Analysis of Conceptual Metaphors in the Political Discourse of. Daily Newspapers: Structure ...... jaunt to New Hampshire. But as he campaigned with Gov. Chris.
University of Niš FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY
University of Niš FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY English Department MA Studies
Analysis of Conceptual Metaphors in the Political Discourse of Daily Newspapers: Structure, Function, and Emotional Appeal
Mihailo Antović, Ph. D.
Vladimir Figar, 39 Niš, 2013
Acknowledgment I am grateful to my mentor, Mihailo Antović, Ph.D. for his support, critical comments, and suggestions. I would also like to thank Todd Oakley, Ph.D. for his critical remarks pertaining to the first part of the present research. Additionally, I would like to express my gratitude to all of my colleagues from the English Department who participated in the second part of the research and made this study possible. Finally, I thank my family and friends for their support and patience.
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ________________________________________________________________________i 1. Introduction__________________________________________________________________________ 9 2. Theoretical Framework _______________________________________________________________ 11 2.1. Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) _________________________________________________ 11 2.1.1. Structural, Orientational, and Ontological Metaphors __________________________________ 12 2.1.2. Systematicity and Partial Nature of Metaphorical Mappings _____________________________ 12 2.1.3. Metaphorical Entailments _______________________________________________________ 13 2.1.4. Metaphor Systems and Metaphorical Coherence _____________________________________ 13 2.1.5. Image Schemas and the Reality behind Them _______________________________________ 15 2.1.6. The Invariance Principle ________________________________________________________ 16 2.1.7. Frames and ICMs _____________________________________________________________ 17 2.1.8. Conventional and Novel Metaphors________________________________________________ 18 2.1.9. Critical Metaphor Analysis (CMA) _________________________________________________ 19 2.1.10. Metaphor and Politics _________________________________________________________ 20 2.1.11. Section Summary ____________________________________________________________ 23 2.2. Conceptual Blending Theory (CBT) _________________________________________________ 24 2.2.1. Mental Spaces and Backstage Cognition ___________________________________________ 24 2.2.2. Conceptual Blending ___________________________________________________________ 26 2.2.3. The Generic Space Problem _____________________________________________________ 27 2.2.3. Vital Relations ________________________________________________________________ 29 2.2.4. Compression _________________________________________________________________ 31 2.2.5. Optimality Principles ___________________________________________________________ 33 2.2.6. Basic Types of Conceptual Integration Networks _____________________________________ 35 220.127.116.11. Single-scope Networks______________________________________________________ 35 18.104.22.168. Double-scope Networks _____________________________________________________ 37 2.2.7. CBT and Metaphor ____________________________________________________________ 39 2.2.8. CMT vs. CBT: Towards a Unitary Framework ________________________________________ 41 2.2.9. Taking a Slightly Different Turn: The Coded Meaning Model ____________________________ 43 2.2.10. Section Summary ____________________________________________________________ 45 2.3. Affect and Emotions ______________________________________________________________ 46 2.3.1. Emotion Concepts _____________________________________________________________ 46 2.3.2. Affect _______________________________________________________________________ 47 22.214.171.124. The Circumplex Model of Affect _______________________________________________ 47 126.96.36.199. The PANAS Model _________________________________________________________ 49 188.8.131.52. The Core Affect Model ______________________________________________________ 51 184.108.40.206.1. Core Affect and Cognition________________________________________________ 52 2.3.3. The Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion_____________________________________________ 53 2.3.4. Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion and Conceptual Blending Theory: Points of Intersection____ 55
2.3.5. Affect, Emotions, Media, and Politics ______________________________________________ 57 2.3.6. Section Summary _____________________________________________________________ 58 3. Previous Research ___________________________________________________________________ 59 3.1. CMT Framework _________________________________________________________________ 59 3.2. CBT Framework__________________________________________________________________ 60 3.3. Political Psychology ______________________________________________________________ 63 3.4. Section Summary ________________________________________________________________ 63 4. Present Research ____________________________________________________________________ 65 4.1. Present Research: Part 1 __________________________________________________________ 66 4.1.1. Corpus and Methodology________________________________________________________ 66 4.1.2. Corpus Analysis and Discussion __________________________________________________ 67 220.127.116.11.1. Structure of CONFLICT Metaphors __________________________________________ 68 18.104.22.168.2. Systematicity of Emergent Structure in CONFLICT Metaphors _____________________ 85 22.214.171.124.3. Function and Emotional Appeal of CONFLICT Metaphors_________________________ 88 126.96.36.199.4. Metaphor Systems and Metaphor Interaction _________________________________ 89 188.8.131.52. SPORT Metaphors __________________________________________________________ 91 184.108.40.206.1. Structure of SPORT Metaphors_____________________________________________ 91 220.127.116.11.2. Systematicity of Emergent Structure in SPORT Metaphors ______________________ 105 18.104.22.168.3. Function and Emotional Appeal of SPORT Metaphors __________________________ 107 22.214.171.124.4. Metaphor Systems and Metaphor Interaction ________________________________ 108 126.96.36.199. Network Optimization in CONFLICT and SPORT Metaphors___________________________ 110 4.2. Present Research: Part 2 _________________________________________________________ 114 4.2.1. Questionnaire 1: Results and Discussion __________________________________________ 116 188.8.131.52. Scale Reliability __________________________________________________________ 116 184.108.40.206. Assumptions Required for the Application of Parametric Tests _____________________ 117 220.127.116.11. Means and One-Sample T-Test ______________________________________________ 118 4.2.2. Questionnaire 2: Results and Discussion __________________________________________ 119 18.104.22.168. Scale Reliability __________________________________________________________ 119 22.214.171.124. Means and One-Sample T-Test ______________________________________________ 120 4.2.3. Questionnaires 1 and 2: Comparison of Findings ____________________________________ 122 4.2.4. Questionnaire 3: Results and Discussion __________________________________________ 124 126.96.36.199. Scale Reliability __________________________________________________________ 124 188.8.131.52. Means and One-Sample T-Test ______________________________________________ 124 4.2.5. Questionnaire 4: Results and Discussion __________________________________________ 125 184.108.40.206. Scale Reliability __________________________________________________________ 125 220.127.116.11. Means and One-Sample T-Test ______________________________________________ 126 4.2.6. Questionnaires 3 and 4: Comparison of Findings ____________________________________ 128 5. General Discussion _________________________________________________________________ 131 5.1. Research Questions 1 through 6___________________________________________________ 131 5.2. Research Questions 7 and 8 ______________________________________________________ 134 5.3. Parts 1 and 2 of the Present Research – Points of Intersection__________________________ 135 5.4. Additional Remarks _____________________________________________________________ 139 5.5. Section Summary _______________________________________________________________ 141 6. Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research ______________________________________ 142 References __________________________________________________________________________ 144
Appendix B – Questionnaire 2 __________________________________________________________ 152 Appendix C – Questionnaire 3 __________________________________________________________ 154 Appendix D - Questionnaire 4 ___________________________________________________________ 156
“Metaphor is a solar eclipse. It hides the object of study and at the same time reveals some of its most salient and interesting characteristics when viewed through the right telescope.” (Paivio & Walsh, 1993: 307)
Analysis of Conceptual Metaphors in the Political Discourse of Daily Newspapers: Structure, Function, and Emotional Appeal
Abstract: The present paper explores the structure, function, and the potential of conceptual metaphors in the political discourse of daily newspapers to provoke an emotional reaction with the electorate, i.e. readers. The two groups of metaphors that are investigated include CONFLICT and SPORT metaphors. Consequently, the corpus consists of metaphorical expressions corresponding to the two previously mentioned conceptual keys, extracted from the on-line editions of The New York Times during December 2011. The paper resides on an integrated theoretical framework that encompasses the basic tenets of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), the fully developed model of the Conceptual Blending Theory (CBT), and the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion. Additionally, basic tenets of the Circumplex Model of Affect and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) are also utilized. The present research is conducted in two stages: 1) metaphorical expressions from the corpus are analyzed in terms of their structure and function through the concomitant use of the CMT and CBT models; 2) building on the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion, Russell’s circumplex, and the PANAS model, the second stage of the research uses appropriate questionnaires to test whether the metaphorical expressions extracted from the corpus can provoke an actual tangible emotional reaction with the experimental subjects. The reaction is measured in terms of affect, and in terms of specific emotion concepts. Such research design is meant to reveal both the cognitive mechanisms that underlie the construction of metaphorical conceptual integration networks, and the mechanisms that facilitate the development of an emotional response. Furthermore, the results obtained from the two parts of the present research are compared and investigated for potential points of intersection. Additionally, the results of the present study are also compared against the results obtained from the previous research in the field, predominantly conducted within the CMT framework. Finally, the paper also presents additional evidence in favor of the joint use of the CMT and the CBT frameworks. Based on the analyses, it can be concluded that all metaphorical conceptual integration networks from the present corpus appeared as single-scope networks. Additionally, a high degree of systematicity of emergent structures was also recorded, which was accounted for by the highly entrenched nature of the two conceptual keys, and links were established with the systematic nature of compression. The two main cognitive mechanisms that facilitate the creation of an emotional reaction are backward projections and coupled elaboration, which in turn enable metaphors to function as powerful persuasive tools. The second part of the research revealed that metaphorical expressions from the corpus can provoke a certain degree of an emotional response with the readers, i.e. experimental subjects. In addition,
vi the recorded reactions also showed a certain degree of consistency. In conclusion, metaphor poses as a powerful rhetorical tool that can influence individuals’ reasoning and behavior by influencing their emotional and affective states. Future research should attempt to further reveal the nature of interaction between the processes of meaning and emotion construction. Key words: conceptual metaphor, conceptual blending, compression, emergent structure, network optimization, human scale, political discourse of daily newspapers, emotional response, affect
Analiza konceptualnih metafora u političkom diskursu dnevnih novina: struktura, funkcija i emocionalni efekat Apstrakt: Ovo istraživanje bavi se strukturom, funkcijom i sposobnošću konceptualnih metafora u političkom diskursu dnevnih novina da izazovu emocionalnu reakciju kod publike. Dve grupe metafora koje će u radu biti analizirane uključuju metafore KONFLIKTA i SPORTSKE metafore. Shodno tome, korpus se sastoji od metaforičkih izraza koji odgovaraju prethodno spomenutim konceptualnim ključevima (conceptual keys) koji su dobijeni iz onlajn izdanja dnevnih novina New York Times tokom decembra meseca 2011. godine. Rad je zasnovan na teorijskom modelu koji obuhvata osnovne smernice teorije konceptualne metafore Lejkofa i Džonsona (Conceptual Metaphor Theory), teoriju konceptualnog stapanja Fokonijea i Tarnera (Conceptual Blending Theory) i teoriju emocija kao konceptualnog čina (Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion). Pored toga, rad se delimično oslanja i na Raselov cirkumpleksni model afekta (Circumplex Model of Affect), kao i na PANAS model (Positive and Negative Affect Schedule). Istraživanje je obavljeno u dve etape: 1) analiza strukture i funkcije metaforičkih izraza iz korpusa kroz teorijski model teorije konceptualne metafore i teorije konceptualnog stapanja; 2) druga etapa istraživanja oslanja se na odgovarajuće upitnike posredstvom kojih se ispituje da li metaforički izrazi iz korpusa mogu da izazovu ’opipljivu’ emocionalnu reakciju kod učesnika u istraživanju. Ova reakcija meri se u odnosu na afekat i u odnosu na konkretne koncepte koji opisuju emocije (emotion concepts). Ovakav nacrt istraživanja ima za cilj da otkrije kognitivne mehanizme koji omogućavaju formiranje metaforičkih mreža konceptualne integracije, kao i mehanizme koji omogućavaju razvoj emocionalne reakcije. Takođe, rezultati dobijeni u dve etape ovog istraživanja biće upoređeni najpre međusobno, a potom sa rezultatima prethodnih istraživanja iz ove oblasti. Pored toga, ovo istraživanje će pokušati da predstavi dodatne argumente u prilog zajedničkoj upotrebi teorije konceptualne metafore i teorije konceptualnog stapanja. Na osnovu rezultata analize korpusa može se zaključiti da su se sve metaforičke mreže konceptualne integracije pojavljivale kao mreže jednostrukog opsega. Pored toga, ustanovljen je i visok stepen sistematičnosti u formama emergentnih strucktura, što je objašnjeno visokim nivoom konvencionalnosti konceptualnih ključeva. Takođe, uspostavljena je i veza između sistematičnosti u formi emergentnih struktura i sistematske prirode kompresije. Dva glavna kognitivna mehanizma koji omogućavaju izazivanje emocionalne reakcije su projekcije unazad (backward projections) i uparena elaboracija (coupled elaboration). Ovi mehanizmi takođe omogućavaju metaforama da obavljaju svoju retoričku funkciju. Drugi deo istraživanja otkrio je da metaforički izrazi iz korpusa zaista mogu da izazovu određeni stepen emocionalne reakcije kod ispitanika. Pored toga, zabeležene reakcije takođe su pokazale određeni stepen doslednosti. Na osnovu rezultata dobijenih u ovom istraživanju može se zaključiti da metafora predstavlja moćno retoričko oružje koje može uticati na rezonovanje i ponašanje pojedinaca tako što utiče na njihovo
8 afektivno i emocionalno stanje. Dalja istraživanja trebala bi da otkriju više detalja o prirodi interakcije između procesa konstrukcije značenja i konstrukcije emocionalnog iskustva. Ključne reči: konceptualna metafora, konceptualno stapanje, kompresija, emergentna struktura, optimizacija mreža, politički diskurs dnevnih novina, emocionalna reakcija, afekat
1. Introduction With the onset of cognitive linguistics, metaphor was transformed from a once anomalous phenomenon, to an indispensable asset in the human cognitive arsenal. Additionally, cognitive linguists claim language to be a function of our cognitive systems, rather than an inborn capacity waiting to unravel, rendering it largely dependent on the bodily experience of the world around us (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a; 2003[1980b]; Lakoff, 1991; 2006; Saeed, 2003; Evans & Green, 2006; Gibbs & Colston, 2006; Mandler, 1992; 2012). In other words, “cognitive semanticists take the view that we have no access to a reality independent of human categorization” (Saeed, 2003: 344), which means that “our conceptual system ... plays a central role in defining our realities” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003[1980b]: 3). Bearing in mind that “our ordinary conceptual system ... is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003[1980b]: 3), it is easy to understand how important conceptual metaphor is in everyday communication. The main aim of the present research will be to explore the structure and function of conceptual metaphors in the political discourse of daily newspapers. Additionally, the paper will also investigate whether these metaphors can in fact provoke an actual, tangible emotional response with the readers. In that sense, the present research will be divided into two integral parts. The results obtained from these two stages of the research will be then compared and investigated for potential points of intersection. The specifics pertaining to the theoretical framework, corpus construction, and the methodologies used in the analyses are described in more detail in sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 4.1, and 4.2. The paragraphs below provide a general overview of the structure of the paper, as well as the information pertaining to the content of its main sections. The paper will begin with the introduction of the theoretical framework (section 2) on which the present research will be grounded. Section 2.1 will introduce the basic notions pertaining to the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), and it will also address some attention to the notions of image schemas (subsection 2.1.5), and frames and ICMs (subsection 2.1.7), which will be essential for further analyses. Furthermore, subsection 2.1.9 will introduce the basic elements of the Critical Metaphor Analysis as presented in Charteris-Black (2004), while subsection 2.1.10 will be dealing more explicitly with the role of conceptual metaphors in political discourse. Section 2.2 will in turn introduce the theoretical framework of the Conceptual Blending Theory (CBT) as presented in Fauconnier and Turner (2002; 2006). Namely, the section will open with the discussion of the basic tenets of the Mental Space Theory (Fauconnier, 1994; 1997; 2007), after which it will proceed to its logical sequel – the CBT model. The discussion of the CBT model will include some important notions that will later be utilized in the analyses of the examples from the corpus. Some of these theoretical concepts encompass the notions of vital relations, compressions, systematic nature of compression, optimality principles, and single- and double-scope networks. Subsection 2.2.8 will pay special attention to the relationship between
the CMT and the CBT model, and it will foreground the arguments in favor of the joint use of the two theoretical frameworks. In summary, sections 2.1 and 2.2 will comprise an integrated theoretical framework that will be used in the first part of the present research. In addition to the now canonical blending model of Fauconnier and Turner (2002), subsection 2.2.9 will also present an outline of a more recent blending framework, the Coded Meaning Model introduced by Coulson and Oakley (2005). Section 2.3 will be dealing with the theoretical framework that will be used in the second part of the present research. Namely, this section will introduce the basic elements of the Circumplex Model of Affect (Russell, 1980), the PANAS model (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), and the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion (Barrett, 2006; Lindquist & Barrett, 2008). Additionally, the constructs of core affect (Russell, 2003) and situated conceptualizations (Barsalou, 2009) will also be briefly discussed, owing to their intrinsic link to the Conceptual Act Theory. Following the introduction of the theoretical framework, section 3 will present some relevant results from the previous research, which will be followed by section 4 that will introduce the present research and the main research questions that this paper will attempt to answer. The present research will consist of two parts. The first part, described in section 4.1, will be dealing with corpus analysis using the combined theoretical model of the CMT and the CBT frameworks. Such an approach is expected to provide a thorough insight into both the cognitive mechanisms that underlie the construction of metaphorical conceptual integration networks, and the social functions that metaphors perform in the political discourse of daily newspapers and mechanisms that facilitate those functions. Examples from the corpus will be organized around the two main conceptual keys – CONFLICT and SPORT. Section 4.2 will introduce the second part of the present research which was designed to determine whether conceptual metaphors from the political discourse of daily newspapers can provoke an actual tangible emotional reaction with the experimental subjects. For that purpose two types of questionnaires were designed. Type-one questionnaires were developed to measure the affective response in terms of valence and arousal, while type-two questionnaires were developed to measure the emotional reaction in terms of more specific emotion concepts presented in the form of a checklist with 4 positive and 4 negative emotion concepts. In addition to the initial discussions of the obtained results, performed in sections 4.1 and 4.2, section 5 will provide a comprehensive overview of the results obtained in both parts of the present research. Namely, this section begins with an elaborate discussion of the main research questions (subsections 5.1 and 5.2), followed by an in-depth comparison of findings from the two parts of the present research (subsection 5.3). Subsection 5.4 presents additional arguments in favor of the concomitant use of the CMT and the CBT models, and once again highlights the points of intersection between the CBT model and the Conceptual Act Theory, which license the construction of the fully developed human scale experience. Finally, the paper closes with section 6 which provides a short overview of the most important findings from the current research, along with their implications for future research.
2. Theoretical Framework The current section will outline the structure of the theoretical framework that will be used in the paper. Namely, this will encompass the CMT model, the CBT model, the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion, Russell’s circumplex, and the PANAS model. Some additional theoretical constructs, such as core affect and situated conceptualizations, essential for the understanding of the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion will also be discussed.
2.1. Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) Instead of viewing metaphor as a purely linguistic phenomenon, cognitive scientists understand it as “a pattern of conceptual association” (Grady, 2007: 188) that can also be expressed in a nonverbal manner. In other words, “the locus of metaphor is not in language ... but in the way we conceptualize one mental domain in terms of another” (Lakoff, 2006: 185). In line with such an interpretation, Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) proposes that “the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003[1980b]: 5). With regard to its structure, conceptual metaphor is characterized by unidirectional systematic partial mappings from the source to the target domain (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003[1980b]; Lakoff, 2006; Saeed, 2003; Evans & Green, 2006; Kövecses, 2006; 2010). In CMT, the term domain refers to “a body of knowledge that organizes related concepts” (Evans & Green, 2006: 190), where “the source is a more physical, and the target a more abstract kind of domain” (Kövecses, 2006: 117). This implies that metaphor facilitates the understanding of target domains that are normally more vague and abstract, via source domains that are more tangible and concrete. Additionally, the unidirectional nature of metaphorical cross-domain mappings suggests that metaphors “provoke the listener to transfer features from the source to the target” (Saeed, 2003: 350), or in other words asymmetrically. While such a cognitive mechanism is of tremendous value when it comes, for example, to learning strategies, it also has one major setback. Namely, “metaphor highlights certain features while suppressing others” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003[1980b]: 141), which suggests that some aspects of a concept will necessarily remain hidden. In turn, “various metaphorical structurings of a concept serve different purposes by highlighting different aspects of the concept” (ibid.: 96). Although this can be harmless in some cases, it can also be used as a strategy that enables a ‘silent’ introduction of entire belief and value systems. Whatever the case, perhaps the greatest appeal to metaphor is situated in the fact that it goes on largely undetected.
Conceptual Metaphor Theory
2.1.1. Structural, Orientational, and Ontological Metaphors Lakoff and Johnson (1980a; 2003[1980b]) provided a basic classification of conceptual metaphors that includes structural, orientational, and ontological metaphors. Structural metaphors represent “cases where one concept is metaphorically structured in terms of another” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003[1980b]: 14), and “the source domain provides a relatively rich knowledge structure for the target concept” (Kövecses, 2010: 37). For example, the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR provides one instance of a structural metaphor, where the concept of argument is structured relative to the concept of war. The cross-domain mappings involved in this metaphor do not only account for the meaning of its individual linguistic realizations (i.e. metaphorical expressions), but also for the understanding of the concept of an argument and its essence. Orientational metaphors “give a concept a spatial orientation” (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003[1980b]: 14), which has a strong experiential basis grounded in both physical and cultural experience. In other words, these metaphors “structure concepts linearly, orienting them with respect to nonmetaphorical linear orientations” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a: 195). Lakoff and Johnson (2003[1980b]: 14-21) list the following pairs of orientational metaphors:
HAPPY IS UP – SAD IS DOWN; CONSCIOUS IS UP – UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN; MORE IS UP –
LESS IS DOWN; GOOD IS UP – BAD IS DOWN;
etc. According to these examples, it is obvious that upward orientation
is coupled with a positive evaluation, whereas downward orientation is coupled with a negative one. This suggests that target concepts in orientational metaphors are structured in a coherent and uniform manner (Kövecses, 2010). Equivalent examples can be provided for center - periphery, left - right, front – back, near – far, and other orientations. Ontological metaphors “involve the projection of entity or substance status on something that does not have that status inherently” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a: 196). In other words, “ontological metaphors enable us to see more sharply delineated structure where there is very little or none” (Kövecses, 2010: 39). This means that ontological metaphors such as
INFLATION IS AN ENTITY, THE MIND IS A MACHINE, THE MIND IS A BRITTLE
OBJECT, THE MIND IS A CONTAINER, COUNTRY IS A CONTAINER, RACE IS A CONTAINER, THEORY IS A LIVING ENTITY, and INFLATION IS A LIVING ENTITY
(Lakoff & Johnson, 2003[1980b]: 25-34), enable us to make sense of some more
abstract, intangible concepts, by relying on our experiences with physical objects. This is particularly transparent in the case of the CONTAINER metaphor, which is largely based on the experience of our bodies as containers. 2.1.2. Systematicity and Partial Nature of Metaphorical Mappings The fact that a concept is structured by a metaphor means “it is partially structured and that it can be extended in some ways but not in others” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003[1980b]: 13), and, in addition, such
Conceptual Metaphor Theory
“metaphorical structuring of a concept is necessarily partial” (ibid.: 52). This, coupled with the fact that “concepts are metaphorically structured in a systematic way” (ibid.: 52), means that expressions from the source domain can be used to refer to concepts in the target domain. Additionally, due to its systematicity, “features of the source and target domain are joined so that the metaphor may be extended or have its internal logic” (Saeed, 2003: 348). Let us consider the metaphor
ARGUMENT IS WAR, discussed
in Lakoff and Johnson
(2003[1980b]: 4-6). Namely, conceptualizing arguments in terms of war sanctions the use of vocabulary such as attack, defense, victory, and defeat, to talk about arguments. The systematicity of this metaphor allows us to talk about interlocutors as opponents who can win an argument, succumb to the attacks, or lose a battle. Still, such systematicity is necessarily paired with the partial nature of metaphorical mappings, suggesting that not everything is projected from the source to the target. In other words, the partial nature of metaphorical mappings necessarily involves a certain degree of highlighting and hiding (Lakoff & Johnson (2003[1980b]; Kövecses, 2010). 2.1.3. Metaphorical Entailments Another important element in the CMT framework includes metaphorical entailments, which refer to rich additional knowledge structures about the source domain that are transferred to the target domain in the process of cross-domain mapping (Evans & Green, 2006; Kövecses, 2010). In other words, “since metaphorical concepts are defined in terms of nonmetaphorical concepts, they show entailment relations parallel to those for the corresponding nonmetaphorical concepts” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a: 197). Owing to the fact that “metaphoric mappings carry entailments or rich inferences” (Evans & Green, 2006: 298), it is possible to use additional knowledge about the source domain in order to make sense of some possible features of the target domain (Kövecses, 2010). As suggested by Evans and Green (2006: 299), and Kövecses (2010: 122), beside the conventional mappings for the metaphor
ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY,
additional knowledge can also be inferred: travelers can stray from the path, be forced to take a break, get lost, not reach their destination, etc. Consequently, interlocutors can stray from the subject, be forced to abandon the discussion, be unable to make their point, or be unable to reach an agreement. This suggests that the association that exists between the source and the target domain makes it possible for the events that normally occur in the source to occur in the target as well. 2.1.4. Metaphor Systems and Metaphorical Coherence An important aspect of metaphors is that they can interact with each other and yield elaborate metaphor systems constructed out of individual conceptual metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003[1980b]; Evans & Green, 2006). Metaphor systems represent groups of conceptual metaphors that offer partial structurings of
Conceptual Metaphor Theory
a concept, and they can be understood as instantiations of one general conceptual metaphor situated at the highest point in the hierarchy, where ”metaphors higher up in the hierarchy tend to be more widespread than those mappings at lower levels” (Lakoff, 2006: 209-210). One of the metaphor systems discussed in Kövecses (2010: 149-167) includes the Event Structure Metaphor which accounts for the metaphorical understanding of events. Namely, Lakoff (2006) found that different aspects of event structure are defined in metaphorical terms, and consequently proposed the general mapping for the Event Structure Metaphor: − − − − − − − −
States are locations (bounded regions in space). Changes are movements (into or out of bounded regions). Causes are forces. Actions are self-propelled movements. Purposes are destinations. Means are paths (to destinations). Difficulties are impediments to motion. Expected progress is a travel schedule; a schedule is a virtual traveler, who reaches prearranged destinations at prearranged times. − External events are large, moving objects. − Long term, purposeful activities are journeys. (Lakoff, 2006: 204)
These individual submappings are understood to constitute the more general Event Structure Metaphor. In addition, each submapping maintains its entailments. For example, Changes are Movements entails that “lack of control over change is viewed as lack of control over movement” (Kövecses, 2010: 164), and “that accidental changes are conceptualized as accidental movements” (ibid.: 164). Metaphors and
ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY
LIFE IS A JOURNEY
are also said to inherit their structure from the more general Event Structure
Metaphor (Evans & Green, 2006). In this sense, the existence of mappings lower in the hierarchy is sanctioned by the general metaphor. Various metaphors used to describe the concept of argument also emphasize different aspects of that concept. The involvement of source domains of
WAR, JOURNEY, CONTAINER,
and BUILDING is possible owing to
the overlapping of purposes that underlie their use. Additionally, this overlapping of purposes also means that these metaphors are coherent. For example, Lakoff and Johnson (2003[1980b]: 94) suggest that metaphorical coherence between the conceptual metaphors
ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY
ARGUMENT IS A CONTAINER
from the overlap of entailments between them, which also leads to “a partial satisfaction of their purposes” (ibid.: 95). Namely, the overlaps in purposes underlying the use of specific metaphors that correspond to the overlaps in metaphors “can be characterized in terms of shared metaphorical entailments” (ibid.: 97). Specifically, the overlap between these two metaphors resides in the fact that both journeys and containers define surfaces. This represents the case of coherence between two aspects of a single concept. When it comes to complex coherence across metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson (2003[1980b]: 97-105) discussed the following metaphors: BUILDING.
ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY, ARGUMENT IS A CONTAINER,
ARGUMENT IS A
The authors suggest that the coherence between these metaphors is again “based on the fact that
all three have content-defining surfaces” (ibid.: 102). However, content is defined differently by a surface in
Conceptual Metaphor Theory
each of the cases. Namely, in JOURNEY metaphors, content is defined by the ground covered by an argument; in
metaphors, the content is limited by the surface of the container; in
content is not inside the building, but in its foundation and the outer shell. In all, these three metaphors “are part of whole metaphorical systems that together serve the complex purpose of characterizing the concept of an argument in all of its aspects” (ibid.: 105). Owing to the overlap in their entailments, they are also coherent. 2.1.5. Image Schemas and the Reality behind Them In line with the notion of embodied cognition and the emphasis on the importance of categorization, cognitive linguists have introduced the notion of image schemas, where “an image schema is a condensed redescription of perceptual experience for the purpose of mapping spatial structure onto conceptual structure” (Oakley, 2007: 215). In other words, image schemas represent preconceptual structures derived from everyday patterns of bodily interaction that provide the scaffolding for the complex conceptual systems that govern human cognition. Lakoff (1990) tackled the issue of the relationship between abstract reasoning and image schemas, and suggested that “a great many, if not all abstract inferences are actually metaphorical versions of spatial inferences that are inherent in the topological structure of image schemas” (ibid.: 54). In addition, image schemas “can be extended by a process of metaphorical extension into abstract domains” (Saeed, 2003: 355), such as politics. Johnson (1987: 126, cited in Oakley, 2007: 217) offered the following list of basic image schemas: CONTAINER, BALANCE, COMPULSION, BLOCKAGE, COUNTERFORCE, RESTRAINT REMOVAL, ENABLEMENT, ATTRACTION, MASS-COUNT, PATH, LINK, CENTER-PERIPHERY, CYCLE, NEAR-FAR, SCALE, PART-WHOLE, MERGING, SPLITTING, FULLEMPTY, MATCHING, SUPERIMPOSITION, ITERATION, CONTACT, PROCESS, SURFACE, OBJECT, COLLECTION.
image schemas can undergo transformations that are also very important, since human cognition is grounded in the notion that allows us to map the perceptual experience licensed by image schemas onto more abstract conceptual categories (Oakley, 2007; Gibbs & Colston, 2006). The primary transformations include (ibid.): − Path focus to end-point focus (to understand this transformation, follow an imaginary path of an object, and then focus on the point where the object comes to rest, or where it will come to rest). − Multiplex to mass (imagine a group of individual objects, and then start moving away from them. As you are doing this, note how the group is slowly transformed into a homogenous mass. As you begin to move back towards them, the mass is transformed into individual objects). − Trajectory (if we observe a moving object, we can mentally trace its path). − Superimposition (if we imagine a large sphere and a small cube, we can mentally enlarge the size of the cube so that it can accommodate the sphere; we can then reduce the size of the cube so that it fits the inside of the sphere).
The role of image schemas has also been emphasized in the developmental context (e.g. Mandler, 1992; 2012), where it is claimed that “image schemas provide the earliest meaning available to the infant for purposes of preverbal thought ... and form the basis on which natural language rests” (Mandler, 1992: 592).
Conceptual Metaphor Theory
This in turn prompted the author to label image schemas as conceptual primitives, where she defines them as “dynamic analog representations of spatial relations and movements in space” (ibid.: 591), where “these new representations are the primitive meaning elements used to form accessible concepts” (ibid.: 591). In addition, Mandler (2012) gives an in-depth analysis of the reasons why the conceptual system is grounded in spatial experience. Namely, the author presents the following evidence to support her claims: spatial movement is very salient and can easily attract attention; it is easily understandable; a fully operational conceptual system for making sense of objects and events can be formed based on spatial representations alone; spatial representations have a clear structure that renders them memorable; spatial representations can be imaged, which means that they can be recalled. Gibbs and Colston (2006) presented evidence for the cognitive psychological reality of image schemas and their transformations, based on the research results from the fields of psycholinguistics, cognitive psychology, and developmental psychology. In the psycholinguistic context, the authors discussed research conducted by Gibbs et al. (1994, cited in Gibbs & Colston, 2006: 243-246), where it was found that “people make sense of different uses of stand because of their tacit understanding of several image schemas that arise partly from the ordinary bodily experience of standing” (Gibbs & Colston, 2006: 245). One of the most interesting findings in the domain of cognitive psychology pertains to the visual and auditory representational momentum that is also explained in terms of image schemas and their transformations (see Gibbs & Colston, 2006: 248-253 for details). One of the examples in the area of developmental psychology includes a study conducted by Wagner et al. (1981, cited in Gibbs & Colston, 2006: 259), where it was found that nine to 12-month-old infants spent more time looking at the dotted line than the solid line when a pulsating tone was played, which suggested that the infants were able to construct a metaphorical match. Also, when listening to a rising tone, the infants looked more at the arrow pointing upward, whereas when listening to a descending tone they spent more time looking at the arrow pointing downward. All of these findings suggest that image schemas are not fictional derivatives, but actual constructs that not only enable us to make sense of the world, but are also monumental for our ability to establish connections between more abstract domains of experience. 2.1.6. The Invariance Principle An important aspect of the CMT includes restrictions that constrain certain cross-domain mappings, while at the same time licensing others. For example, in the case of generic-level metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson (1989, cited in Lakoff, 1990: 68-69) found that death was personified in a rather small number of linguistic realizations. The investigation of such constraints first gave way to the Invariance Hypothesis (Lakoff, 1990) that later evolved into the Invariance Principle (Lakoff, 2006): “Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (this is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain” (ibid.: 199).
Conceptual Metaphor Theory
Obviously, the Invariance Principle is largely grounded in the notion that stresses the importance of image-schematic structures in human cognition. In plain terms, the metaphorical cross-domain mappings make the source and the target domain structures consistent with each other, explaining why some pairs of source-target domains are facilitated, while others are restricted. When viewed at the image-schematic level, the Invariance Principle suggests that in the case of container schemas “interiors will be mapped onto interiors, exteriors onto exteriors, and boundaries onto boundaries” (ibid.: 199). Similar conclusions can be derived for other types of schemas. In addition, the Invariance Principle also implies that a metaphor will allow the transfer of only those metaphorical entailments that are compatible with the target domain. This is labeled as the target domain override and it represents the process “that prevents entailments from projecting to the target domain” (Evans & Green, 2006: 303), which is “a consequence of the fact that inherent target domain structure automatically limits what can be mapped” (Lakoff, 2006: 200). In short, metaphorical mappings are constructed in such a fashion that preserves the basic topology of the target domain, i.e. the image schematic structure of the target domain is invariant. 2.1.7. Frames and ICMs Charles Fillmore introduced the notion of frames, where a frame refers to “any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits” (Fillmore, 2006: 373), or, in other words, “a frame is a structured mental representation of a conceptual category” (Kövecses, 2006: 64). In this sense, the term frame is intimately related to word meaning, and in Fillmore’s frame semantics “words represent categorization of experience” (Fillmore, 2006: 373). This promotes the view according to which word meaning is largely conditioned by the perceptual experience and is related to a set of prototypes. In addition to prototypicality effects, the frame against which a word meaning is understood is also grounded in cultural experience (Kövecses, 2006). For example, let us consider the COMMERCIAL EVENT frame as discussed in Fillmore (2006: 378). Namely, this frame includes the following elements: the buyer, the seller, the goods, and the money. Furthermore, this frame can be invoked through the use of various verbs, and specific verbs can even be used to place focus on certain elements of the frame, while backgrounding others, which is reminiscent of Lakoff and Johnson’s (2003[1980b]) notion of highlighting and hiding. The verb buy, for example, places the focus on the buyer and the goods, the verb sell places the focus on the seller and the goods, etc. This suggests that understanding the meaning of these verbs requires the recruitment of the COMMERCIAL EVENT frame. In short, “a speaker ‘applies’ a frame to a situation, and shows that he intends this frame to be applied by using words recognized as grounded in such a frame” (ibid.: 382).
Conceptual Metaphor Theory
Based on the research conducted by Fillmore, Kövecses (2006: 67-69) presented some additional characteristics of frames: 1) frames are evoked by particular meanings of words; 2) focus can be placed on particular elements of a frame; 3) frames can be used to impose a perspective on a situation; 4) frames provide a particular history; 5) some frames incorporate larger cultural frames; 6) frames are idealizations. In turn, all of the mentioned characteristics contribute to the view that “frames constitute a huge and complex system of knowledge about the world” (ibid.: 69). Building on Eleanor Rosch’s Prototype Theory, George Lakoff (1987, cited in Evans & Green, 2006: 269-281) introduced the notion of Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs) to account for prototypicality effects. In this sense, ICMs represent “relatively stable knowledge structures that are built up on the basis of repeated experience” (Evans & Green, 2006: 279), and “they are ‘idealized’ because they abstract across a range of experiences rather than representing specific instances of a given experience” (ibid.: 270). In plain terms, ICMs are recruited during online processing in order to help us make sense of the conversation. Owing to their connection to typicality effects, ICMs stand as an essential tool for categorizing the world around us. Additionally, ICMs are not innate, but rather emergent structures that arise from experience and everyday interaction with the world and objects in it. Their connection to various levels of prototypicality renders them idealized, in that they are connected to the most general and most abstract representations. In other words, “the models are idealized, in that they involve an abstraction, through perceptual and conceptual processes, from the complexities of the physical world” (Cienki, 2007: 176). In addition, the degree of prototypicality is often connected to the level of conventionality, suggesting the existence of a cultural basis, similar to that of frames. In summary, what both frames and ICMs have in common is the fact that “they all designate a coherent organization of human experience” (Kövecses, 2006: 64). 2.1.8. Conventional and Novel Metaphors Charteris-Black (2004) emphasizes the distinction between conventional and novel (creative) metaphors. Namely, conventional metaphors “reflect a diachronic process whereby use that was originally ‘metaphorical’ becomes established as ‘literal’ within a language” (Charteris-Black, 2004: 17). In other words, conventional metaphors are licensed by the entrenched conceptual associations. Additionally, a novel metaphor can easily become conventionalized through an increased frequency of use, which serves as the main marker of the degree of metaphor conventionality when analyzing language corpora. However, although a conventional metaphor may not stand out in discourse in a way that a novel metaphor might, this in no way undermines its value and potential. In fact, its ability to go on unnoticed renders it a potent tool for perception management and manipulation, especially in political discourse.
Conceptual Metaphor Theory
In terms of differences in interpretation between conventional and novel metaphors, Coulson and Oakley (2005: 1524) argue that conventional, i.e. entrenched metaphors, involve an automatic process of retrieval, whereas novel metaphors require additional computations and analogical reasoning. This means that the emergent structure 1 in novel metaphors needs to be actively constructed, while in the case of entrenched metaphors it is already available for recruitment. Another important point that needs to be stressed concerns the distinction between a conceptual metaphor and a metaphorical expression. Namely, the term ‘metaphor’ is used “to refer to the conceptual mapping, and the term ’metaphorical expression’ to refer to an individual linguistic expression ... that is sanctioned by a mapping” (Lakoff, 2006: 192). In other words, “metaphorical expressions are the linguistic manifestation of underlying conceptual knowledge” (Coulson, 2006b: 33), which reflects the idea that “metaphor is not just a matter of language, but of thought and reason” (Lakoff, 1990: 49), where language is seen as “a reflection of the mapping” (ibid.: 49). In this sense, a conventional metaphor can be understood as an entrenched trigger that fires out individual metaphorical expressions. 2.1.9. Critical Metaphor Analysis (CMA) Given the ubiquitous nature of metaphors in everyday life, recognizing them and understanding the factors that underlie their use in various types of discourse is essential. This necessity becomes even more transparent when the potential for ideological manipulation typical of political discourse is taken into consideration. Charteris-Black (2004: 243-253) outlines the basic tenets of Critical Metaphor Analysis (CMA), and stresses that “an awareness of their [metaphors’] motivation in socially influential domains of language use improves our understanding of the ideological basis for metaphor choice” (ibid.: 244). Bearing in mind that the process of cross-domain metaphorical mappings goes on at an unconscious level, it is clear why CMA can serve as a potent tool for unraveling the hidden persuasive functions sanctioned by metaphors.
Figure 1. A discourse model for metaphor (adopted from Charteris-Black, 2004: 248) 1
The notion of emergent structure is described in section 2.2.2 below.
Metaphor and Politics
In his approach, Charteris-Black (2004: 244) offers the following conceptual levels for metaphor analysis that are hierarchically organized: conceptual keys, conceptual metaphors, and metaphors. Conceptual keys are situated at the highest point in the hierarchy, followed by conceptual metaphors, and metaphors that stand for metaphorical expressions. According to this author, the choice of metaphors in discourse is governed by their persuasive function, which is obvious in his discourse model of metaphor presented in Figure 1. As shown in the diagram, various factors conspire in order for the persuasive rhetorical function of a metaphor to be achieved. Consequently, “understanding more about metaphor is an essential component in intellectual freedom” (ibid.: 253). 2.1.10. Metaphor and Politics “The very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another ... will necessarily hide other aspects of the concept” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003: 10), which means that a metaphor can make us see only certain aspects of an issue, while rendering us blind to its other sides. Also, “owing to their ability to transform the abstract onto the concrete, metaphors represent one of the most significant instruments of persuasion and propaganda in the language of political rhetoric” 2 (Radić-Bojanić & Silaški, 2008: 141), suggesting that “political metaphors can justify courses of action” (Mio, 1997: 118), and can be used to “create political reality” (ibid.: 121). In addition, conceptual metaphors can “make the public feel a part of the political process and supportive of decisions made by the political elite” (ibid.: 118), rendering their value systems more susceptible to manipulation. The choice of such metaphors is often not arbitrary, and politicians use them consciously, since “the fact that by using metaphors they choose which aspects of a concept will be emphasized, creators of a text more or less consciously reveal their value judgments and ideological stances.” 3 (Silaški, Đurović, & Radić-Bojanić, 2009: 119). According to Mio (1997), the three basic mechanisms that enable a conceptual metaphor to perform its persuasive function in political discourse include: 1) simplification; 2) manipulation of underlying symbolic representations; and 3) the emotional appeal. Firstly, if a political issue is too complex or abstract for an average supporter to grasp, a metaphor can be used to simplify it. For example, the conceptual metaphor
POLITICS IS SPORT
can transform the complexity of a political issue into a simple contest. Secondly,
after enough repetitions metaphorical connections can become so entrenched as to go on unnoticed. In other words, “what was initially understood to be metaphorical can become implicit and accepted as truth at an unconscious level” (ibid.: 122). In that sense, conventional, i.e. entrenched metaphors can serve as a better conduit for political ideas compared to novel, i.e. creative metaphors, precisely due to the fact that the former „Zbog svoje sposobnosti prenošenja apstraktnog na konkretno, metafore predstavljaju jedan od najvažnijih instrumenata ubeđivanja i propagande u jeziku političke retorike“. 3 ,,Time što putem metafora biraju koje će aspekte nekog pojma istaći, tvorci teksta manje ili više svesno otkrivaju svoje vrednosne sudove i ideološke stavove“. 2
Metaphor and Politics
can go on undetected (Burnes, 2011). Finally, the role of metaphors in stirring emotions is invaluable, since “when emotions are evoked, logic is circumvented” (Mio, 1997: 123) and persuasion more easily achieved. The persuasive aspect of metaphors in political discourse and their emotional appeal are also addressed in Mio (1996). His experimental research provided empirical support for the Metaphor Extension Hypothesis, according to which “metaphors that extend someone else’s metaphor are more effective persuasive devices than those that do not” (ibid.: 136). To arrive at such a conclusion, the author investigated political debates where one of the participants constructed his arguments around the metaphor(s) introduced by his opponent. Such an approach was rated as more persuasive compared to the cases where participants introduced new metaphors. Additionally, research performed by Mio et al. (2005) showed that US presidents who used more metaphors in their inaugural speeches were labeled as more charismatic than those who used fever metaphors. Also, “even those presidents who did not appear to be charismatic were still perceived to be more inspiring when they used metaphors“ (ibid.: 292), which suggests that metaphor really is a powerful rhetorical tool. Charteris-Black (2004; 2009; 2011) also stressed the importance of emotional dimensions that metaphors introduce into the architecture of political rhetoric. Namely, building on the Aristotelian notion of rhetoric and aspects of contemporary rhetoric, Charteris-Black (2009; 2011) discusses the notions of ethos (a morally worthy stance), logos (proofs that support an argument), and pathos (arousing emotions). Their relationship is illustrated in Figure 2 below, where it is obvious that all of these rhetorical elements are connected by their persuasive aspect.
Figure 2. Rhetorical means of persuasion in political communication (adopted from Charteris-Black, 2004: 14)
Charteris-Black (2009; 2011) proposes metaphor as one of the main tools in political persuasion, and presents its ability to arouse emotions as one of the key mechanisms in persuasion. Namely, “metaphors change how we understand and think about politics by influencing our feelings and thoughts” (Charteris-Black, 2011: 32), which suggests that “increasing the emotional impact is a very vital role for metaphor” (CharterisBlack, 2009: 104). In other words, “the social role of metaphor in the construction of an ideology is motivated by a rhetorical purpose of arousing the emotions in order to persuade” (Charteris-Black, 2004: 251). In addition to heightening the pathos, Charteris-Black (2011) also claims that politicians often resort to metaphors in order
Metaphor and Politics
to justify their arguments and present them as rational. In this sense, political metaphors are understood to advocate only the desired stances affiliated to particular groups (Charteris-Black, 2009), which is reminiscent of Lakoff and Johnson’s (2003[1980b]) notion of highlighting and hiding. Additionally, metaphors are often used by politicians either for self-representation, or to evaluate others and their actions. Thompson (1996) emphasizes the fact that politics is grounded in the group-level phenomena, suggesting that “a major function of political metaphors is to link the individual and the political” (ibid.: 186), and that “the existence of metaphors describing the links between individuals and larger groups is crucial to making politics relevant” (ibid.: 187). In addition, the author claims that metaphors facilitate communication between the political elites and their supporters, which is sanctioned by the fact that metaphors combine values, emotions, and ideology. Furthermore, “metaphors have implications for action because of their ability to frame issues” (ibid.: 194), suggesting that apart from being grounded in our physical and social experience, “they also influence our experience and our actions” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003[1980b]: 68). Let us consider the following example: “When the Lord asked the prophet Isaiah, he said, ‘Whom shall I send and who will go for us?’ Isaiah said, ‘Here am I, send me,’” Mr. Perry said in Council Bluffs. “This is your country. Taking her back is your calling. Join me in this mission.” (28 December 2011, The New York Times online edition)
The above example reveals the underlying conceptual metaphor POLITICS IS RELIGION. This metaphor presents a political campaign in terms of a holy mission, rendering the politician a saint fighting for a holy cause. Naive as it may appear at first, this simple metaphor has a very powerful emotional appeal with the public. Namely, it strikes upon the very place where some of them are most sensitive - their religious beliefs. The frame of RELIGION
also encompasses a whole set of values, and by appealing to those values, the politician is
practically blackmailing his supporters into following him, because not doing so would be a sin that would interfere with their established value system. This is a transparent example of how “politicians commonly reframe the ideas expressed in relatively neutral language; that is, they place ideas in frames that were never intended to be used in conceptualizing ideas” (Kövecses, 2006: 92), which gives way to silent manipulation. In other words, “the manner in which one frames an issue can have practical implications for social policy and for politics” (Cienki, 2007: 174). Additionally, “we conceptualize experience by means of frames we get from a particular culture, and these frames are anything but neutral” (Kövecses, 2006: 91), suggesting that the (ab)use of metaphorical language in political discourse can give way to the creation and implementation of new frames, and therefore entirely new sets of values. Now it is becoming even more evident why “metaphors are regarded as a powerful persuasive tool used for generating or exploiting some of the already existent 4 specific value judgments, thus constructing via discourse a certain point of view” (Silaški & Đurović, 2011: 229). The lexical cue mission can also serve to introduce the elaborate
following metaphor system: 4
metaphor, and the even more
metaphor. In this sense, the previous example can be said to introduce the POLITICS IS RELIGION
RELIGION IS A JOURNEY
POLITICS IS A JOURNEY
Metaphor and Politics
journey is understood in terms of event structure). Such a system can serve to obscure the persuasive aspects of a metaphor even further, owing to its coherence and the shared entailments. Also, the JOURNEY metaphor is derived from an even more fundamental image schema of
lending support to Lakoff’s hypothesis that
abstract reason is based on image schemas (Lakoff, 1990). With all of this in mind, it is safe to state that metaphor “conceals an underlying persuasive function that is often not immediately transparent” (CharterisBlack, 2004: 9), by manipulating the fundamental conceptual structure of the human cognitive system. This in turn can be used to silently shape the collective consciousness of the public and pave the way for ideologies that represent the building blocks of entire belief and value systems. 2.1.11. Section Summary In brief, the current section introduced some of the basic tenets of the CMT that will be used in the present research. Additionally, the notions of image schemas, frames, and ICMs have also been discussed in some detail, owing to the fact that these constructs will be used in the analyses. Finally, the basic framework of the Critical Metaphor Analysis (Charteris-Black, 2004) was introduced, which was followed by the discussion of the role of conceptual metaphors in political discourse. Additionally, some of the basic mechanisms via which metaphors achieve their persuasive function in political discourse have also been discussed, with the ability to provoke an emotional appeal presenting itself as one of the more salient of these mechanisms.
Conceptual Blending Theory
2.2. Conceptual Blending Theory (CBT) This section of the paper will introduce the basic tenets of the Conceptual Blending Theory, best elaborated in Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner’s seminal book The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities. The section will start by addressing the notion of mental spaces and the Mental Space Theory as introduced by Fauconnier (1994; 1997; 2007), with the CBT as its logical ‘sequel’. In addition, special attention will be paid to the treatment of metaphor within the CBT framework (e.g. Grady et al., 2007; Fauconnier & Turner, 2008; Coulson, 2006b), and the section will close by providing a comprehensive comparison between the CMT and the CBT, advocating for the possibility of a joint use of the two frameworks. 2.2.1. Mental Spaces and Backstage Cognition The onset of the 2nd generation cognitive science marked a shift from the traditional truth-conditional notion of meaning, highlighting the idea of meaning construction as a dynamic process largely conditioned by the context and background knowledge structures such as frames and cognitive models (Fauconnier, 1994; 1997; 2007; Evans & Green, 2006). Although it is understood that language essentially does encode meaning, linguistic structures introduced into the discourse serve as partial prompts for meaning construction, the process often labeled as conceptualization. The process of conceptualization is licensed by the human cognitive architecture that incorporates entire sets of unconscious actions dubbed “backstage cognition” (Fauconnier, 1994; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). In an effort to develop these ideas further, Gilles Fauconnier introduced the notion of mental spaces which represent “domains that discourse builds up to provide a cognitive substrate for reasoning and for interfacing with the world” (Fauconnier, 1994: 34). In other words, mental spaces are “very partial assemblies constructed as we think and talk for purposes of local understanding and action” (Fauconnier, 2007: 351). According to the Mental Space Theory, the two main stages in meaning construction include: 1) creation of a mental space; and 2) formation of mappings between spaces, where mappings are influenced by the local discourse context (Evans & Green, 2006). Mental spaces are normally set up by space builders, where “a space builder is a grammatical expression that either opens a new space or shifts focus to an existing space” (Fauconnier, 1997: 40). Some typical space builders include “prepositional phrases, adverbials, subject-verb complexes, conjunctions + clause” (Fauconnier, 2007: 371), etc. The topology of a mental space is structured by frames or ICMs, and elements that constitute mental spaces are either pre-existent and introduced by frames (a process often labeled as schema induction, Evans & Green, 2006), or are constructed on-line. Elements are introduced via linguistic expressions, noun phrases (NPs), that can either have a definite or an indefinite interpretation, which is marked grammatically by the presence of a definite, or an indefinite article, respectively (Fauconnier, 1994).
Conceptual Blending Theory
Consequently, NPs with an indefinite interpretation are used to introduce novel elements, whereas “NPs with definite interpretation are said to function in the presuppositional mode, because they presuppose existing knowledge” (Evans & Green, 2006: 372), but they still need not necessarily have a unique referent. Alternatively, new elements can also be introduced by “nonlinguistic pragmatic conditions (e.g. objects which are salient in the interaction that produces the discourse)” (Fauconnier, 1997: 39). Additionally, “definite descriptions are primarily role functions and secondarily the values taken by such roles” (Fauconnier, 1994: 40). In that sense “mental spaces ... belong to the domains of role functions” (ibid.: 42), which suggests that roles can adopt different values in different spaces. In broad terms, roles are introduced by frames. For instance, the election frame introduces, among others, the role of the president, and the competing political parties and their representatives. Once this frame has been recruited via the process of schema induction, those roles are connected to their values, i.e. specific participants in the elections who vary from country to country, or over longer time periods. In other words, the abstract role-scaffolding introduced by the frame is completed by the context-bound values that can vary across spaces. As discourse unfolds, new mental spaces are introduced, creating structures called lattices (Fauconnier, 1994; 1997; 2007). An important aspect of these networks are various mappings that serve to connect elements across spaces, with identity and analogy being the most common (Fauconnier, 2007). A crucial theoretical construct that facilitates this process is the Access Principle 5 which states: “If two elements a and b are linked by a connector F (b = F(a)), then element b can be identified by naming, describing, or pointing to its counterpart a.” (Fauconnier, 1997: 41)
Element a is labeled as the trigger, while b is the target. This means that the description of the trigger in one space can be used to access the target in another space. Additionally, owing to the Access Principle, “expressions referring to a particular counterpart can typically provide access to entities in mental spaces in either direction” (Evans & Green, 2006: 377), suggesting a bidirectional nature of the mappings, typical of open connectors. In order for interlocutors to be able to navigate through the discourse lattice, it is necessary for them to keep track of the base, viewpoint, and focus (Fauconnier, 1997). The base space is “the starting point for the construction to which it is always possible to return” (ibid.: 49); the viewpoint represents the space “from which discourse is currently being viewed and from which other spaces are currently being built” (Evans & Green, 2006: 389); the focus space represents the space that is currently under construction. In light of the tenseaspect-mood system 6 in Mental Space Theory, another important space in the lattice is the event space, which “represents the time associated with the event being described” (ibid.: 389). For instance, tense-marking which is associated with the time in the event space can shift focus from one space to another. The Access Principle was initially introduced as the Identification Principle (for details see Fauconnier, 1994: 3). For a detailed account of the tense-aspect-mood system in Mental Space Theory see Fauconnier, 1997: 72-98; Fauconnier, 2007: 365- 371; Evans & Green, 2006: 386-396.
