Keywords: organized crime; research methods; policy; policing; criminal .... main sources for the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor are the closed police files of ...
Kleemans, E.R. (2014). Organized crime research: challenging assumptions and informing policy. In: J. Knutsson & E. Cockbain (eds.). Applied Police Research: Challenges and Opportunities. Crime Science Series. Cullompton: Willan (accepted / in press).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Organized crime research: Challenging assumptions and informing policy Edward R. Kleemans, VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Keywords: organized crime; research methods; policy; policing; criminal investigation.
Introduction Applied research is often too narrowly focused on policy questions and on the direct implications for policy and practice. This may adversely affect the quality of research questions, research designs, and the quality of advice (in the absence of sufficient empirical evidence). On the other hand, academic research is often too far removed from the reality of criminal investigation, as very little research effort is generally put into the most harmful criminal activities, such as organized crime, corporate crime and terrorism, since data sources are frequently inaccessible. As a result, academic research into organized crime is vital, but is poorly developed and barely able to answers the questions raised by policymakers and practitioners.
This chapter on organized crime research focuses on the ways in which academic and applied research can be combined to challenge assumptions and inform policy. It is based on experiences with the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor, an ongoing research project based 1
upon the analysis of closed, extensive police investigations. During the period 1996-2012, a research team collected and analysed 150 cases of organized crime in the Netherlands, covering issues as diverse as transnational drug trafficking, human smuggling, sex trafficking, arms trading, vehicle theft, and large-scale fraud and money laundering. This chapter first elaborates on the importance of using police data for academic research and describes the basic idea behind the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor. Second, it discusses the main choices made in the data collection. Third, it elaborates upon the constant struggle to make realistic promises about what empirical research could produce for politicians and policymakers. Fourth, the reason for choosing to use solid evidence is explained and discussed. Fifth, the chapter elaborates on how to report publicly on sensitive issues. Finally, it discusses several empirical findings and examines how these findings have influenced policy and practice.
Police data and academic research
In many countries organized crime research suffers from the counterproductive juxtaposition of police and academics. Organized crime is, to a large extent, a hidden phenomenon that is only revealed if the police use special investigative techniques such as undercover operations, wiretapping and bugging. As a consequence, the police hold a monopoly position with regard to information and for many academics access to criminal justice sources is a key problem. Lacking access to these sources, a lot of academic time has been spent on debunking the police representations of organized crime as naive, exaggerated, and as tailored toward the acquisition of more resources and investigative powers. Although it is true that empirical research has proven that many organized crime groups are not as organized and transnational 2
as some official reports claim them to be, the main weakness in academic criticism is that it is often not based on independent, empirical research, but on normative statements and, as such, is criticism that could equally be uttered by any other academic or the man in the street. It is no wonder that the police are often not very impressed by this criticism, which widens the gap between academics and the police even further. It is precisely this gap which undermines both the quality of academic research and the rationality of policing.
In the Netherlands, law enforcement institutions, such as the police and the Public Prosecution Office, are generally more willing than in other countries to cooperate in empirical research, particularly in the area of organized crime research (for a review, see Kleemans, 2007). This cooperative spirit is one of the aspects of a progressive police force, but was also produced in part as a response to a huge political scandal which took place in 1994-1996. This was the socalled IRT affair – about a police team which helped criminals import several tons of drugs under the supervision of the authorities, in the hope that some of their informers would move to the top of criminal organizations. In the end, however, it was questioned whether the authorities were running the informers, or vice versa. As a result, a Parliamentary Inquiry Committee investigated both the use of criminal investigation methods (by this police team in particular, and by the police in general) and the nature, seriousness, and scale of organized crime in the Netherlands (PEO, 1996). According to the Committee, discussions about certain intrusive methods of criminal investigation, such as undercover operations and the use of pentiti (police collaborators), could not be had without a valid assessment of the nature, seriousness and scale of organized crime in the Netherlands. The Committee discredited existing police reports and appointed an external academic research group, chaired by Professor Fijnaut, to execute this thorough inquiry. The extensive research report produced by 3
the Fijnaut research group was published as an appendix to the report of the committee in 1996 (Fijnaut et al., 1996; 1998). After the publication of this report, the Dutch Minister of Justice promised the Dutch Parliament that he would produce regular reports on the nature of organized crime in the Netherlands. To meet this need for information, the Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) formed the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor, a group comprised of researchers working at WODC, Erasmus University Rotterdam, and VU University Amsterdam. Together, they conduct an ongoing systematic analysis of closed police investigations of criminal groups. Major reports to Parliament were published in 1998, 2002, 2007, and 2012 (Kleemans, Van den Berg and Van de Bunt, 1998; Kleemans, Brienen and Van de Bunt, 2002; Kruisbergen, Van de Bunt and Kleemans, 2012; Van de Bunt and Kleemans, 2007).
