'Strong Institutions' Mediated by a 'Strong Third Force

‘Strong Personalities’ and ‘Strong Institutions’ Mediated by a ‘Strong Third Force’: Thinking ‘Systems’ in Corruption Control Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah

Public Organization Review A Global Journal ISSN 1566-7170 Public Organiz Rev DOI 10.1007/s11115-016-0351-5

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Author's personal copy Public Organiz Rev DOI 10.1007/s11115-016-0351-5

‘Strong Personalities’ and ‘Strong Institutions’ Mediated by a ‘Strong Third Force’: Thinking ‘Systems’ in Corruption Control Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah 1

# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Abstract Corruption in public sector is a complex, ‘messy’ and ‘fuzzy’ phenomenon which involves calculus machinations between actors and constantly growing in sophistication. Consequently, an attempt to prevent, control or fight it requires systems thinking that ranges from public officials with integrity and personal ethics [strong personalities]; administrative rules and procedures as well as governments adopting, enforcing and monitoring appropriate systems [strong institutions]. This paper provides a systems approach to enhancing public sector ethics through ‘a corruption control tripod’ in preventing, controlling and combating corruption in all its forms. This framework discusses three overarching pillars and argues that adopting a reductionist approach in corruption control would yield futility; there is a need for synthesis so that each one would reinforce the other. Keywords Corruptioncontrol . Public sector . Institutions . Integrity . Ethics . Civilsociety

Introduction A stinky public sector has a cascading effect on overall development of people and all entities within the state (Alm et al. 2016; Banerjee 2016; Ashforth et al. 2008; Bardhan 1997), ousting corruption should correspondingly be regarded as a responsibility of all stakeholders, individuals and organizations (including the state machinery). Farazmand (1999) paints a picture of corruption’s overarching consequence by providing that Bcorruption has turned societal resources into illegal, immoral, and unproductive

* Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah [email protected]

1

School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, Western Cape, South Africa

Author's personal copy Yeboah-Assiamah E.

activities. It also challenges the very foundations of societal health and destroys citizens’ trust in leadership and system legitimacy^ (p. 518). This point was made by Obama in his historic visit to Ghana’s Parliament that Bno country is going to create wealth if its leaders exploit the economy to enrich themselves, or police can be bought off by drug traffickers… no business wants to invest in a place where the government skims 20 % off the top, or the head of the Port Authority is corrupt...^1. Although high levels of corruption as indicated above by Obama may serve as disincentive to investment, other scholars maintain that grand corruption [state capture] in the public sector is largely caused by increasing globalization, flow of foreign direct investment and privatization which tend to co-opt public officials into unethical deals to favor global capital owners (Farazmand 2002). He explains that Bglobalization and privatization empower corporate business elites and, by providing various opportunities for corruption, lubricate their wheels of domination and exploitation of indigenous national economies and human and natural resources^ (p.134). Arguing on omnipresence and sordid nature of globalization, he adds that global finance knows no territorial borders and has a tendency to co-opt and weaken the public sector in an effort to compromise officials and have their way through with ease. Therefore, whilst unethical public sector may serve as a disincentive to investors, the latter also tends to ‘grease’ their way through [state capture] which polarizes the public sector and this remains a puzzle. From the foregoing, corruption is complex in nature, its causes and effects appear to be in constant flux and closely interwoven. This makes the phenomenon a ‘fuzzy’, ‘messy’, ‘wicked’ and ‘ill-defined’ concept with dynamism and changing complexities (see Dexter 1993; Gong 2002, 2011). The nature, classification and definition is contested and contextual in nature, some authors widen the scope to include many forms whilst others make it appear limited in scope. For instance, Shah (2007) discusses four broader types of corruption: (i) bureaucratic corruption which involves secluded transactions by public officials who misuse their authority to solicit bribes and kickbacks, pilfering and the award of favors in return for individual gains; (ii) grand corruption, involves gargantuan amounts of public resources which are either mismanaged or stolen by public employees or politicians (iii) state or regulatory capture involves a situation where public officials and political elites get ensnared by the global capitalists or buoyant private sector who through their financial prowess are able to influence public decision-making, mostly to the detriment of the general public interest (see Farazmand 1999, 2002); (iv) patronage or clientelism involves public officials portraying favoritism tendencies and exhibit exceptional interest in people whom they have some form of affiliation to public officials. This may influence public service delivery, decisions and recruitment skewed towards the ‘known’ thereby sidestepping professionalism, due process and neutrality principles. This form of affiliation or relationship could be same geographic, ethnic, cultural origin, political party, old-boyism or old-girlism, religion, creed, race or others. On what appears a broader scope, Argyriades (2006) enumerates various forms of corruption which manifest itself in the form 1

