The 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey ... - Oxford Academic

Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 62 No. 1, 2009, 129– 148 Advance Access Publication 15 October 2008

The 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey: Between Securitisation and Desecuritisation BY RABIA KARAKAYA POLAT1

ABSTRACT On 22 July 2007, 84% of the Turkish public went to polling stations to cast their votes in General Election. The incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP) won a landslide victory, receiving 47% of the vote, the largest share since the elections of 1957. The political debate before the elections focused on two issues: the election of the next president and a potential military incursion into Northern Iraq. These issues have become deeply ingrained into the two main ongoing salient issues in Turkey: political Islam and the Kurdish issue. Drawing upon concepts from Securitisation Theory, this article argues that the election results can be explained by reference to Turkey’s longstanding regime problems and the perceptions of these problems by the public. An analysis of the securitisation and desecuritisation of political Islam and the Kurdish issue provides insights into the understanding of the election results and its implications for the future of democracy in Turkey.

27 APRIL 2007 is now yet another date to remember in Turkish politics. On this date, the army’s General Staff posted a memorandum on its website accusing the government of having a hidden Islamic agenda and not doing enough to prevent the rise of a supposed Islamic threat. Dubbed an ‘e-memorandum’ in the media, this posting followed the government’s nomination of then Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gul, for the post of president. The nomination triggered a row between the Military/Bureaucratic elite and the ruling party, the AKP. Gul’s nomination was so controversial because his political career started in a political party with Islamic roots (the Welfare Party or the RP), and because his wife wears an Islamic headscarf. This was perceived as an existential threat by the Turkish Army, which sees itself as the guardian of the secular Republic. Although not widely debated, the military also emphasised the ethnic separatist (Kurdish) threat and said that: ‘the army is against those who oppose the Kemalist motto—Happy is he who calls himself a Turk’. The timing of such a comment is telling when we consider the reforms then underway as part of the EU Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 62 No. 1 # The Author [2008]. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government; all rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected] doi: 10.1093/pa/gsn039

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accession process, such as the right to broadcast in Kurdish. This comment is also an obvious challenge to the Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan’s, suggestion that Turkish identity can remain the primary identity while Kurdish identity should be recognised as a sub-identity. The army had also previously raised concerns about the rise of terror in the country’s south-eastern region and recommended that the government launch a military campaign in Northern Iraq to combat terrorists who had found refuge there. Hence, once more, the military emphasised its position in regard to the twin enemies of the Republic— political Islam and Kurdish separatism—through a direct intervention into government and civil politics. The military intervention created much debate and varying levels of enthusiasm over its virtues or drawbacks. Following the memorandum, hundreds of thousands of people gathered in Turkey’s major cities to protest against the government, which they believed has a hidden agenda to establish Islamic rule. This has come to be considered the awakening of civil society in Turkey—a sector that had largely been silent since the 1980 coup. The government did not consider the demonstrations a challenge to its rule and claimed that it could easily mobilise larger numbers of people in support but that it chose not to for the sake of peace and stability in the country. There were a number of weak voices in the media and academia that expressed concern about the damage being done to the consolidation of Turkish democracy by the Military’s intervention.2 Some of these opined that such interventions cause reactive voting and even increase the share of the vote for any political party challenged by the army.3 Turkey went to the polls in the light, or shade, of these developments. The ruling AKP won a landslide victory, receiving 47% of the vote, the largest share for a single party since the elections of 1957, and significantly higher than in the previous three elections in which the winning parties obtained 34% in 2002 (AKP), 22% in 1999 (Democratic Left Party, DSP) and 21% in 1995 (RP). It was only the second occasion since 1954, in which the incumbent party significantly increased its vote share in a subsequent election. The election result came as a surprise since opinion polls had failed to predict such strong support for the AKP.4 There could be several explanations as to why the AKP received such strong support. Some argue that the AKP has become a centre right party,5 whereas others analyse how the growth in the religiously inclined middle class is reflected in their desire for a bigger say in politics through the AKP.6 Drawing on the concepts of Securitisation Theory, this article argues that the election results can be explained with reference to Turkey’s long-standing regime problems and public perceptions of these problems. An analysis of the securitisation and desecuritisation of political Islam, and the Kurdish issue, provides insights in the understanding of the election results and their implications for the future of democracy in Turkey. The first

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section provides background and context to the election through discussion of the above issues and their securitisation following a discourse of danger and threat. This section also summarises policy developments under AKP rule between 2002 and 2007. The second section focuses on the election campaign, and in particular, party positions in respect to the subsequent presidential election (linked to debate about political Islam and secularism), and a putative military incursion into Northern Iraq (linked to the Kurdish issue). The third section focuses on the dynamics of party support during the campaign and assesses the election results. It also discusses the aftermath of the election with special focus on signs of Democratisation and the process of desecuritisation and resecuritisation in the Turkish body politic.

Background The agenda of the July 2007 election was shaped by long-standing issues arising from the extant political regime. Indeed, the election took place four months ahead of schedule when a crisis erupted regarding the election of a new president, the Government’s candidate being a man who was supposedly a threat to secularism. The election should thus be examined in the context of a broader battle of ideas and identities (secular/non-secular and Turkish/Kurdish) that have shaped the Republic’s history. At this point, a more detailed reading of the political context and the last four and half years of AKP government is necessary. I first discuss the political context with reference to the securitisation and desecuritisation of political Islam and the Kurdish issue in Turkish politics. I then discuss the AKP rule between 2002 and 2007.

SECURITISATION AND DESECURITISATION OF POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE KURDISH ISSUE. Political Islam and the Kurdish issue have long

dominated Turkish domestic politics; they also have shaped Turkey’s relations with neighbours such as Syria and Iran.7 The threat of Political Islam triggered the ‘post-modern coup’ of 28 February 1997, in which the military, concerned about the future of secularism, launched a campaign against the RP-led government. On 28 February 1997, the National Security Council made decisions designed to ‘reinforce the secular character of the Turkish state’. Then, in April 1997, Kurdish separatism and reactionary Islam (irtica) were highlighted in a National Security Policy Document as the most important threats to national security. The Office of the Chief of Staff declared that ‘internal threats against the territorial integrity of the country and the founding principles of the Republic have become graver than external threats’.8 In July 1997, the coalition government had to step down after threats of military intervention. The process initiated on 28 February 1997 has come to be called the first ‘post-modern coup’ in Turkish political history.

