The governance of adaptation financing - Inderscience Online

226

Int. J. Global Warming, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2017

The governance of adaptation financing: pursuing legitimacy at multiple levels Louis Lebel* Unit for Social and Environmental Research, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, 50200, Thailand Email: [email protected] *Corresponding author

Albert Salamanca Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) Asia Centre, 15th Floor, Witthyakit Building, 254 Chulalongkorn University, Soi Chula 64, Phyathai Road, Pathumwan Sub-district, Pathumwan District, Bangkok 10330, Thailand Email: [email protected]

Chalisa Kallayanamitra Unit for Social and Environmental Research, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, 50200, Thailand Email: [email protected] Abstract: The objective of this paper is to assess how climate change adaptation funds have been legitimised; that is, how they have been justified and made acceptable to different actors. To this end, it analyses the way various actors have sought to promote and challenge the legitimacy often multi-lateral international and national climate change adaptation funds in the Asia-Pacific region. The study shows that adaptation funds draw on multiple sources of legitimacy, including: ethical or justice arguments; participation and deliberation; transparency; accountability; coherence; and effectiveness. Efforts to strengthen one source of legitimacy can have an impact on other sources, with evidence of both synergies and trade-offs. International and national adaptation funds are primarily legitimised to state actors, even though funds and projects are justified in terms of assisting vulnerable groups and communities. International financing has helped legitimise adaptation as an important development and policy objective. An adaptation financing architecture that is more multi-level, if not yet polycentric, has emerged alongside new legitimacy challenges; but at the same time, providing opportunities for improving outcomes on the ground if greater attention is given to access by vulnerable groups and communities.

Copyright © 2017 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.

The governance of adaptation financing

227

Keywords: climate; adaptation; financing; funds; legitimacy; accountability; governance. Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Lebel, L., Salamanca, A. and Kallayanamitra, C. (2017) ‘The governance of adaptation financing: pursuing legitimacy at multiple levels’, Int. J. Global Warming, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp.226–245. Biographical notes: Louis Lebel is Director of the Unit for Social and Environmental Research (USER) at Chiang Mai University. His research interests include global environment change, water governance, resilience, and sustainability of production-consumption systems. Albert Salamanca is a Research Fellow and Co-Leader of the Transforming Governance theme at the Stockholm Environment Institute – Asia Centre. He has 15 years experience in several countries in Southeast Asia, working on natural resources management, conservation, development and sustainable livelihoods issues. Chalisa Kallayanamitrais is a Researcher and Research Coordinator at the Unit for Social and Environmental Research (USER) at Chiang Mai University. Her research interests are in institutional and environmental economics and public policy. This paper is a revised and expanded version of a paper entitled ‘The governance of adaptation financing: legitimacy at multiple levels’ presented at the Earth System Governance Tokyo Conference, Tokyo, 28–31 January 2013.

1

Introduction

Adaptation as an idea had to struggle for acceptance on the international stage; whereby there was concern that doing so would reduce mitigation efforts, namely the agreement on limiting emissions of greenhouse gases (Dryzek and Stevenson, 2011). Before adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, most national governments had paid little attention to climate change adaptation; by the Bali Action Plan of 2007, adaptation had gained prominence in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process. Now, adaptation as an objective is more or less accepted as one of the necessary elements of a response to the challenges posed by climate change; alongside mitigation and effective loss and damage systems (Warner and Geest, 2013). The next struggle is to make sure that the initial financial instruments gain public and political support, which in turn is needed to secure longer-term financial support for adaptation in developing countries (Donner et al., 2011; Fenton et al., 2014b). An assessment of the costs of managing extreme event risks under current climate suggests the need for US$4-28 billion per year (Hochrainer-Stigler et al., 2014). Estimates of the costs of adaptation to future climate are crude and imply a range from around US$25 to over 100 billion per year, by 2015–2030 at the global level (Fankhauser, 2010). A World Bank study that systematically tried to separate the additional costs due to climate change above and beyond existing development and adaptation deficits, arrived at a figure of US$70–100 billion per year in developing countries alone (Narain et al., 2011). The upper end of these estimates is equivalent to

228

L. Lebel et al.

80% of all existing annual overseas development assistance from major donors, and double the annual lending by the World Bank. Increasing the perceived legitimacy of adaptation funds to donors and recipients is critical to attracting funding support. Previous scholarship on the legitimacy of international environmental institutions suggests that norms and discourses in an issue area, play key roles in the acceptance of their authority (Bernstein, 2011). Other research underlines the importance of legitimacy in both procedures (input) and effectiveness (output) (Scharpf, 1997); and, between those directly part of an institution (internal), and those which are not (external) (Biermann and Gupta, 2011). While there has been some recent analysis of climate change adaptation funds from a normative or theoretical perspective that explore what should be the basis for legitimacy (Grasso, 2011), much less attention has been given to how claims of legitimacy are articulated, and how legitimisation actually happens in particular instances (Bernstein, 2011). Recent work on local climate change planning in Denmark has shown that entrepreneurial individuals who bring in knowledge and resources, can help legitimise actions in the absence of strong national level support (Wejs et al., 2013). In this case, ethical and moral arguments were shown to be of lesser importance to perceived legitimacy than those aligning actions with current policies on, and business interests in, green economic growth. At the same time political factors and institutions greatly influenced the actions of the institutional entrepreneurs (Cashmore and Wejs, 2014). There is a need to apply insights of this sort on legitimisation in the case of adaptation financing. A recent study of the transparency and effectiveness of the multilateral climate finance, showed that these dimensions of legitimacy are crucial to the viability of funds, but that there is also a need for innovation in order to engage the private sector (Nakhooda et al., 2014). This paper addresses the question: How are climate change adaptation funds being legitimised? To respond to this question, this paper looks at the sources of legitimacy in sets of both multi-lateral international and national adaptation funds, and at the arguments they made to donors, recipients, and other stakeholders. The main sources of information were reports about the negotiation and establishment of funds, fund implementation documents, newspaper articles, and previous published analyses of individual funds. The analysis is novel in the emphasis that is given to understanding the legitimisation of national and international funds, within an increasingly multi-level and complex financial architecture; and, for the attention given to legitimacy from the perspective of the needs and interests of vulnerable groups and communities. The next part of this paper develops a framework for analysing sources of legitimacy and their interactions. This is followed-up by a brief introduction to the international and national adaptation funds studied. The succeeding sections after this illustrate and evaluate evidence for different sources of legitimacy in the establishment and implementation of the various adaptation funds. The final section integrates the findings about the different sources of legitimacy, to draw out implications for scholarship on legitimacy and the institutional design of new adaptation funds.

