Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime. The 'ODEPLAN Boys' and the 'Gremialists' in Pinochet's Chile Carlos Huneeus Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2. (May, 2000), pp. 461-501. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-216X%28200005%2932%3A2%3C461%3ATAPIAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S Journal of Latin American Studies is currently published by Cambridge University Press.
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Technocrats and politicians in an authoritarian regime. The ' ODEPLAN Boys ' and the ' Gremialists ' in Pinochet's Chile* CARLOS HUNEEUS Abstract. This article analyses the role of the economic team known as the 'Chicago Boys' and of the main political faction in Pinochet's Chile, the ' Gremialists', founded by Jaime Guzman in the Catholic University in I 966. These two sectors of the elite had a common professional and political career and were the principal civilian groups of the dictatorship who developed a long-term political strategy that deeply influenced both the economic and political orientation of the military regime. They shared a long-term power strategy, that was basically defined by the 'Gremialists'. The article focuses on the role played by O D E P L A N in shaping the economic reforms. It demonstrates that the coherence of the economic model inherent in the implementation of its policies is to be found in the integration of the policies with a political project, articulated by the 'Gremialists '. I want to make it clear that I am convinced that the main responsibility for all that is going on in Chile lies not with the military, but rather with the civilian advisors and the whole climate of adulation and servilism that the economic right has created around them, The ideology of the government was born in the most traditional circles of the economic right, disguised under the sign of 'nationalism' and shielded behind 'the courage to declare oneself antiMarxist '.'
This article analyses the role of the economic team known as the 'Chicago boys'2 and of what could be described as the political team, the Carlos Huneeus is Professor of the Institute of Political Science, Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica de Chile.
* This article was prepared with
the support of Volkswagen Stiftung. Thanks to Pablo Policzer, I found out about the existence of the Minutes of the on our able Junta of Government (AHJG). The President of the Senate, Sergio Romero (RN) and that of the Chamber of Deputies, Gutenberg Martinez (PDC) gave their authorisation for me to revise the Minutes, which are secret. The Jaime Guzman Foundation gave permission to view the political leader's papers. I would also like to thank Humberto Vega and Alfonso Lazo from MIDEPLAN (formerly ODEPLAN), Alan Angel1 from Oxford University for his helpful criticism of an earlier manuscript and Icirsten Sehnbruch for reviewing the translation and editing this text. I would like to make it clear that I am responsible for the contents of this article. Letter from Claudio Orrego to Jaime Guzman, 29 November 1974, Jaime Guzmin Foundation. Juan Gabriel Valdes, L a escueia de Chicago: Operacidn Chiie (Buenos Aires, 1 9 8 9 ) .
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'Gremialists' during the authoritarian regime of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile from 1973 to 1770. It concentrates on these two sectors of the elite because they became the principal civilian groups who developed a long-term political strategy that deeply influenced the political orientation of the military regime. The predominant view in the bibliography on this period is that the 'Chicago boys', led by Sergio de Castro, took charge of directing the economy without having political interests other than that of establishing a capitalist economy; while the ' Gremialists ', under the leadership of Jaime Guzman, aimed to establish the legal framework of the 'protected democracy' - as embodied in the 1980 Constitution - independently of the economic team. According to this view, these were two clearly separate groups, with different objectives: the economic team was not interested in the political-institutional design of the regime, and the 'Gremialists' did not understand the economic reforms. This article shows that they were not, in fact, two separate groups, working independently. Rather, they shared a long-term power strategy, which was basically defined by the 'Gremialists' . A large number of the economists were either supporters, or active members, of the Gremialist blovement founded by Guzmin in the Catholic University after the electoral failure of the right in the I 961 election^.^ Thus the coherence of the economic model inherent in the implementation of its policies is not to be found, as is usually asserted, in the rigid adhesion to a recipe of neoliberal measure^,^ but rather in the integration of the economic policies with a political project, articulated by young men belonging to the same political movement. This cohesion was driven principally by politics, and to a lesser degree by economics.' This article is composed of five sections. The first describes the intertwining of the political and economic teams in the key government institutions in which they operated. The second section examines the authoritarian context in which the economic reforms were undertaken.
