those in authority in the aftermath of three financial crises: the Great Depression; The Savings and Loan. Crisis; and the most recent economic calamity brought ...
FORTHCOMING IN: The Journal of Financial Crime
Discretionary Justice: A Comparison and Discussion of Criminal Prosecutions in the History of Major Financial Crimes
James F. Gilsinan Muhammad Islam Neil Sietz James Fisher Saint Louis University
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Introduction: Contingencies in the Pursuit of Justice Prosecutors at both the state and federal levels routinely report high rates of convictions. In FY 2010, the United States Attorney General reported a criminal conviction rate of 93%. In FY 2009, the conviction rate was 92% (Executive Office for United States Attorney, 2010). Similarly, state prosecutors generally report conviction rates in the 90% range, often near 100% Such high rates of convictions result from the almost unlimited discretion prosecutors have in deciding what cases to accept for prosecution. It is clear that these decisions are driven in large part by what can be termed a “probable win” test. Given the nature of the crime, the strength of the evidence and the believability of the victim and witnesses, how likely is it that I can win this case? From the point of view of the prosecutors, the probable win test makes both economic and political sense (Gilsinan, 1990). On the economic side, the process of prosecuting a crime requires the use of a number of scarce resources. Among these are courtroom availability, the number ofjudges hearing cases, the size of the prosecutor’s staff, the availability of defense attorneys, particularly public defenders, investigative resources, time constraints, and concern about not wasting taxpayer dollars. When all of these factors are brought into play, it makes little economic sense to waste resources on what, from the prosecutor’s perspective, is a loser. It also makes little political sense to pursue cases that have a slim chance of resulting in a conviction. At the local and state level, the position of chief prosecutor is an elective office. High conviction rates serve to display both competence and a commitment to community safety, characteristics obviously helpful in campaigning for election or re-election. At the federal level, politics
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and economics also affect decisions on what cases to pursue, since the party in power will be judged in part by the efficiency and effectiveness of its Justice Department. Although, the Attorney General of the United States and the regional Attorneys General are appointed by the President as part of the executive branch of government, they still face the political and economic constraints of their directly elected counterparts on the local level. High conviction rates are further insured by the dominance of plea bargaining in criminal case processing. Trials are the exception in the criminal justice system. Most cases are resolved through an agreement among the prosecutor and the defense attorney, and eventually the defendant and the judge in exchange for a sentencing consideration. The defendant agrees to plead guilty either to a lower charge or with a guarantee of a low sentencing recommendation. Plea bargaining provides a win-win situation for all of those involved. The accused spends less time incarcerated or pays a lower fine, the expense of a trial is eliminated, and efficiency is increased by moving cases more quickly through the system than would be the case if there were overloaded trial dockets (Gilsinan, 1990). From the above discussion, it is clear that the pursuit and punishment of wrong doers is a contingent enterprise. Factors affecting defendant processing will vary by historical circumstance, opportunities for displaying competence and avoiding appearances of incompetence, the political, social, and economic factors at play, and the policy goals to be accomplished. In this paper, we explore the influence of these contingences in an attempt to understand the different approaches taken by those in authority in the aftermath of three financial crises: the Great Depression; The Savings and Loan Crisis; and the most recent economic calamity brought on by the collapse of the housing market. We begin with the Great Depression. The Great Depression: “Buddy, Can You Paradigm?” The Great Depression changed the understanding of government’s role in the regulation of markets and what tools were necessary to pursue financial wrong-doing. This paradigm shift was