2

Legitimacy

Legitimacy refers to the acceptance and justification of an institution by a community (Bernstein, 2011). Acceptance is to act in accordance with the rules of the institution.


229

Justification is to reason with those it will affect in a way they can accept. Legitimacy is a relational concept, which depends on the perspectives of different parties. Legitimacy of an institution is critical to function: without it, the authority of an institution is continuously challenged, and voluntary compliance is low. Where governments are elected, one mechanism of legitimacy is that the authority can be removed at the next election. Governance at levels above the state or involving private actors, however, cannot rely on conventional avenues of legitimacy such as democratic accountability, but instead must draw on other sources (Biermann and Gupta, 2011). Sources of legitimacy can be classified in several ways. Here we adopt an expanded classification to aid analysis of legitimising processes in the establishment and operation of adaptation funds. Six sources are distinguished (Figure 1). Four deal with aspects of input or procedural legitimacy, namely: participation and deliberation, transparency, accountability, and coherence. ‘Effectiveness’ describes output legitimacy, while ‘justice’ encompasses both input and output dimensions. Figure 1

Six sources of legitimacy (in bold) distinguished in this analysis with illustrative mechanisms and relationships

First is social justice. Attention to social justice in the norms, principles and ethical arguments in an institution, help confer legitimacy to that institution. Actors are more likely to collaborate and support a just institution, because they feel doing so is the right thing to do (Grasso, 2011). Justice on paper and in procedures, however, is not enough if it does not also lead to more equitable and fair outcomes, or distributional justice (Dore and Lebel, 2010). A common barrier to pursuits of justice is lack of access to social processes; which in turn are often related to factors underlying vulnerabilities like physical location, wealth, gender, and ethnicity (Gupta and Lebel, 2010). Second is through participation and deliberation. If those who are subject to a decision have been included, or well represented in decision-making processes, then they are more likely to accept the authority of those who decide and act (Dingwerth and

230

L. Lebel et al.

Eichinger, 2010). Inclusive participation also generates multiple discourses, which, given adequate deliberative space, then leads to higher discursive quality and better arguments contributing more to decisions (Bernstein, 2005; Dryzek, 2001). In practice, however, the meaningfulness of participation and inclusiveness of deliberations vary greatly, so that instrumental or token forms, if recognised as such, may undermine legitimacy. Third is through transparency, or when there is full access to information about procedures and key decisions. Education-based approaches that improve information actors have about their own behaviour, may also improve transparency in some circum stances (Mitchell, 2011). Transparency provides an incentive for better performance (Bernstein, 2005), but requirements for disclosure may not be enough if it means information is still inaccessible or difficult to comprehend (Gupta, 2010). Fourth is through accountability mechanisms; by which authorities are made answerable for their behaviour and actions (Biermann and Gupta, 2011; Dore and Lebel, 2010). An actor who is accountable, can be sanctioned or even stripped of authority for poor performance, or other reasons by those whom it aims to govern. Accountability also implies a willingness to accept responsibility and behave according to an acceptable standard (Mason, 2008). Thus, decisions and actions which are consistent with the law, are more likely to be seen as legitimate (Cashmore and Wejs, 2014). Fifth is coherence; through which the mutual interests of key actors are addressed. In the case of development aid, for instance, alignment of objectives of donors, implementing agencies and recipients, is often critical to acceptance of programmes and projects. Coherence implies a fit with priorities and procedures that can foster ownership, as well as reduce contradictory and redundant policies (Kok and Coninck, 2007; May and Jochim, 2013). Sixth is effectiveness. An effective institution achieves outputs (makes rulings, assigns roles), outcomes (secures voluntary participants), and impacts (meets objectives with results) efficiently (Young, 2002). Claims of authority may be accepted based on history of responsible behaviour and satisfactory outcomes. Good performance builds trust that in turn, leads to acceptance without needing to examine details of each institution or intervention. Sources of legitimacy do not operate independently from each other (Figure 1). Participation in monitoring and evaluation may support accountability and building of trust. Accountability often also requires transparency. Transparency however, may not empower information users where power relations are highly unbalanced (Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010), or reduce legitimacy where an authority or institution is otherwise perceived as unfair, arbitrary or ineffective in its decisions (Bauhr and Nasiritousi, 2012). Deliberation and social learning at the local level may legitimise adaptation actions, even where there is a lack of policy coherence or effectiveness at the national level (Wejs et al., 2013). Finally, it should be emphasised, that legitimacy may be perceived and weighted differently by different actors. Elected authorities typically argue that downward accountability is the most important; unelected authorities, in contrast, often emphasise effectiveness. Higher-level authorities argue for the importance of coherence. Governed residents prioritise participation and transparency; whereas the subset that is neglected or adversely affected, see justice as the supreme source of legitimacy.


3

231

Adaptation funds

A mixture of different international and national funding systems is needed to support the diversity and volume of adaptation needs. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) manages the first three listed in Table 1 for the UNFCCC, while not itself being part of the convention. The GEF was initially proposed to manage the Adaptation Fund (AF), but this was resisted by many developing countries based on their past experiences with earlier funds. The Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR) was set up by the World Bank outside the UNFCCC process (Ayers, 2011). The establishment of the PPCR has been controversial however, as it seems to compete with the UNFCCC administered funds. One reason developing countries still granted legitimacy to PPCR, was because the inclusion of an ambiguous sunset clause under which operations would end “once a new financial architecture is effective”, that is, a working Green Climate Fund (GCF). As of the end of 2014, the GCF has its own board with a secretariat based in Korea; though no project funds have been approved yet. Pledges have reached approximately US$10 billion (GCF, 2015); less than the initial target of US$15 billion, but still much more than other climate funds (Nakhooda et al., 2014). Table 1

Key features of the main international adaptation funds and selected national adaptation funds considered in this study Started – ended

Approved USD mill

Least Developed Country Fund

2002

733

Voluntary country contributions

Special Climate Change Fund

2002

253


SPA

Strategic Priority for Adaptation

2004–2007

50


AF

Adaptation Fund

2009

232

2% proceeds from clean development mechanism and other contributions

PPCR

Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience

2008

796


GCF

Green Climate Fund

2012

0

Voluntary country contributions and donors

ICCTF

Indonesian Climate Change Trust Fund

2010

9.5

Donors and national budget

BCCRF

Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund

2010

148

Voluntary country contributions and donors

BCCTF

Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund

2009–2010

n/a


PPSF

Philippines’ People’s Survival Fund

2012

0


Short

Fund

LDCF SCCF

Source: HBF and ODI (2015)