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-ghanaian-parliament

Author's personal copy Corruption Control Tripod

of Babuse of power for personal advantage; bribery, theft, embezzlement; fraud and receipt of kickbacks; rent-seeking; tax evasion; extortion and soliciting ‘free rides’; demanding sexual favors; or other favors; the practice of discrimination, of ‘clientelism’, patronage and cronyism; failure to speak the truth; distortion of reality or ‘doctoring’ of evidence in disingenuous ways in order to curry favor with the rich and powerful^ (p.156). Owing to the complexities associated with corruption, ousting it requires a concerted approach that is context-dependent. The phenomenon, its description, causes and further analysis are abundant in the literature of public administration (Klitgaard 1988; Farazmand 1999, 2001; Gioacchino and Franzini 2008; Barr and Serra 2010; Gyekye 2013; Yeboah-Assiamah and Alesu-Dordzi 2015). For instance, Gyekye (2013) discusses how culture influences people’s tendency to be corrupt, especially, in Africa which has a collectivist culture. Farazmand (2002) assesses how globalization and increasing privatization provide a breeding ground for corruption especially in developing administrative systems (see also Farazmand 1999). In a recent study, Yeboah-Assiamah et al. (2014) design a transactional model to describe how corruption is bargained between public officials and clients. This model was abridged by Yeboah-Assiamah and Alesu-Dordzi (2015) to assess why in spite of rules and systems, corruption still permeates in the Ghanaian Setting. Given just these three dimensions of corruption [among others] demonstrates its complexities which suggests that a reductionist approach or adopting piecemeal anti-corruption models will not be effective. In spite of abundant literature on corruption, measures or a framework to prevent, control and fight corruption appears fragmentarily treated in the public administration literature which mostly come in the form of few paragraphs dedicated to recommendations and conclusions. The fragmentary approach presents a gap which needs to be addressed in contemporary public administration literature and practice. With a view to stimulating academic enquiry and further discussion on corruption control, this paper attempts to collate and synchronize the fragments to design a three-point ‘corruption control tripod’. The paper is conceptual and adopts critical stage review of classical anti-corruption literature and reconciles it with contemporary empirical findings of corruption performance from public organizations across different countries. Gaps in Existing Anti-Corruption Frameworks: Filling the Vacuum Kim (2014) discusses four anti-corruption mechanisms: legal-administrative, behaviocultural economic and technological approaches. Whilst some scholars blame the persistence of unethical and corrupt practices in public organizations on poor enforcement of institutions and anticorruption frameworks (see Brinkerhoff 2000; Lawson 2009); others have argued the frameworks for anticorruption are not properly designed [perhaps not holistic or one-best-fit-all or policy transfer] (Riley 1998; Shah 2007; Lawson 2009). By viewing corruption control as mutually exclusive, there is a tendency for an organization to resort to just one or two of the approaches and neglect others. Even where an organization is tempted to contextualize all four approaches, there still appears a vacuum or a missing link, especially, where the mediating ‘third sector’ appears silent in the discussions above.


For instance, solely depending on structures and systems [strong institutions] is not enough because the combined effect of hungry, selfish and unethical public officials [weak personalities] could easily deactivate the strongest of institutions or structures especially in developing administrative systems (see Jávor and Jancsics 2013). Also, with the behavioral approaches, although workplace ethos and codes as well as individual ethics are important values, the willingness or desire of people to engage in ethical conduct is episodic and mostly context-dependent. This is exacerbated by the fact that most officials, such as the ‘climbers’, and ‘conservers [Downs 1966] or ‘demons’ [Ayee 2000] will never be moved by normative ethics or integrity training but driven largely by egoistic selfish desires. With the economic approach, in most cases, the richer [well paid politicians, directors and chief directors] are more engaged in grand corruption schema. How could one explain such paradox where the rich mostly extort from the poor in society? (see Di John 2010). It should be noted that money is sticky, the lack of it, the desire for its acquisition, or the fear of losing it – brings out the worst in human nature even when they are well motivated. The argument that increased remuneration would reduce corruption is not a straightforward issue as generally argued and it is not always the case (see Gong and Wu 2012). Moreso, if an organization is tempted to adopt only legal-administrative strategy through structural procedures, rules, regulations and laws, people can still forge a clandestine network to reduce potency of structures and systems or act at the blindside of rules (see Jávor and Jancsics 2013; Yeboah-Assiamah and Alesu-Dordzi 2015). This has been observed in an empirical study that, even where mechanisms exist to check corruption, managers at the various levels of the organization have their own machinations [technicization] to side-step and trick the system to have their corrupt way through; people engage in a formidable network to ‘eat up’ the technical quality of systems (Jávor and Jancsics 2013; Kim et al. 2009). The argument is, if higher officials, the political institutions or regulatory bodies [for instance, courts] are part of the syndicate, how do the legal-administrative structures get upheld? How would it work? Who watches their back? Another common weakness with the legal-administrative approach is mimethic isomorphism [see Massey 2009] where policy makers are tempted to engage in wholesale policy transfer without situating it to their context. For instance, Siddiquee (2010) observes that the Malaysian government [especially Badavi] since 2003 has come out with numerous anti-corruption frameworks and institutions yet there has not been significant impact. A major observation is that rather than empowering and strengthening existing ones, governments are tempted to engage in adopting and transporting different and new models (see Massey 2009 on policy mimesis). Reconciling the numerous institutional frameworks and the negligible impact on corruption control, the author asks in exasperation: Bdo institutions matter?^ (Siddiquee 2010). This question is adequately answered in this present paper [a corruption control tripod]. I argue that institutions would matter to the extent that they are matched with other enabling and prevailing conditions whereby each one reinforces the other, lest we will have a paradox of strong corruption amidst strong institutions (see Yeboah-Assiamah and Alesu-Dordzi 2015). Another inherent weakness, laxities in enforcement complementarity at times make the vision of the transparency and accountability of government processes a mirage.


