Nov 22, 2015 - 1950s and 1960s at the hand of Sayyid Qutb and later Ayman Al-Zawahri are particu- larly significant, in terms of their influence on political ...
Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism
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The complexity of responding to home-grown terrorism: radicalisation, de-radicalisation and disengagement Nathan Irwin To cite this article: Nathan Irwin (2015) The complexity of responding to home-grown terrorism: radicalisation, de-radicalisation and disengagement, Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 10:2, 166-175, DOI: 10.1080/18335330.2015.1089639 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2015.1089639
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Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 2015 Vol. 10, No. 2, 166–175, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2015.1089639
FORUM The complexity of responding to home-grown terrorism: radicalisation, de-radicalisation and disengagement Nathan Irwin*
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Griffith University, Nathan, Australia Following the 2004 and 2005 bombings in Madrid and London, the involvement of citizens from Western countries in Islamist militant groups in Afghanistan and the Middle-East, as well as the more recent incidents in Sydney and Melbourne, particular concern has been raised around the development of “home-grown” terrorist plots. As a result, various strategies have been implemented which often seek to counter or reverse the adoption of radical ideologies, or seek to disengage offenders from participation in terrorist activity. This paper raises the issues around the development and implementation of these strategies, and the assumptions upon which they are based. It is argued that the related research and policy development should seek to achieve greater clarity in the objectives and terms of reference utilised; thoughtful and comprehensive investigation of the range of potential causal processes; and finally, a consideration for the wider contexts within which engagement in terrorism may take place as well as the outcomes following disengagement. Keywords: de-radicalisation; disengagement; domestic terrorism; home-grown terrorism; terrorism risk reduction
Despite its long-standing contemporary occurrence in various regions throughout contemporary times, following the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001, there has been0020increasing discussion around terrorism, and in particular responses to home-grown terrorist plots that may be motivated by militant interpretations of Islam (Bergin, Jones, & Ungerer, 2007). As a result, various responses have been mobilised, including counter-radicalisation, de-radicalisation and disengagement programmes (Precht, 2007; Sedgwick, 2010). Despite the widespread discussion on policy and academic circles, the literature is often void of explanations as to what exactly is being referred to by the terms terrorism and radicalisation (Borum, 2011; Meisels, 2006). This lack of clarity, along with a range of other conceptual and practical issues, may mean that programmes which are being developed are not well informed and even counter-productive. To illustrate these issues, we first begin with a discussion of the definition of terrorism. The process of defining terrorism is difficult, foremost because it is a somewhat subjective undertaking, with often pejorative implications (Chlebik, 2010; Lutz & Lutz, 2004, p. 7). Indeed it would appear that, both in the literature and in policy, *Email: n.irwin@griffith.edu.au © 2015 Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism
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the concept often remains undefined (Byman, 2005). Where the term has been demarcated, varied definitions have been utilised, although often with some common elements such as the use of violence in pursuit of political aims (Lutz & Lutz, 2004, p. 8). Hoffmann (2006, p. 61) provides a useful conceptualisation of the phenomenon, specifically stating that terrorism involves “violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change” where such acts are “specifically designed to have farreaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack”, which “might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general”. Finally he qualifies that such violence is “perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity” (Hoffmann, 2006, p. 61). While a further discussion of the complexities that arise in the process of defining terrorism is possible, this definition is at the outset useful, as it is not too vague, nor too specific and effectively captures the phenomena which are the subject of this paper. One form of terrorism that has been of increasing interest is that of home-grown Islamic terrorism (Dawson, 2009; Kirby, 2007; Precht, 2007). More generally, home-grown terrorism refers to plots which are targeted against the country of which the conspirator is a citizen, resident, or where they have spent considerable time being raised (King & Taylor, 2011; Mullins, 2011; Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010). Within Australia and other Western states, particular concern has been voiced around the role radicalised interpretations of the Islamic theology may have in driving such attacks, such as the Martin Place siege and the stabbing of two policeman in Melbourne (Bergin et al., 2007; Jordan & Boix, 2004; King & Taylor, 2011; Mullins, 2011; Porter & Kebbell, 2011). According to Kömeçog˘ lu (2014), such an interpretation, most often referred to as Islamism, is perilous to democracy, as it is inherently political in nature and, most importantly, rejects the notion of secularism. Instead Islamism is said to opt for a totalistic system of divine governance, whereby political, social and spiritual life are all within the ambit of the regime (Kömeçog˘ lu, 2014; Mozaffari, 2007). Islamist interpretations of the Islamic faith were initially far less violent in their implications, and arose as a challenge to traditional Islam (Azzam, 2006). It is argued that the somewhat more militant reinterpretations during the 1950s and 1960s at the hand of Sayyid Qutb and later Ayman Al-Zawahri are particularly significant, in terms of their influence on political violence (Azzam, 2006; Kömeçog˘ lu, 2014). Precht (2007) notes that while not all Islamists subscribe to these means of activism, there are those militant Islamists who utilise the ideology as a platform to support violence as a means of effecting their goals, such as the installation of Sharia (Islamic) law or the expulsion of Western interests from the Middle-East (Mozaffari, 2007). As a result of the concern surrounding the possible connection between Islamist ideology and home-grown terrorism, governments have enacted new counter-terrorism strategies to deal with the issue (Bergin et al., 2007). One group of approaches, generally referred to as soft strategies, can be differentiated from hard approaches which seek to detect, disrupt or criminalise terrorism-related activity through targeted surveillance, policing and intelligence gathering (Spalek & Imatoual, 2007). One angle of these contrasting soft strategies is to prevent or dismantle the psychological commitment to violence as a political activity, for example, by undermining violenceconducive political or religious ideologies (Akbarzadeh, 2013; Horgan & Braddock, 2010). Such approaches are usually termed counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation,
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168 N. Irwin respectively (Bergin et al., 2007; Borum, 2011; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Mulcahy, Merrington, & Bell, 2013). Another approach, appropriately termed disengagement, is more behaviourally focussed, and is primarily interested in stopping actual involvement with a terrorist movement or participation in terrorism activity, rather than necessarily changing ideological commitment that might relate to participation in political violence (Horgan, 2009). Importantly, while individuals may physically disengage from involvement in terrorism, they may still hold radical ideological views (Reinares, 2011). In a number of jurisdictions, disengagement programmes have been directed towards those who are deemed at-risk of radicalisation or those who have already become involved in terrorism or paramilitary violence, which includes both members of the community, as well as individuals in custodial settings (Akbarzadeh, 2013; Horgan, 2009; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Mulcahy et al., 2013). Within Australia and the UK, both hard and soft strategies have been adopted. While this paper will not attempt to fully describe or critique any one response, the latter of these strategies will form the context for discussion. In these jurisdictions, soft approaches have involved the funding of religious education initiatives, community engagement and sponsoring of moderate Muslim organisations in order to build community resilience to radicalisation, that is, resistance to the influence of violent extremist ideology (Akbarzadeh, 2013; Aly, 2013; Attorney-General’s Department, 2012; Baker-Beall, Health-Kelly, & Jarvis, 2014, p. 100; Hardy, 2015; Mullins, 2010). A more recent initiative in both jurisdictions, however, has been the employment of de-radicalisation programmes. Most recently, in the UK, attendance at such programmes has become potentially mandatory for those returning from relevant zones of conflict, a strategy which has also been identified as viable within a report by the Australian Government (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2015; United Kingdom Parliament, 2014). With respect to the research and development of such approaches, there has been a range of concerns, which in many cases have been largely ignored in the literature and within the implementation of such programmes internationally (Horgan, 2009; Horgan & Braddock, 2010). These issues relate to: the relativistic nature and scope of the term radicalisation, and the implications for its deployment; the targeting of programmes; the assumptions about the relationships between engagement in terrorism, radicalisation, de-radicalisation and disengagement, upon which related programmes are based and the relative lack of knowledge on the subsequent outcomes of de-radicalisation or disengagement. Given the increasing presence of such programmes within Australia and the UK’s counter-terrorism policy, these issues are particularly deserving of discussion (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2015; United Kingdom Parliament, 2014). While the term radicalisation scarcely existed in academic literature prior to 2001, since the September 11 World Trade Centre attacks its use has flourished, particularly with reference to Islamist-related terrorist plots (Sedgwick, 2010). At the same time, despite its increasingly widespread use as an analytic term, it remains relatively undefined (Stevens & Neumann, 2009). Sedgwick (2010) argues that while the expression may loosely imply movement toward a position of radical thought or worldview, where the term is used in the literature, this conceptualisation is seldom expanded on and thus authors tend to rely on relative meanings, or presume that an absolute meaning is understood. The complexity of the matter is compounded, in that the use of the term and its resulting implications can differ across foreign policy,
