note that CFSP and ESDP do not cover the whole of EU security policy. For instance, ... This makes it possible for multilateral institutions in general and the EU in ...
The EU - A Capable Security Actor? Developing political and administrative capabilities Pernille Rieker (NUPI)
Abstract There is a large literature claiming that the EU has become an important international actor and even an important security actor. While much of this literature has focused on the political will and the ambitions of the EU in this field, there has been much less attention to the actual capabilities at the disposal for the EU in this field. For any political organization there need to be some kind of relationship between aspirations and capabilities. This means that if the EU is to be considered as an important security actor, we should expect that it has developed a certain degree of political and administrative capabilities in this particular policy area. Increased importance of the EU as a security actor would also somehow imply increased capabilities. This article makes three contributions. First, by drawing upon insights from institutional theory and organizational studies I present a conceptual scheme for analyzing the dynamics of capabilities and for assessing distinct configurations of capabilities. Secondly, I make an empirical account of the development of capabilities in the EU in the field of security policy. Finally, the article concludes with a discussion on the relationship between this capability configuration and the role of the EU as a security actor.
1
1. Introduction There is a large literature claiming that the European Union (EU) has become an important international actor and even an important security actor (See for instance Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Deighton, 2002; Duke, 2000; Ginsberg, 2001; Hill, 2007; Hoffmann, 2000; Howorth, 2007; Manners, 2002; Peterson and Sjursen, 1998; Rieker, 2006; Sjursen, 2003; 2006; Smith, 2002; Smith, 2003; Smith, 2004; White, 2001; Whitmann, 1998; Wæver, 2000). While much of this literature has focused on the political will and the ambitions of the EU in this field, there has been much less attention to the extent to which the EU has developed into a capable actor, or the extent to which the EU has developed the capabilities that enables it to deliver a security policy. In order to improve our understanding of the dynamics of capabilities and the implications of distinct configurations, we need to “unpack” the concept of capabilities. In the field of institutional theory and organizational studies there is a rich discussion on the different aspects of capabilities. Drawing on the works by James March and Johan P. Olsen (1995) I will present a conceptual scheme for analyzing the dynamics of capabilities and for assessing distinct configurations of capabilities, and I will show how these classifications might be relevant also for students of International Relations and for EU governance. I will separate between four kinds of capabilities, that is, rights and authorities, resources, competencies and organizational skills. If the EU is to be considered an increasingly important security actor, we should expect increase in some (and possibly all) of these four kinds of capabilities when it comes to security policy. In the empirical section of the paper, I analyze the development of these different elements of capabilities in the EU in the field of security policy. I will here focus primarily on the capabilities related to the CFSP and ESDP and parts of the Commission. Since the CFSP/ESDP can be regarded as a specific policy area, with a separate set of legal rules and treaty basis, a specific budget line, distinct set of institutions and equipments, as well as a staff with competences, know-how and experiences, it makes sense to conduct such an analysis. However, it is important to note that CFSP and ESDP do not cover the whole of EU security policy. For instance, 2
it leaves out important parts such as Enlargement, European Neighbourhood Policy, Development Policy as well as the parts of Justice and Home Affairs that account for the Union’s counter terrorism policy. Although there is a large literature on the development and content of the CFSP and the ESDP, there is, to my knowledge, surprisingly few studies of the development and existence of political and administrative capabilities in relation to the CFSP and ESDP. There are, however, some studies that briefly touch upon these issues (See for instance Aggestam, et al., 2008; Chiti, 2007; Duke, 2006b; Gourlay, 2006; Howorth, 2007; Missiroli, 2006; Smith, 2004), but there are few or none that have this as the main focus. The aim of this article is therefore to fill this gap. The empirical analysis builds upon primary sources and official documents. But since it tries to cover all the political and administrative capabilities, it cannot go in depth on each of them. Still, such a broader overview might provide insights that otherwise have a tendency to get lost in more detailed empirical studies. Recognizing that there is a relationship between goals and aspirations and actual capabilities to act and to realize these goals, there is no reason to assume that there is a simple or linear relationship. On the one hand, the character of the security context might affect the capability configuration. In fact, if one applies a broad approach to security, the set of capabilities that will be considered as important and relevant will differ from an approach that applies a narrow concept of security. The evaluation of capabilities is therefore dependent on the concept of security that is applied. In this paper, I will take as a point of departure the security concept that is used by the EU itself and referred to in important EU documents such as the European Security Strategy. This means that the main focus will be on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), but also other parts of the Commission’s External Relations activities. On the other hand, the existing capability configuration is also likely to affect what kind of security actor the EU is, and a distinct set of capabilities is likely to impact on the range of possible actions and activities it can engage in. I will discuss this in more detail towards the end of the article.
