABs among which to choose. For example, Africert in Kenya is accred¨ ited by DAP (Deutsches Akkreditierung Prufwesen (Germany)), but they could have chosen from NATA, JAS-ANZ (The Joint Accreditation System of Australia and New Zealand), HKAS (Hong Kong Accreditation Service) or UKAS (AfriCert, 2009). Even more telling of the importance of the NABs’ role in the TSR, is that Africert has the comprehensive DAP accreditation in addition to being accredited to certify specific product, process and management systems – e.g. GlobalGAP, British Retail Council, Utz Kepah, Starbucks C.A.F.E. Practices, Organic Agriculture (Ceres GmbH) and MPS-GAP/QS (MPS–Holland). Moreover, there are instances where individual NABs have had their accreditation systems accredited by other 521


NABs. Consider El Salvador; its Quality Management System (consisting of a Standardization Unit, an Accreditation Unit and Legal Metrology Laboratories) is accredited by the Mexican Institute of Normalization and Certification (INMC) (CONACYT, 2007).


Promoting NABs through technical assistance projects As part of the construction of the TSR, there has been a concerted effort on the part of industrialized countries to foster the creation or improvement of NABs in developing countries, the motives for which are termed in the typical language of ‘development aid’ (ILAC and UNIDO, 2003). For example, NATA assisted the development of NABs in Papua New Guinea, Hong Kong, and Brazil (NATA, 2007). Similarly, many European countries, the US and the United Nations organizations have been involved in ‘technical assistance’ projects that have helped to create and promote national accreditation systems throughout the developing world (e.g. NIST in Bulgaria and AFNOR in Morocco). The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), in collaboration with ILAC and ISO, has been involved in a long term project to prepare laboratory accreditation bodies in developing countries for entrance into the ILAC MRAs (ILAC and UNIDO, 2003). This theme is also apparent in the work of the World Bank. In the report, Unleashing Kenya’s Potential for Trade and Growth, the World Bank assessed Kenya’s trade performance, and identified key domestic constraints to its further integration into the global economy, one of which was that ‘Kenya’s standards architecture is over-stretched and support is needed through an adequate revenue structure’ (World Bank, 2007). Among the recommendations put forth following a 2004/5 field visit was a reorganization of key public sector functions with a focus on training and accreditation; facilitation of the accreditation of the private sector to provide testing, consultancy and conformity assessment services; and strengthening and operationalizing of Kenya’s National Accreditation Service (KENAS). An update on progress in 2006 found KENAS in operation and recommended that KENAS be used as a regional platform for accreditation (World Bank, 2007). Promoting NABs through international collaboration The above trends are further supported by the work of the International Accreditation Forum, Inc. (IAF). Created in 2000, the IAF is the world association of conformity assessment accreditation bodies and other bodies interested in conformity assessment in the fields of management systems, products, services, personnel and other similar programs. IAF’s members include 49 out of the 69 NABs included in our data set. The association’s primary function is to ‘develop a single worldwide program of conformity 522



assessment which reduces risk for business and its customers by assuring them that accredited certificates may be relied upon’ (IAF website, 2009). In other words, the IAF accredits the accreditors. This is done first by ensuring that IAF accreditation body members only accredit those who are competent to do the work they undertake and are not subject to conflicts of interest; and second by establishing MLAs between its accreditation body members which reduce risk to businesses and their customers by ensuring that an accredited certificate may be relied upon anywhere in the world (IAF website, 2009). Linking the work of the IAF to that of the WTO, the IAF mission claims that: ‘[t]he MLA contributes to the freedom of world trade by eliminating technical barriers to trade . . . Certified once – accepted everywhere’ (IAF website, 2009). The ISO has also played an important role in this process of encouraging the emergence of NABs and compatible accreditation systems through its Committee on Conformity Assessment (CASCO). The purpose of this committee is to improve the global conformity assessment apparatus. This is achieved by studying the means of assessment and by preparing international guides and standards on the subject. CASCO also promotes mutual recognition of conformity assessment through the acceptance of national and regional conformity assessment systems and promotion of the appropriate use of international standards (ISO, 2008). Thus, guides such as ISO/IEC Guide 65:1996 (General Requirements for Bodies Operating Product Certification Systems) and ISO/IEC Guide 17011:2004 (Conformity Assessment – General Requirements for Accreditation Bodies Accrediting Conformity Assessment Bodies)3 are used in standardizing the organizational and operations structure of NABs and certifying bodies (ISO, 2008). This standardizing practice works to align conformity assessment systems between countries and eliminates some of the negotiations that would otherwise have to occur between actors in the TSR. NABs in international trade agreements As mentioned above, the formation of the WTO has been extremely important for the worldwide acceptance of conformity assessment. Procedures for conformity assessment are to be applied to products imported from other WTO Members ‘in a manner no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country’ (WTO, 1994: Article 5.1.1). Similarly, Members must respect the confidentiality of information about the results of conformity assessment procedures for imported products in the same way as for domestic products so that commercial interests are protected (WTO, 1994: Articles 5.2.4 and 5.2.5). As a result of this synergistic requirement for conformity assessment, the TBT Agreement has been mentioned in many forums with respect to 523



