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Systematic Occupational Health and Safety Management in Complex Industrial Settings P.H. Lindøea, O.E.Olsena, T. Lieb a
Department of Media, Culture and Social Science, University of Stavanger, 4036 Stavanger, Norway b International Research Institute of Stavanger, Box 8046 Stavanger, Norway
Abstract The paper presents a model of systematic occupational health and safety management of a company with focus on three feedback loops where exposed hazards and risk are channelled through a regulatory regime, market stakeholders and the industrial system. The purpose of this paper is to improve the understanding of how an enterprise, as part of an industrial context, develops barriers and constraint by using feedback from incidents and accidents. The question is how to identify critical elements in the industrial context and its relations regarding safety. Experience from the oil and the fishing industry are used to testify the model. Keywords: Occupational health and safety management, organisational learning
1. Introduction Instrumental models of regulation have lost their dominating position in the search for better regulation and safety management systems [1]. Risk based regulation and safety management concepts coined as «enforced self-regulation», «regulated selfregulation», «meta-regulation», «internal control» flourish [2]. Within the framework of self-regulation, where part of the regulatory process is delegated from the authorities to industrial stakeholders [3], the enterprise is obliged to identify and assess risks and hazards embedded in their operations. Consequently, there is a need for improving the framework of problem solving where information from incidents is channelled back to the enterprise through efficient feedback loops. Thus, organizational learning and institutional design will remain central in developing a safety culture and proactive management systems [4].
The purpose of this paper is to discuss how an enterprise in an industrial context may use different feedback channels in the development of proactive safety management systems. 2. Theoretical perspectives The theoretical framework builds on two perspectives. (a) The enterprise is seen as a sociotechnical system [5, 6] with interacting elements of physical artifacts, and individual and collective mindsets [7] aiming to reach intentional purposes. (b) The workplace and its context is seen as communities of practice which plays an active part in the construction of safety as shown by Gherardi & Nicolini [8]: “Communities construct safety from the heterogeneous materials of cultural referents,
artifacts, rules and constraints that originate inside and outside the formal boundaries of the organization.” The organization is both an agent and an object in promoting safety. Information from outside has to be handled as input in a mutual learning process within the communities of practice. From this perspective regulatory bodies should see themselves as an integral part of the safety system with an obligation to design rules that can be more easily implemented. The analytical framework is outlined in figure 1.
(f-3) is related to the industrial relations, safety institutions, availability of knowledge, training programs, research on safety issues, etc. These factors will to a large extent determine how the industry makes use of the information across the different organizational layers. Our hypothesis is that the way different feedback loops interplay and interfere will play a decisive role in the design and implementation of efficient safety management systems. 3. Method
Market actors
Safety management
Regulators
f-2
Fatal accidents & injuries
f-3
f-1
Figure 1: The analytical framework The inner stippled arrow indicates an organizational unit (department, installation, plant, vessels, etc.) with a safety management system as part of a wider socio-technical system. The model has three feedback loops (f-1,2,3) where information from incidents and accidents is channeled into the enterprise. The regulatory mechanism (f-1) is composed of hierarchical layers of legislators, governmental regulation agencies and field inspectors. In the short term, authorities may use sanctions to improve safety. But in the long run they have to improve industrial standards based on improved regulations. The second feedback loop (f-2) is linked to a heterogeneous group of market actors; customers, clients, consumers groups, etc. These stakeholders will have different views on safety and different capacity to influence on safe products and processes, environmental issues etc. Awareness on corporate social responsibility may increase the importance of this feedback mechanism in some industrial sectors. In the case of major accidents, media may act as designers and social amplifiers of the feedback effects. The third feedback mechanism
In the paper, we compare the safety management systems in the fishing and offshore oil industry. Both industries are working in the same demanding marine environment. Even so, the accident rates and patterns are extremely different. During the last 15 years, the work force within the fishery has been reduced from 18 000 to 12000. At the same time, the average loss of lives in accidents has been 16, 5 every year. In the same period, there has been only one lost life per year in the offshore oil industry, although the workforce has increased from 20000 to about 30000. By using an accident rate of lost lives per 10 000 man-labour year, figure 2 gives an indication of an accident rate that is 30 times higher in the fishing industry compared to offshore oil production. The case method used here is in line with the argument of Yin [9]. By comparing critical samples, it is possible to compare and utilize the findings and identify some main generic features providing valid knowledge about organizational performance regarding safety management. The data used are provided from different sources. A national research program “Safety in fishery and marine harvest” was carried out from 2002 to 2004, with 343 respondents from a total sample of 1784 vessels [10]. The empirical basis for the offshore oil industry is several research projects undertaken during the last 20 years. Among these are a “Risk trends projects” monitoring safety within the industry every second year. (See www.Ptil.no). Many of the same variables are observed in the two industries by using the same questions. Even if studies in the two industries are different in their approach, they cover the scope of the issues raised in this paper.