3
2. The importance of political and administrative capabilities 2.1 Actorness and capabilities There are various ways of understanding actorness in international politics. In both international law and conventional international relations, statehood has traditionally been seen as a requirement for being treated as an actor in the international system. More recently, however, other criteria have been emphasized – such as autonomy and the ability to perform. This makes it possible for multilateral institutions in general and the EU in particular to be considered as ‘actors’. Gunnar Sjöstedt defined actor capability as a ‘capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’ (Sjöstedt, 1977: 16). While he viewed this capacity primarily as a function of internal resources and internal cohesion, Bretherton and Vogler have argued that actorness is constructed through the interplay of both internal and external factors (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 2). They hold that an actor is an entity capable of formulating and acting upon decisions, but also that the capacity to act reflects the interaction between understandings about internal character and capabilities and external opportunities. Their focus is on interaction of three types: the interaction between opportunity, in terms of the external context of ideas, events and expectations – the context which shapes and frames EU action or inaction; presence, in terms of structural power – the ability to exert influence externally; and internal capability – those aspects of EU policy process which constrain or enable external action and hence govern its ability to capitalize on presence or respond to opportunity. With regard to the latter, namely capability, Bretherton and Vogler focus on four aspects: shared commitment to a set of overarching values; domestic legitimation of decision processes and priorities relating to external policy; the ability to identify priorities and formulate policies; finally, the availability of and capacity to utilize policy instruments such as diplomacy, economic tools and military means (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 2). While this is an impressive and comprehensive approach, it lacks a focus on governance and administrative capabilities. According to March and Olsen, the craft of democratic governance is organized around four tasks: the development of identities of citizens and groups in the political environment; the development of
4
capabilities for appropriate political action; the development of accounts for political events; and the development of an adaptive political system that copes with changing demands and changing environments (March and Olsen, 1995: 45-46). In this article, I will focus on the second, which means that I will provide an assessment of the actual political and administrative capabilities the EU has at its disposal and how they are used. This task is of particular importance because the existence of certain basic political and administrative capabilities are required in order to be considered as an actor. Even though the EU cannot be characterized as a democratic state, it is possible to apply some of their insights to a unity like the EU – especially as regards the development of political capabilities. March and Olsen start that particular chapter of their book by arguing that ‘developing appropriate identities and acting accordance with them require resources and capabilities’. They further maintain that ‘the tending of capabilities – creating, sustaining, mobilizing, and regulating them – is the task of governance [and that without] such a structure of capabilities, little in the way of individual or collective purpose can be accomplished’ (March and Olsen, 1995:91). According to this understanding, it can be argued that if the EU is to be characterized as an actor, it needs to have certain political and administrative capabilities. This means that Sjöstedt’s focus on internal factors still is important. By using a typology developed by March and Olsen (1995), we may single out precisely what kinds of internal factors are required.
2.2 Types and dynamics of political and administrative Capabilities March and Olsen distinguish between four broad types of capabilities that are particularly relevant to governance (March and Olsen, 1995: 92-95): The first type of capability that is required is what they refer to as rights and authorities. Rights and authorities are capabilities that typically would be enshrined in formal rules. These are protected, interpreted, and enforced by a structure of norms and institutions. By exercising valid authority and having that exercise certified by political institutions and culture, officials establish their existence as officials, and the EU establishes itself as a legitimate actor. The formal rights and authorities that
5
regulate the CFSP are to be found in the treaties. Since treaty revisions do not take place frequently, and since these texts often are results of incomplete drafting, the Council will contribute to the specification of the regulation of this policy area. Second, March and Olsen emphasize the need for resources. By resources, they mean the assets that make it possible to do things or to make others do things. Such assets may include money, property, time, information, facilities and equipment, and have both individual and institutional attributes. By looking at the evolution in budgets and staffs in the period between 2002 and 2007, as well as the development of civilian and military assets, we may get an idea of the extent to which the EU has the necessary resources for being a capable actor in this policy area.1 The third type of capability is, according to March and Olsen, competencies and knowledge on the part of individuals, professions and institutions. Individuals have competencies from their education and training. Institutions encode knowledge in traditions and rules. Competence and know how is therefore a result of a combination of recruitment policy, leadership, skills, training programs and the extent to which it draws upon policy analysis institutes and think tanks. Even though the EU is a relatively young security actor, I argue that its competence is dependent on its capability to draw on its member states experiences as well as developing its own programs for training and lessons learned. In order to evaluate this, I study the Union’s use of national security experts and the extent to which the Union has taken measures in order to develop its own training programs in order to strengthen its competence. Finally, March and Olsen point to the need for organizing capacity. While this capacity is dependent on the availability of the other capabilities (rights, resources and knowledge), organizing capacity is also a condition for making effective use of formal rights, resources and competencies. As March and Olsen argue
1 The time period is linked to the fact that the information about the budgets is available on-line as from 2002. However, this also makes sense since the ESDP was declared operational in December 2001.
6
Without organizational talents, experience, and understanding, the other capabilities are likely to be lost in problems of coordination and control, logistics, scheduling, allocation and mobilization of effort, division of labour and specialization, motivation, planning, and the mundane world of meeting deadlines, budgets, and collective expectations. Attention must be focused; activities must be meshed to produce combined effects; people must be consulted and involved; resources must be conserved and expended in a timely fashion’ (March and Olsen 1995: 95).
There are several institutions at different levels that all have an important role to play in the development of CFSP and ESDP. The Commission, the Council, together with some important agencies as well as the member states all contribute to the implementation of the CFSP. While there are rules that regulate the different institutions competences, these are, often of a very general nature. This means that there are many issues that remain to be solved. In this part of the paper, I will try to describe the main challenges and the responses from the EU. In order to be able to say something about the functioning of the EU as a security actor given this capability configuration, we also need to understand how these capabilities develop and change. While capabilities often are created by deliberate action, capabilities also have a dynamic of their own. In fact, the four types of capabilities presented above differ in the sense that some are limited resources that will come to an end, whereas others can be said to increase if applied properly (March and Olsen, 1995: 96-98). Many capabilities are expendable. This means that capabilities that are used at one time or in one place are unavailable for use at another time and place. This is the case for most resources. In fact, if the budgets, staff and equipment are used for one purpose, it cannot be used for another – at least not at the same time. Most political systems also have difficulties in seeing costs and benefit that are distant in time and or in space. In fact, it has a tendency to respond to current and local pressure more easily than to future or distant ones. This may have important consequences for governance since some capabilities require investments of time and resources that are well prior to the realization of their benefits. This means that the necessities of immediate problems have a tendency to overwhelm the capabilities of political institutions to sustain a longer-term perspective. While a democratic political system based on bargaining and 7
exchange among self-interested actors is poorly equipped to deal with such problems, an institutionalisation of political action – both in terms of establishing rules that regulate the activities or creating institutions or agency with certain responsibilities – may be better at having a long-term perspective (March and Olsen, 1995: 98-103). Such nearsightedness may also prevent an actor to make the necessary decisions about long-term investments in capabilities that take time to develop and therefore prevent an actor to acquire the necessary equipment in order to become an capable actor also in the near future. But, there are also capabilities that are augmented by use. This is the case for capabilities such as competencies and organizational skills. In fact, the more frequently a task is performed, the more competently it is done. Similarly, the more often an organization faces a problem, the more effectively it deals with it. This means that there is a “learning-by-doing” characteristic of some kinds of capabilities that also, in turn, has consequences for governance. This dynamic suggests that political capabilities profit from exercise, but it may also lead to over commitment. However, experience with a particular combination of rules, rights and authorities tends to develop competence within existing frameworks and make experimentation with other combinations less likely (March and Olsen, 1995: 97). This means that a minimum of rights and resources is required, but also that there are processes that may lead to a more efficient use of even rather limited resources.