Sources of finance

232

L. Lebel et al.

Several countries in the Asia-Pacific have launched their own national climate change funds dedicated to, or which include some support for, adaptation activities (Table 1). National funds can combine internal and external financing. Establishing national funds may make it easier for agencies to take on ‘national implementing entity’ roles in international institutions, like the AF or GCF; underlying the importance of cross-scale links in adaptation financing, and potentially also for efforts to strengthen legitimacy. The Indonesian Climate Change Trust Fund (ICCTF) was established through decrees issued by the Ministry of National Development Planning. While the main focus is on mitigation, one of the three windows focuses on awareness raising and adaptation. Disagreement between the Bangladesh government and international donors resulted in the creation of two separate trust funds in 2010: the Bangladesh climate change trust fund (BCCTF), as funded by the government; and, the Bangladesh climate change resilience fund (BCCRF), which is funded by donors (Alam et al., 2011). Legislation to support the People’s Survival Fund (PPSF) passed final steps in the Philippines congress in June 2012. The fund complements the Climate Change Act of 2009 by providing funds to local governments and communities for climate change adaptation programmes.

4

Legitimacy of adaptation funds

In the following sections, we examine the evidence for the use of different sources of legitimacy (Figure 1) by adaptation funds.

4.1 Social justice The high estimates of the costs of adaptation help legitimise the claims of vulnerable developing countries for assistance from developed countries (Moore, 2012). The countries most vulnerable to harm it is noted, contributed least to historical greenhouse gas emissions (Dellink et al., 2009). The idea of justice in adaptation funds is in part, encapsulated by the idea of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’, as articulated in Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC; an important norm guiding negotiations over the design of international financing for adaptation (Grasso, 2010). Various formula and schemes based on criteria of justice have been proposed to differentiate country contributions in line with abilities to pay, and responsibilities for impacts (Dellink et al., 2009). On the one hand, developing or recipient countries are sensitive to adaptation funds being seen as a form of charity or loan, as they feel it should be thought of as compensation (Syrovátka, 2009). On the passing of the PPSF, it was noted by the Philippines Senate President, Juan Ponce Enrile, that more money had gone to mitigation activities and, “worse, funds that went to adaptation have come in the form of loans, which is unacceptable…climate change is an issue of tort. A compensatory framework governs this issue and we need to leverage finance that addresses our country’s priorities, not the plans of rich nations”. (Climate Change Commission, 2012)

Moreover, loans, like those included in the PPCR portfolio of financing may contribute to long-term debt. From a recipient’s perspective, loans, debt-for-nature swaps, and related mechanisms, lack the legitimacy of compensation or aid financing.


233

On the other hand, developed or donor countries are very reluctant to enter into significant binding commitments based on responsibilities for the consequences of climate change. The UNFCCC framework provides the foundations for justice to be a central concern, but wealthy countries have not met their obligations to provide adequate funding (Ciplet et al., 2013). International politics suggest that securing binding commitments will be difficult, leading some analysts to argue that aid-like models supported by technical analyses will likely continue to predominate (Moore, 2012). The GEF-administered funds were criticised early on for failing to prioritise the needs of the most vulnerable (Mitchell et al., 2008). At COP-12 in Nairobi, it was agreed that AF “should be country-driven and should be based on needs, views and priorities of eligible parties” (Grasso, 2010). COP-13 ambiguously concluded that ‘particularly vulnerable countries’ were eligible. The ‘most vulnerable first’ norm was important to legitimising the fund, but the problem was: virtually all countries could claim to fit under some criteria. Analysis of existing funds show that a wide range of criteria are being used, implying that vulnerability is politically and technically ambiguous (Horstmann, 2011; Klein and Möhner, 2011; Stadelmann et al., 2014). Attention to social justice is clearly important to legitimising adaptation funds from the perspective of donor and recipient governments. One important reveal from these debates on legitimising international funds is: the strongly state-centric framing of social justice issues in international relations. Insufficient attention is placed on the inequalities and differences in vulnerability within countries. Ultimately, adaptation funds need to flow to where they are most needed – vulnerable groups and local communities – and these parties need to be more clearly defined.

4.2 Participation and deliberation So far, international financial institutions for adaptation have followed the conventional pattern in international environmental governance of focusing on states. Key councils and decision-making bodies remain state-centric. The GEF council and AF board, for example, are only open to state representatives. Civil society organisation however, may observe or comment in some meetings. The GEF council has 32 members; with 16 from developing, 14 from developed, and 2 from transition economies. Decisions here are by consensus or double-weighted majority voting. Large donor countries have greater say in decision-making. Developing countries see the conference of the parties (COP), which they dominate numerically, as more legitimate than the GEF; and thus should have the final authority over funds. The Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and PPCR are governed by trust fund committees – of 12–20 members – with equal contributor and recipient country representation, but require consensus decision-making (Ballesteros et al., 2010). In the AF, on the other hand, 10 of the 16 board members are from developing countries, including reserved seats for least developed countries and small island states, and is thus likely to be perceived as more legitimate. Decision-making is by consensus, but if this fails, then a decision is passed by a two-thirds majority vote. One reason the AF has found it hard to raise funds is because, with developing countries in the majority in the AF board, donors feel they have lost some control or authority over how funds are used. At COP-17 in Durban, 2011, parties agreed that the GCF would be overseen by a UN body and not the GEF, and that the governing board would include balanced representation – in line with demands of developing countries, but not the US or EU. The Philippines, which held a

