SWP-Aktuell - Diplocat

German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Catalonia on the road to independence? The key lies in Madrid Kai-Olaf Lang On 26 July 2013, the head of the Catalan Government, Artur Mas, formally requested Spain’s Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, to enter into negotiations to lay the foundations for a referendum on the independence of Catalonia. The request is part of a process in which the Catalan nation would exercise a “right to choose”. This process, which has been pushed for by the parties of the government alliance in office since December 2012 in Catalonia, should culminate in a referendum. This would allow the citizens of Catalonia to decide whether this autonomous region of Spain should become a new European State. In Catalonia, where sovereign-separatist tendencies are gaining ground, a clear majority for a referendum is emerging. In contrast, the centralist powers in Madrid, including the governing People’s Party, have opposed a referendum so far. The transfer of competencies that would concede further autonomy to Catalonia or a comprehensive reform of the financial equalization that would reduce the burden on this part of the country have so far also been met with resistance in the capital. If the central powers remain adamant and refuse to enter into dialogue, the tensions between Madrid and Barcelona will inevitably worsen as part of growing Catalan discontent.

All those forces in the general public and political framework of Catalonia who are dissatisfied with the current position of the autonomous region within the Spanish national structure have been significantly strengthened in recent years. The financial and debt crisis, which has also affected northeastern Spain, should not be underestimated as a driving force. However, it would mean glossing over the facts to view the crisis as the sole cause of

the new Catalan movement; the national surges in Catalonia have complex causes.

Turf wars and pro-Catalan mobilization The current level of tensions is at least somewhat due to the disputes over the modified Statute of Autonomy of 2006. This amended quasi-constitution of the region was passed in August 2006 after difficult negotiations. From the determined pro-

Dr. Kai-Olaf Lang is Head of the EU Integration Research Division for

SWP-Aktuell 50 August 2013

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SWP-Aktuell

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

Catalan forces’ perspective, the result was disappointing, as the Spanish Parliament had rejected numerous claims to restore competencies to Catalonia. Although Catalan nationalists (and Spanish centralists) spoke out against the new statute, a referendum in Catalonia approved the text by a large majority, albeit with low voter turnout. Immediately after the entry into force of the Statute, the conservative People’s Party (PP) of Spain and some other regions brought Catalonia’s new constitutional order before the Spanish Constitutional Court. In its judgement of June 2010, the court rejected significant points of the Statute of Autonomy, for example concerning financial or language policy. As a result, the possibilities for expanded competencies in the context of the Spanish autonomy model were exhausted for the representatives of many national-Catalan currents - and this even though they put their hopes in the Socialists governing in Madrid at that time who were relatively open-minded with regard to the additional flexibility of regionalism. After the victory of the traditionally centralist People’s Party in the Spanish Parliament elections of November 2011, this assessment was confirmed, especially as the PP won an absolute majority and were thus not dependent on regionalist parties as the majority. In the wake of the economic and financial crisis, Catalonia’s net payer position in the intra-Spanish financial compensation system also became a highly controversial topic. By their own account, the region hard hit by the crisis pays about 8 percent of its bottom line gross domestic product (GDP) into the intraSpanish redistribution to other parts of the country - in marked contrast to the equally wealthy Basque region, for example, which has a different financial model and does not have to make solidarity payments in a comparable scope to other parts of the country. Without the net contributions payable under the present system, the pressures for consolidation in Catalonia would be significantly lower, such is the interpretation of the Catalan Parliament. Catalonia’s regional