3. Identifying the existing political capabilities in EU’s security policy
and
administrative
Taking as our point of departure March and Olsen’s four types of political and administrative capabilities, presented above, we will now try to identify the existing of such capabilities in EU’s security policy. If the EU is an increasingly more important security actor, we would expect to find that both that these capabilities do exist, that they are of a certain size and that they increase over time. In addition to simply identifying the existence and character of these capabilities, this part of the article will also try to say something about how these capabilities develops as well as
8
whether there are any possibilities for improving the institutional processes by which political capacities are distributed and organized for use.
3.1 An increase in formal rights and authorities While the competencies of the EU are more limited in the area of foreign and security policy than in other Community matters,2 there exists a legal framework that regulates the competencies of the CFSP institutions at the EU level, and between the EU and its member states. This legal framework for the CFSP is clarified under Title V in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), established in 1992 (Maastricht) and later revised in 1999 (Amsterdam) and in 2001 (Nice). The Constitutional Treaty also proposed some important new elements, several of which are included in the Reform Treaty that was finally agreed at the informal European Council in Lisbon on 19 October 2007 (to be ratified).3 The treaty both presents the overall objectives and principles for the conduct of the Union’s external action (that it shall be in accordance with the principles in the UN charter and international law etc), but it also clarifies in detail the competencies of the different institutions. As it stands now, the Treaty on the European Union identifies four CFSP instruments: general guidelines and common strategies, joint actions and common positions. General guidelines and Common strategies are both adopted by the European Council. While the former sets out priorities and broad guidelines for this policy area as a whole, the latter provides overall policy guidelines for activities with individual countries.4 Joint actions and common positions are somewhat more specific in scope and are both adopted by the Council. While the former addresses specific situations where operational action by the EU is required and which therefore often translate into common administrative and operational expenditures, the latter merely defines the approach of the EU to given matters of a geographical or thematic nature.
2 Community matters means “first pillar issues” or those issues that fall under the so-called European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community. 3 Following the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands in 2005 and a two year period of reflection, the EU leaders have recently agreed on a new Reform Treaty (2007). 4 Each strategy specifies its objectives, its duration and the resources that will have to be provided by the EU and the member States. So far the EU has adopted Common Strategies on Russia, Ukraina, Mediterranean and the Middle East Process
9
Formally, the various institutional actors therefore play a specific role in the decisionmaking process for the various CFSP instruments. The Amsterdam Treaty introduced the new office of a High Representative (HR) for the CFSP, fusing it with that of the Council Secretary General. The Treaty stipulates that the HR ‘shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties’ (TEU, Title V, Article 26). But even though the Amsterdam Treaty indicated a relatively modest role for the HR/CFSP, the appointment of Javier Solana to this post came to shape the office in ways that have given him a unique stature in the diplomatic world. For many, he has become the face of the EU’s external relations (Duke, 2006b: 12). Since the CFSP is an intergovernmental policy area, the legal competencies of the Commission are more limited compared to the policy areas under the Community. Still, Article 27 of the Treaty confirms that ‘the Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security field’. This means that Commission officials are involved at every level of the CFSP, with the overall objective of ensuring consistency in the external relations of the EU as a whole, safeguarding the acquis communautaire and the EC Treaties. Under Article 22 of the TEU, the Commission shares the right, alongside the member states, to refer to the Council any questions relating to the CFSP and to submit proposals. In the case of CFSP Joint Actions, for instance, the involvement of Community funding would normally give the Commission a role in implementation of the instrument (Duke, 2006b:8). The Council and the Commission are thus jointly responsible for ensuring consistency in the EU’s external activities as a whole, in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. If the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, however, the Commission will become more important in relation to CFSP. (For more information on the impact of the Lisbon treaty see AgenceEurope, 2008: 1). As we have seen, the formal rights, institutions and rules that regulate this policy area are continuously under revision. With the various treaty revisions, the legal basis for 10
this policy area is gradually strengthened even though the intergovernmental character of this policy continues to put certain limits to what the EU may do. However, the establishment of permanent institutions at the EU-level – such as the High Representative for CFSP and his staff – provides the EU-level with more influence over this policy area. The fact that these institutions have got an important role in the preparation of decisions do not give them a say in the actual decision making process, but sometimes influence over the shaping of the decisions is just as important. This means that this policy area has, to some extent, moved beyond intergovernmentalism – at least in its pure form – and is perhaps better characterized by complexity or some form of multi-level governance. Rights are not a capability that is depleted by use. Rather the development of some rights will often create the need for further regulations. When the changes happen gradually and over a long period of time it is primarily because security policy is so closely linked to national identity that there is acertain reluctance towards supranational regulations in this policy area. In fact, progress is linked to critical junctures in international politics, and it may be argued that there are important historical events that facilitate the establishment of more supranational regulation in this area. The CFSP was established at the end of the Cold War. The ESDP was formulated and established as a consequence of the Balkan Wars and a recognition of a need to strengthen the Union’s collective action capacity in this policy area. The Union’s counter terrorism policy was strengthened after the 9/11 attacks on the United States. The transatlantic dispute over the Iraq War led to the adaptation of the European Security Strategy. Finally, the big bang enlargement of the EU in 2004 triggered a process towards important institutional reforms, also in the area of se security and defence. In this sense, it seems like changes in this capability happen primarily as a response to important external events. While the existing rights and authorities define the EU’s security identity and put concrete limits to what kind of security actor the EU may be, important changes in the security context often lead to further regulations.