Conceptual Blending Theory
When a space builder introduces a new mental space in discourse, that new space will be included in its parent space (Fauconnier, 1994), suggesting a hierarchy in the organization of mental spaces. Consequently, “there must be a connector capable of connecting triggers and targets in the parent and daughter spaces” (ibid.: 18). Additionally, “structure from a parent space is transferred to a new space by default ... the default transfer, called optimization, will apply to the extent that it does not contradict explicit structure in the new space” (Fauconnier, 2007: 355-356), which in turn constitutes the Optimization Principle. With some of the basic tenets of the Mental Space Theory explained, the following sections will pursue its logical ‘sequel’ – the Conceptual Blending Theory. 2.2.2. Conceptual Blending Conceptual blending, alternatively discussed as the many space model (Turner & Fauconnier, 1995) or the network model of conceptual integration (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006), was developed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner as a theory of online meaning construction. In short, the paradigm “is concerned with on-line, dynamical cognitive work that people do to construct meaning for local purposes of thought and action” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006: 312), while “a fundamental motivating factor of blending is the integration of several events into a single unit” (ibid.: 332). As a ubiquitous phenomenon, blending is understood to be the driving force not only behind human imagination, but also behind some basic cognitive processes that constitute our everyday realities. In other words, “blending is pervasive in all modes of thinking and talking, and in fact it is not even inherently tied to language, but appears more generally in action and phenomena of cognition” (Fauconnier & Turner, 1994: 7). The so-called “minimal network” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006: 313; 2002: 47) in conceptual blending consists of four spaces: the generic space, two input spaces, and the blended space or the blend (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006; 2002; Coulson & Oakley, 2000; Turner, 2007). Alternatively, the blending network can include multiple input spaces, or even multiple blends. The generic space maps onto each of the input spaces, and it “contains what those inputs have in common at any moment in the development of the conceptual integration network” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006: 308). In that sense, it “contains highly schematic information which serves as a basis for establishing cross-space mappings between the input spaces” (Evans & Green, 2006: 406). These cross-space mappings facilitated by the generic space serve to identify counterparts in the inputs, which are then projected to the blend. Input spaces represent partial structures that normally correspond to events that are to be integrated in the blended space. Inputs are involved in selective projections which means that “only the matched information, which is required for purposes of local understanding” (ibid.: 409) is projected to the blend. Such partial nature of the projections can yield the production of different blends, even though the inputs remain the same. The blended space appears as the result of conceptual integration, and its main element is the emergent structure not present in
Conceptual Blending Theory
either of the inputs (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006; 2002; Coulson & Oakley, 2000). The emergent structure in the blend can cause backward projections 7 to the inputs (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006), which can influence global insight at the human scale. 8 Such backward projections are licensed by the Access Principle. 9 Emergent structure in the blend appears as the result of the following processes: composition, completion, and elaboration. Composition includes “attributing a relation from one mental space to an element or elements from other input spaces” (Coulson & Oakley, 2000: 180), and in addition, elements from the inputs can be composed in such a way, as to create relations that are not present in either of the inputs (Turner, 2007; Fauconnier & Turner, 2006). As a result, emergent structure is a product of “contextual accommodation of a concept from one domain to apply to elements in a different domain” (Coulson & Oakley, 2000: 180). The process of completion is based on the fact that a lot of background knowledge and conceptual structure gets recruited into the blend (Turner, 2007; Fauconnier & Turner, 2006; 2002), which means that the above described “composed structure is completed with other structure” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006: 314). In other words, “completion involves schema induction which refers to 10 unconscious and effortless recruitment of background frames” (Evans & Green, 2006: 409). A transparent form of completion is pattern completion, where, for example, an event can be completed by information based on background knowledge or preexistent entrenched frames stored in long-term memory (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006; Coulson & Oakley, 2000; 2006). Elaboration or “running of the blend” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 44), involves mental simulations “according to principles and logic in the blend” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006: 315). In other words, elaboration represents “the simulated mental performance of the event in the blend, which may continue indefinitely” (Grady, Oakley & Coulson, 2007: 425). Elaboration can appear in two forms: coupled and decoupled (Coulson & Oakley, 2000). Decoupled elaboration “involves little or no physical realization” (ibid.: 181), whereas coupled elaboration involves physical realization, i.e. actual physical activity. Coulson and Oakley (2000) suggest that the latter type of elaboration can include action blends, with patterns of activity from one domain applied to elements of another domain. 2.2.3. The Generic Space Problem Based on the current research trends in the domain of the CBT, the role of the generic space and even its psychological plausibility have been largely disputed (Brandt & Brandt, 2005; Oakley, 2011; Coulson & Oakley, 2005). Namely, the structures present in the generic space are “immanent in the input and blended spaces themselves and are of little relevance to the network as a cognitive model of online meaning Note that Coulson (2001: 178-196) refers to backward projections as retrospective projections. For more details concerning the notion of human scale consult subsection 2.2.5. 9 See section 2.2.1 above. 10 My italics. 7 8
Conceptual Blending Theory
construction” (Oakley, 2011: 4). One of the possible issues where a generic space could play an important role is in “modeling the socio-historical development of ideas over larger temporal spans” (ibid.: 4), such as complex numbers. In that sense, the present research will adopt the stance that the generic space is largely an artifact of analysis, and shall treat it as such. However, it will be argued that the structure of this “artifact” can be represented at the image schematic level. Namely, in order to avoid the generativist pitfall and its stipulation that, owing to the fact that the generic space contains structure common to the entire network, the generic space can be viewed as a generative mechanism largely similar to the Chomskian notion of the LAD, the present research will instead argue that the generic space, although largely an artifact of analysis, can be represented in the form of the image schematic structure that provides the scaffolding on top of which the human ability for meaning construction is mounted. Building on the notion of image schemas as conceptual primitives (Mandler, 1992), and the discussion on the psychological reality of image schemas (Gibbs & Colston, 2006), as well as the argumentation presented in Antović (2013), the present research will stress the importance of the generic space constructed at the level of the image schematic structure which serves as a conceptual primitive, and in that sense underlies much of our everyday routine, including the construction and understanding of metaphorical language. With this in mind, the underlying image schematic structure that makes up the generic space is meant to reflect the fact that the notions of categorization and the active processes of on-line reasoning and meaning construction are in fact grounded in the abstract preconceptual knowledge structures with a marked experiential basis, which make up the bulk of our background image schematic knowledge. This suggests that these background knowledge structures at the image schematic level are also available for recruitment, like frames or cognitive models, which are ready to be activated. However, while the entrenched frames are often products of previous conceptual integration, i.e. they are often pre-built compressions ready for recruitment (in the sense of Fauconnier & Turner, 2008, and Fauconnier, 2008), the image schematic background knowledge structures are actually uncompressed conceptual primitives built on experiential interaction during the prelinguistic phase of development, which can be further enriched via metaphorical projections. In that sense, the image schematic structure of the generic space can help explain the alignment of the topologies of the input spaces of conceptual integration networks and it serves to shed more light on the process of conceptual integration itself. Therefore, although an artifact of analysis, i.e. a theoretical analytic tool, the generic space can offer an additional insight into the process of conceptual integration. Additionally, the image schematic structure of this “artifact” supplies it with some actual psychological plausibility. Furthermore, in case of the analysis of conventional, i.e. entrenched conceptual metaphors and their corresponding metaphorical expressions, which the present paper is concerned with, such generic space structure can serve to both emphasize, and further explain the nature and structure of such entrenched cognitive mechanisms.
Conceptual Blending Theory
2.2.3. Vital Relations Vital relations stand for salient conceptual relations that occur between the inputs in a conceptual integration network (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), which also serve to define the topology of those inputs (Fauconnier & Turner, 2000). Common vital relations include the following: Change, Identity, Time, Space, Cause-Effect, Part-Whole, Representation, Role, Analogy, Disanalogy, Property, Similarity, Category, Intentionality, and Uniqueness (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 101; Turner, 2007: 381). Change is perhaps best illustrated in the “dino-blend” discussed in Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 9395). Namely, this blend pertains to the evolutionary journey from dinosaurs to birds. Along this path, there are various dinosaurs at different evolutionary stages of development, which, in this particular case, embody the vital relation of Change. In the blend, Change is compressed into Uniqueness, which enables us to grasp the full extent of the evolutionary transformation. Identity “is not only a vital relation, but perhaps the primary vital relation without which the others are meaningless” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2000: 299; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 115). Furthermore, “human mental life is unthinkable without continual compression and decompression of Identity” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2000: 299), and these compressions and decompressions of Identity are also argued to facilitate the functionality of the linguistic system (Fauconnier & Turner, 2000). Although usually understood as a primitive, the vital relation of Identity is in fact “a feat of the imagination, something the imagination must build or disassemble” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 95). For instance, as discussed in Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 96), Identity can serve to connect roles (e.g. the roles of president) in different inputs, which allows us to construe utterances like: “In France the president is elected for a term of seven years, whereas in the US he is elected for a term of four years.” As a result, “the identity connection in this case 11 is manufactured” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 96), since the roles of president are different in the two countries. Additionally, the vital relation of Identity can also be established between more abstract causal structures of the inputs (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). Another example of the vital relation of Identity and its compression into Uniqueness is provided by the Ghosts of Predator’s Past example (Fauconnier & Turner, 2000: 299-302; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 115119). Namely, this example describes the American pronghorn which manages to outrun all of the predators over the course of evolution. The conceptual integration network in question has one input space with a modern pronghorn that runs fast, and another input with a prehistoric pronghorn that runs fast to escape predators, where each of the pronghorns is “an identity compression over an epoch in the history of the species” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2000: 300). This identity compression serves to turn “a group identity into a particular identity” (ibid.: 300), since each of the two pronghorns is ‘picked’ from one of the two respective groups of prototypical pronghorns, i.e. the group of pronghorns from the prehistoric epoch, and the group of 11
Conceptual Blending Theory
pronghorns from the modern epoch. In the blend, the vital relations of Identity and Intentionality between the pronghorns from the two inputs are compressed into Uniqueness and inner-space Intentionality (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). Time relates to “memory, change, continuity, simultaneity and nonsimultaneity, as well as to our understanding of causation” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 96). As seen in the Regatta (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006: 327-329; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 63-65) and the Debate with Kant (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006: 315-317; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 59-62) blends, different times from the input spaces are projected into the same moment in time in the blend. These two examples can also be used to exemplify the vital relation of Space, and its compression. Namely, different physical spaces from the inputs are brought together as a single space in the blend. Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 96) discuss the example of a fire in a fireplace, and argue that the Cause-Effect vital relation requires that two mental spaces be set up. One space contains the burning logs, and the other the cold ashes. In addition to the Cause-Effect, the inputs are also connected by Time, Space, and Change. The Part-Whole vital relation may be exemplified by the police trying to identify a murder victim based on a set of fingerprints. One input contains the entire person, while the other input contains the person’s fingerprints, as the most salient characteristic. In the blend, the prints and the person are fused, solving the problem of the person’s identity. This way the outer-space vital relation of Part-Whole is compressed into Uniqueness in the blend. The vital relation of Representation is closely linked to the trigger-target relation of the mental space theory. For example, one of the inputs can contain a photograph of a person, which can serve as a representation, while the other input can contain the actual person being represented. In the blend, the two are compressed into Uniqueness, allowing us to refer to the representation in the photograph as the actual person. Role “is a ubiquitous vital relation” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 98), and it can serve to connect roles from one input with values from another input, like in the simplex network Paul is the father of Sally (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 120-122). Some other roles can include, for instance, president, pope, or emperor, and they are filled by appropriate values depending on the context. The vital relation of Analogy is established when “through blending, the different blended spaces have acquired frame structure in common” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 99). Additionally, the vital relation of Analogy is conditioned by the previously discussed Role-Value compression. Analogy can also be compressed, and these are usually compressions into Uniqueness and Change (ibid.). Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 99) discuss the example: Stanford is a West Coast “analogue” to Harvard. Both networks have the frame of a university and the role of a prestigious university. As the result of conceptual integration, one blend acquires the role of Stanford from its other input, and the other blend that of Harvard. Consequently, the two blends are linked via Analogy.
Conceptual Blending Theory
Disanalogy is both grounded on, and coupled with Analogy (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). The values from the inputs, which are disanalogous, can be introduced into the blend as separate when there is a need to fill multiple slots that have the same role. For example, this is the case in the Regatta blend, when the disanalogous boats are both brought into the blend. The vital relation of Property is used to assign a certain property to an object. For example, a white shirt has a property white, a convicted felon has a property guilty, etc. Additionally, “blending often compresses an outer-space vital relation ... into an inner-space vital relation of Property in the blend” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 100). Similarity “is an inner-space Vital Relation linking elements with shared properties” (ibid.: 100). For example, two pieces of fabric can be dubbed similar in terms of their color, or the cross-space relation of Analogy can be compressed into Similarity in the blend. Category is similar to Property. For example, in the case of a computer virus, the outer-space vital relation of Analogy between a real virus and a computer program is compressed into Category in the blend (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). Intentionality includes a group of vital relations linked with “hope, desire, want, fear, belief, memory, and other mental attitudes and dispositions directed at content” (ibid.: 100). Intentionality is very important because it enables us to frame an event as either intentional or unintentional. For example, in the Regatta blend (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006: 327-329; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 63-65), the race frame introduces the relation of Intentionality. Additionally, Intentionality can be introduced into the blend through compression (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 100). As may be transparent from the discussion in the previous paragraphs, the most notable characteristic of the vital relation of Uniqueness is that many vital relations are compressed into it in the blend. The above listed vital relations are prominent in various types of conceptual integration networks. The present paper will address special attention to the vital relations occurring in metaphorical networks and to their compressions. 2.2.4. Compression Mental spaces and conceptual integration networks created as discourse and thought unfold are the result of meaning construction, and the need to achieve understanding at a human scale 12 (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). One of the most valuable assets in this process is compression which represents “a phenomenon in conceptual integration that allows human beings to simultaneously control long diffuse chains of logical reasoning and to grasp the global meanings of such chains” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2000: 283). In other words, “compression is used to describe an entity in a blended space that has distinct counterparts in 12
For more details concerning the notion of human scale consult subsection 2.2.5.
Conceptual Blending Theory
multiple input spaces, and, moreover, those counterparts are related to one another via a vital relation” (Coulson & Oakley, 2005: 1532-1533). The importance of compression as one of the central phenomena of blending was initially discussed in Fauconnier and Turner (2000; 2002), and later further elaborated in Fauconnier (2008) and Fauconnier and Turner (2008). As discussed in Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 312-322), compression can involve scaling or syncopation of a single vital relation. This can include temporal compressions, scaling of cause and effect, etc. Additionally, one of the most important traits of the process of compression is the compression of one vital relation into another. For example, outer-space vital relations of Representation and Part-Whole can be compressed into Uniqueness in the blend, which is evident when a photograph is used to represent a person. Additionally, as a result of conceptual integration, an outer-space vital relation between the inputs can be compressed either into an inner-space vital relation of the same kind, or of a different kind in the blend (Fauconnier & Turner, 2000). Compression can also be used to create new vital relations. Namely, conceptual integration can result in new vital relations that did not hold in the inputs, but are present in the blend, and which are obviously closely linked to the emergent structure. If we consider the Regatta blend (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006: 327-329; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 63-65), the two inputs contain the two boats on their journeys, while the blend recruits an additional frame of race, thus introducing the vital relation of Intentionality (in this case the intention to win the race), not present in either of the inputs. A very important form of compression pertains to borrowed compressions, where one of the input spaces already has its own compression which is further exploited in the new blend. This is especially interesting in conceptual metaphors, where, as argued in Fauconnier and Turner (2008), and Fauconnier (2008), inputs in metaphorical networks are often results of previous conceptual integration, i.e. inputs themselves can be instances of entrenched blends. Compression in conceptual integration networks is generally achieved in two ways: 1) through syncopation; and 2) through scaling. Syncopation means “to leave out significant chunks in a vital relation” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2000: 298), and it can apply either to elements between different inputs, or to elements of the same input (Fauconnier & Turner, 2000). As discussed in Fauconnier and Turner (2000: 298), if we try to think of a good response to criticism that we had received a couple of years earlier, we are actually syncopating over time, and focusing only on the time the criticism was received and the present moment, leaving out everything that happened in between. Unlike syncopation, scaling “preserves the topology of what is compressed” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2000: 298), and the interval that will be scaled can be either innerspace, or outer-space. For example, in the Baby’s Ascent example (Fauconnier and Turner, 2000: 294-297), the entire lifetime is scaled down to the period required to climb the stairs, which occurs in one mental space. In the Bypass blend (Fauconnier & Turner, 2000: 288-292; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 65-67), on the other hand, the time interval is scaled down over the two input spaces. Despite their differences, “scaling and syncopation often work together” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 314). For instance, in the dino-blend, there is
Conceptual Blending Theory
the scaling of Change and Time, but there is also syncopation since only the key moments on the evolutionary path are depicted (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). One of the main goals in conceptual integration networks is to achieve human scale, 13 which is sanctioned by compression, and the fact that some vital relations are scalable, while those that are not scalable can be compressed to scalable relations (ibid.). Another important trait of compression includes highlights compression, which reflects the requirement that blends and generic spaces need to “reflect the structure and highlights of the overarching stories” (ibid.: 320). Highlights compression can include “compression to Category, compression to Property, and syncopation over detail” (ibid.: 325). As argued in Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 324-325), and Turner (2007: 382), the above presented features of compression can be summarized under the Governing Principles for Compression which include: 1) borrowing for compression; 2) single-relation compression by scaling; 3) single-relation compression through syncopation; 4) compression of one vital relation into another; 5) scalability; 6) creation by compression (creating a new vital relation in the blend); and 7) highlights compressions. 2.2.5. Optimality Principles 14 Optimality principles “characterize strategies for optimizing emergent structure” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 311), and, paired with the constitutive principles, place strong constraints on the process of conceptual integration. The constitutive principles, which refer to the structure and dynamics of conceptual integration, include “partial cross-space mappings, selective projection to the blend, and the development of emergent structure in the blend” (ibid.: 310). The main goal that both constitutive and optimality principles aim to achieve is: Achieve Human Scale,
with its subgoals: Compress what is diffuse. Obtain global insight. Strengthen vital relations. Come up with a story. Go from many to one. (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 322-323; Turner, 2007: 383)
Human scale refers to “the level at which it is natural for us to have the impression that we have direct, reliable, and comprehensive understanding” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 323), and it is such understanding that creates the feeling of global insight. In brief, the entire process of conceptual integration is fueled by the necessity of understanding the world at a level that is both tangible and intelligible. Additionally, compression and human scale go hand in hand, since “compression is a way to achieve human scale” (ibid.: 323), and achieving human scale requires compression. The process of conceptual integration will also lead to the For more details concerning the notion of human scale consult the subsection 2.2.5. The present section will provide only a basic overview of Optimality Principles. For a more detailed account, see Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 327-333, and Turner, 2007: 382). 13 14
Conceptual Blending Theory
strengthening of vital relations “either by making new ones, or by intensifying existing ones, or by converting vital relations of one type into vital relations of another type” (ibid.: 323). The blend can also provide a simple story for the entire network, like in the Regatta 15 example where the blend supplies the simple story of a race (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 287-288) also discuss the example of the Story of Life, where the Story of Life serves as a preexisting overarching integration that guides some of the compressions in the Birth Stork Network, 16 i.e. it serves to provide a story that facilitates the development of the conceptual integration network. Consequently, each of the blends in the Birth Stork Network has a structure that is aligned with the preexistent compression of the Story of Life. Namely, in each of the blended spaces, “states are locations, and there is a change from one ranked state/location to another” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 289). Finally, as a direct result of compression, conceptual integration networks are expected to go from many elements in the input spaces to a fewer number of elements in the final blend (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). Optimality principles include the following: ■
The Topology Principle: Other things being equal, set up the blend and the inputs so that useful topology in the inputs and their outer-space relations is reflected by inner-space relations in the blend. (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 327; Turner, 2007: 382)
The Pattern Completion Principle: Other things being equal, complete elements in the blend by using existing integrated patterns as additional inputs. Other things being equal, use a completing frame that has relations that can be the compressed versions of the important outer-space vital relations between the inputs. (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 328; Turner, 2007: 382)
The Integration Principle: Achieve an integrated blend. (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 328; Turner, 2007: 382)
The Maximization of Vital Relations Principle: Other things being equal, maximize vital relations in the network. In particular, maximize the vital relation in the blended space and reflect them in outer-space vital relations. (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 330; Turner, 2007: 382)
The Intensification of Vital Relations Principle: Other things being equal, intensify vital relations. (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 330; Turner, 2007: 382)
The Web Principle: Other things being equal, manipulating the blend as a unit must maintain the web of appropriate connections to the input spaces easily and without additional surveillance or computation. (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 331; Turner, 2007: 382)
The Unpacking Principle: Other things being equal, the blend all by itself should prompt for the reconstruction of the entire network. (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 332; Turner, 2007: 382)
The Relevance Principle: Other things being equal, an element in the blend should have relevance, including relevance for establishing links to other spaces and for running the blend. Conversely, an outer-space relation between the inputs that is important for the purposes of the network should have a corresponding compression in the blend. (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 333; Turner, 2007: 382)
The Compression Principle: 17 Achieve compressed blended spaces. (Turner, 2007: 382)
Grady, Oakley, and Coulson (2007) discuss an additional principle of Metonymic Tightening, according to which “relationships between elements from the same input should become as close as possible within the blend” (ibid.: 426). In sum, optimality principles have much to do with vital relations and their projections, and by offering additional constraints to those of the constitutive principles, optimality principles are able to dictate the course For details see Fauconnier and Turner, 1994; 2006; 2002. For details see Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 284-289. 17 The governing principles for compression have already been presented in section 2.2.3. above. 15 16
Conceptual Blending Theory
of the development of conceptual integration networks. Additionally, when it comes to various types of networks, many of these principles interact and compete, so that the satisfaction of one of the principles may imply a violation of other principles. 2.2.6. Basic Types of Conceptual Integration Networks 18 The four basic types of conceptual integration networks include: simplex, mirror, single-scope, and double-scope networks 19 (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006; 2002). A notion closely related to the types of integration networks that also serves as the main criterion for the above given classification is that of an organizing frame. Namely, an organizing frame of a mental space is “a frame that specifies the nature of the relevant activity, events, and participants” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006: 341; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 104), or in other words, “an organizing frame provides a topology for the space it organizes by providing 20 a set of organizing relations among the elements in the space” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006: 341; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 123). Although the notion of frames has already been introduced in section 2.1.7, it is worth noting at this point that in terms of the Mental Space Theory, frames are understood as “entrenched mental spaces that we can activate all at once” (Fauconnier, 2007: 352; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 103). Furthermore, even entire networks of spaces with their blends can become entrenched and available for recruitment (Turner, 2007; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). 18.104.22.168. Single-scope Networks The main characteristic of single-scope networks is that inputs have different organizing frames, and only one of those frames is projected as the organizing frame of the blend (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006; 2002; Coulson, 2001). As a result, “the projection to the blend in a simple single-scope network is highly asymmetric” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 127). Also, with their structure in mind, single-scope networks are prototypically metaphorical since they “give us the feeling that one thing is giving us insight into another thing” (ibid.: 129), which is reminiscent of Lakoff and Johnson’s (2003[1980b]) definition of metaphor. Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 127-129) propose two types of single-scope networks: 1) the inputs are not contained within a larger history; and 2) the inputs are contained within a larger history. In the former type of single-scope networks, there are no Identity connections between the inputs, nor are there vital relations of Time, Space, Change, Cause-Effect, and Intentionality that license direct connections between the inputs. In short, there is no obvious relevance of one input space for the other. In the latter type of single-scope networks, the inputs This section will describe only single- and double-scope networks, since those are typical instances of metaphorical networks with which the present research is concerned. For a detailed account of simplex and mirror networks see Fauconnier & Turner, 2002. 19 Note that Seana Coulson (2001: 120-122) uses different terminology to describe these same types of networks. Namely, she discusses single framing networks, frame networks, one-sided networks, and two-sided networks, which correspond to simplex, mirror, single-scope, and double-scope networks, respectively. 20 My italics. 18
Conceptual Blending Theory
are relevant to each other, and there are outer-space vital relations that connect them. The connections can be established between the respective organizing frames, as well as between elements below the frame level. Considering that inputs have different organizing frames, conceptual clashes in single-scope networks are extremely transparent, and the blend normally inherits the organizing frame of the framing input, i.e. the source input. In this type of networks the clash is resolved by projecting only one of the organizing frames to the blend. Typically, the framing input “has a prebuilt superb compression that is exploited to induce a compression for the focus input” (ibid.: 129), and the use of such preexistent compressions is in general a salient property of single-scope networks. In other words, single-scope networks satisfy the principles of borrowing for compression and scaling compression. However, “the topologies of the two spaces are preserved in the cross-space mapping” (ibid.: 130), in spite of the clashes.
Figure 3. Boxing CEOs (adopted from Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 128) In terms of optimality principles, single-scope networks satisfy integration owing to the “borrowed” compression from the source input, which in turn satisfies the topology principle. The topology principle is further satisfied in projections from the target input because the topologies of the source and target inputs are already ‘prealinged’ by the presence of a conventional metaphor (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). The metaphorical nature of the mappings also satisfies web, while unpacking goes on in a similar fashion as in the case of mirror networks. 21 Namely, unpacking is facilitated by the fact that the blend is not integrated to the same extent at the more specific levels as it is at the more general level. Let us consider the example of Boxing CEOs, presented in Fauconnier and Turner (2006: 344; 2002: 126-131). This metaphor of CEOs as boxers allows us to compress our understanding of business 21
For more details on mirror networks, consult Fauconnier and Turner, 2002.
Conceptual Blending Theory
competition. In that sense, cross-space connections can be established between the CEOs and boxers, punches and business moves, and the boxing match and business competition. This is also an instance of a network in which the inputs are not contained within a larger history, since there is no direct obvious link between them. The conceptual clash is resolved by projecting the organizing frame from the source input 22 (boxing) to the blend, which in turn introduces the preexistent compression of boxing into the blend. This way, structure from the target input (business) is “projected into the already compressed inner-space relations ... from the framing input” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 129). Additionally, “cause-effect relations, agent-action relations, and temporal ordering are aligned in the two spaces” (ibid.: 130), owing to which the projection of elements from the target input as values into the source organizing frame does not disrupt the structure of the organizing frame. In short, the blend achieves the conceptual integration of the events from the target input into a unit. Additionally, in terms of compressions, it is worth noting that the outer-space vital relation of Analogy is compressed into an inner space vital relation of Uniqueness: in the blend, CEOs are fused with boxers. 22.214.171.124. Double-scope Networks Double-scope networks constitute fertile ground for conceptual clashes, owing to the fact that their inputs have different organizing frames, and both of those frames contribute to the organizing frame of the blend (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006; 2002; Coulson, 2001). As discussed in Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 340-345), since the blend has a specially developed organizing frame of its own, Compression, Topology, Integration, and Web principle are not automatically satisfied in double-scope networks. This increases the possibilities for competition between the optimality principles and it becomes more difficult to satisfy them. As a result, the construction of a functional double-scope blend requires that some optimality principles be relaxed. The fact that all the spaces in the network have different organizing frames facilitates the Unpacking Principle. Namely, in order for the elements from the blend to be projected back to the inputs, first the organizing frame of the blend needs to be unpacked into the organizing frames of the inputs. Double-scope networks also include networks with high asymmetry and nonclashing double-scope networks. 23 In the former type of networks, although the organizing frame of the blend adopts elements from the organizing frames of both inputs, it is basically an extension of the organizing frame of only one of the inputs. In the latter type of networks there is no clash between the organizing frames of the inputs, and the blend contains both of them. Among other examples of double-scope networks, Coulson (2001: 168-172) discusses the idiom Digging Your Own Grave, also described in Fauconnier and Turner (2006: 321-323; 2002: 131-135). The clash of topologies between the two inputs of this network is manifested on multiple levels, including
Note that similar to the CMT framework, inputs in metaphorical integration networks are also labeled source and target. For a detailed account of these two special types of double-scope networks see Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 134-135.
Conceptual Blending Theory
“causality, intentionality, participant roles, temporal sequence, identity, and internal event structure” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 132). The concrete structure of the blend is adopted from the “grave” input, whereas the event structure, intentionality, and causality come from the “failure” input. The clash in this network is presented in terms of the shift in the causal structure owing to which the existence of a grave causes death, and the other way around. This causal structure is adopted from the “failure” input, while death and dying come from the “grave” input. As a result, the amount of trouble maps onto the depth of grave, and making bad decisions corresponds to digging the grave. Such framing also fuses the roles of agent and patient, and the patient who is also the agent digs his own grave. The resulting emergent structure also has backward projections to the “failure” input, where it creates real-life inferences. I propose another real-life example of double-scope blending, based on my personal experience. Namely, imagine a situation where a man is in a long-term relationship with a woman seven years younger than he is. Now imagine that the woman has just graduated from the University and the couple is out celebrating. At one point, the man turns to the woman and says: “Now I’m your Mrs. Robinson.” To fully appreciate this statement, one should be familiar with the movie The Graduate (1967), starring Dustin Hoffman and Anne Bancroft.
Figure 4. Mrs. Robinson
The conceptual integration network that describes this example has two inputs, the movie space and the reality space, while the generic space contains elements that are shared by the entire network (see Figure 4 for details). Elements Mrs. Robinson and the man, the graduate and the woman, and their age differences are connected by the outer-space vital relations of Analogy. The extramarital affair and the long-term
Conceptual Blending Theory
relationship are on the other hand linked by the vital relation of Disanalogy. As the result of compression, the blend develops its central emergent structure. Namely, the outer-space vital relations of Analogy between the man and Mrs. Robinson, and the woman and the graduate are projected into Uniqueness in the blend. However, the two compressed elements in the blend acquire their genders and specific values (i.e. their real identities 24 ) from the reality space, whereas their roles are acquired from the movie space. In that sense, the blend contains Mrs. Robinson, who is in fact a man, and the graduate, who is in fact a woman. Furthermore, the age difference and the long-term relationship status are projected directly from the reality space. Additionally, Time from the movie and Time from reality are also compressed through syncopation into the same moment in time in the blend. In keeping with the partial nature of projections, the languages used in the two respective input spaces are irrelevant, and not projected from either of the inputs (like in the Debate with Kant example discussed in Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). The arguments presented in the previous paragraph lend support to the conclusion that the resulting topology of the organizing frame of the blended space is in fact a direct result of interaction between the organizing frames of the two input spaces, thereby rendering the present network double-scope. Namely, while the two compressed elements assume their roles from the ‘movie space’, their other characteristics are acquired from the ‘reality space’. Furthermore, the age difference and the relationship status are also acquired from the ‘reality space’, thereby licensing a novel, emergent structure that appears in the form of a long-term relationship between Mrs. Robinson and the graduate. Prior to the process of conceptual integration, this structure was not available in either of the two inputs. 2.2.7. CBT and Metaphor In the domain of the CBT, metaphors normally appear as single- or double-scope networks. Unlike the unidirectional source-target mappings stipulated by the CMT, the CBT introduces at least the minimal network model, allowing projections in multiple directions, including backward projections from the blend to the inputs. In their paper Rethinking Metaphor, Fauconnier and Turner (2008) argued for a revised approach to metaphor analysis. The authors suggested that a full account of conceptual metaphors needs to include a greater number of elements than a simple four-space-model. Namely, the inputs of metaphorical networks are rarely simple constructs, and they usually represent previously constructed entrenched blends available for recruitment (i.e. borrowed compressions). This means that a seemingly simple conceptual integration network can in fact be rather complex and elaborate. In other words, “analysis of metaphor requires analysis of elaborate integration networks producing what can seem like straightforward mappings between two domains taken as primitives” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008: 61).
