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Jul 27, 2017 - 1For example, in El Salvador the civil conflict was associated with land ..... gas, 2014; Quinche, 2016; Vargas, 2016), or the case of Curvaradó ...
Received: 12 January 2017

Revised: 27 July 2017

Accepted: 28 July 2017

DOI: 10.1111/joac.12237

SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE

State, war, and land dispossession: The multiple paths to land concentration Jenniffer Vargas1

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Sonia Uribe2

1 PhD student in FLACSO‐ Mexico.‐ Picacho‐ Ajusco 377, Héroes de Padierna, 14200 Mexico City, CDMX Mexico. Researcher of Observatorio de Restitución y Regulación de derechos de propiedad agraria. Bogotá ‐ Colombia 2

Observatorio de Restitución y Regulación de Derechos de Propiedad Agraria, Bogotá. Colombia

Correspondence Jenniffer Vargas Reina, Calle 24 N° 51C‐04, Bogotá, Colombia Email: [email protected]

Abstract We focus on the role of the state in land dispossession during war. State agencies promote land accumulation not only through coercive paths, but also by combining political and market mechanisms. Each mechanism may link the state with different actors and coalitions. We illustrate how this worked in Tibú, a Colombian municipality in which violence against civilians and land accumulation took place in more or less distinct phases. The case highlights the fact that land accumulation during war is not only achieved through coercion. At the same time, it shows the importance of identifying the specific coalitions through which states establish their presence in contested territories during war. We explain such variation as resulting from the types of alliances and coalitions that the state establishes with different sets of stakeholders, and the aims pursued by coalition actors. KEYWORDS

accumulation, coercion, land dispossession, markets, state

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I N T RO DU CT I O N

This paper focuses on the role of the state in land dispossession during war. We show that in wartime, states not only promote coercive paths to land concentration, but also other paths that may involve administrative and market‐oriented policies, or some forms of restraint. States establish links with different actors in contested territories, seeking to broaden their territorial reach and to push forward counter‐insurgent policies, and in this process adapt their policies vis‐à‐vis land. Since state interlocutors and land stakeholders are heterogeneous (and include local, regional, national, and global actors), these links may also prompt the state to deploy some actions to prevent land dispossession. The importance of rediscovering the link between violent and agrarian conflict has been highlighted in the recent literature (Ballvé, 2013; Cramer & Richards, 2011; Thomson, 2011). Some of this literature has placed special emphasis on the disputes created by the occupation of lands that were abandoned by displaced people, and the way in which agrarian conflicts fuel war, as in the cases of Rwanda (Jones, 2003), Sudan (Salman, 2013), and Bosnia (Williams, 2013). It is established that there are complex and important links between agrarian and violent conflicts; that states play a central role in shaping property regimes and political orders associated with land disputes (Boone, 2014), which J Agrar Change. 2017;17:749–758.

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feed or escalate into violent conflicts and civil wars (Van Leeuwen & Van Der Haar, 2016); and that even during war, land accumulation does not take place in an institutional vacuum (Gutiérrez, 2014). However, we are still far from understanding the specific and complex mechanisms that link statehood, coercion, and markets. This paper helps to fill this gap. Both the putative link between land and violent conflict and the role of the state in establishing, or deconstructing, that link can be observed in a particularly pristine manner in Colombia, which is one of the countries with most concentrated land tenure in the world, with a land Gini coefficient of 0.86 (IGAC, 2012). Furthermore, its war has been marked by massive waves of displacement (at least 7 million displaced) (RUV, 2017) and massive processes of coercive land dispossession (CNMH, 2013). Indeed, in other countries, the relation between land and war has been very different.1 To explain the pro‐concentration pattern of the Colombian conflict, it is fundamental to understand the role that the state played in the accumulation processes that took place during the country's conflict. The Colombian literature has clearly identified the key role of economic and political elites in the country's land dispossession (Gutiérrez & Vargas, 2016; Salinas & Zarama, 2012). State authorities have played a central role in promoting and legalizing the takeover of land by paramilitaries and associated actors (Ballvé, 2013; Observatorio, 2017). In several regions, such as Urabá and Magdalena in Colombia, massive dispossession was carried out by coalitions of paramilitary groups, cattle ranchers, banana entrepreneurs, and state authorities (Quinche, 2016; Vargas, 2016). Here, the actors that wielded the weapons were the same ones who took over the lands. We examine here the case of Tibú, a Norte de Santander municipality. This is a territory severely affected by war, where extreme violence against civilians and dispossession took place during relatively distinct phases. In each phase, the state relied on different allies. During the coercive phase, the security agencies established alliances with armed groups that displaced the population but did not take over the land. The accumulation came later, when various entrepreneurs, encouraged by state policies, bought the land abandoned by peasants and implemented agro‐industrial projects (Uribe, 2014). This produced a drastic change in land tenure and the use of land. Thus, land accumulation in Tibú involved two types of coalition. A coercive coalition was formed between the security agencies of the state and a paramilitary unit intent on deploying punitive actions against civilians. An accumulating coalition was created between state authorities and national entrepreneurs, whose businesses are based on export products with high demand in the global economy. In the next section, we discuss the recent literature on the role of the state in land accumulation in violent contexts. Then we describe land accumulation in Tibú, and explain the mechanisms through which different state agencies enabled such accumulation by means of alliances and public policies: coercion, land markets, and incentives for oil palm agriculture. We also show that some agencies fought against illegal accumulation. Finally, we discuss some of the analytical implications of the case.

