The Iraq War - Center for Strategic and International Studies

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The Iraq War: Progress in the Fighting and Security Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

February 18, 2009 www.csis.org |

Introduction This report is a status report. It is not intended to support a given policy, and it is not intended to assess future risks like Arab-Kurdish tensions, the government’s handling of the Sons of Iraq, or intra-Shi’ite tensions between the government and Sadr and the JAM. There are, however, several points that deserve special attention. The manning and funding comparisons of the US military effort in the Iraq and Afghan wars show just how critical providing adequate resources has been to progress in the war, a point often lost in discussing concepts and strategy. (pp. 8 to 11) Changes in strategy and tactics have, however, had a critical impact and here it is clear that US strategy has evolved far beyond the initial strategy often described as the “surge.” The “Anaconda Strategy” described by General Petraeus took advantage of Al Qa’ida’s extremism and the alienation of Iraqi Sunnis to create a far larger movement with civil and economic dimensions, not just military ones. (pp. 12 to 15)

Introduction - II Ethnic and sectarian differences remain a critical problem, and challenge to Ira’s future stability and security. The US retained enough influence in 2007, however, to bridge over many of these divisions – in spite of slow progress and a lack of support by the Iraqi central government in some areas. • It is also important to note that Iraqis never supported division of the country at a popular level, and that a steady decline took place in ethnic and sectarian violence. As the graphs in this report show, this decline has led to massive decline in such violence between late 2006 and September 2007, and a further decline after the containment of the Sadrists and JAM in Baghdad in the spring of 2008. (pp. 16 to 25) The graphs showing the patterns in overall violence show a steady rise from 2003 to late 2006, and that a major reduction in violence through August 2007. Since that time, violence rose only during the clash between the central government and Sadr/JAM forces in the spring of 2008, and has continued to decline. (pp. 26 to 32) •The extent to which the Anaconda strategy went beyond an increase in US troop levels is clearly reflected in the data on violence and casualties for 2006, 2007 and 2008. Advances in US intelligence,

Introduction - III surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities during 2005-2007 laid the groundwork for far more effective attacks on terrorist and insurgent networks. The Sadr ceasefire enabled US and Iraqi forces to first deal with Al Qa’ida in 2007, and then deal with Sadr and the JAM in 2008 – aided in part by carefully targeted US efforts against the most extreme elements of the JAM in 2007. The US team in Iraq expanded the civil-military aid and governance efforts into the field in spite of the ability to quickly deploy more US civilian advisors, and expand aid and governance activity at the local and provincial level. (pp. 33 to 41) Declassified US intelligence maps show the impact on the scale of Al Qa’ida and affiliated insurgent activity in Iraq and Baghdad from the end of 2006 through the fall of 2008, as well as the impact of key land and air operations, and targeting Al Qa’ida’s key cadres. Coupled to still classified advances in IS&R, the US effectively redefined jointness in counterinsurgency warfare. (pp. 42 to 45) Graphs showing the level of violence by type of attack also reflect these patterns (pp. 41-44), but they also provide a warning. The overall level of violence remains as high as at the beginning of the 2004. The war is not

Introduction - IV “won” or “over.” Suicide bombings and other bombing attacks on the Iraqi population have not been sharply reduced in number or intensity. What some US commanders call an “irreducible minimum” can only be addressed by political accommodation and the growing capabilities of the Iraqi security forces. (pp. 46-50) Major progress has occurred in reducing the level of violence in Baghdad, which has been a key center of violence throughout the insurgency. This has only been possible, however, by US division of the city into largely Sunni, Shi’ite, and mixed areas. Reaching political accommodation and creating security in the capital remain key challenges. (pp. 51-57) Iraqi civilian casualty patterns show the same decline as in the levels of violence, whether calculated by Iraq, US, or NGO count. (pp. 58-61) •The same is true of US military, allied military, and Iraqi security forces, although the Iraqi security forces continue to take significant losses. (pp. 62-69)

•Iraqi perceptions of the “surge” present reporting problems because polling data are dated and do not reflect the level of progress achieved

Introduction - V during the fighting in 2007, and after the spring clashes with Sadr and the JAM. They do, however, reflect progress for the period shown. (pp. 7073)