"here are two collections of his newspaper articles, which express his polltical principles, Jaime Guzman Errazuriz Escritospersonales(Santiago, 1992); Gonzalo Rojas Sanchez et al., Derecho poiifico. Apunfes de /as clases dei profesor Jaime G u ~ m a nErraytirix (Santiago, 1995). There is a fairly informative biography by the journalist, Manuel Salazar, Guyman. iQuie'n, coma, por qud? (Santiago, 1994). LIanuel Delano and H u g o Traslavifia, La herencia de ios Chicago Dqs (Santiago, 1989). " Lye have used this argument in another case of economic reforms, those initiated by President Carlos Menem in Argentina, by the economic team lead by the Minister of Economy, Domingo Cavallo, which we have mentioned before in Carlos Huneeus, 'Technocrats and Politicians in the Democratic Politics of Argentina' in Miguel A. Centeno and Patricio Silva (eds.) The Poiitics of Experfire in Latin America (London, '997).
'
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The third part examines the development of the Gremialist Movement within the Catholic University, while the fourth section looks at it within the political and institutional structure of the military regime, including gremialista reluctance to form a political party. Finally, the article discusses economic institutional structure of the regime, together with the development of the institutions of higher education that helped perpetuate the influence of the state.
The intertwining of politics and economics Important members of the 'Gremialists' were student leaders at the Universidad Cat6lica de Chile. Jaime Guzmdn was president of the Law School's Student Union, as was Jovino Novoa, the former president of the Uni6n Democrdtica Independiente (UDI), the political party created by Guzmdn in 1783. Miguel I05. See the narration of these events in an article of the FEUC magazine of the time, Presenriu, reproduced by Gonzalez Pino and Fontaine Talavera (eds.) Los mil &s de ,4//end~,Volume r, pp. I Z J 5-1262. -
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linked to the old regime who had been supported by the Grand Chancellor of the institution, the Cardinal-Archbishop of Santiago, Cardinal Silva Henriquez. These events provoked a conflict which obliged him to resign his position in the U n i ~ e r s i t y . ~ ' In all fairness, the appointment of numerous student leaders to positions of responsibility within the University was not something new in this house of learning. In fact, the Rector, Fernando Castillo Velasco, elected in 1967 by the university community as a result of the reforms, had formed his teams of collaborators not only from among the professors that had supported him, but also from amongst the student leaders who had promoted the profound changes in the university. The novelty was that while Castillo's team carried through the reforms with new academics, without expelling the anti-reformists, Swett's new team carried out their changes purging the University of 'T\larsists', Christian Democrats and independent academics who did not support the military regime. The new university authorities maintained the FEUC as an institution and appointed 'Gremialist' leaders to its head. The first president was Xrturo Fontaine Talavera, appointed in October 1973 ; he was followed by Cristian Larroulet (1974), hliguel Allamand (197j), Juan Antonio Coloma (1976), XndrCs Chadwick (1977), etc. Only after the protests and the political opening from 1983 onwards did it become impossible for the delegate-Rector to carry on these appointments, and he was forced to allow direct elections. In 1984 the students were allowed to vote for the first time at which point the ' Gremialists' lost control of the FEUC, which again came under the control of the DCU in coalition with the Socialist Party during the following years. The 'Gremialists', however, remained a significant force, and in 1988, after the plebiscite of 5 October, they regained control of the student union for a year, only to be defeated in the following four elections, regaining control again in the 1993 elections. C i d ~ l i t eand the coheszz'efactors ?f' authoritarianism
Throughout this article we have referred to the economic team, rather than the 'Chicago bovs', because these professionals came from diverse backgrounds. In the first place, their university education was not homogeneous. For example, Jorge Cauas, the Finance Minister who launched the economic programme in April 197j was not an economist, but an engineer who had studied as an undergraduate at the LTniversity of Chile and as a postgraduate at Columbia University; Hernan Biichi, 6"his conflict has been described b!. him in his memolrs, \'olume 111, Cardenal Raul Silva Henrique7, AJlernorias, (Sant~ago,1992). This incident is not mentioned in the official history of the Catholic Yniversit!, Ricard Krebs et al. Historlu de /a Pontificia 17nii'er.ri&d Catdlicu de Chiie.
