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The Diversity of Modes of Discourse and the Development of Sociological Knowledge* N I C O STEHR - A N T H O N Y SIMMONS

Summary This paper presents an analysis of the structure of contemporary sociological knowledge in terms of a theory of scientific discourse. The concept of 'discourse" is introduced as a theoretical refinement of the concept of 'paradigm' and is applied to the classes of knowledge claims of the natural and social sciences. It is concluded that general modes of scientific discourse are definable in terms of their vertical differentiation from everyday discourse, while particular modes of sociological discourse are additionally definable in terms of their horizontal differentiation. A classification is then proposed which identifies three modes of sociological discourse: natural, technical and formal.

Despite some recent optimistic assessments to the contrary (e.g. Parsons, 1968: 334), the view that sociological knowledge is, in some sense, "preparadigmatic", "immature", "backward" in its relationship to natural scientific knowledge, now appears to be a widely shared belief within the discipline. However, the general recognition of the relative immaturity of sociological knowledge has produced no corresponding consensus among sociologists over the possible reasons for the differences between the developmental patterns in the social and the physical sciences, in spite of the fact that the current interest in scientific knowledge represents a legacy of Kuhn's analysis of the development of the natural sciences. In fact, the problem of the divergence of natural scientific and social scientific knowledge has only rarely become a primary problematic for a theory of the sciences (c.f. Elias, 1974:23). This failure to problematize the differential status of natural and social scientific knowledge in established theories of science is partly attributable to the common tendency in both of the dominant traditions of the philosophy of science, logical positivism and critical rationalism (c.f. Keat and Urry, 1975:16), to demonstrate the essential unity of science. Thus sociologists have increasingly turned to the philosophy of knowledge (Elias, 1971:363), or to ideals of scientific knowledge which are far from being realised in practice (c.f. Ferdinand, 1969; Freese, 1972). One of the outcomes of the sociological pursuit of a philosophical theory of social scientific knowledge has been that the predominant relation between the philosophy of science and the sociology

* The authors greatly appreciated and benefitted from a critlc~ reading of an earlier draft of the paper by Karin Knorr, Helga Nowomy and Peter Zernitz. Zekschriftfiir allgemeineWissenschaftstheorieX/1 (1979) © FranzSteinerVerlagGmbH,D-6200Wiesbaden

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of science (and the sociology of knowledge) has remained characterized by the dependency of the latter upon the former1. Among the several purposes of this essay, therefore, it is proposed (1) to overcome the dependency of the sociology of scientific knowledge on the (dominant) philosophy of science, (2) to offer a critique of the theory of the underdevelopment of contemporary sociological knowledge, by (3) presenting the outline for an alternative theory of (social) scientific discourse, and illustrating its application to the case of sociology. EXPLANATION OF THEORETICAL TERMS

A popular criterion of cognitive development employed in critical evaluations of the state of contemporary sociological knowledge has been that of the presence or absence in sociological research of an identifiable level of formalized language. The presence of such a formalized language, in which knowledge claims may be formulated, communicated and justified has often been accepted as a valid (or even crucial) indicator of the cognitive development of scientific specialities (for example, Stegmueller, 1973:467). However, besides its apparent growing popularity as a central criterion of scientific knowledge, there are more particular analytical advantages to adopting a sociolinguistic perspective on sociological knowledge. The study of sociological (and all scientific) knowledge through an analysis of the structure of its specialized languages, and the relationship of these languages to the sociohistorical contexts of their origination and application, presents a more heuristically open theoretical framework than does, for example, the Kuhnian notion of "paradigm". For the notion of paradigm is already incorporated into a theory of science which is not only descriptive, but also presumptive; for Kuhn's historiography of science is, at the same time, an active programme for the growth of scientific knowledge (c.f. Feyerabend, 1970:199). In contrast, to the theoretically-laden concept of paradigm, therefore, the conceptualisation of sociological knowledge as a type of language-use, or more properly, as a mode of discourse, remains relatively neutral with respect to presenting identifiable historiographical programmes for the growth of (social) scientific knowledge. Besides freeing the analysis of the development of sociological knowledge from particular historiographies of science, however, the concept of discourse, as the theoretical framework in which it finds its application, ultimately results in a theory of the social meaning of science rather than a theory of scientific research practice. For these reasons, therefore, the concept of discourse presented in this paper is seen to provide a useful theoretical orientation for the analysis of sociological knowledge, and one which

I Space limitations prevent us from explicating reflexively the intellectual context to which our approach is critically committed. Important however is a commitment to the possibility of a sociology of scientific knowledge (in contrast to a mere sociology of scientific organization, e.g. Ben-David, 1972; Toulmin, 1972; Weingart, 1974; Barnes, 1974; Stehr, 1975).

The Diversity of Modes of Discourse and the Development of Sociological Knowledge