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The incident is one of the clearest examples of the securitisation of domestic politics in Turkey. Securitisation theorists do not define security as an objective and material condition. Rather, from their perspective, ‘security’ is seen as a ‘speech act’ and the fact that, ‘something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so’.9 Issues become ‘Securitised’ through speech-acts that not only describe an extant security problem, but also bring it into being as a security problem by presenting it as one. By labelling something a ‘security issue’, the actor claims a need for the use of extraordinary means, emergency measures and other actions outside the normal boundaries of political procedure. Reflections of historical problems and memories of past crises are also important in the securitisation process. One of the most highly securitised issues in Turkey is minority rights, especially those of the Kurds.10 This is not surprising in the light of living historical memory of revolts by ethnic minorities, usually with the encouragement of the West, against the Ottoman Empire.11 Also, the realities of Kurdish secessionist terror since the mid-1980s have made it more difficult to focus on discussion of rights and freedoms. Likewise, the securitisation of Islam is supported by collective memories of regressive phenomena such as the Menemen and Sincan incidents.12 This critical and constructivist approach to security necessitates a closer analysis of domestic power-domination games. Far from being objectively defined concepts, discourses of security are: ‘rather the products of historical structures and processes, of struggles for power within the State, of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege them’.13 Therefore, this is a field of struggle in which the securitising actors point at a security issue to secure the support of society for a certain policy or course of action. The securitisation of Political Islam and the Kurdish issue in Turkey goes far beyond the current conflict; it is the result of a struggle between emerging social and political forces that are seeking more influence through the AKP and the military and civilian bureaucratic elites who have historically been the driving force of Turkish modernisation and Westernisation. Serif Mardin’s Centre-Periphery Framework is frequently used to analyse Turkish politics, and it is particularly useful at this point.14 This framework describes Turkish politics as being built around a strong ‘Centre’ that is dominated by the Civil/ Military Bureaucratic Elite and, a heterogeneous ‘Periphery’, composed of farmers, the peasantry and small business owners that is often hostile to the modernising/westernising efforts of the Centre. The Civil/ Military elites have controlled state institutions and the economy since the inception of the Republic. More recently, however, the rise of a new Muslim bourgeoisie has started to challenge the status quo by pressing for greater political and economic rights and freedoms. Another challenge from the Periphery has been the demand for more rights and freedoms for the Kurds. Facing these challenges from the


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Periphery, the Centre started to resort to securitisation of problems such as the lifting of the headscarf ban in universities, or broadcasts in minority languages. The mistrust between the politicians representing the Periphery and the Centre’s elites has been part of the state tradition and political culture in Turkey. A good example of this is the role of the Turkish President. Under the current Constitution, Turkey has a strong President, who is the pinnacle of the state elite and who is perceived to be the guardian of the regime and, as such, is implicitly against any potential wrongdoings by politicians. The relationship between the two elite groups/power centres can be best described as ‘periods of domination, protest and re-domination’.15 The Civil/ Military elite’s mistrust of the Political elite has led them to securitise certain issues in order to sustain power. The presentation of political issues as existential threats by the Centre has hindered the emergence of healthy political debate in the public sphere. The authority of the securitisers is further enhanced by their acts of securitisation since, ‘Winning the right to define security provides not just access to resources but also the authority to articulate new definitions and discourses of security as well’.16 Successful securitisation is also structured by the forms in which securitisation claims are made so as to be recognised and accepted as convincing by the relative audience.17 Psycho-cultural orientation of the audience is important, when the securitising actor attempts to frame an issue as a security matter; it needs to resonate with the audience. In Turkey, the military has little difficulty in convincing the public as it enjoys a high degree of trust and respect.18 The existence of a robust civil society would mean that it would normally be expected to act against this kind of excessive securitisation. However, civil society can also be mobilised by the securitisers against any supposed or perceived threats. Hence, societal actors in civil society may be unable or unwilling to stand against securitisation moves.19 In 2000, conversely, Turkey has undergone a period of desecuritisation. Desecuritisation is conceptualised as the broadening of the boundaries of normal politics. It is the process of ‘moving issues off the “security” agenda and back into the realm of public political discourse and ‘normal’ political dispute and accommodation’.20 The so-called post-modern coup against the RP-led coalition government on 28 February 1997; the capture of the leader of the terrorist organisation the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in February 1999; and the decision at the Helsinki Summit (1999) affirming Turkey’s candidature for the EU have all created a political climate that has triggered an energetic economic and political reform process. These developments also set the stage for a more relaxed environment in which a public debate in which new definitions of ‘national security’ began to emerge. Several academics, think-tanks and columnists asked for a normalisation of issues such as the use of headscarf and the use of the Kurdish language. The EU

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accession process obviously supports this trend by forcing the introduction of various reforms in the areas of human and minority rights. More recently, there have been retreats in these fields resulting from the slowing of Turkey’s EU accession; the rise in fears about the threat posed by Political Islam; and an increase in ethnic/separatist terrorism. These retreats have demonstrated how fragile the desecuritisation process is. The Military, an important securitising agent, enjoys a high level of political power and support from varying segments of Turkish society,21 and it is likely to continue to play an important role in identifying national security concerns and, possibly, in shaping domestic politics. Retired generals frequently resist demands for further democratisation by reference to Turkey’s ‘sensitive’ geopolitical location, an argument that supposedly gives the Army a unique role in both domestic and international politics.22 Moreover, issues like minority might still have the potential to be framed as existential threats to the state. It is possible to argue that, in the last decade, Turkey has been swinging pendulum-like between the extremes of securitisation and desecuritisation, particularly in the realms of Political Islam and the Kurdish issue. Over its nearly five years in power, the AKP has overseen a period of domestic political stability and sustained economic growth, while also passing domestic reforms sufficient to allow Turkey to open accession negotiations with the EU. In domestic politics, the AKP government has continued the reform process that was started by the previous coalition government. Reforms at the domestic level should be evaluated within the context of EU accession, a process which has had an impact on Turkish domestic politics in two ways. First, the process has opened the way for the desecuritisation of formerly securitised issues, especially the Kurdish issue. The EU serves to desecuritise various issues since putative member states must focus on issues such as their integration into the economic and political games of Europe.23 The negotiation process triggers changes in identity and interests through which securitised issues such as minority rights start to be ‘downplayed’. A significant desecuritisation move is the removal of the ban on Education and Broadcasts in languages other than Turkish. Previously, the granting of these basic rights to the Kurdish minority had not been considered from the perspective of basic rights and freedoms, but rather through the lens of National Security. The Kurdish issue had historically been ignored by the Civil/Military elite that perceived the problem as simply one of terrorism or regional underdevelopment. The AKP government departed from this attitude by repeatedly emphasising the Kurds rights to express their culture and identity. A significant turning point in Turkish history was marked in