Anti-corruption institutions and rules at times appear inconsistent, and may exhibit lackadaisical posture in enforcement by engaging in ‘pick and choose’ strategy. Quesada et al. (2013) observe laxities in enforcement of accountability mechanisms in Spanish local governments which has led to sporadic increase in local level corruption schema. They observe that whilst the legal-administrative framework provides numerous internal and external control of the local government officials Bin fact, most checks and balances were scarcely effective to ensure that local politicians performed ethically and independently from private influence^ (p. 633). Kim (2014) argues in exasperation that Bit seems that creating an anti-corruption system is one thing and changing corrupt behaviors of public officials and citizens is another [because] many clients in developing and emerging countries, in fact, are willing to pay express fees or bribes to expedite public services and to gain greater private interest^. How could public officials resist these tendencies? Governments, scholars, anti-corruption organizations and citizenry have bemoaned why in spite of the various administrative reforms and legal-administrative processes, corruption still persists in accelerated spate. The argument is that reforms and legal controls [structural approaches] do not necessarily bring out ethical character in public officials since these processes may be reduced in quality because of red tapeism (Johnston 1998), could be too expensive to effectively enforce, especially, the legal approaches may overburden public prosecutors and may slow down processes (Hamilton-Hart 2001), or clandestine collusion (Jávor and Jancsics 2013). A major factor that may undermine such approaches could be explained by the elite preference and group models of policy making which argue that few political elites and small interest groups composed of rich individuals tend to control the policy processes to reflect their interests and choices (Dye 2008). If these same powerful public officials and policy elites are to be sole reformers and enforcers, there is a tendency to ignore many important factors, inadequate commitment in revealing and prosecuting corruption issues because of their own self-interests (Doig and McIvor 2003). These policy elites and enforcers may gang up to form a clandestine network to even deactivate the potency of systems through a calculus approach to act at blind side of rules (YeboahAssiamah and Alesu-Dordzi 2015; Zeng and Ji 2007). Without systems thinking, see what happens to societal interest or public value in Fig. 1 below.

Equilibrium (Public value creation)

Personalities (Dominated by Weak officials) (Without ethics & integrity)

Third force

Systems

Weak third force

Strong systems

Fig. 1 Reductionist approach to corruption control

(Will get deactivated by weak men)


If organizations do not pay attention to ethics and integrity of public officials, many selfish individuals pull societal resources and service delivery to their end [from the equilibrium which is utilitarian point]. Even if the systems appear strong, officials form clandestine network that could deactivate the system to also pull service delivery and resources to their favor (Jávor and Jancsics 2013; Yeboah-Assiamah and Alesu-Dordzi 2015). There is a missing link, the role of third force or non-state actors are not adequately encouraged, therefore the ‘people’ and ‘systems’ are moving apart in a centrifugal force.

Discussion Argument for Systems Approach The ‘corruption control tripod’ provides three overarching pillars which adequately discuss specific but integrated measures to address corruption in the public sector. This is against a backdrop that governance involves an organizational and institutional diversity and complexity increasingly explained as a differentiated polity where the role of government is to create enabling conditions in which other organizations can thrive and contribute (Richards and Smith 2002). We argue for systems thinking by positing that the different elements or compartments ought to be approached and treated as a whole. Therefore, this three-point framework needs to be treated or viewed as a ‘systems approach’ whereby each entity needs to be functional and integrated into the other. In making a case for complexity thinking and interdependence, Nicolescu (2004) posits, Beverything is dependent on everything else, everything is connected, nothing is separate^ (p.48). Different actors such as the legislature, judiciary bodies, civil society, and the private sector, as well as the government, should be all interconnected by a holistic vision of fighting against corruption (Kim et al. 2009). In the Post-NPM era [public value governance], accountability mechanisms are multifaceted, the public sector must pay attention to laws, ethics and respond to citizen interests in a collaborative approach to create public good. There is also a call to facilitate dialogue to respond to active citizenship [third force] in public value creation. This has come against a backdrop that no one sector or entity has a monopoly of public service ethos especially complex problems (Bryson et al. 2014). See Fig. 2 on how systems thinking could synchronize energies in a synergistic relationship to create public value. Equilibrium Public value

