Economics, Management, and Financial Markets Volume 10(3), 2015, pp. 43–56, ISSN 1842-3191
THE ECONOMICS OF DRIVE-IN THEATRES: FROM MAINSTREAM ENTERTAINMENT TO NOSTALGIA ON THE MARGINS MARK A. FOX
[email protected] Indiana University South Bend ABSTRACT. At their peak in the 1950s, there were around 4,500 drive-in movie theaters accounting for 25% of box office revenues. Today, fewer than 350 drive-ins remain in the United States. This research examines the economic, social and technological forces that have contributed to the decline of this once popular form of entertainment. The decline of drive-ins can be attributed to changing cost structures within the industry, demographic patterns, changes in viewing preferences, and to changes in Americans relationship to their automobiles. JEL codes: L10; L25; L82 Keywords: industry analysis; entertainment; drive-in theaters How to cite: Fox, Mark A. (2015), “The Economics of Drive-in Theatres: From Mainstream Entertainment to Nostalgia on the Margins,” Economics, Management, and Financial Markets 10(3): 43–56. Received 28 January 2015 • Received in revised form 27 July 2015 Accepted 27 July 2015 • Available online 1 August 2015
1. Introduction Research on drive-in theatres is relatively sparse. During recent decades, that research has largely focused on the history of drive-ins in different regions within the United States, including Colorado (Wolfe, 2007), Wisconsin (Marchant, 2001), and Virginia (Sopko, 2008). The drive-in theater industry is worthy of further research in light of the historical arc of drive-in theater exhibition. At their peak in the 1950s, there were around 4,500 drive-in theatres in the United States, comprising around one-third of all cinemas and accounting for 25% of box office revenues (Kozak, 2007; Lobban, 1996c). This was an impressive feat as drive-ins theatres typically only operate for a 43
limited number of months per year (particularly in cooler climates) and usually only show films after dusk. Historically, drive-ins were an integral part of their local communities. For example, Durant (1950) observed what he called de lux drive-in theatres, which were akin to community recreation centers: Here, for instance, are some of the things you can do at various ozoners [drive-ins] without taking your eyes off the screen or missing a word of dialogue: You can eat a complete meal, get your car washed and serviced, including a change of tires, have the week’s laundry done, your shopping list filled and the baby's bottle warmed. All this while the show is on. (p. 24)
During the 1950s additional entertainment was common at drive-ins (Lobban, 1996a). These drive-ins often had a “circus-like atmosphere that you just didn’t get at an indoor theater” (qtd. in Wright, 2013). One of the largest drive-ins of its day was The Johnny All-Weather Drive-in. This drive-in opened in 1957 in Copiague, Long Island, with a capacity of 2,500 vehicles (drive-ins.com, 2015a). The All-Weather Drive-in also had an indoor theatre for inclement weather, as well as a playground, restaurant, cafeteria, and a shuttle train to transport customers around the 28-acre facility (Capo, 2004). Given the early and widespread appeal of drive-ins, a 1950 article by Rodney Luther predicted that they would have a bright future – even though television was emerging as a competing form of entertainment at that time: Most discussions of television indicate that TV competition may alter the present structure of theatre exhibition to a considerable degree. However, the drive-in theatre is capable of offering a greater number of varied attractions than is possible in the case of conventional theatres, even though the precise drawing power of pony rides, laundry service, etc. has not been determined. Moreover, since drive-ins have achieved their present status with largely subsequent-run product offerings, it seems apparent that they can progress considerably further if given first- and second-run product. In the few cases where drive-in theatres have enjoyed first-run product, outstanding grosses have been recorded. (1950: 46–47)
If we fast-forward to the present day, most drive-in theatres do indeed offer first-run movies, but they tend not to offer the wide range of entertainment options that were common in the 1950s. Moreover, today, television is only one of the substitute forms of entertainment competing with drive-ins. Technological and social developments have made drive-in theatres largely extinct and they are now a marginal form of film exhibition. In recent years, the costs of moving to digital projection technology have further undermined the viability of drive-ins. Historically, major movie studios made first release films available on 35mm, but in the future new releases 44