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integration and desegregation, and national security agendas (Baker-Beall et al., 2014, p. 220). In addition to this, its use within these contexts is subject to further variation between the analytic, official, public and political levels (Sedgwick, 2010). Another complication is that political movements and their constituencies typically have multi-issue concerns, and thus even where a given moderate point of reference can be established on these dimensions, such movements and their followers may not necessarily be radical in all respects (Sedgwick, 2010). An example of one such political group is Hamas, which while essentially calling Palestinians to arms and supporting violence against Israel has in some respects been seemingly open to democratic processes, and has upheld the importance of individual rights, and transparency and anti-corruption measures in government (Wing & Kassim, 2007). Moreover, as Herbert (2009) illustrates with the case of vocal Sunni theologian Yussef al-Qaradawi, individual radicals may also vary in their treatment of certain issues depending upon the geographical context of discussion. For example, while al-Qaradawi supports the role of suicide attacks in the Middle-East, in the context of America or Europe he does not outwardly condone such tactics and is instead supportive of dialogue with their secular institutions (Lorenzo, 2006). Clearly, defining radicalisation or what is radical, perhaps more so than terrorism, involves a significant degree of subjectivity or at best relativity, as its nature is contingent on the existing dimensions in a given context (Cross & Snow, 2011). Although the last of these problems may be overcome somewhat by ranking an ideological movement’s position on relevant dimensions, defining radicalisation is still far from a simple task and its utilisation between different agendas may at times be in conflict, both in the explicit sense, as well as in terms of its unintended consequences (Sedgwick, 2010). A definition which begins to demonstrate these issues is that of Fraihi (2008), which sees radicalisation as “a process in which an individual’s convictions and willingness to seek deep and serious changes in society increase”, which he further qualifies is not necessarily a negative process. On the other hand, some official working definitions imply that even the adoption of non-violent radical systems of political thought can be harmful to society, specifically where they are anti-democratic or segregationist in nature (Jordan & Boix, 2004). This is the case in both Denmark and the Netherlands (General Intelligence and Security, 2004; Sedgwick, 2010). Apprehension has, however, been raised about the implications of such definitions. Specifically, there is concern that where they inform policy they could essentially be used as thought-policing tools, which result in net-widening (Stevens & Neumann, 2009). Monaghan and Walby (2012), for example, argue that when definitional boundaries are blurred or expanded in the counter-terrorism threat assessment context, any group who is seen as oppositional to the given regime in power may be haphazardly re-categorised as a threat within intelligence reporting, as has arguably been the case with various social activist groups in Canada. Other commentators have drawn attention to the increased marginalisation that may result from a government’s selective engagement with moderate groups to the exclusion of others within a given community (Spalek & Lambert, 2008). Civil rights considerations aside, one potential negative outcome is that where radical, though non-violent, ideological groups are criminalised, controlled or dismantled, valuable sources of intelligence might be lost, as these networks may also have visible social connections with those who are disposed to violent activism (Sedgwick, 2010). It seems that the utilisation of a relatively wide definition of what is radical, which may stem from efforts to satisfy multiple agendas, could actually
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result in the inflammation of political violence (Sedgwick, 2010). Perhaps for this reason some have opted for more finite conceptualisations of radicalisation. While in some settings what is deemed radical may be wider in scope, with respect to counter-terrorism some authors do explicitly distinguish violent radicalisation from other non-violent radical thinking or activism (Stevens & Neumann, 2009). One definition put forward by Wilner and Dubouloz focuses on violent behavioural outcomes and sees radicalisation as:
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a personal process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social, and/or religious ideals and aspirations, and where the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence. It is both a mental and emotional process that prepares and motivates an individual to pursue violent behaviour. (2010, p. 38)