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Finance Minister (1981 and 1989) was also an engineer from the University of Chile who completed his postgraduate studies at the University of Columbia; Jose Piiiera, a Minister of Labour (1976-80) who introduced two important economic reforms the labour reform and the privatisation of the pension system and who later became Minister of Mining (198 1-83), was an economist from the Catholic University, with a P h D from Harvard. During Piiiera's time as a minister, he was careful to maintain his independence from the team headed by de C a ~ t r o . ~ " O n the other hand, there was no exclusive relationship between the Economics Faculties of the University of Chicago and the Catholic University, nor did everybody adhere to the same paradigm. Moreover, students from the LTniversity of Chile, such as Carlos hfassad and Roberto Zahler, as well as other officials of the Central Bank, also attended Chicago courses as part of their professional training, such as Ricardo FfrenchDavis. In all of these cases, the graduates of Chicago subscribed to the 'Structuralist School' rather than to the neo-liberalism represented by the 'Chicago Boys'.66 The stability of the military regime, the cohesion of its elite and the considerable support it enjoyed in the popular sectors tend to be explained as the products of coercion, and not as a consequence of political consensus and the use of political resources. The novelty of the military regime was that it achieved its political objectives without the existence of the typical structure of interest groups, and in the absence of a single party, in contrast to Franco's Spain. Nor did it resort to the bipartidism, with one government party and another in opposition, as was the case in Brazil under military rule.67The absence of a party probably strengthened the image accepted by various sectors of society of a regime in which the military was the coercive force, while the civilians were the technocrats in charge of the economy. This image allows no room for diverse currents or power groups, each trying to occupy powerful and influential positions within the regime. The cohesion tends to be explained in terms of Pinochet's centralised and authoritarian leadership and not as the result of the voluntary and enthusiastic effort of the top civil servants, who were linked through personal and political loyalties that went back a long way. In fact the absence of a single party helped the informal groups that acted -
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66
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See Fontaine hldunate. Pifiera joined the UDI after Guzman's assassination in 1991 and was elected councillor for Conchali in the municipal elections of 1992, but he abandoned the party after a few months. This confirms that he was a person w h o did not feel a member of the 'Gremialists'. O n the 'Structuralist School', see Joseph G r u n ~ v a l d ',T h e Structuralist' school of price stabilisation and economic development: the Chilean case', in Hirschman, '1, Lutin Americun l.r.rue.r, ( N e a York, 1961), pp. 91-12> Bolivar Lamounier and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (eds.) Os partldos r u.r e1i.zcioe.r no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1978); hIaria D i i l r a Gil Icinzo, Oposicao P u~toriturismo.G P ~ P S P u tru]etdriu do .\fIIU (Sao Paulo, 1988).
