THE JORDAN RIVER BASIN: EXPLAINING INTERSTATE WATER COOPERATION THROUGH REGIME THEORY by
Anders Jägerskog E-mail:
[email protected] Department for Water and Environmental Studies, Linköping University, 581 83 Linköping, Sweden.
Occasional Paper No 31 Water Issues Study Group School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) University of London June 2001 INTRODUCTION A wide range of International Relation (IR) scholars showed by the mid-70s that the international system is increasingly characterised by interdependence. As interdependence affects politics and the behaviour of states new forms of rules, procedures and institutions for various activities have been created in order to manage and control transnational relations. These co-operative arrangements are usually referred to as international regimes. (Keohane & Nye, 1989) The hydrological interdependence, i.e. the transnational nature, of international river basins (Elhance, 1999) provides a rationale for co-operation. Indeed, an awareness of the positive prospects of basinwide co-operation through the development of a water regime might spur an increased hydrosolidarity. Or, as a leading water professional put it “water may be a catalyst for peace” (Asmal, 2000). Water experts are an integral part of the establishments of co-operative water regimes as they tend to favour basinwide co-operation. They are referred to by political leaders who, under conditions of scientific uncertainty, “consult experts to help them identify their own interests and policies” (Haas, 1994). WHY STUDY WATER REGIMES? Many IR scholars have devoted significant attention in trying to understand why international co-operation occurs in spite of the presumed anarchic international system. Some try to explain the co-operation through regime theory. The basic rationale for this paper is to try to discern if, and if so, how, regime theory can help us understand interstate water co-operation. In particular, specific emphasis is put on the role of water experts in this promotion of co-operation. The most commonly used definition of an international regime is that of Krasner (1983, p. 1). He defines regimes as:
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“implicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors` expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice”. The particular object that regime analysis is concerned with is the normative institution, dealing with a specified issue, which states create and subscribe to voluntarily as a means of self-regulation in the international arena (Mayer, Rittberger & Zürn, 1993, p. 393). Keohane (1984, p. 97) holds that: “international regimes are useful to governments. Far from being threats to governments (in which case it would be hard to understand why they exist at all), they permit governments to attain objectives that would otherwise be unattainable. They do so in part by facilitating intergovernmental agreements. Regimes facilitate agreements by raising the anticipated costs of violating others’ property rights, by altering transaction costs through the clustering of issues, and by providing reliable information to members. Regimes are relatively efficient institutions, compared with the alternative of having a myriad of unrelated agreements, since their principles, rules, and institutions create linkages among issues that give actors incentives to reach mutually beneficial agreements. They thrive in situations where states have common as well as conflicting interests” These regimes are considered to exist in areas such as international trade, monetary policies, security and arms control, and concerning the use of natural resources. One might see the regimes as an intermediating factor between the power structures of the international system and the political bargaining, which takes place within it. In fact, regimes can become embedded in a sort of normative framework for action and thereby increase the political salience of certain issues. (Keohane, 1993, p. 29-30, and Keohane and Nye, 1989, p. 21). Furthermore, they may also function as a vehicle for international learning and the converging of policies of states (Haas, 1994). This is iterated by Mayer, Rittberger & Zürn (1993, p. 394) who holds that the social interaction which takes place in a regime fosters a convergence in value orientation and thereby create incentives for a further institutionalization of co-operation. Wendt (1994) has usefully clarified the institutionalization of co-operation in the international arena. He argues that: “the process by which egoists learn to co-operate is at the same time a process of reconstructing their interests in terms of shared commitments to social norms. Over time, this will tend to transform a positive interdependence of outcomes into a positive interdependence of utilities or collective interest organized around the norm in question.” Wendt argues that this constructivist approach to institutionalization of co-operation focus on how the expectations that are produced by the behavior affect interests and identities. This process of institutionalization is one in which actors internalize new understandings of self and other and, furthermore, move towards increasingly shared commitments to the norms of the regime. Thus, there is a strong behavioral component in the international regime theory. Whereas as an international treaty is a legal document stipulating rights and obligations a regime is a social institution in which the behaviour of
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its actors constitute the regime (List and Rittberger, 1992). Thus a regime is often based on an informal understanding and need not be in the form of a written document. Thus, applied to the water relations within the international system, the regime theory appears to be a relevant tool in the analysis of how one might find compromising solutions, built on an acknowledgement of hydrological interdependence, through cooperation (du Plessis, 2000, p. 21-22). Water regimes has been identified by Haftendorn (2000) as: “when the affected states to a conflict observe a set of rules designed to reduce conflict caused by use, pollution or division of a water resource or the reduction of the standing costs and the observance over time of these rules”. Haftendorn does, however, distinguish between general water regimes and those intended for a particular conflict. An example of a general one is the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses whose aim is to establish general principles