Note that “identity” here is not being used to label the vital relation of Identity.
Conceptual Blending Theory
Building on the analysis of the metaphor
TIME IS SPACE
Fauconnier and Turner (2008: 60) conclude
that time and time-space mapping appear as the emergent structure in the blend, rather than time being a simple primitive input. Additionally, “the topology of the domain for time is incompatible with the domain of objects moving in space” 25 (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008: 56), owing to which meaning construction in metaphorical expressions that correspond to the above introduced conceptual metaphor is ultimately a result of resolving the clashes that appear due to the inconsistencies in the topologies of the two inputs. Another important notion that needs to be stressed includes the differences between the universal event and subjective experience. Namely, the universal event assumes the same order of events for all participants, with time as an invariant component. Depending on the specific context, however, different participants can construe the duration of a single event as being different, which gives way to expressions such as: “These three hours went by slowly for me, but the same three hours went by quickly for him” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008: 61). Meaning construction in cases like this one is “a result of resolving a clash between subjective experience and shared universal events” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008: 64). In sum, Fauconnier and Turner (2008: 54) propose that the following notions be taken into consideration during metaphor analysis: ■ Integration networks: Blends always involve multiple mappings. ■ Cobbling and sculpting: Integration networks always have parts that are entrenched (i.e. conventional), and parts that involve novel mappings and compressions. As a result, integration networks that permeate everyday life are usually a mix of these two components. ■ Compression: “Integration networks achieve systematic compressions” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008: 54). Although compression and the notion of borrowed compressions has already been addressed in their previous work (e.g. Fauconnier & Turner, 2000; 2002), the authors here argue that the systematic nature of compression has been overlooked in previous research. Such importance of compression is also stressed in Fauconnier’s 2008 lecture How Compression Gives Rise to Metaphor and Metonymy. In short, the systematic nature of compression is reflected in the fact that “the ability to use standard techniques and patterns of compression and decompression enables us to work at once over elaborate integration networks” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008: 54). ■ Inference: When metaphors involve multiple inputs, the topologies of those inputs will often clash. Consequently, some elements from those inputs will not be projected to the blend, which means that “inference transfer is not in itself the driving force behind metaphor” (ibid.: 54). ■ Emergent structure: The authors argue that some of the previous approaches to metaphor analysis neglected to recognize the fact that many of the most fundamental metaphorical projections (e.g. the above discussed TIME IS SPACE), are in fact emergent.
For a detailed list of the points of incompatibility between the two inputs see Fauconnier and Turner, 2008: 56-57.
Conceptual Blending Theory
Grady, Oakley, and Coulson (2007: 426-427) discuss the
SHIP OF STATE
metaphor, and they
suggest that although this metaphor represents an instance of a conventional mapping, it is also related to more fundamental conceptualizations, like ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION, TIME IS MOTION, etc. This suggests that simple metaphors can be joined to pave the way for more elaborate mappings. The authors also argue that “one blend may be the input for another” (Grady, Oakley, & Coulson, 2007: 427), which reflects Fauconnier and Turner’s notion of the systematic nature of compression. Additionally, Grady, Oakley, and Coulson (2007) argue one of the basic characteristics of metaphorical networks to be fusion with accommodation, which means that not all elements from the inputs are fused in the blend. Essentially, in the case of metaphor, fusion corresponds to the compression of outer-space vital relations of Analogy into innerspace vital relations of Uniqueness in the blend. This way, “a single element in the blend corresponds to an element in each of the input spaces” (Grady, Oakley, & Coulson, 2007: 431). 2.2.8. CMT vs. CBT: Towards a Unitary Framework In view of the CMT, “a conceptual metaphor consists of a (partial) mapping of the basic structure of one conceptual domain (the source) onto another (the target)” (Turner & Fauconnier, 1995: 184). CBT, on the other hand, introduces a four-space model, in which projections are not restricted to unidirectional sourcetarget mappings advocated by the CMT. Instead, elements from both the source and target inputs are projected to the blend, with an additional possibility of backward projections that can affect inferences in the input spaces. Another important difference between the two frameworks is presented in the fact that the domains of the CMT framework pose as stable, entrenched structures, while mental spaces from the CBT framework appear as dynamic constructs, structured by frames, domains, and cognitive models. Additionally, the CBT framework is usually aimed at investigating instances of novel conceptualizations, whereas the CMT deals with entrenched structures (Grady Oakley, & Coulson, 2007; Coulson, 2006b). Despite the obvious incoherencies between the two frameworks, there are also certain similarities. Namely, metaphor is treated as a conceptual phenomenon in both frameworks; both frameworks deal with systematic projections between conceptual domains; both frameworks introduce certain constraints; etc. (Grady Oakley, & Coulson, 2007). As discussed in Fauconnier and Turner (1994: 4-5), and Turner and Fauconnier (1995: 184), the two space model of the CMT is in fact only a border-line case of the more elaborate many-space model of the CBT that “explains a range of phenomena invisible or untreatable under the two-domain model and reveals previously unrecognized aspects of even the most familiar basic metaphors” (Turner & Fauconnier, 1995: 184). Furthermore, Grady, Oakley, and Coulson (2007) in their discussion on Blending and Metaphor also suggest that the two approaches should be treated as complementary, and argue that “the conventional conceptual pairings and one-way mappings studied within CMT are inputs to and constraints on the kinds of dynamic conceptual networks posited within BT” (Grady,
Conceptual Blending Theory
Oakley, & Coulson 2007: 436). Similar positions are adopted in Coulson (2006a; 2006b). Such treatment of the CMT as a special case of the CBT, instead of being dubbed a separate theoretical framework, allows the CMT to still serve as a useful aid in the research in conceptual metaphors. Grady, Oakley, and Coulson (2007: 422-424) discuss the well-known example of the IS A BUTCHER
metaphor (Figure 5), and the analysis of this metaphor reveals the advantages of the many-
space model of the CBT. Namely, the blend has the emergent structure of incompetence that is difficult to explain relying merely on the CMT model. The problem lies in the fact that both surgeon and butcher are highly competent professionals. Although butchery might be dubbed a less prestigious calling compared to surgery, there are no obvious elements that could serve to discredit the competence of the former. Still, the above presented metaphor is perfectly clear, and the inference of the surgeon’s incompetence is retrieved without difficulties.
Figure 5. Surgeon is a butcher (adopted from Grady, Oakley, and Coulson, 2007: 423)
Conceptual Blending Theory
The CBT framework provides a plausible account of the emergent structure. Namely, the role of butcher is projected from the source input, while elements like the identity of the patient and identity of the surgeon are projected from the target input. The clash between the goals of a surgeon and means and manner of a butcher results in the emergent structure in the blend that is not available in either of the inputs. In short, “the incongruity of the butcher’s means with the surgeon’s ends leads to the central inference that the butcher is incompetent” (Grady Oakley, & Coulson, 2007: 424). In that sense, while the CMT allows the identification of the source and target inputs, and establishes connections between their elements, the CBT expands that relationship by analyzing it in the four-space network of conceptual integration that also includes the emergent structure not captured by the former framework. In sum, while the CMT model is focused on investigating entrenched conceptualizations, the CBT model deals with dynamic on-line processes of meaning construction. With the arguments presented in the above paragraphs in mind, it can be concluded that the joint use of the two frameworks can facilitate and unite the investigation of both conventionalized mappings available for recruitment, and individual instances of active, on-line meaning construction. 2.2.9. Taking a Slightly Different Turn: The Coded Meaning Model In addition to the approach to conceptual blending advocated by Fauconnier and Turner, the present paper will discuss another ‘alternative’ approach - The Coded Meaning Model, introduced by Coulson and Oakley (2005). Namely, building on the previous work in conceptual blending performed by Fauconnier and Turner (e.g. 2002), and Brandt and Brandt (2002), 26 Coulson and Oakley (2005) introduced the coded meaning model. The predominant role of this approach was to attempt to foreground the importance of contextual information and background cognition that play vital roles in the process of meaning construction. Additionally, the authors argue that “coded meaning plays an important role in the construction of conceptual integration networks” (Coulson & Oakley, 2005: 1511). The coded meaning model includes a presentation space, a reference space, a blended space, and a grounding box. The presentation space is similar to the source domain of a conceptual metaphor, while the reference space “represents the facet of a situation that is the present focus of attention of the discourse participants” (ibid.: 1516). The grounding box is used to include the “role of implicit and explicit assumptions in meaning construction” (ibid.: 1517). In other words, following in the footsteps of the mental space theory, the role of the grounding box is to account for the influence of the immediate context, as well as for the background knowledge that might be recruited for the purposes of building a conceptual integration network. Brandt and Brandt (2002) developed a model that consists of six spaces: a semiotic space, a presentation space, a reference space, a relevance space, a virtual space, and a meaning space. Such approach was developed as a result of criticism of the blending theory, specifically its inability to provide a clear account of the origin of the emergent structure (cited in Coulson & Oakley, 2005: 1515). Coulson and Oakley adopted the presentation and reference spaces form their model, while the blended space comes from Fauconnier and Turner’s approach. 26
Conceptual Blending Theory
As such, the grounding box appears as a ‘partial’ counterpart of the generic space. Namely, while the generic space contains general relations at the conceptual level, which apply to the entire network, the grounding box on the other hand is more concerned with the elements of the immediate context and background knowledge structures that usually take a more tangible form. Coulson and Oakley (2005: 1517) propose two possibilities for a grounding box: deictic and displaced. The deictic grounding box includes specific conditions like time, place, status of discourse participants, or the forum where the situation is taking place (e.g. an office). A displaced grounding box is set up when the immediate context activates “structured background knowledge that constitutes and constrains the interpretive process” (ibid.: 1517). This is reminiscent of frame-recruitment, where a particular frame introduces not only roles, but also full sets of attitudes, available from long-term memory. As a result, the construed meaning will depend on “the background knowledge of the participants, as well as the extant mental space configuration set up by the local context” (ibid.: 1522).
Figure 6. On the one hand ... on the other hand (adopted from Coulson and Oakley, 2005: 1524) The idiom “on the one hand/on the other hand” discussed in Coulson and Oakley (2005: 1523-1524) can be used to exemplify an analysis in the above described theoretical model (see Figure 6). The authors discuss a paragraph dealing with a relationship between the EU and Israel that appeared in a newspaper article: ‘‘I noticed people saying, which they didn’t use to say, but now they have been saying for the last year or so, perhaps Israel should have never been invented, but then I hear them say that the only solution is for the Arabs to accept the existence of Israel, and normalize with it’’, she says. ‘‘So I see them on the one hand acknowledging that the Arabs have reason to resent the Europeans for supporting something they find intrusive, but on the other hand demanding the Arabs to put up with it, now
Conceptual Blending Theory
that it has happened. And so it would be more consistent for the Europeans, and the British included, to say: Yes, we did want Israel to exist, and it is not a mistake, but since Israel is more us than you, Israel’s future will be more with us than with you, the Arabs.’’ (Coulson & Oakley, 2005: 1523; originally appeared in Haaertz, January 26, 2004)
The idiom “on the one hand/on the other hand” prompts the construction of a blended space in which each hand supports a certain position, and there is an emergent structure that suggests that the position held in one hand should be dropped in favor of the position in the other hand. This way the blend is actually anchored in the human body (in the sense of Hutchins, 2005), and the two hands provide spatial orientation for the two opposing positions, which is licensed by the entrenched nature of the idiom. The presentation space contains human hands and the bilateral symmetry of the human body, while the reference space contains two ideas: 1) the creation of Israel was a mistake, and 2) Arabs must put up with Israel. Elements of the grounding box, which include participants, forum, and circumstances, are presented in Figure 6. 2.2.10. Section Summary The present section provided an overview of the basic tenets of the Mental Space Theory, and it also presented the main elements of the Conceptual Blending framework, where blending is viewed as “an offspring of the theory of mental spaces” (Harder, 2005: 1639). Special attention was paid to vital relations, topology principles, and the notions of compression and the systematic nature of compression in the sense of Fauconnier and Turner (2008), and Fauconnier (2008). Additionally, the basic characteristics of single- and double-scope networks which will be of particular interest for the present research have also been presented. The current section also pointed out the main similarities and differences between the CMT and CBT, and presented arguments in favor of a joint use of the two frameworks. Finally, the section finished by presenting the Coded Meaning Model as introduced by Coulson and Oakley (2005).
Affect and Emotions
2.3. Affect and Emotions The present section of the paper will outline some of the dominant approaches to research in the domains of affect and emotional responses. Building on the basic definitions of emotion concepts and affect, the section continues with the discussion of the Russell’s circumplex, the PANAS model, the Core Affect model, and the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion. This is followed by the overview of literature dealing with the role of emotional and affective experiences in relation to the media and politics. Finally, the section closes by summing up the main conclusions, thereby providing the theoretical grounding that will be used in the second part of the present research. 2.3.1. Emotion Concepts In general terms, “emotions are commonly defined as positive and negative feelings in certain situations” (Nešić et al., 2009: 137), and the ability to make sense of those feelings is facilitated by the use of concepts. Emotion concepts are similar to other abstract concepts addressed in the context of cognitive semantics, and they “are not only fundamental for an understanding of the social world; they are fundamental to the development of an individual’s behavioral repertoire” (Niedenthal, 2008: 587). In that sense, a complete account of human behavior and experience necessitates a detailed insight into the structure of emotional dimensions of that experience. An important distinction to be stressed at this point is the one between emotions and moods. Namely, although related in the sense that they refer to subjective states, “mood is a much broader concept than emotion” (Gray & Watson, 2007: 171), since moods last considerably longer compared to emotions, and they are also more frequent and consistent. Emotions, on the other hand, “are typically short-lasting, may be intense, focused, and often have a clear causal underpinning” (Barlett & Gentile, 2011: 60). Among other approaches to the analysis of emotions, Niedenthal (2008) discusses the dimensional models (e.g. Russell, 1980; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), and models that view emotion concepts as prototypes (e.g. Russell, 1991; 2003). The dominant dimensional models that discuss the dimensions of valence and arousal, and notions of positive and negative affect, are described in great detail in subsections 126.96.36.199, 188.8.131.52, and 184.108.40.206. The application of prototypicality effects onto emotion concepts reflects the idea that an emotion concept is “a fuzzy one defined by a set of probable features, but not necessary and sufficient ones, that overlap with closely related categories” (Niedenthal, 2008: 592). Further application of the prototype theory to emotion concepts is evident in Russell’s research (1991), where he views emotions as “events having a causal and temporal structure, and not objects, and so the notions of a temporally structured script best captures the representation of an emotion” (Niedenthal, 2008: 593). Consequently, “to know the sense of a term like anger, fear, or jealousy is to know the script for that emotion” (Russell, 1991: 39, cited in Niedenthal,
Affect and Emotions
2008: 593), which reflects the connection between the Russell’s notion of an emotion script, and the notion of frames from cognitive semantics. 2.3.2. Affect “Affect plays a central role in human experience” (Gray & Watson, 2007: 171) and, in comparison to emotions and moods, it stands as a “more inclusive psychological construct that refers to mental states involving evaluative feelings” (ibid.: 171). Furthermore, “affect is conceptualized as more global than emotions and mood, and may consist of many different emotional and mood states” (Barlett & Gentile, 2011: 60). In view of its value in the construction of the fully developed human scale experience, it can be added that, “perception without an affective component lacks the first-person, subjective quality that is the hallmark of conscious awareness of external sensory information” (Duncan & Barrett, 2007: 1197). In terms of its structure, the two dominant models of affect include the specific-affect theories, and dimensional theories. The former group of theories was based on a discrete-affect model, where it was considered that a number of well-defined content factors were required to fully explain the affective experience (Gray & Watson, 2007). However, “these specific-affect scales usually were found to be significantly interrelated” (ibid.: 172). The latter group of theories was designed to overcome the shortcomings of the former group, and “given the very broad non-specific nature of affective experience of affect, researchers began to adopt models that bypassed these discrete affects and posited fewer underlying dimensions” (ibid.: 172). Two of the most dominant dimensional models include the Russell’s circumplex, and the PANAS model, both of which are discussed in greater detail in subsections 220.127.116.11 and 18.104.22.168. Another important fact to be stressed when dealing with the measurements of affect pertains to the difference between state and trait affect. Namely, while state affect refers to short emotional episodes directly related to the immediate context, i.e. a specific stimulus, trait affect reflects “long-term, stable individual differences that reflect a person’s general tendency to experience a particular affective state” (ibid.: 172). In that sense, type-one questionnaires 27 used in the second part of the present research were designed to measure state affect. 22.214.171.124. The Circumplex Model of Affect Russell (1980) introduced the Circumplex Model of Affect, where he proposed that “affective states are, in fact, best represented as a circle in a two-dimensional bipolar space” (Russell, 1980: 1161-1162). 28 In that sense, this model represents one of the dimensional models of affect, where affect is represented in terms of two main components: valence (pleasure – displeasure), and arousal (activation - sleep). As a result, “any
See section 4.2 for details. See Figures 7 and 8 for details.
Affect and Emotions
affect word could be defined as some combination of pleasure and arousal components” (ibid.: 1163). In short, the circumplex model of affect represents a coordinate system in a two-dimensional space, where the horizontal axis corresponds to the pleasure-displeasure dimension of affect, while the vertical axis corresponds to the arousal-sleep dimension. Consequently, all affect-related words can be defined as vectors that originate from the center of the coordinate system, and are distributed in a circular fashion in relation to that center (Russell, 1980). As a result, each vector defines a single point in the two-dimensional space of the circumplex. This in turn supports Russell’s proposition that there are no clear-cut boundaries between emotion concepts, and they cannot be accurately represented on a simple scale, but require a two-dimensional geometric model. In other words, “each word can thus be considered a label for a fuzzy set, defined as a class without sharp boundaries, in which there is a gradual but specifiable transition from membership to nonmembership” (Russell, 1980: 1165). Such reasoning is also aligned with some of the basic tenets of cognitive semantics, where words are seen as prompts for vast repositories of meaning, rather than exclusive labels that correspond to strictly defined entities (e.g. Saeed, 2003). Additionally, Posner, Russell, and Peterson (2005) provided a more recent account of the application of the circumplex model in which they gave further validation for its use, and, among other points, discussed the neural circuitries that support valence and arousal, as well as the developmental correlates of the circumplex.
Figure 7. Eight affect concepts in a circular order (adopted from Russell, 1980: 1164)
Figure 8. Direct circular scaling coordinates for 28 affect words (adopted from Russell, 1980: 1167)
Building on the previously described circumplex model, Russell, Weiss, and Mendelsohn (1989) introduced the Affect Grid that represents “a scale designed as a quick means of assessing affect along the dimensions of pleasure-displeasure and arousal-sleepiness” (Russell, Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 1989: 493). The Affect Grid is a single-point item scale represented in the form of a 9x9 matrix organized along the valence and arousal dimensions of affect, like the Russell’s circumplex. Affect descriptors listed around the grid “are arranged from the northwest corner of the grid in a clockwise direction – stress, high arousal, excitement,
Affect and Emotions
pleasant feelings, relaxation, sleepiness, depression, and unpleasant feelings – so that the two major dimensions are represented as bipolar opposites” 29 (Gray & Watson, 2007: 177). In experimental contexts, the experimental subjects have the task to rate their response to the presented stimulus by marking an appropriate field on the grid. For instance, the affect grid was used as one of the instruments in the study conducted by Lindquist and Barrett (2006).
Figure 9. The Affect Grid (adopted from Russell, Weiss, and Mendelsohn, 1989: 494) 126.96.36.199. The PANAS Model The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), first introduced by Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988), represents another dimensional model of affect, which distinguishes between the two primary dimensions of mood - positive (PA) and negative affect (NA). To avoid the misinterpretation of equating PA with pleasure and NA with displeasure, it is important to stress the fact that “PA is a measure of the combination of pleasure and arousal, while 30 NA is a measure of the combination of displeasure and arousal” (Russell, Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 1989: 498). The measurement tool that this model utilizes is based on a list of adjectives with ten adjectives related to PA and ten adjectives related to NA, where each adjective is graded on a 5-point Likert scale. The final list of adjectives was obtained using factor analysis that was applied to the initial list of 60 terms adopted from previous research. The aim of such a procedure was to “select terms that were relatively pure markers of either PA or NA” (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988: 1064). Additionally, the PANAS questionnaire can be tailored to suit a particular purpose by introducing an appropriate temporal reference (see Figure 10 for details). Apart from the presently described version of the PANAS model, Watson and Clark (1994) introduced the PANAS-X model, where they “expanded this instrument by including 11 factor-analytically derived scales that assess specific, lower order affects” (Gray & Watson, 2007: 176). 31 The fact that “one interesting property of a circumplex is that since rotation of the axes leaves the circular configuration of the variables intact, rotation is considered arbitrary” (Russell, 1980: 1171) offers a connection between the Russell’s circumplex and the PANAS model. Namely, the PA and NA dimensions from See Figure 9 for details. My italics. 31 For more details about the PANAS-X model, consult Watson and Clark, 1994, and Gray and Watson, 2007: 176. 29 30
Affect and Emotions
the PANAS model can be obtained directly from the circumplex by rotating the circumplex’s valence-arousal space by 450 counterclockwise (Russell, Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 1989; Gray & Watson, 2007; Niedenthal, 2008). This is made possible owing to the fact that “from a circumplex point of view, any rotation of the axes is possible because the structure of affect is determined by the circular ordering” (Russell, Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 1989: 494). However, it needs to be stressed that these two dimensional models “offer opposing views on the polarity of the dimensions of affective space” (Gray & Watson, 2007: 173). While Russell’s circumplex stresses the bipolar nature of affect, PANAS focuses on two mostly unipolar dimensions. 32 Namely, “whether or not PA and NA are in fact orthogonal or correlated dimensions has been, and remains, a controversial issue“ (Thompson, 2007: 229). 33 Additionally, both models have received numerous empirical validations (Gray & Watson, 2007; Lang & Ewoldsen, 2011).
Figure 10. The PANAS (adopted from Watson, Clark, and Tellegen, 1988: 1070)
Figure 11. I-PANAS-SF (adopted form Thompson, 2007: 240) 32 For a detailed account of the differences and similarities between these two dimensional models of affect see Gray and Watson, 2007: 172-173. 33 For a discussion on the validity of the PANAS model see, for example, Crawford and Henry, 2004.
Affect and Emotions
In order to aid the advancement of cross-cultural research on affect, building on the initial PANAS model (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), Thompson (2007) developed an internationally reliable 10-item version dubbed I-PANAS-SF (see Figure 11 for details). His research “was specifically aimed at developing a measure for trait affect” (Thompson, 2007: 231). An additional motivation for such course of research resides in the fact that covariances between some of the PANAS items “suggested considerable redundancy of the PANAS items closely related to each other in meaning” (ibid.: 230), which gave way for item reduction without compromising scale efficacy and validity. 188.8.131.52. The Core Affect Model The Core Affect Model belongs to the group of psychological constructionist models that suggest that an emotion is constructed out of more basic components (Russell, 2003; Barrett, 2006). Core affect can be defined as “a neurological state that is consciously accessible as a simple, nonreflective feeling that is an integral blend of hedonic (pleasure-displeasure) and arousal (sleepy-activated) values” (Russell, 2003: 147). In other words, core affect “is the ongoing, ever-changing state that is available to be categorized during emotion conceptualization” (Barrett, 2006: 31), which reflects the similarity between the development of emotion concepts and other concepts discussed in the framework of cognitive semantics, and also suggests that emotion construction is essentially related to the on-line process of meaning construction. Such categorization of core affect will prove to be one of the cornerstones of the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion discussed in subsection 2.3.3. The notion of “core” in core affect has multiple implications (Barrett, 2006). First of all, “core” can refer to some basic sort of “core” knowledge, and it is meant to distinguish core affect form the general notion of affect. Secondly, “this form of affective responding is “core” because it is influenced by a very simple form of meaning analysis” (Barrett, 2006: 31), regardless of the value assigned to the stimulus. Additionally, “core” also means that the “basic instrumental behaviors [...] are part of this form of affective responding” (ibid.: 31). Finally, it is suggested that “core affect is universal to all humans [...] and forms the core of emotion experience” (Duncan & Barrett, 2007: 1186). Furthermore, the influences of various stimuli “allow core affect to always be represented verbally as feelings of valence, and it is often represented as arousal” (Barrett, 2006: 31). This in turn suggests that the dominant perception of core affect appears in the form of valence (e.g. positive or negative), while the degree of activation, i.e. arousal is often more difficult to capture through the use of self-report measurements. Russell (2003) also suggests that core affect can be attributed to a stimulus, but can also appear in a free-floating form, unrelated to any particular stimulus (e.g. in moods). Another important fact pertains to the difference between core affect that is related to an individual experiencing it, and the affective quality which is situated in the stimulus. Namely, “objects, events and places (real, imagined, or anticipated) enter consciousness affectively interpreted” (Russell, 2003: 149), and the perception of affective quality influences
Affect and Emotions
individuals’ reactions to them. This in turn leads to the notion of emotional meta-experience that Russell (2003) uses to describe an individual’s experience of a particular emotion. This represents “a categorization of one’s state” (ibid.: 150), or in other words, “categorizing affect puts a person into a state that corresponds with the colloquial idea of “having an emotion”” (Barrett, 2006: 21). Additionally, it is important to note that Russell (2003) places special emphasis on prototypical conceptual representations. 184.108.40.206.1. Core Affect and Cognition Building on the results from the corpus of contemporary research, Duncan and Barrett (2007) stress the idea that affect and cognition are not two completely separable mental processes, as had been stipulated in the traditional psychological frameworks, but are instead largely connected and tend to interact with each other. Such line of reasoning lends support to the claim that “affect is a form of cognition” (Duncan & Barrett, 2007: 1185), which is further reinforced by the finding that “the circuitry that instantiates a core affective state is widely distributed throughout the brain, and includes so-called “cognitive” areas” (ibid.: 1201), i.e. “no brain areas can be designated specifically as “cognitive” or “affective”” (ibid.: 1187). Additionally, the authors propose that, depending on the focus of attention, core affect can appear as either the central or a background trait of consciousness. In the latter case, “backgrounded core affect is experienced as a property of the external world, rather than as the person’s reaction to it” (ibid.: 1202), whereas in the former case, when it is foregrounded, “core affect will be experienced directly as pleasant or unpleasant content with some degree of arousal [...] and can serve as information for making explicit judgments and decisions” (ibid.: 1203). The multifaceted value of core affect is reflected in the fact that it “makes external information from the world personally relevant to people, providing them with a first-person experience of the world, a fluency with language so that they can describe those experiences, and enhances how those experiences are encoded for future use” (ibid.: 1196-1197). In these terms, core affect can be argued to give ‘color’ and more specific shapes to the human conscious awareness of the world. Bearing in mind that “all words have an affective dimension of meaning” (ibid.: 1198), it is clear why core affect has an invaluable role in language. Furthermore, “the affective dimension in language makes communication personal and easy to accomplish, and is an important contributor to language fluency” (Altariba & Mathis, 1997, cited in Duncan & Barrett, 2007: 1199). In that sense, the abilities to both extract the affective meaning of words, and successfully communicate that affective meaning, are the underlying requirements for language fluency. Apart from linguistic messages, affective meaning is also present in the non-linguistic forms of communication. In addition to its role in language, core affect can also be suggested to influence the formation of background knowledge structures, in the sense that it “helps determine which experiences of the world are encoded in the brain for later use” (Duncan & Barrett, 2007: 1200). This line of reasoning also reflects the ideas of embodied cognition, where the human cognitive architecture is understood to be conditioned by the
Affect and Emotions
various types of sensory experiences (e.g. Saeed, 2003; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003[1980b]; Gibbs & Colston, 2006) which in turn have an inescapable affective dimension. In summary, affect cannot be divorced from cognition, since the specific neural circuitries that support the two phenomena largely overlap (Duncan & Barrett, 2007). Consequently, the process of meaning construction coincides with the process of emotion construction and core affect categorization, so that one constantly influences the other. While core affect will necessarily influence the on-line computations of meaning, these on-line computations, along with the context that is introduced, will also influence the construction of a specific emotional experience that takes place within that same context. Such development reflects the dynamics of the human mind, where there are no explicitly separated modules reserved for individual processes. Instead, there is a constant interplay between different neural circuitries, parts of which are often shared by different processes, all of which contributes to the active, on-line construction of human experience in its fully developed form. In other words, the specific neural mechanisms, coupled with the realworld contextual elements and background knowledge, can be understood as the grounding that sanctions the completely elaborated experience at the human scale. 2.3.3. The Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion Like the previously discussed Core Affect Model, the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion also “belongs to a class of models known as psychological constructionist models, which view emotions as psychological events that are composed of more basic psychological components” (Lindquist & Barrett, 2008: 902). In other words, “emotions are not biologically given, but are constructed via the process of categorization” (Barrett, 2006: 27), during which more abstract affective experiences, dubbed core affect, are conceptualized as more specific emotional experiences. As a result, “the experience of emotion does not issue from discrete bursts of activity in putative emotion mechanisms, but rather from an act of conceptualization” (ibid.: 38). This in turn reflects the previously introduced idea that emotions are not entities with strictly defined boundaries, but rather fuzzy sets without clear-cut distinctions (Russell, 1980; 2003; Niedenthal, 2008), i.e. “emotion concepts do not have conceptual cores but are represented by loose collections of situated conceptualizations” 34 (WilsonMendenhall et al., 2011: 1107). Namely, “concepts are not typically processed in isolation but are typically situated in background settings, events, and introspections” (Barsalou, 2009: 1238), and in that sense, situated conceptualizations refer to situated representations of categories. Bearing in mind the discussion presented in Barsalou (2009: 1283-1284), situated conceptualizations can be understood as highly specified partial frames tailored to fit specific situations. Such conclusion stems from the fact that “because a single general conceptualization would be too vague to support relevant inferences in specific situations, representations that are more 34
For a detailed account of the notion of “situated conceptualizations” see Barsalou, 2009.