will only be available in digital format (Alexander and Blakely, 2014). This means that cinemas, including drive-ins, need to invest in costly digitalprojection equipment. Today, fewer than 350 drive-in theatres remain in the United States, compared to around 5,326 traditional cinemas (drive-ins.com, 2015b; National Association of Theatre Owners, 2015a). To help understand why the drive-in theater industry has become increasingly unprofitable, I apply Michael Porter’s Five Forces model (Porter, 2008). The Five Forces Model is the most commonly used framework for helping understand why some industries are more attractive than others. In this paper, the Five Forces Model is applied to answer the following questions: What threat do new drive-ins theatres pose to the industry? What influence does rivalry between drive-ins have on the industry? What power do suppliers (in particular, the major movie studios) have on drive-in theatres? What power do moviegoers have on the drive-in industry? What impact do substitute entertainment alternatives have on the drive-in industry? To help answer these questions, I make use of data collected during August 2014 on the characteristics of the 332 surviving drive-in theatres (driveins.com, 2015b). This data provides useful insights into the nature of the industry as it stands today. 2. Barriers to New Drive-ins Entering the Industry During the 1950s drive-ins provided returns that were “an investor’s dream” (Underhill, 1950, p. 163). As Durant observed: Building costs are small compared to those of regular theatres, and profits so large that it’s possible to payoff the initial investment in two or three seasons. All you need besides a little capital is an empty lot in a good location and some equipment, a lot of which you can get on the cuff from theatre-supply companies. (1950: 90)
Since their heyday in the mid-1950s the number of drive-in cinemas has declined markedly. Today, it is rare for new drive-ins to open, whereas operators exiting the industry have been common (Sangiacomo, 2013). Owing to the geographical spread of those drive-ins that remain open, even when new drive-in theatres do enter the industry their impact on the profitability of existing drive-ins is limited. Drive-ins tend not to compete directly with one another. The United Drive-In Theatre Owners Association (UDITOA) advises potential drive-in operators to avoid locating near existing drive-ins and to focus on the competition coming mainly from indoor cinemas: “You will 45
need to check on your potential competition from indoor theatres. If you are nearby an operating drive-in, locate yours in another area” (UDITOA, 2015). The costs of entering the drive-in theatre industry are significantly higher today than in the 1950s. These costs pose a major deterrent to entrepreneurs considering entering the industry, particularly as operating a drive-in is not all that profitable. Limited profit potential due to high costs, seasonal operation, and soft demand pose additional barriers to operators entering the drive-in industry. Hence, operating a drive-in theatre is often referred to as a “labor of love” (e.g., Harmon, 2012; Northfield Drive-in, 2015). This may help explain why most drive-ins tend to be small, family businesses and chains of drive-ins are relatively rare (Segrave, 2006). For those operators considering entering the drive-in industry by building a new facility, the costs involved are often prohibitive. The major cost is land. One estimate is that a 500-vehicle drive-in would need 10 to 14 acres (UDITOA, 2015). Entering the industry at a certain size is necessary in order to achieve economies of scale by spreading costs over a large number of potential customers. This scale requirement is evident when we consider the vehicle capacity of existing drive-ins. In 2014, the average drive-in theatre had 1.7 screens and capacity for 500 vehicles. Most drive-ins had just one or two screens: 61% of drive-ins had just one screen, with an average capacity per screen of 383 vehicles. 