Strong personalities

Strong third force

Attention paid to integrity and ethics

Media & other non-state actors

Fig. 2 Systems thinking in corruption control

Strong Systems Rules, procedures, leadership ethos


Recruiting and developing strong personalities is important, but all the people cannot and may not be willing to be ethical [homo economicus], even the ethical ones may be tempted to fall at times (Ayee 2000; White 2004); institutions and systems are important to enable and constrain behaviors but when left unguarded, they hardly get enforced. With a strong third force [media, opposition parties, think tanks, religious groups, pressure groups and civil society organizations], the best in people and systems are churned out towards the equilibrium [to create public value] in a compelling way (see Ebrahim and Weisband 2007). The third force forms a centripetal force that enjoins or mediates the two. The Corruption Control Tripod The corruption control tripod hinges on three key pillars: (i) strong personalities which requires public officials to develop their personal ethics and integrity levels for their own sake and that of the organization (ii) strong organizations which requires individual public organizations and the state to design peculiar systems that are context-dependent to propel, promote ethical conduct and integrity, to monitor, prevent and control corruption. This pillar moves beyond the basic or immediate organization to oversight organizations [eg Judiciary, Ombudsman, and Parliament] (iii) the possibility of the first two pillars engaging in ‘groupthink’ ‘scratch-my-back-I-scratch-your-back’ syndicate requires a strong third force or active civil society [media, think tanks, opposition parties, pressure groups, NGOs] that compels the public officials to churn out virtues. Therefore, if a strong third force mediates public officials and organizations, there will be more strong men and women to conduct public business ethically whilst organizational systems and enforcers would be compelled to do the right thing without active collusion. This, they do by pooling the best part of public officials as well as institutions towards a utilitarian public good. This is represented in the framework below (Fig. 3). Pillar one: Individual Level (Strong Personalities) An important approach to controlling public sector corruption starts from the individual level. Firstly, there should be individual public officials willing to uphold public ethical

Individual Level

Organizational level

Personal ethics Champions Whistleblowers

Integrity tests Investing in ethics training Merit recruitment Systems

(Strong personalities) Third force

(Strong organizations)

Or

Compelling force

(Strong civil society) Fig. 3 The corruption control tripod. Source: author’s construct


standards. At the personal or individual level, upholding integrity is imperative for corruption control, it helps the individual official and the organization at large. Farazmand (2002) observes the uniqueness of administration in politics and governance arrangement which makes him confer that an ethical and sound professional public administrators could serve as effective ‘guardians of public trust’. He defines personal ethics to connote a Bform of self-accountability, an ‘inner check’ on the conduct behavior or action of public administrators and other officials of public service^. Owing to the influential role of global finance and privatization, he has urged public administrators in all countries ‘to act ethically and morally’ and ‘they must expose and fight corruption at any level and at any time’ (Farazmand 1999, p.519). Individual officials need to uphold integrity because they will be held liable for their own actions (Martinez 2009). We provide a guide and sense of direction to public officials. In any public decision being made, officials are to be guided by a BGo-No Go^ decision model. By this, the official is to ask himself three critical questions: Is my action legal? Is my action ethical? Is my action effective? (see Lewis 1991). Public officials are also to be guided by key prima facie duties which include, inter alia, duty of fidelity, gratitude, fairness, justice, as well as duties of non-injury and nonmalfeasance to the state (Ross 1930). Additionally, in their day to day transactions, public officials should be mindful of some basic theories of ethics which would guide them to act legally, ethically and professionally. Whether an action would be a ‘go or no-go’, officials should ponder on these four basic models. Firstly, an official should be guided by the TV Test by asking oneself, Bwould I feel comfortable explaining to a national TV audience why I took this action?^ (Preston et al. 2002). Any unethical act mostly occurs in secrecy, but in all their dealings, officials should bear in mind that ‘appearance of propriety’ is good ethos in public administration, any prebendalist and surreptitious action which would bring reproach and soil their integrity and that of the organization should be avoided. Secondly, officials should be guided by the professional ethics which implores them to take actions that a disinterest panel of professional colleagues would view as proper (see Gilman 2005). In this case, before embarking on any decision, the public official should ask him or herself: how would my colleagues in same profession review my action? As right or wrong? Thirdly, actions of public officials should be guided by Kant’s categorical imperative which implores them to act in such a way that the action you take could be a universal law or rule of behavior under the circumstances (Kant 1785). Finally, the utilitarian principle directs public officials to act in ways that result in the greatest good for the greatest number (Mill 1957). For instance, if a judge should accept a bribe and sets an accused armed robber free, is the society safe? This will not be a sign of statesmanship but service of gluttony. Individual officials and public servants should serve as checks on one another as some may not be moved by these normative ideals of being ethical. Ayee (2000) identifies three key groups of public officials namely; saints, wizards and demons. The saints are the ethical individuals who enable systems to work perfectly whilst the wizards are professional and technical officials. However, demons are the prebendal, unethical and corrupt public officials who are largely moved by selfish desires as well as private and sectional interest maximization. It takes the saints and wizards to neutralize the effect of demons, [the two


