The 2006 Parliamentary Elections and Party Politics in Slovakia

A Change of Direction: The 2006 Parliamentary Elections and Party Politics in Slovakia

´R ˇ TIM HAUGHTON AND MAREK RYBA

A detailed examination of the 2006 parliamentary elections in Slovakia highlights the evolving pattern of party competition in the country. A transformation of the party political scene in the country has taken place, from one dominated by questions of the character of the political regime, illiberal democracy and nationalism into one in which socio-economic themes are of key importance for political parties to mobilize voters and win elections. Nevertheless, although socio-economic themes are now more salient, other dividing lines that shaped Slovak party politics in the 1990s, especially national appeals, remain significant for smaller, niche parties.

Introduction The 2006 elections marked the first victory in a Slovak parliamentary election of a leftist party since 1920, when the Social Democrats won in the Slovak part of the newly created Czechoslovakia.1 The victory of Smer – Social Democracy (Smer –SD), led by Robert Fico, a leftist party with an explicit programme of increasing welfare spending and reintroducing progressive taxation, demonstrates the importance, and indeed prominence, of social and economic themes in Slovak politics and in the electoral campaign in particular. This in itself is a significant development that requires some consideration, since, until recently, struggles over the character of the political regime and the role of nationalism were central to party politics in Slovakia.2 These divisions, however, did not disappear and played an important role both in the

Tim Haughton is Senior Lecturer in the Politics of Central and Eastern Europe at Birmingham University. He is the author of Constraints and Opportunities of Leadership in Post-Communist Europe (2005) and numerous articles and book chapters examining politics in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). He is currently undertaking research on party politics in Slovakia, why countries take neo-liberal turns, and the impact of EU membership on new member states in CEE. Marek Ryba´rˇ is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Comenius University, Bratislava. His main research interests include party politics in East-Central Europe and the impact of EU membership on the domestic politics of the region. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.24, No.2, June 2008, pp.232–255 ISSN 1352-3279 print/1743-9116 online DOI: 10.1080/13523270802003053 # 2008 Taylor & Francis

A CHANGE OF DIRECTION

233

campaign and in the post-election coalition formation process. It was the latter’s outcome that produced some concern abroad, when Smer – SD decided to form a government with two parties, the Slovak National Party (SNS) led by Jań Slota and the People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (L’S –HZDS) led by Vladimı´r Mecˇiar, whose previous stint in government in the mid-1990s had been marked by illiberalism, insider privatization and a general unwillingness to engage in the give-and-take of democratic politics. This article explains the outcome of the election through the prism of party politics, and also uses the 2006 election to highlight the evolving pattern of party competition in Slovakia. We argue that that election demonstrated the increased salience of appeals based on socio-economic themes, which were not only the key to explaining the electoral success of Smer – SD, but also the unexpectedly good showing of the incumbent Slovak Democratic and ´ –DS) led by Prime Minister Christian Union– Democratic Party (SDKU Mikula´sˇ Dzurinda. None the less, national themes are central to explaining the electoral showing of both SNS and the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK). After charting the main divisions of party politics in Slovakia prior to 2002, we outline both the electoral system and key developments between 2002 and 2006, before examining the appeals of the respective parties in the 2006 elections and identifying why some were more successful than others at the ballot box. The final section analyses the unexpected outcome of the coalition negotiations, arguing that, although appeals based on socioeconomic themes have become more salient in Slovak politics, other dividing lines of Slovak politics in the 1990s, especially the nation, continue to shape the structure of party politics. Table 1 summarizes the election results. Assessing Parties’ Appeals In order to assess the appeals used by political parties in Slovakia during the 2006 election campaign, we adopted a three-pronged methodology. First, we coded the parties’ manifestos. Coding can be a problematic exercise as election manifestos of various parties are often written in different styles and are of varying lengths. Indeed, scholars have debated what to use as the base unit, using either sentences, phrases or paragraphs, knowing that no single measure is ideal.3 Most of the 2006 Slovak election manifestos were organized around two-sentence paragraphs or bullet points of one or two sentences. We have therefore used these as the basis for counting. (Longer paragraphs were split into separate two-sentence sections.) Our objective was to assess what themes were the most prominent, so for each of the base units we assessed

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J OU RN AL OF C OM M UNIS T S T UDI ES AND TRANSITION POLITICS TABLE 1 SLOVAK PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS 2006

2006 Party Smer–SD (Smer–Social Democracy) ´ –DS (Slovak SDKU Democratic and Christian Union) SNS (Slovak National Party) SMK (Party of the Hungarian Coalition) L’S–HZDS (People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) KDH (Christian Democratic Movement) KSS (Communist Party of Slovakia) SF (Free Forum) ANO (Alliance of the New Citizen) HZD (Movement for Democracy) Others Totals

Change from 2002

Votes

%

Seats

Votes

%

671 185

29.14

50

þ284 085

þ15.68

422 815

18.35

31

211 138

þ3.26

270 230

11.73

20

þ69 513

þ4.76

269 111

11.68

20

251 958

þ0.52

202 540

8.79

15

2358 151

210.71

191 443

8.31

14

245 759

þ0.06

89 418

3.88

0

292 454

22.44

79 963 32 775

3.47 1.42

0 0

– 2197 534

– 26.59

14 728

0.63

0

279 569

22.65

2.60 100.00

0 150

58 931 2 303 139

– –

– –

Turnout: 54.67 per cent.

Calculated using the combined total for SNS (95, 633) and PSNS (105, 084) in the 2002 elections.

Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.

which of the main themes it was addressing (economic and financial policy, social policy, health, education and science, religion and religious values, the nation or ethnic minorities, culture, agriculture, regional policy, justice and the interior, foreign and security policy, the EU, and ‘other’4) and assigned that theme a score of ‘1’. We recognize that coding of manifestos in isolation can be problematic.5 Nevertheless, party election manifestos represent authoritative statements of parties’ official positions and are usually an important source for the media and parties themselves to shape public discourse. To complement the examination of party manifestos, we employed two other techniques: expert surveys and first-hand observation of the campaign. We use results from two expert surveys, conducted in 2004 and 2006, to


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assess the importance of various issues in Slovak party politics. The first, undertaken by Rohrschneider and Whitefield, was part of a larger study.6 Their results for Slovakia are based on the response of ten experts on Slovakia (a response rate of 50 per cent). The later study, conducted by Marek Ryba´rˇ, was carried out between April and June 2006, and draws on the answers of 16 respondents (a response rate of 80 per cent). In addition, during the election campaign we travelled around the country attending rallies, speaking to activists, politicians and voters, and observing the key themes used on election billboards across the country, especially in electoral strongholds of the major parties (Bratislava, Trencˇ´ın, Zˇilina, Dunajska´ ˇ adca, Orava region, and so on). As we show below, socio-economic Streda, C ´ –DS and Smer – SD. themes were central to the appeal of parties such as SDKU These themes were prominent in their campaigns, but their electoral successes owed no small part to the conduct of the campaign. Dividing Lines of Politics, 1989 – 2006 Between 1989 and 2002 we can identify five major dividing lines of politics.7 Following the initial post-revolutionary debate over the character of the new political regime in Czechoslovakia, four divisions came to shape Slovak party politics in the 1990s: the national question, the pace and purpose of economic reform, the role of religion in public life, and the character and ruling style of the government. Whereas the first of these was particularly significant during the debate surrounding the place of Slovakia in the Czechoslovak state, following Slovakia’s independence in January 1993 the fourth of these became dominant, especially during the mid-1990s when Vladimı´r Mecˇiar was prime minister. Indeed, the character and ruling style of the 1994 – 98 government sharpened the divisions of Slovak politics, helping to create two rival camps. Stung by the increasingly harsh criticisms of the government emanating from foreign fields, including the EU’s snubbing of Slovakia at the Luxembourg European Council in 1997, but more importantly the undermining of democratic institutions at home, the opposition co-operated to ensure that Mecˇiar and his allies were removed from power following the 1998 elections. Socio-economic themes were not absent during the 1990s, but rather they were overshadowed by national and ethnic questions and the character of the political regime, and were thereby rendered less important, especially as the conflict over the rules of the democratic game became crucial in 1997 –98. The 1998 – 2002 broad-based coalition government not only helped restore Slovakia’s democratic image and took Slovakia most of the way towards EU membership, it also ushered in a new era of Slovak politics. New parties critical of the politics of the 1990s emerged, such as Robert Fico’s Smer (see