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government therefore wanted to reformulate the finance and transfer model (pacte fiscal). Specifically, the region would like to get out of the common regime for financial resources of the Autonomous Communities and come to a bilateral agreement with the central state. However, the talks on this failed at a summit meeting between the Spanish and Catalan Prime Ministers in September 2012. Prime Minister Rajoy rejected the “fiscal pact” not least with reference to the Spanish Constitution. The unproductive frictions and negotiations over competencies and money have given rise to the feeling in many parts of the Catalan community that they have less and less influence over their own destiny. This view is particularly pronounced when it comes to infrastructure projects or regional development, where cases of (alleged) discrimination, for instance in the construction of faster train connections, are firmly anchored in the public and private discourse. As a result, Catalan ideas are increasingly finding resonance in social classes and sections of the political landscape that have long been reluctant to accept these postulates. The call for sovereignty (soberanismo) and independence (independentismo) up to the open call for statehood and secession has gained powerful traction in political debates and real life in the last few years. After 2009, legally invalid “independence referendums” in which almost 900,000 people participated were held in dozens of towns, cities and communities. On 10 July 2010, a mass demonstration was held in Barcelona with the motto “We are a nation. We decide” in immediate reaction to the Constitutional Court’s judgement on the Autonomy Statute of 2010. On the occasion of the Catalan national holiday on 11 September 2012, between 600,000 and 1.5 million people gathered in the streets of Barcelona in a now independentism-aligned protest march under the slogan “Catalonia, new state in Europe.”

Under the impression of the rally and after the negotiations for a revised financial compensation agreement with the Rajoy government had failed, the head of the Catalan government, Artur Mas, pushed through early re-elections. In this way a new government should be able to obtain the mandate to hold a referendum on the independence of Catalonia. Before the end of September, the Catalan Parliament passed a resolution in which this very option was called for.

The 2012 elections and the road to a referendum on independence In the November 2012 parliamentary elections, the previously dominant grouping of Artur Mas and the Convergence and Union (CiU) centrist party alliance suffered heavy losses, but remained the strongest force. However, the sovereign-social Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) achieved significant growth. Overall, those parties which had supported the organization of a referendum obtained a clear majority of seats. CiU and ERC subsequently signed a cooperation agreement in which the ERC ensured the parliamentary support of the CiU minority government to exercise the “right to choose” (dret a decidir): The citizens of Catalonia should be able to decide in a referendum whether Catalonia should become a new state within Europe. Specifically, both parties agreed, among other things, to  adopt a “declaration of sovereignty of the people of Catalonia” in the Catalan Parliament at the beginning of the legislature,

 enter into discussions and negotiations with the Spanish government regarding the holding of a referendum,

 convene an “Advisory Council for the National Transition” (CATN), which would act as an advisory service and coordination body for the preparation and holding of the referendum to ensure the participation of broad parts of the political spectrum and society,

legal holding of a referendum in the course of the following year. Since taking office, the government team has implemented most of the measures they had targeted. At the same time, social activities have intensified. A striking feature of the Catalan movement is its anchorage in civil society as well as in the towns, cities and communities. Large civil-society umbrella organizations act as braces and cooperation forums with high mobilization potential. The most important associations include the Catalan National Assembly (ANC) and the Òmnium Cultural association. Founded in the Franco era, this association promotes above all the Catalan language and culture, but has increased its political nature over the years. The ANC organized the big protest march on 11 September 2012 and is currently collecting signatures for a referendum on independence. ANC and Òmnium Cultural were joint organizers of a “Concert for Freedom” which was attended by around 90,000 people at the FC Barcelona football stadium in June 2013. On 11 September 2013, the ANC will organize the formation of a human chain across all of Catalonia. Although some of these associations may receive funds from the Catalan budget, it is unmistakable that they are based on a fundamental civic commitment and find a remarkable resonance. For government-loyal associations, the so-called “National Pact for the Right to Decide” in which political parties, economic actors and social organizations are involved in order to demonstrate unity in terms of “national transition”, is thus also more than a simple chore. In addition, the pact visibly showed to the outside who is currently in line with the self-determination movement. The Catalan government likes to promote these kinds of civil society initiatives, but does not control them.

 create the formal legal and institutional conditions by the end of 2013 to enable the SWP-Aktuell 50 August 2013