Affect and Emotions
specialized are constructed instead” (ibid.: 1283). Therefore, “a concept is the skill or ability to produce a wide variety of situated conceptualizations that support goal achievement in specific contexts” (ibid.: 1283). Consequently, the Conceptual Act Theory proposes that “emotion concepts [...] refer to entire situations, and thereby represent settings, agents, objects, actions, events, introspections, and mentalizing” (WilsonMendenhall et al., 2011: 1107), which again suggests that emotion concepts include the recruitment of partial frame structures, i.e. situated conceptualizations, and the entire process of emotion construction is similar to the active construction of a mental space that takes place during the on-line semantic processing. With that in mind, the two main ingredients of the Conceptual Act Theory are core affect, and the conceptual knowledge about emotions. Another important parameter foregrounded by the Conceptual Act Theory is the importance of individuals’ previous experience, i.e. their background knowledge related to specific emotion concepts, which serves to both constrain and direct the categorization of core affect. In addition to background knowledge, the effects of the immediate context are not to be disregarded either, since each conceptualization of a particular emotion “is situated, in that it is a highly specialized package of conceptual knowledge that is tailored to the needs of the person in a given context” (Barrett, 2006: 33), i.e. “knowledge about emotion is contextdependent [...] and driven by emotion language” (ibid.: 38). Coupled with the fact that “language plays a strong causal role in conceptual development of emotion knowledge” (ibid.: 34), the previous stipulations suggest that the knowledge about emotions is acquired along the same guidelines as the knowledge about other concepts, with language as a conduit. In other words, “emotion concepts are abstract concepts that work in fundamentally the same way as other kinds of abstract concepts” (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011: 1107), and the Conceptual Act Theory “suggests an intrinsic role for language in the emergence of emotional experience” (Barrett, 2006: 37). An important outcome of the present model resides in the fact that the modulations of core affect during the process of emotion construction can influence cognition and behavior (Barrett, 2006; Duncan & Barrett, 2007), and in that sense, “emotion categories can be thought as goal-directed categories that develop to guide action” (Barrett, 2006: 37). Additionally, “conceptual knowledge about emotion constitutes expertise about how to deal with your own internal state – experienced as “an emotion” – and the situation or event that you believe caused that emotion in the first place” (ibid.: 36). Consequently, this suggests that the categorization of core affect also influences an individual’s reasoning regarding future actions within the given context. In other words, the frame associated to a certain emotion concept carries in it a backgroundknowledge-based formula that ‘tells’ an individual how to express the on-line computed emotion depending on the context. For example, if an individual experiences fear before a job interview, he should try to compose himself by, for example, controlling his breathing. If, on the other hand, an individual experiences fear during an encounter with a wolf while taking a walk in the forest, the right course of action would be to flee the scene, or climb the nearest tree. In summary, the presented course of reasoning supports the initial claim that
Affect and Emotions
emotional involvement can influence cognition and behavior, and it also reinforces the role of background knowledge and immediate context in this process. In addition to its purely theoretical appeal, the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion has also been supported by empirical research. The first study that provided empirical support for the present theoretical framework was conducted by Lindquist and Barrett (2008), where the two authors investigated the worldfocused experience of fear as a conceptual act. Their findings showed that “the world-focused experience of fear can be produced by the interplay of two more basic psychological ingredients: core affect and conceptual knowledge of emotion” (Lindquist & Barrett, 2008: 902). Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, Simmons, and Barsalou (2011) conducted another empirical study, where the following two main hypotheses, derived from the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion, were tested: 1) “emotion is constructed differently depending on the situation” (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011: 1120), and 2) “the composition of a situated conceptualization for an emotion would draw on contributions from different sources of information in the distributed neural circuitry that produces emotion in general” (ibid.: 1111). The results of the experiment supported both of the two hypotheses. 35 Finally, it is important to stress the major similarities and differences between the Core Affect Model, and the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion, bearing in mind that the two frameworks are largely connected. Namely, as discussed in Barrett (2006: 41), both models deal with continuous changes of core affect; both models claim that the changes in the body need not correspond to specific templates for discrete emotions; and the fact that core affect can undergo additional meaning analysis is also supported by both frameworks. On the other hand, unlike the Core Affect Model, the Conceptual Act Theory proposes that categorization plays a much broader role in emotion construction, in the sense that “even nonprototypical conceptual representations will be used to conceptualize core affect as emotional when the situation demands it” (ibid.); the Conceptual Act Theory places stronger emphasis on more contextual and socially situated emotion concepts; and finally, in the Conceptual Act Theory framework, linking an object to core affect is viewed as a consequence of categorization, whereas the Core Affect Model sees this as a purely attributional process. 2.3.4. Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion and Conceptual Blending Theory: Points of Intersection With the previous subsections in mind, it is transparent that the presently discussed framework can be directly linked to some of the ground-stone-ideas of cognitive semantics and cognitive linguistics in general. First and foremost, the similarities between the two approaches include the emphasis on the processes of categorization and conceptualization which provide the scaffolding for both meaning construction and emotion construction. In that sense, the categorization of more abstract core affect along with the recruitment of
35 For a detailed account of the two experimental studies consult the respective references. Being beyond the scope of the present research, this section lists only the most important conclusions from the two studies.
Affect and Emotions
background knowledge associated to more specific emotion concepts can also be understood as analogous to the process of meaning construction. Another valuable point of intersection is the importance attributed to background knowledge and the immediate context, which impose a significant influence on both meaning construction and emotion conceptualization. Furthermore, the previously stipulated link between language and emotion knowledge renders the two phenomena directly connected, which in turn licenses the claim that the process of meaning construction is in fact interwoven with the process of emotion construction. This idea is further supported by the empirical findings from contemporary research presented in Duncan and Barrett (2007). When placed in the context of a linguistic stimulus-response environment, which will be discussed in the second part of the present research, it can be hypothesized that the link between the processes of meaning construction and emotion construction can be further elaborated as a cause-effect relation, where the two processes take place parallel to each other, and can directly influence one another. In short, the computed meaning, conditioned by background knowledge and the immediate context, and the specific emotional reaction, interact to sculpt each other’s final shapes. Such sculpting will necessarily involve the process of core affect categorization that shares the same context as the process of meaning construction, and may involve the recruitment of additional background knowledge structures related to specific emotion concepts. The interplay of background knowledge structures related to the frames involved in meaning construction, and background knowledge from the frames related to particular emotion concepts, coupled with the influence of the immediate context, will cause the experience of a specific emotion to vary, a proposal which is in line with the general arguments presented in Barrett (2006), Wilson-Mendenhall et al. (2011), Russell (2003), and Barsalou (2009). In addition to the already stipulated link between situated conceptualizations and highly specified partial frame structures, a connection can also be established between background knowledge structures available for recruitment during the on-line cognitive work and entrenched situated conceptualizations. Namely, “over time, the situated conceptualization becomes so well established that it becomes active automatically and immediately when the situation arises” (Barsalou, 2009: 1284), just like familiar background knowledge structures get recruited in the process of meaning construction. Furthermore, Barsalou (2009) proposes that “once situated conceptualizations become entrenched in memory, they support a pattern completion inference process” (1284). This is reminiscent of the process of completion involved in the development of emergent structure in the context of the CBT, where the structure of the organizing frame of the blend is completed by additional entrenched background knowledge structures related to the frame in question. Viewed in the context of situated conceptualizations, “when a partially viewed situation activates a situated conceptualization, the conceptualization completes the pattern that the situation suggests” (ibid.: 1284).
Affect and Emotions
2.3.5. Affect, Emotions, Media, and Politics The mass media are a powerful tool for inducing and altering individuals’ emotional states (Barlett & Gentile, 2011; Lang & Ewoldsen, 2011), which is often exploited for purposes of persuasion, especially in the context of political discourse (Schemer, 2012; Ridout & Searles, 2011). As a result, “political scientists have recognized that both substantive message content and emotional content are important in understanding the effects of campaign advertising on voters” (Ridout & Searles, 2011: 440). Namely, placing a person in a desired state of mind can influence their decision-making and behavior, owing to the fact that “affect will influence one’s information-processing abilities” (Barlett & Gentile, 2011: 62). Additionally, both the perception and the emotional experience in individuals “have been shown to have profound effects on many aspects of on-line message processing and subsequent related behavior” (Lang & Ewoldsen, 2011: 79). In his overview of the previous research dealing with emotional responses to political campaigns, Schemer (2012: 415) concludes that “political campaign communication clearly aims at voters’ emotions.” The author also argues that one of the main benefits of voters’ emotional and affective involvement is situated in the fact that such involvement can be used to direct their attention. For example, as shown in previous research, “attack ads aroused voters’ negative emotions thereby influencing their candidate evaluations” (ibid.: 413). Consequently, “on one hand, affective reactions are precursors to the attention to political advertising. On the other hand, the attention to such ads elicits affective reactions” (ibid.: 414), suggesting that one process fuels the other. The author also proposes that negative affective reactions are especially suitable as attention-directing devices. Additionally, in his study Schemer (2012) “demonstrated the reciprocal relation between attention to political ads and negative affective reactions in political campaigns” (ibid.: 426), where one amplifies the other. Namely, the author showed that negative political ads against asylum seekers in Switzerland produced negative affective reactions against that entire group, and these negative reactions were further reinforced due to the attention that they provoked in the first place. Ridout and Searles (2011) conducted a study in which they analyzed the conditions under which emotional appeals are exploited in political campaigns, and which types of appeals are favored by politicians. They opened their discussion with the claim that “there is little question that political campaigns make appeals to voters’ emotions” (ibid.: 439). Based on the examination of “631 unique ads aired in 26 different U.S. Senate races from the year 2004” (ibid.: 446), the authors managed to conclude that there are certain systematic patterns that include the use of specific emotional appeals during the course of a political campaign. For example, the use of anger “is much more predictable than the use of other appeals, such as pride or enthusiasm” (ibid.: 455). Additionally, despite the obvious manipulative dimensions of the use of emotional appeal in the political setting, the authors also stress the importance of context, and the stage of the political race, which serve as two very important variables that determine the use of one type of the emotional appeal in favor of the other. Finally, although Ridout and Searles’ study stresses the importance of an emotional
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appeal in TV campaign ads, the importance of provoking an emotional appeal in press reports should not be neglected either. 2.3.6. Section Summary In brief, the present section gave an overview of some of the dominant models of affect and emotions that provide the grounds for practical measurements of real-time responses to specific stimuli. Namely, this section introduced the two dominant dimensional models of affect – the Circumplex Model of Affect and the PANAS model, which was followed by the discussion of the Core Affect model and the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion. Additionally, some results of contemporary research in political psychology, as well as the relationship between affect, emotions, media, and politics have also been presented.
3. Previous Research In addition to the previous research already discussed within the theoretical framework of the paper, the current section will present a few additional research papers dealing with metaphors and conceptual blending in political discourse.
3.1. CMT Framework Semino and Masci (1996) discussed conceptual metaphors in the discourse of Silvio Berlusconi, and found that the most prominent metaphors used by this politician were those “drawing on the source domains of football, war and biblical images” (Semino & Masci, 1996: 245). The quantitative analysis showed that the football metaphors were the most prominent and most frequent, followed by the war metaphors. The fact that Berlusconi created “the whole identity of his new party around the football metaphor” (ibid.: 250) enabled him to both bring his supporters closer together by aiming at their emotional attachment to the newly-founded political team, and to bring them closer to the complex political topics through the use of simple sport terminology. Additionally, the analysis revealed that “Berlusconi ... frequently mixed the football and war metaphors” (ibid.: 253) which led to a “metaphorical system that is likely to sound natural and coherent” (ibid.: 254), owing to the fact that both metaphors are pervasive in political discourse, and can be viewed as an extension of conventional metaphors SPORT IS WAR and WAR IS SPORT (ibid., 1996). Burnes (2011), analyzed metaphors used in French and British newspaper reports of the 2008 elections that took place in Pakistan and the US. The study showed that the most frequently used metaphors were those of conflict. Namely, “in the US election reports, conflict metaphors constituted almost a quarter of metaphors (24%) describing the elections, and in the Pakistan reports, they comprised over a third” (Burnes, 2011: 2166). Among others, the corpus analysis also revealed the presence of ‘sport’ and ‘journey’ metaphors. With “the reciprocal relationship between
metaphors” (ibid.: 2169) in mind, and taking into
consideration that “as source domains, sports and war both equate physical power with political power” (ibid.: 2169), it is understandable why the two domains are so suitable for use in the political arena. Additionally, such results suggest that “Western society places a positive value on conflict, and conceptualizes politics primarily in terms of conflict” (ibid.: 2174). Journey metaphors were especially prominent in reports of US elections, where Obama was portrayed as an emissary “sent by Martin Luther King to continue the journey to a better America” (ibid.: 2171). Furthermore, “Obama used the journey metaphor in his victory speech in a way which echoed Martin Luther King” (ibid.: 2170). Such framing of political ideas is aimed at obtaining positive evaluations from the public through the emphasis on equality and the pursuit of a better future. This gives another illustration of the potential for highlighting and hiding that the conceptual metaphor offers.
3.2. CBT Framework Coulson and Oakley (2006) analyzed two examples of persuasive discourse to show how both cases “use discourse to prompt very specific actions in the world” (ibid.: 48), and how the CBT framework accounts for the mental operations that license such real-time influence of discourse onto people’s behavior. Still, the authors emphasize that “the rhetorical effect of the text [...] depends in part on the reader’s willingness to construct the blend” (ibid.: 51). The two examples include “a widely distributed email message urging recipients to vote for Democratic candidates in the 1998 U.S. congressional election” (ibid.: 47), sent by Michael Moore, and “a solicitation for monetary donations from the St. Matthew’s Church Ministry” (ibid.: 47). The present section will address only the most interesting details related to the first example, where five distinct instances of conceptual blending that can be found in Moore’s argument are presented. These include palatable candidates, stinky candidates, public conversation, sending a message, and the legal act of civil disobedience. If you want Congress to stop this witch hunt, if you want Congress to start focusing on the REAL problems facing this country and the world ... get out and vote November 3. Hold your nose if you have to. (ibid.: 51)
For example, the above excerpt illustrates the stinky candidates blend which involves input spaces of voting and holding one’s nose while performing an action. The voting frame recruits a familiar script of going to the ballot and casting a vote for one of the candidates, whereas the organizing frame of the other input involves an unpleasant action. As the process of conceptual integration progresses, voting is framed “as an unpleasant but necessary chore” (ibid.: 51), and the entrenched nature “of the ‘stinks’ metaphor allows speakers to understand the text as acknowledging the limited political options available to progressive voters” (ibid.: 51). Consequently, in the blend “the voter is performing an unpleasant task in a stench-ridden environment, and that task is to choose the thing that stinks the least” (ibid.: 52). Such integration network is expected to prompt the reader to vote for the candidate that stinks less, i.e. for the Democrat. In the discussion of the public conversation blend, the authors suggest that it “has desirable rhetorical characteristics from both a cognitive and an affective standpoint” (ibid.: 53). This suggests that the blend simplifies the course of events, and “if the reader fully integrates knowledge about the political process with her own personal experience with losing arguments, it can evoke the sorts of emotions that accompany the latter” (ibid.: 53). In turn, such line of reasoning supports the general idea that conceptual blending can serve to modulate affective states, which will be pursued in sections 4.1 and 4.2 of the present paper. Coulson and Oakley (2008) analyzed the CONNECT THE DOTS metaphor from a radio interview with the former White House Special Advisor on Counterterrorism, Richard A. Clarke. One of the authors’ goals was to attempt to integrate the CBT framework and the Mental Space Theory with “Chafe’s (1994) theory of discourse based on conscious experience” (Coulson & Oakley, 2008: 28). Additionally, the authors argued that the understanding of the excerpts from the above mentioned interview “relies upon three interrelated kinds of
knowledge that we call elements of understanding” (ibid.: 28). These elements include linguistic knowledge, cultural knowledge and situational knowledge. The situational knowledge that Coulson and Oakley discuss includes the necessary information about the setting, participants, and the immediate circumstances that underlie the given event. In this particular example, the participants are Richard Clarke, Dave Davies, the journalist, and Richard Posner, a virtual participant (ibid.). The setting is constrained by the radio interview, while the “rhetorical context of the exchange is the differing assessment of Clarke (the actual guest) and Posner (the virtual participant) of the Congressional report by the 9/11 Commission” (ibid.: 32). The cultural knowledge assumes the awareness that the
CONNECT THE DOTS
metaphor is largely
related to the events from 9/11, i.e. the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. In that sense, “failure to connect the dots refers to the failure by US intelligence agents to understand the relationship between different facts about individuals with links to terrorist groups” (ibid.: 35). In other words, the important information that was unknown to the agencies corresponds to the unrecognized pattern in the game. In addition to the familiarity with the socio-cultural context, Coulson and Oakley (2008) also suggest that the success of this metaphor is largely licensed by the linguistic knowledge of the meaning of the concept connect. With that in mind, they suggest a link between the CONNECT THE DOTS metaphor and the entrenched metaphor knowing is seeing. Consequently, Colson and Oakley (2008: 36) propose that “the connect the dots blend co-opts the KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor and applies it to the game of connect the dots by adding a few new mappings.” Additionally, such line of reasoning supports the authors’ idea that “creative metaphoric blends rely heavily on conventional linguistic knowledge” (ibid.: 46). The conceptual integration network that the authors propose in the first part of their analysis (ibid.: 3137) consists of a presentation space with the “connect the dots” game, the reference space, with national security agencies and the information related to them, and the blend, where “it is possible for the intelligence officer to see terrorist activities represented in the dots” (ibid.: 36-37). An important factor to be taken into account is that not all dots in the blend have the same relevance for solving the puzzle, and that the agencies’ failing to connect the dots might not be caused by the failure to share information, but by the lack of time to go over the potentially relevant links within the available information (ibid.: 41). Coulson and Oakley also stress the fact that the interpretation of the metaphor
CONNECT THE DOTS
will be conditioned by the individual’s
linguistic and cultural knowledge, as well as by the immediate context and the level of involvement that the individual ‘invests’ into (de)constructing the blend. Additionally, the authors also discuss the
metaphor which builds on the initial
conventional CONNECT THE DOTS mapping, and also introduces new elements of fictive interaction. Furthermore, the authors claim that in the case of the
metaphor “innovation [...] emerges from the
intersection of cultural, linguistic, and situational knowledge in the service of the interconnected demands of discourse coherence and argumentative goals” (ibid.: 47). Namely, because Clark disagrees with the
conclusions arising from the
CONNECT THE DOTS
integration network, “he explicitly disputes the applicability of
the term connect” (ibid.: 47), and employs another conventional blend available for recruitment – that of fictive interaction. For a full account of this part of the analysis, consult Coulson and Oakley, 2008: 41-47. Harder (2005) discusses the notion of full-blown blending, where this process “ is distinguished by the way it enables the conceptualizer to superimpose two pictures that could not occur together in the reality space – without ‘cheating’, i.e. in a way that preserves the contradictions while suspending them for the purposes of creating the blended space” (ibid.: 1650). In layman’s terms, full-blown blending enables an individual to construct a blended space that contains elements in direct opposition to some elements from the reality spaces, which is done for purposes of persuasion, or even self-preservation. Still, the individual does not do away with those contradictions, but keeps them active. In that sense, Harder (2005) argues that, when blends are viewed in their functional context, “a distinction becomes necessary between the purely conceptual anatomy of a blend and the status of a blend as a successful response to a particularly difficult challenge” (ibid.: 1640). In relation to that line of reasoning, another important variable that Harder (2005) places into the equation is the role of the social grounding, i.e. the immediate socio-political setting, which further stresses the functional perspective of the cognitive processes by showing how they are “shaped by and contribute to the pattern of interaction of which they constitute one aspect” (ibid.: 1637). Additionally, Harder (2005) also proposes that apart from the processes of integration, attention should also be paid to the processes of disintegration, since, under certain circumstances, conceptual integration networks can become unstable and disintegrate. This author also introduces the notion of polarization which he illustrates in relation to post-9/11 conceptualizations of American policies directed at the Muslim world reported in the news and commentaries. Namely, polarization takes place “when two parties interact in such a way that each act in a sequence brings about a greater sense of threat in the other party” (ibid.: 1643). In other words, framing the opposition as a threat serves to both fuel and justify the negative campaign against them. This was particularly evident in the post-9/11 period, when the U.S. framed almost the entire Muslim world as the enemy, and presented its foreign policy as war on terror. Interviewer: Is there not a risk of alienating the Muslim world and thus sowing the seeds of future terrorist activities? U.S. official: You are playing on Bin Laden’s turf. I think you should stop playing on his turf. (ibid.: 1646)
Although from a purely objective point of view the constructed mental space in the above example may seem inadequate, from the policymaking point of view it may be purely legitimate. Namely, the U.S. official imposes a direct constraint on the entire line of reasoning by enforcing a favorable point of view, i.e. a point of view that justifies the U.S. military intervention in Iraq, and at the same time secures the safety of the U.S. Such course of action reflects the cognitive, emotional, and functional mechanisms of conceptual (dis)integration that Harder (2005) discusses in his paper. Additionally, Harder (2005) pays particular attention to the emotional dimension of the process of conceptual integration, in the sense that “getting an ‘integrated’ picture of objects, where fragmentary experiences with different emotional colorings are brought together, is an emotional
achievement as well as a cognitive achievement” (ibid.: 1642). The remainder of Harder’s (2005) paper engages in an in-depth analysis of full-blown blending and disintegration that took place when George W. Bush, president of the U.S. called Ariel Sharon a “man of piece.” 36
3.3. Political Psychology Bougher (2012) stresses the fact that the majority of previous research dealing with the use of conceptual metaphor in political discourse was focused primarily on the elite discourse, while the metaphors used by the citizens who comprise the electorate have been largely neglected. The author foregrounds the importance of these metaphors, since an in-depth investigation in this field could provide a more through insight into the minds of the voters and the ways they conceptualize the political scene, which “holds relevance for a number of other areas within the field of political psychology” (Bougher, 2012: 154). Additionally, such investigation could show which metaphors the electorate responds to best, as well as whether the citizens employ similar metaphors to those of the elite. Accordingly, Bougher’s paper also emphasizes that “a focus on elite discourse risks understanding the cognitive depth citizens apply in political reasoning and the consistency that binds their beliefs and attitudes” (Bougher, 2012: 151). In relation to the use of specific metaphors, the author discusses the role of analogical reasoning, as well as issues of similarity and familiarity, which condition the choice of domains, i.e. inputs, involved in metaphorical mappings. Furthermore, the author also discusses the emotional appeal of conceptual metaphors, and suggests that “metaphorical reasoning can help illuminate the “rationale” of affect in political reasoning” (ibid.: 155). Additionally, based on the overview of previous research, Bougher (2012) concludes that “identifying the metaphoric sources used in political reasoning cannot only clarify the origins of those emotions; it can also demonstrate the cognitive complexity that underlies emotion and intuitive understanding” (ibid.: 155). Finally, bearing in mind that “metaphor offers a cognitive mechanism that explains how citizens make sense of the political world by drawing from their nonpolitical knowledge and experiences” (ibid.: 157), a thorough investigation of metaphors used by both the political elites and the electorate can provide a comprehensive insight into the ways in which the political reality is constructed, understood, and navigated.
3.4. Section Summary Bearing in mind both the previous research discussed in the present section, and the previous research presented in the theoretical framework, it can be concluded that metaphor appears as a ubiquitous phenomenon in political discourse. Such frequency of metaphor use in political discourse is justified mainly by its role in persuasion, predominantly achieved by constructing a favorable point of view, and by provoking an 36
For a detailed overview of this part of the research consult Harder, 2005: 1646-1650.
emotional appeal with the electorate. The current section provided a brief overview of some results from contemporary research conducted in the domain of the CMT, CBT, and political psychology.
4. Present Research The present research will be conducted in two stages. Namely, the first stage of the present research will involve the theoretical analysis of the corpus, following the methodology presented in section 4.1. The second stage of this research will be focused on investigating whether metaphorical expressions commonly used in the political discourse of daily newspapers can in fact provoke a tangible emotional reaction with the readers. Specific methodological procedures employed in this part of the research are elaborated in section 4.2. With such an outline of the course of analysis in mind, the present research will attempt to answer the following Research Questions:  What are the basic functions of conceptual metaphors in the political discourse of daily newspapers?  How are these functions achieved, i.e. which mechanisms are they licensed by (for example, are there mechanisms like emotional appeal, highlighting and hiding, simplification, etc.)?  Which groups of metaphors (based on their conceptual keys) are dominant, and are the findings consistent with the results from previous research?  What type of networks is dominant: single-scope, or double-scope?  Which vital relations are dominant in metaphorical networks, and what happens to them during compression?  Is there any similarity between the forms of emergent structures that appear in the present corpus?  Can conceptual metaphors from the political discourse of daily newspapers provoke an actual, tangible emotional response with the audience, i.e. readers?  How was that emotional response depicted in terms of affect and more specific emotion concepts? In particular, the first six research questions will be addressed in the first part of the research, while the final two research questions will be the subject of inquiry of the second part of the present research. Additionally, research questions 1 through 3 fall in the domain of the CMT, research questions 4 through 6 will be dealt with in the framework of the CBT, while research questions 7 and 8 will be addressed within the theoretical framework dealing with affect and emotions.