• Similar progress is shown when the data on violence are examined by key province, rather than aggregated at the national level. It is clear that most violence has always been concentrated in a limited number of provinces, and that even these provinces are now far less violent than in late 2006. (pp. 74-80). This is particularly apparent if the number of daily attacks counted in each chart is compared over time. • Iraqi perceptions of safety show progress since 2006, and growing perceptions of safety in Iraq neighborhoods. They are disturbing, however, to the extent they do not show similar progress in perceptions of safety outside the neighborhood where those polled live. This seems to reflect the still slow progress in political accommodation and the risk that new sectarian and ethnic violence could occur. (pp. 81-87). • It is also disturbing that progress in the transfer of control of provinces from the MNF-I to Iraqi government often has not reflected the level of

Introduction - VI security in that province. (pp. 88-91), when these charts are compared to the other data in this report. • Like public opinion polling on the impact of the “surge,” the polling data lag current developments. They do, however, clear reflect the tensions between Iraqi belief that the invasion was not justified, a history of popular support for attacks on US and allied forces and a broad desire for the US and allied forces to leave -- and understanding that a rushed US and allied departure could undo the gains made to date. (pp. 92-99) • Major progress has occurred in increasing the size and capability of Iraqi forces, and in Iraq’s taking over the funding of such efforts. This progress is still, however, highly dependent on continued US and allied advisory efforts and support. (pp. 101-123)

The Challenge of Afghanistan vs. Iraq TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES ~49,000

AFGHANISTAN IRAQ • Land Mass – 432,162 sq km • Population – 27,500,000 people; 84% literacy • Economy dominated by the oil sector: $100.0B GDP, $3,600 PCI • Budget $48.4 billion; $33B+ in aid pledges

AFGHANISTAN • Land Mass – 647,500 sq km

•Comparatively developed transportation and information infrastructure; 45,5502 Km of roads, 38,399 Km paved

• Population – 31,900,000 people; 28% literacy • Land locked, primarily agrarian economy: $35.B GDP, $1,000 PC •Budget: $2.6; $8.9B in aid pledges • Lacks both transportation and information infrastructure: 34,782 Km of roads, 8,229 KM paved • Restrictive terrain dominates the country

IRAQ

TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES ~176,000

Iraq vs. Afghanistan 35,000,000 30,000,000 25,000,000 20,000,000 15,000,000 10,000,000 5,000,000 0

Afghanistan

Iraq

647,500

437,072

31,889,923

27,499,638

GNP ($USB)

35

100

Oil Export Revenues - 2007 ($USB)

0

41

Per Captia Income (US$)

1,000

3,600

Literacy Rate (%) 74.1

28.1

74.1

Median Age

17.6

20

% 0-14 years

44.6

39.4

Territory (Sq Km Population

Source: CENTAF CAOC, 5 December 2007

US Force Levels in Iraq vs. Afghanistan

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

Iraq BA Afghan BA

FY0102

FY03

FY04

FY05

FY06

FY07

FY08

FY09 Bridge

0

50

56.4

83.4

98.1

129.6

145.4

*53.4

20

14

12.4

17.2

17.9

34.9

30.2

*12.5

10

Cost to DoD of Iraq vs. Afghan War 160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

Iraq BA Afghan BA

FY0102

FY03

FY04

FY05

FY06

FY07

FY08

FY09 Bridge

0

50

56.4

83.4

98.1

129.6

145.4

*53.4

20

14

12.4

17.2

17.9

34.9

30.2

*12.5

11

Strategy •No new Bush strategy since December 2006 • Anaconda strategy slide provided by by General Petraeus in April 2008 testimony to Congress. • Broad picture of potential long term US force cuts, and shift of US role to strategic overwatch, presented in September 2007, but with little details. • No clear long term timelines: Force cuts beyond one brigade remain “conditions based.” • Both the Iraqi MoD and head of MNSTC-I said in February 2008 that Iraqi forces would not be ready to assume full counterinsurgency role before 2012.

• Announced development and aid strategy do not yet reflect US cuts in aid and massive increases in Iraqi oil export revenues.

Full Spectrum Operations

Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008

Source: MNF-I, April 9, 2008

14

Key Counterinsurgency Ideas


Counterinsurgency Guidance


The US Joint Campaign Plan


The Changes That Have Shaped the War •Affect all aspects of US forces

• Involve major changes in doctrine. • Change in leadership, training, education, communication. • Changes in US Army force structure. • From short wars and “kinetic bursts” to sustained civilmilitary operations in “clear-hold-build” • From post conflict reconstruction to armed nation building.