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Political landscape dominated by the national question The increasing relevance of the “Catalan question” is also recognizable in the party structure, which, apart from economic and social issues, is increasingly shaped by the conflict over the future constitutional quality of Catalonia (see chart). In the political parties, a strengthening of the left-national trends can be observed in particular. The Republican Left (ERC) has especially benefited from the progressive polarization and now achieves the highest poll numbers. The ERC aims to make a “Catalan Republic” an independent state in the EU. Should Madrid oppose the Catalonia’s desire for independence, the ERC wants to impose a unilateral approach, which does not exclude the “Kosovo way”. The party that also sees itself as “social democratic” is apparently finding supporters in increasing numbers in the pro-Catalan portions of the Socialists of Catalonia (PSC) reservoir. The radical left, especially the alliance of Greens and Left Socialists (ICV EUiA), calls for unrestricted freedom of choice and would like to unite “social emancipation and national liberation”. While the radical left “Popular Unity Candidates” (CUP) coming from the communities target “total independence” and a break with the existing involvement with the government, ICV EUiA has not yet committed itself and accepts both federal reforms and a path to independence. The largest government grouping, the civil CiU, has gradually dismissed the idea of maximizing the autonomy after the conflicts surrounding the 2006 Statute of Autonomy. Even in the 2011 Spanish parliamentary election, they had the objective of “opening a new Catalan political stage in Madrid,” which must be based on the recognition of Catalonia as a nation and on a “bilateral relationship” between Barcelona and Madrid. Head of government Mas and the liberal CDC component of the two-party CiU coalition CiU have since become the driving supporters of the Catalan “right to self-determination”hardly slowed down by the smaller Christian Democrat UDC partner, whose party leader


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Duran i Lleida acted very cautiously in the matter of independence. Counterpoints to the sovereignist trends are the conservative People’s Party (PPC), and the Party of the Citizenry “(or Ciutadans - Citizens for short) supported by liberals and intellectuals. While Ciutadans are committed to the protection of bilingualism and individual civil rights (rather than collective ethnic groups’ rights), the attitude of the PPC is rooted in the traditionally centralist state understanding of the Spanish conservatives. The PPC, which rejects both the pursuit of independence and a federalization of Spain, advocates - rather vaguely - for a “differentiated” or modernized autonomy and changes in the financial compensation system. From the PPC’s perspective, the Spanish Constitutional Court defended democracy and constitutional law by judging found the Catalan Parliament’s declaration of sovereignty to be legally invalid. The Catalan Socialists (PSC) are somewhere in the middle. They argue for a transformation of Spain into a federal state and achieved a corresponding, albeit laboriously-won compromise (“Declaration of Granada”) at the beginning of July 2013 with the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE). The PSOE therefore has the core demands of the PSC such as the possibility of a referendum (the PSC wants a referendum but would invoke people to vote “no”) or rejecting the definition of Spain as a multinational state. The search for a third path between independence and centralism favoured by the PSC is not without controversy and has been criticized by the “Catalanist sector” of the party again and again. Both the relationship with the PSOE as well as the intra-partisan cohesion are fragile.

Diagram: Programmatic positioning of Catalonia’s parties (own illustration) Independence ERC

ICV EUiA

(CDC) CiU (UDC) Market

State/social justice

CUP

PSC

Ciutadans

PPC

Centralism

Public opinion The conflicts surrounding the Statute of Autonomy and the growing discontent in large parts of Catalan society have led not only to mass mobilization and protest demonstrations, but public opinion has also changed noticeably. The Madrid opinion research institute Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) found in a study conducted at the beginning of the year that 83 percent of people in Catalonia are dissatisfied with the policies of the Rajoy government with respect to Catalonia. About 70 percent are in favour of a referendum and the percentage of those who would hold a referendum even without the consent of the central government is almost as high. However, three-quarters of the respondents do not want unilateral secession against Madrid’s will. Unlike before, the advocates of complete independence now seem to have a relative majority over those who prefer other options (federalization, greater autonomy, status quo). The camp of those who maintain that independent statehood is the best solution has grown massively over the last three years to around one third (according to the CIS in Fall 2012) to almost half (according to a survey conducted by the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió [CEO] in late May and early June 2013, which is associated with the Catalan government). The ratio between supporters of Catalan independence and all the

other variants of the remaining part of the Spanish state is balanced, even if the independence camp has experienced strong growth according to the polls. The result of a popular vote is therefore quite open and will depend on many factors, such as how the question is formulated in the referendum. Several surveys have shown a clear preponderance of positive votes if there is a yes-or-no vote for independence. The step towards Catalan independence is therefore conceivable for a growing share of the populations or rather no longer a taboo. It should not be forgotten that the issue of selfdetermination has no central importance for Catalan society. High unemployment, the economic crisis and the behaviour of political leaders, who are often involved in corruption scandals, are considered to be of higher priority.