22% of drive-ins had two screens with an average capacity per screen of 278 vehicles. Historically, drive-ins tended to locate on the outskirts of smaller towns or within easy driving distance of towns that would provide a sufficient customer base (Shiffer, 1990; Wolfe, 2007). However, due to its attractiveness for other uses – such as strip malls and subdivisions – the land that could be used for drive-ins has become increasingly expensive (Austin, 1985; Fox and Black, 2011; Segrave, 2006). Aside from land, the other costs of establishing a new drive-in include: landscaping to create ramps for vehicles to be positioned so as to not block one another’s view; constructing a concession building; projection technology; and screens. The UDITOA puts the cost of a new drive-in, excluding land, at $300,000 to $500,000 for a single-screen and $400,000 to $800,000 for a twin screen (UDITOA, 2015). A single screen tower can cost anywhere from $20,000 to $90,000 (UDITOA, 2015). Further, the costs of entering the drive-in industry are increasing due to the move toward digital projection. Historically, projection technology for drive-ins typically involved using equipment to show 35mm films. Such equipment, when purchased used, was likely to cost at least $20,000. However, film projection technology should complete its migration to an alldigital format sometime in 2013 (Belton, 2012). This will make entering the 46
industry considerably more expensive as digital projection technology can cost anywhere from $60,000 to $150,000 per screen (Rezsnyak, 2012). Even if they can raise the finance necessary to open a new drive-in, prospective operators may face community opposition with concerns about traffic congestion or outdated stereotypes of drive-ins as “noisy, rowdy places that are passion pits” (UDITOA, 2015). Another consideration that makes drive-ins potentially unattractive to new entrants is that these businesses are seasonal, typically operating in the warmer months. This dynamic is in contrast to the economics of indoor theatres that are often open all year and are not limited to just showing films during the evening. In short, the capacity utilization of drive-in cinemas is relatively low. This was not helped by the introduction of daylight savings in the 1960s, which had the effect of forcing later starting times for evening showings (Barnes, 2012). Historically, some unsuccessful attempts were made to develop projection technology that could show movies during daylight hours (Segrave, 2006). This would have allowed for matinee showings, or earlier start times for evening showings. However, the likelihood of such technology being developed in the future is unlikely as the dwindling number of drive-ins makes developing and commercializing such technology economically unattractive (Segrave, 2006). 3. Rivalry among Existing Drive-ins There is very little competition between those drive-ins that remain open. Drive-ins tend not to locate within close proximity to one another. A 2009 survey found that the average distance between drive-ins on the mainland United States was 45.7 miles (Fox and Black, 2011). Table 1 shows the distribution of drive-ins by state for the summer of 2014 and shows that most states have relatively few drive-ins. Interestingly, there is relatively little variation in ticket prices between drive-ins – who are mainly competing with other forms of entertainment. As we will discuss under the “substitutes” section of this article, indoor theatres and other forms of entertainment pose a greater threat to drive-in profitability than do other drive-ins. It is also worth noting that one factor that keeps existing drive-ins in the industry is that exit barriers are high. In some locations, the specialized nature of assets used by drive-ins makes using the land for other purposes (especially, in the absence of real-estate developments) unlikely. Also, many drive-in owners are devoted to preserving a unique part of U.S. history. Such barriers may lead businesses to persevere in an industry, even though they may be earning low profits, or making a loss (see, general, Porter, 2008). 47
Table 1 Distribution of drive-in theatres, by State in 2014 %
New York
Number 26
%
North Carolina
Number 5
7.8
Ohio
26
7.8
Utah
5
1.5
Pennsylvania
26
7.8
West Virginia
5
1.5
Indiana
19
5.7
Iowa
4
1.2
California
18
5.4
New Hampshire
4
1.2
Texas
16
4.8
Oregon
4
1.2
Tennessee
14
4.2
Washington
4
1.2
Illinois
12
3.6
Arkansas
3
0.9
Kentucky
12
3.6
Connecticut
3
0.9
Missouri
11
3.3
Massachusetts
3
0.9
Wisconsin
11
3.3
South Carolina
3
0.9
Michigan
10
3.0
Vermont
3
0.9
Alabama
9
2.7
Montana
2
0.6
Idaho
9
2.7
Nebraska
2
0.6
Florida
7
2.1
Nevada
2
0.6
Colorado
6
1.8
New Mexico
2
0.6
Minnesota
6
1.8
Arizona
1
0.3
Oklahoma
6
1.8
Maryland
1
0.3