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D E B A T E S I N TH E RE C E NT L I T E R A T U R E

As Unruh and Williams (2013) have highlighted, during war the institutions responsible for the regulation of property rights—the very core of the institutional order—tend to be weakened in the extreme. This encourages land dispossession through coercive, but also political, mechanisms (Sachs, 2013). This is the case for Rwanda (Jones, 2003) and Bosnia (Williams, 2013), and to an eminent degree for Colombia as well (Salinas & Zarama, 2012). But it is still necessary to unravel the mechanisms that link the state, coercion, and the market in the context of war to be able to explain differential patterns of land accumulation, for war often changes institutional practices rather than merely weakening them, and where there is weakening there is not necessarily an institutional vacuum. The key role of institutions in land accumulation is also highlighted by the problems of looking at the latter as a process of “primitive accumulation” driven by the interests of the export agro‐industry and the world food system 1 For example, in El Salvador the civil conflict was associated with land fragmentation and there was some redistribution to the poor peasants (Wood, 2003).

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for which it produces (Thomson, 2011). Here, the state tends to be seen as a unitary and homogeneous actor at the service of global capitalism. Approaches of this type do not account for the power struggles that take place in local territories between the state and powerful economic and armed actors that fight over the assignment of authority and the rules of the game (Migdal, 2001), property rights (Boone, 2014), or the social and political orders that are created in territories during civil war (Staniland, 2012). They do not take into account potentially contradictory evidence, either. In Colombia, for example, much of the land taken from the peasants by the paramilitaries was not intended for agricultural export projects, but for livestock, a form of accumulation that does not always respond to the demands of the global market (Gutiérrez & Vargas, 2017). If this is the case, then land dispossession cannot be explained without taking into account the constellation of forces that constitute and uphold political authority both at the national and the local level.

3 3.1

T HE C A SE OF TI B Ú , N OR TE D E SA N TA N D E R

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Coercion

The municipality of Tibú is part of the Catatumbo region in the department of Norte de Santander. Its location on the border with Venezuela makes it part of a strategic corridor that connects the Caribbean region with the Eastern Plains, which have rendered it important both geopolitically and historically. Since the late 1970s, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the People's Liberation Army (EPL) have been present in the area, and later, in the late 1980s, the predominant guerrilla force was the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In 1999, the paramilitaries irrupted into Norte de Santander and managed to consolidate control through the Catatumbo Block (BCa).2 As in many other parts of the country,3 it has already been shown that the paramilitaries had the support of certain units and officials of the army and the national police, with backing from people who were well placed within the central government (Tribunal Superior del Distrito Judicial de Bogotá, ruling of October 31, 2014).4 Salvatore Mancuso, the paramilitary commander of the Catatumbo Block, publicly claimed that without the assistance from the state, the paramilitaries would not have been able to establish and expand in the way they did: (02:53:55) In 1995 commander Carlos Castaño told me he had a meeting with the top military officials and high representatives of the State, and that at the meeting they asked him ... to organize Self‐Defence groups in the North of the country where no Self‐Defence groups existed … The meeting was held and I participated; at that time, I was ordered to set up those Blocks. It was done hand in hand with the State; without the direct action or deliberate omission of the State we would not have been able to grow the way we did, or get to where we are now [...]. (Tribunal Superior del Distrito Judicial de Bogotá, ruling of October 31, 2014, p. 143). In Tibú, the paramilitary offensive had three clearly established goals: to wrest control over the territory from the FARC, to wipe out its “social base”, and to control the illegal crop economy (Tribunal Superior del Distrito Judicial de Bogotá, ruling of October 31, 2014; Salinas & Zarama, 2012).5 The strategy was highly punitive and established a genuine reign of terror against civilians (Asociación Minga, 2008).