Next steps and further development In his aforementioned letter of 26 July, Artur Mas formally asked Prime Minister Rajoy to enter into talks, with the objective of creating the legal prerequisites for a referendum on Catalan independence. Mas underlined the fact that Barcelona is interested in dialogue and a negotiated solution with Madrid. The Catalan Consultative Council CATN, which drafted an extensive report prior to the request, identifies five possible legal constructions: a regular referendum endorsed by the Spanish Congress of Deputies; a new type of referendum established by constitutional amendment; the delegation of the referendum decision to regional level; the application of a Catalan law from 2010 which allows consultative regional referendums, or a new legal framework for votes similar to referendums on independence (so-called consultations), with which any legal restrictions pertaining to the 2010 law are circumvented. Which of these paths will be taken still remains to be seen, although constitutional amendments, are hardly possible to implement politically. Should Madrid react


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negatively (or not at all) to the request from Barcelona, the following “non-negotiated” scenarios are possible:  The Catalan side proceeds unilaterally. Parliament and the government hold a referendum with reference to the 2010 law or a new regional standard. The central government would view this move as illegal and apply to the Constitutional Court, but would probably not forcibly thwart the referendum themselves. Madrid could also politically outlaw the Catalan government as a lawbreaker and reduce the cooperation to a minimum.

 Following a negative decision from Madrid, re-elections with plebiscitary character would be called for in Catalonia, against which the central government would have no legal leverage. The nationally-oriented forces in Catalonia could now support additional steps towards a democratically-founded directional decision for a referendum - or even for independence. It seems rather unlikely that Madrid would allow a Spain-wide referendum. Although the vote would probably be negative throughout the country, in fact, this would offer Catalonia the option of a legal ballot, for which a high turnout would be expected. The political rift in the country would be even greater, since the pro-Catalan forces would have a high degree of legitimacy for themselves and would perceive other parts of the country as opponents of Catalan independence. Given the political pressure in Catalonia and the self-imposed targets, it will be difficult for the Mas government to move away from the demand to hold a referendum. For large parts of the Catalan public, this would amount to a waiver of the right to self determination, which is regarded as a democratic essential. The course of the referendum process is, however, associated with some unanswered questions. The time frame is somewhat unknown. According to the cooperation agreement between the CiU and ERC, the vote should take place in 2014. One possible option is 11


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September 2014, the National Day of Catalonia, in which the 300th anniversary of the incorporation into the Spanish state will be celebrated. In the CATN’s opinion, the proposal of 11 September 2014 will be rejected because this date would be contrary to the bid for neutrality. Therefore, the Consultancy Council argues alternatively for a date between the end of August (to have enough distance from the European elections) and 18 September. A referendum for independence will be held in Scotland on this same day, the outcome of which could affect the Catalan vote. If this time window is confirmed by the Catalan leadership, the events themselves would quickly condense, as legal and bureaucratic organizational steps would need to be introduced soon afterwards. However, the cooperation agreement of the CiU and ERC provides that for socioeconomic or political reasons, a date after 2014 might would also be considered. The behaviour of the government in Madrid will be particularly important for the progress of the referendum process. Up to now, the Catalan impression has been that of an attitude of denial. Moderate politicians like the Head of the UDC, Duran i Lleida, criticized Prime Minister Rajoy, who follows the motto “more Spain, less Catalonia,” and created even more supporters of independence. Rajoy should follow the example of British Prime Minister Cameron who did not deny the Scottish desire for a referendum, but instead dealt with it constructively. The Spanish Prime Minister has so far failed to present an attractive offer to the Catalan people. The Catalan government will emphasize above all three strategic points in the coming months. First, it will consistently place the right to self-determination in the foreground, meaning the right to hold a referendum, not the desire for independence. Second, it will aim to form “pacts” with Madrid, strive for the legal route and thus show both internally and externally that it prefers an amicable solution with the central government. Third, it will attempt to obtain the broadest possible

consensus within Catalonia for a referendum. A clear majority, in fact, represents a forceful political signal with which they want to overcome any legal obstacles from Madrid. It is no coincidence that the CATN has stressed that beyond the desirable “legal” ways there are also “legitimate” possibilities of exercising the right of self-determination. In this respect, parts of the government camp are interested in integrating the Socialists as well. The talks with Madrid and their progression will show whether a large majority in Catalonia actually wants to assert an illegal but legitimate referendum if the central government maintains its hard-line stance. Socialists, LeftGreen, but also the co-governing UDC would be unlikely to be associated with this type of referendum front at any price. Madrid might be tempted to deepen such differences in Catalonia by referencing a constitutionallyjustified “No” to let the hard-line selfdetermination advocates appear to be only one of many groups in the local political landscape.