Accident rate
25 20
Oil industry Fishery
15 10 5
19 90 19 92 19 94 19 96 19 98 20 00 20 02
0
Figure 2 Fatal accidents in offshore oil and fishery 4. Findings 4.1 Accidents A total number of 260 lives were lost in work accidents offshore from 1967 to 2003. The numbers of lost lives per 100 million working hours (FAR) for supply vessels was at a peak about but decreased gradually towards zero in the 1990s. Over the last 25 years occupational injuries also decreased continuously. Fatal accidents in fishery show a substantial reduction from the peak in 1993, even if 72 lives were lost from 1998 to 2004. There is now a tendency of increasing injuries, however that may be a result of increasing reporting. Falling, pushing or squeezing objects causes the most frequent accidents on fishing vessels. Then follows accidents caused by “flying” objects, handling tools and lifting/handling objects. While the risk of fatal accidents is highest in the smaller fishing vessels with a risk of 2.0 – 2.5 lost lives per 1000 man-labour year, the reported occupational accidents is highest in the deep sea fishing fleet with a risk of 25 accidents per 1000 manlabour year [11]. 4.2 Feedback channels 4.2.1 Regulation The regulatory regime in the Norwegian petroleum industry has been developed in a dynamic relationship between regulator and the regulated [12]. While the 1970s was characterized as the “Wild West” period, a modest adjustment took place with regulatory elements picked from Norwegian onshore industry, including the Work Environment Act (1977). The act
contained one of the world’s most stringent labor legislation and it supported the development of the unionized offshore environment characterized by complete collective bargaining rights and a comprehensive network of safety representatives. In this phase the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) enforced new risk and performance-based criteria for safety management systems (internal control). The blowout at the “Bravo” platform in 1977 and the catastrophe of “Alexander Kielland” in 1980 raised a public debate about offshore safety and became a driving force for a new safety regime. As a follow-up the authorities launched a long-term research program called “Safety at the shelf”. The companies established “Goodwill agreements” and “Industrial co-operation agreements” which also stimulated improved R&D activities. At the end of the 1990s, the authorities established new means for the improvement of safety; A safety forum for dialogue and exchange of information together with the biannual “Risk trend project” in cooperation with research institutions and the industry. Within the fishing industry, the Norwegian Maritime Directorate implemented a new regulation regarding occupational health and safety on vessels in 2000, with special guidelines regarding design and maintenance of safety management systems. The regulation built on the same principles as the offshore industry. It had the same requirements to regular risk assessment and documentation of necessary means to reduce identified risks and hazards. However, most vessels in the fisheries are small, and they are operated by a small crew or even by a single fisherman. The survey from fisheries [10] indicates that the crew knows the regulations, and two out of three are in agreement that the new guidelines regarding the safety management are suitable for the caretaking of occupational health and safety. However, the follow up and contact with the authorities depends on the size of the vessels. While the maritime inspectors visits 95 % of the vessels of more than 15-meter length, only one out of three of the smaller ones are visited. The same pattern is found for the fishery authorities and the Coast Guard. Eight out of ten reports good relations and cooperation’s with the authorities. 4.2.2 Market mechanism As main actors in a global energy industry the oil industry is exposed to the interest of stakeholders and consumers, both in the global and the national context. Major accident as the blowout at the “Bravo”