South Dakota
6
1.8
Mississippi
1
0.3
Virginia
6
1.8
New Jersey
1
0.3
Georgia
5
1.5
Puerto Rico
1
0.3
Kansas
5
1.5
Rhode Island
1
0.3
Maine
5
1.5%
Wyoming
1
0.3
1.5
4. The Power of Suppliers There are two major suppliers to drive-in theatres, namely movie studios and those who supply concession items. Until the 1950s, drive-ins typically did not have access to first run movies. This was because film distributors were concerned that drive-ins would “‘cheapen’ films shown in them and lower earnings in subsequent runs” (Durant, 1950, p. 470). 48
Today, most drive-ins exhibit first-run movies. Drive-ins are reliant on the major movie studios for movies to attract customers. There are relatively few major movie studios and these studios wield considerable leverage over cinemas. In 2014, seven studios were responsible for 88.3% of overall box office grosses: 20th Century Fox (17.3%); Buena Vista (15.6%); Warner Bros. (15.1%); Sony/Columbia (12.2%); Universal (10.8%); Paramount (10.2%); and Lionsgate (7.1%) (Box Office Mojo, “Studio Market Share, 2014”). Given that individual blockbuster movies tend to be produced by different studios, drive-ins are reliant on all of the studios for movies that will attract customers (Box Office Mojo, “All Time Box Office: Domestic Grosses”). The power of movie studios over cinemas derives partly from the highly differentiated nature of movies themselves, i.e., no two movies are the same. Further, blockbuster movies make up a disproportionate share of the gross receipts for drive-ins and indoor cinemas alike. Consider that 697 movies were released in 2014, grossing $10.4 billion, with the top 20 movies alone grossing a total of $3.2 billion dollars or around 44% of overall box office grosses (Box Office Mojo, “Yearly Box Office”). Another reason that movie studies are such a powerful supplier is that they have multiple sources of revenue and are not reliant solely on revenues from drive-in cinemas (or, for that matter, from cinemas in general) (Young et al, 2010). Only 25% of studio revenues are from the box office; 37% are from disc sales and rentals; 21% are from video on demand/electronic sellthrough; and 17% are from pay TV/premium cable (Entertainment Merchants Association, 2015). The power that movie studios have over motion picture exhibitors is evident by the move to digital projection technologies. This initiative is partly a cost-saving measure from movie studios. As the former head of Universal Pictures, Tom Pollack, observed in Variety magazine, “[studios] stand to eliminate billions of dollars in costs in coming years without spending very much” (qtd. in Egan, 2010). In the future, it is likely that major studios will only release movies in a digital format (Alimurung, 2012; Nelson, 2013). Hence, those drive-ins that do not move to digital projection technology will be unable to show popular first-run movies. For example, the manager of the Family Drive-In Theatre in Stephens City, Virginia opines that: “[Studios are] telling all the theatres that by mid-2013 you better be digital, or you will not be a movie theatre” (Voth, 2012). While studios have made deals with larger, traditional theatres to subsidize the cost of new projection technologies, they have not been willing to do so for drive-ins (Voth, 2012). Given the significant cost of digital projection technology, this may force many theatres out of business (see, generally, Dombrowski, 2012). In recent years, this led Honda to create Project Drive-in to provide 49
digital projectors to drive-ins that may otherwise not be able to stay in business (Graser, 2013). The power of movie studios enables them to charge high film rents to exhibitors for first run movies. This forces drive-ins to rely on concessions for most of their profits while needing the high priced new release films to attract patrons and compete with indoor cinemas. Historically, concession revenues were around half of the box-office take (Durant, 1950). Today, drive-ins continue to rely on concession sales as the main source of their profitability, though the percentage of drive-in revenues from concession sales has dropped to approximately 24% (U.S. Bureau, 2007). As the UDITOA (2015) observe: … movie theatres (both outdoor and indoor) make most of their money in the concession stand. An often-high percentage of the monies received for ticket sales must be paid to the film studios as film rent. Therefore, for a theatre to survive, theatre operators must depend on their customers to patronize their snack bars.