The EU and the Catalan question Although the Catalan question is primarily an internal Spanish affair, it has manifold European dimensions. An escalation of the conflict between Catalonia and the country as a whole could result in an internal political crisis that would have an impact on the economy, fiscal consolidation and the financial sector in Spain. An escalation could be expected in particular if the receivables from Catalonia ran completely dry and the central government persisted in its strict opposition of a reform of the territorial or financial system. The EU or rather the Member States could thus come to a point which would make it necessary to consider whether a negotiated separation was preferable to a state of permanent instability. If Spain reaches a constitutional “point of no return,” at which a withdrawal of Catalonia from the previous political system looms, the EU and the Member States would have to clarify something: Who would recognize a new country of Catalonia under international law?

Could there be a second Kosovo constellation which divides the perception held by the EU? Since Catalonia as a secessionist state would, for the most part, not automatically be the legal successor of Spain: Which international organizations would it be a member of? How would you deal with a situation in which Catalonia had to first accede the EU as a new member in the EU but the acquis (as has long been the case) was fully transformed and the citizens of the country possibly still had EU citizenship? Catalonia would presumably unilaterally maintain the euro as a means of payment but it would be fragile financially and could not avail itself of the euro zone’s rescue packages: How would the country stand with regard to monetary and fiscal policy under these circumstances? How could Catalonia and companies located there (including 570 German companies) be integrated into the internal market without friction? Catalonia generates one-fifth of the current Spanish GDP and accounts for one quarter of the exports: In view of this, what would the impact of this area’s exit be on the Spanish economy and the national budget? The Catalonia problem poses risks, but also opportunities. If the Spanish model of autonomy is transformed with view to creating a new equilibrium, this could be the basis for a new regionalism in the EU. The prerequisites for this are willingness of the central government in Madrid to reform and realpolitik on the part of Catalonia. If the Catalans voted against independence in a referendum (as in the case of Québec), the constitutional question (although not the reform of the internal organization) would disappear from the agenda throughout Spain for years or decades. Should the referendum for Scottish independence planned for autumn 2014 also fail, secession movements in the EU would become politically irrelevant for a long time. On the other hand, should the process of alienation between Catalonia and Madrid continue leading to a sustainable sovereign consensus in Catalonia, Spain’s cohesion may only be maintained with difficulty. While the EU should continue to adhere to


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© Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2013 All rights reserved Aktuell exclusively reflects the personal opinions of the author SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Ludwigkirchplatz 34 10719 Berlin Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] ISSN 1611-6364


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the dominant principle under international law of the territorial integrity of its member states, it must be prepared politically and institutionally in the event of an impending collapse (ruptura). Should this occur, it would be necessary to review whether there are models that could mitigate the negative effects for all involved. One might think about an inverse Cyprus model, for example: The whole island is a member of the EU, but the acquis is only applied to a part of the territory; in the case of secession, only the reduced-size successor state would initially be a member of the EU; but European law would apply to the whole territory. Whether there will be a constitutional breach between Spain and Catalonia depends at least somewhat on the extent to which the moderate forces in Catalonia can provide convincing arguments against a separation. They would be inclined to make these types of argument if the central government were to make concessions with regard to the organization of competencies or financial compensation. The federalist direction of today’s Catalanism, pragmatic segments in the government and last but not least, parts of the economy (such as the business association Foment del Treball and especially large companies dependent on the Spanish market) would then be revalued. Should Madrid make such an offer and come to an agreement with Barcelona, many of the moderate voters in Catalonia would probably vote against secession despite their dissatisfaction. Then, in fact, a referendum would serve to decide not only between the present form of autonomy and independence, but between a status quo plus and independent statehood. The key to a constructive solution to the Catalan question lies in Madrid.