The Metaphors of Development

Paper Human Development 2003;46:3–23 DOI: 10.1159/000067782

The Metaphors of Development Charles M. Super

Sara Harkness

The University of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn., USA

Key Words Development ` Ethnotheories ` Metaphors ` Parents ` Professionals ` Theory

Abstract Pepper's [1942] conceptualization of `root metaphors´ offers developmentalists a scheme for organizing theories of child behavior held by both parents and professionals. In this paper, we identify the root metaphors underlying current perspectives on human develoment, and present evidence for their role in interpretations of child behavior by parents and mental health professionals. Study 1 demonstrates that there are stable individual differences in root metaphor preference among US parents (n = 224), and these differences are influenced by experience in predictable ways. Study 2 describes similar differences among 32 mental health professionals at a US psychiatric clinic, and confirms relationships expected on the basis of theoretical analysis between metaphoric orientation and therapeutic specialization. Study 3 replicates these findings with a broader sample of 55 mental health professionals at a Dutch psychiatric treatment center and further relates metaphoric orientation to the daily task demands of their occupational roles. Thus the studies reported here provide strong support for the proposition that Pepper's metaphoric analysis of philosophical systems can be applied meaningfully to the cognitive systems used by both parents and professionals in interpreting children's behavior. We discuss the implications for understanding the socially regulated nature of partents' belief systems, the origins of individual variation, the `goodness of fit´ between mental health practitioners and their clients, and the role of theory in the developmental sciences. Copyright © 2003 S. Karger AG, Basel

Editor’s note: The action editor for this article was Barbara Rogoff.

Ó2003 S. Karger AG, Basel 0018–716X/03/0461–0003$19.50/0

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Dr. Charles M. Super School of Family Studies University of Connecticut, Box U-58 Storrs, CT 06269-2058 (USA) E-Mail [email protected]

The behavior of young children is characterized by a shifting complexity of meaning and function across time and place. Interpreting and responding to the stream of behavior is a major cognitive task for parents and other caretakers, for it requires the ongoing extension of present knowledge to new events and new contexts; often it necessitates taking action based on unconfirmable expectations about the future. The importance of interpeting children’s behavior is reflected in the attention devoted to the topic by parents, by the popular press, and by educators, pediatricians, psychologists, researchers, and others who are called upon for their expertise in understanding and influencing children's development. The research literature on parents’ knowledge, beliefs, and ‘theories’ concerning child development has grown substantially in the past decades [see Goodnow & Collins, 1990; Sigel, McGillicuddy & Goodnow, 1992]. Much of this work focuses on parental thinking as an individual characteristic, assessing such qualities as knowledge of developmental milestones [e.g. Vukelich & Kliman, 1985], level of reasoning about child behavior [e.g. Newberger, 1980; Sameroff & Feil, 1985], or the determinants of parents’ interpretations [Dix & Grusec, 1985]. Child outcomes related to parental thinking have also been documented [e.g. Patel, Eisemon, & Arocha, 1988; Rubin & Mills, 1990]. Research in this tradition tends to be monocultural and to assume that systematic individual differences are primarily reflective of variation in psychological functioning or experience with children. A second, more anthropological approach examines parents’ belief systems as social or cultural constructs [see Harkness & Super, 1996; Moscovici, 1990], often comparing the content of ethnotheories or cultural models typically found in different communities [e.g. Holloway, Kashiwagi, Hess, & Azuma, 1985]. Some of this work specifically examines variations in parental beliefs in relation to social change and subcultural differences in, for example, education [e.g. Frankel & RoerBornstein, 1982; LeVine, Miller, Richman, & LeVine, 1996; Palacios & Moreno, 1996; Youniss, 1995]. Research in this tradition focuses on the understandings of reality that are shared among members of a social group, and it tends to consider differences as organized by social forces rather than as individual idiosyncrasies. Developmental theories held by human development professionals often serve in the literature as an ideal – the substantive knowledge and the structure of reasoning against which parental theories are measured [e.g. MacPhee, 1984]. Yet the diversity of formal developmental theories and perspectives found in comprehensive textbooks or displayed at professional gatherings suggests that experts, too, vary substantially among themselves in how they think about child behavior, and in addition that this variation concerns something more than accuracy of belief, abstractness of reasoning, or culture of origin. Differences among scientists’ theories, however, are usually discussed in quite separate terms than differences among parents’ beliefs [e.g. Thomas, 1985]. This article examines the proposition that there are common features to the variations in developmental theory held by parents and professionals alike, and that this commonality can be identified in the metaphors used to interpret specific instances of child behavior. At the level of individuals, analogical or metaphoric reasoning is a fundamental way that people use their current knowledge to understand new situations and phenomena. Lakoff & Johnson [1980] argued that metaphors are not merely pretty embellishments for otherwise plain ideas, but rather are the very foundation of everyday thought. Based in part on this work, detailed analysis of the

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metaphors used by adults in natural discourse has proven to be an effective method of understanding the semantic representation and use of concepts in daily life. As an inductive method, there is no a priori assumption about the kind of metaphors that might be identified; rather, the meanings attributed to concepts are revealed through an analysis of their use. Nevertheless, such research usually results in the identification of socially shared rather than idiosyncratic concepts, in domains ranging from the non-expert understanding of home heating systems [Kempton, 1987] to metaphors of marriage [Quinn, 1982]. Pepper’s Theory of Four Root Metaphors