Changes in Doctrine


Changes in Leadership Development


Changes in Collective Training


Changes in Equipping the Force


Changes in Lessons Learned


Changes in Knowledge Management


Active Brigade Team: “Road to Deployment


Sectarian and Ethnic Divisions, and Political Accommodation • Current CIA and other estimates of Arab Shi’ite,Arab Sunni, Kurdish, and minority shares of population have uncertain credibility. • Data on sectarian and ethnic violence only reflect deaths, not patterns of low level violence, intimidation, kidnappings, and displacement (cleansing). •Data on refugees and displacements uncertain have reached more than 2 million internally and 2 million driven outside country in nation of 28 million. Some estimates reach 5+ million, but some evidence indicates may be far too high. • Polling data precede Maliki offensive in Basra and fight against Sadr; Shi’ite public opinion now far more uncertain. • Option data show growing Sunni support for government, but date back to February 2008, and there has been significant progress since then.

Sectarian, Ethnic, and Tribal Challenges

Sectarian Challenges

Afghanistan: 80% Sunni, 19% Shi’a. 1% Other Iraq: 60-65% Shi’a, 32-37% Sunni, 3% Christian or Other

Ethnic Challenges Afghanistan: Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, Other 4% Iraq: Arab 75-80%, Kurdish 15-20%, Turcoman, Assyrian & Other 3%

Tribal Challenges Afghanistan: Fragmented, rural, divided Iraq: Confederations, broad area, heavily urbanized.

30

Iraqi Sectarian & Ethnic Divisions

31

Real World Ethno-Sectarian Population Parameters? Three sources: CIA World Factbook, unsourced;  “Iraq: a Country Study,” Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1988, unsourced (“knowledgeable observers”);  Average ABC News polls „07-„08, N=6,652 via 1,386 points. 

CIA WFB LoC ABC Shiites 60-65% 60-65% 49% Sunni Arabs 12-22* 13 33 Kurds 15-20 NA 15 Non Muslims 3 NA 3 *Extrapolated Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, “War in Iraq: The Public Perspective,” presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

Iraqis Never Sought Division Even During Worst Part of Fighting

Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” June, 2007. Pg. 1

33

Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” September, 2007. Pg. 16

34

Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” December, 2007. Pg. 17

35


36

Movement of Iraqi Refugees •Some 2.7 million displaced within Iraq •1.2 million before February 2007 •1.5 million since •300,000 in first three months of 2008

Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 30, 2008, p.

Copright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved

37

The Course of the Fighting • Major gains against Al Qa’ida in Iraq from mid-2007 onwards, but still face major uncertainties over remnants of Al Qa’ida, KurdishArab Tensions, sectarian and ethnic tensions, Sadr and JAM, role of Iran. •Iraqi government data indicate major rise in violence in Baghdad in March and April of 2008 has ended. • Maps cover al Qa’ida,but not pattern of clashes with extreme Shi’ite groups, elements of Mahdi Army. •Attack data reflect sharp cuts in the level of insurgent attacks, but do not fully reflect overall climate of violence: crime, ethnic and sectarian cleansing, etc. •Casualty data only reflect killing, not wounded,kidnapped, disappearances, impact of “cleansing, etc. • Casualty counts uncertain.

Mapping the Overall Pattern: Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Month, May 2003 to May 2008

GAO analysis of DIA-reported Multi-National Force-Iraq data, May 2008.

Source: GAO. “SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ: Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed” June, 2008. Pg. 12

39

AVERAGE DAILY ATTACKS: MAY 2003 TO MAY 2008


40

Rising Violence: 2003-2007

Iraqi Civilians Killed: 2003-2008 30000

25000

Total Deaths: Jan 2003-Dec 2008: 90,335-98,639

20000

High Estimate

15000

Low Estimate

10000

5000

0 2003

2004

Source: Iraqi Body Count, as of December 28, 2008

2005

2006

2007

2008

Iraqi Civilian Deaths Per Day from Vehicle Bombs, Gunfire & Executions: 2003-2008 80

70

60

50 Vehicle Bombs

40

Gunfire/Executions

30

20

10

0 2003

2004

Source: Iraqi Body Count, as of Feb 4, 2009

2005

2006

2007

2008

Rise in Terrorism in Iraq: 20052007 Attacks Targeting Non-Combatants 45,000 40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000

15,000 10,000 5,000 0

Terror attacks

2005

3,469

Attacks causing at least one death, inury, or kidnapping 2837

People killed, injured, or kidnapped 20731

2006

6628

6026

38863

2007

6212

5574

44008

Adapted from US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism. April 30, 2008, and www.nctc.gov

The Military Course and Impact of the Surge

The “Surge” - I What Went Right in Original Strategy US build-up to 20 brigades Shift in tactics to lasting forward deployment. Only fight where can both “win” and “hold.” Exploitation of major advances in IS&R. Surge airpower as well as ground forces.