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within the Government to obtain significant power and influence. The most successful of these were the 'Gremialists'. There were reasons why Pinochet did not organise a political party. In the first place, to protect his image abroad: to create a single party would immediately have been associated the regime with fascism, which was one of the criticisms directed at him from the Left, and which the military, of course, were keen to reject. Second, there was an even more important internal political factor: the organisation of a single party would have implied handing over certain functions, leading to a weakening of some of the attributes of the Head of State, something- that Pinochet urould not accept. Nor was this favoured by the military, who would not approve of a link between Pinochet and a government party. Moreover, the existing civilian groups rejected the idea of diminishing Pinochet's authority, as they preferred to deal with him directly rather than through an intermediary, which would have been the case with such a party. Third, the crisis of democracy had not left public opinion with a good image of political parties, as it was considered that the collapse of the pluralist order was due to the conflicts between the parties and the divisions among their leaders. Other experiences, which the regime followed with interest, also counselled against the creation of an official party. The experience of Franco's regime, which the Chilean Right knew well, had shown how marginal the role of the Falange had been from the end of the 1 ~ ~ 0Ins . ~ ~ reality the regime had worked without an official party. However, more than once Pinochet sounded out what kind of reception the initiative to create a civil-military movement would receive. He did not proceed because he came up against internal resistance and found scant support with public opinion. This runs counter to the thesis of certain analysts that Pinochet was an all-powerful d ~ c t a t o r . ~The ' Junta's Declaration of Principles on I I March 1974 stated that the Armed Forces and the forces of Law and Order 'consideran como parte de su misibn el inspirar un nuevo 1 gran movimiento civico-militar, que 1a esti surgiendo de laealidad de 10s hechos y que proyectara fecunda y duraderamente hacia el futuro la labor del actual Gobierno'." Later, during the speech given at
" Juan I m z , 'From Falange to hfo~imiento-Organizaci6n:T he Spanish Single Party and
" ''
the Franco Regime, 1936-1968 ' in S. Huntington and C. hfoore (Camp,.), ./luthoritarian 1'oiitic.r In .llodern Socieiy (New York, 1970), p. I 5 I . See the description by the last leader of the Falange, of how Franco marginalised them, Jost: Luis de Arresse, Cna etapa ronstitymte (Barcelona, I 98 2 ) . For example, Karen Remmer, iZfl/itary Rule In Latin ,4merica (Boston, 1 9 8 9 ) The opposing thesis , which depicts a weak dictator, w h ~ c hwas also not the case, is argued by Robert J . Barros, e y Reason and Force: ,Ili/itag Con.rtitt/tionalism in Chile, 1973-1989, unpub. doctoral thesis, University of Chicago, 1996. Declaracidn de Principtos de /a Junta de Gobierno, I I March 1974, p. 2 5 .
Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime
48 I
Chacarillas on 9 July 1977, another attempt was made in this direction, but it did not g o ahead because it did not receive support. The third occasion was after the plebiscite of I I September I 980, during Pinochet's greatest moment of euphoria. During that night's speech to celebrate his triumph, he once more announced the founding of a civil-military movement, calling on 'men, women, and children to go from tomorrow onwards to enrol in their respective Municipalities in order to form the great civilmilitary movement of Chile'." This invitation was never followed through since the supporters of the military regime themselves downplayed the significance of Pinochet's words in order to stop it reali~ation.'~ At one moment, the 'Gremialists' did prepare themselves for the eventuality that a civil-military movement would be created, when they organised the Frente Juvenil de Unidad Nacional (Youth Front for National Unity). This was the winter of 1975. This organisation was distinct and separate from the state agencies in charge of mobilising government support, in other words, the General Secretariat of the Government and its dependencies, the Youth Secretariat, the Guilds and the Secretariat for Female Affairs. High level Government officials and Gremialist movement leaders who had not been called upon to fill posts in the public administration joined forces in the 'Frente'. Their leader was Guzman and their General Secretary was the ex-president of the FEUC, Javier Leturia. The leadership of the Frente was based on a National Council of 18 people, made up of important members of the economic team, like Miguel Kast, the then Sub-Director of ODEPLAN, and the Director of Budget, Juan Carlos Mendez; high level officials of the Catholic University were also members such as Alberto Hardenssen, ViceDean of the Economics F a ~ u l t y . ' ~T he Frente had established an organisation throughout the country and was to have an important presence in the school^.'^ Guzman conceived the Frente as an organisation that would generate stable support for the government - one of the tasks of a party since it sought to be the 'means of communication between -
Complete text in L a Nacion, I r September 1980.
Jaime Guzman pointed out that the proposed movement was not a political party, but
this was rather a way of strengthening the support for the government around local government. See 'Diversas opiniones en torno a movimiento civico-military', L a Segunda, I 3 September 1980. Guzman rejected the idea because of its fascist content: ' Si se trata de un partido politico, ello no podria impedirse, salvo que se trata de un partido unico de corte fasc~sta.Pero bajo un regimen milltar J- con receso politico estimo que el movimiento debe tener solamente alcance en el dmbito municipal', La Segunria, ibid. Frente Juvenil: Un respaldo civico a1 Gobierno', Que' Pasa, no. 28 I , 9 Sept. 1976, pp. 6-8. The public relations executive, hlanfredo hlayol, General Manager of Television Xacional, was also there, as were many others. '"eeQue' Pa.ra, no. 281, 9 Sept 1976, pp. 7-8.