the establishment and coordination of NABs in these countries. For example, in its Fourth Triennial Review, the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade considered various approaches to conformity assessment (such as a supplier’s declaration of conformity and accreditation to qualified conformity assessment bodies) and included a section about facilitating the recognition of conformity assessment results, e.g. through voluntary mutual recognition arrangements among individual laboratories, certification and inspection bodies or even regional and multilateral recognition arrangements between accreditation bodies (WTO, 2007). The WTO organized a conference in 2006 to better coordinate these organizations by sharing best practices and lessons learned by various NABs (WTO, 2006). Moreover, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed at the fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico, established a strategic partnership between UNIDO and WTO to ensure that trade and industrial development enhance economic growth, in the context of the Doha Development Agenda and assist the beneficial integration of developing, least developed countries, and transition economies into the global economy and the multilateral trading system. The three program modules that drive UNIDO-WTO cooperation aim to do this through the promotion of conformity assessment (ILAC and UNIDO, 2003). In sum, accreditation – as independent and authoritative attestation as to the competence of certification bodies – became rather widespread in industrial countries during the 1970s. Specifically, this occurred with respect to the assessment of the technical competence of calibration laboratories that provided metrological support to industrial production. The 1980s, however, saw the expansion of NABs for the qualification of the main conformity assessment organizations such as testing laboratories, certification bodies, and inspection bodies. This expansion can be traced back to both the activities of ILAC and ISO, as well as the restructuring of the global economy, with the introduction of GATT and the WTO. The 1990s and 2000s saw significant growth in ‘technical assistance’ projects promoted by NABs in industrialized nations, and the multilateral agencies, to encourage the growth of NABs in post-communist countries and those in the Global South. These projects point to an important role for NABs in integrating developing economies into the global economy. During this period, accreditation also spread beyond laboratory practices, namely to management systems certification, product certification, personnel certification, information security management and environmental management. The rise of NABs built on the steady climb in SDOs since the beginning of the last century. The early SDOs were often driven by domestic needs for consistency in metrology and standards for industrial and war goods and the struggle to gain consumer confidence. The focus on international trade was reinforced with the introduction of GATT and the WTO, which have dominated the need for standards and accreditation (and thus the TSR) 524


within the framework of facilitating international trade. The case of private food safety and quality standards is instructive: as they begin to challenge the role of the WTO, in particular the SPS and the TBT Agreements, the utility of food standards diplomacy based on government-to-government relations via the WTO may decrease (Henson, 2006). This is where the public–private nature of the TSR becomes increasingly important, as the use of conformity assessment as part of supply chain strategies decreases direct reliance on government regulation and increases the importance of mutual recognition of accreditation.