platform with heavy pollution and the collapse of the “Alexander Kielland” with a loss of 123 lives raised an awareness about safety in the public opinions in Norway. Even if there has been a long period without major accidents the issues of safety is raised again when the activities moves north towards the vulnerable fishing areas in Lofoten and the Barents Sea. Opposite to the oil industry, the high numbers of fatal accidents in fishery have neither given rise to a public debate about safety standards, or any common effort among stakeholders to improve safety standards. Even if the total pollution from the fishing fleet may be considerable, the oil pollution from the individual vessel plays a minor role. Each incident may be of a small magnitude, and the reporting systems may not expose such small incidents to the public. Thus, pollution from fisheries is an almost non-existent issue. For the market stakeholders, it is the quality of the products and food security that counts, not the unsafe conditions within the fishery industry. 4.2.3 Industrial context Due to the very high demands on investments and technological know-how in offshore crude oil production, the oil industry is a big business industry. Ample resources, and a high-risk profile characterize the industry. Consequently, the contractual relations that are highly formalized also focus on safety management. Investments in safety means part of the normal procedures. The restructuring of the fisheries and allocation of limited fishing quotas has reduced the profitability, particularly for the coastal fishery. Seven out of ten informants in the survey argue that the poor economy limit their opportunity to improve safety by modernizing their vessels, investing in new and better equipment, better training, etc. The survey demonstrates clearly that vessels built before 1980 have a low safety standard, and that very few have been brought up to the requirements of today. The workforce in the petroleum industry is almost unionized, and they have played a decisive role in developing the regulations by acting both as critical watchdogs and co-players when new initiatives came from NDP in the 1980s. Through a tough, but cooperative behavior, they got opportunities to influence decisions on program design. By representing almost the whole work force they have a very strong position as a negotiating partner towards management at the industrial level.
Within the fishing industry there has not been a tradition for using the industrial relation in the development of better safety standards. A reason for that may be that most of the ship-owners and the fishermen are members of the same union. As a consequence there has not been a critical counterpart regarding workers safety as in the oil industry. Within the fishing industry, there is no tradition for using industrial relations in the development of better safety standards. Most of the vessel owners and the fishermen are members of the same union. Often, they have close relationships. On small vessels, they also share the same risks and face the same hazards. As a consequence, there has not been any critical counterpart regarding worker safety. The safety deputy has a strong and legitimate position anchored in the Working Environment Law, among other things a right to stop dangerous work. Even if this position formally is in place many safety deputy claims that in their everyday life there is scarcity of economic resources, of participation in training, etc. According to the regulation, a ship with a crew between three and seven shall elect a safety delegate if not a majority of the crew decides to handle safety issues without a representative. If the crew consists of eight or more, they are obliged to elect a safety delegate. According to the survey, 92% have organized an election. All fishermen have to follow a 40 hours statutory training course on safety and 75% claim it cover their needs. Only 30 % of the delegates report that they have received the prescribed training. About 50% of respondents claim that the safety delegate is functioning well and that they have a substantial impact on the working environment. The survey from fishing industry shows a lack of commitment and support regarding the some of the basic principles behind the systematic safety management. Two out of ten ships have written goals for their safety work, while four of ten have a regular mapping of the occupational health of the crew. One out of four ships has plans for preventive actions regarding injuries and almost half of them agree that the plans are implemented. The data support the conclusion that use of preventive planning is low within the fishing fleet. An active participation from the crew is not dominant even if 85% admit that the degree of potential influence on safety decision is high. However, two out of three say the crew takes initiatives when they see the need of safety improvements. The findings from the three feedback channels are summarized in table 1.