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Judicial and academic sources on the paramilitary expansion in Norte de Santander and Catatumbo region include: the Tribunal Superior del Distrito Judicial de Bogotá (ruling of October 31, 2014); the Tribunal Superior del Distrito Judicial de Bogotá (ruling of December 2, 2010); and Salinas and Zarama (2012). 3 The role played by the armed forces in the emergence of paramilitary ventures locally was prominent. For cases such as Magdalena Medio, see Medina (1990). For Antioquia and Córdoba, see Salinas and Zarama (2012). On the cases in other regions, see Duncan (2006) and Reyes (2009). 4 The ruling also describes several actions performed jointly by the security agencies of the state and paramilitaries of the Catatumbo block in Norte de Santander, ranging from joint patrols, cooperation, and training to carrying out massacres. 5 Controlling coca cultivation does not necessarily involve land acquisition. The division of labour creates a chain in which farmers grow and sell crops to armed groups that process and market it.

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FIGURE 1 The population expelled from Tibú, 1995–2014) Source: Prepared by the authors, based on information from the Unified Victims Registry (RUV), retrieved May 31, 2015 from http://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/

FIGURE 2 Abandoned land claims included in the official register, 1981–2012 Source: Single Registry of Property and Territories Abandoned (RUPTA, in Spanish).

Between 1985 and 2014, the Unified Victims Registry (RUV in Spanish) reported a total of 26,188 homicides and 2,121 forced disappearances, of which 15,833 and 1,421, respectively, occurred during the period of paramilitary hegemony from 1999 to 2004. Similarly, the RUV reported a total of 52,481 persons displaced from Tibú between 1985 and October 2014, of whom 37,490 (71.4%) were displaced in the period between 1999 and 2004 (Figure 1). The forced exodus of the population implied the large‐scale abandonment of rural land (Figure 2) and consequently a de facto change in landownership, without evidence of any direct and significant appropriation of lands by the paramilitary unit that operated in the region (Uribe, 2014).

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Land transactions through the market

Between 2005 and 2010, following the BCB's demobilization, Tibú experienced an increase in land market transactions, despite the continued presence of guerrillas in the territory. Even though many of the transactions did not affect the original size of the properties, landownership and usage did become significantly more concentrated: the land Gini coefficient increased from 0.52 in 2005 to 0.67 in 2011 (IGAC, 2012). On the one hand, small properties were more fragmented, which means that properties of less than 10 hectares became smaller, while the middle‐sized and large properties increased in size and number. The size of rural properties in Tibú increased by 14,635 hectares during 1999–2010; the greatest increase, of 6,297 hectares, was for properties larger than 1,000 hectares; followed by those in the range 50–200 hectares, with an increase of 4,037 hectares; and the ranges 200–1,000 hectares and 10–50 hectares, with increases of 2,723 and 1,578 hectares, respectively (Uribe, 2014, p. 254). On the other hand, land usage became more concentrated because of the expansion of oil palm plantations, the coverage of which increased from zero in 2000 to 6,077 hectares in 2009 (Uribe, 2014), and due to the simultaneous expansion of oil and coal exploration and production areas.6 “Exploitation requests or mining‐energy titles affect the equivalent of 81.12% of the total area of the municipality” (Acción Social, 2010, pp. 76–82).