The present work begins deductively with the hypothesis set forth by the twentieth-century American philosopher Stephen C. Pepper [1942] that there is a limited number of metaphors that satisfactorily support broad and systematic thought about the nature of reality. Although Pepper’s work preceded Lakoff and Johnson’s by four decades and grew from separate disciplinary roots, his understanding of metaphor as the basis of interpreting the world nevertheless strongly resembles their cognitive-linguistic view. Pepper was concerned with the world views, or metatheories, underlying different philosophical systems. In his analysis, Pepper identified four such views, called ‘world hypotheses’, that are drawn from common, concrete experience and are available, by extension, for understanding more abstract notions. The underlying analogy used in a world view is referred to by Pepper as its ‘root metaphor’. Although there might be any number of such systems of understanding, each with its own root metaphor, Pepper contended that within philosophy there are only four that have proven reasonably adequate for the task of encompassing a large range of experience with enough precision to be useful. In his book World hypotheses: A study of evidence [1942], Pepper identified Formism, Mechanism, Organicism, and Contextualism as the four basic world views and their associated root metaphors. Formism rests on the classification of objects into discrete and bounded categories on the basis of definition or similarity to a prototype. Similarity of type is in fact the root metaphor. ‘The world is full of things that seem to be just alike: blades of grass, a set of spoons, newspapers under a newsboy’s arm’ [Pepper, 1942, p. 151]. Pepper associated this metaphor with the work of Plato, Aristotle, and the Scholastics. The meaning and structure of objects or events are provided by their classification (as qualities of the category are known) and by the organization of categories into hierarchies (based again on similarities and differences). The process of knowing in this system is primarily analytic, and the associated cognitive task is to discern diagnostic similarities. It is significant that in a Formist system the number of categories can be changed without altering the relationship of existing categories. Mechanism focuses on the connections among parts of a whole, and as an explanatory system it insists on a discrete, specific set of causal relations for every event. According to Pepper, this metaphor characterizes the philosophical theories of Democritus, Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, Hume, and Locke. The mechanistic metaphor represents relations among events in terms of a machine – whether a simple lever, a clock, internal combustion enginge, or electromagnetic field – in which the nature of the fundamental elements and their relations remain similar. Each

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element in the machine can be isolated for examination, but only in their functional, pragmatic connections do their workings become apparent. Organismic theories, which Pepper attributed to the philosophies of Schelling, Hegel, and Royce, recognize synthetic and integrative, or in more modern terms the ‘systems’ aspects of an ‘organism’ of mutually influencing parts. The philosopher with this perspective believes that every event in the world is the result of an organic process and that its apparent structure is best viewed as an ‘ideal, aimed at by the progressive steps of process’ [Pepper, 1942, p. 281]. Thus there is a special emphasis on the internal regulation, reorganization, transformation, and production of patterns of change. The organic whole, the putative object of study, is seen to have been implicit in the early fragments or developmental antecedents; together these elements transcend their particularness to create a qualitatively distinct and coherent totality in which the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Contextualism is most distinctive in its focus on the subjective and on the historical moment, or the particular subjective act ‘in and with its setting, an act in its context’ [Pepper, 1942, p. 232]. The history of the act, the context, and the observer are often viewed as the substance that provides meaning to the moment. Proponents of contextualism, according to Pepper, include Protagoras, Pierce, James, Dewey, and Mead. In this world view, it is only from the cultural-historical perspective that meaning can be derived. The meaning has no existence apart from the context and the participating observer; hence meanings are multiple and relative. Inherent in this view are change and novelty, more radical and less derivative than in the other three world views, but the focal point remains the given event, ‘the historical event as it actually goes on. The whole universe, it asserts, is such as this event is, whatever it is’ [Pepper, 1942, p. 235]. In this view, it is impossible to arive at a single or simple explanation of the ‘cause’ for anything and multiple perspectives are appreciated, even required. Pepper further discovered, perhaps to his own surprise, that the ‘four hypotheses arrange themselves in two groups of two each’ (p. 142), suggesting a two-by-two grid, although he did not pursue this model. Formism and mechanism are analytic, with the significant features of study lying in the elements, and synthesis, when it occurs, following secondarily. In contrast, organicism and contextualism are synthetic at the core, focusing on ‘complexes or contexts, so that analysis becomes derivative’ (p. 142). The second group pairs formism and contextualism in their ability to take facts one by one and so interpret them, without any single fact determining to a significant degree any other; they are dispersive. In contrast, mechanism and organicism are inherently integrative, seeing the universe as necessarily coherent and, if all were known, ultimately deterministic; these approaches are integrative. From the combinations of these two contrasts, the relative weaknesses of each view can be discerned: for example, the dispersive theories may lack precision, while the integrative ones may be tempted to omit inconsistent details and thus limit their scope. In discussing these relationships, Pepper suggested that by aligning them across a single dimension, as Formism – Mechanism – Contextualism – Organicism, one could make successive pairs that ‘seem almost to shade into one another’ while ‘other pairs seem to have much less attraction for each other and are much more obviously discordant in eclectic combination’ (p. 147). For example, Pepper indicated, ‘formism and organicism are especially hostile to each other’ (p. 147). In his sequence, the pairs of analytic theories (Formism and Mechanism) are adjacent,