11
3.2 Limited but increasing resources This section will examine the extent to which the EU has resources – budget, staff and equipment – in the sphere of common foreign and security policy. In focus here are the size and the composition of the budget, the number of staff working in the Commission and in the Council, as well as the military and the civilian capabilities available to the EU. A small, but growing CFSP Budget The CFSP budgets are limited compared to other policy areas in the EU. In 2008, for instance, the CFSP budget represents 0,2 % of the Community budget as such. If we include the totality of the money that is allocated for the Union’s international activities – or what is referred to as “the EU as a global actor” (including preaccession, European neighborhood policy, development, humanitarian aid, democracy and human rights, CFSP and the stability instrument) – the number increases to 5,7 %. However, it is difficult to argue that this is a priority area for the EU.5 Still, it is interesting to note that the CFSP budget has increased considerably since 2002 (from 30 to 200 million euros). The financial framework for the period 2007-2013 also stipulates an important increase in the CFSP budget (from 200 to 340 million euros). Regarding military operations, the picture is somewhat different since it depends largely on national contributions. However, in order to make the EU a more unitary security actor, the General Affairs Council of 17 May 2002 reached a preliminary agreement on the funding of military operations.6 Accordingly a distinction was introduced between “common” costs (head quarters, infrastructure and medical care) to be financed through a new financing mechanism (ATHENA) set up under the Council and individual costs (troops, arms, equipment) to be borne by each Member State involved. But since the ATHENA mechanism only represent 10% of the total cost of a military operation, the remaining problem is still that there are no emergency funds available to tackle unforeseen crisis. Funding for military operations can only be unlocked on the basis of a joint action establishing an operation, and there is, for instance, no provision for covering the crucial stage of preliminary fact finding.
5
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/publications/budget_in_fig/dep_eu_budg_2008_en.pdf 6 This agreement translated into the Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council of 20 June 2002.
12
Lengthy procurement procedures also undermine a rapid deployment of ESDP operations. This overview of the relevant budgets for EU’s security policy shows that these are relatively limited compared to other policy areas and also compared to the ambitions expressed by the EU in the European Security Strategy and elsewhere. Even though the CFSP budget has increased gradually since 2002, and considerably since 2005 and that we also may add on other parts of the External Relations budget that are of particular relevance for civilian crisis management, it still remains a relatively small part of the overall budget. In addition, the common funding for military crisis management is more or less non-existent and the EU’s activities in this field are dependent on the member states willingness on a case to case basis. Even though these findings are not sufficient to draw any conclusion on the capacity of the EU as a security actor, these budget limitations will have important implications for what the EU can and can not do in the security field. Still, it is more important to find out how these limited resources are being used. For instance, that the EU lacks emergency funds to act efficiently in relation to potential crises or that 75% of the CFSP budget is allocated civilian crisis management activities tell us more about the EU as a security actor than the actual size of the budget.7 In addition, it is important to understand why these budgets are so limited and under what mechanism they change. First of all, this capability is one that is depleted by use. In order to have an increase, a change in priorities is required. The nearsightedness of the member states and the prevailing reluctance to take decisions on long-term investments in this area, however, make the prospects for important changes rather slim. The intergovernmental character of this policy area also means that the Commission is expected to have a somewhat more limited role. It is the Council and the member states are expected to carry the main financial burden. Still, there has been a relatively important increase in the current financial framework. This must be understood as a result of regional conflicts on the continent and elsewhere together with the need to fight international terrorism, but also as a result of 7
Interview with the head of unit for the CFSP and RRM in the Directorate A (DG Relex) in July 2007.
13
the enlargement of the EU in 2004. While the enlargement may be an important part of the explanation for the increase, it is likely that regional conflicts and international terrorism has had an effect on the budget in the sense that it has convinced the EU leaders that they should create more adequate instruments of both diplomacy and intervention. It was especially the debate among the European countries in relations to the Iraq crisis in 2003 that led to an increased focus on the need for a stronger coherence in European foreign and security policy. This led to adoption of a European Security Strategy in December 2003 and it also made the need for developing the Union’s foreign policy one of the four main policy objectives in the Commission’s proposal for a new financial framework that was first presented in June 2004. It is argued that an increase in this funding is inevitable given the ambitions of the Union in this field. The establishment of the European Defence Agency, for instance, will have an important role here. While the Union’s ambitions are presented in the European security strategy, some of the proposed practical proposals were presented in the European Commission’s communication Europe in the World: Some Practical Proposals for Greater coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility, which was discussed at the European Council in June 2006. Once again we see that it is external events that trigger a change. Still, the effects are limited and the budget constraints still makes it difficult for the Union to become the capable actor it aims at. Many institutions and few people The Council and the Commission are jointly responsible for ensuring the consistency of EU external activities as a whole. These activities cover all aspects of external relations, security, economic and developments policies. While Directorate General (DG) for External Relations is subdivided into 12 Directorates and has a staff of 661 people8, the staff in Directorate that deals with CFSP and ESDP-related issues is roughly 60. This means that while only 3 % of the staff in the Commission as a whole is working in DG Relex, 9 % of the staff within DG Relex is working with CFSP and ESDP related issues.9 The Commission’s role in civilian crisis management cannot be reduced to these activities only. However, if we assume that all of staff working in the DG for Humanitarian Aid and Development (263), the EuropAid Co-operation Office 8 The largest DG being the DG for translation and the DG for research who has a staff of 2,222 and 1,173 respectively. Source: Statistical Bulletin of Commission staff (October 2007) http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/about/figures/index_en.htm 9 On the whole the Commission has a staff of 23608 (in 2007).