should serve as champions] by making sure the right thing is done and to blow the whistle to expose, name and shame without covering up for corrupt bosses and colleagues. Pillar two: Organizational Level (Strong Institutions) The organization has a peculiar role in maintaining ethical standards to help control corruption. The role of the organization could be discussed under these themes: systems auditing, internal controls and management system, external accountability mechanisms and supra level leadership. Pragmatic Systems Auditing and Refinement Firstly, organizations need to carry out an audit of prevailing systems and procedures to assess the loopholes and various ‘windows of opportunity’ that are candidates for corruption. After doing so, it is necessary to amend, repeal, or adopt a complete new system. For instance, in Malaysia, the Badavi Government since 2003 has intensified implementation of different new anti-corruption models yet no real impact. This is because Bno significant move has been made to either rectify the defects of the political system or to address the weaknesses of the existing institutions for enhancing their effectiveness; hardly anything substantive has been done in terms of strengthening democratic institutions, audit and oversight functions, freedom of media, access to information and the like^ (Siddiquee 2010, p. 169). The argument is that when people become too familiar with a system, they can easily form a clandestine network to outsmart and act at the blindside of these systems or rules. Therefore, in the design of systems and anti-corruption rules, it is more important to summon the relevant actors who would be involved in the execution to bring out all possible ‘decoding mechanisms’ [however, limited by bounded rationality, see Simon 1947, 1987] or how they think the system could be outsmarted by other officials. The ‘saints’ and ‘wizards’ (Ayee 2000) or ‘statesmen and women’ (Downs 1966), by this, may consult to identify possible and plausible inherent weaknesses or ‘windows of opportunity’ for corruption. By identifying these head on, some provisions or caveat could be put in place to patch up. This is not to suggest that rules should be too tight and strait jacket that seeks to micro manage public officials [lest they are cogs in iron cage], some form of flexibility is required to enable higher productivity, innovation and context-dependent actions and inactions. However, uncontrolled discretion in the public sector is a recipe for ineffective service delivery, inefficiencies and administrative corruption (Braibanti 1969; Klitgaard 1988). Institutionalized Integrity Systems The enactment of legislations on integrity and disclosure systems would enable public organizations to keep track of their workforce. The process should oblige public officials declaring their financial and non-financial assets and interests, those of their family members and the information made public for verification and subsequent actions thereof (Gong 2011). The adoption of integrity system through wider scope disclosures and quality assessment in an open and transparent manner enables the


system, the spirit and letter of disclosure. By allowing the public a space to verify [any query or suspicion would lead to a committee to investigate, quality assurance] makes public officials to be circumspect in carrying out public duties in ‘good faith’ and not for private or self-maximizing inclinations. When the decision to disclose is discretionary or optional through normative appeals and directives without legal backing, most public officials will deliberately ignore or approach it haphazardly. Promoting Accountability and Transparency Another important tool is public sector accountability in all its forms. Internal control measures should be activated in the organization whilst external oversight agencies should be pragmatic. Every action of public officials should be accounted for; a hallmark of public administration is its significant accountability and answerability to the general public. In other words, public officials are to operate in Ba plain fish bowl^ [in the fish aquarium, you see through the transparent bowl how the fish is diving and moving]. Jabbra and Dwivedi (1988) provide five main elements of accountability which are; administrative, legal, Political, professional and moral accountability. This requires a 360-degree accountability mechanism that makes the public official open, transparent and less room for secrecy [corruption thrives in secrecy]. Sadly, in most countries, especially, developing administrative systems, accountability appears to be deficient. For instance, Mo Ibrahim Index of 2013 observe that Baccountability is one of the weakest elements of governance in Africa with an average score of 39.6%^ which breeds high levels of corruption in the public sector. In its 2015 report, accountability is among the three canons that have still fallen below the baseline. Ideally, every use of bureaucratic discretion should be accounted for and justified because unchecked discretion greases the wheels of corruption (Braibanti 1969; Klitgaard 1988). Consequently, by controlling discretion through accountability and transparency in the usage, corruption will reduce. This is supported by an empirical study in Seoul, South Korea which observed that transparency in the use of public authority plays a moderating role in reducing corruption (Park and Blenkinsopp 2011). Ethical Training The first three approaches are legal-administrative [structural] in nature and ought to balance with ‘soft’ approaches that talk to the inner person of human beings. By ethical training, the organization needs to put up programs geared at developing the integrity levels of the human capital. It is not enough to institute complex organizational systems, rules, procedures and mechanisms. Spending quality time and resources in developing complex system without a corresponding time and resources in developing the integrity levels of people will make the system dysfunctional. The literature provides that even where systems exist, unethical officials still manoeuvre their ways through (see Javor and Jancsics; Yeboah-Assiamah and Alesu-Dordzi 2015). This suggests that viewing the organization just from the rational perspective would not work out perfectly. It is mostly argued that countries do not need strong personalities but institutions1, although this statement is a call to strengthen systems, public administrators and policy elites may be tempted to ignore the human elements and role of building people with ethics. Maintaining high ethical standards in the public sector, organizations need strong