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Fig. 1. Empirical relationships among the four root metaphors (Study 1).

as are the two synthetic ones (Contextualism and Organicism), while the dispersive (Formism and Contextualism) and integrative (Mechanism and Organicism) are separated. Pepper suggested that the four hypotheses drawn this way have ‘a tendency to pull cognitively toward the center, as if most cognitive adequacy lay somewhere between mechanism and contextualism’ (p. 148), with the former the stronger analytical and integrative theory, and the latter the stronger synthetic and dispersive one. However, a more parsimonious model can be constructed from the dimensionality of the two-fold classification system postulated by Pepper. Figure 1 illustrates the two-dimensional model as a square, a structure that captures the eclectic tendencies and particular antagonisms anticipated by Pepper. Adjacent pairs in this figure should have minimal conflict, and the diagonals should be strongly oppositional. A final significant feature of Pepper’s approach is that the four world views are autonomous and ‘of about equal adequacy. They are capable of presenting credible interpretations of any facts, whatever, in terms of their several sets of categories’ (p. 99). The scope, clarity, internal concepts, and standards of evidence within each system are adequate to address the full range of human experience. Hypotheses can be developed and tested within each view. However, in light of the difference in concepts used and the equality of general adequacy, Pepper concluded that dialogue among the four views is in essence impossible. Systems of knowledge developed within different world views cannot agree on even the question, much less the answer. In this regard, Pepper’s view as applied to scientific thinking parallels the work of T. Kuhn [1962] and others who have argued that, in the words of Lakoff and Johnson [1980], ‘Truth is always relative to a conceptual system that is defined in large part by metaphor’ (p. 159).

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Root Metaphors in Developmental Theory

There is a continuing interest in the role of metaphor in the construction of psychological theory [e.g. Leary, 1990; Sternberg, 1990], and a number of psychologists have been attracted to Pepper’s work as a way of organizing the diversity of theoretical systems [e.g. Altman & Rogoff, 1987; Sigel, 1981]. By and large, developmentalists have tended to accept, at least in part, Pepper’s postulate of incompatibility [e.g. Reese & Overton, 1970]. Most have tried to conclude that one metaphor, or a particular combination of metaphors, holds the key to a proper theory of development. Langer [1969] favored an organismic view, while D. Kuhn [1978] argued for the use of both organismic and mechanistic models to deal with different aspects of cognitive development. Lerner and Kauffman [1985] looked to contextualism and organicism to represent their concept of development, only to be criticized by Kendler [1986] for ignoring the merits of a mechanistic view. Prior to that exchange, Moshman [1982] had focused on a synthesis of mechanistic, organismic and contextualist views. Sameroff [1983] rejected each metaphor in turn to suggest that general systems theory can incorporate the important features of mechanistic, organismic, and contextualist models. One striking feature of all these extensions of Pepper’s model in the developmental domain is their reluctance to entertain the core of Pepper’s thesis, that there are four systems, each in its own way adequate to explain the features of the real events salient to its view. There are several exceptions to this generalization within developmental psychology. Merlino [1975], for example, challenged the logic of ‘metaphysical isolationism’ as unnecessary. In agreement, but more narrowly focused, Cooper [1987] used Pepper’s four-fold theory to organize conceptual differences among research traditions in the study of adolescence and noted the advantages of maintaining an open approach. Similarly, Lyddon [1989] identified theoretical approaches in the field of counseling which correspond to each of the four world hypotheses. He used this correspondence to highlight differences among various positions, but did not make judgments of superiority based on these observations. More broadly, Schwartz & Russek [1997] recognized the unique contribution of each perspective, and even proposed supplementing Pepper’s work with four additional world hypotheses in order to accommodate theoretical progress in integrative medicine. The present analysis proceeds in the spirit invoked by these last works. It is our view that Pepper’s philosophical and metaphoric analysis can be used to organize developmental theories in a useful way without introducing artificial distinctions of general supremacy. The current intellectual scene is populated with exemplars of each world view, and further, each of the major formal approaches to child development can be identified with a primary metaphoric base as outlined by Pepper. Thus, Pepper’s theory appears to be comprehensive and exhaustive in this domain, as he claimed it was in philosophy in general. Formism, first, is represented rather purely in modern temperament theory, for example in the work of Chess & Thomas [1984]. Stern, Arcus, Kagan, and Rubin [1995] have recently made this argument more explicitly. There are different types of behavioral disposition, according to this highly successful research tradition, and these differences account for significant aspects of personality development and behavioral disorder. Similarly, the taxonomy of childhood psychopathology, as