The Dutch organized crime monitor
The basic idea behind the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor is to collect solid empirical data on a wide cross-section of organized crime cases in order to inform policy and practice. The main sources for the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor are the closed police files of criminal groups, often spanning a period of several years (for more information, see Kleemans, 2007). During the period 1996-2012, 150 large-scale investigations were systematically analysed. Each case study started with structured interviews with police officers and/or public prosecutors. After these interviews, we analysed and summarised the police files (to which we had direct access) using an extensive checklist.
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Unobtrusive police methods, such as transcripts of wiretaps, data from police observations and interrogations of victims and offenders, often provided a detailed picture of the social world of organized crime. It is important to note the absence of plea-bargaining in the Dutch criminal justice system and the extensive use of wiretapping, which provided researchers with a lot of unobtrusive evidence that they could check themselves.
A recurring discussion in academic literature is whether organized crime should be defined in terms of the characteristics of groups or of criminal activities (for an overview, see Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004). In the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor, organized crime is mainly distinguished from terrorism, corporate crime, group crime, and other types of crime by the characteristics of the groups involved. Following the Fijnaut research group (Fijnaut et al., 1998), groups are considered to be organized crime groups if they are focused primarily on obtaining illegal profits, if they systematically commit crimes which cause serious damage to society and if they are fairly competent in shielding their criminal activities from the authorities. Shielding illegal activities from the authorities is made possible by using various strategies such as: corruption, violence, intimidation, storefronts, communication in codes, counter surveillance, media manipulation and the use of experts such as public notaries, lawyers and accountants.
After four data sweeps, we collected 150 cases representing a wide cross-section of various forms of organized crime. The strength of this data set was in its combination of breadth of scope and in-depth content. Yet it should not be understood as a representative sample as using intrusive policing techniques to shed light on a hidden phenomenon such as organized 5
crime, means that a complete or random sample is rarely conceivable. Furthermore, all samples are, in some way, selective and influenced by police priorities (as well as the failures of criminal groups to escape police attention and shield their activities effectively). Therefore, the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor employs a strategic selection of cases from a total population of all closed criminal investigations of national and regional investigation teams (including the fiscal police). This strategically selective sample focuses not only on traditional drug trafficking cases (cocaine, heroin, and cannabis) (37 cases), but also on other – less frequently prioritised – phenomena such as synthetic drugs (production and export) (15 cases), mixed cases (including traditional drugs and synthetic drugs) (21 cases), human smuggling (16 cases), sex trafficking (18 cases), fraud and money laundering (32 cases) and other criminal activities (11 cases). In this way, we collected a wide cross-section of empirical cases, covered by the broad umbrella term organized crime.