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problematizes the linkage between the related contributions of cognitive and social processes to the development of sociology and sociological knowledge. The degree of language formalisation in science has been used, as already indicated, as an indication of the general level of cognitive development of a discipline. However, language is, of course, part of a more inclusive means of communication available to man for the construction, communication or objectification of social meaning. A consideration of the symbolic function of language in the production of meaning at this point therefore introduces the need for a more elaborate explication of the central theoretical concept of discourse, which is indispensable to the following analysis. Discourse generally refers to institutionalized communicative practices in the production of social meaning. Sociological discourse refers to a specialized mode of discourse designed to produce more restricted social meaning. Although the implications of a theory of discourse remain manifold and complex for sociological formulation, the central point of reference is clearly the social study of language. The study of discourse is thus, above all else, the social study of language, the structure of its concepts and the relations of terms, and the social conventions which underlie the rules for correct language use and linguistic competence for both natural and specialized language communities. The analytical focus on language as a social institution which is provided by a theory of discourse finds a further justification for its application to the case of sociology in terms of the already established traditions of research into the social organization of scientific communities. For in scientific communities, as in all human communities, a common language is an indispensible condition for the operation of the fundamental social processes (cf. Hertzler, 1965:20). The institution of language, it may be said, is thus the pre-condition as well as the product of social interaction (cf. Apel, 1973), and its categorical significance for social relationships has long been recognized, (Weber, 1947:136) 2. The analytical conceptualisation of sociological knowledge as a form of specialised discourse constitutes an important development in the formulation of a general theory of social scientific knowledge. Application of the concept of discourse to the production, communication, objectification and reproduction of social meaning, moreover, reveals the potential variety of institutionalized languages which not only embody differences of symbolic content, but also express differences in the social relations that govern the conventions of language use. For interrelations within and among modes of discourse, always presume social relations (interaction), thus it is on the basis of the social relations of discourse that we shall later undertake a classification of institutionalized languages in social sciences. 2 The reciprocity between language and interaction is clearly intended by Wittgenstein (1953:7) who describes a "language game" in the following manner: "I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the 'language'." (see also, Habermas, 1970".236--242; Keat and Urry, 1975:171-172; Mills, 1963:433). But as we will argue later, a particular language game although tied to action in principle is not tied to all types of action.

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T h e application of the c o n c e p t of discourse to the s t u d y of knowledges additionaUy reveals the existence of certain conventions associated w i t h the limits of particular languages and languages communities 3. These limits are recognizable in the differentiation of the n o r m s and rules of language communities in relation to each other, o r in the difference of practical interests, aspirations and socio-historical experiences w h i c h mediate the particular limits of language use practiced in different language communities (cf. Habermas, 1970:257). W h e r e the conceptualization of discourse is applied to that class of knowledge claims definable as "scientific", the sociological analysis of the cognitive n o r m s of discourse is presented with a possible m e t h o d of h o w such k n o w l e d g e claims in science are formulated, justified or socially limited (cf. Lavine, 1942) 4. Besides introducing a sociological c o n t e n t into the study of 3 However, "the orientation to the rules of common language is . . . primarily important as a means of communication, not as the content of a social relationship. It is only with the emergence of a consciousness of difference from third persons who speak a different language that the fact that two persons speak the s~_melanguage, and in that respect share a common situation, can lead to a feeling of community and to modes of social organization consciously based on the sharing of the common language" (Weber, 1947:138-39). 4 A classification of the norms and rules which certify knowledge claims in science has been undertaken by Karin Knorr (1975). This classification advances from the earlier analysis of the structure of argument in scientific discourse presented by Touhnin (1958). For Toulmin had proposed that the basic structure of an argument consists of the data which constitutes the basis of a knowledge claim and the conclusion which accepts or rejects the claim. However, as this description of the structure of argument fails to represent the potentially problematic connection of data and conclusion, Toulmin further examines the ground upon Which the connection is legitimized: and this he refers to as a warrant, or generalization. Although the classes of data and warrants resemble each other, the data are subject to explicit and particular appeal, while appeal to the warrants often remains implicit or general (Toulmin, 1958:100). In the same way as data, therefore, warrants are also subject to justification when their legitimacy is challenged, and the relation of warrants to their backings constitute an important aspect of Toulmin's analysis of the structure of argument. Toulmin's analysis of the rules and norms which legitimate knowledge claims and the distinctive types of justification used in different structures of argument, has provided Knorr with a framework for the classification of alternative modes of scientific discourse. The primary classes of scientific discourse are identified by Knorr as: (1) analyticaldiscourse, where justification is based on implication, (2) empiricaldiscourse, where justification is based on experience either in observational or theoretical terms, and (3) dialecticaldiscourse, where justification of knowledge claims yield a new argument which implies yet another generalization. The movement from analytical to dialectical discourse implies progress towards a more open-ended and complex argumentative structure which the degree of consensus and the reduction of complexity achieved is lower then for members practicing analytical discourse. Knorr argues that the degree of cognitive consensus achieved in a scientific speciality is a function of the mode of discourse prevailing in the speciality. Missing from this list of types of discourse is the historically significant case of discourse which employs "authorities" as a mode of justification. As a result, Knorr's typology of modes of discourse is restricted to what Gouldner (1976:39) has called "rational discourse" which by definition excludes legitimations of knowledge claims which refer to authorities as their ultimate source. The presence of rational discourse requires historically that the "coercive power and the public credit of societal authorities has been undermined, restricted, or declared irrelevant, and that the use of manipulative rhetoric is limited either by institutional and moral restraints or by the prevailing technology of mass communication" (Gouldner, 1976:39). Gouldner in turn seems to underestimate or even overlook the extent to which "authority" (or, perhaps, "scientific authority") plays a role in so-called rational discourse. Instructive in this instance is Bourdien's