DEVELOPMENTS UNDER AKP RULE BETWEEN 2002 AND 2007.


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2005 when Erdogan became the first Prime Minister to acknowledge that, ‘the State had made mistakes in regard to the Kurdish issue’.24 Second, the EU process has reshaped the domestic opportunity structure by reducing the role of the civilian–military bureaucracy and empowering the political elites and societal actors.25 Some of the reforms in this field include the shifting of the balance of power in the National Security Council (MGK) in favour of its civilian members; the appointment of a civilian Secretary-General for the MGK and a reduction in its role to that of an advisory body; the removal of military representatives from the Council of Higher Education and the Radio and Television High Council; and the bringing of the Turkish Armed Forces under the judicial authority of the Court of Accounts. All of these reforms have changed the domestic opportunity structure by empowering the political elite vis-a`-vis the military bureaucracy. These changes have also facilitated a decline in the role of the military in the securitisation of political issues at both the domestic and international levels. The EU membership process has also had impact on the domestic opportunity structure by empowering societal actors. In fact, civil society has been both the subject and the object of the EU accession reform process.26 The reform process has gradually increased the credibility and legitimacy of civil society in such a way that civil organisations have become more empowered and better equipped in their push for more democratisation and desecuritisation.27 Despite these improvements, and particularly in the year leading up to the calling of the 2007 poll, the AKP has appeared to have lost direction. The reform agenda began to slow, there has been an upsurge in the PKK’s attacks, and there have been continuing clashes between the AKP and the State establishment. The internationalising of the PKK terror following the USA’s invasion of Iraq has led to a more complicated arena in which the Government has had to act. Attempts at legislation by the AKP in areas such as the criminalisation of adultery have raised suspicions about the nature of its intentions, especially the introduction of an Islamic way of life. The Government has also been accused of corruption and of filling civil service positions with its supporters, particularly in the administration of Health and Education.

The Campaign: The Parties and the Issue Agendas Following the Government’s decision to hold a ballot on 22 July 2007, 14 political parties mounted their campaigns. Official campaigning commenced on 12 July 2007, but the real campaign had started much earlier when it had become obvious that the existing parliament would not be able to elect a new president. Although economic issues were also debated throughout the campaign, it was, in fact, dominated by two issues: the election of the next President (linked to debate about Political Islam and Secularism); and a possible military incursion into Northern Iraq (linked to the Kurdish issue).

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WHO WILL BE THE NEXT PRESIDENT. Secularism has been one of the cornerstones of the Republic since 1923. Secularism in Turkey is often compared with the French model of Secularism (or laı¨cite´, the removal of Religion from the public sphere).28 This understanding was challenged by the advent of multi-party politics in the 1950s. Since that time, almost every election has been won by centre-right parties that have advocated relative measures of religious freedom. Despite the various military interventions to protect the secular regime, debate on Political Islam has consistently dominated Turkish political life, especially since the mid-1990s. Following the post-modern coup of 1997, the RP and its successor, the Virtue Party (FP), were closed down. However, the movement recovered in the 2002 elections when the AKP, which had split from the FP as a movement of innovators, gained a majority of seats in the Parliament. The Felicity Party (SP), the conservative rump of the FP, on the other hand, obtained only 2.5% of the vote and was unable to secure a seat. Since 2002, the AKP has claimed that it has adopted an ideology of ‘conservative democracy’, and that it is not interested in initiating Islamic rule. Nevertheless, sceptics believe that the AKP’s moderation is merely a cover and that it has in reality been engaged in Dissimulation (takiyye—a religiously sanctioned form of concealment)—and that is hiding its true intention to establish an Islamic State, when the time is right. In fact, the political crisis triggered by the presidential elections of April 2007 was the last unfolding of developments dating back to the 2002 elections when the AKP received 34% of votes cast. Owing to the nature of Turkey’s electoral laws, this translated into 66% of the seats in Parliament. It became clear that the AKP was going to choose the next president unless there was an extraordinary development, such as early elections. For this reason, as early as 2005 the Chairman of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Deniz Baykal, was calling for early elections, hoping that this would benefit his party. Prime Minister Erdogan ignored these calls for early elections, and insisted that the existing parliament would choose Turkey’s next president. Before any presidential candidate was announced, many expected the Prime Minister himself to run for the job.29 The Army expressed its reservations about this possibility, with the Chief of Staff, Yasar Buyukanit, holding a press conference on 12 April 2007 at which he noted that the Military was especially concerned about the Presidency, since the President is its Commander-in-Chief. He stated that the Army hoped that the future president would share the basic values of the Republic, ‘not in words, but in deeds’. The next day, on 13 April 2007, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who had previously served as the head of the Constitutional Court, issued a warning that the State’s secular system faced its greatest threat since the foundation of the Republic in