Some governments also appear to make this distinction in their official political positions on counter-terrorism, though the consistency of this differs, both between and within governments (Attorney-General’s Department, 2012; Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010; Sedgwick, 2010). On the other hand, even where the above complexities are avoided with the use of more finite definitions of radicalisation, a number of issues still influence the investigation of this phenomenon, its role in political violence and the development of sound counter-responses. Soft counter-terrorism responses typically involve the prevention or reversal of the psychological effects of the radicalisation process, or the advancement of disengagement from actual terrorist involvement. While some progress has been made which informs the development of all three approaches, overall there appears to be consensus that a number of limitations exist in the various programmes which have been implemented internationally and, more importantly, the research which informs and critiques such strategies (Akbarzadeh, 2013; Horgan, 2009, Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Marret, Feddes, Mann, Doosje, & Griffioen-Young, 2013; Mulcahy et al., 2013; Spalek & Imatoual, 2007). Perhaps the first of these issues relates to where and at whom such programmes are being targeted. While many have been implemented within the community, university students and, perhaps more so, incarcerated individuals are also seen as populations who may be particularly prone to radicalisation (Hamm, 2009; Woodward, Rohmaniyah, Amin, & Coleman, 2010). For this reason, policy-makers and academics have focused particularly on strategies to de-radicalise terrorist offenders and counter the radicalisation of other inmates, using strategies such as isolation or separation from the general prison population (Jones, 2014; Mulcahy et al., 2013). Despite these developments, significant gaps have been identified in the literature around such approaches (Horgan, 2010; Mulcahy et al., 2013). Some have even challenged the assumptions that prisons are necessarily a high-risk environment for radicalisation, identifying that such settings may actually insulate prisoners from this process (Jones, 2014). The relatively uncharted nature of counter and de-radicalisation strategies is not, however, solely limited to the context of corrective custody, indeed more generally such approaches appear to be underdeveloped (Herbert, 2009; Horgan, 2009). One reason for this may be the lack of theoretical and empirical research in the area. While the degree to which the development of these counter-terrorism strategies is informed by research is difficult to ascertain, it does appear they are often based on assumptions around the potential causal factors of terrorism (Akbarzedah, 2013;
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Borum, 2011). While such research initially looked at individual-level factors such as psychopathology, it is now widely accepted that there is no one terrorist profile (Bakker, 2006; Borum, 2011; Porter & Kebbell, 2011; Precht, 2007). Other approaches in various fields such as sociology and social psychology have sought to explain participation in terrorism with wider-level theories, such as organisational or social movement theory (Borum, 2011). While approaches such as these may be useful to explain some aspects of terrorism, such as organisation-driven recruitment phenomena, they are by no means comprehensive and given their assumption of a unidirectional, topdown process of recruitment, they may mask the dynamic features of any one context that are independent of the wider social movement or terrorist organisation itself. Moreover, these macro-level theories, while applicable to larger and more formally structured organisations such as paramilitary or insurgent groups, may have less utility in the context of so-called “lone wolf terrorists” or home-grown terrorist cells which are less hierarchical in configuration and who essentially self-recruit (Lakhani, 2014; Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010). Given the increasing occurrence of leaderless or “self-starting” terrorist threats, more recent approaches have sought to explain participation in terrorism with conceptual models, which seek to identify the complex psychosocial processes that proceed actual engagement in terrorist acts (Zammit, 2010). While such approaches might better account for the multiple levels of influence that likely motivate an individual or group of individuals towards political violence, they frequently have an explicit ideological focus, often specifically towards Islamism (Borum, 2011; Porter & Kebbell, 2011). Although, more common within the context of harder counter-terrorism strategies, this particular emphasis on Islamist ideology has been criticised for several reasons which seem equally applicable in the context of soft counter-terrorism measures. Mythen and Walklate (2008), for example, argue that policy approaches adopting such narrow paradigms are particularly problematic, as they form the basis of increasingly future-oriented risk assessment and governance, which essentially erodes liberty and encourages the inattention to other potentially