234

L. Lebel et al.

seat in the transitional committee designing the GCF, noted that the new fund “is vital to the national interest…with the right design, our vulnerable country will be eligible to tap the fund” (Climate Change Commission, 2012). At the same time caution is warranted. Experiences with the GEF show that providing developing, recipient countries with more votes, does not in itself result in empowerment (Ballesteros et al., 2010). The approval process, conditionality on grants and involvement of implementing agencies, puts significant power over key decisions on priorities and procedures back in the hands of contributing countries. The fiduciary requirements of the AF for NIE accreditation, for instance, are very stringent. The direct authority international funds have over member states actions are very modest, with key provisions remaining voluntary. Deliberative processes helped establish the first set of funds, and continue to be important to strengthening their legitimacy over time. The presence of alternate, competing discourses, for example, ensures that proposals for reform of old or design of new funds are, carefully scrutinised from multiple perspectives; as has been demonstrated by negotiations of the AF (Grasso, 2011). Achieving discursive quality is important to legitimacy, but this takes time. The AF board struggled over 2009–10 without reaching agreement on how to define and prioritise ‘particularly vulnerable’. One reason for the long debate is that, most developing country AF board members did not fit the SIDS/LDC definition of particularly vulnerable, and were looking for alternative ways of prioritising (Harmeling and Kaloga, 2011). Differences in national interests among developing countries help explain the contested legitimacy of funding criteria. National funds vary in their involvement of non-state actors in governance structures, and the support they give to non-state organisations. In the initial phase, ICCTF was governed by a steering committee, which, apart from the government, included civil society, private, donor, and expert representatives. Central and local government agencies could submit proposals to ICCTF. A technical committee reviewed proposals, which were then submitted to a steering committee that either approved or rejected the proposals (UNDP, 2011). A planned call for proposals for civil society organisations in 2013 under the ICCTF did not take place (ICCTF, 2013). The BCCRF fund is managed by a board, including ministers of environment, finance, agriculture and disaster management, as well as donors and civil society representatives (Gomez-Echeverri, 2010). The BCCRF will allocate about 10% of its budget to civil society and private sector projects, and be administered by the Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation. The rest will go through the line ministries. Expanding representation of recipient developing countries in the governing structures of international funds, and of CSOs in national funds, helps improve fund legitimacy by demonstrating inclusiveness, and increases opportunities for diverse discourses.

4.3 Transparency International funds raise transparency issues important for their legitimacy to contributors as well as to recipients. The UNFCCC, for example, stipulates that financing for adaptation must be ‘new and additional’ to existing forms of development assistance (Smith et al., 2011; Stadelmann et al., 2011). GEF contributions are classified as aid, making it difficult to ensure that they represent new and additional resources. Lack of


235

clear definitions and ambiguities make it relatively easy for developed countries to re-label official development assistance as ‘climate finance’ (Ciplet et al., 2013). The SCCF and least developed country fund (LDCF), only finance ‘additional costs’ due to climate change relative to a development baseline. Just improving public health, education or basic infrastructure, does not account. Distinguishing additional costs of dealing with climate change impacts from baseline needs is complex, and furthermore, many developing countries are already struggling to meet even ‘baseline’ development costs (Ayers and Huq, 2008). From a donor country’s perspective, ‘additional cost’ arguments were important for legitimising funds to domestic constituencies, as well as setting limits to support commitments under international negotiations. Separating out funding for adaptation helps address transparency concerns, but at the same time, adds to the challenge of mainstreaming efforts and achieving results on the ground (Fankhauser and Burton, 2011). It also risks duplication of funding between funds for development and funds for adaptation. The inclusion of ethical principles on equitable access, and transparency in governance from the start in designing the AF, contributed to reducing the conflict between developed and developing countries apparent in the GEF-administered funds (Grasso, 2010). At the same time, the AF has struggled to raise funds from contributors (Harmeling and Kaloga, 2011). One reason is a lack of clear prioritisation of how funds will be distributed or how projects are approved. As a consequence of civil society pressures, the Adaptation Fund now publicly discloses projects and allows a period for public comment prior to approval (Ballesteros et al., 2010). A comment facility is provided on the AF website, where users can click on project titles and leave comments once they have registered; a facility only relevant to those with internet access. Reasons for approving and rejecting projects and programmes, however, are not made public, so transparency remains partial at best (Harmeling and Kaloga, 2011; Persson and Remling, 2014). National funds also face significant transparency challenges. One important institutional design challenge is to clearly separate technical assessment of proposals; from bodies with strong organisational or political interests in where the funds are allocated. In its first two years, the BCCTF allocated almost US$70 million to adaptation projects related to food security, agriculture, disaster management and infrastructure work, and, research. Transparency International Bangladesh convened a discussion in April 2012, to discuss ways of improving governance of the climate change funds, after presenting evidence that 3 of the 83 projects financed by BCCTF had “been plagued by gross anomalies, lack of planning and indications of resource misappropriation at implementation and project formulation stages” (Daily Star, 2012). One of the longer-term, unintended consequences of the controversy may have been to discourage continuation of the BCCTF. No funds were allocated for the BCCTF in the proposed budget for the fiscal year of 2014–15. In June 2014, the finance minister argued in his budget speech that “this allocation will be reduced in the future and instead steps will be taken to increase (funding to) the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund, established with the assistance of our development partners” (Islam, 2014). A transparency international project official responded that “slashing the budget of our country’s adaptation fund because of corruption is like cutting off your head when you’ve got a headache” (Khan, 2014).

236

L. Lebel et al.

The initial nomination in 2011 by Indonesian Government for ICCTF to be accredited as a national implementing entity for AF, was not accepted following site visit; which found need to improve transparency and disclosure on spending among other things (Halimanjaya et al., 2014). Civil society and international funds both have roles in keeping pressure on governments to administer national funds transparently. A third-party auditor could overcome some of the problems of transparency and conflicts of interest with in-house reviews (Harmeling and Kaloga, 2011). More broadly, efforts by CSOs to track adaptation financing have been enhanced with the launch of the adaptation finance accountability initiative at COP-18 in Doha, 2012 (Terpstra et al., 2013). In summary, donors worry about transparency of recipient government use of international funds, because irregularities undermine the legitimacy of those funds; intended beneficiaries in local communities are concerned that their needs remain un-addressed when projects are left incomplete.

