The Case of the Islamic State - MDPI

religions Article

Intercultural Struggle and the Targeting of Noncombatants: The Case of the Islamic State Ross Moret 1, * and Simone Burgin 2 1 2

*

Florida State University, Honors Program, 127 Honors Way, Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA; [email protected] Correspondence: [email protected]

Received: 28 June 2018; Accepted: 23 July 2018; Published: 27 July 2018







Abstract: The prohibition against targeting noncombatants is a long-held commitment in both Muslim and Western military ethics. Nevertheless, some militant Muslim groups, and particularly the Islamic State, have created ever-widening space for attacking those traditionally considered immune from targeting in military operations. Our essay uses two theoretical apparatuses developed in social psychology—cultural cognition and moral foundations theory—to explain how certain aspects of post-9/11 tactics on the part of the United States and its allies have contributed to this phenomenon. We also use these same tools to show that similar dynamics work to contribute to the rightwing backlash against Muslims in the United States. Keywords: military ethics; Muslim ethics; just war theory; noncombatant immunity; discrimination; cultural cognition; moral foundation theory

1. Background

If the Islamic State (ISIS) group is known for one thing among the general public in the West, it is its brutality. It is not difficult to recall—indeed, it is difficult to forget—the images of Islamic State fighters killing prisoners, Western journalists, and even aid workers in gruesome fashion on international television. These images were most prevalent between 2014 and 2016 when, in addition to committing large numbers of executions, ISIS was taking control of significant chunks of land in Syria and Iraq and inspiring numerous terror attacks in the West. The level of coverage has shrunk with the size of its geographical holdings, but ISIS continues to inspire and encourage attacks against civilian populations and they continue to justify these attacks by appealing to traditional Islamic sources. While Islamic tradition has a long history of prohibiting the targeting of noncombatants, various militant groups have found ways of getting around the prohibition while still holding to the prima facie distinction between combatants and noncombatants, usually by appealing to certain exceptional circumstances that temporarily require such targeting. That is to say, the prohibition is overridden, but only in particular, drastic situations. ISIS, however, is different. Not only do they target noncombatants, they do so with a sense of great enthusiasm and as part of what they see as a state of affairs that will endure until the black2018, flag 9,governs the REVIEW entire world. And they use this brutality Religions x FOR PEER as a tool for their propaganda. In their eyes, their legitimacy is not threatened, but is strengthened, by the level of brutality they are ablesuch to inflict noncombatants. How, despite the prohibition that on some without formal legalthen, training have begun to issue legal rulings, an against targeting noncombatants in Muslim tradition, did ISIS come to place of not only substantial followings in doing so.the One helpful way of ordering, approaching these tension but sensationalizing the brutal, targeted killing of civilians? for both continuity and change in the tradition is provided by John Kelsay, who a There is longstanding tension inethical Islamicdiscourse jurisprudence taqlid, following tends between to function according to the the judgments more or less formal proced of an established scholar, and ijtihad,what arriving at a Shari Shariʿaa ruling on one’s Traditionally, he calls reasoning. This own. framework includesijtihad methods of interpretin was only performed by scholars who had gone a long, formal process of study thelife feet Qur ʾ an andthrough sunna (precedent-setting traditions aboutatthe and sayings of Muh of recognized authorities. In recent decades, however, areached certain democratization has occurred, such reasoning also specific judgments by scholars of previous times. Shariʿa a balance between respect for the past and creativity regarding application in the p tradition as a body of precedents that Religions 2018, 9, 230; doi:10.3390/rel9080230 suggests that Muslims tend to treat Islamic www.mdpi.com/journal/religions but practitioners must also seek to find the right fit between the precedent and a p It is not surprising, therefore, that while the broad norms of Shariʿa reasoning a their application includes a good deal of diversity and disagreement (Kelsay 2007

