essentials shared in common provide a list of reliable characteristics that will serve as the basis .... A love of expression, especially eloquence, dance and song. A strong tendency to ...... Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. de Ventós ...
The Classification of Honor-Based Societies C. S. Herrman Abstract With cultural development featuring mixtures of collectivism and individualism, cooperative and competitive modes, etc., it is increasingly difficult to speak of an overall ‘modal’ type. But even complex societies can be considered as composites of smaller groups that often enough do admit of a modal component. Thus Thomas Jefferson (1955 [1787])1 was able to identify traits unique to the Northern and Southern states, distinctions that survive to this very day in the United States. In the Honor-Dignity binary the honor-based cultures greatly predominate and manifest far more variation under their canopy cognate (honor), making a classificatory system a worthwhile endeavor, presuming it can be done. This paper asserts that it can be done. Honor-based societies are classified as ‘quiet, ‘intermediate’ and ‘loud’ in accordance with emically2 derived cultural judgments as to the quality of conduct (specifically, measures of dignity) deemed fitting to a given state of honor. Current practice is to assess conduct in terms of ‘dimensions’, paired cognates such as shameguilt, tight-loose, hot-cold, and so on. The latter two will be utilized for lack of better possibilities and only in a secondary aspect of classification. As a general rule, dimensions are more valuable the closer they reflect honor and dignity as in the top tiers of Table (1). 1. Overview This is the first of a two-part examination of the parent honor-dignity binary3 from which to obtain explanative and predictive capability. The connection of a parent binary with respect to dimensions can be made clear with a pride-righteousness dimension derived from Arutiunov (2001: xi) – While there are clear-cut cultures of shame and cultures of guilt, one never hears about a culture of pride. This is quite understandable, because this would be only an inverse definition of the culture of shame. Similarly, an inverse definition of the culture of guilt would be a culture of righteousness, a term into which Western cultures would fit only too well. What may not seem obvious, but which is quite understandable, is that the author treats shame and guilt as a parent binary in a typological dichotomy. From that author’s vantage, what is tantamount to the parent or even its inverse becomes on that account redundant and so irrelevant. The reality, however, is that a synonymous pair of labels for pride and righteousness occurs in the form of honor and dignity respectively, which is also broadly synonymous with shame and guilt. In this case, there is no redundancy but rather a hierarchy: honor and dignity constitute the parent binary equally to the pride-righteousness and shame-guilt dimensions. The fault to be found with Mead (1961a) and Benedict (1946) is their failure to see shame and guilt as dimensions derived from this honor-dignity binary.
The first scholar to employ the honor-dignity (H-D) binary as a methodology was Orit Kamir (2002, 2006, 2015).4 Her flagship work (2006) offered an overview as part of a broader topic but was excellent as far as it went and is still to be recommended as an introductory piece. Beyond Benedict’s shame-guilt and Apollonian-Dionysian dyads, however, she offered no evaluation of dimensions, thus introducing generalizations that we consider to be of questionable utility.5 Table (1) begins by classifying the data structurally as follows: H-B = Honor-based; C-H = Cult of honor; C-D = Cult of Dignity, and D-B = Dignity-based. This is also a diachronic organization; we hold that society began as honor-based, within which were gradually developed honor cults comprising the best traits and which were offered as exemplary expressions of function that would otherwise have been impossible for lack of the necessary concentration of resources or power at the helm. To this idealized cult we owe our civil services, elective offices and all the professions. To this cult we owe in addition the norms of stewardship (Herrman, 2009b). Table 1. (from Herrman, 2010b: 26)
Tier One & Two Dimensions – Office and Ethos H-B
C-H
C-D
1̊ Sources of Obligation
Thirdness
Merited Respect Realism
Inherent Acceptance Mixed
Merited Respect Mixed
2̊ Moderating Power
Secondness
Praise-Bad Quiet Prerog.
Should-Blame Warm Authority Mixed
Shame
Aretaic Loud Prerog. Shame
3̊ Manifesting Will
Firstness
Trust Implied Contract Mistrust
Mixed Mixed Offence
Trust Status Defense
H-B
C-H
D-B
Degree/Dimension
Descriptor
1̊ Inherent Acceptance Idealism
Merited v. Inherent Respect v. Acceptance Realism v. Idealism
Worth Belief Philosophy
2̊ Deontic Cool Authority
Aretaic v. Deontic Prerogative v. Authority
Norms Office
Guilt
Shame v. Guilt
Motivation
3̊ Faith Contract Curiosity
C-D
Trust v. Faith Status v. Contract Avoidance v. Adience
D-B
Degree
Reliance Manner Intentionality
Descriptor
1̊ Valuing Worth
Thirdness
Autochthonous Kinship
Autonomy Ideological
Independence Identification
Freedom v. Liberty Responsibilities v. Rights
Independence Source
Deserving
Duty
Dispensable v. Indispensable
Expedience
Dependent
Individuality Identificatio n Weak
2̊ Modalities of Command
Secondness
Moira Coexistence Repute-Kin
Standing Continuity Substance
Honor Contingency Honor-Myth
4̊
5̊ Dignity Well-being Opportunity
Self-aware v. Self-conscious Security v. Safety Mastery v. Domination
Mythos Circumstance Method
6̊
3̊ Constituent Roles
Firstness
Identifies Resources
Takes Pride Time-Talent
Declaims Fate
Chooses Self-mastery
Custom
Tradition
Opportunity
Choice
2
Collective v. Individual Participat’n v. Representat’n Conformity v. Autonomy
Reference Mode Liberty
Many have noted the tendency of even the best social structures to degrade over time. Schiller (1930: 2) was especially prescient: All human institutions have a way of growing into perversions of their original purpose that block its attainment…. Those who run the institutions are allowed to acquire interests that conflict with the professed purpose of the institutions they serve. One of the Table (1) dimensions is the authority-prerogative dyad. Dignity, being the author of an internally experienced sense of authority, and hence autonomy, corresponds to honor-based prerogative which in context works to assure one’s rightful place in the group. But with autonomy goes a comparative lack of group control, which largely accounts for the degrading of the pure honor-based cult into the dignity cult. Here the worst of the honor-based traits are in evidence as one naturally expects when people achieve plenary power with little to hold them back from aggrandizing others for personal benefit or other illegitimate ends. Before long the cultists’ dignity is better soi-disant than others’ dignity; they expect to receive the first and best fruits from their endeavors while shouting ‘the dignity of all’ from their rooftops. They work assiduously to deny outsiders their due, even when they are actually clients who should be able to expect the highest display of duty. It may be objected that this description is maudlin and overblown. In fact, it is real and is responsible, if at a lower pitch, for more than just gangs and Mafiosi. Cults of dignity, like their forebears, are offices, the functions of which, if minimally achieved, tend to mask what proceeds behind gilded exteriors. We don’t know of these consequences because we rarely confront them; or we do learn of them but attribute their cause to amorphous entities. We simply are not accustomed to seeing the reality behind the exterior of many seemingly benign offices. Those who do look see what we here record. The true dignity-based society is thus the opposite of the dignity cult, which nonetheless predominates throughout the youth and adolescence of any nominal dignity-based moiety. Our professions, for example, though the offspring of honor cults, are sometimes dignity cults refusing to offer information to any but their memberships, which has resulted in extraordinary ignorance throughout the world. While in proper form they should police their membership, in reality they typically defend errant members from accountability. They educate their membership with overkill as much to generate self-confidence as to obtain and communicate functional knowledge. Once in business they pay attention to no outside sources, presuming to be the only spokesperson for an entire area of study that extends tentacles into several other fields. They know best, and have the power to illustrate the point graphically. Their dignity is better than ours. How long did it take patients to obtain rights vis-à-vis doctors and hospitals? Why should we suppose that it was ever an issue?6 Nominal dignity-based groups are too often completely unaccountable and so eschew the stewardship of their offices. The esteemed United States Congress, for example, which was originally a citizen-centered affair, is now all but a de facto tenured profession. Their power is comparatively detached from popular dissent, leaving those they are elected to represent under- and misrepresented. Once in their positions they believe themselves the only people properly fit to perform these duties. 3
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Whereas the honor-based groups have historically been characterized as dealing directly with difficult environments and living conditions – from which they have developed a healthy respect for ‘reality’ – the dignity-based have been, with the exception of the Romans and early English, a product of the Enlightenment, arriving at a time of comparative progress in confronting and overcoming those once difficult environments. They have the luxury to be premised upon ‘ideals’ more than upon ‘realism’, the chief example of the former holding that essential worth is based upon inherent dignity from which proceed the ‘rights’ so often spoken of in connection with Western society. “Collectivists [H-B],” says Triandis (1995: 69), “frequently have realistic self-perceptions about their abilities, and individualists [D-B] frequently have flattering [as in ‘ideas’ of] self-perceptions” [my stress]. Table (1) lists these as first-tier components, so fundamental are they to culture.7 The table is overkill for present purposes but I include the entirety in order to offer food for thought.8 Our chief concerns revolve almost entirely about the first three tiers, which are easily overviewed: The honor-based moiety believes firmly that worth is owing to merit (1st tier), that merit presupposes esteem and provides the foundation for trustworthiness (3rd tier), which in turn supports the honor-based conception of authority (2nd tier), where influence is communicated through respect (1st tier) rather than power. Triandis (1995: 65), himself a Greek and speaking of the Greeks, mentioned that “when completing sentences, Greek subjects mentioned ‘good conduct’ as linked to love, trust and respect much more frequently than did American subjects” [his stress]. Merit and esteem presuppose honor as well, and prerogative (2nd tier) implies a felt right to participate in and claim honor vis-à-vis others. The reader can apply what has been given above to the dignity-based descriptors matching the honor-based to see how this other half compares. We are hereafter interested specifically with the honor-based traits and offer only enough of the dignity-based for necessary perspective. 2. Methodology In other fields this methodology is considered a ‘dichotomy’ to which the bulk of academe has shown little interest apart from a good bit of open skepticism (e.g., Lewis, 1968 & Ostrom, 2003). With due respect for their concerns, it is invariably the case that bare binaries are poor purveyors of trustworthy generalizations. But this argument against the dichotomy falls short when the methodology is placed on a solid structural footing, especially when premised upon a valid metaphysical ground (Herrman, 2009a, 2010a). While we will speak generally of ‘quiet’, ‘intermediate’ and ‘loud’ cultures, they will be termed classes in the classificatory sense used in the paper. The paired subdivisions within these classes will be considered as sub-types, where by ‘type’ we use both Weber (1965), who reifies a synecdoche in actual application, and anthropologist Julian Steward, for whom a ‘type’ (Wolf, 2001: 161), “was…a means for conceptualizing what he called cultural ‘cores’, causally enchained elements in interrelation. [By ‘type’] he meant a conceptual model that could be used in discovery procedures.” In sum, using a parent H-B/D-B binary with subsidiary dimensions we 4
employ a metaphysically grounded methodology to develop a classification consisting of classes and their sub-types. There is no intention of turning this into a discussion of metaphysics. By ‘methodology’ is meant the choice of sources and their presentation in order to cull the best information relevant to the objective: a discussion of traits such as to enable explanatory and predictive power in the evaluation of honor-based structures. The premise is simply that a good choice of anthropological materials will provide examples that deliver empirical data that in turn sustain the honor-dignity hypothesis and the subdivisions thereof (specifically the H-B) which appear below in figure (1). For ‘honor cultures’ per se, the collection edited by Peristiani (1966a) is the classic and still the go-to reference. All but one of these articles have been utilized. For the sub-types of cooperative and competitive (in Figure 1) the collection edited by Mead ([1937], 1961a) remains the classic selection that deserves far wider recognition than it has received. The well-regarded edition edited by Hunt (1967) offers examples for the other two classes. Binary (Type) Classes Subtypes
Honor-based
Quiet Cultures Intermediate Cultures Loud Cultures Cooperative/Competitive/Mixed Composite/Mixed Dignity cult/Caudillo Fig. 1
‘Quiet’ and ‘loud’ will refer to and describe conditions of dignity, which for our purposes amounts to the backbone of honor and is revealed through expressive aspects of comportment and deportment (taken here to be one’s behavior and appearance respectively).9 The louder – the more expressive and definitive – the objective criteria of expression the less dignity is presumed by users as referenced to a quiet standard (which we rely on for the analysis, meaning that it is not based on how ‘loud’ a loud-oriented group considers itself, but rather how a quiet orientation would judge the matter). In this connection an interesting blog by a native Japanese speaker (Maki, 2009) revealed the following when critiquing American expression: 大声 （おおごえ 大げさ (おおげさ
ohgoe) - loud - loud literally and loud as in opinionated ohgesa) - exaggerated, exaggerates, over-dramatic.