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contemporary scientific knowledge, however, the concept of discourse also reveals the historicaland dynamic character of scientific language use, through the study of its conceptual changes. Several analytical distinctions have already been advanced as fundamental criteria for the conceptualization of the structure of scientific discourse, although these criteria have generally been derived from specific theoretical problems such as the special status of language, the conventions and limits which govern language use, or the developmental processes of language uses. Apart from the theoretical analyses of the logical and epistemological status of scientific language which have preoccupied earlier writers, however, the more central problem of the differentiation of scientific discourse from everyday discourse still remains largely unformulated in most studies of contemporary science. It is for this problem that we shall later undertake to provide a formulation in the course of this paper. Theories of scientific discourse have also been implicit in accounts of conceptual change derived from historical interpretations of the development of scientific knowledge. Thus Kuhn (1962) has offered an account of conceptual change which emphasized the revolutionary character of the historical process, while Toulmin (1972: 122) has suggested the need for the construction of "an evolutionary account, which explains how "conceptual populations' come to be progressively transformed". The series of criteria selected for the identification and definition of the structure of language in scientific discourse, therefore, varies with a wide range of practical research interests. However, the general conceptual model of discourse would appear to offer an ideal approach for the clarification of the (1975:24) observation that "in the scientific field as in the field of class relations, no arbitrating authority exists to legitimate legitimacy-giving authority from the relative strength of the groups whose interests they express: inasmuch as the definition of the criteria of judgment and the principles of hierarchies is itself at issue in a struggle, there are no good judges, because there is no judge who is not also a party to the dispute". In other words, even rational discourse retains and is based on a political dimension. s Prominent among the various analytic distinctions which have been proposed to conceptualize the general status and variety of language within the practice of science is the traditional but controversial (of. StegmueUer, 1973) distinction separating the languages of observation (Lo's), from the languages of theory (Lt's) [for example, Specter, 1966-67; Wisdom, 1970; Hesse, 1970]. In brief however, what is generally indicated by this distinctionis on the one hand, the existence of a stable language of observation: a set of propositions which more or less faithfully record the empirical phenomena of the subject domain and certify them as 'facts'. The language of theory, on the other hand, refers to the existence of a set of interrelated propositions (propositional calculus) which are connected to the sentences of the observational language by means of 'correspondence rules' which may partially interpret, but may never fully translate, the propositions of the Lt into the propositions of the Lo. In many sciences the language of theory has been formally reconstructed from the terms of ordinary language discourse to the re-axiomatised terms of the theoretical science through the application of logico-mathematical operations to the semantic content of the theoretical terms. To some extent, all theoretical and observational terms of the sciences depart from the conventions of ordinary language discourse. This is largely a result of the fact that in the exact sciences, terms such as 'mass' 'velocity', "acceleration' etc., refer to a fully specified class of object predicates, whereas in ordinary language discourse the casual use of these terms is frequently in violation of the classical rules of logical inference (cf. Lachenmeyer, 1971).

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languages and related knowledge claims that have characterized the development of the social sciences, and the application of the conceptual model of discourse to the particular case of sociology may also succeed in imposing some order on the bewildering diversity of claims advanced about the state of contemporary sociological knowledge. A CLASSIFICATION OF MODES OF DISCOURSE IN SOCIOLOGY

One of the problems encountered in trying to identify the modes of discourse present in sociology on the basis of the language used to formulate knowledge claims, is that of locating an adequate criterion for distinguishing different modes of discourse. At its basis, "scientific" discourse may be conceived as the outflow of everyday (lebensweltlicher) discourse, and the relationship between scientific and everyday discourse can be further conceived as one of differentiation (cf. Boehme, 1975a). The differentiation of scientific discourse from everyday discourse, therefore, can also be employed as a general criterion for the classification of sociological discourse, and different types of sociological discourse will thus become identifiable in terms of their degree of differentiation from everyday discourses. The extent to which different systems of knowledge have codified their claims into distinctive, specialized languages therefore has evidently been subject to great variation. In general, however, it may be argued that the range of differentiation of specialized discourse from everyday discourse falls along an analytical continuum from limited to extreme differentiation, and it is on the basis of this criterion that we have proposed the following typology for the classification of the different modes of discourse present in contemporary sociology: (1) natural discourse, (2) technical discourse, and (3) formal discourse. Natural discourse refers to the class of knowledge claims in sociology which have been formulated primarily in terms of the everyday language concepts present in any natural speech community. To a certain extent, of course, the notion of an undifferentiated mode of everyday discourse is an idealization, for as Bernstein (1971) has shown, everyday language is capable of developing restricted codes associated with geographic region or social class. In cases where the structure of everyday discourse is internally differentiated, therefore, some further specification of the relationship between specialized languages and everyday languages is required before the class of natural sociological discourse can be identified. Technical discourse refers to the class of knowledge claims in sociology which, although formulated in a language clearly differentiated from everyday discourse, still retains sufficient continuity to make a "'translation" between the levels of discourse unnecessary. 6 Max Scheler (1960:64) may, perhaps, have anticipated such a classification of different modes of discourse in his observation that "each type of knowledge develops its own special language and its own special style in formulating its knowledge".


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Formal discourse refers to the class of knowledge claims in sociology which have been formulated in a distinctive and differentiated mode of discourse. This may include the formalization of specialized languages of observation and theory, and may vary from a lexical re-axiomatisation of terms from the language of everyday discourse to a logico-mathematical reconstruction of the foundations of everyday language. Formal discourse, however, as used here, is not identical with the standard concept of formal languages (as in mathematical or computer languages), for such langages form a special case of the more general class of formal discourse. Indeed, formalized languages (or deductive languages) in the restricted sense of the term, represent another case of language specialization where reduction of complexity is achieved through the formulation of rigorous deductive relations between symbols. For such discourse, consensus becomes necessary as a pre-condition for communication, rather than a possible outcome of communication, as it is in other nondeductive languages of discourse (cf. Habermas, 1970:259-60). The distinction between everyday discourse and the three types of specialized modes of discourse may be empirically established in a series of related ways. One such empirical indicator of a differentiation between modes of discourse would be the existence of distinctive sets of vocabulary, although differentiation between alternative modes of discourse may also exist in cases where lexically identical terms are provided with different contexts of meaning, or used with different frequency, or are given an alternative emotive significance. The empirical correlates of symbolically differentiated modes of discourse at the basis of social interaction, are identifiable on the grounds of the consensus or dissensus about the "'failure" or "'success" of interaction among groups of individuals (Habermas, 1970:250). It is evident, however, that the empirical analysis of the symbolic and social differentiation of sociological discourse remains a complex problematic, and one that stands in need of greater theoretical elaboration. A further clarification of the theoretical correlates of the discourse classification, therefore, is now offered in an attempt to provide more rigorous criteria for the specification and identification of the categories of discourse analysis. CORRELATES OF THE HIERARCHY OF MODES OF DISCOURSE