Present Research: Part 1
4.1. Present Research: Part 1 The first part of the present research will be dealing with the theoretical analysis of the metaphorical expressions from the corpus. Corpus formation criteria and steps involved in the analysis, as well as the main theoretical frameworks that are employed, are described below. 4.1.1. Corpus and Methodology The corpus of the paper consists of metaphorical expressions from columns dealing with foreign and domestic politics, extracted from the online editions of the daily newspaper The New York Times in the period from 28 November 2011 to 31 December 2011, and there are a total of 240 metaphorical expressions. The criterion for Metaphor Identification was adopted from Charteris-Black (2004), where conceptual metaphors are defined in terms of semantic tension, role in persuasion, and cross-domain mappings in the conceptual system. In that sense, the CMT framework played a vital role in corpus construction. The Metaphor Identification process consisted of two parts: the first part was a close reading of the articles to identify conceptual metaphors and metaphor keywords which represent words often used with a metaphoric sense, “and it is possible to measure the presence of such keywords quantitatively in the corpus” (Charteris-Black, 2004: 35); in the second part, the article context was used to evaluate whether the use of a keyword was literal or metaphorical (Charteris-Black, 2004). Metaphor Identification was then followed by Metaphor Interpretation and Metaphor Explanation, where a link was established between the metaphorical expressions and cognitive factors they are governed by, and the role that metaphors perform in political discourse was further explored (Charteris-Black, 2004). The analysis then follows the basic guidelines as presented in Cameron and Low (1999). Namely the collected metaphorical expressions were grouped according to the general metaphors they represent, and finally the results were used to “suggest understanding or thought patterns which construct or constrain people’s beliefs and actions” (Cameron & Low, 1999, cited in Charteris-Black, 2004: 34). In line with such an approach, metaphorical expressions were classified according to their corresponding conceptual metaphors, which are then grouped under the conceptual keys (in the sense of Charteris-Black, 2004) POLITICS IS CONFLICT and POLITICS IS SPORT. Such corpus choice is justified by the fact that newspapers can be considered a secondary carrier of political discourse. Namely, daily newspapers are aimed at a wide audience of various backgrounds, education, and professional orientation. Therefore, newspaper language can be considered a good approximation of everyday language, which serves the purpose of presenting to the public the ideas and goals of certain political groups. In that sense, newspapers serve as a mediator between political fractions and citizens and perform the role of the secondary carrier of the political discourse.
Present Research: Part 1
Once the corpus was formed, the analysis entered the domain of the CBT. Namely, individual examples from the corpus were analyzed through the steps presented in Table 1. Such an approach was expected to provide a detailed insight into the structure of metaphorical conceptual integration networks, by addressing some of the key tenets of the CBT framework. Additionally, the algorithm for the analysis given in Table 1 should yield systematic results that are expected to produce statistically relevant data based on the present corpus. This part of the analysis also tackled the problem of functions that metaphors play in political discourse, as well as some of the mechanisms through which these functions are achieved, with the potential to provoke an emotional appeal as one of the most salient of these mechanisms. With this in mind, the CMT framework was also included in the analyses. Step 1:
Identify the inputs, the generic space, and their elements.
Identify counterpart connections and partial mappings.
Identify the organizing frame(s), and the type of the integration network (simplex, mirror, single-scope, or double-scope).
Identify the emergent structure in the blend, and the processes of composition, completion, and elaboration (coupled or decoupled).
Identify possible backward projections and their consequences.
Identify Vital Relations and their compressions (i.e. compressions of outer-space vital relations into inner-space vital relations).
Identify the Governing Principles for Compression that have been satisfied.
Discuss the systematic nature of compression (in the sense of Fauconnier & Turner, 2008).
Discuss the issue of network optimization. 37
Table 1. Main steps in corpus analysis within the CBT framework
4.1.2. Corpus Analysis and Discussion The present section will explore the structure, basic functions, and mechanisms through which these basic functions of conceptual metaphors in the political discourse of daily newspapers are achieved. Additionally, special attention will be paid to the notions of compression, systematic nature of compression (in the sense of Fauconnier & Turner, 2008, and Fauconnier, 2008), and network optimization.
37 This step of the analysis will be addressed separately in section 4.1.3, where the issue of network optimization based on the results obtained from CONFLICT and SPORT metaphors is thoroughly investigated.
220.127.116.11. CONFLICT Metaphors Metaphors of
will be organized under the conceptual key
POLITICS IS CONFLICT.
include conceptual metaphors with their corresponding metaphorical expressions, organized around the following metaphor keywords: battle, war, fight, showdown, standoff, attack, defense, strategy, maneuvering, victory, defeat, alliance, and (war) front. The distribution of these metaphor keywords in this part of the corpus is presented in the bar graph in Figure 12. Percentage-wise,
metaphors take up 59.58 % of the
corpus, and there is a total of 143 metaphorical expressions that can be attributed to the above mentioned conceptual key. Such a dominant role of
metaphors is in keeping with the findings from previous
research (e.g. Howe, 1988; Burnes, 2011).
Figure 12. Distribution of metaphor keywords in CONFLICT metaphors 18.104.22.168.1. Structure of CONFLICT Metaphors The current section of the paper will use examples from the corpus to discuss the structure of metaphorical conceptual integration networks. Some examples of metaphor systems and interactions of metaphorical networks within those systems will also be addressed. (1)
The battles within the movement have played out in public. (The New York Times, 3/12/2011)
This metaphorical expression corresponds to the conceptual metaphor POLITICAL ARGUMENT IS A BATTLE, which further corresponds to the conceptual key
POLITICS IS CONFLICT (in
the sense of Charteris-Black, 2004).
The generic space contains schematic structure that corresponds to both inputs, and it is related to the event structure metaphor. Namely, it contains the following elements: participants, setting, means, and goal. The source input is that of a
and it contains a prebuilt compression of a battle that is recruited in this
network, while the target input is that of POLITICAL ARGUMENT. The elements of the two inputs are presented in Figure 13. Elements: battlefield - public arena, soldiers – politicians and party reps belonging to the same
political group, officers – leading figures from the same political group, casualties - the defeated fraction within the same political group, and weapons - arguments are connected via an outer-space vital relation of Analogy that is compressed into Uniqueness in the blend, i.e. they constitute counterpart connections between the input spaces, which reflects the process of matching. Additionally, the blend inherits the organizing frame of the source input, which renders this network single-scope. This allows for the structure from the target input to be projected into the pre-compressed innerspace relations of the source input (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). The blend also contains emergent structure not present in either of the input spaces: arguments can cause harm, and political defeat equals political death. The emergent structure is a result of the following processes: 1. composition: the network establishes connections between the elements in the inputs and projects them to the blend; 2. completion: the elements from the target are projected into the organizing frame of the source. Additionally, the recruitment of background knowledge related to the frame of a BATTLE also aides the process of completion; 3. elaboration: since it can affect actual political outcome and reasoning, this is an instance of coupled elaboration.
Figure 13. Battles within the movement This emergent structure can yield backward projections to the target input, which can in turn serve to provoke an emotional response with the public (similar to the Regatta blend, discussed in Fauconnier & Turner, 1994; 2006; 2002). If compression is taken into consideration, it can be concluded that the emergent structure is also a direct product of compression of the outer-space vital relation of Disanalogy between the
means for achieving victory in the two input spaces. An important contextual variable that needs to be stressed is the fact that the conflict described by the present network is taking place between the members of the same political group. This can in turn serve to additionally explain the form of the emergent structure, according to which arguments can harm all of the participants. Apart from the above mentioned compression of Analogy into Uniqueness, it is useful to address the vital relations of Cause-Effect and Intentionality. Namely, the preexistent conventional compression aligns the Cause-Effect relationships in the two inputs and projects them to the blend. For example, the causal relationship between waging a battle and winning or losing it, and the causal relationship between engaging in a political argument and winning or losing it are compressed into Uniqueness in the blend. The Intentionality that underlies the previously discussed causal chains is also compressed into Uniqueness (i.e. into the intention of winning). In terms of the Governing Principles for Compression borrowing for compression is satisfied, since the mappings introduced by the conceptual metaphor automatically recruit pre-built compressions. Compressions of one vital relation into another have already been discussed, while scalability is also satisfied, and human scale is achieved. In order for the analysis of compression to be complete, guidelines from Fauconnier and Turner (2008) should also be addressed. Namely, in line with their argument, and bearing in mind that the notion of borrowed compression from the source input has already been mentioned, it is obvious that the source input does not represent a fundamental concept. This means that the integration network needs to be expanded beyond the minimal four-space model in order to account for the recruited compressions, i.e. for both cobbling and sculpting (in the sense of Fauconnier & Turner, 2008). The same can be argued for the target input, since ARGUMENT
can also be represented as a compression. In that sense, such an elaborate network of conceptual
integration reflects the notion of systematical compressions that enable the human mind to operate over numerous compressions and decompressions, i.e. perform blending and unpacking as necessary. The shape of this network is captured by the diagram presented in Figure 14. As can be concluded, the systematicity of compression does not end with the battle and argument inputs. On the contrary, it can be elaborated even further. Note also that both battle and argument blends have competition as one of their input spaces. Such relatedness between the source and target input of the final network can be used to account for the prealignment of their topologies before they are projected to the final blend of the fully elaborated network. The elaborate network from Figure 14 resembles a complex molecule from the domain of organic chemistry. This “molecule-model” is plausible on at least two levels. Firstly, it reflects the notion of the dynamic structure of conceptual integration networks, where they can change depending on the context, just as a molecule can mutate under foreign influences. Secondly, the “molecule-model” stresses the fact that the CBT is not confined to the domain of static structural analysis grounded on rigid mathematical approximations. On the contrary, the CBT deals with live, dynamic phenomena that the human thought is made out of, which undergo constant changes and mutations owing to both immediate contextual influences,
Figure 14. “Molecule-Model”
and rhetoric and pragmatic strategies that interlocutors have at their disposal. In that sense, the “moleculemodel” captures the very essence of human reasoning and cognition, and renders the role of compression in this process more transparent. Additionally, the notion of pre-built compressions available for recruitment foregrounds the role of the immediate social network that provides the grounding for human reasoning. In other words, these entrenched compressions are not instances of compressed anomalies available to a small number of individuals. Instead, they make up the vast domain of background knowledge characterized by a marked cultural influence. (2)
His [Mitt Romney’s] aides are vigorously organizing in Florida, where absentee voting begins right after the New Year, and in states far down the line, to build a backup plan when the nominating battle becomes a delegate fight. (The New York Times, 15/12/2011)
This example illustrates the interaction between two conflict metaphors: ELECTIONS ARE A BATTLE, and ELECTIONS ARE A FIGHT. CONFLICT.
These two conceptual metaphors are organized under the conceptual key
Based on Figure 15, it can be concluded that both initial conceptual integration networks actually
share the same generic space which is structured by the event structure metaphor, and contains the following elements: participants, setting, means, and goal. The source input of the first metaphor is structured by the organizing frame of a
which represents a prebuilt compression available for recruitment, while the
target input is structured by the frame of source input is
In the second metaphor, the organizing frame of the
which also represents a prebuilt compression available for recruitment, and the
organizing frame of the target input is
Both blends inherit the organizing frames of their
corresponding source inputs, making each of the networks single-scope. In addition to being linked by the change of focus in the discourse lattice, the two blends are connected by the vital relation of Change, forged by the immediate discourse context. Each of the blends develops emergent structure, as the central product of compression: Blend 1: winning the nomination harms the opponent; Blend 2: good campaign harms the opponent; which is achieved through the following processes: 1. composition: during this process, connections between the inputs are established and elements are projected to the blend. Counterpart connections are established between the inputs of the two initial networks, and their elements are projected to blends 1 and 2. 2. completion: elements from the target inputs of the two initial networks are projected to the organizing frames of the blends 1 and 2, respectively. Completion also involves the recruitment of background knowledge related to the organizing frames of the two blends, which facilitates the entire process. 3. elaboration: as in all cases of conceptual metaphors in the political discourse, this is again an instance of coupled elaboration, since it can affect inferences and reasoning in real time.
Figure 16. Nominating battle becomes a delegate fight.
The emergent structure is the result of the Disanalogy between the means for achieving the goal between the input spaces in the two initial networks, respectively, i.e. the Disanalogy between physical violence that can lead to casualties, and a political campaign. Such emergent structure can yield backward projections from the blends back to the inputs, which can provoke an emotional response, thereby amplifying the rhetorical power of the conceptual metaphor. Another important aspect of this network that needs to be addressed is the fact that the conflict is taking place during the primary elections in the Republican Party, i.e. all of the participants belong to the same political group. This contextual variable can also account for the form of the emergent structures in the two blends, where all participants can be harmed in the political process. The most dominant compression is the compression of the outer-space vital relation of Analogy into the inner-space vital relation of Uniqueness, evident in the two initial networks. Namely, the causal relations between the inputs of the two initial networks are related by the vital relation of Analogy, which is compressed into Uniqueness in the blend. The inner-space vital relations of Intentionality in the inputs of the two initial networks are also analogous, and are compressed into Uniqueness in the blends 1 and 2. Again, the compression of Disanalogy leads to the creation of emergent structure, unique for the blend. In sum, the satisfied Governing Principles of Compression include compressions of one vital relation into another. Additionally, scalability and borrowing for compression are also satisfied, owing to the fact that both the human scale is achieved, and pre-built compressions are activated. All of the inputs from the two initial networks represent compressions available for recruitment, rather than basic concepts, which reflects the systematic nature of compression. As argued in Fauconnier and Turner (2008), every conceptual integration network has parts that are entrenched, and available for recruitment (cobbling), and parts that are constructed on-line (sculpting). Like in example 1 discussed above, Figure 15 captures only the on-line active process of sculpting, whereas the entrenched part, i.e. cobbling, can be represented in an elaborated “molecule-model” network similar in structure to the one in Figure 14. (3)
Late Saturday, former Senator Bob Dole, the 1996 Republican nominee, endorsed Mitt Romney, whose campaign is now anticipating a long and hard-fought nominating battle against Mr. Gingrich. (The New York Times, 19/12/2011)
The metaphorical expression in the previous example corresponds to the conceptual metaphor ELECTIONS ARE A BATTLE,
and to the conceptual key
POLITICS IS CONFLICT.
Consequently, the topologies of the
source and target inputs of the corresponding conceptual integration network are structured by the organizing frames of BATTLE and ELECTIONS, respectively. The process of matching, i.e. counterpart connections between the two input spaces is presented by the horizontal lines in Figure 16. The generic space is structured by the event structure metaphor and contains the following elements: setting, participants, goal, and means. Since the blend acquires its organizing frame from the source input, this is another example of a single-scope network.
The blend develops emergent structure, which is a direct product of compression of the outer-space vital relation of Disanalogy between the means for achieving the goal in the two inputs. This structure is introduced through the following processes: 1. composition: elements of the two inputs are linked by counterpart connections, and projected to the blend; 2. completion: elements from the target input are projected into the organizing frame of the source input. Through the recruitment of additional background knowledge pertaining to the organizing frame of the source input, the blend is completed; 3. elaboration: finally, mental simulation of the blend licenses on-line real-world inferences, which suggests that this is a case of coupled elaboration. Such emergent structure can give way to backward projections to the inputs, which can further amplify the rhetorical power of a conceptual metaphor.
Figure 16. Nominating battle between Mitt Romney and Newt Gingrich As in other metaphorical conceptual integration networks, the most dominant compression is that of the outer-space vital relation of Analogy into the inner-space vital relation of Uniqueness. Namely, cause-effect relations structuring the topologies of the two input spaces are related by the outer-space vital relation of Analogy, which is compressed into the inner-space vital relation of Uniqueness in the blend. Intentionality underlying these cause-effect topologies is also compressed into Uniqueness in the blend. Additionally, there is also the compression of Disanalogy into Uniqueness, already mentioned above. Therefore, it is obvious that
the satisfied Governing Principles of Compression include the compression of one vital relation into another. Additionally, scalability, and borrowing for compression are also satisfied. In terms of the systematic nature of compression, the analysis of the present example also sanctions the conclusion that neither input is a basic concept, but rather a pre-built compression available for recruitment. In that sense, the conceptual integration network depicted in Figure 16 represents the sculpting part of the more elaborate network, i.e. the part that is constructed on-line. The remainder of the fully-fledged network could be represented in the form of a “molecule-model” network, similar to the one in Figure 14. (4)
Facing a tough re-election fight in five months, Mr. Sarkozy is presenting himself as a man of experience, capable of strong leadership in a crisis. (The New York Times, 2/12/2011)
The above metaphorical expression corresponds to the conceptual metaphor RE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN IS A FIGHT,
which is further contained within the conceptual key POLITICS IS CONFLICT. The organizing frame of the
source input is that of a CAMPAIGN.
whereas the organizing frame of the target input is that of a
Counterpart connections between the elements from the source and target input are presented by
the horizontal lines in Figure 17. The generic space contains the following elements: setting, participants, goal, and means, and it is structured by the event structure metaphor. The blend inherits the organizing frame of the source input, suggesting that this is a single-scope network. In this case, the conflict is taking place between representatives of different political parties.
Figure 17. Sarkozy’s re-election fight Compression in the network sanctions the creation of emergent structure. More specifically, it is the compression of the outer-space vital relation of Disanalogy between the means for achieving the goal in the
two inputs that leads to the emergent structure in the blend. Additionally, emergent structure is constructed through the following processes: 1. composition:
counterpart connections between elements from the two inputs are established and
elements are projected to the blend; 2. completion: elements from the target input are projected into the organizing frame of the blend, which was adopted from the source input space. This way, topology of the blend is completed, which is also facilitated by the recruitment of additional entrenched knowledge structures related to the
frame, i.e. the organizing
frame of the blend; 3. elaboration: since mental simulation of the blend provokes inferences in real-time, this is a case of coupled elaboration. The emergent structure can cause backward projections to the inputs which can, for example, provoke an emotional response with the readers, or make them focus only on certain aspects of the problem, which consequently augments the rhetorical force of the metaphor. In terms of the Governing Principles of Compression, the present network satisfies the following: compression of one vital relation into another, scalability, and borrowing for compression. Namely, there are obvious compressions of the outer-space vital relation of Analogy into the inner-space vital relation of Uniqueness. Additionally, human scale is achieved, and the network builds on activated entrenched compressions, i.e. the inputs are not basic concepts, but pre-built compressions. This idea leads to the issue of the systematic nature of compression, and to the notion of the “molecule-model.” In line with the previously presented arguments, the conceptual integration network presented in Figure 17 can be viewed as the on-line active construction, licensed by the more elaborate, fully developed network that also incorporates the pre-built, entrenched elements available for recruitment. (5)
As the perceived front-runner, he [Mr. Paul] is drawing a barrage of attacks from his rivals. (The New York Times, 18/12/2011)
The above example represents an interaction between two conceptual metaphors: ELECTION CAMPAIGN IS A RACE,
ELECTION CAMPAIGN IS A BATTLE,
POLITICS IS SPORT,
the former of which can be attributed to the conceptual key
and the latter to the conceptual key POLITICS IS CONFLICT. The first integration network has a
combined generic space 38 which includes elements of the event structure metaphor, and the basic preconceptual image schematic structure of the
image schema. Namely, as a conceptual
primitive (in the sense of Mandler, 1992), the proposed image schema underlies not only the human ability to understand the world in terms of spatial relations, but also the ability to forge metaphorical connections between a concept such as movement and other concepts. Therefore, combined with the elements adopted from the event structure metaphor which also has an underlying image schematic structure, the notion of the 38
The notion of the combined generic space will be further elaborated in the section dealing with SPORT metaphors.
Figure 18. Metaphor system: RACE and ATTACK
combined generic space is aimed at foregrounding the importance of the preconceptual image-schematic structures in the construction of metaphorical conceptual integration networks grounded in entrenched conceptualizations, i.e. conventional conceptual keys. Still, as discussed in the theoretical framework, such notion of the generic space will be understood as a theoretical construct and an artifact of analysis. Blend 1 adopts the organizing frame of its corresponding source input, i.e. that of a RACE, while Blend 2 adopts the organizing frame of the source input from the second network, i.e. that of an
sense, both conceptual integration networks from Figure 18 are single-scope. It is also worth stressing that both the race and the conflict are taking place within the Republican Party during the primary elections. The two blended spaces also develop the central emergent structure as a direct product of compression in each of the two networks. More specifically, the two emergent structures are products of compression of the vital relations of Disanalogy that exist between the means for achieving the goal between the source and target inputs in each of the two networks, respectively. The emergent structure is constructed through the following processes: 1. composition: counterpart connections are established in each network and elements are projected to the blends 1 and 2. This process involves the compression of outer-space vital relations onto inner-space vital relations. 2. completion: each blend activates entrenched knowledge structures related to its organizing frame, which serves to complete the blend. 3. elaboration: both blends can be dubbed instances of coupled elaboration since they can affect real-time inferences and lead to actions. Such emergent structures can sanction backward projections to the corresponding inputs, which can in turn increase the rhetorical power of the two metaphors. Namely, both presenting elections as a race and as a conflict can provoke an emotional response with the readers. Furthermore, the interaction of the two metaphorical networks in the discourse lattice can render them resonators to each other, which can amplify their persuasive power even further. Additionally, apart from being the two coinciding focus spaces in the final discourse lattice, the two blends are connected by the outer-space vital relation of Cause-Effect. Namely, the fact that Mr. Paul is the perceived front-runner invites the attacks against him. However, the two blends remain connected only via the discourse lattice, and the change of focus, and there is no final compression between them. In that sense, it could be argued that the Cause-Effect vital relation between the two blends is actually forged by the discourse structure, i.e. the immediate context. Such a conclusion could further serve to reinforce the already established invaluable role of context in the process of meaning construction argued by the cognitive semanticists (e.g. Saeed, 2003; Evans & Green, 2006; etc.). Both networks are dominated by the compressions of the outer-space vital relation of Analogy into the inner-space vital relation of Uniqueness. Namely, both networks show the vital relation of Analogy between
the causal structures of their source – target input pairs, which is compressed into Uniqueness in the blend. The same can be said about Intentionality. In that sense, in addition to borrowing for compression, and scalability, the present two networks also satisfy the principle of compression of one vital relation into another. Additionally, as mentioned above, the outer-space vital relation of Cause-Effect between blends 1 and 2 remains uncompressed. In view of Fauconnier and Turner’s (2008) argument on the systematicity of compression, diagrams in Figure 18 depict only the active on-line aspect of meaning construction. Capturing the activation of the massive entrenched knowledge structures and frames would require the construction of an elaborate “molecule-model” network (see Figure 14 for details). (6)
As Mr. Gingrich and Mr. Romney tangled with each other over their backgrounds, their world view and their leadership styles, the rest of the Republican field took aim at both of the men, reflecting how the race is narrowing as voters draw closer to weighing in. (The New York Times, 11/12/2011)
The fully developed discourse lattice (see Figure 19) required to capture the conceptual nature of the above example consists of three conceptual integration networks which constitute a metaphor system that incorporates two metaphors of conflict, and one sport metaphor: POLITICAL ARGUMENT IS A FIGHT, ELECTIONS ARE A STANDOFF,
ELECTIONS ARE A RACE.
The first two integration networks have a shared generic space, i.e.
their generic spaces are structured by the event structure metaphor, so that they consist of the following elements: setting, participants, means, and goal. The third network has a combined generic space 39 that incorporates the previously mentioned elements of the event structure metaphor, and the
image schematic structure. This image schematic structure is introduced by the activated entrenched compression of the GOAL
which is linked to the metaphor of
and its underlying
image schematic structure. In that sense, the image-schematic-based generic space is contained within
the event-structure-metaphor-based generic space, thus explaining the notion of the combined generic space. Each of the blended spaces inherits its organizing frame from the corresponding source input, rendering all three networks single-scope, with
as the organizing frames of the
blends 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Additionally, in the discourse lattice, the attention shifts from Blend 1, to Blend 2, and finally to Blend 3, which means that the three blends are taking turns playing the role of the focus space. 40 Each blend develops emergent structure as a direct product of compression in the network. Namely, the emergent structure is the result of Disanalogy between the means for achieving the goal in each of the pairs of inputs in the three networks, which is compressed into Uniqueness in each of the respective blends. Furthermore, emergent structures are constructed through the following stages in each of the networks:
The notion of the combined generic space will be further elaborated in the section dealing with SPORT metaphors. See section 2.2.1 above for details.
Figure 19. Metaphor system: FIGHT, STANDOFF, and RACE
1. composition: in all three networks counterpart connections are established between the elements from the inputs, and these are then projected to the blend. 2. completion: in all of the networks structure from the target input is projected into the already precompressed topology of the corresponding source input (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), and background knowledge structures related to the organizing frame of the source input are activated in order to facilitate this process. 3. elaboration: mental simulation of all three blends can be interpreted as coupled elaboration. In general, the emergent structures in all three blended spaces can cause backward projections to the inputs and therefore increase the rhetorical force of each metaphorical expression. In the above presented discourse lattice structure of the discussed metaphor system (Figure 19), such backward projections can conspire to create an even greater amplification of the rhetorical effect. This means that the metaphor system licenses the interaction not only at the level of entrenched conceptualizations, but also in the process of active on-line meaning construction. This also opens up possibilities for the interaction of backward projections that need not remain confined to their original network, but may be transferred further through the discourse lattice. This can especially be the case for the first two networks, which are linked by the same conceptual key of CONFLICT. It may be the case that metaphorical integration networks linked by the
same entrenched conceptual
mechanism, i.e. the same overarching conceptual key, can manifest stronger interaction, and even serve as resonators to each other’s rhetorical force. In that sense, interaction between the networks can actually forge the vital relation of Time between the three blends, which is introduced owing to the temporal and chronological organization imposed by the discourse structure, i.e. the immediate context of the above example. In that sense, the change of focus between the blends follows the discourse chronology, and the vital relation of Time actually facilitates this process and enables the readers to navigate their way through the discourse structure, and perform both compression and decompression as needed. Again, it is worth noting that all of the events presented in Figure 19 are taking place within the Republican Party during the preliminary elections that involve various interactions between the members of that party. In other words, both the conflicts and the race involve members of the same political group. The Governing Principles of Compression that have been satisfied in all three networks are the same as in other metaphorical networks discussed so far, and they include the following: compression of one vital relation into another, borrowing for compression, and scalability. There is an additional vital relation of Time that is not compressed, but serves to provide a chronological link between the three blends. The systematic nature of compression can also be explored relying on the “molecule-model.” which would be extremely elaborate in this case, since there is an interaction between three conceptual integration networks.
Senate Democrats introduced legislation Monday to extend and expand an expiring payroll tax cut, setting the stage for a showdown with Republicans who are almost certain to reject the Democrats’ proposal for paying for the cut. (The New York Times, 29/11/2011)
The metaphorical expression from the previous example illustrates the conceptual metaphor POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS ARE A SHOWDOWN,
and the conceptual key POLITICS IS CONFLICT. The generic space is structured
by the event structure metaphor as can be seen in Figure 20, while the blend adopts the organizing frame of the source input, making this another instantiation of a single-scope network. Furthermore, the blend develops emergent structure through the following processes: 1. composition: counterpart connections between the elements from the two inputs are established, and elements are projected to the blend. 2. completion: this process involves the recruitment of certain entrenched background knowledge structures related to the organizing frame of the blend, which aides in the completion of the structure of the blended space. 3. elaboration: bearing in mind that the elaboration of the present blend can affect real-time inferences and actions, this is another example of coupled elaboration.
Figure 20. Showdown between Democrats and Republicans Additionally, the emergent structure appears as a direct product of compression of the outer-space vital relation of Disanalogy between the means for achieving the goals in the two input spaces. Such emergent
structure can also cause backward projections to the inputs, thereby increasing the rhetorical strength of the metaphor. The most dominant vital relation is the outer-space vital relation of Analogy that is compressed into the inner-space vital relation of Uniqueness in the blended space. In other words, the vital relation of Analogy that connects the causal structures of the two input spaces is also compressed into Uniqueness in the blend, as is the vital relation of Intentionality. In terms of the Governing Principles of Compression, the present network satisfies the following: compression of one vital relation into another, borrowing for compression, and scalability. Closely related to the notion of borrowed compression is the systematic nature of compression (in the sense of Fauconnier & Turner, 2008). Namely, the diagram in Figure 20 captures the on-line aspect of the process of meaning construction. However, beside such sculpting, the network also includes the elements of cobbling, i.e. the entrenched sections that are recruited, and which actually fuel the on-line process of meaning construction. This can be illustrated by a “molecule-model” diagram which can be developed for the fullyfledged model of the present conceptual integration network. (8)
“I would like Monti to be a bit more courageous on this front, about the labor market,” said Sergio Romano, a columnist for Corriere della Sera and a former ambassador. (The New York Times, 16/12/2011)
The above metaphorical expression can be attributed to the conceptual metaphor NEGOTIATIONS ARE A CONFRONTATION ON THE WAR FRONT, POLITICS IS CONFLICT.
which further corresponds to the conceptual key
The generic space contains elements organized by the event structure metaphor, and
they include: setting, participants, means, and goal. The clash between the organizing frames of the two input spaces is resolved by the projection of the organizing frame of the source input to the blend, rendering the present network single-scope. Owing to the compression of Disanalogy between the means for achieving the goals in the two input spaces, the blended space develops emergent structure presented in Figure 21. This also involves the following processes: 1. composition: counterpart connections between the elements from the two inputs are established, and elements are projected to the blend. 2. completion: entrenched background knowledge structures are activated in order to facilitate the completion of the blend. 3. elaboration: mental simulation of the blend can lead to actual action caused by the real-time inferences, which makes it another instance of coupled elaboration. Such emergent structure can facilitate backward projections to the input spaces, thereby augmenting the rhetorical power of the metaphor (e.g. by provoking a stronger emotional response).