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that some without formal legal training have begun legal rulings, found such that some without formal legal training have begun issue legal rulings,and and some some have found Religions 2018,to 9, to xissue FOR PEER REVIEW substantialfollowings followingsin indoing doingso. so.One Onehelpful helpfulway wayof ofapproaching approaching these these tensions tensions while while accounting accounting substantial for both both continuity continuity and andchange changein inthe thetradition tradition provided byJohn JohnKelsay, Kelsay,legal whotraining argues that that Muslim for isisthat provided who argues Muslim such some by without formal have begun to issue legal rulin ethical discourse discourse tends tends to to function function according according to the the more more or less lessin formal procedures and norms norms of ethical to or formal and substantial followings doingprocedures so. 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This methods for both and change in theShari tradition is treat provided byframework John Kelsay, thatofM their aa good deal disagreement (Kelsay p. 73). but practitioners also seek to2007, find the right fit between thelife precedent their application application includes includesethical gooddiscourse deal of of diversity diversity and disagreement Qur ʾ an and must sunna (precedent-setting traditions about the and sayi tends toand function according to the more or less formal procedures and no This of Shariʿa to understand how the Islamic State group not surprising, therefore, that while theof broad norms of Shariʿa reaso This essay essay uses uses the the framework framework of Shari ShariItʿaaisreasoning reasoning toThis understand how the Islamic State group specific judgments reached by scholars previous times. Shariʿa reas what he calls reasoning. framework includes methods of interpreting and apply has of noncombatants. However, whereas Kelsay tends to focus their includes a good deal of diversity andon disagreement (Kelsa aapplication balance between respect for thethe past and creativity regarding applicat has approached approached the the issue issueQur of targeting targeting noncombatants. However, whereas Kelsay tends to focus on ʾ an and sunna (precedent-setting traditions about life and sayings of Muhammad) as the in light of precedents in we This essay uses the framework of Shariʿa reasoning toalso understand ho suggests that Muslims tend tradition, totimes. treat Islamic tradition a body of prece the ways ways that that ethical ethical reasoning reasoning functions inreached light of by precedents in Islamic Islamic tradition, we emphasize emphasize specificfunctions judgments scholars of previous Shariʿa reasoningas involves ach the guides use precedents. More we argue that the Islamic approached thespecifically, issue of targeting However, whereas but for practitioners must also seek to noncombatants. find the right fit between the preced a balance between respect the past and creativity application in the present. Kels the ways ways that that aa sense sense of offit fit guides the the use of ofhas precedents. More specifically, weregarding argue that the Islamic State’s the of noncombatants stretch the use precedents beyond ways that ethical reasoning inof light of the precedents Islamic It is not surprising, therefore, that while the broad ofin Shariʿa suggests that Muslims tend to treat Islamic tradition as a body precedents that must be resr State’s arguments arguments justifying justifying the targeting targeting ofthe noncombatants stretch the use of offunctions precedents beyond thenorms norms such that ISIS on point one must understand the the ways that athis sense of fit guides the use the of More specifically, their application includes a good deal of precedents. diversity and disagreement (K but practitioners must also seek find the right fit between precedent and a particular sit norms of of Islamic Islamic tradition, tradition, such that to tounderstand understand ISIS onto this point one must understand thefactors factors that their sense sense of“fit”. “fit”. WhileaState’s acomprehensive comprehensive case would require much more than arguments justifying the targeting noncombatants the use This essay uses the framework to It isof not surprising, therefore, that while the broad norms ofofmore Shariʿa reasoning areunderstand relatively that contribute to their While case would require much than one stretch one essay, we suggest that two psychological paradigms, moral foundations theory andcognition, cultural norms of Islamic tradition, such that to understand ISIS on this point one m has issue ofand targeting noncombatants. However, whe their application includes aapproached good deal ofthe diversity disagreement (Kelsay 2007, p. 73). essay, we suggest that two psychological paradigms, moral foundations theory and cultural cognition, can help to shed light on the deepening extremism of ISIS beyond their predecessors. In that contribute to their sense of “fit”. While a comprehensive case would the ways that ethical reasoning functions in light of precedents in Isl This essay uses the framework of Shariʿa reasoning to understand how the Islamic State can help to shed light on the deepening extremism of ISIS beyond their predecessors. In emphasizing emphasizing theofimportance of cultural inof the formation ofofboth ethical norms, bothofwhereas of these one essay, we suggest that two paradigms, moral founda the ways that a norms, sense fit guides theparadigms use precedents. More specific hasconflict approached the issue noncombatants. However, tends to fo the importance cultural in the conflict formation oftargeting ethical ofpsychological these alsoKelsay paradigms point to the significance of anti-Muslim rhetoric and actions on the of of important cognition, can help shed light onprecedents thepart deepening extremism ofstretch ISIS State’s arguments justifying the targeting the theanti-Muslim ways that ethical reasoning functions in light of innoncombatants Islamic we beyo emp point to thealso significance of rhetoric and actions onto the part of important officials in the tradition, officials in theinUnited in fueling anti-Western in targeting general and the targeting of emphasizing the importance of cultural in the formation of the eth ofextremism Islamic tradition, such that toconflict understand ISIS on this that point on the ways that extremism a sense ofnorms fit the use of precedents. More specifically, we argue United States fuelingStates anti-Western inguides general and the of noncombatants in noncombatants in particular among militant Muslims. At the same time, we cultural suggest, similar cultural paradigms also point the significance of anti-Muslim andcase action that contribute tototheir sense of “fit”. While a in comprehensive wo State’s arguments the targeting of noncombatants stretch the use of precedents beyo particular among militant Muslims. At thejustifying same time, we suggest, similar dynamics therhetoric dynamics the West have fueled political climate in continued forms ofon Islamophobia have officials in which the United States inISIS fueling anti-Western extremism in gen one such essay, we that two psychological paradigms, moral fou norms ofaIslamic tradition, that tosuggest understand this point one must understand the West havein fueled a political climate in which continued forms of Islamophobia have contributed to the contributed theprohibition relaxation of the prohibition against noncombatants onthe the partwould of the noncombatants in on particular among militant Muslims. At the same time, w cognition, can help topart on deepening extremism of ISIS thatagainst contribute to their sense oftargeting “fit”. While ashed comprehensive case require much mo relaxation oftothe targeting noncombatants the of light the United States. United States. dynamics in thepsychological West fueled aofpolitical climate in in which continued emphasizing the have importance cultural conflict the formation ofc one essay, we suggest that two paradigms, moral foundations theory andfo 2. Case Study: Targetingcognition, Noncombatants in Muslim Tradition and the Islamic State of anti-Muslim contributed to on the relaxation of significance the prohibition against targeting noncom paradigms also point to the rhetoric and ac can help to shed light the deepening extremism ISIS beyond their predeces 2. Case Study: Targeting Noncombatants in Muslim Tradition and the Islamic State United States. officials incultural the United States in can fueling anti-Western the importance of conflict in the formation of ethical extremism norms, bothino Much of the classicalemphasizing Muslim tradition concerning noncombatant immunity be summarized noncombatants in particular among militant Muslims. At thepart same paradigms also point to the significance of anti-Muslim rhetoric and actions on the of tim im in a Much tradition of classical Muhammad, in tradition which heconcerning charges his army when immunity they go out “Do not of the Muslim noncombatant cantobefight, summarized 2. Case Study: Targeting Noncombatants in Muslim Tradition and the Is dynamics the have fueled a political climate continue officials in the United States in infueling anti-Western extremism inthat general and the targe cheat or commit treachery, nor should you mutilate anyone orWest kill children,” prohibition inin which in a tradition of Muhammad, in which he charges his army when they go out toafight, “Do not cheat contributed to the relaxation of thethe prohibition against targeting nonc infor particular militant Muslims. At same time, we suggest, similar other traditions also includes protections women and aged men (al-Shaybani 1966, pp.in 76, 92). or commit treachery, nornoncombatants should you mutilate anyone orthe kill children,” a prohibition that other Muchamong of classical Muslim tradition concerning noncombatant imm United States. dynamics in the West have fueled a political climate in which continued forms of Islamophob These prohibitions, when combinedfor with other practices in Muhammad’s life, form the92). basis ofarmy a when they go o traditions also includes protections women and agedofmen (al-Shaybani 1966, pp. 76, These in a tradition Muhammad, in which he charges his contributed to the relaxation of the prohibition against targeting noncombatants on the para longstanding Muslim tradition that has sometimes been expanded to include prohibiting the targeting prohibitions, when combined with other orpractices Muhammad’s life, you form the basis of aor kill children,” commit in treachery, nor should mutilate anyone 2. Case Study: Targeting Noncombatants in Muslim Tradition and th United States. of slaves and the elderlytradition [see (al-Shaybani p. 76) as well as (Kelsay 2007, p. 114)]. However, in men (al-Shayban longstanding Muslim that has1966, sometimes been expanded to include prohibiting the traditions also includes protections for women and as aged Western traditions, hasthe been generally among Muslims some noncombatants be targeting of slaves it and elderly [see recognized (al-Shaybani 1966, 76)combined asthat well aswith (Kelsay 2007, p.may 114)]. prohibitions, when other practices in Muhammad’s Much ofp.the classical Muslim tradition concerning noncombatantl 2. Case Study: Targeting Noncombatants in Muslim Tradition and the Islamic State killed unintentionally in the process of a legitimate attack. However, as in Western traditions, it has longstanding beeningenerally recognized among that some Muslim tradition that has he sometimes been expanded to a tradition of Muhammad, in Muslims which charges his army when they In recent may decades, Muslims always accepted aconcerning prima facie commitment to or noncombatants be killed unintentionally inor the process of aand legitimate attack. targeting of slaves the elderly [see (al-Shaybani 1966, p. can 76) as well commit treachery, nor should you mutilate immunity anyone killbe children Much have of the nearly classical Muslim tradition noncombatant summ noncombatant Disagreements continue, however, most concerning which persons In recent immunity. decades, in Muslims have nearly always accepted a traditions, prima commitment However, as in Western it has been generally traditions also includes protections for women and aged men (al-Sha a tradition of Muhammad, in which henotably charges hisfacie army when they gotoout torecognized fight, “Do am no count as noncombatants. Some have argued that war in Islam should only be with defensive nature noncombatant immunity.or Disagreements continue, however, most notably concerning which noncombatants may be killed unintentionally ininpersons the process a legitimate prohibitions, when combined other practices inof Muhammad commit treachery, nor should you mutilate anyone or kill children,” a prohibition that i and that the command protecting from targeted attacks is For example, count as noncombatants. Some havenoncombatants argued thatlongstanding war in Islam should only beinviolable. defensive in nature and accepted Inprotections recent decades, Muslims have nearly always a prim Muslim tradition that has sometimes beenpp. expanded traditions also includes for women and aged men (al-Shaybani 1966, 76, 92) in their “Open Letter to Baghdadi (2014)”, a rebuke of the Islamic State, a large international group that the command protecting noncombatants from targetedwith attacks isand inviolable. For inhowever, theirlife,1966, noncombatant immunity. Disagreements continue, most targeting of slaves the elderly [see (al-Shaybani p.notably 76) as prohibitions, when combined other practices in example, Muhammad’s form the basw of leading Muslim scholars and jurists argue in favor ofState, aasvery firm prohibition against “Open Letter to Baghdadi (2014)”, a rebuke of the Islamic large international group oftargeting leading count as noncombatants. Some have argued that war into Islam should only b However, inahas Western traditions, itexpanded has been generally recognize longstanding Muslim tradition that sometimes been include prohibiti noncombatants, thattargeting “only may be killed; their families and noncombatants may notas Muslim scholars such and jurists arguecombatants inoffavor ofthat aand very firm prohibition against targeting the command protecting noncombatants from targeted attacks inviol noncombatants may be killed unintentionally in the process ofisa2007, legitim slaves the elderly [see (al-Shaybani 1966,noncombatants, p. 76) as well (Kelsay p be killed intentionally” (sec. 8.d). Others, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, have argued for the temporary such that “only combatants may be their Letter families and noncombatants may not beIslamic killed “Open to Baghdadi (2014)”, a rebuke of the State,Muslims a large inte In recent Muslims have nearly always accepted a However, as killed; in Western traditions, itdecades, has been generally recognized among tha suspension of(sec. the 8.d). prohibition in order to address a kind of emergency situation. Butasuspension whenfirm that intentionally” Others, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, have argued the temporary Muslim scholars and jurists for argue in favor of very prohibition against immunity. continue, however, nota noncombatants may benoncombatant killed unintentionally in Disagreements the process legitimate attack. most emergency passed, Qaradawi reversed his opinion (Lieber 2017). of the prohibition in order to address a kind of emergency situation. when that emergency passed, such that “only combatants may be killed; their and noncomb count as noncombatants. Some have argued that war in facie Islam should o In recent decades, Muslims have But nearly always accepted a families prima commitm So significant theopinion prohibition against targeting noncombatants that even jihadi militants such targeted asconcerning Qaradawi reversedishis (Lieber 2017). intentionally” (sec. 8.d).protecting Others, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, have attacks argued forinp thatDisagreements the command noncombatants from is noncombatant immunity. continue, however, most notably which Osama bin Laden tend observe itsagainst prima of facie status. He overcomes the prohibition by expanding So significant is thetoprohibition targeting noncombatants that even militants such the prohibition in order to address aIslam kind of emergency whe “Open Letter to Baghdadi (2014)”, a rebuke of the Islamic State, But ain large count as noncombatants. Some have argued that war injihadi should only besituation. defensive natu as Osama bin Laden tend its Qaradawi prima facie status.his Heopinion overcomes the prohibition reversed Muslim scholars and jurists argue in2017). favor ofisa inviolable. verybyfirm prohibition aga thattotheobserve command protecting noncombatants from (Lieber targeted attacks For example, expanding greatly those who count as to combatants. Citizens United States, bin argued So (2014)”, significant isthe the prohibition against targeting noncombatants that such that “only combatants may be Laden killed; their families and nonc “Open Letter Baghdadi a of rebuke of the Islamic State, a large international group of as jurists Osama bin in Laden tend to observe itsYusuf prima facie targeting status.have He overc intentionally” (sec. 8.d). Others, such as al-Qaradawi, argued Muslim scholars and argue favor of a very firm prohibition against noncomb expanding greatly who count as combatants. Citizens of the United of the prohibition in order to address aand kindnoncombatants of emergency situation. such that “only combatants may be those killed; their families may notBut be reversed hisal-Qaradawi, opinion (Lieber 2017). intentionally” (sec. 8.d).Qaradawi Others, such as Yusuf have argued for the temporary susp