What Went Sort of Right Iraqi government support of operations against both Sunni & Shi’ite violent extremists Iraqi Army deployment, although slower than planned and Iraqi forces far less ready. Expansion of embeds, partner units, partner cells. Focus on Baghdad 46

The “Surge” - II Synergy and Serendipity Al Qa’ida extremism alienates many Sunnis and tribes Tribal uprising in Anbar is transformed into sons of Iraq Sadr declares and keeps ceasefire. Kurds wait on Article 140

What Went Wrong  Central government did not reach out to Sunnis, “Sons of Iraq”. Police generally fell short, did not perform. Negligible progress in rule of law Extremely slow progress in political accommodation. US civilian role and aid impact fell far short of goal. Iraqi government spending on development, services, and security. Did not reduce impact of British defeat in the south, growing intra-Shi’ite tensions. Growing Iranian role and influence Did not affect Arab-Kurdish-Turkish tensions. Little progress in strengthening ties to other neighbors. 47

US Shifts in Strategy in December 2007: The Surge

GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq, GAO-08-837June 23, 2008, p. 10

US Troop Levels: March 2003 to May 2008


Al Qa'ida in Iraq December, 2006

50

51

OEF Close Air Support Sorties With Munitions Dropped, 2004-2007 (Excluding 20mm and 20mm rounds and unguided rockets)

800 700 600 500

400 300 200 100 0

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun

Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Totals

2004 1 3 7 1 3 24 16 9 13 4 1 4 2005 1 1 1 23 7 10 16 20 9 19 23 46 2006 5 23 42 63 59 141 216 242 329 240 201 209 2007 178 163 310 202 179 288 368 670 181 98 289 0 Source: CENTAF CAOC, 5 December 2007

0 0 0 0

Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved

53

Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved

54

55

Al Qa'ida in Iraq March, 2008

Source for slides 18 and 19: MNF-I, April 9, 2008

56

Patterns in Violence As Result of the Surge and Campaign Against Sadr

Al Qa'ida in Iraq Winter 2006 vs. Fall 2008


58

Key Areas of Shi’ite Extremist Activity: Winter 2007 vs. Fall 2008


The Battle of Sadr City: March-April 2008


Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” December 2008, Pg. 18


Indirect Fire Attacks: 2004-2008


IED Explosions: 2004-2008


IED INCIDENT TRENDS

Source: Bill McMichael, Pentagon Correspondent, Times News Service, Military Times News Group, http://www.militarytimes.com/

65


Weapons and Explosive Cache Finds: 25 March-7 August 2008


Trends in Baghdad: US and Iraqi Views

US Joint Security Stations and Outposts in Baghdad: July 2007


Ethno-Sectarian Attacks: May 2006-Oct 2008


Baghdad: Major Incidents of Violence in 2007-2008 (Trend in Total Incidents per Month by Type) 450 400

350 300 250 200

150 100 50 0 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Katyusha

0

0

2

1

1

0

3

0

0

0

0

9

16

23

15

32

21

0

Suicide Bomb

0

0

2

1

1

0

3

0

0

0

0

0

5

4

2

1

3

2

Assasination

0

21

13

13

23

15

16

0

0

9

12

16

21

16

15

22

31

25

Bicycle Bomb

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

Car Bomb

26

23

19

38

35

20

35

15

24

20

15

16

6

13

13

13

13

11

Mortar

87

74

43

83

90 190 138 89

76

54

48

46

82

62 228 216 98

63

IED

55

65

33

82

63 133 96

63

78

73

71 103 77 131 118 107 96

Source: Iraqi Official

84

Baghdad: Major Incidents of Violence in 2007-2008 (Monthly Distribution of Incidents by Type) 250 200 150 100 50 0 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun

Jul

IED

55

65

33

82

63

133

96

84

63

78

73

71

103

77

131 118 107

96

0

Mortar

87

74

43

83

90

190 138

89

76

54

48

46

82

62

228 216

98

63

0

Car Bomb

26

23

19

38

35

20

35

15

24

20

15

16

6

13

13

13

13

11

0

Bicycle Bomb

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Assasination

0

21

13

13

23

15

16

0

0

9

12

16

21

16

15

22

31

25

0

Suicide Bomb

0

0

2

1

1

0

3

0

0

0

0

0

5

4

2

1

3

2

0

Katyusha

0

0

2

1

1

0

3

0

0

0

0

9

16

23

15

32

21

0

0


Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Total

Baghdad: Major Iraqi Casualties in

2007-2008 (Trend in Total Casualties per Month by Type) 2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 Jan Feb Mar