personalities as well as institutions, it takes strong personalities [conceptualized as public officials with integrity] to effectively enforce institutions even against the whims and caprices of their superiors. Corruption mostly involves a clandestine network where an actor may seek support or collaboration from other colleagues who when agreed could easily act in spite of the systems. Therefore, to ignore men and women of integrity and ethical standards, to ignore periodic ethical training and just concentrating on institutions and systems would usher organizations into the scientific management [Taylorism] era and may be dysfunctional. Human beings are smarter who could easily adapt and outsmart; they appear more dynamic than organizational rules and structures. Therefore an attempt at working on the ‘conscience’, ‘morality’ , ‘soft spot’ , ‘patriotism’, ‘statemanship’, ‘nationalism’ and proper sense of ‘collectivism’ would go a very long way to at least get some officials to fill their ethical tanks and to refrain from corrupt dealings. This is because systems and rules alone cannot stand the power and influence of money churned out by globalization and increasing privatisation (Farazmand 2002). He notes how this global finance could pose accountability problems; promote potentials for corruption, secrecy, conflict of interests, unethical conducts among public officials especially in developing administrative systems. To overcome the lust for money, ethics is important, at least if one person in the chain changes his or her mind, corruption equation may become destabilized as asymmetric information increases the cost of corruption transaction (Ortner and Chassang 2014; Laffont and Matrimort 1997). According to Shah (2007) the principal-agent theories focus on reducing the opportunities of exchanges between public employees and third parties through information asymmetry. Through ethics training, at least few participants would be bold to blow whistle after they get to know how ‘the heroes and heroines’ of whistleblowing got to become famous and salvaged their companies and people’s lives. A major catalyst of corruption is when others aid and abet it or just keep mute for collaborators to transact without acting or stopping them. This reflects a classical assertion that ‘all that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men [and women] do nothing… nobody made a greater mistake than he who did nothing because he could do only a little (Edmund Burke 1729–1797)2. Humanist and Prudent Approach to Management Firstly, the organization needs to have a philosophy that pertains to the classical origin of ‘capital’. Ulrich and Brockbank (2005) trace the concept of capital from its Latin root caput which literally means ‘head’. This suggests that in the organization any entity that is described as capital plays a critical role, it is considered as ‘head’ and not ‘tail’. Although capital in the organization had traditionally been used for money or financial resources, contemporary human resource literature uses the term human capital or intellectual capital. They observe that ‘people’ in contemporary times have been viewed as most valued asset to the organization even more than organizational processes. Tantardini and Garcia-Zamor (2014) use the concept of social capital to discuss how human relations, interactions and ‘positive’ networks could enhance trust and relationship building that may reduce the tendency for corruption (see also Shim and Eom 2009). The ‘softer part’ requires a human relations approach, however, a 2

http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/e/edmund_burke.html


common prejudice that anti-corruption systems engage is to rely largely on rational systems [structuralism]. This has been observed by Gebel (2012) that Bthere is dominance within TI discourse of a mechanistic conception of human nature as rational and self-interested… [which] leads to an over-emphasis on institutional engineering and the strengthening of oversight and control (to set ‘disincentives’ for corruption), while neglecting the social–moral components of human behaviour as well as the political processes of their generation^ (p.109). Meanwhile, the structures could easily be outsmarted by human elements if the right personalities are not in the workplace. By viewing the people as precious capital, motivating them and getting to their psycho-social needs would help enhance their desire to be somewhat faithful to the organization. At least the prima facie duties of non-malfeasance and non-injury; gratitude, justice and loyalty would make them remain resolute. Prudent approach to management requires observing from the peculiar tasks of officials and devising specific targeted measures to get the best practices from them. For instance, the incentive for a public tax officer to work harder to recover and deal with tax evaders may require negotiating and giving him or her part of the retrieved taxes (see Escobari 2012). Supra Level ‘Shadow’ and Support By supra level, we move beyond the immediate organization to their officials at the apex and political elites. The shadow of leaders mostly reflect on what subordinates do, the kinds of habits portrayed, the kinds of actions rewarded or sanctioned go a long way to give a mental picture to subordinates across the rank and file. This point has forcefully been brought home by Farazmand (2002) that Bif accountability and ethical behavior are lost at the highest level, then little can be expected at the lower organizational levels^ (p. 138). The same argument has been advanced by Dickson et al. (2001) that Bthe leader serves as a role model for his […] subordinates about the type of behaviors that are seen as ethically acceptable and how ethical problems and questions should be addressed^ (p. 208). Yeboah-Assiamah et al. (2015) discuss a leadership-ethical diffusion model with cases to explain how subordinates imitate their leaders. This model gets quantitative support in an empirical study by Mashali (2012) which sought to measure the relationship between leadership and petty corruption. The study observed a positive correlation between the two and concludes that Borgans get spoiled in a body once the head gets corrupted; the head symbolizes top-level officials and the organs are the masses^… Bcitizens will lose hope in the battle against corruption once they find that statesmen and women who are responsible for fighting corruption engage in corrupt behaviors themselves^ (p. 786). Consequently, leaders and organisational superiors need to ask themselves critical questions that will serve as an ethical toolkit before they pursue any action. Adapting a leadership ethical checklist from Jurkiewicz (2012); Jurkiewicz and Giacalone (2015) discuss an eight-point toolkit for leaders to assess their actions to enable them know whether it is desirable or undesirable [a go or no-go] (Table 1). Political will At the supra-level, the state and senior management need to exhibit adequate political will in the design as well as committing resources in enforcement and prosecution of