Table 1 The three feedback mechanisms compared: Relations between external actors and the enterprises
f-1
f-2
Perspective Positions of authorities Regulators dialogue with industry Political awareness Economic consequences of major accident Trust among stakeholders The role of media Industrial structure
The role of the unions
Oil Industry One strong co-ordinating authority Frequent dialogue and mutual learning about new generations of regulation Very high due to a high catastrophe potential Reduced trust and legitimacy Loss of contracts and reputation Environmental groups mobilize against pollutions High awareness Homogeneous with few big companies and very formalized contractual relations within a hierarchy of contractors Strong and critical unions with a good position vs. safety authorities
f-3 Safety delegates Safety management system
Strong formal position with a high legitimacy A top-down and formalised system implemented in all organisations
Fishery A maritime authority with fishery as a minor priority Distanced and fragmented implementation through individual safety training Very low due to isolated incidents. Fatal accidents gets low attention Pollution or losses of lives gives no direct impact in the market No watch-dogs or stakeholders preoccupied with safety issues In general, low awareness Heterogeneous sector with many individual small actors and few bigger ship owners. The main union includes employers and employees. It has no important role in safety Seem to have a position at bigger vessels Some degree of a top-down and formalised system, but low degree of implementation
5. Discussion 5.1 Feedback loop 1: The regulatory mechanism The structure in the oil industry, its capabilities, leadership hierarchies and formal structures made it easy for the regulator to identify their “partners”. Opposite it has been easy for the industry to relate to one dominating and coordinating regulator, as has been the case with NPD. The oil industry may be seen as a homogenous and technically advanced industrial sector, investing large resources in safety and risk prevention after several serious catastrophes. Communication with the NPD was based on dialogue, even if NPD could use licences and contracts as “stick and the carrot” in this process. This was a mutual learning process, going through many phases. After the 1980s the industry accepted stronger regulation and was positive to the new regime [12]. The challenges of implementation in fisheries have been quite different. The ship owners have limited resources, many of them operates in locally and by their own with few or relations to the authorities, and a rather limited experience with formal safety systems. The Maritime Directorate and inspections
has responsibility for about 10.000 fishing vessels. That gives few possibilities for dialogue with the ship owners, and there has not been others mediators in the process of implementation. 5.2 Feedback loop 2: The market Some industries as the “oil business” operates in a global market with stakeholders and groups that are sensitive regarding their products or production. If issues as damaging the environment, exploiting workers, handling waste, etc. the questions of safe and legitimate operation of the enterprises can be raised in public, by actions groups and finally by politicians and legislators. Such effects may enforce the pressure on the feedback towards the regulators (f-1) and the internal feedback (f-3). 5.3 Feedback loop 3: Industrial relations The petroleum industry has exploited the potential of a “three-pillared” system of cooperation between company, union and authorities, and the industry has
achieved a substantial improvement in safety management. The unions act as watchdogs if the employers introduce programs undermining the legitimacy and formal position of the “three-pillared” system. Because safety is a main concern both for management and the unions, the “three pillared” system seems to contribute to increased awareness in safety and to juxtapose quality and safety management. In the fishery industry, there is no institutionalized system to handle safety issues in a continuous dialogue between company, employees and authorities.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] 6. Conclusions The mechanisms leading to an effective safety management opens for a variety of practical implementations. If the three-folded mechanisms of feedback channels acts in concert, the principles of self-regulation leads to an organizational learning process as the case of the oil industry has demonstrated. However, when the external and internal stakeholders are disorganized and without power or incentives to exploit information about unsafe conditions, the principles of “self-regulations” by using feedback loops seems to be inefficient or useless as the case of the fisheries underlines. From this discussion we may draw some preliminary conclusions. (1) The principles of selfregulation may remain an empty shell unless it is filled with industrial standards, procedures and “best practice” set by empowered actors in community of practice. (2) If there are no equal industrial partners the safety management systems degenerates from a dynamic process to a bureaucratic management tool. The specific positions and roles assigned to the organized safety service and safety representatives may be neglected and their legitimacy pulled down. (3) The role of the authorities should not be underestimated. By taking an active role they may come into a position where the can form frameworks for unifying and enforcing the information needed from all stakeholders.
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