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J OU RN AL OF C OM M UNIS T S T UDI ES AND TRANSITION POLITICS

below), whose initial pitch promised new faces and a new direction for Slovakia.8 Nevertheless, the period 1998 –2002 seemed to indicate the revival in significance of socio-economic themes as evidenced by the tensions between the governing parties of the broad-based first Dzurinda-led government, encompassing those from the left and the right of the spectrum, and the return to political salience of the hard-line Communist Party of Slovakia and the creation of the liberal Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO).9 Slovak politics witnessed significant changes following the 2002 elections. The four-party centre-right coalition formed after the elections was arguably the most ideologically coherent government formed since 1989. Consisting ´ ,10 the conservative Christian Democratic Movement of Dzurinda’s SDKU (KDH), the liberal ANO and the moderately centre-right SMK,11 the new coalition ensured the approval of the international community and the easing of Slovakia’s entry into international clubs, especially the European Union. Despite the ideological coherence of the government, tensions soon emerged. We can identify four major sources of the tensions within the government. First, different views on the role of religion in politics sparked heated exchanges between the conservative KDH and the liberal ANO over abortion and the Church’s role in Slovak society. Second, debates surrounding the Status Law introduced by the Hungarian government to give rights and opportunities to ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary, provoked sharply different views among SMK and the other members of the government. Third, a corruption scandal involving the borrowing of 100 million Slovak crowns (E2.5million) in which ANO leader Pavol Rusko was implicated prompted the other three coalition partners to end co-operation with ANO in autumn 2005.12 This scandal highlighted the fourth and major tension running through both the coalition and its constituent parties: the governing style of the leaders. Rusko’s tensions with ANOnominated ministers led to the departure of two ANO nominees from their government posts in 2003 and prompted a majority of the party’s parliamentarians to leave the party two years later. Nevertheless, it was the governing style of Prime Minister Dzurinda that was the focus of much attention. Thanks to what was perceived as his increasingly domineering personal style of leadership and reluctance to compromise, ´ in 2003 to create two of the most prominent members of his party left SDKU Free Forum (SF). But Dzurinda’s governing style also helped to sour relations with coalition partners, especially KDH. Indeed, complaints over the prime minister’s leadership, fused with KDH’s adherence to Christian values, led to KDH’s decision to leave the government in February 2006 over the issue of a new law linked to a conscience clause in a treaty with the Vatican which, for example, allowed doctors to refuse to perform abortions or


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prescribe contraceptives, on the basis of their religious belief. To come into force, the treaty required the approval of government and parliament; but Dzurinda refused to back the law, arguing that changes were required. KDH’s championing of the conscience clause, in the eyes of Dzurinda and others, appeared to be a pretext for the party to leave the coalition, and also to demonstrate KDH’s adherence to Catholic values. On the 2002 –6 government’s watch, Slovakia achieved its long-cherished goals of entry into the European Union and NATO, but politics during these four years was dominated by domestic concerns. Following the election, Dzur´ , which had placed EU entry at the centre of its campaign, shifted inda’s SDKU its focus to more ideological concerns. At the heart of the government’s aims, particularly those of Finance Minister Ivan Miklosˇ, was a neo-liberal agenda partly inspired and encouraged by international financial bodies such as the World Bank.13 Driven by a belief in the superiority of the market, the government embarked upon radical socio-economic reforms including pension reforms, changes to the health system, cuts in welfare benefits and the much-vaunted 19 per cent flat-rate income tax.14 Although there were some differences between the coalition partners over the speed and extent of the neo-liberal reforms, the four parties in the government backed the agenda. As the above discussion has indicated, the Slovak party political scene has been undergoing constant changes since 1989. New parties have regularly emerged and succeeded in elections only to disappear into oblivion after spending an electoral cycle in parliament or even in government. The 2006 elections, however, represent an exception, since for the first time no new party managed to cross the 5 per cent threshold of parliamentary representation. This was the second instance, following the 2004 European parliamentary elections, of visible signs of consolidation of the existing political parties as the main channels for political representation. Moreover, as documented throughout this article, never before did socio-economic themes play such a prominent role in electoral mobilization and the campaign strategies of Slovak political parties. It may well be that the two phenomena are interrelated, although it is still too early to draw more than tentative conclusions. The main political parties by and large ran effective campaigns mobilizing their core constituencies, presenting relatively clearly focused messages and, before the elections, managing to integrate institutionally potential competitors of a similar political orientation (see the discussion on Smer–SD below). At the same time, there are signs of political learning on the part of the electorate, too, in terms of both strategic voting and non-voting, and this contributed to a general decrease in the effective number of political parties and reduced levels of wasted votes.15 Only when the process of structural stabilization of individual political parties is reasonably advanced, that is, when a more or less stable set of political parties competes in elections over a longer period of time, can we expect

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the development of functioning accountability mechanisms and growing importance of retrospective voting. An accountability structure in multi-party parliamentary democracies is further strengthened in situations where patterns of co-operation and competition are predictable in advance, that is, where party alliances are reasonably predictable before the elections. In this sense the strategy of Smer – SD, when the party refused to reveal its preferred coalition partners before the elections (see below), did not contribute to the strengthening of accountability structures, even though the party’s decision may well have been strategically wise. Nevertheless, in the context of the formation of stable interactions between parties, the decision of Smer – SD to invite into government SNS and L’S –HZDS may have longterm implications. First of all, by virtue of the wholesale alteration in the government, whereby all former governing parties went into opposition, the three ´ , SMK and KDH – have shared their political centre-right parties – the SDKU fate on the same side of the political barricade since 1998: twice (1998 – 2002 and 2002 –6) in the government, and in the opposition following the 2006 elections. Second, the dominance of the leftist Smer –SD over the new government also means that there is the potential for the further perpetuation of the socio-economic competition between the centre-right and the left-leaning government. Hence, the government – opposition dynamics may further strengthen the left –right competition of the political parties. However, there are parties, most notably SNS and SMK, whose persistence and systemic importance can only be explained by reference to a second relevant dimension of party political conflict in Slovakia. The two expert surveys, referred to above, indicate that social and economic themes are central to the shaping of party politics in Slovakia (see Tables 2(a) and 2(b)). Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s (2004) expert survey reported two economic issues – redistribution and state-run versus market economy – as the most prominent issues in Slovak party politics. Similar findings were revealed in the expert survey carried out by Marek Ryba´rˇ just before the 2006 elections, in which two economic issues (state versus market and social welfare) were also judged the most important divisions on the party political scene. Secondary to these major divisions, Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s respondents indicated the salience of nationalism and democracy, whereas the more recent survey indicated issues of nationalism and social order (divisions over traditional authority and morality). The tendency of SMK to co-operate with the centre-right and of the SNS with the leftist Smer–SD (see above) is very much in line with the conclusions of other researchers who claim that, unlike the position in Western Europe, in the newer democracies of Central and Eastern Europe the centre-left parties tend to co-operate with particularistic, traditionalist and less liberal parties, while the centre-right is more prone to work with parties of libertarian and cosmopolitan views.16

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A CHANGE OF DIRECTION TABLE 2a ISSUE DIMENSIONS IN THE SLOVAK PARTY SYSTEM (BASED ON ROHRSCHNEIDER/WHITEFIELD EXPERT SURVEY, 2004)

Issue Dimension

Mean

Economy: redistributional issues (for example, tax levels, welfare state spending) Economy: state-run versus market economy Nationalism and Internationalism (for example, views about the EU) Democracy: strengthening democratic institutions Ethnic rights (for example, minorities) Religiosity (role of church) Social rights (for example, lifestyle) Views of the Communist past and its legacies

1.44 1.80 2.20 2.63 3.14 3.50 3.50 4.00

Respondents were asked: Could you please indicate how important each issue dimension is in the party system of Slovakia? Where a score of 1 is the most important issue, 2 is the second most important issue, 3 is the third most important issue and 4 is the fourth most important issue and 9 is insignificant as an issue.

