On 27 February 2014, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) was established.1. With President Xi Jinping serving as Chair and Premier Li Keqiang as ...
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Policy review: The Cyberspace Administration of China Weishan Miao
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China
Wei Lei
China Radio International, China
On 27 February 2014, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) was established.1 With President Xi Jinping serving as Chair and Premier Li Keqiang as Vice-Chair, this institution comprises almost all heads of ministries relevant to China’s Internet.2 The establishment of a top-level Internet governance body emphasizes the importance of the new stage that China is entering. However, little is known about the CAC. Where did it come from? What has it been doing? Where is it going? Focusing on these questions, this article attempts to offer a brief review of the CAC. The main sources for this account are data collected from the official CAC website, public accounts on social media (WeChat), the affiliated magazine New Media and other media reports on the CAC.
The prehistory of the CAC The prehistory of the CAC includes institutional restructuring and a shift of priorities. When China was officially connected to the global Internet in 1994, the expressed priorities were infrastructure construction, information system security and industrial development. In effect, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) was to serve as the core institution governing the Internet. With the Internet’s influence on China’s political and social development rising, the government has expressed increasing concern about the medium’s content. In 2000, the State Council Information Office (SCIO) established the Bureau of Internet News Regulation. This agency was replaced by the State Internet Information Office (SIIO) in 2011, demonstrating the government’s intention of developing a comprehensive system for cyberspace governance. Both domestic and international Internet currents have contributed to a perceived emergency, legitimizing the Chinese government’s strengthening of its Internet governance. In recent years, concomitant with the widespread use of the Internet in both public and individual life, China has experienced an enormous amount of online activism. Internationally, the Snowden and WikiLeaks incidents have further urged the Chinese government to step up its investment in Internet governance. In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping commented as follows: ‘The Internet directly relates to the national ideology security and the regime security’. He added that Internet governance in China
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had ‘obvious problems, mainly referring to multiple management, overlapping power, mismatch of authority and responsibility, as well as inefficiency’ (People’s Net, 2013). Against this backdrop, the CAC was established in 2014 in the hope of ending the regulatory chaos in cyberspace, alluding to the re-regulatory trend in Internet governance in China (Hong, 2017).
Job description First, the CAC is in charge of Internet security. On its official homepage, the slogan ‘Without Internet security there is no national security’ proposed by President Xi appears in the most prominent spot, highlighting the core work of the CAC. Differing from the traditional ministries in Internet security, that is, from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’s focus on technological development and the Ministry of Public Security, which is in charge of execution and punishment, the CAC aims to establish both a systematic mechanism and a strategic plan. The range of its work includes the following: launching the annual propaganda week of national security to improve netizens’ security awareness; launching special campaigns aimed at regular detection of Internet crime; releasing plans pertinent to education and talent cultivation; providing funding support through its affiliated organization, the China Internet Development Foundation; promoting the Internet security law and standard making; and promoting the construction of a national security system. Among all of the above-mentioned, the World Internet Conference organized by the CAC in 2015 was the highlight. In the keynote speech delivered by President Xi Jinping at the opening ceremony, cyber security was declared a global challenge which called for international cooperation. Cyber sovereignty was seen as a prerequisite and precondition for cyber security, meaning that each country had the right to choose how to develop and regulate the Internet at its own discretion (Xi, 2015). Second, the CAC has taken on the role of promoting informatization and the Internet economy. Since its inception, considerable effort has been devoted to expanding its international market. The CAC has organized and participated in a series of bilateral or multilateral activities, for example, the US–China Internet Industry Forum, the China–UK Internet Roundtable, the China–EU Digital Cooperation Roundtable, the China–ASEAN Internet Forum and the China–Singapore Digital Economy Forum, its aim being able to facilitate the Chinese Internet company’s entry into the global market. In 2016, The Guideline of National Informatization Development Strategy was issued, a guiding document for regulating national informatization development over the next 10 years. These guidelines explicitly state that the organization ‘must stick with the centralized leadership (CAC) … significant policies and issues must be reviewed by the leading team (CAC)’ (Xinhua News, 2016), confirming the crucial place of the CAC in the informatization sector. Third, the CAC has been charged with the responsibility of managing all online content. In order to fulfil this responsibility, large numbers of special campaigns were launched, for example, deleting rumours and false information, closing related websites and punishing those individuals who were liable. While this top-down campaign style of governance indubitably achieved a positive effect in a short period of time, it signalled an aggressive state of mind which ignored deep-seated structural problems.