It should be noted that studies to date have not treated dignity in relation to honor nor the reverse, yet it seems to this writer to be the real nub of the matter without which generalizations cannot be relied upon. Loud honor refers in short to loud dignity, wherein the standard we go by says this: all dignity is quiet dignity, so that loud dignity requires justification (from a quiet perspective). This is exactly what we find in the literature, thus supporting the method and enabling well-chosen journal articles to serve as a reasonable source for the actual attitudes behind our labels. Because we are reliant on the quiet approach, it is all the more important that we obtain a good representative selection of these specific cultures such that there is internal consistency and 5
empirical verification of the ‘quiet’ dispositions as revealed in socio-political and other broad cultural expressions. We begin this process with a general observation: ‘quiet’ appears highly correlated with cooperative cultures in which honor is collective more than personal, and where expressions of honor rely on quiet conceptions of dignity, describable in general as restrained emotional expression, avoidance of risk and above all avoidance of conflict such as to risk disorder within the cultural milieu. These then are the criteria for selecting probable quiet cultures for comparison such that the essentials shared in common provide a list of reliable characteristics that will serve as the basis for comparison with all louder societies. With individualism comes elevated competitiveness with louder expressions. Intermediate societies are ‘composite’ when identifiable groups reflect quiet on the one hand and loud(er) on the other. The ‘intermediate-mixed’ sub-type implies that quiet and loud are thoroughly intermingled and broadly distributed throughout the culture. The loud societies are therefore those that have without question left quiet standards struggling, and where loud traits are accepted throughout the culture with little muss or fuss. Further, we insist that cults of dignity or a Caudillo pattern be recognized only from definitions derived from an adequate evaluation of the literature. The following honor-based groups were chosen for these quiet and loud traits, with results collated and reduced into the listings of Tables (2), (3) and (4):10 1) Tuscarora (Wallace, 1951 & 1952); 2) San Carlos pueblo (Tumin, 1952; Gillin, 1967); 3) Russians (Miller, 1961; Inkeles et al., 1967); 4) Lakalai of New Briton (Valentine, 1963); 5) Bedouins of Egypt (Abou-Zeid, 1966); 6) Kabylia of Northern Algeria (Bourdieu, 1966); 7) Sarakatsani of Epirus (Campbell, 1966); 8) Cypriot Greeks (Peristiani, 1966b); 9) Andalusian pueblo (Pitt-Rivers, 1966 & 1971); 10) Menomini (G. & L. Spindler, 1967 & 1971); 11) Fa’a’nakkar of Micronesia (Caughey, 1977); 12) Anyi of West Africa (Parin et al., 1980); 13) Latin Americans (Véliz, 1994). Geographically, they appear as follows: 1) North America: Tuscarora (member Iroquois Federation) Northeast U.S.; Menomini, Wisconsin; 2) Central/South America: San Carlos of Guatemala, Latin Americans; 3) Mediterranean: Greeks of Cyprus; Bedouins of Egypt, 4) Europe: Sarakatsani of central Greece, Andalusian pueblo of Spain; 5) Asia: Russians; 6) Africa: Kabylia Northwest, Anyi West; 7) Oceania: Fa’a’nakkar, Micronesia; Lakalai, Melanesia. Below are the three tables enumerating widely shared traits of quiet and loud with an interpretive ‘modal’ or general honor-based assessment. Quiet traits Collective honor All have the right to seek and claim honor; individuals represent the honor of their respective groups; failing reflects on the group and vice versa; one is neither ‘boss’ nor ‘better’ than anyone else; egalitarian principles adhered to; all are entitled to food and shelter; cooperation is the desired way to achieve corporate goals; decisions on group action are expected to be unanimous Compulsive conformity
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Parsimony, humility and modesty ground conformity; minor emphasis on dominance, achievement, aspiration or initiative; nails are pounded down (standing out is discouraged); criticism unstated or understated; emotional responsiveness well throttled by school age Composition and discord Typically without political leadership factions; kin groups or interpersonal agreements effectuate customs; from quarrels to serious breaches of code, the object of social structure is peace and tranquility; avoidance of risk and especially of discord and dysfunction; wrongdoers ask for and receive forgiveness; envy, jealousy and competitiveness discouraged Us versus them attitudes Self-glorification, other contempt; strangers, outsiders and upper-classes subject to a degree of aggrandizement; isolationism and xenophobia; strangers may also, however, offer opportunity to demonstrate hospitality Authority without power True authority reflects an obligation to society and is absent executive prerogative, influencing instead through respect; ‘powered’ authority enters from outside and is inherently dangerous; material power requires spiritual power Status and respect Respect builds honor; status derives from it and is granted indulgences. Elders usually earn the highest status and the greatest respect; respect and cooperation are a composite of quiet traits working through kin and para-kin groups; Thinskinned disposition generally dependent on degree of individualism Fatalism A siesta approach to work and rest; patient expectation for reality to act; indifference to time or punctuality; tendency to leave matters unfinished or unrepaired; disapproval of high aspiration as being a challenge to fate; indiscriminate use of money; ‘Some things just happen.’ Ideals Independence and autonomy; generosity; hospitality; not quarrelsome, not aggressive, not striving; behaves properly regarding rues determining both his own nature and society as a whole Table 2. Because this listing is premised on the notion that quiet honor is gauged with respect to quiet expressions of dignity, and because it is the reference list for comparison with the intermediate and loud classifications, it follows that whatever varies from the quiet list is almost necessarily loud by some degree of comparison. The selection of loud traits below will be the collated and reduced average of societies that manifest concrete and clear examples of the type.
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An additional concern arises when a society exhibits both cooperative and competitive traits, as for example Japan and Russia where there are primarily structural antecedents to cooperative traits and functional (and quickly becoming structural) for competitive. Thus Japan becomes severely competitive for places in higher education, just as Russia has become more competitive with the advent of market practices. In addition to cooperative and competitive classifications we therefore urge a ‘mixed’ category as well, similar in principle to the mixed grouping in the intermediate class. Loud traits Individual honor Fulfills ideal behavior, not average expectations; the ‘protagonist’ of his group; results and success take precedence over downstream effects on others; looks others in the face and applies mannered proprieties to avoid feuds; constantly guards against slights Personality Insecurity of constant public evaluation breeds constant self-assertion; riskfriendly (rogues and adventurers welcome); working from agonistic values one must possess boundless self-confidence; stress on competition breeds envy; assert superiority or the right to equal esteem; prerogative is the desire to overcome a rival; modesty, humility and meekness appropriate only for women Individuality Indulgence toward boastful conduct; dependence greatly feared; oaths expose one to public right to assess culpability; joking scandalously prevents actual scandals; the individual personality is of the highest value; as a general rule private ownership of property is the norm Ideals Self-respecting, high-souled, generous, proudly ambitious; leadership, nobility of manner, honesty in personal dealings; placing one’s good name, social image and rank above all else; wealth reflects importance, while the misdeeds of the wealthy are invisible Table 3. The last table deal primarily with traits that are modern outgrowths of the traditional structures, or those in between the quiet and loud that may read differently enough to cause some wonderment, whence the interpretive aspect. The core ideas came from the same collection of societies used above. General Honor-based Traits Insecurity and bravado ‘Cargo’ mentality: a fancied deservedness of desirables that advanced cultures have not truly merited but at any rate should share or otherwise make available (as 8
good an explanation as any to account for China’s determination to thieve intellectual property by any means possible) ‘A general diffuse sense of sinfulness’ in which all men share,11 with little distinction between thought and deed, intolerance of ambiguity in status/rank A marked disinclination to air dirty laundry (the Western position allows this as expected from a doctrine of accountability, as least as an ideal) A motto appropriate for Russians and various South American elites: ‘Eat the cake, keep it, sacrifice little and change even less’ (also a great motto for a cult of dignity) [Véliz, 1994: 203-4]. Once having learned the Western concept of ‘dignity’ the honor-based come to have a love affair with the word, for reasons evident from the text. A disposition to strongly identify with national figures and groups earning prominence; states will ape Western constitutional ideals and then ignore them. Persons or groups will goad a dignity-based person or group into uncomfortable or discomfiting positions as a game of one-upmanship. Institutions and statism Institutions are populist, oligarchic, dogmatic and plagued with social and racial prejudices (e.g. the reaction to the Syrian refugee crisis) Stressing status differentials even in absence of discrepancies in living standards Highly nationalistic; a felt deservedness to cut a figure on the international stage; willing to accept remarkable deficiencies in basic rights in order to perceive stability and order in a difficult world. A predilection for cultivated overt or indirect aggression to achieve goals (see Gay, 1993); other advanced cultures seen as a threat to security or culture (the Russian government views toward America are not recent but have materialized over a century. Her individualism and success have always been strongly disapproved – as one will disapprove that of which one is jealous) An especially solicitous regard for children that makes many a dignity-based person seem Puritanical or uncaring. Personality and relations A happy-go-lucky weltanschauung nevertheless easily punctured by projected slights. Rare to seek control over others though manipulation is occasionally observed (by these criteria not ‘tight’). Relations to one’s children range from warm-loose to cool-tight. Personality closed in cooperative, open in competitive.