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reflected in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [American Psychiatric Association, 1987], provides the research, professional, and insurance communities with a list of distinct forms of disorder, each with definable criteria and known characteristics. In both temperament theory and psychiatric nosology, the addition of further categories or dimensions of variation does not significantly affect those already present in the system. Also in both cases the procedures of treatment or prevention depend critically on an accurate diagnosis of type or form [e.g., Chess & Thomas, 1986]. The core concepts of temperament theory are widely publicized for parents in works by Brazelton [1983] and Turecki & Tonner [1985], among others, and the popular press routinely presents discussion of specific syndromes such as dyslexia and anorexia nervosa. Mechanism, second, is straightforwardly implemented in the classical behavior theories of Pavlov and of Skinner, and in the developmental extensions by Watson and by Dollard and Miller. In this view each behavior has a specific and (theoretically) identifiable cause. While the internal structure of the behavioral machine may be of little interest, understanding the regularity of the connections between stimuli and responses is the goal of behaviorist science. The implementation of behavior theory in child therapy is widely known and its success is said to depend on discovering the objective contingencies controlling a specific behavior. Popular manuals such as Leavitt’s [1982] Active parenting and Patterson’s [1976] Living with children make this approach widely available. Organicism, thirdly, is development with a capital ‘D’. Freud, Werner, Piaget, Maslow, and Kohlberg all shared a concern with the processes of development and strove to understand internally regulated change over time. Weak in detailing the mechanics of process, theoreticians of this world view are interested in growth and internally directed transformation toward higher levels of organization. The integration of emotion, thought, and behavior are often a focus in organismic theory. In the realm of practice, Rogers and Adler are among the best known organicists, and their insights have been made widely available to parents through such programs as Parent Effectiveness Training [Gordon, 1970]. Contextualism, finally, is the most difficult world view to specify, but its emphasis on the local and individual construction of meaning is echoed in diverse theories relevant to development. The construction of individual meaning is evident in the work of such idiographic or ‘morphogenic’ personality theorists as Allport [1962], and contextual themes can be seen in life-course and life-span theories to the degree that they emphasize the embeddedness of development in a particular historical moment [Baltes, Reese, & Lipsitt, 1980; Elder, 1974]. The prominence awarded to local meaning and interactionism in constructivist branches of anthropology and psychology represents another version of contextualism. The perspective espoused by cultural psychologists captures this in its attempt to study ‘the ways subject and object, self and other, psyche and culture, person and context, figure and ground, practitioner and practice live together, require each other, and dynamically, dialectically, and jointly make each other up’ [Shweder, 1990, p. 1]. Rogoff [1990, p. 28] is specific about the connection to the historically particular: ‘The child and the social world are mutually involved to an extent that precludes regarding them as independently definable. ... This approach is consistent with Pepper’s [1942] contextualist hypothesis.’ Finally, Hayes, Hayes, & Reese [1988] have argued that a radical revision of behaviorism yields a contextualist approach. In

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practice, contextualism is strongly represented in schools of family therapy which propose that the only reality a therapist can grasp for treatment is the one defined by the family. In the Milan approach, success in therapy is seen to result not from specific instruction or from pressing toward a particular goal, but rather from acting ‘to jog the (family) system toward unpredictable outcomes’ [Boscolo, Cecchin, Hoffman, & Penn, 1987, p. 18]. Similarly, the phenomenological aspects of existential therapy and counseling are distinctly contextual [e.g. Frankel, 1967]. It is appropriate that Contextualism, the world view which highlights multiple viewpoints, has such diverse expressions. In this paper, we present evidence for the presence of these root metaphors in parents’ and mental health professionals’ interpretations of children’s behavior. Study 1 demonstrates that there are stable differences among American parents in their preferences for interpretations of child behavior that correspond to the four root metaphors; and that these preferences are related to two indices of parental experience. Study 2, carried out with mental health professionals at a child guidance clinic in Boston, describes similar differences and indicates relationships between metaphoric orientation and therapeutic specialization. Study 3 replicates these findings with a sample of mental health professionals at a Dutch psychiatric treatment center and further relates metaphoric orientation to the daily task demands of their occupational roles. Taken together, the results of these studies suggest that root metaphor analysis provides a unifying framework for understanding individual variations in the interpretation of child behavior, the way these variations reflect and are reflected in behavioral routines, and how individual thinking varies within a structure of socially shared concepts of the child. Study 1: Root Metaphors in Parental Interpretations

The link between Pepper’s four world views and formal models of development does not necessarily imply that individuals demonstrate this systematic pattern of variation in thinking about child behavior in everyday life. This possibility is suggested, however, by the theory’s fundamental similarity with cognitive science’s understanding of metaphors in everyday thinking. It is further advanced by studies based on the World Hypotheses Scale [WHS; Fontana, Dowds, & Bethel, 1976; Harris, Fontana, & Dowds, 1977], a brief questionnaire designed to assess the relative preference for Formism, Mechanism, Organicism, and Contextualism in people’s interpersonal interpretations or attributions. The WHS presents 12 behavioral statements (such as ‘Alan is borrowing a lot of money’) accompanied by four interpretations, each of which represents one of the four root metaphors (e.g. ‘Alan is a big spender’ is the Formist explanation offered for the statement above). The respondent must choose the preferred interpretation in each case, and the scale thus yields four summary scores, one for each metaphor. In several studies of validity, the WHS succeeded in differentiating college students with various occupational preferences, the formation of compatible friendship pairs, and the success of divergent therapeutic approaches for alcoholism. In addition, Harris, Fontana, and Dowds [1977] demonstrated that the four orientations of the WHS are ‘independent entities and are not essentially other ways of measuring already established personality and cognitive variabels’ (p. 540), such as authoritarianism, rigidity, dogma-

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tism, locus of control, or intellectual ability. Related findings are reported by Johnson, Germer, Efran, & Overton [1988]. The present research extends this work to focus specifically on child behavior and development. The primary hypothesis is that parents will vary reliably and systematically in their preferences among the four root metaphors to interpret specific descriptions of child behavior. Secondarily, we examine the hypothesis that some of the variation among parents’ preference among root metaphor interpretations can be related to indicators of their personal experience.