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1923, and he further claimed that all State institutions had a duty to protect the regime. He also added that internal and external forces had joined together in their shared interest in questioning the basic values of the secular republic.30 Within days, the masses were mobilised to protest against the government and to show support for state secularism. On 14 April 2007, the first of the mass demonstration (dubbed the ‘Republican meetings’ by the media) took place in Ankara. The participants marched to the Anitkabir, the mausoleum of the founder of Turkish Republic. The act of visiting Ataturk’s resting place to protest about the state of the country has a deep resonance in Turkish political discourse. Some of the slogans displayed and chanted during the demonstration included: ‘We don’t want a mullah in Cankaya!’,31 and, ‘We are here! We are aware of the danger!’. The ‘mobilisation potential’32 of securitisation had brought the people onto the streets. After creating so much curiosity, on 24 April 2007, the final day for nominations, the Government nominated the Foreign Affairs Minister, Abdullah Gul, to replace the strongly secular Sezer. This led to further mass demonstrations by secularist Turks who shared the army’s concerns about Gul’s early career as an Islamist politician. They also took issue with his wife’s headscarf. For the Army and the secular elite, the headscarf is an unequivocal symbol of Islamist militancy. The retiring President, Sezer, for example, refused to invite the headscarf wearing wives of AKP Deputies to State dinners and receptions. Although Erdogan was not the presidential candidate, this was insufficient to calm both the opposition and the sceptics. The Government was criticised for pushing its own candidate forward and not trying to reach a consensus with the main opposition party, the CHP, on a candidate acceptable to all. The first round of balloting in the parliament did not produce the necessary majority for Gul, and hours later, on 27 April, the Army posted a memorandum on its website stating that the country was heading towards religious rule and that the military was the firm defender of Secularism.33 The memorandum also stated that the Army would demonstrate its stance clearly when needed and implied that it would intervene directly. Unlike previous military interventions, the Government stood firm and issued a counter-statement that reminded the soldiers that they are government employees, and that it was not acceptable in a democracy for the military to intervene in politics. On 29 April, another mass protest was organised in Istanbul, this time there were new slogans including: ‘Neither Sharia nor a military coup!’ Within days, the Constitutional Court upheld a case brought by the CHP, arguing that the first round of parliamentary voting to elect the President was invalid because of the lack of a two-thirds quorum. With the issuing of the ‘e-memorandum’, the Court had become embroiled in controversy in the lead-up to their verdict on the status of the quorum in Parliament. In the end, the Court decreed that 367 deputies were needed for a quorum and declared that the first ballot was

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invalid. The decision was criticised by many commentators on the basis that the justice system had lost its neutrality and become politicised. The Prime Minister criticised the decision, ‘as a bullet fired at democracy’. Following the Court’s decision, Gul was forced to withdraw his nomination and, Erdogan opted to call early elections for 22 July (well ahead of the scheduled date of 4 November) in order to avert further political crises. The President, the Constitutional Court, the CHP and the Army all contributed to the securitisation of the presidential election by consistently claiming that the Government’s candidate was a threat to the secular regime. Throughout the general election campaign, the AKP managed to present itself as the victim of military intervention, and as the defender of the ‘civilianisation’ of Turkish politics. The AKP took obvious advantage of being victimised in the presidential election while also portraying itself as the champion of democracy. The presidential question dominated the campaign on two levels: Secularism (How secular was the AKP’s candidate?) and the role of the Army in politics (Should the Army intervene to protect secularism?). The AKP insisted several times that it does not have any problem with secularism and that secularism should be understood in tandem with the other characteristics of the regime laid down in the Constitution (A Democratic, Social and Secular State governed by the Rule of Law). The AKP’s campaign emphasised ‘Democracy’ more than ‘Republicanism’ or ‘Secularism’, and the AKP claimed that the State establishment would not let them to elect the next President. Erdogan promised that if elected again, there would be constitutional changes permitting people to directly elect the President, rather than the existing system of election by Parliament. Throughout the campaign, the CHP accused the AKP of failing to pick a candidate acceptable to all parties. The CHP’s campaign can be best described as ‘negative campaigning’, and there were frequent suggestions that the regime was under threat. There was little emphasis on ‘Democracy’, with the CHP avoiding any statements against the military’s interventions. Since the CHP had boycotted the balloting in Parliament, and had brought the matter before the Constitutional Court, it was perceived by some as responsible for the crisis. The CHP formed a bloc with the Democratic Left Party (DSP) to increase its share of the vote, and to help the DSP cross the 10% threshold for admission to the Parliament. During the campaign, the CHP also moved closer to the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) despite being ideologically opposed groups. There were rumours of a possible CHP– MHP coalition, and the CHP’s leader, Baykal, never denied the possibility. Campaigning saw the CHP adopt a more Nationalist discourse with a strong emphasis on secularism. It failed to propose any socioeconomic programmes. The traditional centre-right parties like the True Path Party (DYP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP) had been


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discredited when they had abstained from participating in the first round of the presidential vote. In short, the opposition parties failed to inspire people with concrete proposals to bring social cohesion and economic prosperity. Their aggressive and argumentative campaigns using the language of danger and fear might have alienated the electorate by raising the prospect of further instability.

MILITARY INCURSION INTO NORTHERN IRAQ. The Kurdish issue gained increased regional and international dimensions with the USA’s occupation of Iraq. The occupation raised the real possibility of an independent or autonomous Kurdish State, and fear of this was heightened when the Iraqi Kurdish parties claimed oil-rich Kirkuk as part of their mini-state and when neither of the Iraqi Kurds nor the USA was able to re-assure Ankara that the PKK would not be tolerated in Northern Iraq. The number of PKK attacks inside Turkey increased substantially in 2007, and the issues related to Iraq became a dominant theme in the general election campaign. Despite developments on the Kurdish issue during the first AKP government, these aspects were almost marginalised. There was debate on PKK terror and on the benefits (or drawbacks) of military incursion into Northern Iraq, but these were not linked to Turkey’s Kurdish issue. Aside from some marginal left-wing parties and the Democratic Society Party (DTP), most political parties chose to use the language of hawkish nationalism to appeal to voters. They competed with one another in convincing the electorate that they would launch the toughest crackdown on the PKK. As a result, the government that contributed a lot to the desecuritisation process also became a Securitiser of this issue with the aim of not missing the nationalist votes. The campaign period and the debates about the Kurdish issue cannot be properly understood without reference to the nationalist discourse that has become increasingly dominant since 2005. This discourse, championed by retired generals, certain civil society organisations and parts of the security establishment, blamed the reforms as part of the EU accession process for threatening the unity of the nation. Coupled with foreign policy concerns such as the war in Iraq and, Turkey’s deteriorating relations with the USA after the March 1 motion,34 this nationalist discourse has been propagated in highly popular xenophobic films and books.35 The common theme of these films and books is the claim that Turkey is under threat. In addition, the nationalist discourse has directly led to political assassinations, including the murder of a Catholic priest in Trabzon; the assassination of a High Court judge in Ankara in 2006 and the killing of two Turkish Christians and one German missionary in Malatya in 2007. The most significant of this rash of attacks was that against a