Realistic claims: keeping feet on the ground
From the start of the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor, there has been a constant struggle for realistic claims about what empirical research could produce for politicians and policymakers. Politicians and policymakers generally want full, and constantly updated, information on all the issues of the day. Though it is tempting for scientists to want to fulfil such unrealistic demands, it is ill-advised as it can only serve to produce quick, superficial reports which have no valid empirical basis. The original wish, following the Parliamentary Enquiry Committee, was to have a yearly report, but because of these concerns about lack of depth, it was amended to biennial reports. After the first report was published in 1998, a time frame was 6
adopted that was much better fitted to the necessity of producing reports based on solid data: a periodical report every four or five years. A longer time-frame gives researchers the opportunity to do solid research and produce new findings for the policy arena rather than becoming entrenched in a very short policy cycle with yearly reports.
A second important issue regards the basic research question: what is the nature of organized crime in the Netherlands? The Fijnaut research group also had to investigate the seriousness and scale of organized crime in the Netherlands, but to a certain extent this was an impossible task. Organized crime is generally only revealedif the police investigate it, so police priorities often provide the boundaries of knowledge for both the police and scientists. Scientists do not possess a crystal ball and often rely on criminal justice sources for their investigations. Nevertheless, the temptations facing scientists, and the expectations placed upon them to make wider and wider claims, are huge. Politicians and policy makers ask for information about the scale and seriousness of organized crime, the trends and threat analyses. The basic assumption is that making sound judgements about policing priorities depends on having complete information about the nature, seriousness and scale of organized crime now, and in the near future. Nevertheless, the solid information that is available is only partial knowledge about prioritised and successfully investigated criminal groups from the past. The Dutch Organized Crime Monitor is tailored toward this solid existing evidence; evidence that is often not properly analysed by the police, as operational needs usually take precedence over analysis. Systematic analysis, however, is exactly the sort of research that produces knowledge which can be vital for the policy arena and for policing practices.
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By deliberately adhering to the basic research question, the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor always left quite a lot of leeway for police reports about trends and threat assessments of organized crime. A National Threat Assessment (Boerman et al., 2012) covers areas that the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor deliberately avoids: questions about the scale of certain criminal phenomena and their supposed development over the next five years, and the normative validation of these phenomena (is it a threat to Dutch society?). This threat assessment also has a function in the policy arena but, by its very nature, it is a mixture of empirical evidence, expectations about future developments, and normative judgement. A threat assessment such as this cannot move beyond the boundaries of knowledge regarding intelligence and criminal investigation that are created by police priorities.
Opting for solid evidence
Information on organized crime varies from soft to solid. Criminal intelligence and documents collated at the start of a criminal investigation often have a strong hypothetical character and it is only during a criminal investigation, when wiretaps, observation, and other methods generate concrete information, that these hypotheses can be tested. The criminal reality can often turn out to be rather different from what the criminal intelligence suggests. It is also possible for a criminal investigation to produce insufficient evidence to arrest people or take the case to court. Finally, the courts may rule that certain allegations are insufficiently backed by evidence.
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Back in the 1940s, Tappan (1947) and Sutherland (1945) were already discussing what the consequences of this difference in solidity could mean for criminological research. Tappan claimed that only the courts could rule whether someone was guilty or not. Sutherland, on the other hand, stated that criminal activities should be investigated as close to the sources as possible, or some criminal activities, such as white-collar crime, could scarcely be the subject of criminological research.
Solidity of evidence is important for research; for the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor, therefore, the best sources are documents from recently closed police investigations into criminal groups that provided enough evidence for the public prosecutor to take the case to court. However, waiting for a final judgement of the courts – as Tappan suggested – means that we would have to ban the use of relevant evidence for several years until a final verdict had been reached. In organized crime cases, this could mean a wait of five to ten years. For this reason, we analyse the evidence at an earlier point, as soon as the first check (by the public prosecutor) is completed. An advantage of this timing is that the police team has just finished the largest part of the investigation and can answer a lot of the questions put to them by researchers. We also follow the court cases and the confiscation of assets procedures and update our case descriptions if, and when, necessary.