Method Participants completed the Child Behavior Questionnaire (CBQ), which contains eight vignettes, each followed by four possible interpretations that the respondent is asked to rank order for their appropriateness in explaining the described behavior [Super, 1986/1995]. The sturcture of forced rankings and the somewhat projective nature of the vignettes is modeled on the demonstrated success of the WHS. All the examples given in the CBQ, however, involve specific behaviors by young children. The eight vignettes are balanced for sex of the child and for positive or negative behaviors to be explained. Children in the stories range in age from 1 year to 8 years, with the majority being preschoolers. To illustrate, here is the first vignette, followed by the four interpretations offered: Michelle, who is almost 4 years old, is in the supermarket with her mother late in the afternoon. Soon they pass the candy display and Michelle starts to fuss for the candy. Her mother says ‘No, you can’t have any now because we’re going to have supper as soon as we get home.’ Then Michelle really starts to scream and kick, making a big scene right there. Why did Michelle have a fit? (a) It is a stage – she’s trying to be independent. Most kids around this age are struggling with the need to define their own independence, and that’s just a stage of development they go through. Because Michelle wants the candy, the question is really if her mother can stop her. It has to be worked out at Michelle’s level of development. (b) She is a difficult child. Some children are naturally more difficult to handle than others, and Michelle seems like that kind – very demanding and quick to fuss when she cannot get what she wants. (c) It depends; she is probably hungry. It is the end of the afternoon and little kids are always hungry then. The particular circumstances have a lot to do with it and you cannot really tell much about Michelle from this story. (d) She thinks she can get away with it. Kids learn from experience what they can get away with. Probably Michelle has tried this before and learned that if she screams loud enough in the supermarket she will get the candy. For this vignette, answer (a) is scored as Organicist, (b) as Formist, (c) as Contextualist, and (d) as Mechanical. The remaining vignettes, which offer a similar tetrad of interpretations, concern: (2) the most appropriate action for Michelle’s mother to take; (3) a preschooler who cleans up his room happily; (4) an infant who does not sleep through the night; (5) a two-year-old who does not display the ‘terrible twos’; (6) an 8-year-old who will come to dinner when called, even in the

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middle of a TV program; (7) a 3-year-old who is very fearful; and (8) a fifth-grader who makes new friends easily after moving to a new school. Scoring the CBQ consists of calculating for each metaphor the average of its ranks across the vignettes, and subtracting that average from a constant, so that high scores indicate strong preference1. It is important to note that because of the forced rank ordering, the four metaphor scores indicate only a constrained relative preference, and a higher score on one scale necessarily results in a lower score on some other(s). The participants were 243 parents recruited from a large Health Maintenance Organization Center where their family received pediatric care. The Center is located in Cambridge, a city adjacent to Boston and home to a substantial population of middle and working class families, as well as several renowned educational institutions; most families came from surrounding towns. 171 of the parents whose data are presented here were recruited by Center staff in connection with a previously scheduled well-child visit; after their agreement to participate, they were sent copies of CBQ to be filled out at least by the parent bringing the child into the clinic for the appointment (in 13 of the 158 families both parents completed the form), and a family background questionnaire [see Harkness, Super, Keefer, Raghavan, & Kipp-Campbell, 1996, for further detail]. Participation by families recruited to the study was nearly 100 %. An additional 72 parents (from 36 families) were recruited from the Center for a more intensive, longitudinal project, and agreement to participate was about 75% [see Harkness, Super, & Keefer, 1992]. These parents completed the CBQ on two occasions, 6 months apart. The final, pooled sample included primarily female respondents (75%), reflecting the fact that it was generally the mother who brought a child to the clinic for the well-child visit (and therefore filled out the CBQ). Virtually all the respondents appeared to be of predominantly European ancestry. The well-child visit and longitudinal sub-samples of parents did not differ statistically in education, age, number of children, age of their oldest child, or age of their youngest. On average, these parents were highly educated (averaging 17 years of schooling, and ranging from 11 to 30 years), in their early thirties (ranging from age 20 to 57) and had a total of one or two children (range 1–6), who were usually of preschool age or younger (but ranged up to 30 years of age).

Use of the 4 Metaphors Scale results are shown in table 1. Pepper’s expectations concerning internal structure relating the 4 metaphors, as shown in figure 1, would suggest that factor analysis of individual scores should yield either a 2-factor solution (capturing the diagonal axes) and/or a 4-factor solution (one for each scale), depending on the strength of the diagnoal correlations. Factor analysis of the present data confirm,

1 Based on a preliminary analysis of internal consistency, 4 of the 32 answers were dropped in order to improve the scales' reliabilities, and thus the scores used here are based on 6, 7, 7, and 8 vignettes (for Formism, Mechanism, Organicism, and Contextualism, respectively). Ultimately, scores are standardized according to the results reported in table 1.