4.4 Accountability Much of the initial attention to accountability in international and national adaptation funds has been concerned with conventional issues of avoiding mismanagement of funds at the project-level. This reflects the sensitivity of contributors to criticism they may receive from domestic constituencies, if the fund’s legitimacy was undermined by revelations of corrupt projects. The sanctioning power of contributors over funding institutions is high, because they can withhold future contributions even if they have already pledged. One consequence of this accountability fear, developing countries have argued, is that rules and procedures to accessing GEF-administered funds have been difficult and slow. Reporting and co-financing requirements are a burden (Ayers and Huq, 2008). Implementing agencies such as UNDP, UNEP and World Bank, add further layers of bureaucracy. It is important that efforts to improve the governance of financing, to strengthen fiduciary requirements, do not become too cumbersome that they delay adaptation actions. Poor governance in recipient countries should not become an excuse to hold back funds, but rather adaptation should be seen as an opportunity to build governance capacity (van Kerkhoff et al., 2011). Accountability of adaptation fund institutions themselves is also important; but has received much less attention than the individual projects they fund. To this end, monitoring and evaluation at the level of the fund, and not just of projects, is needed. In terms of sanction power, with weighted voting and representation in favour of donors in governing bodies, the GEF was not strictly accountable to UNFCCC, and did not have to follow the guidance from the COP. This lack of accountability undermines legitimacy from the perspective of recipients. In contrast, at COP-19, agreement was reached on how the new GCF would be accountable to and be guided by the COP. National funding institutions need to be accountable to both internal and external actors, and to a standard potential contributors will accept. Accountability to bureaucratic systems and legislature, and ultimately to the tax-paying public, need to be realised. To access external funds requires some form of accountability to legitimising needs, and demonstrating institutional integrity of the fund to potential donors. National funds appear to be able to draw on the legitimacy gained from recognition by international funds to increase their attractiveness to donors, so such an endorsement is usually sought after.


237

ICCTF is being designed so as to be “able to access vertical funds such as the Adaptation Fund and Green Climate Fund” (ICCTF, 2013). A fund report claims that the “ICCTF has proven to be a legitimate national trust fund, gaining the trust of donors and partners” (ICCTF, 2012). Although legitimacy is claimed, in practice, accountability mechanisms need to be strengthened – as the fund found out when it was visited by AF officials. To date the AF has not received NIE accreditation, in part, because it was unable to demonstrate it could meet standards for procurement and vetting of applicants for work funded under AF. The steering and technical committees or ICCTF are responsible for monitoring and evaluation; there are no environmental or social safeguard policies. Proponents of the BCCRF are making a substantial effort to show that the fund is a ‘country-led’ financing mechanism with high legitimacy; and that the World Bank’s role in ensuring due diligence is temporary (BCCRF, 2011). Thus, the BCCRF follows World Bank performance monitoring standards, but it still has no specific safeguards or grievance mechanisms (Ballesteros et al., 2010). In summary, while both international and national funds claim to prioritise the vulnerable, and this argument has helped strengthen the legitimacy of those funds, accountability to intended beneficiaries remains unclear; in particular, with respect to unintended consequences. Making funds and recipient intermediaries more directly answerable to local communities targeted by interventions should be a priority.

4.5 Coherence LDCF supported preparations for the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA) in least developed countries. The emphasis on integration into country priorities defined by local experts, helped legitimise the fund from a recipient’s perspective. The intention was to focus on urgent adaptation needs. Subsequent difficulties in leveraging financial support for many of the priority project proposed, however, suggests a degree of lack of acceptance by donors to invest in nationally-defined priorities. One argument in favour of AF support for national, as opposed to only multilateral implementing agencies, is that it can improve policy coherence. The AF board is approaching this challenge by establishing national implementing entities (NIEs) to deal with subnational projects. It is still too early to judge the effectiveness of this approach, and how legitimacy of those selected entities will be secured domestically and internationally. As of June 2014, 16 NIE’s have been approved, with only one in the Asia-Pacific region; the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development of India. In addition, one of the four regional implementing agencies is the secretariat of the pacific regional environmental programme (SPREP). 11 multilateral implementing entities have also been approved (Adaptation Fund, 2014). Accreditation of national institutions – some as national level adaptation funds in their own right – is expected to improve policy coordination and the effectiveness of climate change financing. The problem is that the strict procedures demanded will take time and capacity building for NIEs to achieve and then implement. National funds are justified by governments with respect to their alignment with key objectives in national plans and strategies. In the case of the Bangladesh funds, it should be noted that this included development strategies, which themselves struggled to achieve domestic and international legitimacy (Alam et al., 2011). Moreover, although funds which go to national government agencies are labelled ‘direct access’ by funds, from the

238

L. Lebel et al.

perspective of vulnerable groups and communities, access remains anything but direct. As a consequence, achieving coherence between local adaptation and development needs remains a challenging prospect.

4.6 Effectiveness The only international adaptation fund, which draws directly and strongly on effectiveness as a source of claimed legitimacy, is the PPCR. The emphasis of the PPCR is on integrating resilience into national development planning or a ‘mainstreaming’ approach. From the perspective of the banks, PPCR expects to gain legitimacy by demonstrating results. This claim appears to have worked in the sense of ability to leverage funds, and thus allocate reasonable level of resources to projects. Many actors, however, question the amount of control given to the banks to manage financial flows in the PPCR (Seballos and Kreft, 2011). Issues of apparent lack of effectiveness have challenged the legitimacy of some international funds. Excessive bureaucracy in the early GEF-administered funds resulted in slow approval processes: average approval processes have taken four years. Finding an efficient way to deal more directly with local organisations in order to avoid complete capture of funds by higher level bureaucracies, and yet keep transaction costs low, is a related institutional design challenge (van Kerkhoff et al., 2011). Comparisons across funds suggest trade-offs among sources of legitimacy in practice: too much emphasis on transparency and accountability seems to result in reduced effectiveness. Analysis of AF project approvals in the first two years suggests that efficiency concerns have been less important than international equity concerns in decisions (Persson and Remling, 2014). National adaptation funds need to be seen as effective or they will not be able to leverage funds from within or outside. In 2013, BAPPENAS officially stated they would allocate 30–50 million USD of state funds for Trust Fund operations in 2015, as a way “to build the credibility of a new government institution” (ICCTF, 2013), and demonstrate national ownership and independence from UNDP. As noted above, the national budget contribution to the BCCTF in Bangladesh may be halted. In the Philippines, the PPSF budget mandated in 2012, remains un-sourced in 2014 as the President has not signed amendments needed to make the fund operational (Reuters, 2014). As of early 2015, the ICCTF had secured only about US$10 million for the fund, suggesting that it is not yet seen as legitimate as other more widely used financing channels by donors (Halimanjaya et al., 2014). The national government has also not yet allocated a national budget to the fund. Stakeholders are also concerned at how long it has taken for the fund to be operationalised. The BCCRF has been more successful in raising funds (Table 1); reports and media emphasise project benefits (Haq, 2014), and in doing so, legitimise World Bank’s involvement. A key challenge for national adaptation funds is to maintain legitimacy with the legislature and the wider public, otherwise the allocation of finance to adaptation funds becomes hard to justify. Without money, an adaptation fund cannot be effective. In the Philippines, local governments and NGOs have been vocal in their support for the PPSF, underlining their readiness to submit proposals as soon as funds become available and reminding the government that, “The longer it takes for us to support the adaptation needs of the communities, the more expensive they get” (GMA, 2014). An important part of the rationale for national funds has been that they would improve effectiveness by being more responsive to local needs, and more efficient as could work through existing


239

national systems. One way they could be more responsive to local needs, is to allow direct access by local communities; that is, provide many smaller grants.