In his analysis of the language of science Savory (1967: 121) has observed that "the language of science overturns the illogical attitude of the ordinary man, defies his spirit of taboo, permits no evasions and counternances, no sniggerings. This conquest of the habitual mode of thought, if thought it be, of the average man is one of the greatest triumphs that must be credited to the language of science". Thus, the differentiation of scientific discourse from everyday discourse is popularly associated with the greater precision of meaning, stability of meaning, and the greater logical consistency of scientific over everyday language use. "Mature" scientific discourse purges a discipline of the "horrifying tendency to move in every possible 'interesting' direction, 10"

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to develop new sociology's of X's for each new dependent variable that comes of age without fully exploring our best fields, and a proliferation of new concepts that differ from each other only slightly" (Blalock, 1973:2). The autonomy maintained by the formal from the everyday mode of discourse has apparently succeeded in purifying it of the problems of incorrect language use endemic to everyday discourse, exemplified in such problems as ambiguity or vagueness (cf. Skinner, 1957; Quine, 1960; Savory, 1967), the elimination of which, according to some observers (e.g. Niezing, 1967:66) has assured the formal modes of discourse a greater "objectivity" than that achieved by alternative modes. Hence, the most common argument advanced in favour of mathematizing sociological discourse is also the argument that such a formally reconstructed discourse serves to reduce ambiguity and other problems of incorrect language use. As Boudon (1974:11) among others has observed "a discipline comes to be regarded as scientific when it is within reach of speaking a language free of ambiguity", and for many critics of contemporary sociological discourse the language of mathematics has been recommended as the ideal paradigm for adequate language use (e.g. Arrow, 1968). A reduction of ambiguity, of course, ultimately requires that the users of specific symbols agree on the appropriate and correct application of these symbols (Nesas, 1952; Lachenmayer, 1971:23). The possibility of consensus among the speech communities employing specialized modes of discourse, therefore, is directly conditioned by the relative insulation of these modes of discourse from the speech practices of everyday life, and in a corresponding reduction of the number or range of functions of specialized discourse (cf. Boehme, 1975a). The social relations of language consensus, therefore, which imply the existence of a series of commonly held cognitive interests of pragmatic goals, are necessary for the attainment of any degree of formalization in specialized modes of discourse. In this sense, all recommendations for various degrees of formalization, including appeals for the use of such formal procedures as "systematization" to refine the specification of referential-sets of object predicates (Lachenmeyer, 1971:24), or the similar procedure of "explication" (cf. Lazarsfeld and Rosenberg, 1955:1; also, Hempel, 1952) as well as other related demands for the introduction of conceptual precision in sociology (Blalock, 1973; Handy, 1964), are contingent for their possible implementation upon a language community in which members share a common orientation to the established practices of a specialized form of life. A further implication of the general thesis, that discourse which is differentiated from everyday discourse produces greater clarification and precision of language use, has been that the knowledge claims produced from such discourse are, to a considerable degree, removed from public control (Kuhn, 1962:20-21; Badura, 1973:105). In practical terms therefore, the greater the distance of scientific discourse from everyday discourse, the smaller the potential "audience" for knowledge claims produced in terms of such discourse. The audience for these knowledge claims increasingly is restricted to collaborators and competitors who are engaged in producing similar knowledge claims.


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In the context of the contemporary social institution of science, the classification of modes of discourse also suggests the presence of an hierarchy of modes of discourse. Within the framework of this cognitive stratification, formal discourse most clearly approaches the dominant conception of science, while natural discourse departs most widely from it, and is for this reason, regarded as the least prestigious mode of discourse amongst both scientific and (ironically) laymen alike. To a certain extent, therefore, the ability to maintain credibility and to attract political and/or economic support for the projects of science from socially powerful groups in society has been contingent upon the level of formalization of the various modes of discourse in the sciences. In addition, however, another general theoretical correlate of the hierarchy of modes of discourse may be seen in their patterns of change. Toulmin (1972:443) has observed a significant variation in the relative stability of concepts between different modes of discourse, "everyday spatio-temporal, numerical, and causal concepts have less technical uses and a wider currency than the specialized concepts of natural science, as a result, they change more slowly. Yet these everyday concepts, too, are open to change, and therefore have conceptual genealogies" (see also, Hertzler, 1965:252)z. At the same time, however, it would be fallacious to imagine that the classification of modes of discourse presented in this paper can be mechanistically applied to all aspects of scientific theory and practice. The judicious use of this model for the reconceptualization of scientific knowledge construction necessarily lies in the selectivity of its applications. There is however, no method of selecting a priori a mode of discourse which is the most appropriate mode for the formulation of sociological knowledge claims. For although Winch (1958:88-89) has strongly advocated modes of discourse for the discipline of sociology and anthropology which are closely tied to everyday discourse (see also, Pitkin, 1972:241-45; Cicourel, 1964:23-24; Ryan, 1970: 144-45; Kreckel, 1975:115), Nagel (1952:53, 1961:473-502), Hempel (1965: 161-66) and others have been equally insistent that such explicit connections are undesirable. The latter view has also been adopted by Black (1961:279) who, in his review of Parsons" theory of social systems has faulted his conceptual scheme for its closeness to common sense and has further argued that "'if the history of the development of the natural sciences is any guide, fundamental social theory will have to employ recondite notions, at a considerable remove from direct observation, in order to have any hope of 7 A similar proposition is advanced by Schutz and Luckmann (1947:300) in their observation that, "generally relevant knowledge exhibits only comparatively slight, and then only extremely slow, changes". For Schutz and Luckmann, the category of "generally relevant knowledge", represented in everyday discourse, is constructed from the practical solutions of the routine problems of daily existence which tend in any society to remain relatively stable over time. Thus the propensity of different modes of discourse for conceptual change is fundamentally related to variations in the historical and social bases of institutionalized discourse. The fact that formalized discourse appears more emancipated from the social base than does natural discourse, however, has not immunized it against periodic and profound conceptual transformations; on the contrary, scientific discourse has always been characterized by an identifiable pattern of conceptual change.