RECONCILING METROLOGY AND STANDARDS The data and analysis above strongly suggest that a network based on the premises of standards has been created and its reach is global. These data bring us to an important aspect of Callon’s discussion of TENs, which is the role of standards (Callon uses the term metrology) in ‘framing’ activities within the market. First, standardizing practices (e.g. those associated with, for example, quality control, audit, environmental monitoring) do not merely reflect reality as it is; they create new realities (calculable objects) that can, in turn, be the object of economic calculation. In principle, as sociologists have long argued, calculation tends to function as an ‘anti-political’ device: it reduces the space of possible political contestation (Barry and Slater, 2002). Second, calculations are always, in principle, contestable. While calculations entail a certain level of rationalization of social and economic relations, as Callon (1998) argues, the extent of this rationalization should not be overestimated. Third, calculation is both a technical and ethical practice. It is not something that agents are naturally able to do once markets are formed. Rather, the capacity to calculate depends on technical devices and discursive rhetoric that make calculation possible. In terms of our argument, we find that these calculable objects are employed to make TEN translations occur more smoothly as they limit contestations by offering a limited number of negotiable options. As suggested, Callon (1998) claims that metrology, and those practices associated with it such as quality control, audit or environmental monitoring, create new calculable objects, which may then become the object of economic calculations. Let us explain: the Oxford Companion to the History of Modern Science (Hessenbruch, 2003: 520) notes that ‘metrology is the mundane backbone of science, the routine calibration of instruments with the aim of rendering comparable the measurements performed in different places. Weights and measures are included in the classic definition of metrology. Balances are compared against a standard so that weighing the same object on each of them will yield the same result’ (cf. O’Connell, 1993). Metrology is indeed the backbone of standards and the history of standardizing weights and measures is the history of many institutions 525



involved in the larger TSR that is included in this study (e.g. NIST). For example, in the standards development process, metrology is used to create standards, which in turn are then sold on the market and form a significant portion of an SDO’s revenue. Reference materials, as the term is used in metrology, are another form of standards. For example, the peanut butter that can be purchased for $603 per three jars of 170 grams from NIST is the standard against which the nutritional composition of all peanut butter in the US is measured (Pearson, 2007). However, reference materials can also consist of printed materials such as handbooks and manuals, which are also ways of standardizing practices and things, and are often invoked as a means of actuating compliance to standards. However, weights, measures and reference materials are not the only standardizing devices in the conformity assessment process. Laws and formal regulations are historically important as means of governing and standardizing calculations. Laws codify standards and bring official sanctions against non-compliance into the equation. As Holt et al. (2007) have shown, the history of food law consists of concerted action against fraud and protection of consumer safety through actions of both positive law and regulation. While laws are mandatory, conventions and formal standards are often voluntary. Conventions are shared way of doing things. Thus, the establishment of conventions allows the coordination and qualification of people and things among different actors (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006 [1991]). Formal written standards are those that are created by SDOs or ad hoc consortia. These formal standards permit official negotiation over quality and price by the parties to the exchange. This can be done in two ways: (1) by holding quality constant, as in the case of bulk commodities like maize or coal, so that price can be negotiated more competitively; or (2) by promoting or limiting the debate over particular qualities, such as organoleptic, environmental, or labor qualities. This is accomplished by what has been called standardized differentiation which involves using standardized practices or products to differentiate between products (Hatanaka et al., 2006). For example, fair trade coffee is differentiated from conventional coffee because of specific ‘qualities’ that the product either possesses or represents. However, all fair trade coffee must meet the same standardized fair trade ‘qualities’ in order to be considered as such. Codes of ethics or codes of practice are yet another less formal means to coordinate action. These too are voluntary initiatives, engaged in by interested parties. Therefore, paradoxically, standards can be used to further both price and non-price competition. This makes it important to distinguish between the terms ‘standard’ and ‘standardization’. Standards are the values against which people, practices and things are measured, while standardization is the process of making things standard. This process requires many layers of standards, tests, criteria, and 526