5. The Influence of Drive-in Consumers The relatively low cost of buying tickets to attend drive-ins illustrates the influence of consumers and that these consumers tend to be price-sensitive. In summer 2014 the average ticket price for adult or general admission to a drive-in was $7.60. This ticket price is typically for a double bill, something that is rather rare for traditional theatres (Rhodes, 2011). In August 2014, 7% of drive-ins exhibited only single features, 88% exhibited double features, 4% exhibited triple features and 1% exhibited a mix of features over different screens. Double features appeal to patrons as they increase the perceived value of attending the drive-in; that is, patrons feel that they feel they are getting to see two movies for the price of one. Drive-ins themselves promote this benefit. For example the Ford Drive-in in Dearborn, Michigan notes on their Website “Always a Double Feature! Two pictures for the Price of one!” The Big Sky Drive-in located in the Wisconsin Dells advertises that: “You get TWO movies for the price of ONE at Big Sky, the same movies that are playing at the indoor theaters when you come see us.” Double features also provide wider appeal to different individuals who attend the theatre together (families, friends) as some movies may appeal to some group members and not others. A good deal of the influence that moviegoers have over the drive-in industry arises from their ability to choose to select alternative sources of entertainment, or to watch the same movies offered by drive-ins at traditional cinemas or, later, at home. These issues are discussed further in the next section of this article. 50
6. The Threat Posed by Alternative Forms of Entertainment Much of the decline of drive-ins theatres is due the availability and attractiveness of substitute entertainment options. Substitutes are those products or services that perform a similar function to drive-ins, but by different means. In a general sense, Porter observes that: When the threat of substitutes is high, industry profitability suffers. Substitute products or services limit an industry’s profit potential by placing a ceiling on prices. If an industry does not distance itself from substitutes through product performance, marketing, or other means, it will suffer in terms of profitability – and often growth potential. (2008, p. 84)
This quote nicely captures what has happened to drive-in theatres over time, particularly as new technologies that have made attending drive-ins increasingly less attractive relative to entertainment alternatives. The closest substitutes to drive-ins are those products that provide a comparable experience, notably traditional cinemas and watching movies in the comfort of one’s home. Other substitutes include alternative forms of entertainment that do not involve watching movies. Following Porter’s logic, substitutes to drive-ins are likely to be attractive to consumers if they offer appealing price-performance trade-offs relative to drive-ins and if the cost of switching to substitutes is low. While drive-ins typically face little competition with one another, their closest form of competition is from indoor cinemas. A recent study found that there was an average of thirteen indoor theatres within thirty miles of any given drive-in (Fox and Black, 2011). In 2014 the average ticket price for all cinemas was $8.17 (National Association of Theater Owners, 2015b). Contrast this with the cost of attending a drive-in, where patrons can typically watch two films for an average ticket price of $7.60. However, compared to drive-ins, indoor theaters typically offer more viewing choices, more comfortable seating, better sound quality, and are less reliant on good weather (Austin, 1985). In contrast, drive-ins offer more privacy, they often show double features, and provide a more social, family environment. Given the relatively low number of remaining drive-ins, traditional theaters are also more accessible to moviegoers. Watching videos in the comfort of one’s home has also become an increasingly popular alternative to attending the cinema. Home viewing provides privacy, convenience, comfort, and more control over the viewing experience itself (for example being able to pause the movie, or adjust the volume). As home video screening technology has developed consumers have increasingly been able afford, and create their own home theatre experiences. 51