TABLE 2b THE IMPORTANCE OF THEMES FOR POLITICAL PARTIES ´ Rˇ , 2 0 0 6 ) (BASED ON EXPERT SURVEY CONDUCTED BY MAREK RYBA

´ –DS SNS SMK L’S–HZDS KDH ANO KSS Smer–SD SDKU European integration Slovakia’s NATO engagement Entrepreneurship and free market Traditional morality Law and order Multiculturalism Social justice and welfare state Decentralization Democracy Religious versus secular principles

3.6 3.3

1.9 1.8

5.1 3.6

2.4 2.8

3.8 3.7

2.4 2.9

3.1 3.6

5.4 3.2

2.4

1.1

3.7

2.6

3.1

2.3

1.4

3.3

5.3 1.9 4.3 1.1

4.2 3.4 3.9 3.8

2.6 2.6 1.8 3.4

3.3 3.7 1.1 2.8

3.6 4.0 4.2 3.0

1.0 1.4 3.8 3.1

3.3 4.2 3.4 4.2

5.6 4.1 5.4 1.1

4.9 3.8 4.1

2.9 2.4 3.9

4.1 5.3 3.1

1.5 2.3 3.7

4.4 4.7 4.1

3.8 2.5 1.0

4.1 2.7 1.8

5.5 5.1 3.4

Respondents were asked to rank the issues for each political party on a running scale from 1 to 7 where 1 was ‘very important’ and 7 represented ‘not important at all’.

The Campaign and the Electoral System Before embarking on an analysis of the campaign, two points regarding the electoral system need to be made. First, Slovakia uses a single-constituency list-based proportional representation system with seats allocated using the Hagenbach –Bischoff counting mechanism. Second, the 5 per cent threshold requirement reduced support for those parties hovering around that mark

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and hence played a role in shaping the post-election outcome, as it had done four years earlier.17 The campaign brought into sharp focus the appeals used by parties to garner support at the ballot box and played no small part in the outcome of the election. A poll indicated that 20 per cent of voters were still weighing up this option a month before the elections.18 Smer –SD ran a much better campaign than four years previously. Fico had been heavily criticized for his 2002 campaign, which was seen to be aggressive, arrogant and full of personal insults directed at his opponents.19 Fico’s style in the final days of the 2002 campaign had been identified as a reason for the drop in support for the party during the last days of the campaign. Central to the 2006 campaign was a series of meetings across the country with an emphasis on fun and enjoyment, in which two popular TV comics were the stars of the show. Fico kept his speeches short and largely focused on socio-economic themes (see below) and getting out the vote.20 The party’s campaign ensured there was not the drop in support witnessed four years earlier and predicted by a number of analysts,21 hence the most prominent of the party’s billboards just urged voters to ‘go and decide’ (see Table 3). ´ – DS significantly outperformed its opinion poll rating (see SDKU Table 4). It profited from the collapse in support for a breakaway party, Free Forum, led by former allies of Dzurinda, owing to the latter’s internal divisions, criticisms of the party leader’s governing style, and a controversial ´ –DS owed part of its success to its highly mayoral election.22 However, SDKU impressive and professional campaign. Not only did the party have extensive billboard coverage across the country, but also it employed a careful threestage strategy. First, hoardings appeared a couple of months before polling day stressing key themes such as ‘education brings greater opportunities’. These were then followed by billboards in which key campaign slogans appeared under a photograph of one of the party’s four main figures. One of these proclaimed ‘it’s about sensitive and just solutions’ under a picture of the Social Affairs Minister Iveta Radicˇova´, whose appointment just a few months before the election appeared to demonstrate a humanizing of the government’s social policy agenda. None the less, Radicˇova´’s energy appeared to enliven the party’s image and may have helped to sway a few voters.23 Central to the final part of the campaign was a call to voters to ensure that the last four years of reforms would not be wasted. This theme was particularly well received in the capital, which had benefited most from the government’s economic reforms, netting the party 38.74 per cent of the vote in Bratislava. In contrast, L’S –HZDS ran a far less effective campaign. Rather than simple, strong slogans used by other opposition parties such as Smer –SD and SNS, L’S –HZDS began the campaign with posters filled with lines of verse with quite unclear messages (see Table 3). The second phase of the

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A CHANGE OF DIRECTION TABLE 3 PARTIES’ MAIN CAMPAIGN SLOGANS IN THE 2006 ELECTIONS

Main Campaign Slogans Smer–SD ´ –DS SDKU

SNS

SMK

L’S– HZDS

† † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † †

KDH KSS SF

ANO

HZD

† † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † †

In the direction of people Go and decide We’ll finish the reforms already begun So the reform efforts are not wasted It’s about sensitive and just solutions It’s about quality education and a strong economy Education brings greater opportunities Equal chances for all families It’s about a successful Slovakia It’s about a self-confident Slovakia in Europe Let’s return Slovakia into the hands of Slovaks! We are Slovaks. Vote SNS For the Slovaks a Slovak government. Let’s not waste the chance! We are voting SNS I like decent people. Yes, I’m going to vote Bugar I have my values. Yes, I’m going to vote for Bugar I don’t want to be disappointed, yes I’m going to vote for Bugar We’ll do what is necessary You will decide the responsibility is with us Use your opinion Let’s put everything into it When in the morning the town awakes, the factory is full of people, work, pay, satisfaction, that’s how I see the future! It is difficult to live fabulously with only 8000 crowns a month. A new car, flat and house? Decide with reason Opportunity for all For the Decent Life in Slovakia For real values, for the family, for you For the strength of truth, for justice, for you Living Security and Respect for Citizens Greens vote for Free Forum Want a change? Vote for it It doesn’t matter what others tell you, what’s important is what you say. Stop being silent Your vote is important She/Her? Yes English for everybody Stop the Vatican Treaty For Civic Partnerships Lower contributions [odvody] With the People and For the People The President trusts us, vote for his programme You trust in the president, trust in us

campaign was more direct, with pictures of Mecˇiar accompanied by the slogan ‘opportunity for all’, but that vague slogan underlined the lack of any strong mobilizing narrative. The party failed to tap effectively into socio-economic or national themes, which it had used to such great effect in the 1990s. Moreover,

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J OU RN AL OF C OM M UNIS T S T UDI ES AND TRANSITION POLITICS TABLE 4 TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION POLLING

Party Smer–SD ´ –DS SDKU SNS SMK L’S–HZDS KDH KSS SF ANO

Election Feb. Oct. Mar. Nov. Feb. Sept. Dec. Mar. June Election 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2005 2006 2006 2006 13.5 15.1 3.3 11.2 19.5 8.3 6.3 — 8.0