Author's personal copy Corruption Control Tripod Table 1 Toolkit for leadership ethicality (self-introspection) Transparency

Would I be embarrassed if my decision became a headline in the local newspaper? Would I feel confident in justifying my actions or decisions to my colleagues, subordinates, stakeholders, and the public?

Universalizability Would I want to be treated in the same manner this decision treats others? Justice

Are others’ dignity and liberty preserved by my decision? Is the basic humanity of the affected parties respected by my choices? Are the opportunities of those involved expanded or abridged?

Rights

Do my actions give full consideration to the rights, welfare, and advancement of minorities and lower-status individuals? Do my decisions benefit only those with influence but without merit?

Egoism

Are opportunities for personal gain clouding my judgment? Would I make the same decision regardless of the benefit I may receive from the outcome?

Principles

Is my decision or action consistent with my espoused principles? Are my choices consistent with the highest values to which organizations should aspire? Do they violate the spirit of any organizational policies or laws?

Utility

Does my action or decision lead to the greatest good for the greatest number or the least harm to the fewest? Can any unavoidable harmful effects be mitigated?

Social contract

Do my actions and decisions facilitate the social contract? Do they facilitate pride in the individuals affected by my actions both inside and external to the organization?

Adapted from Jurkiewicz and Giacalone (2015)

culprits. Likewise, political will is required of the state and senior officials in order to invigorate renaissance into the public sector by committing resources to offer integrity and ethics training which will help in no small way to imbibe ethics into officials. This tool is widely gaining momentum in the newly developing countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe. This has been observed by OECD (2013) that a recognition of the importance of integrity training for ensuring longer-term sustainability of anti-corruption and integrity measures is growing and that many international organisations recommend that countries boost their efforts to educate their public officials on ethics. This approach is promoted by the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) which directs countries and state actors to Bpromote education and training programmes to enable them [public officials] to meet the requirements for the correct, honourable and proper performance of public functions and that provide them with specialized and appropriate training to enhance their awareness of the risks of corruption inherent in the performance of their functions^ (UNCAC 2004, Article 7d). Pillar three: the Compelling Force Since the ‘agents’, so empowered to secure the public interest may end up stabbing the state in the back [see public choice school by Downs 1966], civil society or entire citizenry [principal] has a profound role to play [general overseers] in anti-corruption processes. Governments, in their reform processes need to empower societal actors and resource them with adequate rights and protections which will enable them to actively engage and debate in corruption control issues and expose corrupt scandals (see Johnston 1998). Any reform process or anti-corruption strategy that neglects