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providing an adequate framework for research," although, on the other hand, this conception of theory construction in the social sciences has been strongly criticized by other writers (for example, Feuer, 1962). In the face of such diversity, the general perspective maintained throughout this paper could be described as a formal agnosticism, which pursues the question of why such diversity characterizes the modes of discourse in sociology, rather than which is the preferred mode for the construction of sociological knowledge claims. The question of preference, of course, can only be decided in terms of the legitimating criteria for sociological knowledge claims which are provided by specific programmes for the growth of knowledge in the social sciences. Having thus dispensed with the question of the relative priority of modes of sociological discourse, for the moment, therefore, we turn now to a consideration of the distribution of alternative modes of discourse in sociology. Toward this end, a further criterion will be introduced in order to distinguish typological-variations in equivalently differentiated modes of discourse practiced by sociologists. T H E DIFFERENTIATION A N D DISTRIBUTION O F S O C I O L O G I C A L DISCOURSE

In terms of the degree of differentiation from everyday discourse, it is evident that contemporary sociological discourse remains closely tied to everyday discourse, and as Lachenmeyer (1971:48) has observed, "sociological language more closely approximates conventional than scientific languages". However, the structure of sociological discourse includes a considerable variation of specialized languages which ranges conceptually from naturalistic to highly formalized formulations, and which extends pragmatically from an open integration with everyday discourse to a relative closure of more formalized modes of discourse. This conception of the hierarchy of discourse based on the degree of separation from everyday language use may be termed the structure of vertical differentiation of discourse. In addition to the structure of vertical differentiation, it is also possible to distinguish between different types of sociological discourse which are equaUy differentiated from everyday discourse. Categorical differences between vertically undifferentiated modes of discourse, therefore, have been conceptualized as the structure of horizontal differentiation (or, segmentation) of discourse. Thus the cases of ethnomethodology and causal theory, perhaps, provide examples of modes of discourse which are undifferentiated vertically (i.e. they are equally separated from everyday language), although they are differentiated from each other as types of discourse by their techniques, methods, vocabulary, and research interests. The cases of ethnomethodology and causal theory, therefore, provide an example of the structure of segmentation or horizontal differentation of modes of sociological discourse The complex structures of horizontal and vertical differentiation in sociological discourse represent a wide variation of perspectives on the discipline (Merton, 1971:190). Such a complex set of divisions in the

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conceptual apparatus of the social sciences, however, correspond to a particular profile of the social development of discourse differentiation in sociology, and it is to an analysis of those social conditions of language use that the paper now turns. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIFFERENTIATED DISCOURSE

It has been suggested that the differentiation of levels of discourse which has marked the cognitive development of sociology is a particular example of the general specialization of knowledge brought about by the increasing complexity of modern society. The progressive division of labour in modern society, of course, has been one of the more significant tendencies underlying the present state of social complexity. In a general sense, therefore, the differentiation of discourse in society has tended to correspond to the social divison of labour, and as Schutz and Luckmann (1974:314) have suggested, "language can be relatively equally distributed, because subjective variations in the form of idiosyncratic usages remain socially irrelevant. Given a certain complexity in the social structure, language is converted into socially conditioned, socially established, and socially transmitted 'versions'." The process of differentiation of specialized from ever)iday discourse necessarily entails the institutional separation of specialized form general claims to knowledge. Under the conditions, the social transmission of socially differentiated modes of discourse, which are no longer of universal societal relevance, increasingly becomes a function of role-specific activities. The production and transmission of knowledge claims thus develops within the context of identifiable modes of discourse, "a province of knowledge develops, to a certain extent, its own logic and its own methodology, just as it must have its own 'pedagogy" (because of the requisites of the role-bound transmission of knowledge" (Schutz and Luckmann, 1974:302), although neither cognitive nor institutional factors may be specified as determinant in this process of knowledge construction and differentiation. According to the ideal-typical model of discourse differentiation presented by Schutz and Luckmann, therefore, the developmentof sociological discourse should also reach a stage of institutional and intellectual autonomy from everyday discourse, with a corresponding social separation of specialist and layman. However, it is evident that sociological discourse departs widely from the ideal development formulated by this model for, unless the presence of multiple sociologies rather than a single sociology is recognized, it must be acknowledged that the discipline has failed to develop a specialized (and homogeneous) knowledge formulated in terms of a formal discourse despite the considerable institutionalization of sociological activity (Shils, 1970:763). The case of sociology, therefore, exhibits a disjuncture between the degree of social institutionalization and the level of congnitive development. The most popular explanation offered for the disjuncture of the social from the intellectual development of sociology resorts to the theory of the relative underdevelopment of sociology v i s ~ vis other disciplines of the empirical