By focusing on solid evidence, we could lose sight of the soft intelligence that reveals new phenomena and trends. For this reason, during the first data sweep of the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor (1996-1998) we spent a lot of time and effort collecting all the available intelligence and crime analysis reports on organized crime in the Netherlands and conducted 9
many interviews with key informers in criminal intelligence units. With the benefit of hindsight, we can conclude that the cost-benefit-ratio of all these efforts was rather small for an empirical research project. First, it is often impossible to check the sources of the intelligence reports, which is a problem if one wants to use these sources for research. Second, confidential reports are difficult to use as a source in a public report. For us, the best sources that could be used were the extensive police reports that had been made public and also described the sources used for the analysis.
Reporting publicly on sensitive issues
The Parliamentary Inquiry into Criminal Investigation Methods made clear just how important public empirical research into organized crime is (PEO, 1996). If it is impossible to report publicly on these phenomena, it is also impossible to debate publicly in a rational way. This is even more salient as debates on these issues may have substantial impact on infringements on the basic human rights of citizens.
Reporting publicly on these issues, however, is easier said than done. The main question is: how detailed can descriptions of suspected persons and suspected activities be without being too evidently traceable to concrete persons, and harming their interests. This is not a theoretical problem. One of the researchers of the Fijnaut research group described a case about a particular lawyer, but was then taken to court by this same lawyer who successfully won a prosecution. Other persons described in the Fijnaut report also threatened the writers of the report with prosecution. 10
For a public report, scientists prefer to write in as much detail as possible, but this also makes cases easier for the general public to recognize. First, some of these problems can be solved by using multiple cases; the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor started with 40 extensive police investigations and now has a collection of 150 cases, involving 2,295 suspects. Second, cases can be used as examples for a more general abstract analysis. This also allows researchers to omit some details of the case descriptions that would make these descriptions too easily identifiable. Third, cases can be made more anonymous by abstraction. The Caribbean, for example, can be used to signify the more concrete island of Aruba and exact amounts of money can be rounded up. However, without details, the descriptions of organized crime may become too abstract and sometimes the context is part of the analysis and explanation, so it cannot be omitted entirely. Finally, some details are so easily recognisable, particularly in high profile cases, that they may be traceable to concrete persons: a civil servant who is suspected of corruption, a dubious lawyer, or a contract killing that was on all the newspapers front pages. In cases of this sort, we decided to tone down our wish to mention precise sources and we do not refer to a specific case, but to one of the analysed cases.
As well as the careful proofreading conducted by all the researchers and reviewers from our own organizations, we also used a steering committee comprised of experts from the field of criminal justice and policy. In specific cases, we sometimes asked the public prosecutor of the case to check whether or not any of its details could be made public in this way. We also used this method if we wanted to check if some details might harm ongoing investigations.
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However, nobody ever gives a guarantee, and in the end researchers are on their own and have to rely on their own carefulness and judgement. Even the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee could not protect researchers from law suits. They could only pay the costs. The same is true for the Ministry of Security and Justice: the Ministry can protect its own researchers, if they are civil servants and carefully do their duty, but it cannot protect them as private persons from law suits. For research that is commissioned to external academic partners this is even more problematic, as guarantees against law suits or making financial arrangements to cover any possible risk is not often part of the contract. For the practice of conducting sound empirically-based research this is a huge impediment, as the risks facing academics who engage in this type of research are not mediated properly.
Policy assumptions as a starting point for relevant academic research
Policy-relevant research into organized crime is clearly important, but should avoid two pitfalls. First, it should not be too directive, as policy making is inherently a normative process in which empirical evidence does play a role, but so too do ideology, norms, values, and the varying political support for certain courses of action. Second, advice should not be too practical. Police practitioners know how criminal groups can be investigated and prosecuted much better than researchers do. The main problem of organized crime policies is that these are often based on implicit and untested assumptions about the nature of criminal groups and their activities, and on the ways in which criminal groups interact with the criminal justice system. By focusing research on these main assumptions, academic researchers could make a real impact on policy making and practice, as will be elucidated 12
below in relation to five subjects: criminal networks, facilitators, transit crime versus racketeering, the facilitating environment, and criminal careers in organized crime.