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greatly those who count as combatants. Citizens of the United States, bin Laden argued in 2002, are responsible for their leaders because they live in a democracy. That is to say, the United States cannot claim to have any true noncombatants: all are responsible for the crimes of the national government (bin Laden 2005, p. 164). As important for bin Laden, however, is a kind of principle of reciprocity, which he suggests overrides the command to distinguish between soldiers and civilians. In a famous interview with Taysir Aluni in October of 2001, bin Laden made the following argument about the permissibility of targeting noncombatants: Religions 2018, 9, x FOR PEER REVIEW

The Prophet forbade the killing of children and women, and that is true. It is valid and has been laid down by the Prophet in an authentic Tradition .... but this forbidding of killing such that some without formal legal trainin children and innocents is not set in stone, and there are other writings that uphold it. God’s substantial followings in doing so. One help saying: “and if you punish (your enemy, O you believers in the Oneness God), then for bothofcontinuity and change in the tradit punish them with the like of that which you were afflicted ... ” The scholars peopletends of to function accordi ethical and discourse the knowledge, amongst them Sahib al-Ikhtiyarat [ibn Taymiyya] andwhat ibn al-Qayyim, and he calls Shari ʿ a reasoning. This frame Shawaani, and many others, and Qurtubi—may God bless him—in hisQur Qurʾan ancommentary, and sunna (precedent-setting tradit say that if the disbelievers were to kill our children and women, then we should not feel specific judgments reached by scholars of p ashamed to do the same to them, mainly to deter them from trying to akill our children balance betweenand respect for the past and c women again. (2005, pp. 118–19) suggests that Muslims tend to treat Islamic but practitioners must also seek to find the Bin Laden, then, although his arguments show signs of internal inconsistency, takes pains to It is not surprising, therefore, that while th justify targeting those usually considered noncombatants. Notice, as well, that the reciprocity that their application includes a good deal of div bin Laden cites includes a particular intention—preventing one’s enemies from continuing to kill This essay uses the framework of Shar noncombatants on one’s side. has approached the issue of targeting nonc The Islamic State group is considerably less invested in any form ofReligions prima 2018, facie9,noncombatant x FOR PEER REVIEW the ways that ethical reasoning functions i immunity than is bin Laden. We might say that while bin Laden sees the targeting of noncombatants the ways that a sense of fit guides the use o as an unfortunate but just temporary necessity given the wicked deedssuch of histhat enemies, the Islamic some without formal legal training State’s arguments justifying the targeting of State eagerly encourages the targeting of those uninvolved in any war effort, and not so much because substantial followings in doing so. One helpfu norms of Islamic tradition, such that to unde of their deeds as because of their status as unbelievers. This is perhaps most stated in an article forclearly both continuity and change in the traditio that contribute to their sense of “fit”. Whil in the first issue of their magazine Rumiyah, “The Kafir’s Blood is Halal forethical You, So Shed It”.tends The style discourse to function according one essay, we suggest that two psycholog of argumentation is common to many of their official publications, offering imagery, whatvivid he calls Shari ʿ vicious a reasoning. This framew cognition, can help to shed light on the dee rhetoric, and the sternest interpretations buttressed by citations to the Qur Qurʾan, hadith, and many an and sunna (precedent-setting traditio emphasizing the importance of cultural c classical sources—although invariably without context. The first part ofspecific the argument is somewhat judgments reached by scholars of pre paradigms also point to the significance of a familiar among Islamic militants, with references to the sword verse1 and an interpretation suggesting a balance between respect for the past and cre officials in the United States in fueling a that Muslims are duty-bound to fight non-Muslims who are not granted suggests dhimmi status. The Islamic that Muslims tend to treat Islamic tr noncombatants in particular among militan State takes things considerably further, however, in both its tone and argument. The tone can beseek to find the rig but practitioners must also dynamics in the West have fueled a politica summarized in the brutal declaration that “the blood of a kafir is cheap, filthy, shed” that while the It isand not permissible surprising, to therefore, contributed to the relaxation of the prohib (35). The argument involves erasing the distinction between combatantstheir and application noncombatants while includes a good deal of dive United States. declaring it a religious duty to extend the battle lines to any place where disbelievers may bethe found. This essay uses framework of Shariʿa Instead of a prima facie prohibition against killing noncombatants, the Islamic State declares aissue prima has ofNoncombatants targeting noncoi 2. approached Case Study: the Targeting facie order to kill disbelievers unless they fall under the terms of a specific covenant of protection. the ways that ethical reasoning functions in Much classical Muslim tradition the ways thatofa the sense of fit guides the use of p Muslims currently living in Dar al-Kufr [the territory of unbelief] must be reminded that in a tradition of Muhammad, in which State’s arguments justifying the targetinghe of cn the blood of the disbelievers is halal [permissible], and killing them is or a form of worship to nor should you muti commit treachery, norms of Islamic tradition, such that to unders Allah, the Lord, King, and God of mankind. This includes the businessman riding to includes work ofprotections traditions also wo Religions 2018, 9, x FOR PEER REVIEW 10 of “fit”. for that contribute to their 2sense While in a taxicab, the young adults (post-pubescent “children”) engaged in sports activities in combined with other prohibitions, when one essay, we suggest that two psychologic thethat park, andwithout the old formal man waiting in line to buybegun a sandwich. even the blood ofhave the found such some legal training have to issueIndeed, legal rulings, andcan some longstanding Muslim tradition has cognition, help to shed light onthat the deep kafir street vendor selling flowers to helpful those passing is halal to shed—and striking terror substantial followings in doing so. One way ofby approaching these tensions while accounting targeting ofthe slaves and the elderly [seecon (al emphasizing importance of cultural hearts ofand all disbelievers is atradition Muslim’s TherebyisJohn no shar’i requirement tointarget forinto boththe continuity change in the is duty. provided Kelsay, who argues that Muslim However, as Western traditions, it has paradigms also point to the significance of an ethical discourse tends to function according to the more or less formal procedures norms of inunintentiona noncombatants may be killed officials in the and United States fueling ant what he calls Shari ʿ a reasoning. This framework includes methods of interpreting and applying the In recent decades, Muslims have nM noncombatants in particular among militant 1 Qur ʾan Qur an9:5. and sunna (precedent-setting traditions about the life and sayings of Muhammad) as well as noncombatant immunity. Disagreements dynamics in the West have fueled a politicalcoc specific judgments reached by scholars of previous times. Shariʿa reasoning also achieving count as involves noncombatants. Some have argued contributed to the relaxation of the prohibiti a balance between respect for the past and creativity regarding application in the present. Kelsay thus that the command protecting noncombatant United States. suggests that Muslims tend to treat Islamic tradition as a body of precedents thatLetter musttobeBaghdadi respected; “Open (2014)”, a rebuke but practitioners must also seek to find the right fit between the precedent and a particular situation. scholars and jurists argue in favorino 2. Muslim Case Study: Targeting Noncombatants It is not surprising, therefore, that while the broad norms of Shariʿa reasoning are “only relatively stable, may be killed such that combatants