5

Discussion

The need for substantial financial assistance to developing countries has been established, and the responsibility of developed countries to help, at some level, accepted. The emergence of international financing has helped legitimise adaptation as an important development and policy objective. The design of international and national institutions that govern the financing of adaptation, however, has been keenly contested. Contributors demand stringent procedures; recipients strive to reduce the complexity of reporting requirements for projects. Multilateral banks argue about leveraging funds and achieving results; their critics express concern about their control of financial flows and development. This analysis shows that the support and resistance shown by different actors to proposed rules, procedures and criteria, can be understood in part, in terms of different perspectives on legitimacy. Moreover, donors and recipient countries often adopt interpretations on what is important for a fund to be legitimate, which help them maintain or increase their control over those resources. Differences in interests also help explain why recipient countries argue over the definition of ‘particularly vulnerable’, and donors, on ‘responsibility’ or ‘capacity to assist’. This study also shows that adaptation funds draw on multiple sources of legitimacy, including: ethical or justice arguments; participation and deliberation; transparency; accountability; coherence; and effectiveness (Figure 1). Conversely, critics of funds point to lack of particular practices related to sources as undermining a fund’s legitimacy. The sources of legitimacy that are most contested for international and national funds appear distinct. For international funds, issues of participation and justice at the level of states have been major themes. For national funds, transparency and accountability are more contested. Legitimacy is relational and dynamic. Legitimising a fund to contributors, recipients and ultimate beneficiaries, are distinct challenges for which certain sources of legitimacy may be easier, or more important to draw upon than others. Much of the focus on accountability, for instance, has been on showing donors that the money pledged has been delivered and spent appropriately; but falls short of evaluating to what extent, adaptation benefits were actually delivered to vulnerable groups in those developing countries. Being simultaneously accountable to contributors, recipients and intended beneficiaries, helps legitimise a fund; but admittedly is a difficult balancing act. Legitimacy building also varies with scale. International funds are based on the consent of states, whereas for national funds, the consent of government stakeholders is also crucial. Efforts to strengthen one source of legitimacy can impact on other sources with evidence of both synergies and trade-offs. Placing a strong emphasis on participation and deliberation, as in the case of the AF for instance, led to early perceptions of lower effectiveness compared to PCPR, wherein the focus was on actions that governments and banks wanted. In other cases, interactions were more synergistic. For example, where increasing transparency with respect to projects is proposed, it can also help with independent monitoring and therefore accountability. Simultaneously achieving an

240

L. Lebel et al.

acceptable level of perceived legitimacy on multiple dimensions to multiple stakeholders is difficult; but maybe the best strategy for an adaptation fund. The emerging adaptation financing architecture is becoming more multi-level and multi-actor. Multiple sources of finance will continue to be necessary to match the large and diverse needs of vulnerable people. Competition between funds creates some options for donors and recipients, which in turn, puts pressure on each fund to demonstrate its superiority, as well as helping legitimise the idea of adaptation more broadly. Even so, some consolidation and improved coordination among international funds is warranted; a fragmented system makes it hard for countries to prioritise and synergise projects. We suggest that a more polycentric institutional architecture for adaptation – as has been suggested for mitigation (Ostrom, 2010) – is adopted; because of the increased legitimacy such an arrangement could have with vulnerable and marginalised groups, which ultimately should be benefitting the most from adaptation funds. So far, the legitimisation of adaptation funds has been overwhelmingly state-centric. While some discursive space exists for CSOs, no fund has as of yet made much progress in improving the mechanisms for direct access by vulnerable groups or communities. This is in part, a scale issue in legitimacy: funds need to be also made available in small packages, so that remote and vulnerable communities with limited resources and advocacy support, can still plausibly access it. All funds studied still suffer from significant lack of attention to the importance of pursuing transparency, accountability, participation and effectiveness, in relations to the intended beneficiaries. Shifting to a more polycentric arrangement will require donors, multilateral organisations and recipient governments, to relinquish some power and authority to more diversified stakeholder bodies; which would then enable more projects to be directly proposed, and be led by, local communities and vulnerable groups. To this end, the modest experiences with direct financing of NGOs and CBOs for community-based adaptation of the GEF small grants programme, should be drawn upon. For example: the provision of initial grants for planning projects; simpler procedures for disbursement; and, requirement to demonstrate and document results (Fenton et al., 2014a). Such an approach would draw legitimacy from the more direct participation of intended beneficiaries, and, the ensuing opportunities for coherent and effective local development policies. From a policy and institutional perspective, this study implies that strengthening legitimacy is an important strategy to creating a successful fund. Improved legitimacy to donors helps increase their financial contributions, while improved legitimacy to potential recipients stimulates submission of proposals; both of which lead to more and better projects. Governments need to be able to show their constituencies; that the contributions they make to adaptation funds from collected taxes are used effectively. Thus, it is surprising that a UNDP handbook on designing national funds for climate change does not mention legitimacy (UNDP, 2011). Our analysis here suggests that legitimacy deserves much more prominent consideration in the design of emerging adaptation funds, like the GCF, as well as new national funds likely to emerge (Nakhooda et al., 2014). In particular, this study underlines the need to place greater emphasis on accountability to and effectiveness for, local communities as a fundamental aspect of social justice in financing adaptation, which have so far been legitimised at the national level. A legitimacy lens, like the one adopted in this study, provided insights into the discursive and practical strategies of contributors, proponents and recipients. It helped explain some of the behaviour of state actors, and identified gaps with respect to which


241

funds were being legitimised to, and with what line of reasoning. It also illustrates how institutional design of funds constrain the behaviour of actors, who in turn, strive and sometimes are able to secure design changes (cf. Cashmore and Wejs, 2014). A full understanding of the governance of adaptation financing cannot, however, be based on consideration of legitimacy alone; attention must also be given to other elements of the political economy of development within, and among countries. Several of the funds evaluated in this paper have already or will soon be closed; others are just starting. It is not guaranteed that funding targets of new funds will be reached, or that pledges will be kept. Experiences with building institutional legitimacy should be taken into consideration in the design of new and emerging financing institutions.