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Table 1. Scale characteristics (Study 1) Scale

Mean

Median

SD

Skewness Kurtosis

min

max

alpha

retest r

p of r

Formism Mechanism Organicism Contextualism

1.95 2.66 2.99 2.36

1.92 2.71 3.00 2.38

0.49 0.50 0.51 0.50

0.25 –0.19 –0.51 0.09

1.00 1.43 1.29 1.00

3.33 3.71 4.00 3.63

0.50 0.52 0.56 0.56

0.70 0.72 0.74 0.72

0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001

–0.58 –0.41 0.12 –0.64

particularly, the first expectation2. The two-dimensional structure is visually evident from the interscale correlations that are included in figure 1: As predicted, the diagonals are strongly negative (‘hostile’ in Pepper’s terms), while the peripheral correlations are weaker. Each of the peripheral correlations is significantly (p < 0.05) different from each of the diagonal correlations (using Fisher’s [1921] technique).

The Role of Experience Two specific hypotheses concerning the influence of experience on parents’ interpretations of child behavior can be generated from the existing literature. First, the work of Sameroff and Feil [1985] suggests that parents with more education (higher SES) should be more open to recognizing multiple factors in child behavior and to taking multiple perspectives, and therefore favor Contextualism. Second, several authors have noted that parents of more than one child have increased appreciation for innate differences [e.g. Goodnow, 1985; Chess & Thomas, 1984; Sigel, McGillicuddy-De Lisi, & Johnson, 1980]. Based on this observation, we would expect a stronger preference for Formism among parents with more than one child. Table 2 presents the correlations of metaphor scores with demographic measures that serve as proxies for experience. The first hypothesis is confirmed by the significant positive association between parents’ education and Contextualism: more highly educated parents are more likely to endorse an interpretation that acknowledges multiple determinants and perspectives (r = 0.25, p < 0.01). The nega-

2 Eigenvalues for the first five unrotated factors are: 3.49, 3.02, 1.92, 1.80, 1.54, indicating two dominant factors (which together account for 28% of the total variance), and also, with less strong justification, a possible four-factor solution. Examination of the Verimax rotation for the first two factors reveals that factor 1 includes most of the item scores for Mechanism and (negatively) all of the items for Contextualism, while factor 2 includes all of the items for Organicism and (negatively) most of the items for Formism. Results of rotating of the first 4 factors are less satisfactory. The first factor retains items for Formism and (negatively) Organicism; factor 2 and 3 are dominated, respectively, by Contextualism and Mechanism explanations; but a weak factor 4 contains a mixture of items from all four scales. Each of the four scales has a satisfactory distribution. The raw means (based on complete data from 224 parents) indicate an overall preference for the Organic interpretations, followed by Mechanical, Contextualist, and Formist. Final measures of internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha, based on the same 224 parents) meet the standard criterion of 0.50 for use in group comparisons [Remmers, Gage, & Rummel, 1965]. Test-retest reliabilities, based on 54 of the 72 parents in the longitudinal subsample, are moderately strong (0.70 or above), especially in light of the long interval (6 months). There is no significant difference in the means between time 1 and time 2 (t for the four scales = 0.38, 0.79, –0.21, and –1.59, respective p = 0.71, 0.43, 0.83, and 0.12).

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Table 2. Correlation of Child Behavior Questionnaire scores with back-

ground measures (Study 1) Formism Mechanism Organicism Contextualism Age of parent Education of parent Number of children Age of oldest child

0.04 –0.03 0.15* 0.07

–0.01 –0.26** 0.13 0.10

0.01 –0.02 –0.09 –0.05

–0.04 0.25** –0.19** –0.14*

n = 224. * Indicates correlation significant at p < 0.05. ** Indicates correlation significant at p < 0.01.

tive association of education with Mechanism (r = –0.26, p < 0.01) was not expected, but it follows from the negative association between Contextualism and Mechanism identified in the factor analysis. Although this negative correlation may result in part from the forced choice nature of the CBQ, it is noteworthy that the required shift took place primarily here, rather than with Formism or Organicism. Our second hypothesis is weakly although significantly supported, as having more than one child is associated with Formism. The weak negative association with Contextualism was not anticipated, and further analysis suggests it is an artifact. In this sample older parents, who have more children, tend to have less education, and lower education is associated with lower Contextualism scores. When parent’s age, or parent’s education, is controlled through partial correlation, the negative association between Contextualism and having more than one child disappears. Study 2: Root Metaphor Preferences among US Child Guidance Professionals

It appears that the root metaphors identified by Pepper can be found both in contemporary theories of development and in parents’ interpretations of children’s behaviors. It would thus be reasonable to expect similar patterns of thinking in the interpretive frameworks used by professionals who work on a daily basis with young children. For mental health clinicians, theories serve to guide the interpretation of a complex reality, and thus to provide an intellectual structure for therapeutic intervention. The choice of modality for this intervention presumably bears a close relationship to the theoretical concepts employed in understanding the child, and therefore to the underlying interpretive metaphors. Study 2 investigated these relationships with the expectation that metaphoric preference as measured by the CBQ would be strongly related to professed theoretical orientation and therapeutic practice.