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A love of expression, especially eloquence, dance and song. A strong tendency to utilize symbolism to reveal deep feelings with a devil-may-care attitude toward the results (shove Israel into the Mediterranean: they know full well it won’t happen and that in any event is just not the point of the remark) Self-help is the reprised method of avoiding dependence and expressing independence. Independence also implies staying out of others’ disputes and expecting them to care for themselves. The poor and beggars are not infrequently removed from public areas. Quarrelsomeness is expected in quiet competitive groups as well as the intermediate class. In the quiet cooperative and loud class there are disincentives in the one case and absence of rationale in the other. “Those forms of behavior which involve self-control rather than endurance, measurement rather than unstinted giving or taking, or calculation rather than immediate response to a situation [are] extremely undeveloped” [Mead, 2001: 191]. Table 4. It should be noted that there exist honor-based factions within nominal dignity-based moieties, and these will manifest a number of the traits just recited. It is not necessarily a condemnation of a D-B society, but is evidence of immaturity at tolerating problems and/or the difficulty of changing long-held traditional habits in the H-B pockets. 3. The Quiet Class: Cooperative and Competitive Sub-types As stated above, an important first-tier member of this typology is the reality-ideality dimension. For the honor-based, the reality component drives and shapes many downstream indicators, including cooperative and competitive interactions. The reason for this is simply that the reality of ecology, economics and/or exigency all but dictates many if not most of the circumstances we call ‘cooperative’ and ‘competitive’. The reality of an excessively difficult environment often necessitates both a tight nuclear family and specific modes of cooperation within and between families. Over time individualism is not only favored but becomes endemic; as it colors effort and economy, it likewise tends toward competition, especially where the immaterial values of honor, prestige and status are at stake. The two societies to be discussed below meet these criteria, making the task one of defining and distinguishing the cooperative from the competitive features common to the respective ‘quiet’ classes. Here we will accept three general reasons for cooperative behavior in honor-based societies: 1) to cope with exigencies of any sort that cannot otherwise be addressed; 2) to avoid or avert conflict of the sort capable of sowing discord, and 3) that to which Margaret Mead ([1937] 1961a: 36) limits ‘cooperative’ behavior, namely, “from an effective closed group which
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demands internal cooperation from its members and maintains its position by hostility to outsiders.” Where the reality of exigency dictates nuclear families with a strong stress on individualism, coping and adapting are oftentimes achieved by means of person-to-person relations established for the purpose of staving off disruption consequent to events or competition. They may take the form of gift exchange, joking relationships or para-kin arrangements, for example. But these, Mead declares, fail to be ‘in any material sense cooperative’, suggesting instead that they be classified as ‘collective’, a term that seems altogether better situated to describe her own definition of ‘cooperation’. Nevertheless, in discussing the Mountain Arapesh (our first example, Mead, 1961b), she acknowledges what we take to be an obvious and necessary mode of cooperation: “Although every act of an Arapesh is performed as an individual service…the acts form a pattern of non-material cooperation toward a common goal.” What she is terming ‘an individual service’ is not much different in principle or purpose than ‘services’ performed by two clans in preparing for feasts or rituals, circumstances that she will readily acknowledge as cooperative. Our point is that cooperation can occur between two individuals where the common purpose is of some cultural moment and where otherwise such efforts would never take place by this means. By having all individuals acting thus, it is as if clans are cooperating, two persons at a time per instance of some service which must occur numerous times for the common effect, which in this case is the prevention of inter-kin conflict. In agreement with this notion are the Manus of the Admiralty Islands, for whom “cooperation is conceived of as cementing a relationship which is valuable to both parties” [Mead, 1961c: 232]. *
*
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The Mountain Arapesh are decidedly a ‘quiet’ group based on Mead’s reporting: The Arapesh ideal man is one who shows an all-round capacity for devotion to the community ends, one who is able and willing to lead in spite of a native dislike for leadership, one who is hospitable, wise, gentle, unquarrelsome, and intelligent in the sense that he is able to understand the ends of his society and to carry them out [at p. 40]. Sanctions in Arapesh “are against the individual who provokes anger” [at p. 42]. Nothing that they learn growing up “insists upon initiative, upon control of the environment” [at p. 47]. Quiet is as quiet begets. These two items pointedly dictate against loud behavior, in turn associated with competitive endeavors, making the ‘cooperative’ our choice in this case. As for competition, Mead remarks of “only one rivalry situation institutionalized in Arapesh” [at p. 41]. One of two men involved in a quarrel offers a challenge to the other, whose acceptance entails the conditions that will co-exist if they should elect to remain apart without contact. They now call themselves ano’in, “and their children in turn call each other ano’in. If these children are boys, they can joke together [the ‘joking relationship’]; if they are boy and girl it is considered appropriate for them to marry…[which is] always regarded as a peacemaking move….”
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Call this what you will, it is not really a ‘rivalry’ but rather the result of a rivalry in need of containment lest it become disruptive; the mode and manner follow that of an actual joking relation where maintaining peace is the intended outcome. It is true, however, that joking relationships in the competitive societies can be viewed appropriately as rivalries, for they imitate the actual rivalry and work out the differences in a form of game where everyone gets the matter off their chests with performances ultimately seen not as a rivalry, but instead as peaceful gesturing.12 *
*
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The Canadian Ojibwa, on the other hand, are ‘quiet-competitive’, another intensely individualistic society stressing private ownership of everything from hunting grounds to utensils, even contributions to songs and dances. Notably, “there are no cases of true group ownership” [Landes, 1961: 101]. As with so many small-scale individualist cultures there is little or no institutional backdrop for either political or social unity (though many less individualistic but still ‘quiet’ societies manage the latter, especially modern examples like Japan). Additional hallmarks of the quiet type evidenced by the Ojibwa include – 1) Leaders possess no executive authority; the captain of a war party has no authority to compel participation in a raid; even children can and do reject parental efforts to choose a mate; 2) They will often go out of their way to avoid so much as a disagreement: “It is unlikely, however, that a woman would seed rice if her husband objected strenuously, not because she felt his authority, but because she would choose to avoid ill-feeling in the household” [p. 96]; and 3) Those with more to offer are expected to give when asked (those rejected have sorcery to rely upon). As is common in quiet-competitive societies, “individualistic ideals for boys are correlated with pride” [p. 122]. “A boy’s life is full of never-ending incentives to personal achievement” [p. 118]. Example: “A man aspires for renown in the male activities of shamanism, hunting, and war, in all or in some of these; and loses status if he is permanently unsuccessful” [p. 123]. Competitiveness is also presumed from the existence of joking relationships. Marriages reflect competition in being brittle, “fairly short and very stormy” [p. 104]. Men feel humiliation keenly and will devote themselves to revenge. Polygyny is practiced not out of economic necessity but as a status object for the man. One need only be ‘influential’ and suspected of sorcery to hold others in abeyance; “People cower physically before them, shrink away, hush their talk, straighten their faces lest the shaman suspect some intended offence…” [p. 113]. Shamans in particular are especially sensitive even to imagined slights; yet this counts more as an isolated extension of what is in fact the norm throughout the society. “All persons and households mistrust one another, for reasons of pride” [p. 125].