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brought about by the desire to avoid another catastrophic economic meltdown fueled by unjustified optimism and rampant speculation. Although some 5cholars note that fraud also played a part in the genesis of the Depression (“Fraud Caused the 1930s Depression,” 2010), it is generally thought that outright criminal activity exercised only a minor role in the financial debacle (Bierman, 1998; Galbraith, 1954; Palmer, 2011). Most of what contributed to the Depression was activity that at the time was legal. The Depression in fact developed over a number of years, with perturbations in the economy that foretold worse things to come. For example, agriculture had been in trouble for several years prior to the Crash. The London market crashed on September 20, 1929 following the jailing of Clarence Harty and many associates. On October 24, a panic was averted in New York, but the reprieve lasted only through the weekend. Losses piled up Monday and Tuesday, and the crash was on. Bank runs, however, did not start until late 1930 (“The Great Crash,” 2008), and stocks did not bottom out until mid-1932, by which time they had lost 89% of their value. Unemployment then reached 25%. A paradigm shift needs someone to champion the new way of thinking. In this case the champion was Ferdinand Precora, who was appointed chief counsel for the Senate Banking committee in January, 1933. Up to that point, the committee had been floundering. It began hearings relatively late in the crisis with the first gavel not falling until April of 1932 and it’s response, until Precora took over, was rather anemic. Precora’s key to energizing the committee was to bring before it some of the major financial players of the day. Among those questioned and subject to public scrutiny were the CEO of National City Bank (now Citibank), Charles Mitchell, Samuel Insull, who created a public utility empire, and Richard Whitney, President of the New York Stock Exchange. Precora’s sharp questioning and tendency to put witnesses in the most humiliating light possible, provided great theater but few prosecutions.
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As noted, many of the actions that contributed to the collapse were legal at the time. Thus, Charles Mitchell admitted to wild speculative action, but there were no statutes at the time that prevented such irresponsible behavior. He was charged with tax evasion, but was acquitted. While not getting off scot-free--he paid a million dollar civil penalty
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the importance of his appearance and
testimony before the committee was the ground work it laid for major legislative reform. Similarly, Samuel Insull’s appearance before the committee was light on prosecutorial outcomes, but significant for legislative development. The collapse of Insull’s highly leveraged public utility empire was viewed as a major contributor to the crash. Insull fled the country after testifying, but was brought back and tried. Again, this trial resulted in the acquittal of a major financial player. But Precora was after something other than single convictions. The only criminal conviction was that of Richard Whitney, but he was convicted of embezzlement in 1938 for actions that had nothing to do with his behavior leading up to the crash. He embezzled pension funds to maintain his life style after he had lost most of his money. Here again, however, his testimony was important for reasons other than criminal prosecution. Ferdinand Precora’s work on the Banking Committee was so effective that it became known as the Precora Commission. What was accomplished if not prosecutions? Major reform of the financial system, through significant legislative action! After the failure of prosecutors in a number of high profile cases and the relatively few statutes they had available to them to pursue criminal convictions, a shift in emphasis toward legislative reform was both inevitable and carried with it more far reaching consequences. The work of the Precora Commission resulted in three significant Acts that regulated financial markets through much of the remainder of the century: the Glass-Stegal Act; the Public Utilities Holding Company Act; and the Securities Act of 1933.