Method 45 clinicians employed at a major child psychiatry hospital unit and outpatient clinic in the Boston area were given a copy of the CBQ and asked to identify their

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area of professional training (psychiatry, psychology, or social work) and their theoretical orientation or specialty service. The orientations of the 33 questionnaires that were returned fell into three major groups. Thirteen respondents declared they followed a behaviorist or behavior modification approach, or were employed primarily on the Behavioral Medicine Unit or in a program for teaching parents behavior management techniques. Twelve respondents indicated a psychodynamic orientation and practiced or supervised individual psychotherapy. Seven respondents indicated they were involved in systemic family therapy or were employed on the family therapy team that was generally inspired by this approach. The final respondent indicated a ‘generalist’ approach and was not included in this analysis. It was predicted that the behaviorists would strongly prefer Mechanist interpretations on the CBQ, both compared to their preference for the other metaphors and when compared to other professionals. Respondents who followed a psychodynamic orientation were predicted to tend to choose Organicism, and those involved in systemic family therapy to prefer Contextualism. No systematic differences among the professional disciplines were expected or found; theoretical orientation varied widely within each group (6 psychiatrists, 19 psychologists, and 8 social workers).

Results Respondents’ theoretical orientations were in line with our predictions (multivariate F[8,52] = 8.02, p = 0.0001), and the orientation-metaphor relationships were effectively summarized by multidimensional scaling. The mean score on each metaphor was calculated for each group, and the resulting 3 × 4 matrix was subjected to correspondence analysis [Weller & Romney, 1990]. The two-dimensional solution is presented in figure 2. The close association of Organicism and psychodynamic practitioners is evident in the upper right of the figure, as are those between Mechanism and behaviorists (lower right), and between Contextualism and systemic family therapists (center left). Formism, with no particular affinity for any of these theoretical groups, lies in the neutral middle of the figure. Discriminant analysis demonstrates the strength of these associations. Mechanism, Organicism, and Contextualism each provided a significant contribution to the discriminant function (respective Fs[2,29] = 23.1, 9.80, and 10.48, p < 0.001). The Formism score was not utilized (F[2,29], p = 0.40). Overall, the apparent error rate was 13%, with correct classifications for all of the 7 family therapists, 9 of the 12 psychodynamically oriented therapists, and 11 of the 13 behaviorists. In addition to these group contrasts, it was also found that all therapists who espoused a behaviorist orientation scored highest on Mechanism (that is, for each individual, the Mechanism score is higher than his/her other three), and analysis of variance indicates their average Mechanism score is significantly greater than each of the other group’s (using Bonferroni’s conservative test for all pairwise contrasts, overall alpha set to 0.05). Similarly, clinicians of the psychodynamic persuasion are highest on Organicism, both in relation to their own other scores and compared to the other two groups, and the systemic family therapists are highest on Contextualism in both kinds of comparisons.

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Fig. 2. Correspondence Analysis of clinicians’ Child Behavior Questionnaire (CBQ)

scores (CAPITAL LETTERS) and theoretical orientation (lower case letters) (Study 2).

Intercorrelations of the four metaphor scores replicate the internal structure of the CBQ illustrated in figure 1. The peripheral correlations, clockwise from Formism-Mechanism, are –0.09, –0.11, –0.34, and –0.12; the diagonals, again, are significantly larger (–0.52 for Formism-Organicism, –0.68 for Mechanism-Contextualism). In summary, these results confirm the relationships suggested earlier between root metaphors and various formal theories of child behavior and their related therapeutic modalities. That this structure can be found in the thinking of professionals whose daily work involves acting upon their theories to intervene in the lives of children and families supports the view that the judgments reflected in CBQ scores are not transient, nor without consequence. Study 3: Root Metaphor Preferences among Dutch Mental Health Care Providers

As noted previously, the clinicians in study 2 were all employed at the same institution and were all primarily involved in therapeutic activities involving faceto-face interactions for at most a few hours a week with any one patient; the content of that therapy depended solely on the theoretical orientation of the clinician and thus there was strong overlap between professional beliefs and behaviors. Study 3, in contrast, concerns a more complex situation in a residential setting, where job demands range more broadly – from individual therapy to day-long group management – and where professionals of various theoretical orientations may carry out similar duties. Under these conditions, one can anticipate that the metaphoric models of choice might reflect the cognitive demands of daily functioning as well as differing theoretical orientations. This expectation is supported in part by the meta-