Apr May Jun

Jul

Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar

Apr May Jun

Body Found

395 365 324 411 726 548 596 421 324 174 165 126 123 116 135 117 123 103

ISF Dead

28

36

33

25

32

35

69

22

23

41

26

29

31

28

42

64

59

24

ISF Wounded

55

45

69

100

88

95

119

40

31

58

54

84

77

72

121 141

94

81

Dead Civilian

255 256 198 495 344 190 300 235 219 143

98

104 153 197 322 531 233 178

Wounded Civilian 206 512 403 110 999 530 893 507 437 461 287 329 311 453 941 152 938 468


Baghdad: Major Iraqi Casualties in 2007-2008 (Monthly Distribution of Casualties by Type)

1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0


Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Total

Wounded Civilian 206 512 403 110 999 530 893 507 437 461 287 329 311 453 941 152 938 468 Dead Civilian 255 256 198 495 344 190 300 235 219 143 98 104 153 197 322 531 233 178 ISF Wounded 55 45 69 100 88 95 119 40 31 58 54 84 77 72 121 141 94 81 ISF Dead 28 36 33 25 32 35 69 22 23 41 26 29 31 28 42 64 59 24 Body Found 395 365 324 411 726 548 596 421 324 174 165 126 123 116 135 117 123 103


0 0 0 0 0

Iraqi Casualty Patterns


Iraqi Body Count: Iraqi Civilians Killed During the “Surge” and Afterwards by Month of Combat 3,300

2,800

2,300

1,800

1,300

800

300

-200


Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar April May Jun

Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar

Deaths 1,42 1443 1,76 1,58 2,09 2,42 3,12 2,74 2,39 2,92 2,96 2,65 2,79 2,46 2,56 2,41 2,73 2,08 2,53 2,32 1,22 1,18 986 Source: Iraq Body Count: http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/beyond/enforced-security June 24, 2007

856

767

962 1534

Icasualties: Iraqi ISF Killed During the “Surge” and Afterwards by Month of Combat ISF

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb MarAprilMay Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb MarAprilMay Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan

ISF 189 158 191 201 150 132 217 233 150 224 123 123 91 150 215 300 198 197 232 76

Source: Icasualties, http://icasualties.org/oif/IraqiDeaths.aspx

96 114 89

72

69 110 161 113 110 77

98

85

98

48

27

74

54

Notice Different Axis

Icasualties: Iraqi Civilians Killed During the “Surge” and Afterwards by Month of Combat Civ

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb MarAprilMay Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb MarAprilMay Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan

Civ 590 688 901 808 969 738 106 273 338 131 174 162 171 286 276 152 178 114 145 159 752 565 471 476 485 564 819 631 396 373 321 226 268 240 290 246 132

Source: Icasualties, http://icasualties.org/oif/IraqiDeaths.aspx

US & Coalition Casualty Patterns

US Killed and Wounded in Combat in Various Wars 1000000 900000

800000 700000 600000 500000 400000 300000 200000 100000 0 Revolutionary1812 Wounded in Action 6188 4504 Killed in Action Non-combat Deaths

4435

2260

Mexican Civil Span.-Amer.WWI WWII Korea Vietnam Lebanon 4152 281,881 1662 204002 671846 102284 303644

Gulf 467

Somalia Afghan 1937

Iraq 30004

1733

140414

2446

53402

291557

36574

58209

256

382

29

294

3310

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Civil War is Union only; Confederate dead were 74,524 battle and 59,297 other;

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical Analysis Division, as of April 8, 2008

wounded unknon.