14
(589) as well as the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) (158) contribute to this policy area, the staff still does not exceed 6% of the staff working in the Commission as a whole. The growth of CFSP has led to the development of new and significant institutions under the Council. The Council secretariat is supposed to assist the Council and the Presidency and plays a particularly important role in relations to CFSP and ESDP through the High Representative for CFSP (HR/CFSP), the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (the Policy Unit) as well as the Military Staff. The total number of staff working with CFSP and ESDP at the General Secretariat of the European Union is 32210, which represents 9,5% of the total staff in the Council.11 200 are employed at the EU military staff, 94 in the CFSP and ESDP policy units at external relations directorate general and 28 at the HR/CFSP’s private office.12 The arrival of the High Representative for CFSP, the Situation Centre and the Policy Unit, might appear to suggest the reduction of the Commission’s role to only the administrative and practical aspects of running sizeable aid and assistance programmes and negotiating framework and association agreements with neighbors. However, the influence of the budget means that the Commission still is in a position to play an important role in the part of CFSP that deals with civilian crisis management (Duke, 2006b: 17). But even if one includes all of the staff working with security relevant issues in the Commission (3-6%), the Council (9,5%) as well as the agencies, the overall conclusion still is that there are many institutions and relatively few people dealing with this policy area at the EU level. This argument becomes even more convincing if we compare these numbers to similar numbers from a small country like Norway. In Norway 36 % of the government’s staff (i.e. in the Ministries and the Prime minister’s office) works for the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) – the ministries that are most directly occupied with the external aspects of security.
10 Information by e-mail from the General Secretariat of the Council – “information to the public”. 11 The total number of staff working in the Council secretariat is 3461 (in 2007) http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/budget/data/D2006_VOL1/EN/nmc-grseqAP2000182/index.html 12 Information by e-mail from the General Secretariat of the Council – “information to the public”.
15
This capability is also one that is depleted by use. An increase either requires that one take staff from other parts of the bureaucracy or that the total number of staff is increased, which again requires an increase in the budgets. Whether or not a limited number of staff is alarming depends on the importance of having a staff of a certain size working with a specific policy area. Even though the size of a bureaucracy is not the most important factor, it still gives an indication of the extent to which this policy area is given priority. An increase in Civilian and Military capabilities In addition to budget and staff, it is also important to have the necessary equipment in order to be able to implement policy. In relation to this capability March and Olsen use the example of the governance of hospitals and libraries and argue that “hospitals without bandages cannot function as proper hospitals [and] libraries without books cannot function as proper libraries” (March and Olsen, 1995: 93). Likewise, a security actor cannot function properly without civilian and military capabilities. The EU, as such, has very limited access to civilian and military equipment for crisis management activities. However, the member states have made binding commitments to the EU to make sure that some equipment are made available for the EU. In fact, since the beginning of the decade several Headline Goals have been identified and capability commitment conferences have been organized for that purpose. The former has established some specific objectives and the latter have forced the Member States to identify civilian and military capabilities that can be made available for EU operations. The European Council at Laeken 14-15 December 2001 adopted a declaration on the operational capability of the ESDP, officially recognizing that the Union is now capable of conducting at least some crisis management operations. Since 2000, the EU has developed and improved both its military and civilian capabilities for crisis management. On the military side, the European Defence Agency was established in 2004 to support the member states and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management. While it is possible to identify important progress in the area of military crisis management, some important shortcomings remain in relation to pre-determined headquarters for military operations, extraction forces and joint training and 16
interoperability (Howorth, 2007). The fact that the EU is capable of undertaking a 5 military and 15 civilian or civil military operations of various kinds shows that it cannot be dismissed as an unimportant actor in international crisis management.13 Equipment is also a resource that is depleted by use – meaning that when the already committed equipment is used for one purpose, it cannot be used for another. An increase, however, is dependent on larger national commitments. The European Defence Agency is established in order to facilitate such a development. An increase, however, is first and foremost dependent on national factors – and thus the willingness to provide equipment for strengthening the EU’s actorness perhaps on the expense of other national tasks. The problem of nearsightedness will also here often prevent that the necessary decisions on long-term investments are made. To sum up on resources With regard to resources (budgets, staff and equipment) in the security policy field, the overall conclusion must be that the EU has limited but increasing resources, and that it is primarily oriented towards civilian crisis management and conflict prevention activities. The fact that all these resources are depleted by use makes any changes in the short time difficult and dependent on political will and public support. While limited resources put important constraints on the Union’s capacity to act, it is more important how these limited resources are being used. This means that it is perhaps more interesting to look at the two remaining capabilities, namely competencies and organizing skills. This is both because both of these are capabilities that may augment by use, and because a certain level of competence and good organizing skills may to some extent compensate for both complex rules and scarce resources.