6

Conclusions

The legitimacy of an adaptation fund matters because it influences how much finance the instrument can leverage; and, through the specific criteria and priorities adopted, which projects and programmes get funded. Five specific conclusions are drawn about how climate change adaptation funds are being legitimised. First, adaptation funds draw on multiple sources of legitimacy that reflect the actors involved; including whether they are contributors, recipients or beneficiaries, as well as state or non-state actors. Second, efforts to strengthen one source of legitimacy can impact other sources, enhancing or under-mining, depending on the combinations of sources and scales involved. Third, international and national adaptation funds are primarily legitimised to state actors; civil society organisations and local communities have so far had secondary roles, for example, in advocating for greater transparency and accountability. Fourth, the provision of international financing has helped legitimise adaptation as an important national development and policy objective. Fifth, an adaptation financing architecture that is more multi-level has emerged; with opportunities for improving outcomes on the ground, but also raising new legitimacy challenges.

Acknowledgements The initial work on this paper was supported by the Adaptation Knowledge Platform. The lead author is an Associate of the Stockholm Environment Institute. Thanks to Boripat Lebel for his help with background searches and editorial inputs.

References Adaptation Fund (2014) Implementing Entities, Adaptation Fund, Washington DC [online] https://www.adaptation-fund.org/page/implementing-entities (accessed 30 June 2014). Alam, K., Shamsuddoha, M., Tanner, T., Sultana, M., Huq, M. and Kabir, S. (2011) ‘The political economy of climate resilient development planning in Bangladesh’, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp.52–61. Ayers, J. (2011) ‘Resolving the adaptation paradox: exploring the potential for deliberative adaptation policy-making in Bangladesh’, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp.62–88.

242

L. Lebel et al.

Ayers, J. and Huq, S. (2008) ‘Development’s invisible hands: development futures in a changing climate’, Supporting Adaptation to Climate Change: What Role for Official Development Assistance?, DSA Annual Conference, London. Ballesteros, A., Nakhooda, S., Werksman, J. and Hurlburt, K. (2010) Power, Responsibility, and Accountability: Re-Thinking the Legitimacy of Institutions for Climate Finance, World Resources Institute, Washington D.C. Bauhr, M. and Nasiritousi, N. (2012) ‘Resisting transparency: corruption, legitimacy, and the quality of global environmental policies’, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp.9–29. BCCRF (2011) Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund: An Innovative Governance Framework, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka. Bernstein, S. (2005) ‘Legitimacy in global environmental governance’, Journal of International Law and International Relations, Vol. 1, pp.139–166. Bernstein, S. (2011) ‘Legitimacy in intergovernmental and non-state global governance’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp.17–51. Biermann, F. and Gupta, A. (2011) ‘Accountability and legitimacy in earth system governance: a research framework’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 70, No. 11, pp.1856–1864. Cashmore, M. and Wejs, A. (2014) ‘Constructing legitimacy for climate change planning: a study of local government in Denmark’, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 24, pp.203–212. Ciplet, D., Roberts, J. and Khan, M. (2013) ‘The politics of international climate adaptation funding: justice and divisions in the greenhouse’, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp.49–67. Climate Change Commission (2012) Enrile Lauds DOF And Climate Commission Moves on International and Local Finance Arena, Climate Change Commission, Office of the President of the Philippines, Manila [online] http://www.climate.gov.ph/index.php/news/pressreleases/135-enrile-lauds-dof-and-climate-commission-moves-on-international-and-localfinance-arena (accessed 25 June 2014). Daily Star (2012) ‘Fund use must be transparent’, 10 April 2012, The Daily Star [online] http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=229702 (accessed 2 July 2012). Dellink, R., Elzen, M.d., Aiking, H., Bergsma, E., Berkhout, F., Dekker, T. and Gupta, J. (2009) ‘Sharing the burden of financing adaptation to climate change’, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp.411–421. Dingwerth, K. and Eichinger, M. (2010) ‘Tamed transparency: how information disclosure under the global reporting initiative fails to empower’, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp.74–96. Donner, S., Kandlikar, M. and Zerriffi, H. (2011) ‘Preparing to manage climate change financing’, Science, Vol. 334, No. 6058, pp.908–909. Dore, J. and Lebel, L. (2010) ‘Gaining public acceptance: a critical strategic priority of the World Commission on Dams’, Water Alternatives, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.154–171. Dryzek, J. (2001) ‘Legitimacy and economy in deliberative democracy’, Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 5, pp.651–669. Dryzek, J.S. and Stevenson, H. (2011) ‘Global democracy and earth system governance’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 70, No. 11, pp.1865–1874. Fankhauser, S. (2010) ‘The costs of adaptation’, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.23–30. Fankhauser, S. and Burton, I. (2011) ‘Spending adaptation money wisely’, Climate Policy, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp.1037–1049. Fenton, A., Gallagher, D., Wright, H., Huq, S. and Nyandiga, C. (2014a) ‘Up-scaling finance for community-based adaptation’, Climate and Development, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp.388–397. Fenton, A., Wright, H., Afionis, S., Paavola, J. and Huq, S. (2014b) ‘Debt relief and financing climate change action’, Nature Climate Change, Vol. 4, No. 8, pp.650–653.