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A thin-skinned society is a competitive society. The question is how the consequences of competition are directed. In the Ojibwa it is especially noteworthy that the stress is against anything ‘loud’. “Laughing, particularly on the part of women, is not loud but light” [my stress, p. 114]. “Only heedless young men…are foolish enough to guffaw at one another” [p. 114]. There are two possible ways of looking at this. The society may be adjusted to loud elements in speech and behavior but curtail them under risk of thin-skinned reactions, or the reaction of the shamans is simply an extension of a social code limiting such emphasis. Shamans did not pick up that specific sensitivity out of thin air; if they saw it as offensive so also would others, if less dramatically. In other societies, where loudness actually typifies ‘normal’ behavior, there is little or no negative reaction to any kind of laughing except that which is clearly pointed at a specific person and behavior with the equally clear intent to slight them. And in a loud society there are very few so sensitive that they cannot handle rejection or small slights by brushing them off or returning a riposte that in turn is handled matter-of-factly. Thus the Ojibwa shamans’ reactions against loudness, even though sensitive to it, is strong evidence that we have a quintessential ‘quiet competitive’ society. If the shamanic response to loud expression reflects a cultural habit, the Ojibwa look rather like the Bachiga of East Africa (Edel, 1961: 152), another individualistic society, one in which “the culture is organized in such a fashion as to minimize the competitive effects of the recognized traits clearly seen in the love of boasting and of betting”. As with the Ojibwa, Bachiga cooperation is minimal and competition is implied in behavioral effects rather than appearing in obvious rivalries. Both are quiet-competitive honor-based societies despite a comfort level with loud expressions (boasting) and behavior (in dance and gambling for example). The institutionalized effort to control it marks the distinction we look for in order to make the classification adequate to the reality. This stands opposed to an intermediate mixed type like that of the Ammassalik Eskimos (see below, section four), whose boorishness is socially accepted, collectively a suite of very loud behaviors anathema to a quiet society but welcomed in the context of drum matches. Very unlike the Ojibwa or Bachiga, no cultural or group influence acts to mediate, let alone ameliorate, such influences. 4. The Intermediate Class: Composite and Mixed Sub-types The composite structure – of two identifiable and distinct groups dividing the quiet and loud between them – is most frequently, as least in modern times, a function of (Wolf, 2001: 154) – “the dualization of society into a dominant entrepreneurial sector and a dominated sector of native peasants [widely seen] in peaceful as well as warlike circumstances, in metropolitan as well as colonial countries.” In many traditional societies it is originally an offshoot of individualistic competition, as in the following example. The classic study of an ‘intermediate-composite’ culture is that of Charles A. Valentine’s (1963) report on the Lakalai, a group located on the volcanic island of New Britain in Melanesia. This is a society of some three thousand souls (Valentine’s work evaluated some 250) with no history of 13
chieftainship and no hereditary leadership or rank. Where achievement is desired there are several paths, thus reducing the likelihood of a dignity cult. Recent history entails involvement with a cargo movement (which presupposes individualistic endeavor on a sizeable scale), specifically a desire for the goods and manners derived from outside culture contact. Valentine wastes little time getting to the heart of the cultural constitution, citing the native terms transliterated to English describing the characteristics of two groups. In one we find men of anger, play, movement, diffuse attention and sexuality. In the other, men of shame, silence, good conduct, knowledge and art. ‘Loud’ and ‘quiet’ could hardly be more evident despite a sparse description. Getting more specific with respect to those characterized as angry, they are… …individuals who become angry frequently, easily, or without appropriate cause. Such persons are quick to take offense, ready to participate in quarrels, and easily moved to physical violence [p. 445]. With regard to the sexual aspect: …individuals…regarded as being highly sexed, greatly interested in sexual activities, and uninhibited in their expression of this interest. It is said that persons in this category may spend so much time and energy in intercourse that they become tired out, hollow-eyed, and even ill [p. 445]. We have seen the attributes of anger in every individualistic society in which point of honor (individual honor) is important. Quiet societies are especially sensitive to sexual excess, where there are strict penalties for loose morals. Clearly the men of sexuality are indeed very loud by that standard. As for men of shame and silence, these words together connote “ ‘a man who sits silent.’ Their more general significance can be represented as ‘a man who is not talkative,’ ‘a man who conducts himself quietly’” [p. 446, my emphasis]. Good conduct suggests “From one point of view, ‘man of propriety’…. The idea of ‘good conduct’ which is expressed here evokes explicit approval and positive ethical valuation” [p. 446]. It need not be stressed how perfectly this fits with the ‘quiet’ style. What we have just recounted Valentine summarizes: In terms of both observed usage and elicited informant testimony, ‘man of anger’ and ‘man of shame’ are in sharp, consciously recognized contrast. Much the same can be said of the phrase pairs which invoke ‘play’ as opposed to ‘silence’ and ‘movement’ as against ‘good conduct’ [p. 447]. While this section treats both of composite and mixed types, it should not be a surprise if a culture with the duality of a composite also exhibits a portion of the populace in which the types are mixed, as the following reveals in the case of the Lakalai: There is a minority of individuals about whom there is doubt or disagreement among informants and who seem to the observer to exhibit traits from both sides of the typological dichotomy. These individuals tend to be leading personalities who may combine, for 14
example, a tendency to angry responses, verbal expressiveness, physical mobility, and uninhibited sexuality with care in observing customary proprieties, a high degree of concentrated attention, and achievement in certain traditional skills [p. 448]. An unexpected finding – given that the place of women in virtually any honor-based society is of modesty, especially in sexual matters – is one in which Valentine summarizes another researcher who worked with Lakalai women and discovered that they, too, followed the dichotomy. *
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The Ammassalik Eskimos of Greenland (Mirsky, 1961), like the Mountain Arapesh, are condemned to a ribald individualism that makes Westerners look a tad timid by comparison. These Eskimos deal with the expected competitive drives not by thwarting them but by channeling them. The ideal Eskimo is “one who is outstanding in skill, in strength, in power, a man who expresses his personality fully and without being deterred by economic, social, or supernatural sanctions” [at p. 73]. This sounds so contrary to everything Arapesh that absent further information one could be forgiven for placing such a culture out of the ‘quiet’ category altogether. And despite the list below that might dictate otherwise, you would be correct. This Eskimo group is ‘intermediate mixed’. They could still be quiet-competitive were it not for what followed the excerpt above: “Such a man can take what he wants without fear, he can do as he pleases without being checked or ostracized, he is at once a terror and a pride.” First, notice how otherwise the basics look very much like a quiet group… 1) There is no political unity, no organized leadership, no social stratification. Inequalities are of quality, not quantity; 2) Cooperative enterprises tend to be those in which all share in the work and the rewards; no one is rewarded for exemplary performance; 3) A headman’s authority is limited to hosting guests and determining the division and arrangement of stalls within the great house; 4) Each person can with reason consider him- or herself ‘important’ barring conflicts with those much more powerful; 5) Unlike many other Eskimo groups there are no hospitality wrestling matches nor any shamanic contests (quiet societies are a bit chary of competitive games and sport), and 6) Children are never punished regardless their refractory behavior. As we learn more about the Ammassalik we find that a comparatively small group of powerful men have won the esteem of the group and are free to take immunities as if they were possessed of a mighty amount of status. While the society does not in principle approve what they do, still there is nothing done to stop what they do that is wrong, items that cause a ripple effect throughout the society. That this occurs against so many quiet traits only tells us that ‘loudness’ takes its start from humble origins, and for classification purposes this is essential to point out and recognize when seen.
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The sort of competitiveness serving to spawn the tell-tale ‘loud’ traits and to define this sub-type need not (though it often enough does) entail actual rivalry, but it will of necessity bring immaterial values into play in a way that influences downstream activities. A commonly observed example of this kind comes from matriarchal arrangements in which descent on the maternal side has far-reaching effects engulfing much of the culture. The biological father will pay less heed to his own children if only because the mother’s brother will at some point take over the helm as a de facto father. Some societies permit clan structures that temper these results by introducing some inheritance on the father’s side. Even so, conflicts may arise when the maternal clan exerts it rights on the death of the father, voiding the latter’s last wishes if it so desires. Marriages tend to be brittle, with all the expected consequences. Brittle marriages need not be matriarchal in origin and will in fact result from extreme individualism where the more powerful assume a ‘might-is-right’ attitude that is to an extent tolerated by society but which also results in wife-stealing in a culture where she is a categorical necessity. “By far the greater number of marriages are concluded by the simple act of a man’s taking a woman, whether it be from her father or her husband. Women are taken by force, with the rewards going to the most powerful man” [at p. 67]’ To add insult to injury, “bartering can include everything from a wife to a bone dart; it can be a permanent transaction or a temporary exchange” [at p. 60]. A younger but marginally weaker man must perforce live under the sword of Damocles, fearing the theft of an essential component of the family’s very existence, or that a trade or exchange may not result in the return of the wife. With good reason the author mentions thrice the words ‘suspicion’ and ‘slander’, which are here endemic. As with quiet societies in general, serious aggression accompanies only the most egregious breaches of social mores. Here, however, murder is not infrequent for much the same reason as wife-stealing. The powerful carry immunities that make life difficult for everyone else. All that can be done is to contain the degree and spread of anger. For most traditional societies joking relationships form a part of the defenses, but so also do rituals, select ceremonies and third-party arbitrators. For the Ammassalik people, however, the ‘drum match’ alone serves the purpose for all of the above. While this is a juridical procedure and a method for settling disputes, yet it conforms to the wider social pattern of singing songs for pleasure…. (…) A match of this kind is not settled in one encounter, but is carried on for years, the parties taking turns visiting one another. (…) [These drum songs] arise from a competitive situation, a man’s taking another’s wife…. But from this competitive start the drum matches, after a long inconclusive series of events in which the initial hostility gets lost in a pleasant social pastime, degenerate into a cooperative act in which the two principals and the onlookers all enjoy the ‘show’ [at pp. 68-70]. At first glance this is the picture perfect ‘quiet’ response to conflict. At second glance, it is unsettling that there is nothing more to quell or redress the quality and quantity of offences observed, and which serves effectively no purpose either as a disincentive or as a punishment,
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while admittedly preventing a snowballing into something like a feud. The fact is simply that the Ammassalik tolerate, where they do not actually enjoy, the saga and drama of prestige. Such outstanding men are not classified, rated, and compared one with another; there is no set number of such individuals allowed; each stands out clearly…. Prestige is a direct reflection of a powerful personality. And having set this as an ideal the Ammassalik accept all behavior by which such an individual manifests his greatness: violence, arrogance, aggressiveness” [ pp. 73-4]. No quiet society however defined tolerates these descriptives. Whether by speech or action they are deemed excessively loud and thus disruptive. ‘Arrogance’ in particular is perhaps the most damning epithet the ‘quiet’ throws at the ‘loud’. What makes the Ammassalik an ‘intermediate mixed’ (recall the alternative, the ‘intermediate composite’, where quiet and loud belong to disparate groups coexisting in the society) is a loudness that is ‘bought into’ by the society as a whole rather than within an isolated segment. Typically, there is a group variously defined in which conduct wins at once esteem as well as immunities; once the population as a whole has taken on or otherwise accepted these traits as an ideal, the group as a whole, having thus ‘bought into’ the type, now qualifies for both quiet and loud mixed together – making the components occasionally difficult to disentangle except by identifying what is loud and why what is loud is the way it is. By way of summarizing it should be made clear why it is that we have not been describing a sort of free-floating dignity cult. But these cults are never ‘free-floating’ but are formal and institutional, framed for public benefit even if sabotaged by officers or membership. Thus whenever the public not only approves such conduct but also participates in it, there is no longer a cult but instead an identification with, as well as a ‘buying into’ loud behavior, as is the case with the Ammassalik. 5. The Loud Class: Cult (of Dignity) and Caudillo Sub-types A criterion of the loud honor-based society is that it collectively buys into loud behavior – for the Ifugao of the Philippines, loud is marked by aggressiveness, the antics of shrewdness, coupled with behavior originating in points of honor. What distinguishes the cult of dignity from the intermediate class is the evidence of group-based defense of privilege with the advertisement that such dignity has been purchased – and thus their prestige vouchsafed – by potlatch-like gifts to society. “The very wealthy…have validated their position by giving elaborate and costly feasts to their poor neighbors…” [Goldman, 1961a: 161]. Linked specifically to the cult is a second criterion that must often be discerned rather than readily observed: no attempt is made to limit downstream negative influences upon lower classes, occasionally even of circumstances limiting their own wealth, as in the case of illness in which curing is exorbitantly expensive, where “one field after another is sold to purchase the livestock needed for sacrifice, until even the most prosperous are driven to the wall” [at p. 160].