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soldiers and policemen nor judges and politicians, but all kuffar [unbelievers] who are not under the covenant of dhimmah are fair game. How can the disbelievers ever dream of safety and security while Muslims suffer anywhere in the world and while the rule of Allah is mockingly replaced by manmade monstrosities of democracy? (36) Religions 2018, 9, x FOR PEER REVIEW

For the Islamic State, then, the distinction between combatants and noncombatant is largely insignificant. The only category that matters is one’s status as a Muslim. Thewithout rhetorical strategy such that some formal legal of training have begun the Rumiyah piece seeks to incite violence by Muslims against those in the West, soinnodoing distinctions substantial followings so. One helpful way of a between Muslims are mentioned. It is clear elsewhere, however, a person’s status as a Muslim forthat both continuity and change in theistradition is provid Religions 2018, 9, x FOR PEER REVIEW determined by her loyalty to the Islamic State, such that the overwhelming majority of function the world’s ethical discourse tends to according to the mo population are considered disbelievers (and legitimate targets), including the Shiʿawithout most Sunnis what he calls Shari a and reasoning. This framework includ such that some formal legal training have b (al-Ibrahim 2015). Qur substantial ʾ an and sunna (precedent-setting traditions about th followings in doing so. One helpful way specific judgments reached scholars of tradition previous is time for both continuity and by change in the pr 3. Analysis: Identity, Cultural Conflict, and Justification for Targeting Noncombatants a balance between respect for the past and creativity rega ethical discourse tends to function according to th suggests that Muslims to treat Islamic tradition asina Why is ISIS pushing beyond the boundaries of the precedents of traditional Sharitend toThis framework what he calls Shari ʿaareasoning reasoning. but practitioners must seekinvolve to find the traditions right fit betw blur, even erase, the distinction between combatants and noncombatants? might Qur ʾ anOne andanswer sunnaalso (precedent-setting abo It is not surprising, therefore, that while the broad norm investigating the group’s selective and sometimes faulty interpretations of classical sources. Suchby work specific judgments reached scholars of previous includes amainstream, good of diversity and d aapplication balance between respect fordeal the past and creativity is important and can be very helpful in illustrating the ways intheir which ISIS departs from This essay uses the framework of Shariʿa that Muslims tend tothat treat Islamicreasoning tradition and even other forms of militant, Islam. The multidimensional suggests and multidisciplinary fields approached thejudgments, issue targeting but practitioners mustofalso seeknot to noncombatants. find the right fit H b comprise cognitive science, however, suggest that judgments,has including ethical are ways thatsurprising, ethical reasoning functions in light of pre It is not therefore, that while the broad generally the result of a simple process of self-aware, rational the deliberation. Instead, even considered the ways a sense includes of fitall guides the deal use of their application good ofprecedents. diversity a judgments are the outcome of a mixture of intuitions, emotions, andthat deliberations, ofa which State’s arguments justifying the targeting of noncombata This essayconstructed uses the framework reaso are experienced and worked out through a messy process involving culturally norms of Shariʿa norms Islamic such to understand ISIS o hasoftakes approached the issue ofthat targeting noncombatan and, often, interpersonal communication.2 To understand why ISIS thistradition, position concerning that contribute to their sense ofof“fit”. While a in compreh the ways that ethical reasoning functions light o noncombatants, then, one must offer an explanation that goes beyond their interpretation texts. one essay, we suggest that two psychological the ways that a sense of fit guides the use ofparadig preced One must explain how they derive their sense of “fit”. can help to shed light on the deepening extre State’s arguments justifying targeting of noncom A helpful tool for beginning to explain why ISIS’s approachcognition, differs from that of al-Qaeda andthe other emphasizing the importance of cultural conflict in theI norms of Islamicby tradition, that to understand militant groups is moral foundations theory (MFT), a conceptual scheme developed Jonathansuch Haidt paradigms also point the significance of anti-Muslim r that contribute tototheir sense of “fit”. While a comp and others to explain the aspects of both continuity and uniqueness between human moral systems. officials in the United States in fueling anti-Western essay,making we suggest that two psychological par One aspect of continuity that Haidt identifies is the process of moralone decision and deliberation, noncombatants in particular among militant cognition, can help to shed on the Muslims. deepeningA a process he describes as “social intuitionist” in nature. The process is “intuitionist” insofar as light moral dynamics in the West fueled aofpolitical in in w emphasizing the have importance culturalclimate conflict intuitions come first, both temporally and in terms of priority, with rational deliberation coming contributed to the relaxation of the prohibition against paradigms alsoother pointpeople to the significance of anti-Mus second. It is “social” because morality is viewed as a strategy for influencing rather States.in officials in human the United States in fueling anti-West than an aspect of an individual’s search for personal meaning.United Continuity morality is also

in particular among militant Muslim found in its substance and is derived, according to Haidt, by five noncombatants or six foundations that are rooted 2. Case Study: Targeting Noncombatants in Muslim Tr dynamics in vs. the cheating; West haveingroup fueled a political climate in human evolutionary biology: liberty vs. oppression; care vs. harm; fairness contributed the relaxation of the prohibition aga loyalty vs. betrayal; authority vs. subversion; and sanctity vs. degradation. theory leaves a good Much of The theto classical Muslim tradition concerning n United States. deal of fluidity in how these foundations are actualized in historical communities and individuals, in a tradition of Muhammad, in which he charges his ar however, since each foundation is emphasized and interpretedor differently according to variety commit treachery, nora wide should you mutilate anyone o 2. Case Study: Targeting Noncombatants Musli of historical settings and cultural norms by people with their own idiosyncrasies. traditions also includes protections for womeninand age

If moral intuitions come first and deliberation second, as moral foundations theory prohibitions, with other practices Muchwhen of thecombined classicalindicates, Muslim tradition concernin then we can begin to see how a sense of fit influences the choice and interpretation of precedents. longstanding Muslim tradition that has sometimes in a tradition of Muhammad, in which he charges hb But MFT is helpful in another sense, too, in that Haidt draws atargeting distinction between “individualizing” of slaves and the elderly [see (al-Shaybani 19 or commit treachery, nor should you mutilate any foundations (liberty vs. oppression, care vs. harm, and fairness vs. cheating) that highlight the However, as in Western traditions, it has been genera traditions also includes protections for women and importance of individual human beings and “binding” foundations (ingroup loyalty vs. betrayal, noncombatants may be killed unintentionally in the proc prohibitions, when combined with other practic authority vs. subversion, and sanctity vs. degradation) that emphasize the values that undergird group In recent decades, Muslims have nearly always longstanding Muslim tradition that has sometim solidarity. In the American context, Haidt suggests, liberals tend totargeting focus only on the individualizing noncombatant immunity. Disagreements continue, howe of slaves and the elderly [see (al-Shayba foundations, and particularly on liberty and care, whereas conservatives are traditionally more prone count as noncombatants. Sometraditions, have argued I However, as in Western it that has war beeninge