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the Government and young people'. Its sphere of action was not to be confused with that of the Youth Secretariat because the Frente was 'independent of the Government and its character is civil-patriotic'.'" X few months later the 'Gremialists' suffered a serious setback which aborted the Frente. This was triggered by a scandal provoked by the lending house 'La Familla', organised bj- senior members of this movement, a few of whom were held in custody for possible crimes. This incident harmed the image of the 'Gremialists' in the Government, especially with the military, casting a doubt on their probity.'6 We have said that 'Gremialism' was the only power group clearsighted enough to support the regime from the beginning, and that its reason for doing so was to acquire legitimacy and organisation in order to convert itself into a dominant political force when general elections were eventually called. Very early on the 'Gremialists' and the economic team decided to participate 'from within', taking advantage of the opportunitj- provided by the junta, and giving their support without vacillation. They understood that the military mentality would not accept any support that was not unconditional, which meant having to stifle possible criticism of coercive irrationality. \-ou were either with them through thick and thin or you were against them, but the military regarded half-heartedness or dilatoriness as unacceptable. The 'Gremialists' were also quick to perceive the firmness and enormous leadership potential of General Pinochet, a fact that was not grasped by other civilians and military, most notably not.by General Gustavo Leigh. The 'Gremialists' easily identified with Pinochet since his political programme and his style were to a large extent modelled on Jorge rllessandri, who was the emblematic figurehead of ' Gremialism'. Guzman expressed great admiration and respect for Alessandri, claiming a father and son relationship that he had not enjoyed with his own -father. "
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'Jaime Guzman habla del Frenrr Juvrntil', Q u i l'iisa, no. 281, 9 Sepr 1976, pp. 8-10. The quote 1s from p. 9. Leruria rxplains further thc differencrs in the functions of the Frente and those of the T170uth Secrerarlat in that thr Frente sought to establish permanent 11nks between roung. .people and thr Government, while the Secretariat 'by . its verl- nature is not able to achieve mil~tancyor prrmanent adhesion'. See Frente Juvrnil, ' L n respaldo ci'vico a1 Gobierno', QliP Pasa, no. 281, 9 Sept, p. 7. '"Jaime Guzman: Comidillas de viejas materias', Q I I ~l'ostz, j Feb. 1977, pp. 6-7. Jaimr Guzman was called to trstify in court to explain his participation. Srr Ascanio Cavallo al., 1-0 ilijstorjii ocriifa dei rpjin/ew rniiitiir Santiago, 1989, p. I i7. - et " Guzrnin wrote numrrous press articles in favour of .Alessandr~.' D o n Jorge con la luventud ' ErczNa I Feb. 1984, p. I z ; ' Jorge "ilrssandri : su prnsamiento politico ' Ercillu 18 Dec. 198 5 , p. I 2 ; 'go afios dr don Jorge', 1,o Tercera ile /a Hora, I 8 hlay 1986, p.2 ; ' D o n Jorgr : un espiritu superior', L>u Trrcrru dr iil Hora 7 Sepr. 1986, p.2; ' .Alessandr~ y una lrccitin mu! actual', I.a Tii.cer.~dt /a Hora 28 Dec. 1986, p. r ; ' E l consejo y la contian7a de don J o r g r ' L o '1'rrcrr.o ijt. /a H o r ~18 J a n . 1 ~ 8 7 p. , 2 . He also includrd diverse art~clesin his column in the newspaprr, L'I .Cyguwtiii: ser, for example 'Otra ?