civil society and the ‘fertile soil’ for them to thrive is a recipe for failure or perhaps the reformers are only engaging in ‘policy cosmeticism’ [hypocrisy] where they want to allow window of opportunity to hide their corrupt deals. When driven by selfish desire [homo economicus], there is a tendency that people may not be motivated by personal ethics or even organizational systems. At its peak, these individuals form formidable network to render systems static, less potent, and act freely at the margins (Jávor and Jancsics 2013). It, therefore, takes the ‘compelling force’ to rekindle the system and force public officials to order. The role of non-state actors, especially, the media in corruption control is a formidable force that works better in exposing major scandals, more so, in cases where the formal actors have clandestinely formed a network to cover up one another. Other entities that provide a compelling force include, inter alia, public comments, Interest and pressure groups, political parties, NGOs, international organizations and think tanks. These help to promote the demand side of accountability which tends to call officials to order. The media, especially, through its ‘sunshine effect’ thrown on the public sector cannot be overemphasized. By throwing more light on them and through many [undercover journalism] setups and simulations, corruption would at a point in time become a highly risky and perhaps, unattractive transaction because of uncertainty and ‘actor asymmetry’ – [officials cannot trust a potential corrupter and would not risk transacting]. Most unethical acts are shrouded in secrecy, it takes journalists with ‘Tiger Eye’, which sees from afar, to throw sunshine on all actions and inactions transacted in the dark. Rose-Ackerman (1999) argued that corrupt behavior is a function of both the opportunity to receive bribes and the risk of detection. If the risk of being caught is low and the personal benefit is high, public workers are more likely to be susceptible to bribery (Hamilton-Hart 2001). The role of the media, which is facilitated by media freedom and democratization is imperative in corruption combat (see Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2015 on stylized game theoretic model on democratization and media freedom in corruption control; see also Brunetti and Weder 2003; Chowdhury 2004; Freille et al. 2007). For instance, Gould (1991) observes that a vigilant, well-supported, freely inquiring press provides a means for the public to monitor governmental activities including the extent of corruption in higher places; in several countries, alert newspaper professionals have helped Bbreak^ major scandals. Yeboah-Assiamah et al. (2014) maintain that development journalism, which is the extent to which the media/ press uses their role to propel socio-economic development and exposing developmentretarding tendencies is worthwhile. It has been observed that organizational systems and officials alone cannot be trusted to engender the needed ethical climate and corrupt free public sector so desired. For instance, Raudla et al. (2015) sought to assess how performance auditing reinforces improvement in organizations standards in Estonia. Of the surveyed, less than 10 % considered the process as leading to holding individuals or the audited organization accountable for any actions or inaction. It also recorded only 21 % viewing the process as leading to some form of changes in the organization after performance audit. The study observes that internal factors [the expertise of the audit team, the quality of the audit, the willingness of the auditors to engage in a dialogue during the audit process, the auditees’ agreement with the audit criteria and audit conclusions] had marginal influence to induce a corresponding change; however, the process gets catalyzed when


forged with external factors including inter alia, the media bringing up the issues to set agenda to stimulate debate, pressure from opposition parties, civil society and pressure groups gang up to put enormous oversight and compelling pressure for change inducement. The study brings out that there is a force that lies in between the willingness or unwillingness of individual officials and organizational systems. This force serves as a catalyst that brings out the best in the first two pillars ‘individual officials’ and ‘organizational systems’. It is therefore, worthwhile to conceptualize anticorruption framework as complex and interlocking systems involving basically, three broad pillars.

Conclusions In the Post-NPM era, accountability mechanisms are multifaceted; the public sector must pay attention to laws, ethics and respond to citizen interests in a collaborative approach to create public good. There is also a call to facilitate dialogue to respond to active citizenship [third force] in public value creation. This has come against a backdrop that no one sector or entity has a monopoly of public service ethos especially in dealing with complex problems (Bryson et al. 2014). This paper has discussed the complexity and growing sophistication of public sector corruption and makes a case that its prevention and control defies a simple or reductionist approach. It has also reviewed existing anti-corruption strategies mostly adopted by countries and organizations which involved inter alia, legal-administrative approaches, behavio-cultural approaches, economic approaches and technological approaches. When viewed with an isolationist lens, each of the approaches above falls short in terms of meaningfully addressing public sector corruption. I have also discussed the particular weaknesses inherent in each of the approaches and make an argument for systems thinking in corruption control. The paper, therefore, concludes that preventing, controlling and fighting corruption requires a concerted effort from organizational members, the organization itself and external actors. The corruption control tripod therefore hinges on three key modules: (i) strong personalities which requires public officials to develop their personal ethics and integrity levels for their own sake and that of the organization (ii) strong organizational institutions which requires individual public organizations to design peculiar systems and procedures that are context-dependent to propel, promote ethical conduct and integrity; to monitor, prevent and control corruption. Finally, a strong third force or active civil society [media, think tanks, opposition parties, pressure groups, NGOs] that compels the public officials to churn out virtues. Therefore, if a strong third force mediates between the public officials and organizations, there will be more strong men and women to conduct public business ethically whilst organizational systems and enforcers would be compelled to do the right thing with lesser or no room for active collusion. Developing a strong third force, however, depends on the extent to which the state provides a space and enabling environment for non-state actors to actively engage in the public administration discourse and processes of a given country. The paper, therefore, concludes that each of the three pillars, reinforces one another and should be viewed as a concerted and systems approach lest the loopholes and windows of opportunity would be high for corruption to thrive.


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Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah is a TRECCAFRICA scholar reading a Ph.D in Public and Development Management at the School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University, South Africa. Prior to this, Emmanuel had obtained an MPhil in Public Administration and also started a Ph.D. course work in Public Administration and Policy Management at the University of Ghana Business School where he also served for two years as a Graduate Research and Teaching Assistant. His areas of research and publication include public sector management and leadership, governance and institutions; decentralization and local governance; privatization and urban service delivery; collaborative governance and sustainability with focus on complexities. Emmanuel has written widely, and his papers have been published by inter alia, Sage, Emerald, Taylor & Francis, Wiley & Sons and Elsevier.