2

that the command protecting noncombatants from target noncombatants may be killed unintentionally in the “Open Letter to Baghdadi (2014)”, a rebuke of the Islamic In recent decades, Muslims have nearly al See, for example, (Kahneman 2011; Haidt 2012; Greene 2013; Sapolsky 2017). Muslim scholars and jurists argue in favor of a very firm noncombatant immunity. Disagreements continue, h suchcount that “only combatants may killed; their fami as noncombatants. Somebe have argued that wa intentionally” (sec. 8.d).protecting Others, such as Yusuf al-Qaradaw that the command noncombatants from ta of the“Open prohibition to address a kind of emergency Letter in to order Baghdadi (2014)”, a rebuke of the Isl Qaradawi reversed his opinion (Lieber 2017). Muslim scholars and jurists argue in favor of a very f So significant is the prohibition against targeting such that “only combatants may be killed; theirno

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to put all of the foundations on roughly equal footing.3 When we move to think about groups that embody rightwing authoritarianism, such as al-Qaeda and especially ISIS, we find that the binding foundations take on a remarkable emphasis to the point that commitments to care and liberty (individualizing foundations) become relativized under the aegis of loyalty, authority, and sanctity (the binding foundations). More specifically, al-Qaeda and ISIS both weld authority and loyalty together to form a lens through which the other foundations are interpreted. These central foundations are not understood in precisely the same fashion, however. Bin Laden’s instinct was to work to unite ordinary ReligionsSunnis 2018, 9, xby FOR PEER REVIEW emphasizing the oppression of the West. In conjunction with that instinct, while bin Laden did not hesitate to declare certain regimes apostate, he was much slower to make such declarations such thatagainst some without formal leg common Muslims, especially much tighter substantial followings in doing so ReligionsSunnis. 2018, 9, x For FOR ISIS, PEER however, REVIEW the circle of loyalty is drawn and is explicitly linked to one’s loyalty to the Islamic State. The authority foundation is conceived for both continuity and change in in a tighter fashion as well. Laden was legal oftentraining stridenthave in hisbegun religious interpretations such Although that some bin without formal to issue legal rulings,tends and some have ethical discourse to functio and dismissive of others, there wasfollowings generally ainsense understood something of a distinction, substantial doingthat so. he One helpful way of approaching tensions while accou what hethese calls Shari ʿ a reasoning. T at least in principal, between interpretations and the sources of authority, theby Qur and thewho(precedent-sett for bothhis continuity and change in the tradition is provided John argues that M Qur ʾan anKelsay, and sunna hadith. This distinctionethical is blurred with the Islamic State. Onaccording one hand,tothey that their discourse tends to function the acknowledge more or less formal procedures specific judgments reachedand by nor sch legitimacy depends upon fulfilling theShari Shariʿaarequirements for framework leadership. includes On the other hand,of because what he calls reasoning. This methods interpreting andfor applyi a balance between respect the p those requirements have been to them), their traditions interpretations as binding on Qur ʾ anmet and(according sunna (precedent-setting aboutare theseen life and sayings of Muhammad) w suggests that Muslims tend to as trea all Muslims. In this way,specific authority is tied toreached a concrete political of entity, binding authority and loyalty also judgments by scholars previous times. Shariʿa reasoning ach but practitioners mustinvolves also seek to a balance between for the pastloyal and to creativity regarding application in the present. Kelsa together in a way that was not possible for respect bin Laden. Those the authority of It the State is Islamic not surprising, therefore, that that Muslims tend treat Islamic tradition as aState. body of application precedents mustabe respd receive considerations ofsuggests care, liberty, and fairness astodeemed appropriate by the Others receive that their includes good a particular situ no such consideration atbut all.practitioners must also seek to find the right fit between the precedent This essayand uses the framewor It explain is not surprising, therefore, the abroad norms ofhas Shariʿa reasoning relatively While MFT works to how intuitions might that workwhile to shape person’s basic moral approach, approached theare issue of targes their application includes a good deal oftodiversity and disagreement (Kelsay 2007,reasoning p. 73). it doesn’t tell us much specifically about how a sense of fit relates the interpretation and adjudication the ways that ethical fu uses the of aspect Shariʿaofreasoning to understand how the Islamic State of precedents. It is essential toThis note,essay therefore, thatframework an important group belonging is developed the ways that a sense of fit guides has approached issue targetingwithin noncombatants. whereas Kelsay tends the to foc through narrative, in which an individualthe takes upof a position a story toldHowever, by the group. Group State’s arguments justifying ta thevery waysintense that ethical functionsbyinsocial light psychologists of precedents inof Islamic emp identification can become whenreasoning a process dubbed as “identity norms Islamictradition, tradition,we such th the the ways that a sense of fit guides the one use with of precedents. specifically, we that the fusion” occurs. Essentially, individual’s identity becomes the groupMore in athat robust, visceral contribute to argue their sense of “Is State’s arguments justifyingand the targeting of noncombatants stretch use of precedents beyon sense, such that the individual reacts—cognitively emotionally—to the experiences of the others one essay, wein suggest that two p Islamic such to understand ISIS on this point one must understand the fo the group as though theynorms were of one’s own,tradition, as evinced by that bin Laden’s application of reciprocity and the cognition, can help to shed light that contribute to their sense of “fit”. While a comprehensive case wouldthe require much more Islamic State’s to the worldwide suffering of Muslims. emphasizing importance of c one essay, we suggest that called two psychological paradigms, moral theory cu In this regard, another theoretical apparatus cultural cognition becomes veryfoundations helpful. paradigms also point to theand signifi cognition, canbyhelp to shed light onresearch the deepening extremism ofLaw ISISin beyond their predecesso Cultural cognition, a term developed a multidisciplinary team housed at Yale School, officials the United States in emphasizing importance of cultural conflict in the formation of facing ethical norms, both of refers to the way that individuals tendthe to adopt views that fit with their cultural identities when noncombatants in particular amon also point the significance of beings anti-Muslim rhetoric andwarming actions thehave part of imp disputed matters. Whenparadigms deciding whether theytobelieve that human are causing global dynamics in theon West fueled officials gun in the United States in fueling anti-Western extremism in general the target or whether gun control prevents violence—or, we argue, whether noncombatants can be justifiably contributed to the and relaxation of th noncombatants in particular among militant Muslims. the same we suggest, similar cu United States. targeted in military operations—people don’t characteristically base their viewsAton the besttime, available in the West have fueled political climate into which continued evidence (whatever theydynamics tell themselves), but upon a senseaof how they ought respond as partforms of a of Islamophobia 2. Case Study: Targeting Noncom contributed to the relaxation of the prohibition against targeting noncombatants on the part cultural group. United States.that comprise cultural cognition: motivated reasoning, There are three main processes identity Much of the classical Muslim protective cognition, and naïve realism. Motivated reasoning “refers to the unconscious tendency ofMuhammad, in w in a tradition of 2. Case Study: Noncombatants Tradition and the Islamic State individuals to process information in aTargeting manner that suits some endinorMuslim goal extrinsic to the formation or commit treachery, nor should of accurate beliefs” (Kahan Much 2011). ofThe supported scores concerning of experiments as well asimmunity other the idea, classical Muslim by tradition noncombatant can protection be summa traditions also includes data (cognitive science, in polls, ethnographic accounts, political analyses, and so forth), is that people a tradition of Muhammad, in which he charges his army when they go out to fight, “Do not prohibitions, when combined w characteristically, but unwittingly, manipulate data in service to a particular goal other than that of or commit treachery, nor should you mutilate anyone or kill children,” aMuslim prohibition that int longstanding tradition arriving at a valid or true conclusion. weighted for in awomen certain fashion, perceptions traditions alsoEvidence includes is protections and agedsensory men (al-Shaybani 1966, pp. 92). targeting of slaves and the76,elderl prohibitions, when combined with other practices in Muhammad’s form the basis However, as life, in Western traditio longstanding Muslim tradition that has sometimes been noncombatants expanded to include prohibitin may be killed unin 3 We say “traditionally” because Haidt’sof major workand on the subject was published in 2011, before the rise Donald Trump. targeting slaves the elderly [see (al-Shaybani 1966, p. of 76) well asdecades, (Kelsay Muslims 2007, p. Inasrecent For brief comments by Haidt on Trump, see (Edsall 2016). However, as in Western traditions, it has been generally noncombatant recognized among Muslims that immunity. Disagree noncombatants may be killed unintentionally in the process count of a legitimate attack. as noncombatants. Some hav In recent decades, Muslims have nearly always accepted a prima facie commitme that the command protecting nonc noncombatant immunity. Disagreements continue, however,“Open most notably concerning pe Letter to Baghdadiwhich (2014)”, count as noncombatants. Some have argued that war in IslamMuslim shouldscholars only be defensive natur and juristsinargue that the command protecting noncombatants from targeted attacks is inviolable. For example, in such that “only combatants may