17.6 13.2 4.3 10.7 16.5 7.7 9.9 — 7.6

24.4 7.2 6.5 10.2 16.5 8.2 8.9 — 8.7

25.1 6.6 6.7 11.0 17.0 9.3 8.5 3.0 5.2

25.3 9.3 5.8 9.9 12.2 8.3 8.9 3.1 6.0

30.1 10.8 7.6 9.7 16.5 9.7 4.2 3.5 5.5

35.4 7.4 8.8 10.5 11.6 12.3 4.8 4.4 2.1

31.8 8.5 6.9 9.9 10.8 10.2 7.6 6.0 3.0

32.5 9.9 7.5 10.5 13.0 9.1 5.1 6.6 2.5

28.0 12.5 10.0 10.0 11.5 10.5 5.0 6.0 2.3

29.1 18.4 11.7 11.7 8.8 8.3 3.9 3.5 1.4

Sources: Zora Bu´torova´ and Ol’ga Gya´rfa´sˇova´, ‘Trendy vo verejnej mienke a volebnom spravańı´’ in Grigorij Mesezˇnikov, Ol’ga Gyarfa´sˇova´ and Miroslav Kolla´r (eds.), Slovenske´ vol’by 2006: Vy´sledky, prıćˇiny, su´vislosti (Bratislava: Insˇtitu´t pre verejne´ ota´zky, 2006), pp.111–41 (p.129); Pravda, 16 June 2006.

the party leader, who had been integral to the party’s success in the 1990s, showed only brief glimpses of his charisma during the campaign. Just like the party’s election mascot (a cuddly lion), the party leader failed to roar. The 2006 election was also the first in the history of independent Slovakia where neither Mecˇiar nor his party was central to the debate. Indeed, the cam´ –DS, who directed paign was largely dominated by Smer – SD and SDKU much fire at each other, while other parties either deliberately concentrated on their niche issues (SMK and SNS) or were unable to articulate their agenda clearly and persuasively (L’S –HZDS and KDH).

The Centrality of Socio-economic Appeals Smer – SD owed its success in the 2006 election to a combination of three factors: the party’s well-run campaign (discussed above), the dynamism and charisma of the party’s leader and founder who was consistently one of the most popular and trusted politicians in Slovakia,24 and the decision to base the appeal largely on socio-economic themes. Our coding shows that over half of the party’s manifesto (53.9 per cent) was devoted to such themes (see Table 5). Moreover, of the questions at the start of the manifesto beginning ‘is it just and right that . . .’, ten out of twelve have explicit socio-economic themes.25 This emphasis on the socio-economic themes was also reflected in the party’s newspaper advertisements26 and in the 2006 expert survey. The party’s focus on socio-economic themes ties into two key aspects of the party’s strategy and appeal: ideological positioning and oppositional


TABLE 5 CONTENT ANALYSIS OF PARTY MANIFESTOS IN THE 2006 ELECTIONS (NUMBER OF PARAGRAPHS PLUS PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL)

Party

Economic and financial policy (%)

Smer –SD ´ – DS SDKU SNS SMK L’S– HZDS KDH SF KSS HZD ANO

87 (27.3%) 42 (11.6%) 44 (7.8%) 58 (12.3%) 25 (11.3%) 8 (5.8%) 34 (13.3%) 17 (15.0%) 23 (9.3%) 89 (18.2%)

Social policy (%) 61 29 39 42 20 21 21 29 17 38

(19.1%) (8.0%) (6.9%) (8.9%) (9.0%) (15.2%) (8.3%) (25.7%) (6.9%) (7.7%)

Health (%) 24 (7.5%) 36 (10.0%) 40 (7.1%) 20 (4.3%) 12 (5.4%) 17 (12.3%) 20 (7.9%) 8 (7.1%) 18 (7.3%) 15 (3.1%)

Education Religion/ Nation/ Ethnic secular and values minorities research (%) (%) (%) 28 (8.8%) 47 (13.0%) 40 (7.1%) 51 (10.9%) 29 (13.1%) 8 (5.8%) 29 (11.4%) 15 (13.3%) 21 (8.5%) 31 (6.3%)

0 1 17 4 2 4 1 1 0 10

(0.0%) (0.3%) (3.0%) (0.9%) (0.9%) (2.9%) (0.4%) (0.9%) (0.0%) (2.0%)

10 1 75 63 4 0 0 2 17 6

(3.1%) (0.3%) (13.2%) (13.4%) (1.8%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (1.8%) (6.9%) (1.2%)

Regional Culture Agriculture policy (%) (%) (%) 13 (4.1%) 17 (4.7%) 44 (7.8%) 8 (1.7%) 10 (4.5%) 9 (6.5%) 7 (2.8%) 9 (8.0%) 12 (4.8%) 21 (4.3%)

7 5 55 25 11 4 7 2 14 21

(2.2%) (1.4%) (9.7%) (5.3%) (5.0%) (2.9%) (2.8%) (1.8%) (5.6%) (4.3%)

11 37 42 67 13 8 11 4 9 14

(3.4%) (10.2%) (7.4%) (14.3%) (5.9%) (5.8%) (4.3%) (3.5%) (3.6%) (2.9%)

Foreign and security (including defence) (%) 2 45 69 42 41 18 20 5 20 21

(0.6%) (12.5%) (12.2%) (8.9%) (18.6%) (13.0%) (7.9%) (4.4%) (8.1%) (4.3%)

Justice and interior (%) 22 (6.9%) 40 (11.1%) 34 (6.0%) 23 (4.9%) 26 (11.8%) 21 (15.2%) 23 (9.0%) 3 (2.7%) 40 (16.1%) 29 (5.9%)

EU (%) 8 14 7 24 4 7 14 3 10 10

(2.5%) (3.9%) (1.2%) (5.1%) (1.8%) (5.1%) (5.5%) (2.7%) (4.0%) (2.0%)

Other (%) 46 (14.4%) 47 (13.0%) 60 (10.6%) 43 (9.1%) 24 (10.9%) 13 (9.4%) 67 (26.4%) 15 (13.3%) 47 (19.0%) 185 (37.8%)

Total 319 361 566 470 221 138 254 113 248 490

243

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politics.27 When Smer (which means ‘direction’) was formed in 1999, Fico eschewed ideology, proclaiming that Slovak politics needed new pragmatism and rational solutions;28 but after returning from meetings in London in December 2000 he declared his desire to emulate Tony Blair’s Third Way, later re-branding the party as Smer – Tretia cesta (‘Direction– Third Way’). Following the 2002 election, which was an unmitigated disaster for the left, especially Slovakia’s main left-wing party, the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL’),29 Slovakia not only had a centre-right government, but no declared moderate centre-left party in parliament. The positioning of the party as the moderate left critic of the government’s neo-liberal agenda, which was unpopular with a large slice of the electorate,30 not only helped it gather support but helped to heighten the prominence of left – right socio-economic competition in public discourse. Moreover, Smer actively sought membership of international social-democratic groupings, including the Party of European Socialists in the European parliament. With no sign of their fortunes reviving, most of the remnants of SDL’ and the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia fused with Smer in December 2004, and this removed potential competition on the centre-left and led to the party’s new name, Smer –socia´lna demokracia. Although one of the party’s leading lights, Robert Kalinˇa´k, argued that Smer had always been a centre-left party, he claimed that it was unable to declare itself as such until after the 2002 elections, because of vaguely defined Slovak circumstances.31 Critics of the party saw this re-branding as just cosmetic opportunism, arguing that behind Fico and the social democratic façade was a group of businessmen linked to the former Mecˇiar-era governments with little adherence to social democratic values.32 Smer –SD’s opposition to the government’s neo-liberal reform agenda on social-democratic grounds was well received by voters, who considered living standards, unemployment and the health system to be the three most important issues facing the country.33 Fico’s criticism of the government’s economic reforms went down particularly well in regions that had experienced much pain, but little gain, in the preceding four years.34 In addition to a socioeconomic critique, Fico also played the law-and-order card (6.9 per cent of the manifesto), and bolstered his position by announcing at the start of the campaign that the small contingent of Slovak troops would be pulled out of Iraq, an announcement that provoked the loudest applause during his speech at a rally in the northern town of Cˇadca.35 None the less, foreign policy was tucked away right at the back of the manifesto36 and played a minor role in the campaign. In a similar vein to Smer –SD, at the heart of the campaigns of both ´ –DS and the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) was the governSDKU ment’s socio-economic agenda (the former devoting 29.6 per cent of its manifesto, the latter 47.8 per cent, to such themes), but the two parties