When organized crime arrived on the Dutch political agenda in the early 1990s, it was mainly viewed as an external threat and framed in terms of the Mafia-type organizations which exist in Italy and the United States, and in the ways in which they manifest themselves in society such as by gaining control of certain economic sectors or regions, then acting as alternative governments (see e.g. Cressey, 1969; Gambetta, 1993; Jacobs, 1999; Paoli, 2003). In 1992, the Dutch government issued an ambitious memorandum entitled Organized Crime in the Netherlands: An Impression of its Threat and a Plan of Action (Ministerie van Justitie/Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 1992). According to the memorandum, organized crime was on the verge of infiltrating economic sectors and political institutions and was a major threat to the integrity of Dutch society. In public debate, the problems with the Mafia in Italy functioned as a powerful symbol of what could happen to the Netherlands as well.
Systematic empirical research, however, revealed that this picture was ill-founded and that it actually contradicted the phenomenon of organized crime in the Netherlands (see for a review, Kleemans, 2007). Briefly, Mafia-type organizations were actually the exception rather than the rule and the concept of criminal networks turned out to be a more fitting description of the rather flexible structures within which ordinary offenders operate. Furthermore, racketeering turned out to be virtually absent. The primary business of organized crime in the Netherlands can more aptly be described as transit crime. Criminal groups are primarily involved in international smuggling activities – drug trafficking, smuggling illegal 13
immigrants, sex trafficking, arms trafficking, trafficking in stolen vehicles, and other transnational activities, such as money laundering and tax evasion (e.g. cigarette smuggling, oil fraud, VAT-fraud). The Netherlands can be either a country of destination, a transit country, or, especially in the case of synthetic drugs, a production country (Kleemans, 2007). Organized crime uses the same opportunity structure which facilitates legal trade and, to a certain extent, resembles the transit economy of the Netherlands. The research conducted by the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor also carefully described facilitators who provided crucial services for several criminal groups such as money exchangers, underground bankers, money launderers, document forgers, and the people supplying the basic chemical ingredients and specialized equipment necessary for producing synthetic drugs. The research reports also systematically described the role of the facilitating environment, as opposed to an external threat of foreign groups taking control over certain territories or economic sectors.
What effects did the results of the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor have on policy and practice? Certainly, the revised view of the nature of organized crime in the Netherlands was mirrored by a change in criminal investigation strategies (for a review, see Kleemans, 2007). In the early 1990s, the image of pyramid organizations was largely reflected in large-scale and long-term investigations, aimed at putting the leaders of these organizations behind bars, sometimes using intrusive investigation methods such as covert policing and infiltration, and uncontrolled deliveries of drugs. Since preliminary arrests and seizures might endanger the ultimate aim of the investigation, they were postponed until the leaders could be arrested. Such strategies are expensive and can yield very low returns, in both the short and long run. As it is hard to gather evidence without arrests and seizures, there is increasing pressure for police agencies to get involved in the criminal milieu and in criminal activities, protecting 14
informers, infiltrators, and ongoing investigations. The IRT affair was a clear example of the drawbacks of such strategies. After the IRT affair, such covert policing, infiltration and uncontrolled deliveries were strictly regulated or forbidden. Police investigations increasingly relied on unobtrusive methods of gathering evidence such as the extensive use of wire-tapping and – since 2000 – bugging. In the main, observing criminal activities, rather than being heavily involved in the criminal milieu, became the preferred strategy.