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The concentration of land usage by oil palm plantations was striking. According to the cadastral authority (SNR, 2012), between 2005 and 2010 there were large transfers of land. The buyers include several oil palm companies such as Bio Agroindustrial, Palma Oriente, Palmeros Aliados de Colombia, and Ecopalma, and other well‐connected industrialists.7 Figure 3 shows a very active land market in land areas abandoned by peasants. The gray areas highlight the purchases of land. This land had protective measures that prohibited its sale or transfer without prior authorization from the authorities. Eight thousand hectares were acquired through the land market and institutional mechanisms, but disregarding several legal provisions (SNR, 2012). First, many of these purchases were made on Agricultural Family Units (UAF in Spanish), which are properties that were formed as allotments of public land, awarded to farmer beneficiaries of agrarian reform. These properties could not be legally sold during a period of 12 years without explicit permission by the relevant agencies and it is forbidden to accumulate more than one UAF. Second, some transactions were made far below the “fair” market value. And, third, many purchases were made taking advantage of the conditions of vulnerability caused by the conflict, in the sense that farmers could lose their lives or property because of the war, and many of them had abandoned their farms. From the perspective of Law 1448 of 2011, which was drafted to protect and to restore property to victims of the conflict, transfers of this type have been defined as forms of dispossession (UAEGRTD, 2012).

3.3 | Government policies that promoted massive land purchases and their concentration by oil palm businesses The promotion of oil palm agriculture was a national policy adopted by the central government and touted by different administrations as a “crop for peace” (García, 2014). It was expected that oil palm would also become the basis for productive projects managed by demobilized combatants from the paramilitary within the framework of the Justice and Peace process, and thus become an alternative to the substitution of illegal crops (CONPES 3477, 2007). The first oil palms were planted in Tibú in 2000,8 when productive alliances were promoted to plant 1,000 hectares of oil palm within the framework of the alternative development plans for the region. Alliances between small tenants and agro‐industrial firms were actively being promoted and subsidized by oil palm entrepreneurs and Minister of Agriculture at the time, Carlos Murgas Guerrero, with the assistance of international donors (USAID–MIDAS).9 The resources for the alliances were to be provided by the state through the Rural Capitalization Incentive (ICR)10 and multilateral bank loans (Murgas, 1999). From 2005 onwards, oil palm was included in the rural policy promoting crops for the biofuel agro‐industry, and an official target was set to plant 4,000 hectares by 2020 (DNP, 2007). Government incentives for oil palm crops are in sharp contrast with minimal or non‐existent incentives for the smallholder sector. Between 2007 and 2014, 86% of all ICR funds were allocated to oil palm projects and just 14% to other commodities. Tibú has accounted for a large proportion of the oil palm incentives offered through this rural policy not only of the department, but also at the national level: the history of credits for oil palm plantations (ICR) in Tibú began in 2005, 7 A database on sales and transfer processes was put together by the Project on Protection of Lands and Properties of the Displaced Population (Acción Social, 2010). 8

Retrieved May 12, 2016 from http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/aceite‐de‐palma‐de‐tibu‐holanda‐articulo‐394391

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In 2005, the former Minister of Agriculture, Andrés Felipe Arias, reported that with resources granted by the government, the Investment for Peace Fund (FIP—Plan Colombia) of the United States government (USAID) and the Office of the Mayor of Tibú planned to plant an additional 1,041 hectares of oil palm. See Community Government Council N° 94, retrieved November 11, 2013 from http:// alcandiasalesiano.blogspot.com/ 10 The Rural Capitalization Incentive was established by Law 101 of 1993 (Colombia, Congreso de la República, 1996) and was regulated by means of Decree 626 of 1994 (Colombia, Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, 1994). It was conceived as a right granted to any individual or legal entity that ventures into new investment projects fully or partially funded by Finagro. It translates into a contribution in money granted as payment against the balance of the principal of the loan.

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FIGURE 3 Rural land in Tibú transferred between 2005 and 2010 Source: Acción Social (2010).

when over COP 1,300 million was granted (equivalent to 2.72% of national loans). The amount of these loans grew progressively until 2009, when it reached a peak of COP 12,318 million (99.7% of departmental loans and 12% of national loans). In one decade (2005–2014), Tibú received credit for oil palm plantations worth COP 61,336 million.11 The introduction and expansion of the oil palm crop in Tibú has taken place through an arrangement of production alliances, in which the companies that promote them are part of the Oleoflores business group, the main

11 Database by municipality of oil palm loans granted through ICR. Information processed by ORDPA (2014) according to information from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADR‐Finagro).