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The CAC issued a number of policies and laws pertinent to online content management. This range of governance and control – as opposed to empowerment – has allowed more specific and careful regulation by the government. The three ‘ten clauses’ are seen as representative of these policies and laws.3 The Regulation on Management of Public Information Service Development of Instant Message Tools regulates instant message tools such as WeChat. The Regulation on Accounts of Internet Users mandates a realname registration system for all account-based online information services. The Regulation on Summoning Internet News Service Companies for Talks empowers the CAC to summon any online platform and social media provider who violates related rules for a talk with the local CAC official. In addition to its top-down style of governance, the CAC has been actively mobilizing various social forces to participate in Internet governance, ranging from opinion leaders on the Internet to youth students at college and members of the ‘voluntary fifty-cent army’. In March 2015, a ‘Youth Internet Civilization Volunteer Campaign’ was jointly launched by the CAC and the Communist Youth League of China (CYL), the aim being to instruct college students across the country to post positive comments online (1) to support Party ideology and (2) to report unhealthy online information. In particular, the campaign is required to cover the CYL branches of every class in every university in China. And the number of students mobilized by each university shall be no less than 20 per cent of its CYL members (China Digital Times, 2015).
Future prospects In sum, the establishment and development of the CAC demonstrate the degree to which the Chinese government is attempting not only to adapt to today’s changing Internet ecology but also to some extent to ‘nail Jello to the wall’.4 Moreover, the CAC has been active on the global stage, as is evident in its frequent interactions with Internet giants including Apple, Facebook and Amazon, or as host of the World Internet Conference, evidence of China’s ambition to gain a greater voice in the global Internet world. Here, it is worth pointing out that the CAC, which has existed for little more than 2 years, is vulnerable to change and uncertainty. In the domestic sphere, although the CAC has gained the support of China’s foremost leaders and the consequent significance, it is still difficult for it to play a dominant role in the area of Internet governance. This is partly because this ministry-level agency has not yet developed strong local branches and partly due to the ongoing tension between the CAC and a range of traditional agencies. In the global sphere, whether the cyber sovereignty that the CAC advocates will prove acceptable to other countries and whether the CAC can change the current global Internet power structure all awaits the test of time. Although the future of the CAC remains uncertain, it seems clear that this centralized institution will continue to seek more and wider power. For this reason, it is worth close and long-term observation. Notes 1. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) and The Central Leading Team of Internet Security and Informatization constitute ‘one institution with two names’. Under the Chinese
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regime, which features the Unity of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government, one institution has two different names in order to perform separate administrative and partyrelated functions in specific circumstances. Due to the wide use of the nomenclature, CAC, for the public record, the acronym CAC is the chosen abbreviation form for this review essay. 2. For more details, please refer to the Member of CAC, http://www.guancha.cn/politics/ 2014_02_28_209672.shtml (accessed 2 July 2016) 3. The three ‘ten clauses’ are the three significant regulations that the CAC released. Because each regulation consists of just 10 clauses, they are normally shortened as ‘the governed object + ten clauses’. 4. Former US President Bill Clinton once gave a speech suggesting that the Internet would change China, and that Internet governance by the Chinese government would be in vain. For more details, see ‘Clinton says trade deal and Internet will reform China’, retrieved from http://www.techlawjournal.com/trade/20000309.htm ( accessed 14 June 2016)
References China Digital Times (2015) Youth volunteers to spread sunline online. China Digital Times, 13 April. Available at: http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/04/translation-youth-volunteers-tospread-sunshine-online/ (accessed 20 August 2016). Hong Y (2017) Networking China: The Digital Transformation of the Chinese Economy. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press. People’s Net (2013) President Xi Jinping on the acceleration of improving the leadership system for managing the Internet. People’s Net, 15 November. Available at: http://politics.people. com.cn/n/2013/1115/c1001-23559689.html (accessed 4 June 2016). Xi JP (2015) Speech at the 2nd World Internet Conference Opening Ceremony. Xinhua News, 16 December. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-12/16/c_1117481089.htm (accessed 10 May 2016). Xinhua News (2016) State Council Released an Guideline of National Informatization Development Strategy. Xinhua News, 28 July. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/info/2016–; 07/28/c_135546104.htm (accessed 29 July 2016).
Fan Yang, Faked in China: Nation Branding, Counterfeit Culture, and Globalization. Bloomington/Indianapolis, IL: Indiana University Press, 2016 Reviewed by: Wu Jing, Peking University, China
The ‘rise of China’ has become an increasingly prominent political and theoretical discourse both inside and outside China several years into the new millennium. Since around the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, themes of such discussions soon expanded from economic and military implications of China’s fast modernization to its cultural and political shapes and consequences. One central discussion is whether China’s ‘regeneration’ or ‘rise’ in the contemporary world of global capitalism represents an alternative social imagination or simply a replica of the Western model of modernization. Fan Yang’s book, Faked in China: Nation Branding, Counterfeit Culture, and Globalization, tries to deal with this question from a critical cultural studies perspective. Yang looks at the issue of China’s cultural autonomy vis-à-vis the hegemonic global capitalism through the lens of the IPR (intellectual property rights) regime, China’s nation branding efforts and the