Total US Killed and Wounded in Iraq: 2003-May 3, 2008 18000 16000 14000

12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000

0 19 Mar-30 Apr 03

Total Deaths 139

KIA 109

Non-Hostile 30

1 May 03-3 May 08

4,076

3,323

753

16,451

12,915

Dod Civilians

11

8

3

0

0

Totals

0

0

0

0

0

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical analysis Division, as of May 5, 2008

WIA Returned WIA Not Returned 116 429

US Killed and Wounded in Combat in Iraq by Cause: March 2003-April 5, 2008 Killed in Action

Total of 3,267 hostile deaths,

2500

738 Non-hostile deaths, and

2000

29, 676 wounded =

1500

1000

33,681 Total 500

0 Killed in Action

DrowningBurns/Smoke Artllery/Mortar/Rocket Explosive DeviceGrenade 15

17

190

2076

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical Analysis Division, as of April 8, 2008

Gunshot NBC Agents Other WeaponeryRPG Air/Veh. Fall, Crash Cut, Other Medical Unknown 655

40

110

7

155

Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” December 2008. Pg. 20

84

Monthly US Casualties – Operation Iraqi Freedom: March 2003 to Jan 2009 Non-Combat Deaths

Killed in Action

Wounded

1500

1300

1100

900

700

500

300

2003

2004

2005

Note: Accidents includes “other deaths; Killed in Action includes “died of wounds”.

2006

2007

2008

Jan

Nov

Sep

Jul

May

Mar

Jan

Nov

Sep

Jul

May

Mar

Jan

Nov

Sep

Jul

May

Mar

Jan

Nov

Sep

Jul

May

Mar

Jan

Nov

Sep

Jul

May

Mar

Jan

Nov

Sep

Jul

May

-100

Mar

100

2009

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center

Total US and Allied Killed During the “Surge” and Afterwards 140

Total from 3/2003 to 1/2009 = 4237 US, 178 UK, 138 Other, and 4,553 Total

120 100 80 60

40 20 0

Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb MarAprMay Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb MarAprMay Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan

Other 2 UK 2 US

2

2

0

1

0

1

2

0

1

0

2

1

1

0

0

0

2

0

2

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

6

1

3

3

1

12

3

7

8

4

2

1

2

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

10 70 11 83 81 81 10 12 10 78 84 65 38 37 23 40 29 52 52 19 29 13 23 25 14 17 14 16

Source: Icasualties: Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, accessed, Jan 31, 2008

Monthly US Casualties – “Surge” and Afterwards: January 2007- January 2009 Wounded Killed in Action

Non-Combat Deaths

900 800 700 600 500

400 300 200 100 0

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar AprilMay Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 2007

2008

2009

Wounded

64 51 61 65 65 75 61 56 36 29 20 21 23 21 32 33 19 14 15 10 92 84 87 73 81

Killed in Action

78 70 71 96 12 93 66 55 42 29 28 14 34 25 36 40 15 23

8

12

8

7

6

7

4

Non-Combat Deaths

5

5

11 17

7

10

7

12

11 10

8

6

8

12 29 23

9

8

Note: Accidents includes “other deaths; Killed in Action includes “died of wounds”.

9

6

4

3

12

4

6

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center

Perceptions of the Surge: US and Iraqi

Impact of Troop Surge

100%

ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll

% saying it's worse

90%

August

80%

70%

70%

68%

70%

Now 67%

65%

60%

53% 49%

50%

43%

44%

42%

40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Security where forces sent

Security in other areas

Political dialogue

Ability of Iraqi gov't

Economic development

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK P OLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008

89

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, “War in Iraq: The Public Perspective,” presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.


After the “Surge” Reducing the Uncertainties of a “Long War” Sunni-Shi’a and Arab-Kurd political accommodation. Sons of Iraq Sadr vs. ISCI Stable autonomy for Kurds.

Open list and air elections at national, provincial, and local level. Creation of Effective governance and services at at national, provincial, and local level. Resolving petroleum and national budget issues. Move from aid and government subsidies to sustained development and employment. Neighbors: Iran, Syria, Turkey, Gulf US and Iraqi domestic politics 92

Legislative Progress Towards Political Accommodation: 2007-2008


Potential Risks and “Storm Clouds”


Patterns of Violence by Province and Transfer of Responsibility • Violence varies sharply by province. •Violence by province diminished from mid-2007 to April 2008, but Maliki offensive in Basra and fighting with Sadr that began in March 2008 has since radically increased the level of violence and areas impacted. • Polling data date back to February 2008. • Reporting on transfer of responsibility to Iraqi forces have consistently bordered on the absurd. Transfers have been cosmetic and Iraqi forces are not ready for the mission. • Iraqi government cannot provide effective governance or presence in many areas supposedly under its control.

Average Number of Daily Attacks in Iraq for Selected Provinces, August 2005 through Early May 2008


Note: Each data point represents the average number of daily attacks for the specified period of time, as reported in DOD’s quarterly reports to Congress.