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suffered contrasting fortunes at the ballot box. As the party most identified ´ – DS ran on the government’s with the 2002 –6 administration SDKU record, emphasizing that economic reforms, including a more flexible labour code and a simpler taxation system, had not only stimulated domestic economic activity, but also enticed foreign direct investment into the country. The appeal, however, was about not just what had been done already, but the need to complete the reforms. Two of the most prominent billboard slogans and the theme of the party’s TV spot proclaimed, in a clear echo of the party’s 2002 campaign,37 ‘we’ll finish the reforms already begun’, and urged the voters to back the party ‘so the reform efforts are not wasted’. Central to the next stage of reforms was education. Indeed, Finance Minister Miklosˇ talked in Blairite terms of the vital importance of education for further economic development. In fact, the only hoarding on which his face appeared carried the slogan ‘it’s about quality education and a strong economy’. Socio-economic themes dominated KSS’s campaign.38 The party had used socio-economic themes to great effect in the 2002 elections,39 but the repositioning of Smer as a social-democratic party critical of the government’s neo-liberal agenda clearly had a knock-on effect on KSS’s support. The Communists also lost support thanks to three other factors. First, the party had proved to be a weak and ineffective opposition, and despite its parliamentary status the party failed to enhance its profile. Second, entry into parliament and the perceived moderate stance taken by the party leadership provoked internal discontent and tensions between the party’s base and its parliamentary leadership.40 Third, following the 2004 president elections (when the party did not even put up a candidate)41 and the chaotic 2004 European parliament election campaign,42 KSS ran a lacklustre campaign. The Persistence of the National: SNS and SMK Although socio-economic themes were given significant space in both SNS’s and SMK’s manifestos (21.8 per cent of the former and 25.5 per cent of the later), at the core of the appeal of both parties were national and ethnic concerns. In contrast to the other major political parties, which devoted very little space to these issues, some 13 per cent of SNS’s and SMK’s manifestos emphasized these themes. As the SNS manifesto stated unambiguously, for example, ‘SNS has always had a single goal: to defend the national interests of the Slovak nation’.43 This clear pitch was also represented on the party’s hoardings, which included slogans such as ‘We are Slovaks. Vote SNS’ and ‘For the Slovaks a Slovak Government’, and is reflected in the 2006 expert survey. Much of the ire of SNS was directed at SMK. SMK had been a constituent part of both the 1998– 2002 and the 2002– 6 governments. SNS

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milked this fact for electoral gain, arguing that the SMK was undermining the integrity of the state. In typical style, SNS’s leader, Jań Slota, argued that SMK was seeking to turn the south of Slovakia (where the bulk of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia live) into another Kosovo.44 Although antiSMK sentiment was the basis of SNS’s electoral achievement, three other factors helped to bolster support for the party. First, in contrast to four years previously SNS entered the election campaign united. Hatchets were buried as a largely reunited SNS ran in the 2006 elections under its ‘old new’ leader, Jań Slota, with his former nemesis Anna Belousovova´ (neé Malı´kova´) as the party’s number two. Slota’s leadership was the second key component in the party’s appeal. Although his language and boorish behaviour appalled many of the Bratislava intellectual elite, Slota’s controversial and politically incorrect language ensured publicity and helped to shore up support for his party. Slota was also an astute politician, however. Thanks to his power base in Zˇilina (where he had been mayor for over a decade), he could also point to concrete socio-economic successes in which he could claim to have had a hand, including the decision of the Korean car manufacturer Kia to set up a plant just outside the town. Third, SNS benefited not only from the weak and ineffectual parliamentary performance and campaign of L’S– HZDS, but also the toning down of nationalist messages by Mecˇiar’s party (see below). SMK also used ethnic themes in its campaign. Indeed the first ten pages of the manifesto were largely devoted to minority questions.45 The party was keen to stress what it had done for minority rights during its time in government, including an anti-discrimination law, promotion of the use of the mother tongue for minorities, and the establishment of a Hungarian-speaking university in Koma´rno.46 There were two other components to SMK’s campaign. First, the vast bulk of the ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia live in the south of the country, so the party pushed a regional dimension, devoting 14.3 per cent of its manifesto to regional policy. This appeared to be part of a strategy to broaden its appeal beyond the ethnic Hungarian vote. To this end, the second major component of the campaign was the promotion of party leader Be´la Buga´r. SMK played on his reputation as a likeable and trustworthy politician to attract the support of ethnic Slovaks with slogans such as ‘I like decent people. Yes, I’m going to vote for Bugar’. None the less, the core of SMK’s vote remained ethnic Hungarians, hence the campaign in areas with the largest concentration of Hungarians focused on mobilizing the core vote, using Hungarian language posters calling for ‘everything to be put into it’ (‘Mindent bele!’). SMK appeared successful in mobilizing this core vote, but not in recruiting the support of new voters. Its drop in the total number of votes (see Table 1) was broadly in line with the national fall in turnout.


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Opportunity for All, Even L’S – HZDS For so long the most successful electoral machine in Slovakia, L’S –HZDS slumped to its worst ever result of just 8.8 per cent of the vote thanks to its performance over the previous four years and an ill-conceived and lacklustre campaign. Although the party performed reasonably well in some of its traditional heartlands in central Slovakia, it lost support across the board.47 For most of the period 2002– 6, the dominant motif of the party’s activity seemed to be to achieve respectability both internationally and at home. Rather than act as a trenchant critic of the government and its policies as Fico did, Mecˇiar and his party took a different direction, seeking to project the party as a respectable player on the political scene and a ‘constructive’ opposition partner.48 The changed attitude did appear to bear fruit. Prime Minister Dzurinda and other opponents of HZDS in the 1990s hinted during the course of the parliamentary term of possible co-operation with L’S– HZDS after the next election. The desire to project the image of a respectable and responsible party, however, provoked discontent among a section of its electorate – not so much because these supporters wanted to back an unrespectable and irresponsible party, but because, in projecting this image, much of the party’s language was toned down. Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: KDH and ANO Economic policy was a central plank of ANO’s campaign. The party not only devoted 18.2 per cent of the manifesto to economic and financial policy, but at rallies it pushed its liberal economic stance. ANO’s pitch for the liberal vote, however, was not restricted to economic liberalism: social liberal values infused the party’s manifesto, highlighting gender equality, pro-choice over abortion and tolerance of different lifestyles.49 Much of the party’s campaign for social liberal values was directed at KDH’s religiosity. Although there was little direct reference to religious (Catholic) values in the manifesto, ANO stated its unambiguous opposition to the Vatican Treaty, support for registered partnerships for homosexuals, and a women’s right to choose.50 None the less, despite running an energetic campaign ANO won just 1.4 per cent of the vote. Ultimately, the damage to ANO’s electoral chances had been done the year before by the corruption scandal implicating Rusko and the high profile departures from the party. KDH entered the election campaign buoyed by good opinion polling scores (see Table 4), but ultimately failed to deliver the hoped-for increase in support. Although the Christian Democrats had made much of their adherence to Catholic values while fighting with ANO over the issue of abortion in 2003, and when leaving the government over the Vatican Treaty in February 2006 (reflected in the results of the 2006 expert survey), the election manifesto