Next, I conclude with some thoughts on the various factors that have contributed to the rise and decline of drive-in theaters. 7. Discussion and Conclusions Present day drive-in theatres are an anomaly in the film exhibition industry. A once widespread and thriving part of the movie industry is near extinction. Unfortunately, as this paper illustrates, competitive forces make drive-ins relatively unattractive to operate, and the future of the industry is uncertain. As the discussion that follows shows, the growth and decline of drive-ins can be attributed to: changing cost structures; changing demographics; changing viewing preferences; and to changes in Americans relationship to their automobiles. In the years immediately following their inception drive-ins were regarded as a fad (Shiffer, 1990). While the first drive-in opened in 1933, the early growth of drive-ins was slow and by early 1942 there were only 95 drive-ins (Film Daily Yearbook, 1942). The slow growth of drive-ins during their early years was partly a function of the Great Depression and of the building and fuel rationing restrictions that occurred with the advent of World War II (Bell, 2003; Maxwell and Balcom, 1946). Following WWII automobiles became more affordable and the drive-in industry grew along with Americans love of their automobiles, and the freedom that driving offered (Thompson, 1983). The number of new cars purchased per year rose from 69,500 in 1945 to over 7.9 million in 1957 (Cohen, 1994). Marchant observes that: “After war-time gas rationing was discontinued, men and women found that their cars restored their sense of control. They were in charge of their destiny” (2001, p. 55). The privacy and family viewing experience offered by drive-ins also appealed to returning veterans: Perhaps the best way to understand the post-war years is to consider that many Americans, soldier and civilian alike, had to re-orient themselves from being part of a communal war effort to settling back down to being private citizens. In other words, the period can be characterized by the overt preoccupation with privacy. (Cohen, 1994: 475)
In the years following the Second World War, drive-ins tended to locate in areas that would be appealing to nearby communities – typically along the pre-interstate or state highways and within the reach of several small or medium-sized communities (Shiffer, 1990). Not surprisingly, the suburbanization that occurred along with the Baby Boom helped the growth of driveins during the 1950s (Gomery, 1985). Suburbanization made the traveling to 52
downtown cinemas more time-consuming and expensive while commuting to drive-ins became less costly and more convenient (Gomery, 1985). In the 1950s, the income of the typical drive-in was often as much as double that of indoor theatres (Lobban, 1996a). Drive-ins appealed to families as they often charged on a per-vehicle rather than a per-person basis. Driveins were also a popular form of entertainment at this time because there were few alternative entertainment choices, and – aside from movies – drive-ins often offered other forms of family entertainment. Further, television ownership was relatively rare in the early 1950s (9% of households), but by 1962, 90% of households owned at least one TV (U.S. Census Bureau, 2003). The late 1950s and the 1960s saw major changes that affected the ongoing viability of drive-ins. Movie theaters were increasingly being located in or near malls to appeal to consumers in the suburbs (Cohen, 1994). Mallbased theaters meant that consumers could combine going to the cinema with activities such as dining and shopping. Inevitably, shopping centerbased cinemas siphoned off some of the patronage of drive-ins. There were only a few hundred malls in 1950, nearly 3,000 in 1958, over 7,000 in 1963, and 22,000 by 1980 (Gomery, 1992). Because drive-ins were often located at the intersection of rural, urban-zoned suburban communities, their property was also attractive for shopping mall developers (Cohen, 1994). In the 1960s the development of the interstate highway system further contributed to the decline of drive-ins as new highways often bypassed the older routes where drive-ins were historically located (Marchant, 2001). At this time drive-ins scaled back on their more extravagant entertainment extras, such as poolrooms and skating rinks (Lobban, 1996c). The 1970s saw a continued decline of drive-ins, with younger cinema lovers increasingly preferring multiplexes (Lobban, 1996c). In order to appeal to a younger market, drive-ins increasingly exhibited “Z” movies and by the 1970s and 1980s, “The screen was now full of blood, gore, or porn movies. Producers of skin-flicks, like Russ Meyer, soon became the new kings of the drive-in move” (Lobban, 1996c). Not surprisingly, some driveins developed a reputation for being seedy and steamy, which made them unattractive to many potential customers (Lobban, 1996c). By the 1980s, drive-ins were less common. Sopko (2008) estimates that 1,000 drive-ins closed between 1978 and 1988 and attributes this to the growth of suburbia and the continued attractiveness of drive-in land for commercial real estate development. Drive-ins increasingly returned to second (or even third) run movies, and the land became increasingly attractive for sale relative to the income drive-ins could generate (Shiffer, 1990). Since their heyday in the 1950s another reason for the demise of drive-in has been America’s dwindling love affair with the automobile. The documentary Going Attractions: The Definitive Story of the American Drive-in 53