GAO analysis of DOD’s quarterly reports to Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, January 2006 through February 2008; and data provided by MNF-I for March 2008 through May 2008

96

Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” March 2007, Pg. 15

97

Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” June 2007, Pg. 20

98

QuickTime ™ and a decompre ssor are needed to see this picture.


99


100


101

Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: April 2007

Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” September June 2007. Pg. 26

102

Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: August 2007

Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” September 2007. Pg. 23

103

Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: October 2007

Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” December 2007. Pg. 19

104

Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: January 2008

Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” MJarch, 2008. Pg. 26

105

Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: April 2008


106

Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: August 2008


107

Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: October2008


108

Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: October2008


109

Saw Local Violence During Past 6 Months: August 2007-February 2008 ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK Poll



Car bombs/suicide attacks

27%

Baghdad 61%



Snipers/crossfire

24%

Mosul

58%



Sectarian fighting

22%

Diyala

58%



Unnecessary violence by U.S. forces by militia

28% 18%

Anbar Basra

54% 60%



Forced separation

14%

Baghdad 28% Basra 29%


Transferring Provincial Control - I

Petraeus briefing Slides, April 2008 Source: Petraeus Briefing Slides, April 9, 2008

111


112

Transferring Provincial Control - II


113

Transferring Provincial Control - II


114

Transfer of Forward Operating Bases to Iraqis

Date

FOBs

# Transferred

%Transferred

October 2006

110

52

47.3%

June 2007

122

61

50.0%

September 2007

125

61

48.8%

November 2007

125

61

48.8%

January 2008

125

63

50.4%

Source: DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, November 2006, June 2007, September 2007, December 2007, and March 2008. Note: DoD did not report on FOBs in March 2007.

Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 30, 2008, p. 105

115

Iraqi views of US Role in Iraq • Trend has been more favorable, since victories in 2007 but… • Iraqi public opinion data date back to February 2008. Events since that time may have increase Sunni tolerance and support of US forces and reduced it for Shi’ites. • Data on Iraqi perceptions show clear conflict between nationalism, desire for US to leave,and understanding US presence still necessary. • Sharp polarization of Iraqi opinion along sectarian and ethnic lines.


Views of the U.S. Presence

90%

ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll 80%

August

Now

70%

57%

60%

49%

50%

47% 42%

40%

38%

37%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Invasion was right

Attacks on U.S. forces "acceptable"

Coalition forces should leave now

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK P OLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008 118







Iraqi Force Development - I • Iraqi Army and regular military forces continue to make real progress, •but •MNF-I continues to grossly overstate this progress by lumping together units that can operate independently and units dependent on US. •Constant force expansion still stresses quantity over quality; shortages of officers and NCOs. •Sectarian and ethnic divisions and favoritism remain a problem. •Regular forces remain dependent on US support,armor, air power, embeds, partner units, IS&R, support and other “enablers.” •Regular forces will not have counterinsurgency capability to fully replace US forces before 2012-2015; capability to defend country alone until 2020.

Iraqi Force Development - II • Data on police progress disguise reality that most police are now controlled at local and governorate level, many “trained and equipped” men are no longer in service, and embeds have not been provided or effective. • Corruption and incompetence in MoD and MoI remain major problems. Prime minister’s office continues to provide ineffective guidance and management. • The future role of the tribal militias and “Sons of Iraq” remains uncertain in spite of slow Iraqi government efforts to deal with issue. •No clear plans for transferring funding responsibilities from US aid to Iraqi government budget, but progress is taking place.

2000 Attack Against Iraqi Infrastructure and Government Organizations

IEDs and Mines (includes Explosions and Found and Cleared)

1800

Sniper, Ambush, Grenade, and Other Small Arms Attacks

600

~592K

Mortar, Rocket, and Surface to Air Attacks

1600

1400

1200 500

1000

800

600

400

400

200

0 15 Aug 08

25 Jul 08

27 Jun 08

30 May 08

2 May 08

4 Apr 08

7 Mar 08

8 Feb 08

11 Jan 08

14 Dec 07

16 Nov 07

19 Oct 07

21 Sep 07

24 Aug 07

27 Jul 07

29 Jun 07

1 Jun 07

300

Iraqi vs. US Force Levels 60 0,000

50 0,000

40 0,000

30 0,000

20 0,000

10 0,000

0

En d Jun e 06

En d Jun e 07

Ea rl y Ju ne 07

En d Jul y 08

12 8,798

15 0,336

18 2,060

14 6,000

To tal Iraq i

26 8,400

35 3,100

56 1,963

58 0,970

To tal Iraq i MoD

11 6,100

15 8,900

19 3,324

19 6,362

To tal Iraq i MoI

15 2,300

19 4,200

36 5,030

38 0,826

To tal US -

128

Comparative Cost of Aid to Afghan and Iraqi Forces ($US Current Billions)