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Far from rising up against these influences, the wealthy are excused their methods, and all alike recognize wealth as something to be preserved, but also (in the case of the Ifugao) as a crapshoot in which risk-friendly attitudes prevail over sustaining the circumstances of wealth itself. A corollary to these criteria is that loud society need not, and does not, turn on the amount or degree of cooperativeness or competition, both of which always coexist in varied proportions. The Ifugao are classified (Goldman, 1961a: 178-9; Mead, 1961a: 461) as ‘competitive’ not because there aren’t areas of significant cooperation but because the observable broad cultural brushstroke clearly revolves about a competitive background. A feudal-like band of familycentric organization finds “family…against family in a dueling situation that is reflected in practically every aspect of social behavior” [p. 159]. The result is a class-based system in which the middle struggles to reach higher status and desperately avoids sinking into poverty and dependence. The latter is frequent enough, for wealth comes with ownership of rice paddies which are limited and expensive to build. Owning fewer rice fields leaves the economics of survival open to question, with “a good part of the community…in debt to him [the wealthy]” [p. 161] as they slip behind in availability of resources. Should “a father fall badly into debt he will bond his son out as a servant” [p. 171]. Thus the apex of society is at once cause and rescuer of distress. Heavy interest rates at once reflect the scarcity of resources and assure the precarious status of the debtor. Whereas the cult assesses a 100% interest rate, such does not apply within and between the wealthy groups even when borrowing does become necessary. “’And don’t charge me interest,’ wrote one wealthy Canaanite to another, in a tablet dated 1200BC, ‘after all, we are both gentlemen’” [Graeber, 2011: 86]. The club secures itself at all cost. The society buys into this largely for lack of an institutional security blanket beyond the wealthy. But the society is also fond enough of prestige, as we have seen elsewhere. This assures the popularity of head-hunting, the only way for a lower class member to achieve higher rank. It is also reflected in legal customs in which “an offence against a rich man is more reprehensible than a like offence against a member of the poorer class” [p. 167]. The cement, beyond economic duress, lies with the fact that “what the Ifugao fears most is loss of face” [p. 175]. Dependence upon the wealthy is done so as to retain face when disaster strikes, but at the cost of further dependence. And, here as elsewhere, the high status person has immunities, and is “only the more envied for [a given] violation of custom” [p. 174]. It is a mark of a dignity cult that the public attitude to wealth and prestige is in part to blame for the consequences suffered, and often makes the cult difficult to objectively discern. *
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On the other hand, a cult might be ‘perceived’ yet not properly exist. The Kwakiutl group of the Northwest Pacific Coast [Goldman, 1961b] is an example of the type; renowned for their potlatches and for what appears to be a highly stratified society, it is easy at first blush to think: ‘okay, dignity cult’. Thus the higher strata take umbrage at the lower classmen wishing to enter the potlatch contests, for example. As with the Ifugao it can be difficult to advance in status. As 18
with the Ifugao there is a premium on achievement, and loud traits are indulged in universally. Yet the Kwakiutl society is in our classification not a loud cult group, nor even another ‘intermediate mixed’ society. The reasons why are they are a ‘quiet competitive’ society (admittedly at the extreme end) are thus instructive in assessing dignity and its cult. Part of the issue lies in the ironic ‘quiet’ character of what appears on the surface to be so very loud. “For the Kwakiutl this unabashed boasting is culturally accepted and formalized” [at p, 205]. This, therefore, is where we begin our examination. As societies get louder the concern over quiet traits gradually diminishes until deportment frankly flies in the face of quiet notions. What is really at stake – what really changes – is the regard to dignity that functions as the backbone of honor. It is the dignity, for example, of deportment and conduct that forms the ballast and justification for such honor as may be rightfully claimed. The Kwakiutl, in acclimating to loud traits have in this instance not lost sight of the dignity aback honor as compared with those societies having become intermediate composite/mixed, let alone those of the cultists. A not insignificant part of the dignity of a quiet society is found in the degree to which basic needs are met for people who otherwise might not have the wherewithal to attain them. The dignity of the quiet culture requires that folks have food, clothing and shelter. It is largely to achieve these desiderata that so much cooperative collective engagement occurs. This is all out of respect to dignity, without which their honor would amount to far less. Thus the Kwakiutl, far from leaving food as a challenge to the individual acting in full autonomy, make arrangements through each village chief to secure 50% of the fish catch to distribute to the people during rough times. This has occurred in none of the individualistic groups we have thus far met (except where quiet cooperative, that is). As a general precept: “It is always the responsibility of the chief to provide for his people when they are in need” [p. 182]. Not really the ‘loud’ way of doing things…. Where loud traits serve a purpose in ‘quiet’ society their use is balanced with a justificatory relation to dignity. The loudest of the loud traits in the Kwakiutl is without question the braggadocio of the potlatch. But the potlatch is grounded in two interconnected kinds of goods/valuables, one of which expresses honor (the outward objective material goods such a blankets, dog’s teeth and coppers), and the other, the immaterial valuables (primarily names and titles) that speak to dignity. No Kwakiutl potlatch is without both together, which greatly resolves the matter of ‘loud’ in the context of a justificatory dignity. As with the Ojibwa and Bachiga, Kwakiutl society has institutionalized controls on the volume of loud. It is usual in all societies that the high-status folk are granted some few immunities. The highest status in Kwakiutl society flows to the chiefs, each of whom is accorded “great leeway in expressing his personal glory [but they] nevertheless draw the line at overdoing. A chief may become so arrogant and no more” [p. 197]. Arrogance is without question as loud as dignity gets. To retain the honor associated with status implies that there is a dignity granted along with the immunity, a dignity to make up for the loudness deficit. It is as if, as Graeber (2011: 168) remarked, “honor is surplus dignity,” meaning 19
one can lose that surplus in the loudness of arrogance and still retain the honor of status. But there are built-in limits to surplus dignity beyond which behavior must not go. The general precept: “Kwakiutl society…permits great latitude to the individual both in his attempts to secure individual aggrandizement and in his expression of self-importance – but always with the provision that he must not overdo it” [206]. It is the least a quiet society demands under these circumstances. Sumptuous feasting can be the reward to divinities for help they have provided. They can also speak to the justification of position, as if offering the assurance of substance standing behind the position gained (as with the Ifugao). They can also, with particular reference to potlatches, serve as the basis for competitive contests of worth and honor, where payment for blankets announces value backing the dignity of title. Competition essentially bids the amounts higher and higher until one side achieves honor at the expense of the other, which simply refuses to pay any more. This is the usual list given to account for feasting on a grand scale. It is forgetting one of the most important, one that is without question needful to the ‘quiet’ system. From the lists in section (2) it is apparent that the quiet cultures value independence and autonomy, thus have pitifully little good to say about supervening authority. Indeed there is a widespread awareness throughout the honor-based system, a specific chariness to authority mixed with power, that leaves the individual dubious whether power can coexist with proprieties to dignity. Consider the title (Haley, 1991): Authority Without Power: Law and the Japanese Paradox. It is assumed that power introduces authoritarianism and preferential treatment for the top at the expense of the vast middle and bottom. These are valid worries, after all. Almost universally, quiet systems address these qualms with a simple answer: to all who aspire to prominence regardless the position, they must justify their sincerity and willingness to work for the whole without aggrandizing the position for themselves. Where feasting is commonly used for justificatory purposes, so also in sending to the public the message that they willingly accede to a demonstration of their worthiness to be trusted. Indeed, while it is true that there is a rivalry component to the potlatch, its actual origin speaks in part to the quiet-based need to qualify power.13 Potlatches were originally the province of the influential and wealthy, those selected for political positions. Rivalry for honor can be done without the peculiarities of the potlatch. “One gains even greater prestige by destroying property. As in the sale of a copper, the destruction of a copper is a challenge which the rival must meet with the destruction of one of an equal or greater value” [191]. One does not destroy one’s own (or one’s kin’s) valuable property in a public forum without a rationale beyond the ever-present rivalry. Many rivalry contests require upping the ante on giving and receiving, and these are based on points of honor. They are not based on destruction of wealth, normally associated with the collapse of prestige and honor. The potlatch is unique specifically in this manner, and so appears to speak beyond rivalry. If so, it speaks to the most important quiet desideratum, the assurance of autonomy free from coercion from above. Holders of political office are presumed to be stewards of the public interest. This is fundamental to ‘quiet’ thinking, and is gradually lost as loud traits 20
increasingly serve private interests. An interesting example comes from Quain (1961: 245) in discussing the Iroquois: “The two sets of ideals, that of peaceful cooperation toward national ends and that of competition for individual glory, are thoroughly antagonistic; the overgrowth of the latter was a symptom of the former.” It has been mentioned that the Kwakiutl give the appearance of a severely stratified society. On closer inspection, however, this observation is likewise open to dispute. The classes, to the extent they are correctly so-called, consist of nobles, commoners and slaves. So far, so good. But the problems start precisely here. Valuables are distributed according to the law of primogeniture in which the elder sons constitute the nobility and their very own siblings constitute the commoners. Not the most promising fodder for a caste system and certainly not for a dignity cult. Having mentioned above that the higher strata ‘take umbrage at low-brows wishing to enter the potlatch contests’, we should also add that the nobles hold their sib commoners in contempt and take the very most extreme umbrage toward the nouveau riche. For any of these we must inquire whether they refer simply to the principle that honor settles rivalries only with others of like rank, with the corollary that all rivals are held in sublime contempt – or whether on the other hand there exists the us v. them attitude of the dignity cult. The degree of frank unabashed rivalry in the potlatch contests speaks mainly to honor in this case. Furthermore, were this a cult phenomenon, the wealthy class would disallow the potlatch to any but themselves, and yet it exists in the same fashion, with the same rules, all throughout society. We also mentioned earlier that it is difficult to advance in status. ‘Difficult’ in this case hardly implies the hardship we see in the Ifugao. For the younger son of a Kwakiutl, “a commoner without status, marriage may afford an opportunity to acquire names and privileges that will raise his rank, though this is not easy” [p. 195]. An older brother might loan his name and privileges to a younger brother on evidence that the latter has the means to give a potlatch. Even one’s middling father receives titles from his father-in-law (maternal side) which are expected to be transferred to his son. All things considered, we must pay special heed to quiet characteristics, realizing that loud conduct requires justification, but that justification allows toleration if the players are of status, whence the expressions are themselves examples of immunities typical of status. We must further take cognizance of the role of dignity in the hierarchy of honor, appreciating in particular that loud traits are questioned largely for presupposing a reduction in the expression of dignity, to which institutionalized measures must be instituted to keep a lid on matters. Beyond this we take care to note whether a given trait or behavior is truly that of a dignity cult or only appears to be. *
