The Iranian Nuclear Programme Practical Parameters for a Credible Long-Term Agreement Olli Heinonen
www.henryjacksonsociety.org 3
The Iranian Nuclear Programme Practical Parameters for a Credible Long-Term Agreement
About the Author Olli Heinonen is a Senior Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society in London, UK. His research and \MIKPQVOQVKT]LM["V]KTMIZVWVXZWTQNMZI\QWVIVLLQ[IZUIUMV\^MZQÅKI\QWVWN \ZMI\aKWUXTQIVKMMVPIVKMUMV\WN \PM^MZQÅKI\QWV_WZSWN QV\MZVI\QWVITWZOIVQ[I\QWV[IVL\ZIV[NMZIVLKWV\ZWTWN XMIKMN]T][M[WN V]KTMIZMVMZOa Before joining the Belfer Center in September 2010, Olli Heinonen served 27 years at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. Heinonen was the Deputy Director General of the IAEA, and head of its Department of Safeguards. Prior to that he was Director at the Agency’s various Operational Divisions, and an inspector, QVKT]LQVOI\\PM1)-)¼[W^MZ[MI[WNÅKMQV11 :M[WT^QVO9]M[\QWV[:MTI\ML\W\PM5QTQ\IZa,QUMV[QWV[
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The Iranian Nuclear Programme Practical Parameters for a Credible Long-Term Agreement
Executive Summary The Imperatives of a Credible Nuclear Agreement With Iran Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are continuing negotiations to achieve a comprehensive nuclear agreement. Whilst the wider political context to such an agreement is of importance, the key concern at this stage of the negotiations must revolve around ensuring that any agreement guarantees Iran is left without a pathway to making nuclear weapons. As such, what follows below is concerned narrowly with elucidating the detailed considerations P5+1 negotiators have to account for in setting the parameters for a nuclear agreement with Iran. It offers a realistic, independent assessment of Iran’s pathway to the bomb and the necessary constraints that will make for an acceptable deal. Since the negotiations are now at a juncture at which the ideal scenario of having no enrichment or heavy water research reactor programme in Iran after any deal is increasingly unlikely, it is imperative \PI\ IVa KWVKM[[QWV \PI\ 1ZIV Q[ \W ZM\IQV I TQUQ\ML _MTT LMÅVML V]KTMIZ XZWOZIUUM I[ XIZ\ WN IV IOZMMUMV\U][\ÅZUTaZM[\WV\PMNWTTW_QVOXQTTIZ[" % % % %
)VMNNMK\Q^M^MZQÅKI\QWVZMOQUM Adequate irreversibility of constraints with early detection of violations ;]NÅKQMV\ZM[XWV[M\QUMQVKI[MWN ^QWTI\QWV[ >MZQÅIJTMLQ[UIV\TMUMV\WN MTMUMV\[ZMTI\ML\WUQTQ\IZaLQUMV[QWV
)KPQM^QVO\PM[MJI[QKJ]QTLQVOJTWKS[_QTTVMKM[[Q\I\MI[QOVQÅKIV\ZM[PIXQVOIVL[KITMJIKSWN \PM scope, content and parameters of Iranian activity, with many elements to consider: 6WLMIT_QTTJMKZMLQJTMWZL]ZIJTMQN QV\MV[QÅML[][\IQVML^MZQÅKI\QWVQ[IJ[MV\