Indeed, these Acts not only helped stabilize financial markets for sixty plus
years, but also lead to significantly different outcomes when a financial crisis developed in the 1980’s. The Savings and Loan Crisis
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The Savings and Loan Crisis also unfolded over a period of years. The Savings and Loan Industry boomed after World War II as returning GI’s and their baby booming families spurred a suburban building frenzy. S&L industry expansion continued through the early 1960’s. In 1966 things began to change. The first bell tolling the demise of the S&L’s took the form of a federal regulation controlling the rates both S&L’s and commercial banks could pay on savings accounts. This Congressional mandate was aimed at preventing further rate wars as these financial institutions vied for customers. Unfortunately, as the economy began to stagnate and interest rates moved higher, monies migrated from the S&L’s to other financial institutions and instruments that paid market rates. Changes in the economy continued to challenge the savings and loan industry through the 1970;s. Finally, in the early 1980’s, Congress provided some relief to the ailing industry in the form of two acts:
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Sam—St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. These acts deregulated the industry, lessened oversight, and allowed S&L’s to enter new markets for investments. This combination of deregulation. less oversight, and the opening of new but unfamiliar investment opportunities created a situation ripe for exploitation. During the life of the crisis from approximately 1983 to 1992, 747 S&L’s failed, ultimately costing tax payers $341 billion. The major cause of this crisis was inventive practices used by some CEO’s to meet financial challenges posed by new economic conditions and an increasingly lax regulatory environment. The result was S&L’s being run as Ponzi schemes to give the appearance of profitability to attract the investments necessary to cover losses from reckless investment decisions. This time however, prosecutors had the manpower to punish the miscreants. In total, the FBI opened 5,490 criminal investigations. They were able to aggressively pursue criminal prosecutions because of a commitment of resources from both the state and federal levels. The Thriftcon Task Force began operations in 1987 with 27 FBI agents, 4 officials, 21 prosecuting S
attorney5 from both the federal and 5tate (Texas) level, 4 officials from the office of Thrift Supervision, and 17 IRS agent5. In 1989, then newly elected President George Walker Bush directed the U.S. Attorney General to go give S&L cases highest priority. By 1990, Thriftcon had 94 full time agents and by 1992, 150 law enforcement personnel were on the task force (Pearce & Snider, 1995). By 1992 there had been 1,100 criminal prosecutions of individuals involved in “major” S&L fraud. There were 839 convictions. (“Two Financial Crisis Compared,” 2011). The precedent of vigorous criminal prosecutions of financial crime did not last. The Financial Crisis of 2008 Underlying any discussion of prosecution is the assumption that a prosecutable crime has been committed. One view, summarized by the leaders of the Group of 20 counries is that the Financial Crisis was primarily caused by market participants who under-estimated the risk inherent in the type financial market instruments, including mortgage loans, at use during the immediate period preceding the financial crises. The Group of 20 leaders declared:
During a period of strong global growth, growing capital flows, and prolonged stability earlier this decade, market participants sought higher yields without an adequate appreciation of the risks and failed to exercise proper due diligence. At the same time, weak underwriting standards, unsound risk management practices, increasingly complex and opaque financial products, and consequent excessive leverage combined to create vulnerabilities in the system. Policy-makers, regulators and supervisors, in some advanced countries, did not adequately appreciate and address the risks building up in financial markets, keep pace with financial innovation, or take into account the systemic ramifications of domestic regulatory actions (Office of the Press Secretary, 2008).
The emphasis on risk and poor judgement managing the risk would seem to suggest the absence of criminal intent requiring prosecution. However, William Black, the former Director of Litigation at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, has forcefully argued that crime was at the heart of the financial crises, and the failure to prosecute is due to the failure to diligently look for criminal behavior. Drawing on his
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experience as the lead prosecutor during the S&L crises, Black coined the term, ‘Control Fraud,’ which according to him, was at the heart of the S&L crises and also the financial crises of 2008. Control fraud is similar to consumer fraud as described by Akerlof in his seminal article, The Market for Lemons (Akerlof, 1970). Akerlof argued that markets are often characterized by information assymetry. For example, in the market for used cars, sellers will have more information about the quality of the cars than buyers. In such markets, buyers uncertainty about product quality cause buyers to only offer the average price for the product. This would cause the sellers of above average quality to not offer their product for sale. The average product quality along with the average price offered will fall. The ultimate outcome is a version of Gresham Law, where poor quality products drive out good quality products. That Gresham’s Law might have been at play is hinted at by the following observation from John Robbins, former Chairman of the Mortgage Bankers Association, “During the lending boom, the industry developed products that were “extremely risky that were pushed by everybody up and down the food chain. We forgot about our customers, and making money and our commission checks were more important.” (Berry, 2008).