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and campaign were noticeably devoid of reference to religion and religious values. Often the party’s religiosity was implicit, such as in the education section in which reference is made to developing the ‘necessary values’51 and in the choice of a stork called Kristiań as the party’s election mascot. The most prominent billboard merely campaigned for the rather nebulous ‘decent [or good] life’ (Slusˇny´ Zˇivot). None the less, the party did push two themes: the family and justice. The latter theme, which received a large slice of the coverage in the party’s manifesto (15.2 per cent), was tied not simply to important themes of the core KDH electorate, but also to the achievements of the party’s two most prominent ministers in the 2002– 6 government: Daniel Lipsˇic (justice) and Vladimı´r Palko (interior). The European Union: Only Money Talks Although this was the first parliamentary election held since Slovakia’s entry into the EU in 2004, Europe was a marginal theme. As the content analysis of the manifestos shows, few parties devoted more than a handful of paragraphs ´ –DS, the party that could perhaps have made the most to the EU. Even SDKU capital from its role in securing the country’s accession, largely relegated explicit discussion of the EU to a few paragraphs near the end of its manifesto.52 Debate about what type of EU the parties wanted to see was largely absent beyond such statements as the SNS’s stance that it ‘accepts Slovakia’s membership of the EU’, but believes the EU should be a club of ‘independent sovereign states’;53 SF’s opposition to tax harmonization;54 and SMK’s vague calls for ‘transparency’.55 Whenever Europe was mentioned it was largely in connection with EU funds. All parties talked of using funds to help regional development, agriculture, energy and so forth,56 presenting Brussels as a cash cow ready to be milked. None the less, parties also invoked EU standards to bolster their arguments in particular areas, such as social and economic policy57 and treatment of minorities.58 The relative unimportance of the EU as a divisive issue in Slovak party politics was also confirmed by the results of the expert survey conducted before the elections by Rybarˇ, where foreign policy issues were rated as being among the least important for the Slovak parties with the excep´ – DS (see Table 2(b)). tion of SDKU Changing Direction: Coalition formation The party composition of the new Slovak government, as well as the speed of negotiations, caught many observers by surprise. As Smer – SD was the clear winner of the election, gaining 50 out of 150 parliamentary seats, its leading role in the coalition negotiations was widely expected. However, since there


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were several feasible majority coalitions possible, difficult and lengthy negotiations were expected. Instead, however, the new government was appointed within two weeks of election day. In the months prior to the elections Smer – SD representatives had repeatedly refused to indicate which parties they would consider as potential partners for governing. They only stressed that they would consider all parliamentary parties as legitimate partners and that the new government would probably be composed of both the former governing and opposition parties. How then to explain Smer –SD’s decision? The results of the election put Smer – SD into a position of the ‘dominant player’.59 The key characteristic of such a dominant player, apart from its size, is its willingness to contemplate several different coalition alternatives from the one in which it participates. This unique position of dominant players is usually associated with cabinet durability, as the credibility of their threats to leave government induces the co-operation of the other governing parties. It can also help to elucidate the dynamics of coalition negotiations in post-election Slovakia and, if supplemented by other factors, explains the enormous concessions the two junior parties made to Smer – SD. Shortly before the elections Smer – SD invited all parliamentary parties to preliminary bilateral consultations on the new government. This largely symbolic gesture demonstrated the openness of Smer –SD to all parties (in line with its pre-election stylization) and perhaps also to win some time for its intra-party discussion on the real negotiation strategy. The programmatic ´ – DS was the only officially acknowlincompatibility of Smer – SD and SDKU edged result of these consultations. All other options were kept open: Smer – SD representatives claimed that in terms of party programmes there were no significant obstacles to further negotiations with any of the four remaining parties – SNS, L’S– HZDS, KDH and SMK.60 Policy and personality differences among these minor parties, however, further reduced the number of coalition combinations. SNS and SMK were not going to jump into the same coalition bed; moreover, a government containing both L’S– HZDS and KDH was unlikely. The Christian Democrats were united in refusing co-operation with L’S– HZDS with Mecˇiar at the helm, pointing to the democratic backsliding of the country under his leadership between 1994 and 1998. Their insistence also effectively precluded the ´ – DS, only feasible government that would not contain Smer – SD: SDKU KDH, SMK and L’S– HZDS controlling 80 out of 150 parliamentary seats. The prospect of governing with Smer – SD, however, severely divided the Christian Democrats. While a small majority of the party leadership together with several regional party bosses favoured a government with Smer – SD, a very vocal intra-party minority opposed co-operation with Fico’s party. SMK’s representatives did not rule out co-operation with Smer – SD but initially made it conditional upon a similar decision of, and coordination

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with, KDH. On the other hand, SNS and L’S– HZDS did not announce any demands and showed no internal disunity concerning their post-election strategy. The leader of L’S – HZDS even maintained that his party had no preferred (third) coalition partner and would agree with whomever Smer – SD chose,61 highlighting the party’s keenness to return to power. This negotiating situation reveals Smer –SD’s dominant player status. It was the largest party in parliament, it controlled more than a half of the parliamentary seats that the government needed for its investiture, and it had two different sets of potential coalition partners (SNS and L’S– HZDS, or SMK and KDH) with which it could form a majority government. Smer –SD’s negotiators started simultaneous negotiation games in both directions. Given the games of bluff and counterbluff it is difficult to assess how genuinely Smer –SD contemplated co-operation with KDH (and SMK) or whether their strategy was simply intended to win concessions from their actual coalition partners. It is significant that Smer –SD announced its government with the SNS and L’S –HZDS only a few hours after the KDH eventually officially announced it was ready to start formal negotiations with Smer –SD on the new government. Nevertheless, the dominant position of Fico’s party, allied to the strong desire of its junior coalition partners to return to government, can account for the large concessions it gained from SNS and L’S– HZDS. Most importantly, the cabinet seats were distributed among the three parties using a formula 11:3:2. This was a clear deviation from a perfectly proportional option 10:4:3 that would reflect the proportional distribution of MPs of the governing parties (see Table 6). Even though such a solution would require an increase of cabinet posts by one, this did not constitute a serious obstacle, since the composition of cabinets in Slovakia can easily be changed by a statutory law to suit the preferences of the coalition parties, and this mechanism has frequently been used in the past. Moreover, while L’S– HZDS was publicly silent about its preferred cabinet portfolios, the SNS leader Slota claimed that his party was most interested in having the interior and defence portfolios. Significantly, neither of these two portfolios went to the Slovak Nationalists, an indication that it was not the preferences of the junior partner that decisively influenced the distribution of cabinet portfolios. When commenting on the distribution of cabinet seats, the L’S –HZDS leader stated only that the junior parties would be compensated by other benefits, including a more favourable distribution of junior ministers (sˇta´tni tajomnıći).62 Indeed, as Table 6 shows, junior ministers were more favourably distributed among the two small parties. Similarly, of the 12 chairmanships of the parliamentary committees allocated to the ruling parties, six went to Smer–SD and the rest were equally distributed among SNS and L’S–HZDS, again producing a more favourable ratio for the junior parties. Nevertheless,

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TABLE 6 POST-ELECTION DISTRIBUTION OF PORTFOLIOS AND INFLUENCE IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT

Number of MPs supporting government Percentage of MPs supporting government Number of cabinet members Percentage of cabinet members Difference in percentage Number of junior ministers Percentage of junior ministers Number of parliamentary committee chairs Percentage of parliamentary committee chairs Control over 2007 state budget expenditures