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sciences. Thus Merton (1957:6-7; 1967:48-50) 8 has identified the relative immaturity of the discipline as the prime reason for the absence of formalized discourse, while Ravetz (1970:370) and others have emphasized the lack of exceptional contributors to the discipline (i.e. a Newton or Einstein of sociology)9, although Toulmin (1972:382) has suggested that the failure of formalization resides in the absence of a common set of disciplinary goals. The common premise underlying the types of explanation of the disjuncture between cognitive and institutional development in sociology suggests, so it seems, that the discipline will ultimately conform in a general way to the idealtypical developmental model of discourse formation, especially as far as the cognitive consequences of such differentiation are concerned. The assumption that the departure of contemporary sociological discourse from the ideal-typical model of discourse differentiation represents not deviance, but immaturity, is, perhaps a general one within the discipline. To maintain otherwise, would be to assume that "all cultural products existing at the same moment of history must have the same degree intellectual maturity" (Merton, 1957:6). Thus most tacit or explicit theories of the relative underdevelopment of sociological discourse (or "theories of backwardness", as Bourdieu [1975:36] has called them) has assumed that the ideal model of discourse differentiation has yet to develop in sociology. However, one of the limitations of this type of explanation, apart from the adequacy of its theory of underdevelopment, remains the absence of any account of the (transitory ?) structure of horizontal differentiation of discourse in sociology. While such theories of underdevelopment may partially explain the development of vertical differentiation, the structure of horizontal differentiation has been left unexplained. At the same time, however, theories of the relative underdevelopment of sociological discourse may, themselves, be based on questionable presuppositions. It is far from readily apparent, for example, that the patterns of discourse development in sociology must necessarily conform to an ideal model of differentiation in which the sociological mode of discourse achieves s It is rather dubious to attribute the contemporary cognitive state of sociology to the "youth" of the discipline (cf. Dixon, 1973: 26) since this implies at a minimum some notion about the origin of sociology but an even cursory examination of texts which deal with the history of sociology will show, sociologists hardly agree in their attempts to date the discipline and thereby only further exemplify the degree of cognitive diversity of the discipline (Gitler, t941; Strasser, 1975). Wittgenstein (1953 : xiv) argues that "the confusion and barrenness of psychology has not been explained by calling a 'young science', its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings... For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion." On the other hand, Hertzler (1955: 358) precisely attributes the absence of conceptual clarity in sociology to its youthfulness as a science. 9 Shils (1970:798), however, observantly notes one reason why it would be futile to expect such a theoretical revolution instituted by a great woman or man from occurring in sociology since "the multiplication of sociological works and persons might render more difficult the entry into ascendancy of a more complex and comprehensive theory because it renders more difficult the ascendancy of a theorist whose mastery of the results of specialized study would be great enough to call forth the respect and adherence of the practitioneers of the diverse and numerous specialism".


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homogeniety and formalization as a condition of its scientific development. The possibility for an alternative course of development of sociological discourse, however, must lead to a consideration of those conditions which have prevented the completion of the process of vertical differentiation, and which have institutionalized the relative co-existence of different modes of discourse within the same discipline over time. THE LACK OF DIFFERENTIATION AND THE DIVERSITY OF SOCIOLOGICAL DISCOURSE

The rejection of the theory of the relative underdevelopment of sociological knowledge and of the process of the inevitable vertical differentiation of sociological discourse, requires the elaboration of an alternative explanation for the present mode of sociological discourse. The traditional problem of sociological and related discourses, frequently cited by commentators on the discipline, is that the object of sociological discourse, like the investigating sociologist, is also an historical subject. In this sense, it is asserted, that sociological knowledge claims are separate from the knowledge claims of the natural sciences. However, although this conventional observation of the differences between natural/social scientific knowledge has led to the acknowledgement of derivative differences in the procedures of concept formation, research techniques, methods and theory construction adopted by sociologists, there has been no parallel acknowledgement of related differences in the structure of sociological discourse. For the most part, it has been assumed that the pattern of discourse differentiation observed in the natural sciences will be replicated at some future phase in the case of sociology. (a) Horizontal Differentiation of Discourse The multiplicity of meanings available in everyday discourse provide the conditions for the possibility of a horizontal differentiation of sociological discourse, although the relations between everyday discourse and sociological discourse remain mediated by a series of cognitive and institutional process. This has been recognized by Toulmin (1967:459), who has observed that, "the continuity and change which are characteristic of an evolving intellectual tradition must be related.., to the processes of transmission by which the ideas in question are passed on from one generation of human 'carriers" to the next". The institutionalization of background interpretations of a decisive social reality, therefore, are reproduced in the professional socialization of sociologists where they militate against the construction of a uniform and standard version of social reality. The professional socialization of natural and social scientist thus tends to produce alternative social relations of consensus and dissensus which come to characterize their respective modes of discourse, for, "whereas the novice in the physical science usually undergoes a process of attitude or belief 'installation', his counterpart in social science is often exposed to a process of profound attitude or belief change" (Lammers, 1974:136).