Black uses the term Control Fraud to “describe situations in which those who control firms or nations use the entity as a means to defraud customers, creditors, shareholders, donors or the general public.” Applied to private businesses, officers in a company, incuding CEO’s are uniquely positioned to remove controls resulting in accounting fraud that greatly harm customers, creditos, and shareholders, but will benefit the officers involved. “A control fraud will often contain “investments that have no readily ascertainable market value”, and then shop for appraisers that will assign unrealistically high values and auditing firms that will bless the fraudulent accounting statements. (Black, 2010). Black states:
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Indeed, these cause such enormous losses because the optimal looting strategy typically involves making deals that create fictional accounting profits and real economic losses. These accounting gains, if blessed by a top tier audit firm, allow firms that are deeply insolvent to grow because creditors and shareholders want to provide funds to profitable firms. Control frauds that loot typically report extremely high profits in early years of the fraud and are able to get clean audit opinions from top tier firms. Control frauds that loot grow rapidly to bring in new cash to pay the interest expense on prior debts they are Ponzi schemes...Control frauds that loot use accounting fraud as their weapon of choice Accounting fraud is an optimal strategy because it simultaneously produces record (albeit fictional) profits and prevents the recognition of real losses. This combination reduces the risk of detection and successful prosecution because the CEO can use normal corporate mechanisms (e.g., raises, bonuses, stock options, dividends and appreciation in the value of the firm’s stock) to convert the creditor’s funds to his personal use. (Black, 2010a, p. 5). —
Black goes on to note that when high ranking officers engage in control fraud, the firm itself may fail, but the officers involved still get a hefty payment. Thus, the firm itself is a weapon that is atrategically used to enrich company officers at the expense of customers, shareholders, and creditors, and when endemic, the general public. Widespread control fraud occurs when the environment is criminogenic, often associated with de-emphasis of regulation and slack enforcement of existing regulation. A criminogenic environment is present when perpetartors can assure themselves of a hefty return amid lax regulatory enforcement which minimizes the risk of prosecution. Ben Bernanke acknowledged that such an enviroenment was present “That conclusion suggests that the best response to the housing bubble would have been regulatory, not monetary. Stronger regulation and supervision aimed at problems with underwriting practices and lenders’ risk management would have been a more effective and surgical approach to constraining the housing bubble than a general increase in interest rates.” (Bernanke, 2010). Black provides many examples of such control fraud during the 5&L crisis. One group of loans S&L’s made was ADC (Acquisition, Development, and Construction) loans. The loans often had the following characteristics: They were 100% LW loans with the real estate project used as collateri; they were interest only loans; the developers received a developers profit from the lender at the time of the loan; the loans had high interest rates and high lender fees in addition to requiring the borrower to 8
share 50% of profits from the project with lender, and finally, the borrower had no personal liability in case of default. Black contends that while the high interest and high fees meant the loans were highly profitable, the lender was fully cognizant that the loan would default. That is because, no credit worthy or reputable borrower would agree to pay the high interest rates and high fees associated with the loan and give up 50% of profits to the lender. So, the only developers who would want to take these loans are the ones that never intended to pay back, enticed by developers profit paid by the lender (2-4% of loan amount). The S&L’s that made these loans could show high short run profits from fees and high interest rates, but were also aware that these loans were not collectible. They made the loans anyway because short run profits trumped long run insolvency of the S&L. Black concludes that many failed S&L operated this fraudulent Ponzi scheme. The 2008 financial crises emanating from the mortgage crisis had many of the same characteristics of the S&L debacle. By late 2006, almost 80% of all loans originated were ALT_A loans. The LW was often 100%, the loans were often interest only, and often required no documentation to establish credit worthiness of borrower. Thus, the borrower had absolutely no liability associated with the loan, These loans were high interest loans with high fees. The lender profited from the loan origination, but given the little stake that the borrower had in the loan, the lender made these loans fully cognizant that many of these loans would fail. According to Black, control fraud was again at work. The lender expected huge short run profits fully knowing that the firm itself would fail. Black, in his testimony before Congress stated:
The claim that no one could have foreseen the crisis is false. Unlike the S&L debacle, the FBI was far ahead of the regulators in recognizing that there was an “epidemic” of mortgage fraud and that it could cause a financial crisis. The FBI warned in September 2004 (CNN) that the “epidemic” of mortgage fraud would cause a “crisis” if it were not contained. The FBI has emphasized that 80 percent of mortgage fraud losses occur when lending industry insiders are part of the fraud scheme. The FBI deserves enormous credit for sounding such a strong, accurate, and public warning. Special praise should also go to Inman News, which put out a series of reports about mortgage fraud that culminated in a compendium in 2003 entitled: “Real Estate Fraud: The Housing 9
Industry’s White-Collar Epidemic.” The warnings about appraisal fraud were equally stark “Home Insecurity: How Widespread Appraisal Fraud Puts Homeowners at Risk” (Demos 2005). The remarkable fact is that the private sector, the regulators, and the prosecutors failed to take effective action despite these warnings. The failure to act is all the more troubling because the nonprime lenders followed the distinctive four-part recipe for lenders optimizing accounting control fraud that regulators, economists, and criminologists had documented and explained in the S&L debacle, during financial privatization (e.g., tunneling), and in the Enron-era control frauds.(Black, 2010b, p. 8). —
Given FBI’s warning of widespread control fraud, one has to wonder why so many were prosecuted and convicted during the S&L Crisis, but so few during the latest mortgage related Financial Market Crisis. Although the policy/justice response to the most recent financial crisis is still unfolding, it appears that after five years, the criminal prosecution of major Wall Street miscreants is not the preferred strategy of government prosecutors. While thousands of “small fry” (mortgage originators, lenders, and some home owners) have been prosecuted and jailed, major Wall Street players have rarely been prosecuted. Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse indicates that in 1995, bank regulators referred 1,837 cases to the Justice Department. (Morgenson & Story, 2011). In 2006, that number had fallen to 75. In the four subsequent years, a period encompassing the worst of the crisis, an average of only 72 a year have been referred for criminal prosecution. The fewer cases being referred are matched by a lack of enthusiasm for criminal prosecution among Justice Department attorneys. Black in his Congressional testimony notes:
Criminologists and financial regulators have long warned that the failure to regulate the financial sphere de facto decriminalizes control fraud in the industry. The FBI cannot investigate effectively more than a small number of the massive accounting control frauds. Only the regulators can have the expertise, staff, and knowledge to identify on a timely basis the markers of accounting control fraud, to prepare the detailed criminal referrals essential to serve as a roadmap for the FBI. and to “detail” (second) staff to work for the FBI and serve as their “Sherpas” during the investigation.” (Black, 20 lOb. p. 14) The lack of criminal prosecutions is due to six factors.
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Investigative resources have been depleted. After 9/11, over 2000 federal agents were transferred to national security. Only 200 agents are assigned to financial crimes. A second problem is concern among federal prosecutors that cases do not pass the probable win test. In a high profile case, the U.S. Government failed to convict two Bear Stearns Hedge fund managers in the first major Wall Street criminal prosecution. This loss has dampened the enthusiasm of prosecutors to seek criminal convictions. Wall Street has resources to keep cases tied up for long time periods. This has been referred to as the too big to jail phenomenon. The too big to jail phenomenon is reinforced by the fear that criminal prosecution of large financial institutions would have a deleterious effect on the economy. Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. responded to a question at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing about the failure to prosecute multinational banks for various transgressions by saying, “I am concerned that the size of some of these institutions becomes so large that it does become difficult for us to prosecute them when we are hit with indications that if we do prosecute
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if we do bring a criminal charge
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it will have a negative
impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world economy.” (Sorkin, 2013). The same sentiment was expressed by Mary Jo White, Chairperson of the Security and Exchange Commission during her confirmation hearings. She told the senator that federal prosecutors should consider the “collateral consequences” of bringing a criminal indictment against financial institutions (ElBoghdady, 2013). This reluctance to prosecute large financial entities is known as the “Arthur Anderson effect” so named because of the demise of the accounting firm after it was convicted of obstruction of justice related to its auditing work at Enron. After the firm was found guilty and was forced out of business, thousands of jobs were lost, sending a chilling message to prosecutors that they needed to tread carefully when pursuing criminal charges against a company in a highly regulated industry. Of course
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this message was reinforced when the conviction was overturned on appeal