important causal factors. Indeed, in the analytic sense, by grouping cells or movements on the basis of their shared religious ideology, important nuances of the discrete motivations of various groups and their individual members can be overlooked (Githens-Mazer, 2009; Herbert, 2009). Examples of such discrete, politically violent groups are evident within the ethno-religious separatist conflicts of Southern Thailand, Southern Philippines and Chechnya (Karim, 2013; Rupprecht, 2014). Another concern is that a focus on one particular ideology may result in certain populations being over-policed (Spalek & Imtoual, 2007). This would indeed seem to be the case in the UK, for example where following the introduction of new stop and search provisions within the Terrorism Act 2000, street stops of Black and Asian people drastically increased to a rate, which in 2008 was four times that experienced by the white population (Mythen & Walklate, 2010). Regardless of the strategy deployed, the overt focus of Australian counter-terrorism measures upon the Australian Muslim community has been argued as representing a potential problem of detection bias that may not only result in perceptions of persecution within such communities, and in turn exacerbate radicalisation (Aly, 2013), but also allow other violent political groups to go relatively unnoticed (Spalek & Imtoual, 2007). What does appear to be clear from the limited empirical research that exists is that whether or not analyses are confined to the context of Islamist offenders, there are multiple pathways towards offending and the
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process of radicalisation may be multi-directional (Porter & Kebbell, 2011; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). This final observation appears to be a key assumption for informing de-radicalisation programmes with radicalisation research (Porter & Kebbell, 2011). While counter and de-radicalisation programmes may be informed by research on the elements and process of radicalisation, Horgan (2009) argues that it is fallacious to assume that the variables underlying the radicalisation process are the same as those which may cause a person to de-radicalise or desist from terrorist behaviour. While some individuals may de-radicalise, as was the case with the Australian offender Jack Roche (Striegher, 2013), many may instead disengage without shedding their radical beliefs (Aly, 2013). Horgan (2009) makes clear the importance of distinguishing disengagement from de-radicalisation, stating that the disengaging individual undertakes a function shift and lowers or ceases participation in actual political violence (Aly, 2013; Horgan, 2010). Such a process may be easier to observe than subjective internal states associated with radicalisation and indeed may be more common among terrorism offenders (Horgan, 2009). Importantly, disengagement, as Horgan (2010) defines it, is not necessarily permanent, nor does it necessarily equate to complete desistance from violent offending. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the outcomes of demobilisation programmes in Colombia, where disbanded paramilitaries have migrated to other forms of severe violent criminality (International Crisis Group, 2007). For these reasons there is an obvious need to further investigate the relationship between processes of radicalisation and engagement in terrorism, as well as the association between de-radicalisation and disengagement, and the outcomes of such processes (Aly, 2013; Horgan, 2010). In conclusion it does appear that soft counter-terrorism strategies such as counterradicalisation, de-radicalisation and disengagement are too often based on unfounded assumptions or uninvestigated relationships between psychological states and behavioural outcomes. In addition, many such programmes appear to have vague or conflicting objectives, which may result in unintended and even inflammatory consequences. The literature discussed underlines the possibility that knowledge of the radicalisation process may not necessarily inform successful attempts at de-radicalisation, and furthermore, that de-radicalisation in itself may be at the very least, difficult to observe. It is for these reasons, Horgan (2010) argues, that such approaches should be termed “riskreduction initiatives”, and that the investigation and critique of these strategies should clearly identify their intended outcomes. This need for clarity can also be seen in the wider scholarship around terrorism, where the term terrorism itself and concepts such as radicalisation are often left undefined or given absolute definitions, and even at times used almost synonymously with certain forms of radical thought such as Islamism (Sedgwick, 2010). Collectively, it seems that such obstacles could be remedied by research and policy development that is characterised by: clarity in objectives and terms of reference; thoughtful and comprehensive investigation of a wide range of factors that may be relevant to participation and desistance in all forms of terrorism, including a consideration of the wider contexts within which this collection of processes takes place and finally, examination of the processes that follow disengagement from terrorism.
Acknowledgements The author wishes to acknowledge those involved in the editorial process, in particular Professor Philip Stenning.
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