3.3. An ongoing learning process It is often argued that the EU is a young and inexperienced security actor (Hoffmann 2000; Kagan 2003). But it is important to note that its various member states have lengthy experience, both from their individual security policies and through participation in other multilateral frameworks such as NATO and the UN. Some of 13For a full overview of ongoing and completed operations: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g
17
this expertise is also channelled through national participation in various expert groups (under the Commission) and working groups (under the Council). Moreover, even though the EU did not start developing a security policy until the end of the Cold War, it has proven surprisingly adaptive to the new security context. It can be said that the EU actively draws on the competence available in its member states. One concrete example is the Commission’s use of ‘expert groups’, composed of members from national governments, academia and various interest groups. The main task of such groups is to advise the Commission in the preparation of legislative proposals and policy initiatives as well as in its tasks of monitoring and coordination or cooperation with the member states. While expert groups do not formally make political decisions, they provide advice and scientific knowledge that are taken into consideration in the actual decision making process (Gornitzska and Sverdrup, 2007: 6). These expert groups have become increasingly important in the EU. Since the role of expert groups is so central in the European multi-level governance system, it would appear relevant to examine the use of such groups in the sphere of External Relations and the CFSP. Oddly enough, there are very few expert groups in this policy area. While there were 1,237 expert groups organized by the European Commission as a whole as of January 2007, less than 5% of these relate to external relations policies. Moreover, since the overall trend is for expert groups to increase over time, it seems particularly remarkable that the use of such groups in the sphere of External Relations has decreased considerably since 2000. While DG Relex had 35 expert groups in 2000, there were only 11 by 2007. Of the current expert groups, only two are linked directly to the CFSP/ESDP (the group on ‘longer-term measures of the Instrument for Stability’ and on ‘conflict prevention and crisis management’). The others are linked to cooperation agreements with various regions and countries around the world.14 It is also interesting to note that there are only four DGs that have reduced the number of expert groups in this period – and that three of these are External Relations DGs (Gornitzska and Sverdrup, 2007: 16: 14-22). One explanation might be that few countries have more experience than the Commission in the sphere of comprehensive
14 http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/search.cfm?l=all
18
security and civilian crisis management. Thus, in this particular area it is the member states that learn from the EU (Rieker, 2006). While the Commission’s use of expert groups varies according to the policy area in question, all the work of the Council is prepared or coordinated by the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER), made up of the permanent representatives of the member states working in Brussels and their assistants. The work of this Committee is itself prepared by some 250 committees and working groups consisting of delegates from the member states.15 Also here there are good opportunities to draw on the knowledge and experience of member states. Concerning the CFSP, the work is prepared in the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is composed of the member states permanent representatives. In turn, the PSC gets advice and recommendations from the Military Committee, composed of the member states chiefs of defence, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, composed of civilian representatives from the member states, and from various other CFSP working groups, depending on the issue (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006: 5). The EU has also taken several initiatives in order to upgrade its own expertise in security and defence. First of all, there are several think tanks that provide the High representative with policy analysis in order strengthen the Union’s competence in this area. The most widely used ate the EU Institute for Security Studies (the former WEU Institute for security studies) in Paris, but also the European Policy Centre in Brussels. In addition, the EU established a European Security and Defence College (ESDC) in 2005. This college is organized as a network between national institutes, colleges, academies and institutions within the EU dealing with security and defence policy issues. It “provides training in the field of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the strategic level in order to develop and promote a common understanding of ESDP among civilian and military personnel, and to identify and disseminate, through its training activities, best practice in relation to various ESDP issues.”16 There are also two training programmes that deal with Civil Military Coordination – one that has been run by the Commission since 2001 and one led by the Council since 2004. Both have been directed towards diplomatic, civilian and 15 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=388&lang=en 16 http://www.ihedn.fr/cesd/index_en.php
19
military personnel from the member states (Khol, 2006: 132). Finally, the EU has undertaken four crisis management and military exercises – CME 02, CME/CMX 03, CME 04 and MILEX 07.17 At the EU military exercise in June 2007, Javier Solana emphasized the importance of this learning process, and stated: ‘we will continue to test and learn each year […]. we will also continue to strengthen our capacity by learning from the actual operations we are running.’18 This capability is one that is augmented by use. There might be a learning by doing process, but there are also room for establishing a learning structure at the EU level. As we have seen this has happened to some extent. Still there is room for improvement. For instance, the EU has no established lessons learned unit or feed back mechanism that makes it possible to systematically learn from previous experiences (Aggestam, et al., 2008: 163)
3.4 Lack of Organizational Skills Organizational talent is perhaps one of the most important capabilities in order to be a more capable actor. In fact, if an actor does not have sufficient organizational skills, the other capabilities are likely to be lost in problems of coordination and control (March and Olsen, 1995: 95). As we have seen, there are many levels and institutions that have a role to play in relation to the different capabilities in this particular policy area. This indicates that one of the main challenges for the EU is to find a way to overcome these institutional challenges. With no less than four DGs responsible for external relations (External relations, Enlargement, Development and Trade), together with their underlying services there is a coordination challenge within the Commission itself in this policy area. Internal communication problems have also prevented the Commission from acting as a coherent force, and the result has sometimes been contradictory politics towards third parties (Duke, 2006b: 10). The adoption of an intergovernmental CFSP in 1992 has only added to this complexity, and the competition between four Commissioners in defining the Community’s profile in EU external relations made it difficult to shape
17 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=283&lang=en&mode=g 18 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/94678.pdf
20