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are interpreted in such a way, and/or reasoning processes are manipulated in order to legitimize a particular conclusion or point ofthat view, often in an unconscious effort tohave regulate one’s emotions such some without formal legal training begun to issue legal rulings, and some (Westen et al. 2006). However, substantial throughoutfollowings all of this, the one doing the reasoning honestly believes she in doing so. One helpful way of approaching these tensions while is expending mental energy only service of the and truth. for in both continuity change in the tradition is provided by John Kelsay, who argues In the case of the Islamic State, motivated reasoning perhaps most apparent in the ways ethical discourse tends toisfunction according to the more or that less they formal procedures an selectively interpret the tradition, and is perhapsThis mostframework apparent in their interpretation what hetheir calls selectivity Shari ʿ a reasoning. includes methods of interpreting and a of the so-called “sword verse”,Qur Qurʾan rendered in the “Kafir’s Blood” article as “So an9:5, andwhich sunnais(precedent-setting traditions about the life andwhen sayings of Muhamma the sacred months have passed, thenjudgments kill the mushrikin wherever find them andShariʿa take them, specific reached by scholars you of previous times. reasoning also involv surround them, and wait for them at every outpost.” As noted the creativity Islamic State takes this verse a balance between respect for theabove, past and regarding application in the present. to mean that Muslims are always and everywhere target disbelieving noncombatants forof killing. suggests that Muslimstotend to treat Islamic tradition as a body precedents that must b This interpretation is selectivebut in atpractitioners least two senses. it ignores context of the must First, also seek to findthe thetextual right fit between the verse’s precedent and a particul revelation, disregarding the surrounding verses. therefore, More thanthat that, it cuts the norms secondofhalf of thereasoning are relat It is not surprising, while theout broad Shariʿa verse, which reads: “But if they should repent, establish prayer, and give zakah, let them [go] on their their application includes a good deal of diversity and disagreement (Kelsay 2007, p. 73) 4 way. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful”. historically speaking, the verse to how the Islamic This essay usesSecond, the framework of Shariʿa reasoning to referred understand polytheists of the Arabian Peninsula, not to Jews Christians or other “People of the Book”.5whereas We has approached theand issue of targeting noncombatants. However, Kelsay tends are suggesting, therefore, that the these kinds of ethical interpretive shortcuts are one that ways that reasoning functions in piece light of evidence precedents in the Islamic tradition, we reasoning of Islamic State ideologues motivated byguides a desire understand the text in all of its the waysisthat a sense not of fit thetouse of precedents. More specifically, we argue tha complexity, but to justify the established practices of the group. State’s arguments justifying the targeting of noncombatants stretch the use of precedents The goals to which motivated applies are legion, but, as with ISIS, most normsreasoning of Islamic tradition, such that to understand ISISby on far thisthe point one must understan researched aims are political and moral in nature. Somesense such of goals areWhile relateda to the interests orcase values that contribute to their “fit”. comprehensive would require much of the individual, such as rationalizing forgetting dishonesty. Those paradigms, that are mostmoral relevant one essay,orwe suggest one’s that two psychological foundations theory a to the current discussion, however, havecan to do with the way reasoning functions inbeyond their pred cognition, help to shed lightthat on motivated the deepening extremism of ISIS relation to one’s group identity. The classicthe study of this kind, “They Saw a Game”, published emphasizing importance of cultural conflict in thewas formation of ethical norms, b by Albert H. Hastorf and Hadley Cantrilalso in 1954 and Cantrilof1954) and wasrhetoric based upon a paradigms point(Hastorf to the significance anti-Muslim and actions on the part o particularly rough football game between and Dartmouth. Students who attended the game officials in Princeton the United States in fueling anti-Western extremism in general and the were asked to give their general impressions in of particular the conduct of each team. Muslims. Other students, who did noncombatants among militant At the same time, we suggest, sim not attend, were shown film of the game in addition to giving their climate general in impressions after forms of Islamo dynamics in and, the West have fueled a political which continued watching the film, were asked contributed to imagine themselves as referees of the game, citing infractions as they to the relaxation of the prohibition against targeting noncombatants on the United States. watched. In a process that is intimately familiar around the world, students from both universities consistently biased their reports in favor of their team. Princeton students overwhelmingly thought 2. Case Study: Targetinginjuring Noncombatants in Muslim Tradition and the Islamic State the Dartmouth team was playing dirty by purposely their star player, whereas Dartmouth

students held that the player was injured andMuslim that thetradition Princetonconcerning team was bent on revengeimmunity can be s Muchaccidentally of the classical noncombatant for the rest of the game. The major finding of the experiment, and that which most interests cultural in a tradition of Muhammad, in which he charges his army when they go out to fight, “D cognition researchers, is that students from Princeton saw a qualitatively different game from that of the a prohibition t or commit treachery, nor should you mutilate anyone or kill children,” Dartmouth students, yet students from both (andfor believed) traditions also schools includesassumed protections womenthat andtheir agedinterpretation men (al-Shaybani 1966, pp. 76 of the game was objectively accurate. These phenomena are referred to as identity-protective cognition prohibitions, when combined with other practices in Muhammad’s life, form the and naïve realism. longstanding Muslim tradition that has sometimes been expanded to include pro Identity-protective cognition involves number of the processes are(al-Shaybani implicitly mobilized targeting of aslaves and elderlythat [see 1966, p. in 76)order as well as (Kelsay 20 to protect one’s identity within a particular group, often blurring the line between the self and the among Muslim However, as in Western traditions, it has been generally recognized group such that the individual noncombatants is personally threatened by opposition to the group’s values orofinterests. may be killed unintentionally in the process a legitimate attack. In essence, one takes up the group’s values and identity as one’s own via identity fusion, and this In recent decades, Muslims have nearly always accepted a prima facie com motivates the individual’s reasoning. Identity-protective cognition tends to makehowever, relationsmost between noncombatant immunity. Disagreements continue, notably concerning wh Religions 2018, 9, xbecause FOR PEER REVIEW 2 of 10 groups difficult each side characteristically interprets contested matters in ainself-serving way. count as noncombatants. Some have argued that war Islam should only be defensive in In the case of ISIS, identity-protective a particularly important roletargeted insofar as loyalty that thecognition commandplays protecting noncombatants from attacks is to inviolable. For exam such thatand some without formal legal training have begun to issue legal rulings, and some have found the group its authority form the core of to their ethical position. “Open Letter Baghdadi (2014)”, a rebuke of the Islamic State, a large international grou substantial followings in doing so. One helpful way of approaching these tensions while accounting Muslim scholars and jurists argue in favor of a very firm prohibition against targeting non for both continuity and change in the tradition is provided by John Kelsay, who argues that Muslim such that “only combatants may be killed; their families and noncombatants may n discourse tends to function according to the more or less formal procedures and norms of 4 ethical Sahih International version. intentionally” (sec. 8.d). Others, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, have argued for the temporary 5 what he calls Shari ʿ a reasoning. This framework includes methods and the For more examples of how ISIS selectively interprets scripture, see (Siddiqui 2015). of Forinterpreting more discussion on applying the contest of of the prohibition in order to address a kind of emergency situation. But when that emerge Qur ʾan seesunna (Esposito 2015). Qur an9:5, and (precedent-setting traditions about the life and sayings of Muhammad) as well as Qaradawi reversed his opinion (Lieber 2017). specific judgments reached by scholars of previous times. Shariʿa reasoning also involves achieving So significant is the prohibition against targeting noncombatants that even jihadi m a balance between respect for the past and creativity regarding application in the present. Kelsay thus as Osama bin Laden tend to observe its prima facie status. He overcomes the pro suggests that Muslims tend to treat Islamic tradition as a body of precedents that must be respected; expanding greatly those who count as combatants. Citizens of the United States, bin La but practitioners must also seek to find the right fit between the precedent and a particular situation. It is not surprising, therefore, that while the broad norms of Shariʿa reasoning are relatively stable, their application includes a good deal of diversity and disagreement (Kelsay 2007, p. 73).