14 12 10

Afghan

8

Iraq

6

Total

4 2 0 Afghan Iraq Total

Source: CBO, 2008

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

0 0 0

0 0 0

0 0 0

0 0 0

0 5 5

1 6 7

2 3 5

7 6 13

1 2 3


130

How US Iraqi Security Forces Aid Funds Have Been Spent

Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 30, 2008, p. 51.

131

Iraqi Security Budget by Year


Iraqi Security Expenditures vs. Budget


US Military Assistance Per Capita Per Year (Constant Dollars) 300

250

200

150

100

50

0 2000

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Pakistan

2.21

1.9

0.58

2.04

1.85

Afghanistan

3.26

14.63

21.32

25.49

58.14

5.67

42.14

52.75

184.07

Iraq

0.23

2001

Source: USAID, US Overseas Loans and Grants, UN Population Prospects

Number of Iraqi Security Forces: March 2005, January 2007, and April 2008

Notes: a: The term “operational” refers to Ministry of Defense forces. The term “trained and equipped” refers to Ministry of Interior forces. Numbers are from the State Department’s March 9, 2005 and January 31, 2007 Iraq Weekly Status Report and Multinational Security Transition Command Iraqi Security Forces Update, January 26, 2007. b: The term “trained” refers to Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and Counterterrorism Bureau forces. Numbers are from April 30, 2008 Iraq Weekly Status Report. c: Army numbers include Special Operations Forces and Support Forces. d: Army numbers include support forces. e: Unauthorized absent personnel are not included in Ministry of Defense numbers. f: The number in the Iraqi police service in 2005 includes highway patrol forces. g: Unauthorized absent personnel are included in Ministry of Interior numbers. h: Does not include the approximately 144,000 Facilities Protection Service personnel working in 27 ministries. i: Numbers reflect total Iraqi security forces trained to date, some of which are no longer assigned due to casualties, absence without leave, and normal separation. Source: GAO. “SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ: Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed” June, 2008. Pg. 24

135

Total Size of Iraqi Security Forces (Number of Personnel) Aug 07-Jul 08 700,000

600,000

Border Enforcement

500,000

National Police 400,000

Iraqi Police Services Special Operations

300,000

Navy Air Force

200,000

Support Forces Army

100,000

0 AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL Source: MNSTC-I, September 2008

Total Size of Iraqi Security Forces (Number of Personnel)May 08-Jul 08 700,000 600,000 Border Enforcement

500,000

National Police 400,000

Iraqi Police Services Special Operations

300,000

Navy Air Force

200,000

Support Forces Army

100,000 0 MAY Source: MNSTC-I, September 2008

JUN

JUL

Iraqi Security Forces: End of October 2008


138

Growth of Iraqi Security Forces (Assigned Personnel) August 2007-July 31, 2008 700,000

600,000

500,000 Border Enforcement National Police 400,000

Iraqi Police Services Special Operations Navy

300,000

Air Force

Support Forces 200,000

Army

100,000

0 Aug-07

Oct-07

Nov-07 Dec-07

Source: MNSTC-I, September 2008

Jan-08

Feb-08 Mar-08

Apr-08 May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Projected Growth of Iraqi Forces


140

Manning of Iraqi Regular Military Forces (Number of Personnel) July 31,2008 250,000 AUTHORIZED ASSIGNED TRAINED Army 200,000

171,262

180,296

224,970

15,583

22,069

21,144

Air Force

3,311

1,887

2246

Navy

1,893

1,872

1,494

Special Operations

4,733

3,589

4,564

Support Forces

150,000

AUTHORIZED ASSIGNED TRAINED

100,000

50,000

0 Army

Support Forces


Air Force

Navy

Special Operations

Iraqi Ground Forces Personnel By Division: November 2008

b. Data is derived from the MoD Human Resource Information Management System (HRIMS), which tracks MoD manpower and payroll data. Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” December, 2008. Pg. 43

142

Source: MNF-I April 9, 2008

Copyright Anthony

143

Iraqi Battalion Combat Readiness Assessment



145


146

Source: MNF-I April 9, 2008

147

Source: SIGIR Quarterly Report, July 30, 2008, p. 56