documentation. Only together can one make the claim that a given standard is ‘the standard’. Therefore, it appears that Callon has overstated the role of metrology. As such, we propose to substitute the term ‘standard’ for Callon’s use of the term ‘metrology’. This term more adequately encompasses the alternative material realities of calculation. Our use of the term ‘standard’ allows us to expand on the ‘calculations’ that can be taken for granted as part of the situation by buyer and seller in supply chain transactions. The standards employed by SDOs and NABs thus entangle both material and social practices within the TEN creating an infrastructure in which translations occur more smoothly and whereby the functioning of a market economy is facilitated. Regulations, laws, conventions, formal standards, codes of conduct, and reference materials are all used as standardizing devices to coordinate translations in a TEN. All these practices are designed to limit the scope of actions to calculative actions and that of agencies to calculating agencies (Callon, 1998). As such, these processes also invoke political contestations, e.g. the WTO disputes over the standard size of tuna fishing nets, and the claims of protectionism based on geographic origin standards (Bonanno and Constance, 1996; Josling, 2006). Put differently, actions to standardize, to regulate through a system of conformity assessment, are highly political attempts to remove politics from the exchange process, so as to make the TEN a market economy, rather than a political or moral economy. Case studies of ethical and environmental standards show that these conformity assessment systems themselves have been created on political and/or moral premises, which makes politics fundamental to the exchange process (e.g. Freidberg, 2004; Mansfield, 2004; Ponte, 2008; Raynolds, 2000). Likewise, we have not found evidence that the conformity assessment process has successfully been able to remove politics; rather it is through the extension of political agreements, such as MRAs and ‘technical assistance’ projects that much of the networks that make up the TSR are sustained. Thus, the TSR has allowed the politics to become embedded within the process itself and as such has concealed it from public view. Therefore, conformity assessment can be seen as a device ‘to abstract’, that is, to transport, transform and displace an action into a formal, calculative space (i.e. a TEN or TSR). This notion of abstraction is also part of the creation of a TEN infrastructure. If we extend our argument that SDOs and NABs are part of the infrastructure, then we must look at how these organizations interact within the context of the market. We have found that these organizations have been focused on creating standards for (and in standardizing) people, products, and processes so to facilitate the performance of market transactions. In this way, the network of SDOs and NABs that we have explored above has been successfully entangling intermediaries and translations within the supply chains that now dominate the global market. Therefore, like the SDOs, these NABs are means for 527


enabling the global TEN to function, of allowing the wheels of commerce (translations in the TEN) to turn with less friction. And also like SDOs, within the context of global trade, NABs have become de facto mandatory. Put differently, without them, the wheels would likely not turn at all.


CONCLUSIONS The rise of both SDOs and NABs points to the salience of the policy being forwarded by advocates of neoliberalism, which is to level the international playing field and to build constructive competition regimes. That is, competition should be used to construct economies and markets, rather than to dismantle them. Yet, ironically, the elimination of trade barriers and the construction of the level playing field must necessarily involve the erection of a wide range of new political edifices that simultaneously (1) permit and block entry to the playing field, (2) determine the rules of the game to be played there, and (3) determine the qualities of the myriad things to be traded. The purpose of these regimes is to bring down barriers and to increase global trade (i.e. expand the dominant TEN globally). Yet, ironically, in order to do so, non-conforming persons, things, organizations, and processes must be banished to the edges of the playing field.4 Moreover, to pursue the playing field metaphor, the focus of attention is on the game and not on the rebuilding of the stadium within which it is played or the changing rules for determining who will be the winner. This is entirely in line with the neoliberal desire to transform the governmentality of the state such that it becomes an active promoter of markets. As Foucault (2008: 131) put it, ‘[t]he problem of neo-liberalism is rather how the overall exercise of political power can be modeled on the principles of a market economy’. The TSR is one means of accomplishing that task. The rise in global trade, combined with the declining importance of quotas and tariffs due to WTO agreements, have raised the visibility of formal standards as playing field strategies for nations, companies, and social movement organizations (SMOs) (Tate, 2001). Thus, nations use standards to further a wide range of national aims including economic development and consumer protection (Krislov, 1997); companies use standards to capture market share, block competition, avoid citizen/consumer protests, and even define new markets (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000; Ponte and Gibbon, 2005; WTO, 2005); and SMOs use standards to further their political aims (Gereffi et al., 2001). All of these use standards to specify, codify, and advance their (diverse and often conflicting) values and strategic interests. However, none of these actions could be completed without a network of SDOs, NABs, and certifiers in place. Thus we find Callon’s view of markets useful for understanding the significance of the two waves in the building of the global TEN. First, the rise of an ‘economy of qualities’ (Callon et al., 2002) leads to an increasing 528