for the use of transboundary water resources. An example of a regime dealing with a specific watercourse is the Rhine regime, which stemmed from an agreement on chemicals and chlorine. The regime has been beneficial in that it has managed to bring problematic issues to the fore and thereby facilitated settlements of disputes (Haftendorn, 2000, p. 65-67). HOW MIGHT A WATER REGIME COME INTO EXISTENCE? There exist a variety of explanations to why regimes come into existence. Realists tend to focus on the interests of hegemonic states. In their view, regimes are created by the powerful hegemons because they serve their interests. Consequently, when the power of a hegemon declines the regime also weakens. Neoliberals, quite contrary, focus on the demand for regimes. They view norms not only as a reflection of sheer power but norms are likely to be demanded regardless of the existence of a hegemon as norms will enable states’ to, more accurately, estimate the costs and benefits of action. When the regime is in place a state is able to interpret and value the actions of self and other and determine if it is in line with agreed upon principles (Mansfield, 1994). The regime might, furthermore, help states to coordinate their behavior so that they can avoid collectively suboptimal outcomes (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997). Another explanation to regime formation is the view that a crisis or shock might precipitate a formation of regimes (Young, 1994). This understanding has close connections to Hajer’s (1996) emblematic events, which he sees as being necessary in order to raise the awareness on environmental degradation and vulnerability. Yet another explanation to the formation of regimes is the one offered by Haas (1994) and Adler and Haas (1992). They focus not so much on interests and dramatic events but argue that a regime can stem from communities of shared knowledge. Experts in a specific issue-area are termed epistemic communities. The emphasis is on how these experts play an important role in the articulation of complex problems, such as water management issues or pollution control. The epistemic communities approach is the one that will be elaborated upon most as it emphasize the role of expert communities in the formation of policy innovation and the institutional processes leading up to the formation of a regime. Haas (1994) holds that “regimes may be transformative, leading to the empowerment of new groups of actors
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who can change state interests and practices”. Members of an epistemic community might also have a decisive influence on the construction of policy in an area and, since the communities’ nature is international, it might also lead to a general convergence of policies internationally. The more general water conventions, whose aim is to establish general principles for the use of transboundary water resources, have seen a high degree of involvement from the water expert community. Although the principles of these conventions are of a general nature they may serve as a baseline for interstate water relations. In fact, the general international principles have led to the formation of more regional water regimes. This has been brought about when riparians have mutually embodied norms, rules and principles and thereby incorporated a higher degree of co-operation among themselves (Haftendorn, 2000). WHAT ARE WATER REGIMES GOOD FOR? A CASE-STUDY OF THE JORDAN RIVER BASIN WATER RELATIONS The water relations in the Jordan River Basin has often been used as a case for showing that water might indeed lead to conflict and even war (Bulloch and Darwish, 1993, and Starr, 1991). However, for example Allan (1999 and 2001), Wolf and Hamner (2000) and Isaac (1995) have brought the severe lack of solidity in this reasoning into the open. In particular, Allan (1999) points at the ameliorating factor of ‘virtual water’, which is the water embedded in water intensive foodstuff that are traded into the region. Furthermore, authors focusing on the potential for war have tended to neglect that something that might be called a water regime has been in place regulating the water relations between Israel and Jordan since the early 50s. Although Israel and Jordan were in a, de jure, state of war they have had, under U.S. auspices, a low-key co-operation on shared water resources. This regime has provided a means to build trust among the states and facilitated a development of friendly relations. Furthermore, the Johnston-plan for the water management in the Jordan River Basin, which was prepared by a U.S. team of experts, can be seen as a water regime despite the fact that it was not recognized by the states (Wolf, 1993). This is due to it being used as a baseline for water relations in the basin. One might also argue that the water agreement between Israel and Jordan, which is a part of the Peace Agreement signed 1994, has enhanced and formalized the regime cooperation between the two states. The treaty is, however, stipulating the rights and obligations of the two parties while the regime predominantly concerns the actual behaviour of the parties to the regime. Keohane (1984) holds that international regimes should be distinguished from specific interstate agreements and argues that a major function of regimes is to facilitate in the making of agreements. Young (1989), however, does not agree. He argues that if that view of regime analysis were adhered to it would merely resemble an analysis of explicit bargaining. In line with the argument of Young, I will, accordingly, view the Israeli-Jordanian water relations as a water regime even though a formal agreement is in place. How can one assess the quality of the water regime presumed to exist between Israel and Jordan? Regime theory offers some tools. Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (1997) maintain that one should analyze the effectiveness and robustness and resilience of regimes. The effectiveness of a regime is dependent on whether its members abide by its norms and rules while the robustness refers to the “staying power” of a regime in the face