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Turkish–Armenian journalist on a busy Istanbul street in January 2007. Some intellectuals have also drawn the attention of public prosecutions and even attack as a result of their questioning of official presentations of Turkish history.36 Although often presented by the media as the actions of religious fundamentalists, the attacks were, in fact, carried out by extreme nationalists with links to the security establishment.37 The outbreak of violence came amidst discussion of the repeal of Article 301 of the Penal Code, the section which regulates ‘insults against Turkishness’. This nationalistic tone was also dominant in the 2007 General Election campaigning, with both the CHP and MHP backing calls, mostly by the army, for a cross-border operation in Iraq. The Army frequently announced that such an incursion was needed and would be beneficial in reducing the number of terror attacks on Turkish soil. Through its website, the Army also invited the public to organise protests against the terrorist attacks. This call was immediately withdrawn when the Army realised that this would lead to a further polarisation of society. The mounting violence and the debates about an incursion into Northern Iraq were the most important elements in the MHP’s electioneering. At one campaign meeting, the Chairman of the party, Devlet Bahceli, threw a rope to the crowd and promised to re-introduce the death penalty and to hang the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan. The AKP was not that enthusiastic about a cross-border operation. On one occasion, the Prime Minister said that Turkey must fight against terror within Turkey before launching any campaign in Northern Iraq. As a consequence of the AKP’s earlier minority rights reforms, and its balanced approach to any military incursion, significant factions of Kurds were sympathetic to the AKP in the elections. Other religious minorities such as the Jews and Armenians also declared that they would vote for the AKP. Obviously, the DTP, which is an ethnic Kurdish party, was against such an operation. The DTP is the last Turkish party to organise itself on ethnic lines and has particularly attracted votes in the Kurdish-populated provinces. Other Kurdish parties failed to sufficiently distance themselves from the PKK and were eventually closed down. The Kurdish-inspired factions were first represented in parliament in 1991, when candidates ran under the banner of the Social Democratic Popular Party (SHP) in an effort to cross the 10% threshold for representation. Entering parliament with 22 seats, they soon left the SHP and established a new grouping: ‘The Party of Democracy’ (DEP). This was later closed down by the Constitutional Court for its separatist and anti-regime tendencies. The DEP was soon followed by several other parties, all of which were eventually banned for their alleged ties to the PKK. In the 2007 election, the DTP campaigned largely on identity politics and blocked differing factions


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(more concerned with the desire for jobs and peace) from emerging within the Kurdish body politic. The increase in the number of PKK terror attacks since 2006 has provided a pretext for the Army to disseminate its views through press releases, briefings to journalists and interviews given by top officers. Despite the formal decrease in its power, the army continues to contribute to the framing of the Kurdish issue simply as a national security problem. Combined with increasing terror, this creates perceptions of emergency and threat that prevent the emergence of more suggestions for democratic/civilian solutions that go beyond conventional military operations and economic measures.

Results and the Aftermath The 2007 General Election was to elect members to the 550-seat Parliament. Fourteen parties and 700 independent candidates ran in the poll, with just three parties managing to gain representation. Of 550 seats, the AKP took 341 seats; the CHP 112 and the MHP gained 71 seats38. Twenty-six deputies, most of whom are Kurds, were elected as independent members. The CHP lost 13 of its seats when the members of the DSP (with whom the CHP had made an alliance) returned to their own party. The governing AKP secured another fiveyear term in power, having increased its share of the ballots to 47%, from 34% in 2002. The number of AKP seats was eventually decreased to 340 as a result of the vagaries of Turkey’s electoral system.39 The atmosphere of fear largely generated by the CHP in the period leading up to voting brought few benefits to the party. The party received only 21% of the national vote, despite merging with the DSP. This result was more surprising when you consider the participants in the Republican and Secularist demonstrations should have been the natural constituents of the CHP. Although the organisations behind the protests were quite visible and vocal in the run up to the election, the political party most closely associated with them, the CHP, still failed to improve its turnout from 2002 levels. It seems that the nationalist discourse and campaign of fear benefited the MHP most. The party attracted 14% of votes and secured 71 seats in the new parliament. This has added significance when it is remembered that the MHP did not sit in the previous assembly as it failed to breach the 10% threshold in the 2002 ballot. The AKP more than doubled its turnout in the predominantly Kurdish southeast regions: from about 26% in 2002 to 53% in 2007. In Diyarbakir, often described as the political heartland of Turkey’s Kurdish population, the CHP drew ,2% of votes. For the AKP, the results demonstrated the party’s success in persuading Kurds to vote for it thanks to its willingness to solve the Kurdish problem through the granting of more rights and freedoms, whereas for the CHP, the results demonstrated the