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Throughout the 1960s and 70s rllessandri had argued that the only possible government in Chile was one led by a president not subject to interference by political parties, nor limited in the exercise of his powers by Parliament. His advocacy prepared the way for the kind of authoritarian presidentialism which Pinochet personified. If Pinochet's principal civilian advisors were economists, then Guzman was one of his principal advisors on political-constitutional issues, even though the law professor did not have a team of collaborators like the economic team assembled by de Castro, because he preferred to act alone. Guzman had to establish his position carefully among others who also influenced the design of the institutional architecture, such as Pinochet's legal advisor, M6nica Madariaga, or the Dean of the Law Faculty of the University of Chile, Hugo ~osende.'' Guzman later found an important ally in Sergio Fernandez, who was appointed Minister of the Interior in I 978 and became one of Pinochet's principal collaborators on institutional issues and his principal political adviser concerning the 1980 and 1988 plebiscites. Guzman and the economic team did not see Pinochet solely as President for the period of the military regime. They also saw him occupying that post in the later stage after the calling of the first general elections. They viewed this as an indispensable condition for the consolidation of the economic transformation. Once again Spain provided the lesson, since Pinochet had to d o what Franco had not succeeded in doing: to lead the transition until arriving at the complete consolidation of the 'protected democracy'. In an article of 1979, written during the Spanish democratic transition, Guzman warned against the danger of committing Franco's 'great mistake' in not seeing that 'in Spain a democracy would take hold, fruit of his own work'. Thus Pinochet had to lead the political process and not limit his political role to 'establishing the foundations of a stable democracj-, but rather to assume realistically and opportunely the responsibility for pushing and guiding the country towards the complete functioning of the new democracj-. T o separate the transition from the definitive institutionalisation would be to deprive it of its greatest fruit and meaning'.'g Participation in the military regime required the Gremialists to assume
78
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leccitin de don Jorge', 2 Dec. 1983; ' E n torno a1 mensale de don Jorge', 27 Jan. 1984 y 'La principal obra de D o n Jorge', 6 Sept. 1981. For example, the Minister of the Interlor informing that Rosende ' techn~cally' baclisup the legal changes that prevrntrd Jaime Castillo Velasco, a leading PDC pol~tician and human rights defender, from returning to the country after his espulsion in 1976. . I H J G 340, 1977. Jaime Guzmin, ' E l Camino Politico', Realidad, vol. I , no.7 Dec. 1979, pp. I 3 - 2 3 . Quote is from p. z j . The article is also published in Estudius Piblicos, no. 42, 1991, pp. 359-383.
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the costs of accepting the reality of the human rights violations. In the sessions of the Military Junta in which the international economic problems were analysed, de Castro did not refer to the impact of the existence of political prisoners, as Fernando Leniz, Jorge Cauas and Raul Saez had done before him. D e Castro assumed a strict neoliberal discourse precisely in order to establish distance from the high external cost of coercive irrationality, making it seem that the economy was a completely separate sphere, which was ruled by its own laws unconnected to the authoritarian political context. But the economic team used this escape route to avoid reference to the irrationality of coercion, Guzman was explicit in defending the states of exception. He argued from a perspective that was very attractive for Pinochet : human rights were not absolute, not unlimited, but rather were restricted by the local demands of society and by exceptional circumstances, for example 'when societies are going through convulsions or extreme challenges' which require the declaration of 'some state of emergency or e x ~ e p t i o n ' . ' In ~ these circumstances 'greater than ordinary or habitual local restrictions to certain rights are justified. These exceptional or extraordinary limits can even reach the transitory suspension of certain rights'." Guzmin's interpretation included an additional clause that reinforced the case for coercion and the cancellation of political liberties: it was not for the courts to declare in such cases, since the latter fell within the ambit of the executive power. During these historic periods, Guzman said, the political-administrative authorities enjoyed a 'fairly wide discretion in applying restrictions of this kind, in other words states of exception' so that the courts of justice could not interfere. If the courts were to become involved 'this would mean the transfer to the judiciary of an eminent and completely political appreciation, which would be completelj- outside its j u r i s d i c t i ~ n ' . Six ~~ years after the coup, Guzmdn used this argument to justify the passivity of the Judicial Power in the face of gross violations of human rights. This relativity of the claims of human rights could also be justified in Chile because this reality was common in Latin America: 'Colombia has lived a state of siege for more than 30 of the last 3 1 years, without the international communitj- having rejected the democratic character of the governments that have operated within this f r a m e ~ o r k ' . ' ~ Any possible intercessions that Guzman may have made in favour of certain detainees he kept utterly discreet, being careful not to touch on extraordinarily delicate issues for the regime and for General Pinochet,
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Derecilio polifzco. Apunfes de las clases delprofrsor Jaime Guxman Erraxurix, p. 149. " Ibid. p. I 10. Ibid. p. I j o. Ibid. p. I j I . This test can also been found in the book Jaime Guzman, Escritospersonales.