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too late to save the
company. Lack of prosecutorial aggressivene5s can also be attributed to the regulatory roll back preceding the crisis which lessened the number of tools prosecutors have available to mount strong criminal cases. Finally, a less risky option has presented itself in the form of civil prosecutions that have a lower standard of proof requirement. A front page headline in the New York Times of Wednesday, November 20, 2013 suggests a reason, other than more easily passing the probable win test, why such an option might be appealing: “In extracting Deal From iPMorgan, U.S. Aimed for Bottom Line” (Silver-Greenberg & Protess, 2013). Indeed, the threat of civil prosecution has yielded significant monetary returns to the Federal Government. In the JPMorgan case, the settlement was for $13 billion, the largest penalty ever extracted from a single company (Douglass, 2013). In another case, federal authorities did not indict HSBC, the international banking giant, for money laundering in exchange for the bank accepting a plea deal to pay $1.92 billion (Goldstein, 2013). There was also concern that criminal charges would jeopardize the stability of the global financial system. It is clear that going after large civil penalties has a number of advantages. As noted, passing the probable win test is enhanced; disruption to the financial system is minimized; and the government recoups monies from bail outs. Individual investors also stand to gain since, at least in the case of the JPMorgan settlement, some monies will go to those who suffered losses because of the banks investment practices. Nevertheless, this approach raises a number of challenging questions. In the case ofiPMorgan, part of the settlement required them to disclosed how it bundled mortgages later sold to investors as having low risk. Although the bank was obligated to inform investors of problems in the portfolios, they
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failed to do so. Moreover, they did not heed the warnings of independent auditor5 who informed bank officials of loans that were problematic. Instead, in some cases, they altered the ratings giving investors the impression that the loans were safer and less risky than was actually the case. The actions of JPMorgan would have been prosecuted criminally had they occurred as part of the Savings and Loan Crisis. Their treatment in this case raises some significant issues including balancing the rule of law against possible disruption of the financial system as well as issues of deterrence. In both the case of HSBC and of JPMorgan, institutions went into negotiations with the government holding a major trump card, i.e. the possible negative effects of criminal penalties on the world economy. Obviously, in such cases, it appears that deterring future questionable or outright fraudulent activities is compromised when banks and large financial institutions know they won’t be fully prosecuted. Although, JPMorgan can still be prosecuted criminally for some of their activities, that seems unlikely at this point.
Discretionary Justice Our review of prosecutions during three financial crises underscores the contingent nature of seeking criminal penalties for financial wrong doing. The decision is influenced by a number of factors including a prosecutor’s level of risk tolerance (applying the probable win test), the potential economic impact of a successful conviction (the Arthur Anderson effect), the number of laws and regulations available in the prosecutorial tool kit, and the desired outcome which can range from new regulatory structures (as after the Depression), to prosecutions that fix blame and satisfy the desire for scapegoats (as occurred after the Savings & Loan debacle), to seeking shoring up the government’s bottom line (the preferred strategy in the aftermath of the current crisis). It should be noted that the current crisis did generate legislative action, most notably in the form of the Dodd-Frank Act. However, as we discussed elsewhere (Fisher, Gilsinan, Islam & Seitz, 2013), political currents acted to significantly blunt the impact
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of that act. Thus a final consideration in understanding prosecutorial discretion related to financial wrong doing is the political context in which remedies, whether criminal or civil, are sought. In the aftermath of the most recent financial crisis, the United States finds itself in a highly contested political state. The explanation for what caused the crisis has been politicized pitting a structural explanation (“bad stuff happens”) against an explanation that seeks to pinpoint human agency (people acting badly caused the crisis). The policy consequences of the former approach are minimal regulatory interference in the market, while the latter explanation leads to an emphasis on robust regulator-y reform (Fisher, Gilsinan, Islam & Seitz, 2013). Given the conflicting political currents, perhaps seeking civil remedies rather than criminal is the best that can be expected. At least under the current conditions, everybody can claim a win. Large financial institutions avoid criminal stigma, the government reaps an enhanced bottom line, and political factions can point to the validity of their world views. Civil fines lessen the burden of individual culpability and suggests systemic misfires (“bad stuff happens”), while simultaneously suggesting that punishment and retribution for wrong doing has been achieved.