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party’s failure to reach out to Kurds as a result of its heavy emphasis on nationalist discourse in its electioneering. One of the most important characteristics of the election was the performance of the independent and female candidates. The number of female members of Parliament increased from 24 to 50, and they now constitute 9% of deputies (up from 4% in the old parliament), 30 of these female members are AKP members. As for the independents, 22 of the 26 elected later established a parliamentary group under the DTP colours. In the 2002 elections, the DTP had won 6% of all votes cast (around two million) but did not take any seats because of the calculation of the 10% national threshold. The year 2007 was the first time in 16 years that Kurdish nationalists have had the opportunity to be represented in Parliament. In many parts of the Kurdish populated south-eastern Turkey, DTP candidates who ran as independents came second to the AKP. It seems that the improvements in human rights and democracy wrought by the first AKP government may have stripped the Kurdish nationalism of popular support. Prime Minister Erdogan described the election result as, ‘the reflex of the national will in response to what was done to Abdullah’. The Speaker of Parliament and one of the founders of the AKP, Bulent Arinc, characterised the outcome as a ‘civilian memorandum’. Both remarks followed up on the AKP’s electoral strategy of presenting the party as a victim. After the elections, the AKP decided to retain Gul as its presidential candidate, claiming that 47% of the vote was proof of popular support for his nomination. The Army again responded in language that expressed threats and danger. On 28 August, a day prior to Gul’s expected election as President, the Chief of Staff wrote a note on the armed forces’ website saying, ‘. . .our nation has been watching the behavior of the centres of evil, who systematically try to corrode the secular nature of the Turkish Republic. Nefarious plans emerge in different forms every day’. It has been suggested that the ‘centres of evil’ he was referring to are allusions to the drafting of a new constitution by the new government.40 The successful presidential election, on August 29, saw 20 of the Kurdish nationalist MPs show up to help the AKP to achieve the quorum. Abdullah Gul was elected president. The Kurdish issue and a possible military incursion into Northern Iraq continued to dominate the political agenda after the elections. In a surprise move, the CHP’s leader, Deniz Baykal, announced a number of suggestions intended to improve Turkey’s ties to Northern Iraq and to improve the rights of Kurds in Turkey. This may be a tactical move following the elimination of the party from the electoral map in the Kurdish areas of the country. On 17 October 2007, Parliament voted in favour of a motion that would enable the Government to take military action against Northern Iraq, and in December several attacks were mounted on PKK camps in Northern Iraq. There seemed to be a wide consensus on the necessity of launching such attacks, there were,


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however, also concerns that the struggle against terror might curb the reform process; reverse the achievements made in democratisation and endanger the advances in political freedoms and human rights.41 To prevent this, the AKP government announced that to improve living standards and reduce unemployment in the southeast, it would make an investment of $12 billion over five years so as to finalise the South-eastern Anatolian Project.42 The government also passed a law allowing the TRT (the State-owned TV and Radio Corporation) to broadcast one of its channels solely in Kurdish. The headscarf issue and concerns about secularism remained on the political agenda following the polls, now as part of the concerns surrounding the drafting of a new constitution. The AKP cooperated with the MHP to pass an amendment to the Constitution that would allow the wearing of headscarves in universities. The CHP then took the issue to the Constitutional Court, which subsequently over-ruled the amendment. The normalisation of the headscarf issue has not taken place because of the securitising moves by the CHP and the Constitutional Court. Taking the securitising moves to a higher level, the State Prosecutor filed a case in the Constitutional Court for the closure of the AKP on the grounds that it had become, ‘a focal point of anti-secular activities’. The case was opened with a 162-page indictment that accused the party and its leaders of violating the principles of secularism defined in the Turkish Constitution. The indictment referred to speeches and statements by the President Abdullah Gul, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and other party officials. The chief prosecutor asked that 71 party members, and the President, should be banned from political activity. The inclusion of the President in the case was unprecedented since according to law a president can only be indicted for Treason. More than four months after the opening of the case, the Constitutional Court decided not to close the party or ban its members from politics. Although six members of the Court, out of 11, were in favour of closure, this did not amount to the qualified majority of seven members that is needed to dissolve a political party. However, 10 out of the 11 judges still found the party a focal point of antisecular activities, and decided to fine it by depriving it half of its State funding. Only the President of the Court, Hasim Kilic, voted against the indictment in toto and asked for legal reforms that will make such party closures more difficult. The AKP escaped, by inches, from being sent to the graveyard of Turkish political parties closed as a result of military intervention or decisions by the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court is still busy trying to reach a verdict in another closure case against the DTP. This case was brought by the State Prosecutor on the grounds that the DTP has not renounced the PKK as a terrorist organisation. As both of these cases demonstrate, the securitisation of the headscarf (and Political Islam in general) and the Kurdish issue continue to dominate

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the political agenda in Turkey even after the 2007 parliamentary elections.

Conclusion The agenda of the 2007 election was shaped both by long-lasting tensions in the political regime and a desire to move away from those issues. The AKP’s surprisingly high share of vote can be seen as an indicator of the divided nature of Turkish society, with Turkey witnessing unprecedented massive protest against the Government before the polls. The participants in these demonstrations the military and the bureaucratic elites came together to accuse the Government of nominating a presidential candidate who was a threat to the secular regime, and questioned the Government’s granting of more rights to the Kurds. Despite having been accused of having a hidden Islamic agenda and threatening the unity of the nation by granting such rights to the minorities, the Government still managed to secure strong electoral support. This provides us with some clues about the unpopularity of the military’s April 27 e-memorandum and indicates, at to least some degree, desecuritisation. Despite the dominant nationalist discourse, the controversial decision of the Constitutional Court on the necessity of a two-thirds quorum and in the shadow of the threat of military intervention, the Turkish electorate did not vote out of fear of Islamic rule, Kurdish separatism or the West—especially the EU. The election results seem to be a reflection of a desire to move away from securitised high politics and focus on more concrete issues that have a direct impact on people’s lives. In the predominantly Kurdish south-eastern region, the AKP more than doubled its vote from around 26% to about 53%. The AKP achieved this by promising more rights as well as jobs and economic prosperity. The votes for the AKP surpassed that of the DTP in many parts of the region. This also can be interpreted as a sign of desecuritisation since many people in the region chose not to vote for the DTP, a party which is unwilling to distance itself properly from the violent methods of the PKK. In a case similar to that of the DTP, the vote for the overtly Islamist SP (from which the AKP’s founding members split) fell to ,3%. When looked at with the party’s vote of 2.5% in the 2002, it would not be an exaggeration to state that this party, as Turkey’s only overtly Islamist party, has become defunct. The 2007 election results confirm the Necati Polat’s assessment of the 2002 election;43 he argued that the 2002 results suggested that Islamist and Kurdish groups are gradually turning away from clientelist sectarian politics and are instead seeking recognition through a civic bid for an improved democracy. The election results seem to be a reflection of a desire for more desecuritisation in Turkey. However, the ‘mobilisation potential’44 of securitisation still constitutes a barrier to the further democratisation of