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Looking over the last few hundred years of social history it has become apparent that the honorbased societies (more and more individualistic by and large, and featuring political factions with significant power) seem prone to totalitarian rule. We have already outlined the chief reasons for this phenomenon, which can be briefly summarized by way of introduction. Two carryovers from the quiet societies and one from the composite have survived unscathed: 1) a tendency for 21
the population to allow and favor dependence on authoritative groups, political or otherwise; 2) political power is apt to be authoritarian, and 3) an increasing stress on the felt perception that order and tranquility require top-heavy restraints and protective capabilities. The ‘Caudillo pattern’ relies variously upon these elements for its existence and functionality, as well as for its ability to persevere despite opportunities for acculturation. The pattern is actually an example of an ad hoc office, meeting the chief criterion that a concentrated authority or power is put in place to accomplish for society what otherwise would not be possible. As with other offices (civil and professional) it is an ‘institution’ for influencing society at large. It differs from other institutions in that the situation-dependent and voluntary nature both of its officeholders and their clients is distinctive relative to the other office types. Specifically, the caudillo pattern features potential clients who offer their allegiance in return for occasional ‘favors’. These are not, however, favors as a considered social obligation, but instead acts that ordinarily (with exceptions) merely reassure the client that a dependence serves the ends of personal and family security in an uncertain world. This is an important observation not often enough stressed. Dealy (1992: 51) phrases the matter well: “Clients, therefore, are not persons to be taken care of and expedited on their way. Clients are to be savored, preserved about one’s person.” The benefit for the ‘surrounded one’ resides in the fact that the “life of power is secured, barring some unforeseen catastrophe…. But for most the struggle for influence is real, pervasive, vicious, and all-consuming.” This has resulted in an epithet for the institution: ‘the mendicancy of influence’. Given the nature of authority to aggrandize upon the powers of office, however, we might as well add to mendicancy the more dangerous term ‘mendacity’. As Revel (1992) spent a great deal of effort detailing, this kind of mendacity absent any real sincerity accounts for most totalitarian motivations. And what largely accounts for the caudillo office is its extension from a preexisting ad hoc office, that of religious intercession, a staple of Catholic influence around the world. Having originated deep within the bowels of culture, these institutions are not easily evaded, let alone overcome. When these offices were translated into military terms – armed militias under a common landlord – the last major step was in place such that men on horseback (cadillos) could now constitute the hub of a social pattern, that of caudillaje, the four features of which are detailed by Wolf & Hansen (1992: 63): 1) The repeated emergence of armed patron-client sets, cemented by personal ties of dominance and submission, and by a common desire to obtain wealth by force of arms; 2) The lack of institutionalized means for succession to offices [i.e., civil]; 3) The use of violence in political competition; and 4) The repeated failures of incumbent leaders to guarantee their tenures as chieftains. The acme of the political caudillo system is the bureaucracy (Dealy, 1992: 58): “The capitalist’s abrasiveness and impatience says, ‘I have self-worth because I represent such and such a 22
company and I am entitled to service’. The caudillaje person says, ‘I have self-worth because I am in charge of these stamps and forms and I will exact your deference on that basis the way you would exact deference on the basis of your wealth and economic position….’” When we say that honor-based societies in a modern age are typically corrupt, where offices are rewards rather than callings, we are only restating the caudillo prerogative to exact payment in return for continuation of the ‘pattern’ of reciprocity: allegiance for ‘favors’. In elective politics all the dictator requires is to call in another exaction, accumulating the votes of all who have become enmeshed in his stature and eminence. Even where votes are not exactly a tit-for-tat, there remains a collective presumption favoring a given caudillo: the assurance of order. “The authority…like that of all the caudillos…was based on the unconscious suggestion of our majority. Our people…instinctively followed the strongest, the bravest and the smartest, whose personality had become a legend in the popular imagination and from whom the people expected absolute protection” [Smith, 1992: 93, his emphasis]. ‘Free and fair’ elections thus produce dictators without a shot being fired. It may as well be a bloodless coup, not unlike the election of Hamas in Palestine, which was founded upon elective reciprocity from services that had long proven beyond the power of a defunct state (or a moribund Israeli overlord) to make available. The final transformation of Caudillo into totalitarian or fascist dictator parallels the extreme German individualism of Max Stirner (1973: 19):14 I, the egoist, have not at heart the welfare of this ‘human society’. I sacrifice nothing to it. I only utilize it: but to be able to utilize it completely I must transform it rather into my property and my creature…. Morse (1992: 81) describes the system as it was in the nineteenth century and to which we believe it applies far beyond into the twenty-first and well beyond Latin America: The charismatic leader may be dedicated to molding the self-perpetuating traditions of a state-community…or, which is more usual, he may set about exploiting the country as his private fief. … Such a caudillo would win the army’s allegiance…then assert control over the several classes by blandishment, personal magnetism, or threat of force…. This is now quite reminiscent of totalitarian regimes throughout the modern world, whence we allow the label ‘caudillo’ to describe them.15 *
*
*
Stalin’s Russia offers an excellent opportunity to examine a Caudillo organization.16 Russia has been seriously misunderstood from a cultural perspective; not so long ago it was supposed that the country was essentially European. Russia has a heavy Slavic representation, as do Eastern 23
European states in general. But while the latter are miscegenating with European populations and policies, Russia has been and remains marginally isolated in a cultural sense, and so is little more European (which is largely, indeed almost entirely, dignity-based) than Japan or India. At the termination of World War II many millions of Soviet soldiers were out of homeland jurisdiction, whereat a surprisingly large percentage defected to Western powers (Inkeles et al., 1967: 338 n.14). The study in Hunt’s collection by Inkeles, Hanfmann and Beier is a portrayal of these emigrants. What was it about life under Stalin that was so objectionable? Have any of the responsible traits or policies survived into the twenty-first century? Germane to our brief overview, the authors see what we require to see as well: They appear to feel a need for aid from without in the form of guidance and pressure exerted by higher authority and by the group to assist them in controlling their impulses [319-20 …. There was an expectation that those with power would in fact be harsh, aloof and authoritarian [326]. Mead (2001: 1912) echoes this with nearly the same wording. This likewise tallies with the brutal realism that honor-based peoples express in so many varied ways. We can also stress their honor-based pedigree and observe composite trait arrangements between certain specific groups while mixed for the population at large– Quiet: 1) a conscious preoccupation with trust v. mistrust; 2) apprehension that people may not be what they outwardly seem; 3) penitent for acting out, they were not punitive toward themselves for such failings; 4) authority will of necessity use both persuasion and coercion; 5) they feel their way through idealistically-focused situations rather than rigorously thinking them through; 6) dependence on loving protection and security...in relations with formal authority figures, and above all 7) a profound acceptance of group membership and relatedness along with a preoccupation with offering food together with hospitality Loud: 1) not at all of a compulsive disposition to or for regularity, order or self-control; 2) high degree of expressiveness and emotional ‘aliveness’; 3) typified by great volubility with emphasis on singing (occasionally see in quiet groups however); 4) an outstanding trait is said to be ‘contradictoriness’ and ‘ambivalence’; 5) willingness to offer and entrust confidences despite the risks, and 6) open willingness to offer criticism or express anger What was found objectionable with the controlling structure under Stalin’s regime was the mix of dignity cult identifiers. The authors summarize the resulting difficulties: “Fear of reprisal at the hands of the secret police, opposition to institutions like the collective farm, or resentment of the low standard of living and the absence of political freedom” [328]. From the cult’s view, the secret police are necessary to curb any effort at disruption of the command system (a typical H-B function gone amuck); the command system is the sine qua non to the philosophy spouted but defied by practice: aspects of communalism, however pleasing in the general perspective, wear thin the strivings of individualism but are shoved down throats because the command structure knows best (the parental expectation of the H-B system gone amuck). The low standard of living and absence of freedom are expected consequences that intend to prove the value of the system rather than to offer real objections to it. Of course the command 24