Smer-SD

SNS

L’S-HZDS

Total

50 58.82 11 68.75 þ9.93 13 52.00 6 50.00 67.22

20 23.52 3 18.75 24.77 8 32.00 3 25.00 23.48

15 17.64 2 12.15 22.64 4 16.00 3 25.00 9.30

85 100.00 16 100.00 n/a 25 (26) 100.00 12 NA 100.00

Source: Based on Koalicˇna´ zmluva uzatvorena´ medzi politicky´mi stranami Smer– SD a Slovenska´ na´rodna´ strana a L’udova´ strana – Hnutie za demokraticke´ Slovensko, 2 July 2006; Programove´ vyhla´senie vla´dy Slovenskej republiky, August 2006; and ‘Za´kon o sˇta´tnom rozpocˇtena rok 2007’, Zbierka za´konovcˇ. 681/2006, s. 5990-6028, zo dnˇa 12. decembra 2006. NB: It was impossible to determine the party affiliation of one of the 26 junior ministers. Contrary to the previous coalition governments, the 2006 coalition agreement does not specify the distribution of junior ministers, hence party affiliation of these junior ministers was established on the basis of various media sources.

while the posts of committee chairs and junior ministers may be important in satisfying the ambitions of middle-rank politicians, they cannot rank in importance with ministerial posts in their policy-making capacity and public visibility. Establishing the importance of individual cabinet portfolios is a difficult task, since the value of portfolios varies according to the preferences of the parties and the distribution of policy-making authority in the ministries. However, it is justifiable to claim that Smer –SD gained the most influential cabinet posts. Alongside the prime ministership, the party gained control of the finance and foreign affairs ministries, and the right to nominate the speaker of parliament. To demonstrate the disproportional distribution of important cabinet posts, we also deploy a proxy measure that takes into account the share of individual ministries (and the prime minister’s office) of the 2007 budget expenditures. As shown in Table 6, Smer – SD gained control of government units that control a disproportionately high share of public expenditure. We do not claim that the respective ministers can freely determine the flow of money into their departmental budgets, but the availability of public funds helps to increase the profile of the party within the area of the ministerial sphere of activity and facilitates redistribution that satisfies both the groups close to

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the parties and the policy-making preferences of the party in charge. Thus, on all analysed accounts the result is the same: Smer –SD received a disproportionately high share of influence in the new government. This outcome, we argue, can be explained by its status as a dominant party that can win significant concessions from its coalition partners by credibly threatening the ‘exit’ option of governing with alternative coalition partners. A few months after the new government took power, L’S– HZDS claimed that it would initiate the establishment of a new ministry of tourism headed by its representative. This is in line with our assertion that the junior coalition parties are aware of the disproportional distribution of powers and after the event tried to raise their status. No new ministry was created, however. Conclusions Our examination of the 2006 parliamentary elections highlights two significant developments in the nature of party competition in Slovakia. First, although during the previous decade the EU had been ‘an object instrumentalized for use in domestic party competition’63 and in previous elections had been prominent,64 with membership achieved the EU was striking by its absence in the campaign. Beyond promises to extract funds from EU ´ – DS, who coffers, political parties barely mentioned the EU. Even SDKU could have made much of the party’s role in leading Slovakia into the EU, did not make the EU a major plank of its appeal to the voters. Moreover, the limited impact of the European level was well demonstrated when the Party of European Socialists (PES) responded to Smer –SD’s decision to include Slota’s Nationalists in the new government by threatening to suspend the Slovak party’s membership. Although Fico travelled to the European parliament to explain his decision and to persuade PES not to invoke its threatened sanction, when the European parliamentarians stuck to their guns, Fico merely disregarded the complaints, stressing that his choice of coalition partner was a matter of internal Slovak politics. Second – and more significantly – we have witnessed a transformation of the party political scene in the country from one dominated by questions of the character of the political regime, illiberal democracy and nationalism into one in which socio-economic themes are crucial for political parties to mobilize voters and win elections. The two most successful political parties in electoral ´ –DS, based their appeal to voters on such themes, terms, Smer – SD and SDKU focusing attention on tax, public spending, the reform of the welfare system and, more broadly, the role of the state in tackling socio-economic problems. In this respect the Slovak political scene appeared to be moving towards the type of bread-and-butter party competition prevalent in many established democracies. None the less, at the same time, the old divisions have not

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disappeared, but rather have found their expression as niche themes of minor parties. We may also hypothesize from the 2006 elections, when no new parties entered parliament, that the rise in the importance of the socio-economic themes may well account for the stabilization of party politics, although the passage of more time is needed before definitive conclusions can be drawn.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to express their gratitude to Akrivi Andreou, Laura Chappell, Erik La´sˇtic, Darina Malova´ and Kieran Williams for their assistance in producing this article and to this journal’s anonymous reviewers for constructive comments. Grateful thanks are also extended to the University of Birmingham’s School of Social Sciences for according funds from its Research Fund, and for financial support received within the research project ‘Political Institutions and Political Elites after Slovakia’s Accession to the European Union’, funded by the Slovak Scientific Grant Agency (VEGA No. 1/1296/04). The article also draws on insights generated by a Leverhulme Trust funded project (F/00 094/AK) examining the impact of EU membership on Slovakia as a case study of a small new member state.

NOTES 1. L’ubomı´r Lipta´k, Slovensko v 20. storocˇi (Bratislava: Kalligram, 1998). 2. See in particular Kevin Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities: Democracy and Party Competition in Slovakia and the Czech Republic (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); Sharon Fisher, Political Change in Post-Communist Slovakia and Croatia: From Nationalist to Europeanist (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2006); Erika Harris, Nationalism and Democratisation: Politics of Slovakia and Slovenia (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002); Karen Henderson, ‘Slovak Political Parties and the EU: From Symbolic Politics to Policies’, in Paul G. Lewis and Zdenka Mansfeldova´ (eds.), The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave–Macmillan, 2006), pp.149–68; Lubomı´r Kopecˇek, Demokracie, diktatury a politicke´ stranictvı´ na Slovensku (Brno: Centrum pro stadium demokracie a kultury, 2006); Geoffrey Pridham, ‘The Slovak Parliamentary Election of September 2002: Its Systemic Importance’, Government and Opposition, Vol.38, No.3 (2003), pp.333–56; and Marek Ryba´rˇ, ‘Old Parties and New: Changing Patterns of Party Politics in Slovakia’, in Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders (ed.), Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp.147–76. 3. See, for example, Ian Budge, David Robertson and Derek Hearl (eds.), Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analysis of Post-War Election Programmes in Nineteen Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Klaus Krippendorf, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology (Beverley Hills, CA: Sage, 1980). 4. Among the themes prominent in the ‘other’ category were energy, transport and sport. 5. See, for example, Riccardo Pelizzo, ‘Party Positions or Party Direction? An Analysis of Party Manifesto Data’, West European Politics, Vol.26, No.2 (2003), pp.67–89; and Alan Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 6. Rohrschneider/Whitefield expert survey on party positions about integration in 13 East– Central European countries (2004); data supplied to the authors by Stephen Whitefield and Robert Rohrschneider. 7. Ryba´rˇ, ‘Old Parties and New’. 8. Robert Fico, ‘Rationale for a New Political Party’, in Kieran Williams (ed.), Slovakia after Communism and Mecˇiarism (London: SSEES Occasional Papers, 2000). 9. Kopecˇek, Demokracie, diktatury a politicke´ stranictvı´ na Slovensku.