Figure 21. War front The satisfied Governing Principles of Compression include the following: compression of one vital relation into another, borrowing for compression, and scalability. Again, the most dominant is the compression of the outer-space vital relation of Analogy into the inner-space vital relation of Uniqueness in the blend, represented by the horizontal lines between the inputs in Figure 21. Reflecting the discussion presented in Fauconnier and Turner (2008),
represent pre-built entrenched
compressions available for recruitment. In that sense, the diagram from Figure 21 represents only the on-line aspect of the process of meaning construction, i.e. the construction of the present conceptual integration network. For the remainder of the fully-fledged network to be included in the diagram would require the construction of the more elaborate “molecule-model” (see figure 14 for details). 22.214.171.124.2. Systematicity of Emergent Structure in CONFLICT Metaphors Similar analyses to those performed in the examples above were conducted over the entire corpus. Such further in-depth analyses of the entire corpus of
metaphors yielded a very relevant finding.
Namely, 88.11% of cases (i.e. 126 metaphorical expressions) showed a consistent form of emergent structure that can be abstracted in the formula A harms B. The remaining 11.89% of cases showed different forms of emergent structure. More specifically, 10.49% (i.e. 15 cases) also showed consistency in the form - A prevents B from being harmed, while the remaining 1.4% of cases showed two different additional forms. The distribution of emergent structures is presented in Table 2.
Form of emergent structure
Number of occurrences in the corpus
A harms B
A prevents B from being harmed
Table 2. Emergent structures in CONFLICT metaphors The established systematic nature of the emergent structure in CONFLICT metaphors can be attributed to the highly entrenched nature of the conceptual key POLITICS IS CONFLICT that binds them together. Namely, the entrenched mechanism of the conceptual key conditions the choice of the source and target inputs of conceptual integration networks and can be argued to facilitate the alignment of topologies of the inputs. In line with the notion of borrowed compressions, it could be suggested that the entire networks and the structures of the blended spaces are actually governed by the borrowed conceptualization of the conceptual key, where the particular entrenched conceptualization can itself be understood as a pre-built compression available for recruitment. In that sense, the structures of the blends, including their emergent structures, should in fact show certain systematicity, owing to the entrenched, i.e. pre-compressed nature of the governing conceptual key they represent. Furthermore, such systematicity in emergent structures also contributes to metaphor coherence in metaphor systems constructed out of CONFLICT metaphors, and facilitates their mutual interaction (see examples 19, 23, and 24). In the sense of Fauconnier and Turner (2008), the systematic nature of compression seems to lead to the systematicity in the form of emergent structures. Namely, the background knowledge structures that fuel the on-line process of meaning construction are conditioned by the context introduced by the entrenched conceptualization of the conceptual key, and are in that sense semantically related. Such relatedness further influences the active computations performed on-line, and conditions the systematicity of the resulting structures. The two abstract formulaic representations of emergent structure presented in Table 2 can be understood as recursive patterns. However, it needs to be immediately stressed that it is not recursion in the generativist sense of pre-defined abstract grammatical structural patterns that await to be filled with proper elements. Instead, this is the case of recursion at the conceptual level. Namely, the two abstract formulas from Table 2 make up a recursive conceptual mechanism that can be used to describe the semantic content of the emergent structures, and not their grammatical structural patterns. In that sense, these formulas are somewhat similar to the general patterns represented by conceptual metaphors and conceptual keys (e.g. ELECTIONS ARE A BATTLE),
suggesting that the relationship between the formula A harms B, and the
corresponding emergent structures is the same as the relationship between a conceptual metaphor, and its corresponding metaphorical expressions. Such reasoning sanctions the conclusion that conventional, i.e. entrenched, conceptual metaphors and conceptual keys can also be treated as recursive cognitive
Form of emergent structure
After months of relative quiet, the Republican presidential candidates have started to increase their television advertising, bringing a new competitive dynamic to a fight that has largely remained off the commercial airwaves until now. ( 6/12/2011)
A good TV election campaign harms political rivals
A harms B
In the battle over how to save the euro, Germany has plenty of leverage but not many friends. 9/12/2011
Political negotiations can harm participants
A harms B
On the political front, Mr. Wang began a campaign for “Happy Guangdong,” derided by critics as empty sloganeering. (31/12/2011)
Political campaign harms political rivals
A harms B
Normally, a candidate spends the dwindling hours before the Christmas break in states that vote first, like Iowa, where the voting starts in less than two weeks and where Mr. Gingrich is dropping in the polls under a barrage of negative attacks. (20/12/2011)
A harms B
The standoff pits Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, a Shiite, against one of his most nettlesome partners in Iraq’s government, the Iraqiya coalition, a multisectarian group with wide support among secular Iraqis and Sunni Muslims. (18/12/2011)
Political fractions harm each other with arguments (i.e. political arguments harm political fractions)
A harms B
Mr. Romney had spent the week leading up to the debate attacking Mr. Gingrich — in interviews, television and Web ads, and through surrogates — but during the debate on Thursday, he tamped down his criticisms. (17/12/2011)
Romney’s arguments harm Gingrich (i.e. political arguments harm the participants of the political process)
A harms B
A political showdown now looms over the Lokpal issue, possibly determining whether the Congress Party can reverse its sagging political fortunes midway through the government’s fiveyear term. (23/12/2011)
Arguments harm political rivals (i.e. argument over the Lokpal issue can harm political rivals)
A harms B
Mrs. Merkel was “fighting for the future of Europe, and we stand behind her,” Mr. Brüderle said Friday. (3/12/2011)
Political arguments harm political rivals
A harms B
Turkey has been locked in an intractable political fight with Cyprus since 1974, when it invaded the island to prevent a proposed union with Greece and set up a rival government in the ethnic Turkish part of Cyprus that only it recognizes. (5/12/2011)
Political arguments harm the participants of the political process
A harms B
While treaty change can be a lengthy process, the hope is that the effort will create enough momentum for economic convergence and discipline that will provide the political cover for Germany’s leaders to allow the European Central Bank to step in much more forcibly to defend Italy and Spain and try to stabilize the market. (2/12/2011)
ECB protects EU member states (Italy and Spain) from being harmed
A prevents B from being harmed
Bowing under intense pressure from members of their own party, House Republican leaders agreed Thursday to accept a temporary extension of the payroll tax cut, beating a hasty retreat from a showdown that Republicans increasingly saw as a threat to their election opportunities next year. (23/12/2011)
Accepting the extension of the payroll tax cut prevents the Republicans from being harmed (i.e. good political strategy prevents the Republicans from being harmed)
A prevents B from being harmed
But as Mr. Gingrich tours the state by bus in the final days of an increasingly bitter campaign, he is wielding Nice Newt — or trying to — as a kind of last defense against a shelling of attack ads, ridicule from opponents and a drip-drip-drip of tough news coverage that has clearly blunted his surge to near-frontrunner status. (29/12/2011)
Gingrich resorts to campaign strategy to prevent himself from being harmed
A prevents B from being harmed
Table 3. Emergent structures in CONFLICT metaphors: Additional examples
mechanisms. This property can serve to further account for the “diagnosed” systematicity in the form of emergent structure in the present corpus. Additionally, Coulson and Oakley (2005) suggested that with novel metaphors emergent structures are completely computed on-line, whereas in conventional metaphors, emergent structures are recruited. In that sense, and using the terminology of Fauconnier and Turner (2008), it can be said that the previously described semantic-conceptual recursive mechanisms (e.g. A harms B) constitute the entrenched part of conventional metaphors which actually represent a pre-built, i.e. pre-compressed, conceptual mechanisms available for recruitment. These pre-built compressions then acquire their elements and specific structure based on the context imposed by the organizing frame of the blend, and the compressions of elements from input spaces. In other words, the conceptual recursive pattern (e.g. A harms B) is completed via the process of pattern completion, which, in addition to compressions of vital relations, constitutes a central process in the formation of emergent structures in conventional metaphors. Some additional examples of metaphorical expressions from the corpus along with their emergent structures are presented in Table 3. 126.96.36.199.3. Function and Emotional Appeal of CONFLICT Metaphors Political discourse in general is highly marked by its persuasive dimension. One of the salient rhetorical tools used to facilitate the process of persuasion is the use of conceptual metaphors (Lakoff, 1991; Mio, 1996; 1997; 2005; Thompson, 1996; Charteris-Black, 2004; 2009; 2011; Burnes, 2011; Bougher, 2012). As argued in section 2.1.10, the main reason for this resides in the fact that metaphors can be used to highlight or hide only the desired aspects of an issue (in the sense of Lakoff & Johnson, 2003[1980b]). Additionally, metaphors can be used to simplify complex issues and render them understandable to a wider population, or they can provoke an emotional reaction, which makes the public more susceptible to manipulation (e.g. Mio, 1997; Charteris-Black, 2009; 2011; Bougher, 2012). In the case of
metaphors, one of the dominant mechanisms that license their persuasive
function is the ability to provoke an emotional response. Namely, “the war metaphor is ubiquitous, connected to strong emotions and social values and it is widely used in politics of mass appeal” (Steinert, 2003: 268), where “emotion is a crucial feature to be taken into consideration as well with regard to the strategic use of metaphor” (Ferrari, 2007: 611). Furthermore, “population and politicians share common value orientations such as ‘(patriarchal) family/community’ and ‘warrior/masculinity’” (Steinert, 2003: 267), which is why politicians often aim to exploit those values for personal benefit. By placing the political process in the frame of
it is possible to talk about political
negotiations as fights, attacks, battles, standoffs, showdowns, defense, or (war) fronts (examples 9 – 20 above). Such framing of political issues “creates pressure for unity, solidarity, mobilization of people and resources for the common good (against the foe)” (Steinert, 2003: 268). In other words, the
metaphor has the power to bring people together in a collective effort of self-preservation. Additionally, bearing in mind that “war forges the bond of community and acceptance of (political) leadership like nothing else” (Steinert, 2003: 266), metaphors of CONFLICT can create a framework in which the public can be manipulated as a collective mass. Furthermore, these metaphors can also make the public empathize with their political favorites, which is evident in examples 12 and 14, where Mr. Gingrich is presented as the victim of attacks. In the context of the CBT, the ability of metaphors to provoke an emotional reaction can be attributed to backward projections from the blend back to the inputs. Furthermore, the coupled elaboration of the emergent structure can produce real-time inferences that can further affect behavior and reasoning in relation to certain issues. For instance, example 10 presents the efforts made by Germany to protect the EU, in terms of a battle, which can result in the actual emotional involvement of the readers, since the notion of “battle” stresses the seriousness of the crisis, and simplifies the complex political and economical mechanisms that caused it in the first place by representing them in terms of an enemy. In turn, this process reflects Harder’s (2005) notion of polarization. 41 In that sense, such emotional involvement can actually amplify the rhetorical power of the metaphor. 188.8.131.52.4. Metaphor Systems and Metaphor Interaction As discussed above, apart from instances of individual metaphors, there are also metaphor systems (in the sense of Lakoff, 1991; 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003; Evans & Green, 2006; Kövecses, 2010). Percentage-wise, 29.37% of
metaphors from the present corpus appear in elaborate metaphor
systems. Apart from reflecting the notions of metaphorical coherence 42 from the CMT framework, individual metaphors that comprise the metaphor systems can serve as resonators to each other’s rhetorical force, which results in an amplified rhetorical effect. In addition to backward projections, section 184.108.40.206.1 has shown that immediate discourse context can actually serve to forge vital relations between the blended spaces of the metaphorical conceptual integration networks comprising the system. That way, apart from serving as focus spaces in the discourse lattice, these metaphorical blends seem to procure a deeper link. Additionally, such connections between the metaphorical blends can be argued to facilitate the process of achieving human scale at the discourse level. (21)
But they are hoping to help stretch the Republican nominating contest into a longer and bloodier battle — meaning they are eager to define Mr. Gingrich for voters in unflattering terms without necessarily wounding him fatally and assisting Mr. Romney, whom they still view as a formidable general election opponent. (The New York Times, 8/12/2011)
Mindful of some Republicans’ goal of privatizing Social Security, the Democrats suggested that tinkering with the payroll tax “may be used as the first step in a larger battle to fundamentally dismantle Social Security.” (The New York Times, 16/12/2011)
See section 3.2 above for details. See section 2.1.4 above for details.
Mr. Compagnone is one soldier in a battle - often uphill - to persuade Italy's famously tax-evading citizens to pay up. (The New York Times, 25/12/2011)
It is unclear what concrete changes will flow from the decision. A top Communist Party official, Ivan Melnikov, told the newspaper Vzglyad that Mr. Volodin’s selection signaled a shift in the direction of “a more harsh model for the coming political battle.” (The New York Times, 28/12/2011)
They have controlled the spending conversation from the first battle, when new members demanded that Republicans hold out for billions more in cuts than those sought by House appropriators. It continued through the debt ceiling showdown, in which a plan to cut $2.1 trillion over 10 years was formed, as well as during the intense focus on changes in entitlement programs. (The New York Times, 4/12/2011)
“London is the center of financial services in Europe,” Mr. Cameron said in October. “It’s under constant attack through Brussels directives. It’s an area of concern; it’s a key national interest that we need to defend.” (The New York Times, 10/12/2011)
But European officials believe that a significant move toward treaty changes to create more economic governance in the euro zone — with tighter, more enforceable limits on debt and centralized oversight of national budgets — will give the European Central Bank the political cover to act more aggressively to defend Italy and Spain and drive down currently unsustainable interest rates on their bonds. (The New York Times, 2/12/2011)
Its shifting alliances, reflecting different currents within the movement, helped keep Islah ahead of its opposition rivals in Yemen. (The New York Times, 3/12/2011)
And while even other Republicans were predicting that the House Republicans would have to blink, or risk further political damage, the ugliness of the fight reminded Americans yet again of the seeming futility of Mr. Obama’s 2008 campaign promise to make Washington work as the year of his re-election race is upon him. (The New York Times, 22/12/2011)
But in an acknowledgement that he might not be able to reverse Mr. Gingrich’s momentum quickly, Mr. Romney and his team are bracing for a far rougher slog through the early Republican nominating contests than they had envisioned even a few weeks ago and preparing for months of a state-by-state, delegate-bydelegate fight. (The New York Times, 15/12/2011)
Previous examples illustrate the interaction between various conceptual metaphors, some of which belong to different conceptual keys. For instance, examples 21, 25, and 26 represent interactions between different
metaphors; examples 22, 23, 24, and 28 represent interactions between
metaphors; example 29 represents interaction between CONFLICT and SPORT metaphors; example 30
represents interaction between
between JOURNEY, CONTAINER, and CONFLICT metaphors.
metaphors; example 27 represents interaction
220.127.116.11. SPORT Metaphors SPORT
metaphors will be organized under the conceptual key
POLITICS IS SPORT,
and they take up
40.42% of the corpus, with 97 metaphorical expressions. This conceptual key will include conceptual metaphors and their corresponding metaphorical expressions organized around the following metaphor keywords: race, team, jab, players, sparring, playing field, game, etc. A complete overview of metaphor keywords corresponding to the conceptual key POLITICS IS SPORT and their distribution in the present corpus are presented in the bar graph in Figure 22. The most dominant metaphor keyword under the conceptual key of SPORT
was ‘race’, which reflects the highly competitive nature of primary elections that were under way in the
US in December 2011. Additionally, the recorded frequent use of SPORT metaphors in the present corpus is in line with the results from previous research in the field (e.g. Howe, 1988; Semino & Masci, 1996; Silaški & Radić-Bojanić, 2010; Radić-Bojanić & Silaški, 2008).
Figure 22. Distribution of metaphor keywords in SPORT metaphors 18.104.22.168.1. Structure of SPORT Metaphors The present section of the paper will discuss the structure of
metaphors by addressing some
specific examples from the corpus, in accordance with the general guidelines for the analysis described in section 4.1.1.
By virtually all accounts, the 2012 presidential race was to hinge on a restless electorate’s overriding worry, the troubled American economy. (The New York Times, 30/12/2011)
The present example is an instance of a conceptual metaphor which can be further attributed to the conceptual key
POLITICS IS SPORT.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ARE A RACE,
The conceptual integration network
presented in Figure 23 has a combined generic space, where the generic space contains elements that include setting, participants, goal, and means, which originate from the event structure metaphor, as well as the
image schematic structure that reflects the image schematic nature of the
metaphor. In line with the discussion presented in section 2.2.3, such generic space organization is aimed at foregrounding the role of conceptual primitives (in the sense of Mandler, 1992), i.e. the role of image schemas in the construction of the human cognitive architecture that supports the previously introduced entrenched conceptual pattern PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ARE A RACE.
Figure 23. Presidential race The source input is organized by the RACE frame, while the target input is organized by the frame of PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.
It is worth noting that the presidential candidates in this case belong to two opposing
political parties, the Republicans and the Democrats. The blend inherits the organizing frame of the source input, rendering the present network single-scope, which means that the elements from the target input are projected into the frame of the source input. The blend also develops its central emergent structure through the following processes: 1. composition: the network establishes counterpart connections between the elements from the two inputs, and these are projected into the blend;
2. completion: the blend recruits background knowledge structures related to the organizing frame of the source input, i.e. the organizing frame of the blend, which completes its topology; 3. elaboration: again, this is the case of coupled elaboration, since it affects real-time inferences, reasoning, and behavior. The developed emergent structure can give way to backward projections to the inputs, which can serve to amplify the initial rhetorical force of the metaphor. In terms of compressions, the emergent structure can be understood as the direct product of compression of the outer-space vital relation of Disanalogy between the means for achieving the goals in the two respective inputs, into the inner-space vital relation of Uniqueness in the blend. Additionally, the causal and intentional structures, as well as the elements from the two inputs are connected by the vital relation of Analogy that is compressed into Uniqueness in the blend. When it comes to the Governing Principles for Compression, the following are satisfied: compression of one vital relation into another, borrowing for compression, and scalability. In terms of the systematic nature of compression (in the sense of Fauconnier and Turner, 2008), both inputs can be understood as prebuilt compressions, i.e. as results of previous conceptual integration work, available for recruitment. In that sense, the network presented in Figure 23 reflects only the sculpting process, whereas a fully developed “molecule-model” similar to the one in Figure 14 would be required to also capture the cobbling aspect of the present network. (32)
Only as the first voting draws closer is the pace of traditional campaigning picking up, with candidates trying to make up for lost time. (The New York Times, 1/12/2011)
The above example can be attributed to the conceptual metaphor
PRIMARY ELECTIONS ARE A RACE,
which further belongs to the conceptual key POLITICS IS SPORT. The combined generic space is structured like in the previous example, and such generic space structure is typical of all
metaphors, which will be
evident from the forthcoming analyses. The conceptual clash at the frame-level is resolved by projecting the organizing frame of the source input as the organizing frame of the blend, which makes this network single-scope. Elements from the target input are therefore projected into the pre-compressed organizing frame of the source input. The blend also develops its emergent structure though the following processes: 1. composition: counterpart connections are established between the elements from the inputs, and these are projected, i.e. compressed in the blend; 2. completion: the blend recruits background knowledge related to the RACE frame, which serves to complete the blend; 3. elaboration: this is another instance of coupled elaboration, since the emergent structure can affect reasoning and behavior in real-time. Additionally, such emergent structure can yield backward projections to the inputs, which can serve to provoke an emotional response and therefore amplify the rhetorical force of the metaphor. In particular, the
metaphor reduces the complexity of a political debate to a simple contest, which in turn involves supporters on an emotional level.
Figure 24. The pace of traditional campaigning is picking up The present emergent structure can also be understood as a direct result of the compression of the outer-space vital relation of Disanalogy between the means for achieving the goals in the two inputs, into the inner-space vital relation of Uniqueness in the blend. As was the case in other metaphorical networks, the most dominant compression is that of the outer-space vital relation of Analogy into the inner-space vital relation of Uniqueness. Compression of one vital relation into another, scalability, and borrowing for compression have all been satisfied. Directly related to the principle of borrowing for compression is the systematic nature of compression. Namely, both inputs are instances of pre-built compressions available for recruitment, and the network depicted in Figure 24 reflects only the active on-line process of conceptual integration. Like in previous examples, a more elaborate “molecule-model” network structure would reveal the ‘hidden’ cobbling aspects of the present network. (33)
The holiday brinkmanship over the issue recalled the December budget showdown 16 years ago between another first-term Democratic president, Bill Clinton, and a new Republican Congressional majority — a fight that capped their year of confrontation over the nation’s fiscal priorities by reviving Mr. Clinton politically as he began his re-election race. (The New York Times, 22/12/2011)
The present example shows interaction between three conceptual metaphors: POLITICAL ARGUMENT IS A SHOWDOWN, POLITICAL ARGUMENT IS A FIGHT,
RE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN IS A RACE.
The first two conceptual
metaphors can be attributed to the conceptual key POLITICS IS CONFLICT, whereas the third one can be viewed
Figure 25. Clinton’s re-election race
as an instance of the conceptual key
POLITICS IS SPORT.
The generic spaces of all three networks are typical
instances of generic spaces found in CONFLICT and RACE metaphors, respectively, both of which have already been discussed in the previous analyses. Additionally, all three networks from Figure 25 are instances of single-scope networks, suggesting that the organizing frames of their respective blends are adopted from the corresponding source inputs, so that the elements from the target inputs are projected into the precompressed topologies of the organizing frames of their corresponding source inputs. Additionally, each blend develops its emergent structure through the processes of composition, completion, and elaboration, in accordance with the general principles discussed in the previous examples. Each of the emergent structures provides a possibility for backward projections to its respective inputs, which can in turn serve to augment the rhetorical power of the given metaphor. Furthermore, the immediate discourse context forges an additional ‘bond’ between the three metaphors that comprise the present system, thereby allowing them to serve as resonators to each other’s rhetorical force. In other words, the backward projections need not be restrained to their ‘mother network’, but can also work across networks. The three blends in the network presented in Figure 25 make up the fully developed discourse lattice, and are connected by the change of focus, where the discourse ‘moves’ from Blend 1, to Blend 2, and finally to Blend 3. These changes of focus can be argued to provide an additional topological link in the entire network, and thus serve to further enhance the rhetorical force of the present metaphor system. Owing to the high degree of relatedness between the frames of showdown and fight, which serve as the organizing frames of blends 1 and 2, respectively, it can be argued that in addition to the simple change of focus, the immediate discourse context also forges a vital relation of Analogy between the first two blends. Namely, the frames of showdown and fight belong to the same conceptual key of
and both the topologies and causal
structures that they introduce into the blends are analogous. Furthermore, as a result of these analogies, the emergent structures of blends 1 and 2 are identical, suggesting that the immediate discourse context also leads to the creation of the vital relation of Identity between the emergent structures of the first two blends. Such network structure also increases metaphor coherence, i.e. the coherence between the individual networks comprising the system. Emergent structures in the three networks can be understood as direct products of compression, more precisely the compression of Disanalogy into Uniqueness, as was the case in all previous analyses. Principles of compression of one vital relation into another, scalability, and borrowing for compression have all been satisfied. The systematic nature of compression for the present metaphor system can be represented by a fully developed “molecule-model” that would capture both the on-line process of meaning construction depicted in Figure 25, and the process of background knowledge recruitment in the form of pre-built compressions.
In the meantime, Mr. Paul’s rivals continued their last-minute sprints across Iowa in the hopes of rallying support among an electorate that appears to remain open to persuasion. (The New York Times, 31/12/2011)
This is an instance of a conceptual metaphor conceptual key
POLITICS IS SPORT.
PRIMARY ELECTIONS ARE A RACE
which belongs to the
The combined generic space of the present network has all the
characteristics already discussed in examples 31 and 32 above. The blend adopts the organizing frame of the source input, which makes the present network single-scope, with all the typical traits of single-scope networks discussed so far. Emergent structure is developed through the familiar processes of composition, completion, and elaboration, and this is another case of coupled elaboration. The emergent structure also licenses backward projections to the inputs, which can result in an amplified rhetorical force of the metaphor, since such backward projections can provoke an emotional appeal with the audience.
Figure 26. Last-minute sprints The emergent structure of the present network can be dubbed a direct product of compression of the outer-space vital relation of Disanalogy between the means for achieving the goals in the inputs, into the innerspace vital relation of Uniqueness in the blend. The causal and intentional structures of the two inputs, as well as their elements, are connected by the vital relation of Analogy that is compressed into Uniqueness in the blend. In terms of the Governing Principles for Compression, the network satisfies compression of one vital relation into another, scalability, and borrowing for compression. The systematic nature of compression can be captured by a “molecule-model” that would reflect both the cobbling and sculpting aspects of the present network, owing to the fact that both inputs can be understood as instances of pre-built compressions.
Former Gov. Jon M. Huntsman Jr. of Utah, seeking to break out of the Republican pack, appeared to jar the audience when, in talking about the lack of trusting government, he declared: “We have been kicked around as a people. We are getting screwed as Americans.” (The New York Times, 16/12/2011)
This is another instance of a conceptual metaphor PRIMARY ELECTIONS ARE A RACE that belongs to the conceptual key POLITICS IS SPORT. The present network also has a combined generic space already discussed above. The blend adopts the organizing frame of the source input, rendering the present network single-scope. This suggests that elements from the
frame are projected into the pre-compressed
topological structure of the RACE frame. The central emergent structure of the blend, which presents itself as a direct product of compression, is developed through the processes of composition, completion, and elaboration. As with other instances of conceptual metaphors in political discourse, this is again the case of coupled elaboration. Such emergent structure facilitates backward projections from the blend to the inputs, which can increase the rhetorical power of the metaphor by, for example, provoking an emotional response.
Figure 27. Break out of the pack Emergent structure can also be viewed as the direct product of compression of the outer-space vital relation of Disanalogy between the means for achieving the goals in the inputs, into the inner-space vital relation of Uniqueness in the blend. Again, the most dominant compression is that of the outer-space vital relation of Analogy into the inner-space vital relation of Uniqueness in the blend. Namely, causal and intentional structures, as well as the counterparts in the two inputs are analogous. Additionally, the two inputs are also obvious instances of pre-built compressions available for recruitment, and the network from Figure 27 presents only the on-line aspect of meaning construction. Activation of background knowledge structures and
the massive work on conceptual integration that looms in the background can be presented by a more elaborate “molecule-model,” similar to the one in Figure 14. (36)
''When a principled conservative took the lead, they outspent Newt Gingrich 20 to 1, attacking him with falsehoods.'' (The New York Times, 28/12/2011)
The above example shows an interaction between two conceptual metaphors: PRIMARY ELECTIONS ARE A RACE,
PRIMARY ELECTIONS ARE A BATTLE,
POLITICS IS SPORT,
where the former can the attributed to the conceptual key
and the latter to the conceptual key POLITICS IS CONFLICT. The first network has a combined
generic space typical of
metaphors, whereas the second network has the generic space based on the
event structure metaphor, typical of
metaphors. Both networks are single-scope, meaning that the
organizing frames of the two blends are adopted from their respective source input spaces. Each of the blends develops its own emergent structure through processes of composition, completion, and elaboration. Additionally, both blends are instances of coupled elaboration, where the developed emergent structure can influence real-time reasoning and behavior. The emergent structures can also give way to backward projections that can serve to amplify the rhetorical forces of the respective metaphors. Furthermore, bearing in mind that this is another instance of a metaphor system, the two blends can serve as resonators to each other, thus increasing each other’s rhetorical power, which is licensed by both the immediate discourse context, and the coherence of the two metaphors. The emergent structure in both blends can be presented as a direct consequence of compression of the outer-space vital relation of Disanalogy between the means for achieving the goals in the two networks, respectively, into the inner-space vital relation of Uniqueness in the two corresponding blends. Again, both networks are dominated by the compression of the outer-space vital relation of Analogy that exists between the causal and intentional structures of the inputs, and the counterpart elements of the inputs, into the innerspace vital relation of Uniqueness in the two respective blends. Additionally, both networks satisfy the following principles of compression: compression of one vital relation into another, scalability, and borrowing for compression. Furthermore, the systematic nature of compression could also be depicted by an elaborate “molecule-model” which would include both the on-line sculpting of the network and the background cobbling that facilitates the process of conceptual integration. In addition to the change of focus between the two blends in the discourse lattice, an additional vital relation of Cause-Effect is also formed between them as the direct result of the immediate discourse context. Namely, the attacks on Gingrich result directly from his perceived superior position, which consequently leads to a more profound link between the two blends. It can be argued that the additional vital relation between the two blends amplifies not only their rhetorical force and coherence, but increases the discourse coherence as well, and facilitates the process of meaning construction.