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Both everyday and scientific modes of discourse perform a similar range of cognitive operations which include the production of meaning and explanations of relevant social/natural phenomena, as well as the provision of accounts of themselves. Although differentiated from everyday discourse, therefore, scientific discourse may still potentially duplicate some aspect of everyday discourse, and may compete with its everyday accounts of social/natural reality. However, as Lammers (1974) has suggested, one important criterion distinguishing the relations of natural and social scientific discourse to everyday discourse is the dominant direction of dependency. The dependency relations of natural and specialized discourse are typically assymetrical, for natural scientific discourse remains relatively independent of everyday discourse for the production of its accounts of the world, while everyday discourse remains heavily dependent upon natural scientific discourse for the production of its accounts of the (natural) world. On the other hand, however, although the modes of social scientific discourse appear to remain dependent upon everyday discourse for the production of accounts of historical (for example) phenomena, everyday discourse remains relatively independent of social scientific discourse for the production of its accounts of historical (and related) phenomena. The relative autonomy of natural scientific discourse may be seen as both the cause and effect of the comparatively greater cognitive homogeneity in the natural sciences. "There is a certain institutional guarantee that successive generations of (natural) scientists can 'stand on the shoulders' of their predecessors" (Lammers, 1947:130), because the "scientist-to-be is either tabula rasa as regards the topics he is taught in the university or he has experienced some anticipatory professional socialization at home, at school, and in the community. Fragments of natural science paradigms and theories have already become widely diffused and form, as a kind of 'scientific lay images', a fertile soil on which his properprofessional socialization can grow" (see also, Feyerabend, 1975:19). Apart from the differences in the assymetrical dependencies of social and natural scientific discourse on everyday discourse, however, there are also important differences in the referential content of these two modes of scientific discourse. For the meanings of social scientific discourse which remain associated with everyday discourse derive their content from the social world of differential material interests and the legitimations of social, political and economic affairs. It is here that multiple images of divergent social reality which are represented in the typically horizontally differentiated character of sociological discourse (cf. Elias, 1956). The connection between the referential form and content of sociological discourse and their dependency on the divisions of societal reality can be most clearly observed during periods of accelerated social change when, "differences in values, commitments, and cognitive orientations of conflicting gruops become deepened into basic cleavages, both social and cultural. As the society becomes polarized, so do the contending claims to truth. At the extreme, as active and reciprocal distrust between groups finds expression in intellectual perspectives that are no longer located within the same universe of discourse" (Merton, 1973:100). The

The Diversity of Modes of Discourseand the Developmentof SociologicalKnowledge

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impact of social and political processes on the form and content of sociological discourse has been largely attributable to the low isolation of sociologists from the social forces which generate and sustain competing interpretations of social reality. In this respect, the social organization of the social sciences differs from that of the natural sciences which "enjoy" a high isolation from the divisions of the social context. In addition however, sociological discourse is primarily consumed as intellectual discourse and is only infrequently translated into "hardware", in the sense that is typical of natural scientific discourse. Thus as sociological discourse (re)-enters everyday discourse it will "tend to (a) be ignored; (b) bolster their competing lay images; and/or (c) damage the reputation of the social sciences and decrease the credibility" (Lammers, 1974:137). Although the horizontal differentiation of the referential from and content of sociological discourse distinguishes it from the relative homogeneity of natural scientific discourse, in other ways, the influence of domain assumptions and tacit pressuppositions continues to play a significant role in both modes of discourse. However, the primary structures of horizontal differentiation are ultimately responsible for the perpetuation of the disjuncture between institutionalization and cognitive diversity in sociological discourse, although the relative profile of alternative modes of discourse in sociology remains subject to change over time (for example, Stehr and Larson, 1972). (b) Vertical Differentiation The view that discursive practices in social science are affected by and based on ideological commitments is rather widely accepted among social scientists; it also has been analyzed frequently and from a variety of perspectives and for a considerable number of reasons (for example, Gouldner, 1970 or Friedrichs, 1970). However, almost unnoticed has been the uneven development of modes of discourse with respect to their formalization. The uneven development of distinct and formalized languages in sociology raises the question of the conditions for the possibility of achieving formal discourse in sociology and since this for many is synonymous with having reached a mature level of scientific development, it raises the issue of assuring that sociology follows in important respects patterns of cognitive development characteristic of some of the physical sciences. Our attempt to provide an answer to this particular question can of course only be considered to be a preliminary answer. First it might be useful to dispose of at least considerations which we feel are definitely not responsible for the uneven development of discourse in sociology~ Thus the often expressed sense of the immense complexity as an ontological characteristic or something very similar beyond the control of sociologists (and for that matter, man) are held responsible for the backwardness of the discipline. Basically the same argument is advanced by those who would claim that c e ~ n aspects of the domain are recalcitrant to formalization (for instance, macro-social or micro-social phenomena). However, what