focus on the quality, qualification, and re-qualification of products. This leads to contestation about the nature of quality where actors become increasingly reflexive and critical about how qualification occurs and what it implies. Second, there is a growing sense of the plurality of market forms and the need to open up the question of the particular forms that markets should take: ‘the organization of markets becomes a collective issue and the economy becomes (again) political’ (Callon et al., 2002: 197). But at the same time, the ‘politics of no politics’ is created in the marketplace, and, through a TEN, the political is excised from political economy, in order to speed the circulation of capital (Marx, 1956 [1893]). This process is made global5 by the TSR, as shown in this study. Over time, and through concerted efforts, the conformity assessment apparatus has created a wide range of enforceable taken for granted standards. In other words, each of the four components of a TEN translation (producer, buyer, technology and money) have become standardized, accredited, and certified to different degrees. This has occurred through the enrollment of intermediaries into a network that keeps everything in check. Rather than creating a vicious circle similar to that of the Tweed Ring (Nast 1871) where everyone is ‘passing the buck’, proponents of the TSR claim to create a virtuous circle where everyone is checking up on everyone else, with the result being the stabilization of intermediaries. In other words, the entanglement that we see in the TSR where each actor is being checked upon by the next actor has a stabilizing effect on the interactions. For example, if one aspect of this entangled network is disturbed (e.g. if deviance from the path occurs), the others in the network race to ‘fix’ the problem and re-stabilize the relations. The goal is to create trust and stability in this network by continuous audit, which will then become ‘embodied discipline’ (Foucault, 1977) on the part of the actors in the network. However, the speed of the market transactions conceals this constant negotiation, making the TEN appear static and standard. Thus, the construction of the TSR, where the majority of the standards that govern transactions are external to the transaction itself, has stabilized the translations and standardized, as necessary, the four intermediaries that are linked within the TEN. Translation processes have become entangled to the point where they appear seamless and money and technology appear to flow ever more smoothly despite the growing number of actors involved. On the one hand, the translations provided by the TSR serve to keep more and more actors in line through both time and space, ensuring their conformity (Latour, 1987). On the other hand, the form of the TSR itself has changed over time based on the changing pragmatic interests and concerns of the dominant actors in the commercial and financial sectors. No grand plan could have predicted in 1900 that the current TSR would emerge; its emergence is in large part a response to emerging opportunities and changing situations. 529


As such we see the TSR as fundamental to the movement towards ‘governing at a distance’ that is part and parcel of the neoliberal shift from government to governance. Supply chain management has become a key technology of the global economy. An understanding of the role that the TSR plays in keeping supply chain transactions running smoothly will help us to better comprehend this current mode of performing the global economy.


NOTES 1 We thank Dr. John V. Stone of the Institute for Food and Agricultural Standards at Michigan State University for devising this term. Our use of the word regime is in reference to Keohane and Nye’s (1977: 19) definition, which defines regimes as ‘sets of governing arrangements that include networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects’. We consider these rules, norms and procedures within the term ‘standards’. 2 Porter (1995) presents a detailed discussion of ‘mechanical objectivity’ where ‘technologies of distance’ perform a check on subjectivity, but are separate from and often replace ‘disciplinary objectivity’ (scientific authority) and ‘absolute objectivity’ (realism). In this way, audits are able to either reinforce or remove trust. 3 ISO/IEC Guide 17011: 2004 replaced the original ISO/IEC Guide 61: 1996 General Requirements for Assessment and Accreditation of Certification/ Registration Bodies. 4 Goldman’s (2005) ethnography of the World Bank provides an excellent case in point. In order for the Bank to create global markets for various goods, such as water, local specificities must be eliminated or relegated to marginal status, thereby clearing the way for the entry of foreign capital. 5 Global refers to the scale, not to the notion that this is the only TEN that exists. Moreover, this regime has added a new layer that includes more actors and covers a larger geographical space.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS Allison Loconto studied international affairs and development at the American University in Washington, DC. She has worked with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and is currently a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology at Michigan State University. Her current research is on sustainability standards in East African tea value chains. Dr. Lawrence Busch studied sociology and economics at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. He is currently University Distinguished Professor of Sociology at Michigan State University and Professor at the Centre for the Economic and Social Aspects of Genomics at Lancaster University. He is co-editor with James Bingen of Agricultural Standards (Springer, 2006) and author of The Eclipse of Morality: Science, State, and Market (Aldine, 2000). He is currently developing a general theory of standards.

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