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10. ‘DS’ was added to the party’s name when the non-parliamentary Democratic Party fused with ´ in January 2006. SDKU 11. The party’s call for more state subsidies and redistribution in favour of less-developed regions placed it clearly to the left of other members of the coalition: see Tim Haughton and Marek Ryba´rˇ, ‘All Right Now? Explaining the Successes and Failures of the Slovak Centre-Right’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.20, No.3 (2004), pp.115–32 (p.116). 12. Grigorij Mesezˇnikov, ‘Domestic Politics and the Party System’, in Martin Bu´tora, Miroslav Kolla´r and Grigorij Mesezˇnikov (eds.), Slovakia 2005: A Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Insˇtitu´t pre verejne´ ota´zky, 2006), pp.19–89 (pp.36–7). 13. Darina Malova´ and Tim Haughton, ‘Challenge from the Pace-Setting Periphery: The Causes and Consequences of Slovakia’s Stance on Further European Integration’, in Wojciech Sadurski, Jacques Ziller and Karolina Zurek (eds.), Apre`s Enlargement: Taking Stock of the Immediate Legal and Political Responses to the Accession of Central and Eastern European States to the EU (Florence: Robert Schuman Center, 2006), pp.323–38. 14. Sharon Fisher, John Gould and Tim Haughton, ‘Slovakia’s Neoliberal Turn’, Europe–Asia Studies, Vol.59, No.6 (2007), pp.977–98. 15. See, for example, Karen Dawisha and Stephen Deets, ‘Political Learning in Post-Communist Elections’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.20, No.4 (2006), pp.691–728. 16. Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, Moira Nelson and Erica Edwards, ‘Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West: Different Structure, Same Causality’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol.39, No.2 (2006), pp.155–75. 17. Tim Haughton, ‘“We’ll Finish What We’ve Started”: The 2002 Slovak Parliamentary Elections’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.19, No.4 (2003), pp.65–90. 18. Zora Bu´torova´ and Ol’ga Gya´rfa´sˇova´, ‘Trendy vo verejnej mienke a volebnom spravani’, in Grigorij Mesezˇnikov, Ol’ga Gyarfa´sˇova´ and Miroslav Kolla´r (eds.), Slovenske´ vol’by 2006: Vy´sledky, prıćˇiny, su´vislosti (Bratislava: Insˇtitu´t pre verejne´ ota´zky, 2006), pp.111–41. 19. Karen Henderson, ‘Europe and the Slovak Parliamentary Election of June 2006’, EPERN Election Briefing, No.26 (2006), available at ; accessed 1 Sept. 2006. 20. For example, Fico’s, speech at Smer–SD rally, Cˇadca, 3 June 2006. 21. Trend, 8 June 2006, pp.26–7. 22. Henderson, ‘Europe and the Slovak Parliamentary Election of June 2006’, and Ty´zˇdenˇ, 5 June 2006, p.26. 23. She also received the largest number of preference votes, outperforming both Dzurinda and Miklosˇ. 24. Bu´torova´ and Gya´rfa´sˇova´, ‘Trendy vo verejnej mienke a volebnom spravani’. 25. SMER–socia´lna demokracia, Smerom k l’ud’om, Election Manifesto, 2006, pp.2–3. ˇ as, 16 June 2006, p.53. 26. See, for example, Novy´ C 27. Andrej Orogvańi, ‘Strana Smer – pokus o novu´ definıćiu slovenskej l’avice’, in Mesezˇnikov, Gya´rfa´sˇova´ and Kolla´r (eds) Slovenske´ vol’by 2006, pp.95–109. 28. Fico, ‘Rationale for a New Political Party’. 29. Haughton, ‘“We’ll Finish What We’ve Started”’. 30. Bu´torova´ and Gya´rfa´sˇova´, ‘Trendy vo verejnej mienke a volebnom spravani’. 31. Peter Ucˇenˇ, ‘Centristicky´ populizmus ako nova´ kompetitı´vna a mobilizacˇna´ strate´gia v slovenskej politike’, in Ol’ga Gya´rfa´sˇova´ and Grigorij Mesezˇnikov (eds.), Vla´da strana na Slovensku: sku´senosti a perspektı´vy (Bratislava: Insˇtitu´t pre verejne´ ota´zky, 2004), pp.49– 76 (p.68). 32. Ty´zˇdenˇ, 24 Oct. 2005. 33. Bu´torova´ and Gya´rfa´sˇova´, ‘Trendy vo verejnej mienke a volebnom spravani’, p.257. 34. Vladimı´r Krivy´, ‘Vol’by v roku 2006’, in Miroslav Kolla´r, Grigorij Mesezˇnikov and Martin Bu´tora (eds.), Slovensko 2006: Su´hrnna´ spra´va o stave spolocˇnosti (Bratislava: Insˇtitu´t pre verejne´ ota´zky, 2007), pp.107–49. 35. Fico, Speech at Smer-SD rally. 36. SMER–socia´lna demokracia, Smerom k l’ud’om, pp.28–9.

A CHANGE OF DIRECTION 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

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Haughton, ‘“We’ll Finish What We’ve Started”’. KSS, Kroky, 2006, No. 11, and KSS, Zˇivotne´ istoty a ućtu obcˇanom, Election Manifesto, 2006. Haughton, ‘“We’ll Finish What We’ve Started”’. Mesezˇnikov, ‘Domestic Politics and the Party System’, pp.82–3. Marek Ryba´rˇ, ‘The Presidential Election in Slovakia, April 2004’, Electoral Studies, Vol.24, No.2 (2005), pp.333–8. Karen Henderson, ‘EU Accession and the New Slovak Consensus’, West European Politics, Vol.27, No.4 (2004), pp.652–70. SNS, Sme Slovaći: Slova´kom Slovensku´ vla´du, Election Manifesto, 2006, p.3. Jań Slota, Speech at SNS rally in Zˇilina, 4 June 2006. SMK, Volebny´ program 2006–2010: Ryćhle dostihnutie u´rovne Euro´pskej uńie!, Election Manifesto, 2006. Ibid., p.5. Krivy´, ‘Vol’by v roku 2006’. Kopecˇek, Demokracie, diktatury a politicke´ stranictvı´ na Slovensku, p.203. Alliance Nove´ho Obcˇana, Moderna´ spolocˇnostˇ, Election Manifesto, 2006. Ibid., pp.13– 14. KDH, Za slusˇny´ zˇivot na Slovensku, Election Manifesto, 2006, p.13. ´ –DS, Ide o u´spesˇne´ Slovensko: Volebny´ program SDKU ´ –DS 2006, Election ManiSDKU festo, 2006, pp.39–40. SNS, Sme Slovaći, p.6. Slobodne´ Fo´rum, Volebny´ program SF, Election Manifesto, 2006, p.14. SMK, Volebny´ program 2006–2010, p.60. KSS, Zˇivotne´ istoty a ućtu obcˇanom, p.9; L’udova´ strana–HZDS, Programovy´ dokument pre parlamentne´ vol’by 2006, Election Manifesto, 2006, pp.1, 5; Slobodne´ Fo´rum, Volebny´ program SF, p.12 and SMK, Volebny´ program 2006–2010, p.30. See, for example, SMER–socia´lna demokracia, Smerom k l’ud’om, p.1. See, for example, SMK, Volebny´ program 2006–2010, p.50. See, for example, Peter Van Roozendal, ‘Cabinets in the Netherlands (1918– 1990): The Importance of Dominant and Central Parties’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol.23, No.1 (1993), pp.35–54. ‘Smer z druhe´ho kola nevylućˇil nikoho’, in SME, 22 June 2006, pp.1–2. ‘O Mecˇiara sa ucha´dza Fico aj Dzurinda’ in SME, 28 June 2006, pp.1–2. SME, 30 June 2006, p.2. Henderson, ‘Slovak Political Parties and the EU’, p.146. Haughton, ‘“We’ll Finish What We’ve Started”’; and Pridham, ‘The Slovak Parliamentary Election of September 2002’.