the substance of the Commission’s ‘full association’ with the CFSP.19 A further contributory factor has been the difference in bureaucratic culture between the Commission and the Council (Duke, 2006a: 22 ; Gourlay, 2006). With the Amsterdam Treaty, the Commission’s external relations structures were simplified with the creation of DG Relex. This DG was given responsibility for the planning and policy aspects of Community external relations. However, the establishment of DG Relex did not really solve the coherence problem. The fact remains that there exist a broad range of instruments that contribute to civilian crisis management, that these are managed by several different DG’s, and that there is no coordinating mechanism. There have been a few modest attempts at streamlining the Commission’s efforts in international crisis management, notably the establishment of Civil Protection Structures and the Advanced Planning Teams. While the former aim at coordinating interventions of national civil protection teams inside and outside the EU in case of a natural or technical disaster, the latter are intended to coordinate the external crisis management missions of the Commission (Gourlay, 2006: 119). Within the ESDP structures, there has also been a need for structures to promote civil–military and inter-service coordination. This has led to the establishment of a Civil–Military Planning Cell and the Crisis Response Teams. The establishment of the Civil–Military Planning Cell is the EU’s first institutional innovation designed to provide a more integrated response to crisis management planning, whereas the Crisis Response Teams are a Council procedural innovation intended to promote interservice coordination. The challenge of coordinating EU crisis management policies is a grave one, characterized by the broad range of activities involving various actors from the decision-making processes to the implementation of policies (Aggestam, et al., 2008). The growing number of cross-cutting issues, for instance, has increased the potential for disputes over competence between the Commission and Council. The question of competences involves many of the tools for crisis prevention, crisis management and 19 The Commission is represented at all levels in the CFSP decision making structures, from European Councils to working groups. It safeguards the EU Treaties and the acquis communitaire and ensures consistency of the action of the Union.
21
resolution being developed by the Commission and within the CFSP/ESDP context. These
challenges
were
identified
in
the
European
Security
Strategy
(EuropeanCouncil, 2003: 19). However, the question remains: how to combine the various instruments and capabilities? According to Gourlay (2004), the EU’s approach to crisis management has been ‘a self-limiting one, largely conducted within the intergovernmental framework of the ESDP, and institutionally divorced from EU activities that use European Community instruments’. She argues that the development of short-term crisis management instruments has not built on the external relations acquis of the Commission, but instead followed a distinctly intergovernmental approach. The resultant shortfalls in relation to coordination between the Council and the Commission in crisis management have led to an inefficient and fragmented approach to planning, deployment, mission support, training and recruitment for civilian crisis management operations (Gourlay, 2004: 420). In addition, the fact that there is no unified chain of command with regard to EU instruments for crisis response means that neither the Council nor the Commission has the necessary strategic oversight concerning all EU instruments (Gourlay, 2006: 112). There have been few institutional innovations to promote coordination between the Council and the Commission. When such coordination has been achieved, this has often been in spite of rather than because of the EU’s structures. It has been characterized by informal working-level cooperation and cross-representation of the Commission in CFSP structures and of member states in EC policy and programming processes (Gourlay, 2006: 119). To a significant degree, the improvement of policy coherence is also a process of learning by doing. However, as a recent SIEPs report on the security-development nexus has concluded, the institutional rivalry generated by the persistence of bureaucratic politics continues to undermine efforts at greater coherence consistency. However, it also argues that the establishment of liaison offices between the Council and the Commission may have a positive impact the EU’s strategic coherence (Aggestam, et al., 2008: 99). With the establishment of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy that will both have the position as High representative for CFSP and as the 22
Vice President of the Commission, the Lisbon Treaty provides for an institutional change that, if the treaty is ratified, may improve the coherence of the EU’s external action and security policy. The new financial framework for 2007–2013 has also opened up for a more flexible funding system. It remains to be seen, however, whether these changes are sufficient to solve the problems related to the EU’s coherence as a security actor.
4. Conclusions: What does this tell us about the EU as a security actor? This article argues that political and administrative capabilities are necessary in order to be a capable actor. Based the work of March and Olsen (1995), I have presented a conceptual scheme for analyzing the dynamics of capabilities and for assessing distinct configurations of capabilities by drawing on institutional theory and organizational studies. I argue that it is useful to separate between four types of capabilities: rights and authorities; resources (budget, staff, and equipment); competencies and knowledge and organizational skills. These different aspects of organizational capabilities are driven by different dynamics and they serve different purposes in constituting the EU as a security actor. In addition, I have made an empirical account for the development of each of these four types of capabilities in the EU in the field of security policy. The main conclusion of this empirical study can be summarised as follows: First, we have observed the gradual development of legal rules and rights which have enabled the EU to become a security actor. Although the rights and authorities are complex and have been subjected to revisions and changes, we observe a gradual process of institutionalization, which also entails an ongoing process of interpretation and specification of the initial formal legal rights. Second, the EU has limited resources. It has a small budget, a limited staff and has relatively little equipment available for conducting crisis management activities. The lack of resources is a serious challenge for the EU as a security actor, and it certainly constrains the scope, duration, intensity and type of activities by the EU in this field. However, we should note that there has been a slight increase in EU’s own resources 23
across time, and that the EU has gradually developed financial mechanisms and networks that enable it to build-upon and make use of resources at the national level. Third, the EU has a certain degree of knowledge and competence in the security field, particularly if one takes into account a wide security concept. Also in regards to knowledge and competence we observe that the EU is to a large extent making use of the knowledge and experience of its member states. However, as knowledge is something that increases by use, we still observe that increased action and experience in operating in the field of security policy has triggered processes of “learning by doing” and there has more recently been put in place structures and mechanisms for training at the EU-level, which is likely to increase the knowledge base for EU security policies further. Finally, this empirical study shows that the EU has a major deficit when it comes to organizational skills. Since organizational skills is a necessary capability in order to get the most out of the rights, resources and competencies available, the EU is dependent on this capability in order to become a capable security actor. The main reason for this deficit is related to the special character of the EU – being something in between an international organization and a federal state. This has led to a complicated institutional structure with fuzzy borders between the legal competencies of the different institutions and levels. There are overlapping competencies between the Council and the Commission in relation to civilian crisis management, as well as between the national and the European level. Without a common chain of command, the Commission and the Council might suffer from a lack of necessary strategic oversight of all EU instruments. In some way or the other the EU has to cope with this co-ordination challenge in order to strengthen its organizational skills and make use of the resources already at disposal. While the establishment of coordination offices and positions may be one solution, the creating of better feedback mechanisms that will improve Union’s capacity to learn from experiences may be another. The establishing a double-hatted High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as proposed in the Lisbon Treaty, and the increased co-ordination of the diplomatic and military services for instance, might be a step in the right direction..