22 July 2007 550 42,799,303 36,056,293 35,049,691 84.25% Votes

Justice and Development Party (AKP) Republican People’s Party (CHP) Nationalist Action Party (MHP) Democrat Party/ True Path Party (DP/DYP) Young Party (GP) Felicity Party (SP) Democratic Society Party (DTP)a Non-DTP Independents a

n

%

16,327,291

46.58

7,317,808 5,001,869 1,898,873 1,064,871 820,289 1,612,381 223,105

Change since 2002 %

03 November 2002 550 41,407,027 32,768,161 31,528,783 79.14% Seats n

%

12.30

341

62.00

20.88 14.27 5.42

1.49 5.91 24.12

112 70 0

20.36 12.73 0.00

3.04 2.34 4.60 0.64

24.21 20.15 21.62 20.36

0 0 22 4

0.00 0.00 4.00 0.73

Change since 2002 n

Votes

Seats

n

%

n

%

222.00

10,808,229

34.28

363

66.00

266.00 70.00

6,113,352 2,635,787 3,008,942

19.39 8.36 9.54

178 0 0

32.36 0.00 0.00

2,285,598 785,489 1,960,660 314,251

7.25 2.49 6.22 1.00

0 0 0 9

0.00 0.00 0.00 1.64

22.00 25.00


1. Elections to Turkish Grand National Assembly Date Seats Electorate Total votes cast Valid votes cast Turnout level

DTP candidates ran under party lists in 2002. They ran as independent candidates in 2007 to cross over the national threshold.

145

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Turkey and prevents it from taking steps to solve its prevailing policy problems such as unemployment and regional development. The closure cases against the AKP and the DTP are the latest examples of this. Securitisation continues to polarise society, leading to an erosion of both human and minority rights; a slow-down in the democratisation process; and, puts relations with the EU at risk. In the wake of the election, Turkey continues to swing like a pendulum between the poles of securitisation and desecuritisation. In applying the securitisation theory to the analysis of the Turkish election results and their aftermath, this article has shown how the struggle between the Civil/Military bureaucracy representing the Centre and the Political elite representing the Periphery leads to the framing of political issues as security issues to legitimise non/anti-democratic moves. The desecuritising moves taken by the AKP has been challenged by the securitising actors including the Army, the Higher Education leadership and the Judiciary. The competition between the securitising and desecuritising agendas has serious implications for the future of political parties and parliamentary democracy in Turkey. Political parties that contribute to the normalisation and moderation of Political Islam and the Kurdish movements are being punished by the Judiciary even if their agendas have public support. Both the Army and the Judiciary play significant roles in shaping the party system, in particular, and domestic politics, in general. When their securitising moves result in the closure of parties, this leads to problems with representation; high volatility in voting behaviour; and a lack of party identification across the generations. Continuation of Turkey’s accession talks with the EU may further reduce the role of the Civil/Military bureaucracy and provide a window of opportunity for desecuritisation. In fact, the membership process has already become an anchor for recent reform. More radical steps to reduce the role of the military and the introduction of judicial reforms may help to accommodate demand for more freedoms and rights within a parliamentary democracy. Department of International Relations Is¸ık University [email protected] 1

2 3 4 5

I would like to thank Bulent Aras and anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to thank Steuart Hutchinson Blue for helping me in proofreading the article. Hasan Cemal, ‘Hayır’ [No], Milliyet (a Turkish daily), 29 April 2007. Omer Taspinar, ‘Secimlerin Galibi Toplum ve Demokrasi Oldu’ [The Victors of these Elections are the Society and Democracy], Radikal (a Turkish daily), 30 July 2007. There was only one exception. A research company called Konda predicted such high levels of support and was heavily criticised for misleading the public by exaggerating the AKP’s support. Yuksel Taskin, ‘AKP’s Move to “Conquer” the Center-Right: Its Prospects and Possible Impacts on the Democratization Process’, Turkish Studies, 9, 2008, 53 –72.