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of exogenous challenges. The resilience refers to the ability of the regime to adapt itself to changing circumstances. It seems as though the regime between Israel and Jordan has been somewhat limited in its effectiveness as conflicts (not on water) between them have forced them not to abide by the rules of the regime at all times. Having said that, it is apparent in the agreement from 1994 that many of the principles existing on the international level, such as the provision not to cause ‘significant harm’, have been incorporated. Furthermore, a joint institution (The Joint Water Committee) has been established in order to implement and monitor the principles agreed upon. It is positive to see that emphasis has been put on co-operation in the maintenance of the common resource. As water experts have been an integrated part of the negotiations leading up to these principles one might argue, along the lines of Haas and others, that the scientific consensus, that water management should be approached from a catchment perspective, has clearly put its mark on the regime. If one analyzes the robustness and resilience of the regime one may argue that it is a rather strong regime. The last time it was severely challenged was during the drought in 1998-2000, which produced a disagreement over allocation in periods of drought. This was partly due to the fact that no provisions had been made for droughts in the agreement from 1994. The conflict was, however, solved and it is arguably so that the norms, rules and principles that existed in the water regime contributed to this end. In this regard it is also interesting to view the Israeli-Palestinian water relations. Although still awaiting a final Peace agreement between Israel and the Palestine Authority there exists an interim agreement in which water is an integral part. As in the Israeli-Jordanian case there also exists a Joint Water Committee (JWC). And even in the midst of the latest tensions during the al-Quds intifada that started in the autumn of 2000 the work of the JWC continues. A joint statement from the Israeli and the Palestinian heads of the JWC (31 January, 2001) reaffirmed their commitment, despite exogenous challenges, to continue their co-operation. This was significant and seems to confirm the functionalist regime analysis. A further aspect relevant when discussing this regime is to acknowledge the asymmetry in power relations between Israel and Jordan. Keohane and Nye (1989) argue that an asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of power by which they mean a power to control resources or a potential to affect outcomes. A less dependent actor can have a political or an economic resource at his/her disposal, which means that changes in the regime or relationship may prove less costly to him. While Israel both has an economy that is diversified and strong as well as is the upstream riparian, Jordan is neither economically strong or has a good negotiation position in terms of control over water (Allan, 2001). Hence, changes in the relationship may prove more costly to Jordan than to Israel. LIMITATIONS OF ANALYSIS While regime theory contributes to our understanding of how water co-operation might come about it has, as any other theory, limitations. The thinking of Asmal (2000) and others is functionalist in that it holds that co-operation over water could be a preliminary to co-operation in other, more contentious, areas. The argument in this paper tends, as well, to lean in that direction. However, an obvious objection to functionalist regime theory is that it is somewhat blind to the fact that water may be subordinated to, for the
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states involved much more important, areas of dispute (Allan 2001). The hierarchy of issues is important to understand. A realist objection to the focus on water experts would be that it is the interests of the powerful that makes regimes come about. Hence, the cooperation between Jordan and Israel would rather be a result of U.S. interests than anything else. Considering the focus on experts and epistemic communities it is debatable whether the experts exert such vast influence as the theory claims. Furthermore, in a world where policy-makers increasingly tend to consult scientific expertise there is also a growing skepticism about their expertise especially since complex issues often are characterized by both social and scientific controversy (Corell, 1999). While these and other objections to the analysis appears to be valid, I would still argue that the formation of co-operative water regimes, through the epistemic communities approach, tell us a great deal about the way co-operation might be achieved. A further limitation to the involvement of experts in policy-making is the connection between science and politics. While there may be scientific agreement on an issue or a way to handle a problem it might not be politically feasible. As Allan (1999) has pointed out, the logical way to achieve a strategic water security would be to secure supplies of ‘virtual water’. It shows, however, that the virtual water solution is not acceptable to the governments in the region since it is not part of the ‘sanctioned discourse’ on water.1 Hence, some strategies that would be logical are not on the agenda since they are politically stressful. It has also been argued that water is, by many, seen as a human right. This fact, that people and governments involved in a water conflict tend to view water as an absolute necessity of life means that there is a general reluctance in using water as a weapon. Thus, the view that water is a human right is a reason why governments are not withdrawing water from an enemy (Soffer, 2001). However, others argue that there is strong historical evidence of water being used as a weapon of, or target, in periods of conflict and war (Turton, 2000). Thus, the explanatory power of using the concept of "water as a human right" as a reason for interstate water co-operation is weak. CONCLUSIONS International water regimes might be seen as a conflict-mitigating factor as they promote basin wide interstate co-operation and as such increase water security. It is argued that an analysis of the water co-operation in the Jordan River Basin through the prism of regime theory is helpful in explaining why co-operation have occurred in spite of the strong political conflict. When a convergence of values has occurred within a regime and the cooperation has been institutionalised it is harder than one might think to reverse or end this co-operation.
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Sanctioned discourse is a term coined by Charles Tripp at London School of Oriental and African Studies. It essentially refers to a normative paradigm within which certain hypothesis might be raised while others cannot.
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