243

GCF (2015) Green Climate Fund Initial Resource Mobilisation (IRM), Green Climate Fund, Incheon [online] http://www.news.gcfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/pledges_GCF_ dec14.pdf (accessed 18 February 2015). GMA (2014) Mindanao LGUs Urge Release of Implementing Rules for Climate Change Fund, 6 October 2014, GMA News on-line, Manila [online] http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/ story/382395/news/regions/mindanao-lgus-urge-release-of-implementing-rules-for-climatechange-fund (accessed 13 February 2015). Gomez-Echeverri, L. (2010) National Funding Entities: Their Role in the Transition to a New Paradigm of Global Cooperation on Climate Change, European Capacity Building Initiative, Oxford. Grasso, M. (2010) ‘An ethical approach to climate adaptation finance’, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.74–81. Grasso, M. (2011) ‘The role of justice in the North-South conflict in climate change: the case of negotiations on the adaptation fund’, International Environmental Agreements, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp.361–377. Gupta, A. (2010) ‘Transparency in global environmental governance: a coming of age?’, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp.1–9. Gupta, J. and Lebel, L. (2010) ‘Access and allocation in earth system governance: water and climate change compared’, International Environmental Agreements, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp.377–395. Halimanjaya, A., Nakhooda, S. and Barnard, S. (2014) The Effectiveness of Climate Finance: a Review of the Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund, Working Paper, March 2014, Overseas Development Institute, London. Haq, N. (2014) Facing Extreme Climate Disasters, 3 October 2014, in The Daily Observer, Hijr [online] http://www.observerbd.com/2014/10/03/46974.php (accessed 15 February 2015). Harmeling, S. and Kaloga, A. (2011) ‘Understanding the political economy of the adaptation fund’, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp.23–32. HBF and ODI (2015) Climate Funds Update, Heinbrich Boll Foundation and Overseas Development Institute, Berlin [online] http://www.climatefundsupdate.org (accessed 13 February 2014). Hochrainer-Stigler, S., Mechler, R., Pflug, G. and Williges, K. (2014) ‘Funding public adaptation to climate-related disasters. estimates for a global fund’, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp.87–96. Horstmann, B. (2011) ‘Operationalizing the adaptation fund: challenges in allocating funds to the vulnerable’, Climate Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp.1086–1096. ICCTF (2012) Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund. External Report 2010-2011, UNDP, Indonesia, Jakarta. ICCTF (2013) Annual Report 2013, Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund Secretariat, United Nations Development Programme, Jakarta. Islam, S. (2014) Bangladesh to Slash its Own Climate Adaptation Fund, 18 June 2014, Thomson Reuters Foundation, London [online] http://www.trust.org/item/20140618092711-072sy/ ?source=dpagehead (accessed 13 February 2015). Khan, M. (2014) Bangladesh: Cutting off Our Heads to Cure a Headache, 3 July 2014, Transparency International [online] https://www.blog.transparency.org/2014/07/03/bangladesh -cutting-off-our-heads-to-cure-a-headache/ (accessed 15 February 2015). Klein, R.J.T. and Möhner, A. (2011) ‘The political dimension of vulnerability: implications for the green climate fund’, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp.15–22. Kok, M.T.J. and Coninck, H.C. (2007) ‘Widening the scope of policies to address climate change: directions for mainstreaming’, Environmental Science & Policy, Vol. 10, Nos. 7–8, pp.587–599.

244

L. Lebel et al.

Mason, M. (2008) ‘The governance of transnational environmental harm: addressing new modes of accountability/responsibility’, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp.8–24. May, P.J. and Jochim, A.E. (2013) ‘Policy regime perspectives: policies, politics, and governing’, Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp.426–452. Mitchell, R.B. (2011) ‘Transparency for governance: the mechanisms and effectiveness of disclosure-based and education-based transparency policies’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 70, No. 11, pp.1882–1890. Mitchell, T., Anderson, S. and Huq, S. (2008) Principles for Delivering Adaptation Finance, Institute of Development Studies Brighton, UK. Moore, F.C. (2012) ‘Costing adaptation: revealing tensions in the normative basis of adaptation policy in adaptation cost estimates’, Science Technology & Human Values, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp.171–198. Nakhooda, S., Norman, S., Barnard, S., Greenhill, R., Caravani, A.T. and Banton, G. (2014) Climate Finance: Is It Making a Difference? A Review of the Effectiveness of Multilateral Climate Funds, Overseas Development Institute, London. Narain, U., Margulis, S. and Essam, T. (2011) ‘Estimating costs of adaptation to climate change’, Climate Policy, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp.1001–1019. Ostrom, E. (2010) ‘Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental change’, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp.550–557. Persson, A. and Remling, E. (2014) ‘Equity and efficiency in adaptation finance: initial experiences of the adaptation fund’, Climate Policy, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp.488–506. Reuters (2014) Filipinos Lack Climate Protection on the Ground, Despite Laws, 28 May 2014, Thomson Reuters Foundation [online] http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/28/trf-climateidUSKBN0E81V420140528 (accessed 25 June 2014). Scharpf, F.W. (1997) ‘Economic integration, democracy and the welfare state’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp.18–36. Seballos, F. and Kreft, S. (2011) ‘Towards an understanding of the political economy of the PPCR’, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp.33–41. Smith, J., Dickinson, T., Donahue, J., Burton, I., Haites, E., Klein, R. and Patwardhan, A. (2011) ‘Development and climate change adaptation funding: coordination and integration’, Climate Policy, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp.987–1000. Stadelmann, M., Persson, A., Ratajczak-Juszko, I. and Michaelowa, A. (2014) ‘Equity and costeffectiveness of multilateral adaptation finance: are they friends or foes?’, International Environmental Agreements-Politics Law and Economics, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp.101–120. Stadelmann, M., Roberts, J.T. and Michaelowa, A. (2011) ‘New and additional to what? Assessing options for baselines to assess climate finance pledges’, Climate and Development, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp.175–192. Syrovátka, M. (2009) Financing Adaptation to Climate Change in Developing Countries, Department of Development Studies, Palacky University, Olomouc [online] http://www. ebookbrowse.com/syrovatka-financing-adaptation-to-climate-change-pdf-d73766960 (accessed 2 July 2012). Terpstra, P., Carvalho, A. and Wilkinson, E. (2013) The Plumbing of Adaptation Finance: Accountability, Transparency and Accessibility at the Local Level, World Resources Institute, Washington, DC, Working Paper [online] http://www.wri.org/publication/the-plumbing-ofadaptation-finance (accessed 13 February 2015). UNDP (2011) Blending Climate Finance Through National Climate Funds. A Guidebook for the Design and Establishment of National Funds to Achieve Climate Change Priorities, United Nations Development Programme, New York. van Kerkhoff, L., Ahmad, I., Pittock, J. and Steffen, W. (2011) ‘Designing the green climate fund: how to spend $100 billion wisely’, Environment, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp.18–30.


245

Warner, K. and Geest, K.V.d. (2013) ‘Loss and damage from climate change: local–level evidence from nine vulnerable countries’, International Journal of Global Warming, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp.367–386. Wejs, A., Harvold, K., Larsen, S.V. and Saglie, I.-L. (2013) ‘Legitimacy building in weak institutional settings: climate change adaptation at local level in Denmark and Norway’, Environmental Politics, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp.490–508. Young, O.R. (2002) ‘Evaluating the success of international environmental regimes: where are we now?’, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp.73–77.