structure expects these objections and reacts accordingly by way of the secret police, thus revealing much of the true character of the system – a veritable cult of dignity. Their dignity is best and exemplary of the best (and only) philosophy along with the best (and only) truth. Specifically – 1) “The system of control required that each and all should constantly watch and report on each other” [at p. 329 – which turns the ‘quiet’ noninterference ideal on its head, while also taking an ideal cult of honor rule (self-accountability) and turning the objective into enforcement of command rather than stewarded authority. “Self-criticism and mutual criticism…became established as consciencequickening procedures” [Mead, 2001: 191]. The cult expects this as a measure of thanks for the advantages of living under the great philosophy. 2) “The regime took pride in following Lenin in ‘pushing’ the masses. It demanded that individuals be responsible and carry on ‘on their own’ with whatever resources were at hand…” [p. 330 – classic H-B self-help ideals turned to the ends of justifying a defective set of self-ordained circumstances]. The cult is never wrong and others are always to accept and/or repair its problems. 3) “The regime tried to focus shame on non-performances [of quotas or bureaucratic rules]. To judge by the clinical sample, however, the Russian is little shamed by these kinds of performance failures” [p. 330-31]. The cult is entirely unmindful of local preferences or inherent characteristics. Where the power is presumed to enforce obedience there will be as much power as it takes. Because the cult cannot be wrong, neither can its methods be questioned. 4) “It gained support for its emphasis on a massive formal program of social welfare measures, even if they were not too fully implemented” [p. 330]. Aspects of the ‘philosophy’ mirrored true H-B ideals and were thus as well received as appropriate to the culture. But the command structure was not willing to trust its own people to extend benefit of the doubt, but instead fomented doubt through heavy-hand methods that were anything but the nurturant and parental governance that was expected by any H-B moiety imaginable. The cult is never trusting and does not care about anything quite so much as itself. Philosophical motivations can be honest enough, but the attitudes are divorced from any rational hope of satisfying the principles aback the philosophy. Cults of dignity are legion, powerful and are surviving because they quench thirst for order and stability despite offering three times as much by way of negatives. The aristocratic-oligarchic command structure in the United States, as also the entire command structure of China, meet all of the criteria of mammoth cults of dignity that will be especially difficult to tame let alone undo, let alone overturn. But no true dignity-based society will emerge except one of more of these ends be accomplished, at which time the results, if successful, will be seen to mimic the quiet honor-based formulation in everything but rationale: the honor-based treat honor as collective and the rights to it as inherent, by dint of which they maintain security, safety, order and a modicum of tranquility through ideals that in function are identical to the idealist dignity-based doctrines that undo 25
themselves by failing to put a check on rampant individualism. If the Russian philosophy is effectively one of pitching against the individualists of the West (which appears to be the truest evaluation), they have a valid point were it not for their methods and gracelessness in confronting the deficiencies of their own philosophy. *
*
*
One might reasonably ask how one distinguishes the Caudillo pattern from the dignity cult pattern. Because the Caudillo attitudes reflect long-standing cultural habits, it is taken for granted that the Caudillo does actually possess the wherewithal to assert an elevated dignity and to expect immunities on that account. This is not the cult, in which the presumed prerogatives are just that, presumptuous. The Caudillo is not inherently a cult of dignity despite seeming to be. Nor is a cult of dignity inherently of a Caudillo pattern, for here there is no thought of overtly compelling actions or consent, and especially not by way of overt violence. The cult pattern works behind the scenes And desires that the normative office be all that the public sees. Thus the cult is not inherently a Caudillo pattern. That neither need imply the other does not, however, mean that there is no overlap, for the reality is often that there is: the cultist makes overt demands and applies overt pressure or the Caudillo applies a presumptuous dignity. In these cases it is best to describe all the relevant behavior and classify it as ‘mixed’ unless one can observe a preponderance of traits favoring one or the other type. 6. Quiet and Loud Dignity Throughout the honor-based pantheon of behaviors one fact stands out as if it were of proverbial provenance: All dignity is quiet dignity. This explains why any expression that would derogate from perceived dignity (i.e., loud) must itself be justified. To be loud and without justificatory rationale or with no custom or mores to back it up, is to invite severe punishment. One of the most notable, because infamous, is the practice of ‘honor killing’ often seen in the Mediterranean but which has examples throughout the world of honor-based culture. It is simply an extreme form of a common denominator. Two especially vexing institutions seen widely throughout honor-based cultures are those of ‘joking’ (similar but distinct from ‘clowning’, also widely observed) and status-based immunities. Both can be best explained as examples in which loud behavior is justified by mores and which together can and do elevate appreciation for the sensibility of quiet dignity, which in actual appearance they are anything but. A parent can point a finger at a disobedient child, but never the reverse. The reason is that the parents can hardly be accused of lacking dignity with respect to their children, those for whom their solicitous regard is paramount. The child, however, would require a healthy justification (to avoid a harsh reprimand) for contemptuously pointing at his or other’s parents. One conceivable justification could be conveyed through humor, as when the child is mimicking his parents, sending the message that what they have done has hurt his pride and he wants to indicate this symbolically but without incurring a slap. This is essentially how joking and clowning function 26
in the honor-based societies, where there is inherent friction between kin groups that must, all the same, find a way to work cooperatively. In the quiet honor-based society it can be considered very loud behavior for anyone to point a finger at someone else. Justifications are difficult to find; we would expect a reaction to the fault. Folks would deliver the unexpressed message that the pointer can be socially isolated if necessary in order to force the point that such gesturing violates the canons of social dignity. If one must point, there is at least one society that allows the gesture if, that is, it is done with the lips. This gets the message communicated without the loudness. Those of status are partly in and partly outside of the common measures of honor and dignity. Though the behavior of status may be objectionable, those of status may also serve important functions for society that are not replaceable. If push comes to shove, status will win this battle, whence the realistic strategy is to provide immunities that are clearly known as such to all. This way the honor associated with status is neither tarnished nor placed at risk by loudness. Those who act loudly and are without the status to do so are presumed to be sending a message that they are equal to that status, which will earn them a rebuke. All appearances to the contrary, women are very often responsible for exemplifying the dignity of their cultures, whence any sexual peccadillos take on a stronger rebuke than were a man to do the same. It is not fair by egalitarian standards, but makes sense where honor requires the support of dignity. It is also responsible for the apparent and actual severity of the sanctions meted out. These factors are no less relevant to societies invaded by cults of dignity, for it has become a regular strategy of dictators to invent social ideals as the justification for severe tactics in rule. One writer (Monga, 1996) believes that too much stress has been placed on cultural mores in accounting for totalitarian methods, preferring to place the blame specifically on the rulers themselves. This rationale, however, is, if based in reality, nonetheless misplaced, for it is a rare circumstance indeed that the public is absolved of any part to play by way of expressing cultural factors. In fact, some of Monga’s own arguments run counter to his thesis, as for instance the following: Like bidders at an auction, the market participants willing to pay the highest rice (defined in any terms) take home the good, in the sense that their willingness legitimizes the supplier of those political goods [p. 3]. When we are permitted to define the matter ‘in any terms’ it is hard to avoid the obvious implication, namely, that the people, in expressing cultural habits that provide for authoritarian tactics to ostensibly do what is necessary to ensure stability, may – if inadvertently – but still willfully sustain negative political ends in failing to act in concert against certain of these socalled ‘political goods’. But to Monga’s point, when the rulers make it all but impossible for the public to collectively express in effective political terms, then it becomes their power that wins against any philosophy of political (or, for that matter) public, goods. The result in many African societies has been for the people to use indirect resistance, gestures that deliver their indignity at the rulers’ claims to 27
the kind of honor expected to accompany political power in duly constituted honor-based moieties. But a joking matter it is not. In connection with the above argument, one of the truly baffling events in recent politics has been Russia’s steady decline back into authoritarianism under Vladimir Putin. One especially astute scholar, however, hit the nail on the head and then correctly justified the position (Lussier, 2010: 8): Russian citizens failed to…actively engage in party development and contentious measures. Left unconstrained, the Kremlin…successfully clamped down on freedom of speech and assembly, raised barriers to political and civil society organization, and intimidated possible sponsors of the opposition. In rebuilding an authoritarian regime, President Putin faced little resistance from the population. The reason for this lies squarely with cultural realities that did not change with a changing political landscape throughout the late 1980’s when liberalization was taking place and during and after the actual collapse of 1989. Nor is this an isolated instance of the phenomenon. Véliz (1965: 1) says essentially the same thing speaking of Latin America: There exists in the region a resilient traditional structure of institutions, hierarchical arrangements, and attitudes which conditions every aspect of political behaviour…. More recently it has not only successfully resisted the impact of technological innovation and industrialization, but appears to have been strengthened by it. Interviews with defecting Soviet soldiers in the last section indicated in particular a fear of the secret police, the targets of which are especially those connected with these ‘non-voting participatory behaviors’ – those ‘contentious measures’ – that the elites and command structure would see as a clear threat to dignity and also as barbs aimed at their own honor, whence the predictable result: quick, firm and effective counteractions.17 Still, why has there been, to this very day, so little public outcry? The following are germane: 1) The honor-based leader who displays a paternalistic visage (regardless how unsuccessful in policy abatement) will typically satisfy a conservative audience that has learned from experience to avoid scrutinizing the regime or that associates Western individualism as an enemy of the State. 2) Again, conservative observers will support authoritarian regimes if they believe their methods are requisite to stability and social order. 3) The very kind of political participation required in order to put pressure on elites is the kind of activity seen as diminishing the dignity of the regime and thus the honor it associates with the ‘great philosophy’. The secret police are adept at keeping a heads up on behalf of the command structure and being their effectuating arm when a challenge is brought forward. 4) The unbridled oligarchs who all but owned the ‘democracy movement’ not only introduced discord but illustrated the worst faults of the Western value system, and thus