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such as criticism of the DINA. Only on I 5 June 1989 (after Pinochet's defeat in the plebiscite of j October 1988) did he speak openly against the excesses of the DINA, condemning the behaviour of General C ~ n t r e r a s . ' ~ It is very hard to discover what he may have done within the regime to help the persecuted or curb the DINA and Contreras. In any case, a revision of the correspondence in the Foundation that bears his name contains no leads, since there is no mention of a request for help or gratitude from the families of detainees for his help.85 It may therefore be wondered whether Guzmin ever did anything at all to help detainees or to restrain the DINA. It is hard to understand how a practising Catholic could have remained indifferent faced with such coercive irrationality. After his assassination bj- terrorists in I 99 I , the figure of Guzman has been idealised, not only by his followers, but also by those who were his opponents. They all obscure his record as a coldblooded politician with a will of iron who found himself able to avert his gaze from the reality of state coercion for so long.
0DEP L A N and the role of Miguel Kast O D E P L A N had been created by the government of President Eduardo Frei Montalva in I 967 in order to advise the President of the Republic 'on all matters connected with the process of economic and social planning'.86 It was to be a national organisation, being able to establish Regional Offices throughout the country. This was a novelty because the politicaladministrative organisation of the country was provincial." As part of its mission to propose fundamental directions for the planning process, which included the national development plan, O D E P L A N was expected to co-ordinate the necessary studies and to establish the economic and social evaluation criteria for projects financed directly or indirectly by the state, and to promote and organise the training in planning techniques of public administration personnel." ODEPLAN was to be headed by a director, who would be backed by a national sub-director and a sub-director of regional planning. The latter would be part of the Regional Planning Offices (ORPLAC), which the military later called the Regional Planning Secretariats (SERPLAC). The law contemplated a fairly numerous staff of about 2 0 0 civil servants, most '"uring a meeting with university students from Cardenal Caro hall of residence, , por quit. according to Salazar, in Gqman. ~ Q u i i n ccdmo, " There are about s o o letters, although a large propbrtion are greetings or thank you letters he was sent, which have been careful revised. 86 Article I , part of law 16.63 5 . The law was passed on 2 2 September 1967, and published " Art~cler of law 16.63 j . on j o October 1967. Ibid.,Article j .
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Carlos Huneeus
of at professional grade.89The law started off creating four ORPLAC with four posts for the heads of these offices. During Frei's government, O D E P L A N managed to organise itself quickly, fulfilling the functions that the law established quite efficiently. Outstanding professionals were hired both in the central office and the regional offices, some of whom came from the Planning Department of the Development Corporation CORF0.90 ODEPLAN7s influence during the Popular Unity government was severely interrupted not only because political orientation of economic policy was different, but also because economic management was concentrated in just one portfolio, Economy, and in particular in its minister, Pedro Vuskovic. O D E P L A N re-assumed the functions established for it by the 1967 law after the military coup,, and adapted itself to the new political tasks laid down by the Junta. It became of great importance for 'Gremialism', offering access to functions of great importance for its political objective of providing the regime with good servants who could be allowed to build their own political movement in the medium and long term. We have said that the economic team was not politically neutral, given that it included a number of 'Gremialists'. For example, Miguel Kast, who had been a student leader in his student union and in the FEUC,~' and whose other services to the military have already been discussed, displayed great capacity for recruiting professionals to work for the Government, which earned him a reputation in government circles as a 'great recruiter'." However, this activity has often been presented as if it were merely bureaucratic, without recognising its political contents or the means employed. These means ranged from personal initiatives such as persuasion to political ones such as transmitting the regime's ideological message, as well as organising the professional and material incentives that this article will analyse. I