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makes these and related arguments about factors which are ultimately all beyond the control of sociologists difficult to sustain is the fact that certain communities of sociologists have achieved distinct and formalized languagesin-use and these do not vary with the macro-micro dichotomy of social phenomena. In short, we would maintain that conditions for the possibility of formal discourse in sociology have to be found in processes which are in principle subject to the control of man (although they might not be subject to the control of sociologists). It seems to us that the crucial factor which influences whether sociologists are able to develop a distinct and formalized language in a given domain of problems must have to do with the social functions of sociology generally and the social functions of the meaning generated by sociological discourse in particular. As we already have stressed in our discussion of the classification of modes of discourse, the progressive differentiation of discourse in sociology from everyday discourse represents a reduction in the range of functions discourse may serve; phenomenologically, the same idea may be expressed by saying that discourse increasingly becomes estranged from everyday life, the totality, diversity, complexity and purposes of everyday lifeI°. A formalization of discourse may then be generally said to involve the progressive de-pragmatization of discourse; in other words, the often intended and sanctioned separation of theory and practice and therefore cognitive autonomy. Developed formal discourse constitutes a province of (restrictive) meaning which does not directly impinge upon the meanings of similar phenomena found in everyday life. The social functions of knowledge claims of formal discourse are rather limited; or, the relevancen of formal discourse for the affairs of everyday life is absent. The extent to which formal discourse is irreversibly "'estranged" from everyday discourse is difficult to judge a priori. It would appear that it likely is an irreversible route. To argue that knowledge claims formulated in the context of formal and distinct sociological language are irrelevant to everyday life is to suggest that such claims remain unaccepted and untransformed into social action and do not serve to underscore and legitimate given beliefs in society (cf. Nowotny 1975). Tenbruck (1975) uses the metaphor of the trivialization of knowledge to characterize the history of the (natural) sciences. It implies that the progress of knowledge can be described as the progressive loss of the meaning, or l0 The view that "formalized" discourse, to use our terminology, involves an "estrangement" of discourse from everyday life, the full diversity of empirical reality, is already presented by Rickert and Weber. They argue that the price the sciendst has to pay in order to achieve greater clarity and greater systematization of arguments irrelevant requires to transcend concrete reality in all its details and thus a move to a kind of "artificial" reality (d. Rickert, 1903:203; Weber, 1922; Burger 1976:76). 11 As Goudsblom, (1977:97) points out, "the very word relevance, with the slightly hysterical overtones that the student movement of the late 1960s gave it, tends to be discredited as naive and political. However, the issue of the social functions of sociology, to call it by another name, is not to be easily dismissed".


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legitimating function (Bedeutungswert) of knowledge claims which corresponds to an increase in the use value (Nutzungswert) of the same claims. While knowledge claims in the early stages of the development of science are saturated with socially relevant meaning, and for this reason are hardly differentiated from everyday life, the scientification of knowledge results in a loss of meaning and a rise in the use value of scientific knowledge. Still, the process which allows this development remains somewhat unclear. In the social sciences, we would argue, the ultimate irrelevance of formal discourse in the sense described is made possible by yet another form of irrelevance. Our assertion is that the conditions which present the possibility for developing formal discourse in society in the first place may be described as conditions which explicitly or implicitly assure that the current problem at hand - at the time - is irrelevant to everyday life. Constitutive of formal discourse is the absence of social pressure of a dominant order to develop arguments which are useful in some fashion to a powerful group in society. A further but not necessarily equally important factor has to do with the explicit desire of sociologists to try and avoid the pregressive de-pragmatization of their discourse and its loss of relevance for everyday life. The observations by C. Wright Mills (1959) are representative of a variety of similar self-conceptions of sociologists: "I believe that what may be called classic social analysis is a definable and usuable set of traditions; that its essential feature is the concern with historical structures; and that its problems are of direct relevance to urgent public issues and insistent human troubles" (emphasis added). To sum up, among the important conditions for the possibility of developing formal discourse is the socially constructed relevance of issues under study by sociologists. The price sociologists have to pay for practicing formal discourse however is a reduction of the social consequences that their discourse may have in major societal institutions. Once a particular issue has been defined as important and it refers to an issue already covered in the context of formalized discourse, competing, less differentiated discourse will emerge so long as societal groups are effective in influencing sociology. The emergence of formal discourse is aided by the societal sanction of irrelevance of the problematic, it is sustained by forces internal to the discipline both organizational and intellectual. However, it terminates as a mode of discourse which has lost its integration with everyday life, even when used critically against its traditional problematic. CONCLUSION

This paper has served as an introduction to the theoretical concept of 'mode of discourse" and to its application to the case of sociology. It has been argued that sociological studies into the foundations of scientifc knowledge have tended to overlook the distinctive properties of social scientific knowledge. In part, this negligence has resulted from the tacit theory of scientific development contained in such concepts as "'paradigm", which have been employed in

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sociological analyses of scientific knowledge. The theory of scientific development implied in the concept of 'paradigm' has tended to explain the present state of sociological knowledge as a case of relative underdevelopment or backwardness which may be expected to achieve scientific maturity at some future date. Such a theory, however, does not admit the possibility of an alternative form of development for the social sciences which may depart widely from the established pattern of natural scientific development. The concept of 'discourse' is thus presented as a relatively neutral expression of the cognitive structure of the sciences insomuch as it contains no implicit theory of scientific development. It is argued that the relations between the existential context and the cognitive content of knowledge claims can be usefully described and analyzed in terms of the structure of the communicative mediations: the structure of language use. Using the structure of a discourse as conceptual framework for the study of scientific knowledge claims, therefore, three modes of discourse have been identified and the relationships between them have been described and analysed. On the basis of this classification, it is further suggested that modes of discourse may be analyzed both in terms of their degree of separation from everyday speech practices, and also in terms of their degree of internal cohesion. Such a distinction has provided a useful criterion for analyzing differences between the classes of knowledge claims constructed in both the natural and social sciences. The concept of discourse, therefore, it is argued provides an adequate framework for the study of the immanent structure of knowledge claims in the sciences, as well as for the study the transcendental structures of history and society which reproduce themselves in the structure of scientific thought.

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Adresse der Autoren: Prof. Dr. Nico Stehr, Prof. Dr. Anthony Simmons, Dept. of Sociology, The University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada. T6G 2H4