28
left a very bad taste not only for democracy but for the philosophy aback it, and those of course whose individualism expresses it. The issue is less one of elite insincerity to the philosophy than of mendacity toward the public and the means of maintaining a dignity cult. The public visage offered the public by the command structure deftly combines these two characteristics into a pattern of supreme deceit: Putin’s role as the people’s savior was on display in the call-in show: Putin told Pikalevo residents that he would return again to sort out the situation, if necessary [at p. 18]. This is reminiscent of the wealthy in Mirsky’s study of the Ammassalik Eskimos whose cult of dignity had successfully snared the entire community under its power and prestige. The role of dignity as honor’s backbone is worth a careful examination whenever baffling events crop up in an honor-based moiety. 6. Personality and Temperament In the H-B world much of personality and temperament is prefigured, if not indeed foreordained, by the structural factors that have taken up the paper thus far, and for much the same reason, or on the same basis, as the influence of reality upon structure. Two additional dimensions claiming to serve as parent binaries or something near to that, are the tight-loose (Pelto, 1968: 37-40; Harrington & Gelfand, 2013; Aktas, Gelfand & Hanges, 2015) and hot-cold (Lévi-Strauss, 1996: 29; de Ventós, 1980; Lanier, 2000; Montesquieu, 1977: Part III and 444-445) pairings. Both have utility, just not in the top tiers, if only because they are so much more descriptive than explanative. Still, in combination with the structural classification, they bear the merit of examination. In Figure (2) honor-based personality is evidenced by terms within the hot-cold dimension, whereas the dignity-based are known by the tight-loose dimension for the same parameter. For temperament we employ the tight-loose dimension for both honor-based and dignity-based moieties, noting that because none of the individuals in honor-based societies feature a significant desire to control or manipulate others we do not favor the ‘tight’ cognate except in responding to kin groups and in child- rearing where H-B values range broadly from loose (Eskimo) to tight (e.g. aristocracies). By ‘tight’ rearing we mean controlling methods such as instilling guilt, or the use of needling, ridicule or shame. It also pertains to strict or highly disciplined methods, if they exist. Lack of discipline will not mean that the relation is ‘loose’ if tight criteria are present. Personality shows in rearing as warmth or coolness, as it also does in expressing elements of honor. Triandis (1995: 65) remarks of the Russians that their children “are hugged, kissed, and cuddled more than American children, but they are also not allowed much freedom of movement.” Here a warmtight composite relation holds good. Outside of the rearing environment ‘tight’ will refer to reactions characterized by fear, contempt, insecurity, discomfiture, discomfort or dismay. The corresponding ‘loose’ are effectively the reverse of these. By defining these cognates by their reactions we leave open a large array of 29
situations which seems necessary in a classificatory circumstance so long as the distinction between the cognates remains as obvious as valid. − Kin − − Status − − Office − Easy Other Equiv Unequal Adv Rel Other H-B Q-Coop W-C H-B Q-Comp T-L Loud W-C D-B W-C
T-L H-C H-C T-L
Q-Coop = Quiet Cooperative Q-Comp = Quiet Competitive Easy = Friendly Adv Rel = Adverse Reliance Equiv = Equivalent W-C = Warm-Cool H-C = Hot-Cold T-L = Tight-Loose
W-C W-C W-C W-C
T-L W-C W-C T-L
−− −− T-L W-C
− Rank − Equiv Unequal/ Adv Rel −− T-L W-C −− −− −− T-L W-C T-L H-C/T-L W-C T-L
Notes: The intermediate H-B culture is not represented for the reason that loud and quiet appear together whence no dimension can favor one over the other in a modal over-view. Quiet sub-types are not well represented in the office and rank columns; status takes the place of rank in these groups; their offices are ad hoc, determined for all by custom. The Loud results are open to suspicion because they blend two disparate sub-types not here listed.
Table 5
Figure (2) shows the Triandis (1995: 44) labels for his individualist-collectivist strategy and their relationship to the theoretical underpinning of Markus & Kitayama (1991, abbreviated M&K in figure 2), followed by our interpretive reading from the honor-dignity binary and its dimensions. Triandis M&K H-B D-B
Horizontal Same Quiet/Loud Loud
Collective Vertical Inter-dependent Different Kin groups Status Offices Rank Fig. 2
Individualist Independent Not dependent Autonomous
In order to usefully apply the hot-cold and tight-loose dimensions we modify the categories accordingly as in Table (5). The H-B classification makes it easier to impressionistically arrive at a dimensional analysis despite the problems inherent to their use. I suspect the reader will disagree with many of these impressionistic selections, and with good reason given that the author is a metaphysician, not an anthropologist.18 Over all, from a functionalist perspective, the hot-cold/warm-cool and tight-loose dimensions can in some regards replace the individualist and collectivist terms, while in some cases they are replaced structurally by the classification herein argued for. This does not rob the individualistcollectivist dimension of its utility, which is on the overall quite handy. For example, the dimension becomes essential prior to the Enlightenment when dignity is more problematic as an 30
operational term. Accordingly, there should be no effort to discredit the fine work done by Triandis et al. All that is argued for is the necessity of a parent honor-dignity binary in terms of which to place all relevant dimensions.
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dignity], Chicaning [recall all business/finance is H-B], Superstitious and hypocritical in their religion [as with the Romans]; SOUTH: Fiery [thin-skinned and impulsive], Voluptuary, Indolent [except to insults to their culture], Unsteady [uneven temper], Independent [fear of dependence], Zealous for their own liberties, Generous [magnanimous, as was Jefferson himself, a Virginian Southerner], Candid [unaffected, plainspoken], Without attachment or pretentions to any religion but that of the heart. 2 “In anthropology, folkloristics, and the social and behavioral sciences, emic and etic refer to two kinds of field research done and viewpoints obtained: emic, from within the social group (from the perspective of the subject) and etic, from outside (from the perspective of the observer).” (Source Wikipedia) 3 The other will be devoted to the dignity-based half of the binary. 4 So far, apart from the present writer she is the only worker to employ the binary as a methodological construct. Others have mentioned honor-based societies but with only occasional explications of dignity. 5 It was admittedly not her immediate purpose to be either complete or thorough; nevertheless she neglected to so much as mention the critical role of a system of dimensions in cultural analysis. 6 For those who paid attention only to the surface presentation (a professional health-care office) Annas (1976) will disabuse ignorance. 7 As early as the 1950’s, anthropologist Alfred Kroeber (1952; 152-66) employed a distinction between ‘reality culture’ and ‘value culture’, which amounts to very much the same thing as our reality-ideality dimension. 8 Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are terms that the American philosopher Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) coined to designate the ground level for his metaphysical system that, appropriately modified, prefigures the present one in which will, power and obligation are the equivalents respectively. 9 “As nouns the difference between deportment and demeanor is that deportment is bearing; manner of presenting oneself: while demeanor is the social, non-verbal behaviours (such as body language and facial expressions) that are characteristic of a person” [Deportment, 2016]. Comportment is, etymologically, very close to ‘with deportment’, meaning the behavior that corresponds with deportment. Comportment and deportment together are in merely a general sense but no less communicative for that, expression. 10 The list is arranged by year of publication; for same year, alphabetical by author. 11 From Mead (2001: 192), interesting given that her remark is in reference to the Soviets, which, like Japan, should be a shame culture in her view, yet the ‘guilt’ culture is described as feeling ‘sinful’. When this is owing to religious adherence to Christianity, we look to nominal D-B criteria. But in H-B groups a common way of instilling behavior in children, as well as in keeping social order, is the instilling of a sense of guilt as an aid to developing the super-ego character of the sentiment of ‘shame’. This is more evidence that the shame-guilt dyad should be a dimension under the honor-dignity canopy, not a stand-alone binary. 12 For a good perspective on joking relationships and clowning, see Mitchell, 1992. 13 Various methods for distributing excess wealth exist throughout the honor-based world. Wolf (2001: 150) mentions a few: “In Central Java…wealth is spent conspicuously in cattle sacrifices, as well as in a large number of ritual feasts of surplus wealth. … Similarly, pilgrimages to Mecca earn prestige at the cost of large stores of surplus wealth. … In Mesoamerica, adult members of the community generally undertake to finance part of the cult of one or more 36
saints…. Expenditures may prove economically ruinous, though they earn great prestige for the spender.” 14 At this point our use of ‘caudillo’ departs from that of Wolf and Hansen (1992: 69) who “would thus take issue with investigators who continue to see in caudillaje the dominant political system in Latin America down to the present day.” While modern dictatorships “exhibited some caudillo features, the dictator functioned with an increasingly centralized governmental machinery, predicated upon a very different balance of social forces.” Those features – “a continuing idiom of machismo, readiness to use violence, gift-giving, personalized loyalties” seem sufficient to apply the caudillo label metaphorically. There is no attempt here to assert the same ‘social forces’, for they are beside the point for our purposes, which is instead the modality of rule – specifically, those ‘features’ they mention. See also note (14) below. 15 Wiarda & Kryzanek (1992: 248f) List ten features of contemporary caudillo rule, which I paraphrase: They generally come up via the military; have a strongly personalistic style; govern paternalistically, autocratically and patrimonially from a highly centralized power locus; enrich themselves and perpetuate themselves in power, stopping short of totalitarian methods (all but the last typify the style we deal with). 16 The following description (Chavalier, 1992: 41) of some modern variations on the theme should disabuse naysayers who complain that the Caudillo label is inappropriate outside of Latin America and/or beyond the nineteenth century: “But as with other American institutions, caudillismo and caciquismo still bear the marks of a long history:…the prowess of the military man who encounters no obstacles…; the ostentation of the new man, who is not quite sure of himself; and finally the power of the businessman who succeeds in controlling the principal means of production. Today this boss or that dictator may be maintained and propelled by economic interests in an environment where money retains all the strength and vitality of youth.” 17 Speaking of Russia, Mead (2001: 177) remarks of “strict forms of political control…and political police who watched over a people adept at indirect forms of resistance, did not need to be reinvented but had merely to be shaped to new purposes.” 18 There is an alternative to these dimensions (developed since writing this piece), in which styles of authority are compared and contrasted. The parent terms are: patrimonial, paternal, vertical fraternal, horizontal fraternal and autonomous. See Herrman, 2016, section 7.
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