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Just as important is the phenomenon of naïve realism, an “asymmetry in the ability of individuals to perceive the impact of identity-protective cognition” (Kahan 2011, p. 22). Essentially, members of a group tend to be quite adept at noticing the biases of other groups (realism), but much less skilled in acknowledging their own (naivety). This asymmetry introduces a situation in which the questioning of one’s (or one’s group’s) position or interests is often seen as a biased or even bad-faith attack, ushering in resentments that, in some cases, shift the argument away from the issues at hand in favor of attacks on the integrity of one’s opponents. If matters take this kind of turn, a vicious circle is often started in which each group continually, but unknowingly, reenacts the naïve realism at the heart of the original conflict. ISIS, again, exhibits these patterns in a number of ways. Like many critics of the West, Islamic State ideologues are skilled at pointing out real ethical failures on the part of the West, particularly concerning policies that are harmful to Muslims or Muslim-majority countries. A strong degree of naivety is evident, however, insofar as the group is unable or unwilling to offer any measure of self-criticism, or even self-awareness. So too, they routinely attack the integrity of their opponents. One common strategy is to offer summary judgments that strain credulity, such as when in the “Kafir’s Blood” article they suggest that “any Muslim who has studied his religion” will understand that scholars have reached a consensus that noncombatant disbelievers should be targeted (36). At other times, they argue that their opponents have lost the ability to recognize even the most self-evidentiary truths because they have given in to corruption to the point of losing their God-given human nature, or fitra.6 What we see with ISIS and in other situations rife with group conflict, moreover, is that cultural cognition is at the center of a larger set of processes that harden the boundaries between “Us” and “Them”. In certain extreme instances, these boundaries can become so rigid that those considered other, “Them”, are dehumanized to the point that they no longer deserve the kind of treatment normally accorded to fellow human beings. When cultural cognition is rooted in an intense privileging of the binding foundations (loyalty, authority,Religions and sanctity), onePEER canREVIEW see how easily the jump to 2018, 9, x FOR dehumanization can be made (Waller 2002, pp. 236–57). Religions 2018, 9, x FOR PEER REVIEW More broadly, moral foundations theory and cultural cognition both formal suggestlegal that training ethical reasoning such that some without have begun to issue legal r is in large measure an explicit working out of one’s moral intuitions which, in some many cases, isformal rooted inof approaching substantial followings in that doing so. One helpful waylegal the such without training have b one’s sense of group belonging. Intuitions andfor deeply convictions tend tofollowings come both felt continuity and change in the first: tradition is provided John way Kel substantial inreasoning, doing so. One by helpful which is influenced by a broad number of socialethical dynamics and cognitive biases, comes second. Insofar discourse tends to function according to the or less form for both continuity and change inmore the tradition is pr as the Islamic State is concerned, therefore, wewhat suggest that Shari Shariʿethical aa reasoning isThis nottends employed as a according he calls reasoning. framework includes methodstoofthi discourse to function means of reaching the conclusion that noncombatants should be targeted. Rather, Sharitraditions isThis Qur ʾ an and sunna (precedent-setting about theframework life and sayin what he calls Shari ʿaareasoning reasoning. in selectively employed as a means of justifying the deeply held conviction that there is (precedent-setting no distinction specific judgments reached by scholars of previous times.traditions Shariʿa reaso Qur ʾ an and sunna abo a balance respect for the past and creativity regarding applicati between enemies of the Islamic State: all are under God’sbetween judgment and worthy of execution. specific judgments reached by scholars of previous suggests that Muslims tend tobetween treat Islamic tradition a body of prece a balance respect for the as past and creativity 4. Conclusions: Cultural Conflict in Circular Perspective but practitioners must also seek find the tend rightto fittreat between thetraditio preced suggests thattoMuslims Islamic It is not therefore, while broad practitioners mustthe also seek norms to find of theShariʿa right fitre Of course, none of these processes function in surprising, a vacuum:but they arethat employed, however application includes a good deal oftherefore, diversity and disagreement (K It is not surprising, that while the broad unconsciously, in the light of real-world conflictstheir as defense against real-world opponents, or enemies. This essay uses the framework Shariʿa their application includes areasoning good diversity a And they are not the sole provenance of Muslim militants but are employed by most of of us in one formdealtoofunderstand has approached the issue of targeting noncombatants. However, wher This essay uses the framework of Shariʿa reaso or another, depending both on the particulars of the cultural conflict in question and the structures the ways that ethical reasoning functions in light of precedents in Isla has approached the issue of targeting noncombata of our moral intuitions. In the rest of this essay, we point briefly to some of the concrete ways that the ways that a of sense ofways fit cognition guides theand usepush of precedents. More in specifica the that ethical reasoning light o historical events and interpretations might engage the process cultural peoplefunctions State’s arguments justifying the targeting noncombatants stretch the the ways that a sense of fit guides the use of preced toward adopting the various aspects of rightwing authoritarianism. Islamicand tradition, such that tojustifying understand on thisofpoint on State’s arguments theISIS targeting noncom It is not difficult to see, for example, hownorms these of patterns mechanisms might lead certain contribute sense of “fit”. While a such comprehensive case woI norms of Islamic tradition, that to understand people to adopt a general attitude of oppositionthat to the West. Astoa their general typology, the thinking may one essay,aware we suggest that two experienced psychological moral foun thatsuffering contribute to their sense of “fit”. While a com function roughly as follows. Many Muslims are acutely of the byparadigms, their cognition, can help one to shed light the deepening of ISIS essay, weonsuggest that twoextremism psychological parb emphasizing the importance in on thethe formation of cognition, of cancultural help to conflict shed light deepening paradigms also point to the significance of anti-Muslim rhetoric and act emphasizing the importance of cultural conflict i 6 See especially “The Fitrah of Mankind and the Near Extinction of the Western Woman” in Dabiq, issue 15 (20–25). officials in the United States in fueling anti-Western extremism in g paradigms also point to the significance of anti-Mu noncombatants in particular among militantStates Muslims. At the same time officials in the United in fueling anti-West dynamics in the West have fueled a in political climate in which continued noncombatants particular among militant Muslim contributed to the relaxation prohibition against targetingclimate nonc dynamics of in the West have fueled a political United States. contributed to the relaxation of the prohibition aga United States.