The 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey 6 7 8 9 10

11

12

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19

20 21 22

23

24

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Canan Balkir, ‘The July 2007 Elections in Turkey: a Test for Democracy’, Mediterranean Politics, 12, 2007, 415 –22. Bulent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat, ‘From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey’s Relations with Syria and Iran’, Security Dialogue, 39, 2008, 475 –495. Cited in Pinar Bilgin ‘Turkey’s Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalisation’, European Journal of Political Research, 4, 2005, 188. Ole Weaver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’ in Ronnie Lipschutz (ed.) On Security, Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 46 –86. According to the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, minority status was conferred only on non-Muslim minorities. Muslim groups such as the Kurds are not recognised, legally, as constituting a minority. In this article I use the word minority rather to refer to Kurds as an ethnic-linguistic group within Turkey. Hakan Yilmaz (2004) defines this as Tanzimat Syndrome. The Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire brought new citizenship rights and some priviliges to the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire in the hope of preventing the dissolution of the Empire in the face of nationalist movements and was an effort at stopping the European powers from interfering in its internal affairs. The next few decades witnessed a spread in nationalist independence movements, which resulted in huge loss of territory. Yilmaz (2004) argues that the historical record taught the Ottomans and the subsequent Turkish elite two lessons: giving rights and freedoms to people would not make them more loyal and that the real intention of the European powers in demanding more respect for human rights is actually to weaken and divide the country. The Menemen Incident took place in November 1930 as a violent religious reactionary rebellion against the secularist Republican regime. The incident made it clear to the Republican elites that the reforms that had been undertaken to that point had not taken root. In February 1997, the Welfare Party Mayor of Sincan hosted a rally called ‘Jerusalem Night’ during which the Iranian ambassador criticised Turkey’s secularism. The army intervened immediately by diverting a column of tanks to Sincan and arresting the mayor. The incident triggered the 28 February ‘postmodern’ coup. Ronnie Lipschutz, ‘On Security’ in Ronnie Lipschutz (ed.), On Security, Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 8. Serif Mardin, ‘Center-Periphery Relations: a Key To Turkish Politics?’ Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 102, 1973, 169 –91. Metin Heper, ‘The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy: Turkey and Germany Compared’, Comparative Political Studies, 25, 1992, 169 –94. See op. cit. 13. Michael C. Williams, ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics’, International Studies Quarterly, 47, 2003, 514. A public opinion poll asked 1,220 individuals in 20 different cities across Turkey about their trust in different institutions over the period between 1999 to 2004. The Army exceded all other groups as the most trusted institution in the poll. This finding is repeated consistently in other surveys. See Turkiye’de Yerel ve Merkezi Yonetimlerde Hizmetlerden Tatmin, Patronaj Iliskileri ve Reform Raporu [Report on Satisfaction from Public Services of Local and Central Government, Patronage Relations and Reform], TESEV, 2004. Pinar Bilgin, ‘Making Turkey’s Transformation Possible: Claiming Security-speak-not Desecuritization’, Southeast European & Black Sea Studies, 7, 2007, 555 –71; TESEV, ‘Tu¨rkiye’de Yerel ve Merkezi Yo¨netimlerde Hizmetlerden Tatmin, Patronaj I˙lis¸kileri ve Reform Raporu’, [A Report on the Satisfaction with Local and Central Government Public Services. (Patronage Relations and Reform)], 2004, Istanbul. See op. cit., n17, p. 523. See op. cit., n18. It is very common for the Turkish media to invite retired generals to comment on Domestic and Foreign Policy issues. The generals often use this as an opportunity to securitise various issues. The most recent example has been their attitude towards Kurdish terror and the situation in northern Iraq. In October 2007, PM Erdogan accused the retired generals of provoking the public. See http:// www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/10/30/son/sonsiy21.asp. Ole Weaver, ‘The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-sovereign Security Orders’ in Michael Kelstrup and Michael Williams (eds), International Relations Theory and European Integration: Power, Security and Community, Routledge, 2000, pp. 250 – 94. Radikal (a Turkish daily), 2005. Devlet Gecmiste Hatalar Yapti [The State has Made Mistakes in the Past], 13 August.

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34 35

36 37

38 39

40 41 42

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Bulent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat, ‘Turkey and the Middle East: Frontiers of the New Geographic Imagination’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 6, 2007, 471 –88. Nathalie Tocci, ‘Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?’ South European Society & Politics, 10, 2005, 73 –83. See op. cit., n25. Banu Gokariksel and Katharyne Mitchell, ‘Veiling, Secularism and the Neoliberal Subject: National Narratives and Supranational Desires in Turkey and France’, Global Networks, 5, 2005, 147 – 65. This would not have been a surprise since the 8th and 9th presidents of Turkey had also been prime ministers before their election into presidency. He also claimed that as part of the Greater Middle East Project, Turkey is presented as a mildly Islamic state that would be a model to other Muslim countries. He argued that this process is being carried out by external and internal forces under the guise of democratisation. He also took issue with criticisms against the military and asked the privatisation process to stop. This speech was almost a textbook example of security as speech-act. Cankaya is the presidential palace. See op. cit., n9, p. 63. The website of the Turkish Armed Forces became a tool for securitising issues and creating public opinion in line with the army. For a discussion on how the use of this technology trivialised military interventions see, Rabia Karakaya Polat, ‘Is Turkish Big Brother Watching Us?’, Turkish Daily News, 3 June 2008. http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=106208. On 1 March 2003 the Turkish Parliament rejected a proposal to let the US ground troops enter Iraq through Turkey. The event strained the relations between the two countries. The two best-selling books in Turkey in this time period reflect the nationalist and anti-west mood of the public. Metal Firtina (The Metal Storm) hit the best-seller list in 2005 with a story about a war between Turkey and the USA. Although the book is sold as a fiction, many agreed that it blurs the line between fantasy and reality. Su Cilgin Turkler (These Crazy Turks) tells the story of the Turkish War of Independence and has almost reached its 200th edition. The film, The Valley of the Wolves, which became a blockbuster hit in 2006, is another example. The film was inspired by a real-life incident: the arrest in July 2003 of Turkish Special Forces by the US troops in Sulaymaniyah, Northern Iraq. The soldiers were pictured with hoods over their heads. America later apologised, but Turkey took the incident as national humiliation. In this film, the fictional hero looks for revenge against Americans. Examples Orhan Pamuk and Elif Safak on the so-called Armenian Genocide and the Kurdish issue. Ogun Samast said he murdered Hrant Dink because he insulted Turkishness. A suspect related to this murder was later understood to be a double-agent working for the police. The murderer of the High Court judge, Alparslan Aslan, was also revealed to have links with nationalist associations and retired generals. One deputy of MHP lost his life right after the election, reducing the number of MHP seats to 70. The Turkish electoral system is based on proportional representation with a national threshold of 10%, which was introduced after the 1980 coup, ironically, to prevent the extremist parties—read Islamist and Kurdish—from being represented in the parliament. The national threshold led to an unfair representation following the 2002 elections when only two parties could pass the threshold. With 34% of vote share, the AKP controlled 66% of seats because the votes of the parties who stayed under the threshold benefited the AKP most. In 2007, however, because three parties and a higher number of independents obtained representation, the AKP did not have this benefit. The 2007 election produced a fairer seat distribution compared with the 2002 election. See www.tsk.mil.tr. Bulent Aras, ‘Turkey’s War on Terror’, SETA Policy Brief, No. 2, November 2007, SETA. South-eastern Anatolian Project is an integrated regional development project including irrigation, hydraulic energy production, agriculture, urban and rural infrastructure, forestry, education and health. The project aims to eliminate regional development disparities by raising income levels and living standards in this region. For more information about the government’s recent move on this project, see, Taha Ozhan, ‘New Action Plan for Southeastern Turkey’, SETA Policy Brief, No. 17, July 2008, SETA. Necati Polat, ‘Identity Politics and the Domestic Context of Turkey’s European Union Accession’, Government & Opposition, 41, 2006, 512 –33. See op. cit., n9, p. 63.