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shareholder of which is Carlos Murgas, known in the industry as the “Oil Palm Czar”. The main funds for the production alliances promoted by Oleflores are the ICR and the DRE Special Credit Line, created with the objective of strengthening exports, as indicated earlier.

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Institutions that protect the land of the displaced population

In Colombia, there are two laws that contain arrangements to prevent the illegal accumulation of land that were disregarded in Tibú: Law 387 of 1997 and Law 160 of 1994. Law 387 establishes the protection of lands abandoned by those who are forced to flee or are at risk due to armed conflict, and prevents transactions or sales of those lands without prior authorization from the relevant authorities, in this case the Territorial Committees for the Comprehensive Protection of the Displaced Population. Such committees include local authorities, are chaired by mayors, and decide which assets to protect. When a property is protected, it must be registered by its cadastral identification number. After this, notaries and registrars cannot allow sales or transactions (purchases, sales, etc.) of the protected property. Law 160 of 1994 prohibits land accumulation beyond one UAF per family. The size of a UAF varies by region (in Tibú, it is 36 hectares). In the case of many land purchases in Tibú, these laws were blatantly disregarded (SNR, 2012). Purchases of land were undertaken without the authorization of the committee. Many were permitted by notaries and public registrars, who overlooked the protection measures enacted by the committees. There were other cases in which the committees raised protective measures but individual members of the committee, despite lacking legal authorization, allowed the transaction. In addition, they did not take the necessary steps to verify that the domain transfers were voluntary and not coerced. Palm oil companies accumulating land beyond established limits accounted for a significant share of the total purchases of land (SNR, 2012). One reason underlying the failure of the committees to block the frenzied purchases of protected land was the deregulated nature of land property rights in Colombia. The committees did not have the information to identify non‐consensual transactions; the cadastre was out of date; there were no information systems that could allow the identification of the irregularities described above; and notaries and registry offices used the informality of landownership to bypass the measures aimed at the protection of assets (SNR, 2012). Furthermore, local authorities such as governors and mayors supported the expansion of oil palm agriculture in Tibú, putting their weight behind pro‐concentration market dynamics.12

4 4.1

T HE I M P LI C A TI O N S OF TH E C A S E

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Variation and coalitions

As noted above, in Tibú there is apparently no direct connection between the paramilitaries and the oil palm businesses. These enterprises made opportunistic purchases after the paramilitaries had demobilized, taking advantage of the conditions created by the initial violence and the incentives offered by the central government. This is different from regions such as Magdalena and Urabá, where the legal rural elites that took over dispossessed lands (ranchers and banana growers) were themselves involved in the alliances that promoted waves of dispossession (García & Vargas, 2014; Quinche, 2016; Vargas, 2016), or the case of Curvaradó and Jiguamiando in Chocó, where there was a direct connection between oil palm businessmen and the paramilitaries (García, 2014). The state agencies that networked with the paramilitary, namely but not only the army and the police, were not the same agencies involved in the promotion of oil palm agriculture (i.e. the central government and the Ministry of See “The government replaced coca in the Catatumbo region with African palm”, retrieved February 27, 2015 from http://www. eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM‐1633593