Another major change during the last decade was the increasing use of flexible, prompt intervention strategies as an alternative to the large-scale and lengthy police investigations of the past. Arrests and seizures in criminal networks were no longer postponed or prevented at any cost, but were – on the contrary – sometimes used deliberately to gather evidence against the prime suspects. Prompt interventions are now often combined with a more long-term investigation strategy. This change was fuelled by the first report of the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor which was received very well in policy and practice (Kleemans et al., 1998). It was also accompanied by a stronger focus on facilitators in criminal networks and the role of the facilitating environment. The so-called administrative approach, involving local governments and other partners in fighting and preventing organized crime, is now a widely acclaimed and accepted approach toward organized crime in the Netherlands (for a review, see e.g. Van de Bunt and Van der Schoot, 2003; Kleemans, 2007).
Results that have not always been welcomed
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Despite the overall positive response to the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor, some insights still have a long way to go. One of these insights is that a substantial percentage of organized crime offenders only become involved in crime later on in life (Kleemans and De Poot, 2008; Van Koppen et al., 2010). Adult-onset offenders are found among all types of organized crime (drugs, fraud, et cetera) and among all categories of offenders (leaders, coordinators, and lower-level offenders). These findings contradict the general idea that crimes committed when an individual is older are usually preceded by an adolescent criminal career, and that individual characteristics and long-term risk factors are the major reasons for a life in crime, let alone a life in serious and organized crime. Most research up until now, however, has concentrated on the early stages of life and on high volume crime. The focus in most empirical longitudinal studies is on a relatively early and short age-period and so phenomena other than the early onset of criminal behaviour are not easily identified (for an overview, see Piquero, 2008). Even when a number of offenders in a studied sample are shown to have had an adult onset, they are frequently ignored or brushed aside in terms of their theoretical implications. Criminal pathways of organized crime offenders, and particularly the relatively large share of adult-onset offenders, can be explained by the distinct features of organized crime and the ways in which offenders become involved in these activities. Key such explanatory factors include social ties that provide access to criminal opportunities, organized crimes transnational character, and its logistical complexity. Not everyone has access to these criminal activities, and some only have this access later on in life.
For practical policy, this means that an overemphasis on persistent criminals may be illconceived. First, some young criminals will never become involved in serious organized crime, as they lack the necessary resources and contacts. Second, some people only get 16
involved later on in life, e.g. through conventional settings which provide opportunities for organized crime. These people are not necessarily known to the police and may only come to their attention if the police realise that people may follow different pathways toward organized crime and that social relations and occupational settings are important explanatory factors.
These empirical findings are highly relevant, both for academic research and for practical policy. Policy makers and practitioners also listened to this message, but some practitioners just did not want to believe it. It is also a mixed message: on the one hand, there are certainly a lot of early starters in crime who later also become involved in organized crime. On the other hand, adult onset, and people switching to organized crime from legal activities is not an uncommon phenomenon. However, the latter is much more difficult to grasp, as many practitioners target primarily the criminals who have been on the police radar for a long time. In academic research, raising awareness about the phenomenon of adult onset also has a long way to go as the primary focus is on early onset and early prevention as a policy implication. Early onset is much better understood than the understudied phenomenon of adult onset. For both academic research and policy and practice, adult onset may become another destination at the end of the long road of raising awareness. To get there, we must all keep on repeating the message.
Conclusion: repeating the message
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Was empirical research alone responsible for making these changes happen? Certainly not. The influence on prompt intervention strategies and facilitators is clear, but to a large extent the process of change should be described as an interaction between solid empirical research, policy plans, and the work of practitioners. Public empirical research both opens and closes certain evolutionary pathways for policies and practice. The discussion about organized crime often starts all over again. Any new incident or crisis can start a new discussion and the repressive pathway is very alluring: raising sentences for certain offences, creating new specialised investigation squads and taskforces, and starting to arrest criminals. Writing public reports, based on solid empirical research may act as a counterbalance to these tendencies and offer support to policy makers and practitioners who want to prevent and fight organized crime in a more sophisticated way.
Acknowledgements: The Dutch Organized Crime Monitor operates with the sustained, collective effort of many persons. The author would like to thank all past and present collaborators, particularly Henk van de Bunt, Edwin Kruisbergen, Christianne de Poot, and Ruud Kouwenberg.
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