Movie (Wright, 2013) observes that the fuel crisis of the late 1970s contributed to a focus on the development of smaller, more fuel efficient vehicles. As Wolf observed “The freedom associated with the car had lost its luster. Fewer and fewer people sought excuses to sit just a few hours more in the family station wagon – which wasn’t as comfortable as the spacious cars of the 1950s anyway.” (2007, p. 9). Similarly, Rebecca Shiffer notes that the motorists of today are a lot less patient: “we no longer drive into anything. We drive through it, whether it’s a bank, a fast food restaurant, or a newsstand.” (1990, p. 1). Today, fewer than 350 drive-in theaters remain. One reason that drive-ins continue to attract customers is that they offer a novel viewing experience, i.e., that one can view a movie outdoor at night. Drive-ins have historically been known as “ozoners” or “ozone theatres” owing to their open air viewing experience. The names of drive-in theatres often emphasize the evening, outdoor viewing experience. Examples include: the Star-Lite Drive-in; Star Drive In; Lake Starlight Drive In; Red’s Crescent Drive In, Blue Moonlight Drive In, Sunset Auto-Vu Drive In; Sky-Vu Drive In; Sunset Drive In. Of course, “star” can be a play on words, indicating both the viewing setting (i.e., under the stars), and on viewing a movie with “star” actors. Another key appeal that drive-ins hold for consumers derives from their nostalgia value (Shaw-Smith, 2009; Fox and Black, 2011). However, with each new generation of moviegoers it appears less and less likely that nostalgia will be an appealing motivation for attending the drive-in. REFERENCES Alexander, H., and Blakely, R. (2014), “The Triumph of Digital Will Be the Death of Many Movies,” New Republic, September 12, http://www.newrepublic.com. Alimurung, G. (2012), “Movie Studios Are Forcing Hollywood to Abandon 35mm Film. But the Consequences of Going Digital Are Vast, and Troubling,” LA Weekly, April 12, http://www.laweekly.com. Austin, B. A. (1985), “The Development and Decline of the Drive-in Movie Theater,” Current Research in Film: Audiences, Economics and Law 1: 59–91. Barnes, B. (2012), “The Sun Hasn’t Set on the Drive-In,” New York Times, August 18, http://www.nytimes.com. Bell, S. (2003), “From Ticket Booth to Screen Tower: An Architectural Study of Drive-in Theaters in the Baltimore-Washington, DC-Richmond Corridor,” Perspectives in Vernacular Architecture 9: 215–227. Belton, J. (2012), “Introduction: Digital Cinema,” Film History 24: 131–134. Big Sky Drive In (2015), http://www.bigskydrivein.com. Box Office Mojo, “All Time Box Office: Domestic Grosses,” http://www.boxoffice mojo.com/alltime/domestic.htm. Box Office Mojo, “Yearly Box Office,” http://www.boxofficemojo.com/yearly. 54
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National Association of Theatre Owners (2015b), “Annual Average U.S. Ticket Price,” http://natoonline.org/data/ticket-price. Nelson, L. J. (2013), “Digital Projection Has Drive-in Movie Theaters Reeling,” Los Angeles Times, January 19, http://www.latimes.com. Northfield Drive-in (2015), “Our Story,” http://www.northfielddrivein.com/history. Porter, M. (2008), “The Five Competitive Forces that Shape Strategy,” Harvard Business Review January: 79–93. Rezsnyak, E. (2012), “Dodging the Digital Bullet,” Rochester City Newspaper, December 12, http://www.rochestercitynewspaper.com. Rhodes, G. D. (2011), “‘The Double Feature Evil:’ Efforts to Eliminate the American Dual Bill,” Film History 23: 57–74. Sangiacomo, M. (2013), “Drive-in Theaters Fighting to Survive Against Modern Technology,” June 8, The Plain Dealer, http://www.cleveland.com. Segrave, K. (2006), Drive-in Theatres: A History from Their Inception in 1933. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company. Shaw-Smith, M. (2009), “Drive-ins: The Last Great Picture Show,” Cricket 36(6): 34–37. Shiffer, R. (1990), “‘Something New Under the Moon’: Drive-In Movies for Motorists,” Society for Commercial Archeology Journal 11(2): 1–6. Sopko, J. (2008), “Movies, Motors and Memories: Westmoreland County’s Drive-in Theatres”, Westmoreland History 13(2): 4–9. Thompson, T. (1983), “The Twilight of the Drive-in,” American Film 8(July/August): 44–49. Underhill, Jr., C. R. (1950), “The Trend in Drive-in Theaters,” Journal of the Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers, February: 161–170. United Drive-In Theatre Owners Association (2015), Frequently Answered Questions, http://www.uditoa.org/FAQs.html. U.S. Census Bureau (2007), Economic Census 2007, http://www.census.gov/econ/ census07. U.S. Census Bureau (2003), “No. HS-42. Selected Communications Media: 1920 to 2001,” in Statistical Abstract of the United States, http://www.census.gov. Voth, S. (2012), “Drive-in Faces Long Road to Digital Projection,” North Virginia Daily, July 12, http://www.nvdaily.com. Wolfe, M. (2007), “Silver Screens under Starry Skies: Drive-in Theatres at Colorado’s Corners,” Colorado Heritage, Winter: 2–23. Wright, A. (2013), Going Attractions: The Definitive Story of the American Drive-in Movie [documentary movie]. Young, S. M., Gong, J. J., and Van der Stede, W. (2010), “The Business of Making Money with Movies,” Strategic Finance 91(8): 35–40.
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