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Agriculture), which granted strong incentives for the oil palm firms to accumulate land despite regulations that explicitly prohibited such accumulation. How should we account for the different paths towards coercive eviction of the peasants and the different paths towards land accumulation? Key factors would be the type of coalition that the state built with different stakeholders; the characteristics of the actors that were part of those coalitions; and the aims they pursued. In Tibú, there was a first alliance between the security agencies of the state and the paramilitaries of the Catatumbo Block (BCa). But the latter, unlike other paramilitary units, were not interested in rural assets. The main feature of the members of the BCa was their clear anti‐subversive nature (Gutiérrez, 2014); that is, they were highly punitive groups more linked to the security agencies of the state than to rural elites. For instance, their immediate leadership was made up of specialists in violence; they ventured into the municipality not at the behest of rural elites, but as a result of requests by intermediaries of the army; their punitive actions were based on an anti‐subversive ideology and a militaristic model.13 This had implications for the type of alliances they built and their relation to the land: they rarely accumulated land by coercion and they did not transfer it to third parties. The accumulating coalition, on the other hand, was made up of legal actors: agencies of the central state and entrepreneurs at the national level, the latter characterized as productive agents with ample political and social capital, who had, and still have, a dense set of relationships with high‐level state decision‐makers, for whom it would not be profitable to deal with the costs and risks of a coercive land dispossession. The worsening of the rural inequality indicators due to the activity of this coalition was as profound as, and at times deeper than, the increases in rural inequality caused by its coercive coalitions. However, the ultimate set of actors that acquired the land was different. The incentives that we find in Tibú resulted from the combination of strategic objectives related to national and global demands, economic power, and political connections. Oil palm had been identified by the Colombian government as an ideal commodity to replace illicit crops and promote peace (García, 2014) and also potentially as a highly productive alternative for farming. FEDEPALMA, the palm oil producers' association, was already very powerful. Carlos Murgas was an extremely well‐connected actor: he had been president of FEDEPALMA and Minister of Agriculture, and had personal and professional links with politicians at the regional and national levels.14 That power allowed Murgas to promote the institutional arrangements that benefited the sector while he was the agriculture minister.

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C O N C L U S I O N S : LA N D C O N C E N T R A T I O N A N D T H E ST A T E RE V I S I T E D

The state is neither a unitary nor a monolithic entity. Beyond the classic debate about the degree of autonomy of the state (Skocpol, Evans, & Rueschemeyer, 1999), Migdal (2001) has shown that in certain contexts, of which Colombia is an egregious example, the state must compete or negotiate with other actors and organizations for the establishment and regulation of rules (see also North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009). Economic elites and non‐state armed actors play an important role in terms of setting and enforcing rules in specific territories (Migdal, 2001). Thus, the study of land dispossession should be linked to the understanding of the role that states play in these processes. We have shown that, in addition to its regulatory role, the Colombian state selected the winners of land accumulation using mechanisms such as agrarian development policies, subsidies, and credits to promote sometimes overtly illegal land concentration. We have also shown that in the case of the Colombian armed conflict, there is no single path of land accumulation. We can envisage at least two routes: one in which coercion and accumulation went hand in hand, and were deployed by the same actors; and another in which coercion and accumulation did not coincide and were carried 13 The organizational characteristics of the paramilitary groups were highly varied. The Colombian paramilitaries did not consolidate a unified army but, rather, had a protean nature (see Gutiérrez & Vargas, 2017). 14 A list of his contacts with high‐level politicians can be found online; retrieved April 14, 2016 from http://lasillavacia.com/ quienesquien/perfilquien/carlos‐alberto‐murgas‐guerrero

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out by different coalitions (accumulating and coercive coalitions). The state agencies involved in each case were different. Ultimately, each of them was functional to land concentration. Yet their interests and forms of operation did not always converge. War involves costs and risks even for powerful actors. For example, only some local elites dare to get involved and only some armed groups can deploy extreme violence against civilians (Ron, 2000). One of the implications of this case study is the need for conflict studies and agrarian political economy to take a more nuanced and empirically rigorous view of processes of “primitive accumulation” facilitated by war. ACKNOWLEDGEMEN TS This paper presents research results from the Observatorio de Restitución y Regulación de Derechos de Propiedad Agraria, which is a research project funded by Colciencias. We are grateful for the input and comments on earlier versions from Christopher Cramer, Elisabeth Wood, Francisco Gutiérrez, and the members of the Observatory of Restitution of Land. We also thank two anonymous referees for helpful criticism. The opinions and any deficiencies in the paper remain our own. ORCID Jenniffer Vargas Sonia Uribe

http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2879-5100

http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2364-8008

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Ru li ngs : Tribunal Superior del Distrito Judicial de Bogotá (December 2, 2010). Ruling 110016000253200680281. Tribunal Superior del Distrito Judicial de Bogotá (October 31, 2014). Ruling 11001600253200680008.

How to cite this article: Vargas J, Uribe S. State, war, and land dispossession: The multiple paths to land concentration. J Agrar Change. 2017;17:749‐758. https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12237