24
In some ways, the EU is best characterised as a system of multi-level governance. This means that insights from the institutional and organizational literature may be useful in order to understand the functioning of the system and thereby also to come up with proposals on how to meet these challenges. Until recently, EU security policy has mainly been analysed from an IR perspective. This has provided interesting, but perhaps limited understanding of how the EU functions as a security actor since this literature have a tendency to disregard institutional factors. Understanding the institutional set up and its dynamics is crucial since the multi-level character of the EU seems to have important consequences for how it works as a security actor. For instance, it is no point in increasing the resources if the knowledge on how to solve the organizational skill-problem is not sufficiently developed. While the IR literature has dominated this field up until now, institutional theory and organizational studies might have more to offer in relation to these questions.
References AgenceEurope (2008) The Lisbon Treaty and its implications for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Bulletin quotidien Europe: Europe Documents 2478, 16 February. : Brussels. Aggestam, L., Anesi, F., Edwards, G., Hill, C. and Rijks, D. (2008) Institutional Competencies in the EU External Action: Actors and Bounderies in CFSP and ESDP 6-7. SIEPS: Stockhold. Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. (2006) The European Union as a Global Actor (London and New York: Routledge). Chiti, E. (2007) The European Security and Defence Administration. Within the Context of Global Legal Space. Jean Monnet Working Paper 7. New Yrok University School of Law: New York. Deighton, A. (2002) ' The European Security and Defence Policy' . Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4, p.pp. 719-42. Duke, S. (2000) The Elusive Quest for European Security (Oxford: St Antony' s). Duke, S. (2006a) ' Areas of Grey: Tensions in EU External Relations Competences' EIPASCOPE 1. Duke, S. (2006b) The Commission and the CFSP. Working Paper 1. European Institute of Public Administration: Maastricht.
25
EuropeanCouncil (2003) A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy 12 December: Brussels. Ginsberg, R.H. (2001) The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by fire (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield). Gornitzska, Å. and Sverdrup, U.I. (2007) Who consults? Expert Groups in the European Union. Working Paper 12. ARENA: Oslo. Gourlay, C. (2004) ' European Union Procedures and Resources for Crisis Management' . International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 3, p.pp. 404-21. Gourlay, C. (2006) ' Civil-Civil Co-ordination in EU crisis management ' . In Nowak, A. (ed.) Civilian crisis management: the EU way (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot paper 90). Hill, C. (2007) ' The Future of the European Union as a Global Actor' . In Foradori, P., Rosa, P. and Scartezzini, R. (eds.) Managing a Multilevel Foreign Policy: The EU in International Affairs (Lanham, MD: Lexington). Hoffmann, S. (2000) ' Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy?'Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 2, p.pp. 189-99. Howorth, J. (2007) Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd). Juncos, A.E. and Pomorska, K. (2006) ' Playing the Brussels game: Strategic socialisation in the CFSP Council Working Groups' . European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 10, No. 8 Sep. Khol, R. (2006) ' Civil-Military Co-ordination in EU crisis management' . In Nowak, A. (ed.) Civilian crisis management: the EU way (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot paper 90). Manners, I. (2002) ' Normative Power Europe: A Contadiction in Terms?'Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, p.pp. 235-58. March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1995) Democratic Governance (New York: The Free Press). Missiroli, A. (2006) ' Money Matters: Financing EU Crisis Management' . In Deighton, A. and Mauer, V. (eds.) Securitng Europe? Implementing the ESS (Zurich: ETH Zurich). Peterson, J. and Sjursen, H. (eds.) (1998) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Comparing Visions of the CFSP (London and New York: Routledge). Rieker, P. (2006) Europeanization of National Security Identity. The EU and the changing Security Identities of the Nordic States (London and New York: Routledge).
26
Sjursen, H. (2003) ' Understanding the common foreign and security policy: analytical building blocks' . In Knodt, M. and Princen, S. (eds.) Understanding the European Union's External Relations (London and New York: Routledge). Sjursen, H. (2006) ' What kind of power?'Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2, p.pp. 169-81. Sjöstedt, G. (1977) The External Role of the European Community (London: Saxon House). Smith, H. (2002) European Foreign Policy. What it is and What it Does (London, Sterling, Virginia: Pluto press). Smith, K.E. (2003) European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.). Smith, M.E. (2004) Europe's Foreign and Security Policy. The Institutionalization of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). White, B. (2001) Understanding European Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Whitmann, R. (1998) From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union (Basingtoke: Macmillan). Wæver, O. (2000) ' The EU as a security actor. Reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on post-sovereign security orders' . In Kelstrup, M. and Williams, M.C. (eds.) International relations theory and the politics of European integration : power, security, and community (London: Routledge).
27