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References Akerlof, G. (1970), The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3), PP. 488-500. Bernanke, Ben. (2010, January 3), “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble,” speech given at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association in Atlanta, Georgia. Available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/tools-resources/what-ca used-the financial-crisis-quotes-from-bankers.html#sthash.aolvyk7l.E8hhYTvG.dpuf. Berry, Kate. (2008, September 15), “Wachovia Alum Has Tips for an Industrial Rebound,” American Banker. Retrieved from www.americanbanker.com. Biernan, Harold Jr. (1998), The Causes of the 1929 Stock Market Crash: A Speculative Orgy or a New Era, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT. Black, William K., (2010a, April 15), “Control Frauds as Financial Super-Predators: How ‘Pathogens’ Make Financial Markets Inefficient.” Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1590400 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1590400. Black, William K. (2010b, September 21), Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Miami, Florida, p. 8. Douglas, Danielle. (2013, November, 20), “JPMorgan, U.S. Finalize Record $13 Billion Accord,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, p. A12. ElBoghdady, Dma. (2013, March 13), “Mary Jo White Faces No Opposition at SEC Confirmation Hearing,” The Washington Post. Retrieved from www.washintonpost.com. Executive Office for United States Attorney. (2010), United States Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report, U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved from www.justice.gov. Fisher, J., Gilsinan, i., Islam, M. and Seitz, N. (2013, May), “The Conundrum of Legislating Risk Reduction Through Financial Regulatory Reform: The Cases of Dodd-Frank and FASB Accounting Changes,” Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol.21, No.2, pp.150-163. “Fraud Caused the 1930s Depression and the Current Financial Crisis.” (2010, October 30), Washingtonalog. Galbraith, John. (1954), The Great Crash, 1919, Muffin Harcourt Publishing Company, New York, NY. Gilsinan, James. (1990), Criminology and Public Policy an Introduction, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Goldstein, Matthew. (2013, December 21), “Deutsche Bank to Pay 1.9 Billion Over Morgages,” The New York Times, p. B3. Morgenson, Gretchen and Story, Louise. (2011, April14), “In Financial Crisis, No Prosecutions of Top Figures,” The New York Times. Retrieved from www.newyorktimes.com Office of the Press Secretary. (2008, November 15), “Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy,” The White House. Retrieved from http://georgewbush white house .a rch ives .gov. Pearce, F. and Snider, L. (1995), Corporate Crime Contemporary Debates, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, ON. Palmer, Brian. (2011, January 28), You’re Under Attest for Causing the Great Depression. Slate. Retrieved from www.slate.com. 15
Silver-Greenberg, Jessica and Protess, Ben. (2013, November 20), “In Extracting Deal From JPMorgan, U.S. Aimed for Bottom Line,” The New York Times, pp. 81, B8. Sorkin, Andrew Ross. (2013, March 12), “Dealbook; Realities Behind Prosecuting Big Banks,” The New York Times. Retrieved from www.newyorktimes.com. “The Great Crash of 1929 vs. The Panic of 2008.” (2008, September 18), The Economic Populist. Retrieved from www.economicpopulist.org. “Two Financial Crisis Compared: The Savings and Loan Debacle and the Mortgage Mess.” (2011, April 13), The New York Times. Retrieved from www.newyorktimes.com.
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