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fellow Muslims throughout much of the globe, a suffering that is experienced on some level as one’s own, in large measure because of a shared religious identity. The consciousness of this suffering is paired with a broadly, although not universally, accepted narrative that juxtaposes the greatness of premodern Islamic civilization with the poverty, tyranny, and indignities that Muslims have endured under colonialism and the continued meddling of the West in Palestine, Iran, Iraq, India, Egypt, and elsewhere. Sometimes this narrative is framed in grand language of Religions civilizational inREVIEW which 2018, 9, xstruggle FOR PEER Israel, Europe, and the United States are depicted as extensions of the crusades or the state of willful ignorance exemplified by pre-Islamic Arabia. Other times the languagesuch is more emphasizing thatlocalized, some without formal legal training have the specific blame due to a particular group of people. But whatever the case, thisfollowings suffering and theseso. One helpful w substantial in doing narratives work to activate the processes of cultural cognition, such for that, for continuity some, reasoning about in the tradition is both and change these matters becomes more an exercise in justifying one’s beliefs by marshalling evidence against the ethical discourse tends to function according to West than an attempt to come to an accurate assessment of the situation by means ofShari Shariʿaareasoning. what he calls reasoning. This framework Moreover, recent events and policies on the part of the West, andQur particularly the United States, ʾ an and sunna (precedent-setting traditions a might exasperate matters and push certain Muslims to subsume the individualizing foundations within specific judgments reached by scholars of previo a balance between for the the binding foundations. Implicit and explicit Islamophobia, for example, frames publicrespect discourse in past and creativ suggests Muslims tend to treat Islamic tradit such a way that Muslim identity is emphasized at the expense of other possiblethat identifications (racial, but practitioners also seek to find the right f ethnic, class, and so on). Those who suffer the pain of discrimination under the rubric ofmust Islamophobia It from is notthe surprising, therefore, that while the broa do so as Muslims, such that their moral reactions are very likely to stem binding foundations, their a good deal of diversity particularly as violations against the loyalty they feel toward their group andapplication the sanctityincludes of the group’s This essay uses the framework of Shariʿa rea most deeply held beliefs. approached the issue of targeting noncomba Or consider the war on terror. While explicitly waged against anhas abstraction, “terror”, targets of the ways that the war on terror are almost exclusively Muslims. Morally questionable tactics thatethical targetreasoning Muslims functions in ligh the ways that a sense of Ghraib, fit guides the use of prec such as torture, rendition, certain forms of drone strikes, the treatment of prisoners at Abu State’sinarguments the targeting of nonc and many other instances are very likely to trigger strong reactions rooted the loyaltyjustifying and sanctity norms of or Islamic tradition, foundations. And inhumane actions on the part of one’s enemies, however real perceived, makesuch the that to understan that contribute to their sense of “fit”. While a co path toward dehumanizing those enemies all the easier. one essay, we suggest that two It would be wrong to think, however, that these kinds of dynamics are limited to Muslims, or psychological p cognition, cancontext help toofshed light on the deepenin to Muslim militants. They are, rather, very widespread, and particularly so in the cultural emphasizing theinimportance of cultural conflict conflict. Let us return to the example of targeting noncombatants in the West. As the Muslim paradigms also point to the significance of anti-M tradition, the just war tradition and international law both prohibit the targeting of noncombatants. officials the United Commitment to these norms has been tested in recent years, however, in theincontext of the States war onin fueling anti-W in particular among militant Mus terror, where both George W. Bush and Barack Obama authorized the noncombatants use of “signature” drone strikes, dynamics in the West fueled a political clim a practice that allows American drones to strike vehicle convoys without verifying the have identities contributed to the relaxation of the prohibition a of potential targets so long as they possess certain, rather slippery, signature attributes such as age, actions, and location (Himes 2016). Yet, Bush and Obama were bothUnited carefulStates. to maintain the prima facie prohibition against targeting noncombatants, each arguing in their own ways that signature 2. CaseHe Study: Targeting Noncombatants in Mu strikes satisfied the prohibition. Donald Trump’s approach is another matter. has largely delegated drone policies to his military commanders. His rhetoric, however, suggests a remarkably cavalier Much of the classical Muslim tradition conce attitude toward concerns related to the principle of discrimination. For example, on 2 December 2015, in a tradition of Muhammad, in which he charges then-candidate Trump said on Fox News: or commit treachery, nor should you mutilate a

also includesyou protections for women a We’re fighting a very politically correct war. And the other thingtraditions is with the terrorists, prohibitions, when combined with other prac have to take out their families. When you get these terrorists, you have to take out their longstanding Muslim tradition that has somet families. They, they care about their lives, don’t kid yourselves. But they say they don’t care targeting of slaves and the elderly [see (al-Shay about their lives. You have to take out their families. (Fox and Friends 2015) However, as in Western traditions, it has been Although he later publicly reversed position on targeting the families of terrorists, these noncombatants may sentiments be killed unintentionally in t were reportedly repeated on his first day in office during a visit to CIA headquarters (Jaffe 2018). In recent decades, Muslims have nearly More than that, Trump’s attitude toward targeting noncombatants is part of a broader, fiery, noncombatant immunity. Disagreements continu rhetorical disposition through which Trump appeals to his base by drawing hard boundaries between count as noncombatants. Some have argued that w “Us” and “Them”, with Muslims often cast in the role of “Them”. For example, shortly after the Islamic that the command protecting noncombatants from “Open Letter to Baghdadi (2014)”, a rebuke of the Muslim scholars and jurists argue in favor of a ver such that “only combatants may be killed; thei intentionally” (sec. 8.d). Others, such as Yusuf al-Q of the prohibition in order to address a kind of em

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State-inspired Barcelona terror attack in August of 2017, then-candidate Trump addressed the question of how best to deal with terrorism by referencing a spurious story about American General John J. Pershing’s tactics for snuffing out insurgency in the Philippines in the early 20th century. As Trump explained it: General Pershing was a rough guy. And he sits on his horse, very astute like a ramdrod. Right? And, the year was early nineteen hundreds. And this was a terrible problem. They were having terrorism problems just like we do. And he caught 50 terrorists who did tremendous damage and killed many people. And he took the 50 terrorists, and he took fifty men, and he dipped 50 bullets in pigs’ blood. You heard that, right? He fit, he took 50 bullets, and he dipped them in pigs’ blood. And he had his men load his rifles. And he lined up the 50 people. And they shot 49 of those people. And the 50th person, he said “you go back to your people and you tell them what happened”. And for 25 years there wasn’t a problem. (Reilly 2017) The reader will notice the similarities between Trump’s approach and that of the Islamic State: appeals to brutality against the Other, appeals which include a strong element of dehumanization, work to trigger the values associated with the binding foundations of loyalty, authority, and sanctity. Moreover, commitment to the individualizing foundations is subsumed under the binding foundations, such that the normal treatment generally according to other human beings—such as prohibitions against execution of prisoners or targeting noncombatants—can be suspended in light of the priority given to protecting the group. Perhaps most troubling, Trump’s statements have gained some traction among the public. As with ISIS, this support seems to be grounded, at least to some degree, in a kind of reaction to the brutality of one’s opponents. Just as the Islamic State’s appeal is specific to a historical context that includes signature drone strikes, the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, and other questionable tactics in the war on terror, so Trump’s appeal is contextualized by the brutality of groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS, and especially by the 9/11 attacks. That is to say, the disconcerting prioritization of the binding foundations and their justification through cultural cognition by those inclined toward rightwing authoritarianism may not be empirically or ethically justifiable, but they are not conjured from nothing. They are, in large measure, reactions against unjust behavior. If this analysis is correct, it suggests that regaining a strong commitment to the prohibition against targeting noncombatants will be a difficult task. Yes, ISIS may be defeated on the battlefield and Trump and his ilk may be removed from office. Both of these developments may lead to policies more in keeping with the traditional commitment to the principle of discrimination. By our way of thinking, however, such policy changes would alleviate a symptom of an underlying problem. The heart of the matter, we are suggesting, has to do with the perception among some that there is a cultural struggle between the West and Islam. If this problematic perception is to be undone, it will take a sea change in political rhetoric, domestic and foreign policy, military tactics, and education by a number of governments and other institutions over an extended period of time. Only time will tell whether we have the resolve to make these changes. Author Contributions: Conceptualization, R.M. and S.B.; Methodology, R.M.; Writing-Original Draft Preparation, R.M. and S.B.; Writing-Review & Editing, R.M. and S.B. Funding: This research received no external funding. Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank Sohail Hashmi for editing this special issue and for inviting us to contribute. Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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