Figure 28. Gingrich took the lead
Mrs. Merkel, a central player in efforts to rescue Europe’s single currency, was addressing the German Parliament before a meeting next week in Brussels, when Europe’s leaders will try again to find a politically palatable solution to the crisis. (The New York Times, 3/12/2011)
The present example is an instance of interaction between a
metaphor and a
metaphor. Both networks are instances of single-scope networks, where the organizing frames of the two blends are acquired from their respective source inputs. Additionally, blends 1 and 2 share the same generic space based on the event structure metaphor, which consists of the following elements: setting, participants, goal, and means. Both blends develop their emergent structures through the processes of composition, completion, and elaboration. Additionally, the two blends show traits of coupled elaboration, where the elaboration of the blend influences reasoning and behavior in real-time. These emergent structures can also facilitate backward projections from the blends to their respective inputs. More specifically, blends 1 and 2 develop their emergent structures owing to the outer space vital relation of Disanalogy between the means for achieving the respective goals, which is compressed into Uniqueness in each of the two blends. The most dominant compression in the two networks is that of Analogy into Uniqueness, as was the case in all other metaphorical networks discussed so far. Apart from being connected by the change of focus in the discourse lattice, the immediate discourse context seems to forge a more profound link between the two blended spaces. Namely, bearing in mind their topologies, and the causal and intentional structures that govern those topologies are governed by, it can be argued that the immediate discourse context forges an additional outer space vital relation of Analogy that exists between blends 1 and 2. Consequently, their emergent structures are also analogous to each other. Owing to this additional outer space vital relation of Analogy, backward projections need not be restrained to their ‘original’ networks. Instead, the two blends can serve as resonators to each other’s rhetorical power, which can, for instance, serve to amplify the audience’s emotional reaction, or to fuel other mechanisms of persuasion. As was the case with all examples of metaphorical conceptual integration networks discussed so far, both networks in the present metaphor system are dominated by the outer space vital relations of Analogy, and their compressions into the inner-space vital relation of Uniqueness in each of the blends, respectively. Additionally, the two networks also satisfy the principles of compression of one vital relation into another, scalability, and borrowing for compression. Bearing in mind the systematic nature of compression (in the sense of Fauconnier and Turner, 2008), the present network from Figure 29 could be elaborated even further, in order to account for both the on-line process of meaning construction, and for the recruitment of the preexistent compressions in the form of background knowledge structures. Such an approach would yield a diagram similar to that in Figure 14.
Figure 29. Angela Merkel as the central player
In their sparring Monday, Mr. Romney threw the first jab, sending an e-mail to supporters in which he called his rival an “unreliable leader,” who had supported action on climate change. (The New York Times, 13/12/2011)
The above metaphorical expression corresponds to the conceptual metaphor PRIMARY ELECTIONS ARE A BOXING MATCH,
which further corresponds to the conceptual key
POLITICS IS SPORT.
Although notions of
‘sparring’ and ‘jab’ are essentially related to the frame of conflict, a distinction is to be made between the notion of conflict within the
frame, and the notion of conflict within the
frame, since boxing
involves a ‘controlled’ confrontation that takes place in accordance with a strict set of rules. In this particular case, it is important to stress the fact that the match is taking place between two members of the same political party.
Figure 30. Sparring between Romney and Gingrich The generic space is organized by the event structure metaphor, similar to the generic spaces discussed in
metaphors. The organizing frame of the blend is adopted from the source input,
suggesting that this is another instance of a single-scope network, where the elements from the target input are projected to the pre-compressed topology of the source input. The emergent structure of the blend is developed through processes of composition, completion, and elaboration, and this is another instance of coupled elaboration. Such emergent structure also offers the possibility of backward projections that can serve to amplify the rhetorical force of the metaphor. There is a vital relation of Analogy that exists between the counterpart elements from the two inputs, which is compressed into Uniqueness in the final blend. Additionally, analogy can also be established between
the causal and intentional structures of the two input spaces. Compression of the vital relation of Disanalogy that exists between the means for achieving the goals in the two respective inputs into Uniqueness gives way to the development of emergent structure. It is also worth noting that the emergent structure from the present network is the same as the emergent structures developed in the majority of CONFLICT metaphors, i.e. it can be abstracted in the form A harms B. This can be explained by the already mentioned link between the frames of CONFLICT and BOXING.
The present network satisfies the following Governing Principles for Compression: compression of one vital relation into another, scalability, and borrowing for compression. Directly related to the notion of borrowing for compression is the systematic nature of compression, where a “molecule-model” could be used to account for both the on-line process of meaning construction, and for the recruitment of pre-built compressions. (39)
In the end, the prime minister [Mariano Rajoy] opted for a team containing several party veterans, including some, like Mr. de Guindos, who already formed part of the government of José María Aznar, Spain’s last conservative prime minister. (The New York Times, 22/12/2011)
Figure 31. Team The present example is an instance of a conceptual metaphor
GOVERNMENT IS A TEAM,
corresponds to the conceptual key POLITICS IS SPORT. The generic space is organized in a similar fashion to the generic spaces in CONFLICT metaphors discussed above, i.e. by the event structure metaphor. The organizing frame of the blend is that of TEAM, suggesting that this is an instance of a single-scope network. The emergent structure of the blend is developed through the processes of composition, completion, and elaboration, and the present network is another example of coupled elaboration.
In terms of compression, the present network develops its emergent structure owing to the compression of the vital relation of Disanalogy between the means for achieving the goals in the two inputs, into Uniqueness in the final blend. Causal and intentional structures, and the counterpart elements from the input spaces are connected by Analogy, and the most dominant compression in the present network, as was the case in all other metaphorical networks discussed so far, is the compression of the outer-space vital relation of Analogy into the inner-space vital relation of Uniqueness. The Governing Principles for Compression satisfied by this network include compression of one vital relation into another, scalability, and borrowing for compression. In light of the systematic nature of compression discussed in Fauconnier and Turner (2008), the diagram in Figure 32 shows only the sculpting aspect, i.e. the live, on-line process of meaning construction. In order for the entire process to be captured, a “molecule-model” would need to be developed, which would encompass both the on-line aspects of processing, and the introduction of pre-built compressions via the process of schema induction (in the sense of Evans and Green, 2006). 22.214.171.124.2. Systematicity of Emergent Structure in SPORT Metaphors A detailed analysis of the remaining
systematicity of emergent structures. Unlike emergent structures were closely related,
metaphors from the corpus revealed a certain degree of
metaphors where the two most dominant forms of
metaphors showed a greater number of source inputs
structured by different frames, which in turn led to a greater diversity in the form of emergent structures, and these results are presented in Table 4. Form of emergent structure
Number of occurrences in the corpus
A improves the position of B
A harms B
A and B are united by a common goal
Table 4. Emergent structures in SPORT metaphors The most frequent form of emergent structure A improves the position of B was predominantly associated with
metaphors, but was also developed in the context of some other metaphor keywords
(see examples 37, 44, 45, 46, and 47). Such emergent structure is highly marked by its spatial topology, owing to its transparent links to the
image schema that makes up an integral part of the above-
discussed combined generic spaces. This connection is licensed by the borrowed compressions from the RACE frame which also has a marked spatial topology, inherently linked to the spatial image schematic structures. Consequently, this evidence supports the earlier claims of image schemas being an integral part of the human
Form of emergent structure
A presidential race that has seen candidates abruptly rise and sharply fall is still remarkably unsettled here in Iowa, where the Republican nominating contest opens on Jan. 3. (7/12/2011)
Good campaign and arguments improve candidates’ positions in the primary elections
A improves the position of B
After a dozen debates in the Republican primary race, which ranged from cantankerous to contentious, a forced sense of restraint hung in the air throughout the two-hour debate at the Sioux City Convention Center. (16/12/2011)
Good campaign and strong arguments improve candidates’ positions in the primary elections
A improves the position of B
Mr. Gingrich is rated more favorably than any of the other six remaining candidates in the race among voters who say they are likely to attend the Republican caucuses in Iowa.7/12
Good campaign and the electorate’s support improve Gingrich’s position in the primary elections
A improves the position of B
“Therein lies the quandary: With the caucuses right around the corner, do you want to let up on the gas pedal?” said Tim Albrecht, a spokesman for Gov. Terry E. Branstad of Iowa, a Republican. (23/12/2011)
Good campaign improves candidates’ positions in the primary elections
A improves the position of B
The biggest player by far in the state has been Restore Our Future, a “super PAC” supporting Mr. Romney. (20/12/2011)
Strong support in the campaign improves Romney’s position in the primary elections
A improves the position of B
While Mr. Biden runs the administration’s policy on Iraq, he does not have as central a role on Iran. But Mr. Biden, officials said, has been an influential voice in dealing with the upheaval in the Arab world, because he has dealt with many of the players as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (3/12/2011)
Good arguments and his background in the Arab politics improve Mr. Biden’s position in influencing the piece process in the Arab world
A improves the position of B
Laying out a populist argument for his re-election next year, President Obama ventured into the conservative heartland on Tuesday to deliver his most pointed appeal yet for a strong governmental role through tax and regulation to level the economic playing field. (7/12/2011)
Persuasive arguments and a good campaign improve Obama’s position in the reelection process
A improves the position of B
[Rick Santorum]“Our phone calls are going better, our volunteers are showing up, the crowds are getting bigger here,” he told reporters after the town hall meeting on Thursday morning. “We’ve got a game plan in place. We’ve stuck to it in spite of people saying it’s not working. We believe it’s working.” (30/12/2011)
Good campaign organization improves Santorum’s position in the primary elelctions
A improves the position of B
Mr. Romney left Iowa on Friday afternoon for a quick overnight jaunt to New Hampshire. But as he campaigned with Gov. Chris Christie of New Jersey at a morning rally in Des Moines, Mr. Romney took a sharp jab at President Obama. (31/12/2011)
Romney’s arguments can harm Obama
A harms B
Mr. Orban and Mr. Simor have sparred over bank decisions repeatedly, as Mr. Orban has pressed for policies that would spur faster economic growth. (16/12/2011)
Mr. Orban and Mr. Simor can harm each other with arguments
A harms B
President Obama and his policy team have said that there is no greater threat to the fragile American recovery than a contracting and destabilized Europe. (29/11/2011)
Obama and his associates are united by the common goal of stabilizing the world economy
A and B are united by a common goal
Mariano Rajoy was sworn in as prime minister on Wednesday, then hours later unveiled a slightly scaled-down government team that includes a former investment banker who will be tasked with cleaning up Spain’s finances and troubled banking sector. (22/12/2011)
Members of the Spanish government are united by their common political and economic goals
Table 5. Emergent structures in SPORT metaphors: Additional examples
A and B are united by a common goal
cognitive architecture that facilitates the processes of meaning construction. Furthermore, the form of the present emergent structure also stresses the role of spatial experience in human reasoning. 43 Emergent structures in the form A harms B appeared in
metaphors, and it is clear that this
emergent structure has the same form as the most frequent emergent structure in CONFLICT metaphors. Such findings are perfectly plausible due to the fact that the CONFLICT.
frame is inherently linked to the frame of
However, it needs to be stressed that boxing involves a ‘controlled’ confrontation that takes place in
accordance with a strict set of rules, suggesting that the participants’ ultimate goal is to simply win the game. TEAM
metaphors yielded a separate form of emergent structure: A and B are united by a common
goal. This reflects the idea that team members are joined together by a common goal that is mutually beneficial for everyone, which is introduced into the blend via the borrowed compression from the TEAM frame. In the context of political discourse, it can be argued that by mirroring the collective cause of the political team onto its supporters, the supporters themselves are joined into a unique ‘virtual’ team, which can be used to bridge any differences and forge bonds between them (Silaški & Radić-Bojanić, 2010). In addition, such framing of political topics also presents an opportunity for provoking an emotional appeal with the supporters, since cheering for one’s team necessarily carries a certain degree of emotional involvement. Additionally, it needs to be stressed that the above presented systematic forms of emergent structures can be linked to the highly entrenched nature of the conceptual key they represent. The same line of reasoning followed in the subsection dealing with the systematicity of emergent structures in
metaphors applies here as well, along with all of the main conclusions presented in that section (see subsection 126.96.36.199.2 for details). Additional examples of the main forms of emergent structures in
metaphors are given in Table 5. 188.8.131.52.3. Function and Emotional Appeal of SPORT Metaphors One of the main advantages of the use of the conceptual key POLITICS IS SPORT in the arena of politics is that it creates the illusion of fair play, team spirit, and it introduces the idea that political players must follow a strict set of rules (Semino & Masci, 1996; Radić-Bojanić & Silaški, 2008; Silaški, Đurović, & Radić-Bojanić, 2009). Additionally, political “metaphors can stir emotions or bridge the gap between logical and emotional (rational and irrational) forms of persuasion” (Mio, 1997: 121), and they are also intended to simplify the political reality, thus rendering it more accessible to a wider audience (Mio, 1997). In this sense, by presenting the complex political issues in terms of sport, an illusion of simplicity is created, which marginalizes the notions of morality and values, while at the same time emphasizing the potential for provoking an emotional appeal (Charteris-Black, 2004; Ferrari, 2007). In other words, “within sport metaphors, the complexities of ideological and ethical issues are backgrounded and politics is presented as a relatively simple domain with clear participants [...], unproblematic goals [...] and unambiguous outcomes” (Semino & Masci, 1996: 250). 43
For example, such conclusions are aligned with Mandler, 2012.
Additionally, similarly to
metaphors also “equate physical power with political
power, and they both share entailments portraying politics as a straightforward contest with an outright winner and clear ‘rules of engagement’” (Burnes, 2011: 2169). For instance, talking about the presidential and primary elections as a race (examples 40-43), politicians and political groups as players (examples 44 and 45), political process as a game (examples 46 and 47), arguments between politicians as jabs or sparring (examples 48 and 49), and the political group as a team (examples 50 and 51), takes the focus of the discussion away from the actual essence and complexity of the political debate, and shifts it onto a far simpler concept of sport. This in turn conceals the persuasive aspect of the overarching entrenched conceptual key
POLITICS IS SPORT,
rendering supporters far more suitable for
manipulation. Additionally, the “repetition of such metaphors results in dulling of the critical faculties rather than awakening them” (Edelman, 1964, cited in Mio, 1997: 119), which gives way for the installation of massive perception management mechanisms. In short, it can be concluded that the presented examples of SPORT metaphors conform to the general mechanisms of persuasion proposed in Mio (1997), which include simplification, manipulation of underlying symbolic representations, and the potential to provoke an emotional appeal. As argued in section 2.1.10, the fact that the present corpus consists of entrenched metaphors actually facilitates the persuasive aspect of metaphorical language in the political discourse of daily newspapers, since these entrenched structures operate mostly at an unconscious level. 184.108.40.206.4. Metaphor Systems and Metaphor Interaction SPORT
metaphors also showed a certain degree of interaction, with 23.71% of metaphorical
expressions corresponding to the conceptual key of
appearing in elaborate metaphor systems. As
discussed in the case of CONFLICT metaphors, metaphor interaction in metaphor systems can serve to amplify the rhetorical potential of individual metaphors, where individual metaphors serve as resonators to each other. The same line of reasoning and the conclusions pertaining to the function and structure of metaphor systems that were presented in the section dealing with CONFLICT metaphors also apply here. (52)
The delayed start to the advertising war — which by this point in the last two presidential election cycles was already in full swing — has been one of the more unforeseen aspects of a campaign season that has had all the other trappings of a highly competitive race: wild poll fluctuations, a fight over coveted endorsements and spirited back-and-forth among the candidates. (The New York Times, 6/12/2011)
Mr. Romney said he would “keep on battling” if he fell short in the first contests in Iowa, where he has stepped up his efforts in recent weeks, and New Hampshire, which had always seemed to be a secure launching pad for him but now seems to be in play. (The New York Times, 15/12/2011)
Some quickly endorsed Gov. Rick Perry when he jumped into the race in August. (4/12/2011)
What his team did not expect was that they would be so cash-poor at this stage of the race. (4/12/2011)
The pointed comments suggested a new dynamic in the presidential primary race, with Mr. Paul as a new and enticing target. (The New York Times, 24/12/2011)
Mr. Obama’s aides acknowledge that a general election campaign against Mr. Gingrich would be “a different race,” one that would present a less predictable, more energetic and personally harder-hitting opponent than Mr. Romney would. (The New York Times, 8/12/2011)
Some additional examples of metaphor systems from the present corpus are listed above, and they show interaction between different conceptual metaphors. Example 52 shows interaction between two CONFLICT
metaphors and a
metaphors, one SPORT metaphor, and an additional CAUSED MOTION metaphor; example 54 shows an
metaphor; example 53 contains a metaphor system that includes two
interaction between a structural SPORT metaphor and an ontological CONTAINMENT metaphor, where the race is viewed as a container; example 55 shows a system that contains two sport metaphors; examples 56 and 57 show interaction between a SPORT and a CONFLICT metaphor.
220.127.116.11. Network Optimization in CONFLICT and SPORT Metaphors In addition to the above discussed issues of vital relations, their compressions, the Governing Principles for Compression, and the systematic nature of compression, another important aspect of meaning construction in single-scope metaphorical conceptual integration networks concerns network optimization. In that sense, and in line with the argument presented in Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 325-339), the present section will discuss the levels of optimization achieved in the previously described networks that were instances of CONFLICT and SPORT metaphors. It is important to note that networks rarely achieve the maximum level of satisfaction when it comes to individual Optimality Principles. Instead, these principles usually compete, and the final network ‘works’ by being optimized for only some of these principles to various extents. For example, while single-scope networks are optimized for Topology, the Topology principle often clashes with some of the governing principles for compression. Namely, in the case of metaphorical single-scope networks, Topology is obviously satisfied between the blend and the source input that provides the organizing frame of the blend. Additionally, Topology is also satisfied between the blend and the target input, since the topological structures of the two input spaces are pre-aligned by the vital relation of Analogy that holds between their causal and intentional structures, and between their counterparts that are involved in the partial cross-space mappings, i.e. in the matching process. If a slight detour into the CMT domain is taken, such alignment between the topologies can be accounted for by the Invariance Principle. Namely, the fact that the target input image schematic structure is invariant to that of the source input suggests that the topologies of the two domains need to achieve a high degree of topological prealignment in order for a metaphoric link to be established between them. The CBT offers an additional step in this process, which is the formation of the blend. In that sense, the prealignment between the source and target inputs’ topologies is already accounted for by the former theoretical approach, while the latter framework offers an additional Topology principle that works over the entire network, securing the network’s coherence and cohesion. Compression of one vital relation into another 44 seems to be working directly against the Topology principle, since it creates novel vital relations in the blend by compressing the existing ones. However, this does not affect the frame-level topology of the blend, since the same casual and intentional structures that are analogous in the two inputs are also in force in the blend. 45 In that sense, although “compression principles can resist Topology Principle’s preference for the preservation of topology” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 328), the relevant topology, especially at the frame-level, remains preserved and the blend achieves an equilibrium between Compression and Topology. In other words, the final network is optimized for both compression and Topology to the extent that secures a ‘stable’, coherent blend at the human scale. As discussed in the previous sections dealing with CONFLICT and SPORT metaphors, the most dominant compression of this type is that of Analogy into Uniqueness. 45 This is the general conclusion reached in the previous sections dealing with the analysis of CONFLICT and SPORT metaphors. 44
The Integration principle can also compete with Topology, since achieving an integrated blend carries an inherent necessity for compression. Still, in line with the previous discussion, the level of Integration needs to be aligned with the degree of optimization of the frame-level Topology. Without that, the network simply won’t work, i.e. the developed blend will be unstable. In that sense, a successful network needs to work out an acceptable level of satisfaction of these two principles in order for an equilibrium between them to be achieved. It is worth noting that the network optimization for these two principles is facilitated by the fact that these are instances of single-scope networks, without serious frame-level clashes between the inputs. The Pattern Completion principle seems to work in concert with the Integration principle. Namely, the blend of a single-scope network inherits its organizing frame from the source input, and the blend’s topology is completed by additional background knowledge structures related to that organizing frame. In addition to strengthening the existing vital relations in the blend, these background knowledge structures also serve to reinforce the already integrated compressions. With that in mind, it can be argued that the Pattern Completion Principle and the Integration principle actually conspire to make the network function better. Namely, the process of Integration seems to be made both more coherent and cohesive by the process of Pattern Completion. This, however, may not be the case in a double-scope network, where the two principles might clash, owing to the fact that background knowledge structures related to the organizing frames of the inputs, which can be recruited in the blend, could in fact clash with some aspects of the topological organization of the novel organizing frame of the blended space in a double-scope network. The main role of the Web principle is to make the network a coherent whole. In other words, the network needs to satisfy the Web principle in order for it to be optimized as a unit, which renders the process of meaning construction, i.e. compression and decompression of the blend, possible. In some cases, the Web principle “combines with Integration to force novel integrations in the blend” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 332), which can facilitate some of the governing principles for compression, like creation by compression. Additionally, the fact that compressions in the blend have their counterparts in each of the inputs facilitates the optimization of the Web principle. However, the Web principle can also compete with other principles, like Topology. Namely, the Topology principle restrains Web in the sense that “we must not project from the blend emergent topology that is inappropriate for the inputs” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 331). As a result, optimization of the Web principle is directly governed by Topology. In the case of single-scope metaphorical networks this process is actually facilitated by the prealinged topological structures of the inputs, and the organizing frame of the blend that is adopted from the source input. In that sense, although Topology restrains the Web principle, the main idea behind the Web principle which suggests “that we should not disconnect valuable web connections to the inputs” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 332) remains preserved. Additionally, the Web principle could also be linked to the “molecule-model” discussed above (see Figure 15 for details). Namely, just as the Web principle accommodates the entire web of connections between
the blend and other mental spaces in the network, the on-line aspect of the “molecule-model” directly implicates the entire network of background compressions. As discussed in Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 339), Unpacking in single-scope networks works similarly as in mirror networks. Namely, while the blend is well integrated at the frame-level, integration at lower levels is weaker. Additionally, the Unpacking process is conditioned by the immediate discourse context, i.e. “the Unpacking Principle is not purely one of structure within the network but, more broadly, one of communication, since the unpacking possibilities offered by the blended space will depend on what is already active in the context of communication” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002: 333). In other words, successful Unpacking requires the construction of the fully developed discourse lattice. Another important cue for Unpacking in the case of metaphorical single-scope networks are the links that exist between the compressed elements in the blend, and their counterparts in the input spaces. These connections that are directly influenced by Integration, Topology, and Web, present themselves as invaluable prompts for blend deconstruction, i.e. Unpacking. In light of these arguments, it can be concluded that Unpacking is directly constrained by Integration, Topology, and Web. This suggests that for the network to be optimized for Unpacking, it must first be optimized at least for the other three principles, which in turn reflects the notion that optimality principles need to be considered as a dynamic set of patterns that interact with each other as discourse unfolds. An additional prompt for Unpacking the blend can be found in compressions of one vital relation into another, i.e. in the compression of outer-space vital relation into inner-space vital relations, which provides a direct link between the compressions in the blend and their corresponding counterparts in the input spaces. The Relevance principle is constrained by a set of other principles. Firstly, the interaction between Integration and Topology constrains the list of elements that will be relevant in the blend, most of all in the sense that the list will be the result of important outer-space compressions between the inputs. Secondly, Web also serves as an important constraint to this list. However, Web interacts with both Integration and Topology, while Integration interacts with Pattern Completion, and all of these interactions also constrain the possibilities of network optimization for Relevance. Thirdly, an additional factor in this interplay is the Pattern Completion principle which can serve to amplify the principle of the Intensification of Vital Relations in the blend via background knowledge recruitment, and therefore possibly render some elements more relevant than others. Finally, perhaps the most transparent limitation to Relevance is that imposed by the Unpacking principle, where the relevance of an element in the blend is determined by its role in Unpacking the blend. All these facts sanction a conclusion that the optimization of a given network for Relevance is actually constrained by its optimization for all other principles. In summary, the previous discussion reflects the dynamic interplay of optimality principles that takes place in the process of meaning construction in single-scope metaphorical networks. Regardless of whether some of the principles stand in direct opposition, or support each other, it is important to foreground the nature
of their interaction and the fact that the optimization of the final network requires that an equilibrium be established between these principles, thereby satisfying each of them to a certain extent. Furthermore, the role of the immediate discourse context must not be neglected, since the fully developed discourse lattice can also serve as an important constraint.
Present Research: Part 2
4.2. Present Research: Part 2 The methodology and theoretical framework used in the second part of the present research were adopted from research on affect and emotions. This section of the paper involved empirical research via appropriate questionnaires based on the theoretical framework introduced in section 2.3. The specific structure of these questionnaires will be described in the following paragraphs. The study included a total of 101 participants, 76 females, and 25 males, with the participants’ average age of 22.68 years-old (Std. Deviation of 1.456). The age range was 21 – 27. All participants were students of English at the Department of English, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Niš, Serbia, and the study included 44 third-year students, 31 fourth-year students, and 26 graduate students. The questionnaires were distributed to the participants during their lectures at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Niš, and they were given thirty minutes to complete them. Based on the theoretical framework discussed in section 2.3, the study included two types of questionnaires. Type-one questionnaires (Questionnaires 1 and 3) 46 were based on the Russell’s circumplex model of affect (Russell, 1980; 1989), and they were designed to measure valence, and arousal, the two components of affect. Questionnaire 1 was designed to measure the response to metaphorical expressions corresponding to the conceptual key POLITICS IS CONFLICT, while Questionnaire 3 was designed to measure the reaction to metaphorical expressions corresponding to the conceptual key
POLITICS IS SPORT.
In line with the
methodology used in Nešić et al. (2009) and Nešić et al. (2010), the participants were presented with a 10point Likert scale, ranging from 0 to 9, on which they were instructed to record their affective responses to the target stimuli. 47 Type-one questionnaire contained eight sentences extracted from the corpus, and in each sentence there was an expression (i.e. a metaphorical expression) that was bolded and underlined. Additionally, before being included in the questionnaire, each sentence containing a metaphorical expression (i.e. a target stimulus) was filtered for potentially biased information. Namely, all of the personal names, names of political fractions, and similar information were excluded and replaced with appropriate pronouns, or other neutral phrases. The experimental subjects were instructed to read each sentence carefully, and then decide on how pleasant (in the sense of valence), and how exciting (in the sense of arousal) the emphasized expression was for them, and rate their answers on the previously described Likert scale. The subjects were not primed, i.e. they were not told that the emphasized expressions represented metaphorical expressions corresponding to CONFLICT and SPORT metaphors. The main aim of type-one questionnaires was to determine whether there was an actual affective response in terms of valence and arousal to the target stimuli, i.e. the selected metaphorical expressions included in the questionnaire. Judging by the scale construction, with “0” corresponding to the most unpleasant See Appendix A and Appendix C for the full content of Questionnaires 1 and 3, respectively. In terms of valence: 0 = the least pleasant, 9 = the most pleasant; in terms of arousal: 0 = the least arousing, 9 = the most arousing.
Present Research: Part 2
reaction (in terms of valence), or to the least arousing reaction (in terms of arousal), and “9” to the most pleasant reaction (in terms of valence), or the most aroused reaction (in terms of arousal), it is obvious that the arithmetic middle of the scale that corresponds to the value of “4.5”, would describe an ideally neutral reaction. In order to make sure that the reactions of experimental subjects were different from neutral, mean values of valences and arousals for each individual stimulus respectively were compared against the calculated mean neutral value of 4.5. The aim of such a procedure was to establish whether the mean values of valences and arousals showed statistically significant differences (p