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phor and career choice analysis reported by Harris, Fontana, & Dowds [1977]: Using their original World Hypothesis Scale, they found that college students whose ideal occupation can be associated with a mechanical model, for example (such as business manager), scored higher than other students on Mechanism. Following this logic, three hypotheses can be formed for the mental health providers in study 3. First, for staff who are centrally involved in the daily management of potentially disruptive patients, a metaphor involving the Mechanism of regulating individual and group behavior should be attractive for its immediate practicality. Second, an organismic metaphor should be more appealing for professionals who focus on promoting the internal, psychological and educational growth of children or parents. Third, Formism should be a common root metaphor for clinicians whose duties center on diagnostic activities, that is the assignment of children’s symptom patterns to nosological categories. A concurrent association of occupational role and metaphoric preference could of course be the effect of selfselection as well as cognitive adaptation to the demands of work. Nevertheless, establishing such an association in a sample of child development professionals would further support the appropriateness of the metaphoric theory as applied to professional beliefs and practice. The primary goal of study 3, therefore, was to examine the effects of daily task demands, as well as theoretical orientation, on mental health care providers’ preferential use of the four root metaphors. The three hypotheses stated above are evaluated, as well as the three highlighted in study 2, namely preferred metaphors for those who espouse behavioral, systemic, and psychodynamic orientations. In addition, study 3 was designed to evaluate the power of the CBQ in a distinctly different cultural setting, still within the general Western traditions of philosophy. There is nothing particularly North American in Pepper’s theory, nor is there intended to be in the present adaptation of it. Thus, study 3 replicates and extends study 2 in a European setting, with a joint focus on professionals’ occupational tasks as well as their theoretical orientation.

Method 73 clinical staff at a day and residential child pyschiatric center in Leiden, The Netherlands, were recruited to fill out the CBQ. 55 completed questionnaires were returned. Discipline overlapped more closely with occupational role than was the case in study 2, and those groups with an adequate number of respondents for statistical analysis are: Psychologist (primarily involved in diagnosis), child psychiatrist (carrying out diagnosis and some therapy), group leader (child care worker responsible for daily management of patients), social worker (primarily involved in parent guidance), and orthopedagoog (a role that requires training comparable to a Master’s degree in developmental psychology, and at this institution has duties either in the residential unit or the school, as supervisor, teacher, and/or counselor). For statistical analysis, these roles were grouped into three task-demand groups: diagnosis (psychiatrist and psychologist), therapy/counseling (social worker and orthopedagoog), and child management (group leader). Theoretical orientations with an adequate number of respondents for analysis are behavioral, eclectic, psychoanalytic, and systemic family therapy.

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Fig. 3. Correspondence analysis of mental health workers’ Child Behavior Questionnaire (CBQ) scores (in CAPITAL LETTERS), theoretical orientation (lower case letters), and occupational role (italics) (Study 3).

Results Correspondence analysis was carried out using average metaphor scores by professional role and by theoretical orientation. The 2-dimensional solution is presented in figure 3. Compared to figure 2, Formism no longer lies in the neutral middle of the graph, as here it is relevant to the group differences. It is notable that with all four metaphors actively contributing to the structure, Formism (upper center) and Mechanism (lower right), the two analytic world views, are aligned orthogonally to Organicism and Contextualism, which are both synthetic. The placement accurately reflects the CBQ structure in this sample: the Formism-Mechanism and Contextualism-Organicism negative correlations, weak and on the periphery in the analysis of US parents’ root metaphor preferences (see fig. 2), are stronger in the Dutch sample at –0.41, and –0.63, which are about as great or greater than the ContextualismMechanism and Formism-Organicism diagonals (–0.50 and –0.32). Although it is sufficient theoretically that the four metaphors are arranged as orthogonal dimensions across the full space, it is intriguing that the analytic/synthetic contrast proves more salient here than the dispersive/integrative one. Perhaps the divergent role demands (e.g. analysis for diagnosis or for daily management) contribute to this shift,

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but it might also be influenced by subtle differences in the two versions of the CBQ (English and Dutch), or in cultural differences between the samples. Several important associations can be identified within this structure. With regard to occupational role, the responsibility of group leaders for the daily management of child behavior is reflected in their high Mechanism scores, even though fewer than one-third of them identified themselves as following a behavioral orientation. Staff who are developmentally trained as supervisors, teachers or counselors (orthopedagoog, labeled ‘counselor’ in figure 3) are especially Organismic, as are the social workers, who are involved with parent guidance. The average score for psychiatrists, who bear major responsibility for diagnosis, lies close to Formism. The psychologists, however, who are also involved in diagnosis, are represented more centrally, reflecting their professed eclecticism. As this implies, the placement of self-described theoretical orientations is also consistent with our analysis of root metaphors in theories of child development: those who identify themselves as behaviorist lie close to Mechanism, systemic close to Contextualism, dynamic closer to Organicism. All three predictions concerning task demand, based on occupational role, are confirmed: Diagnosticians were found to be significantly higher than others in their Formism score (t = 2.09, d.f. = 52, p = 0.04), teachers and counselors were higher on Organicism (t = 2.05, d.f. = 52, p = 0.04), and (marginally) group leaders were higher than others on Mechanism (t = 1.80, d.f. = 52, p = 0.07). In addition, two of the predictions based on theoretical orientation proved correct: Self-described followers of a systemic orientation scored higher than did others on Contextualism (t = 5.67, d.f. = 14.9, p < 0.0001), and behaviorists scored (marginally) higher on Mechanism (t = 1.92, d.f. = 52, p = 0.06). Psychodynamically respondents did not, however, score significantly higher on Organicism. In summary, the associations between the theoretical orientation of clinicians and their metaphoric preference for understanding child behavior as measured by the CBQ, were largely replicated here in a distinctly different cultural setting. In addition, predicted associations between CBQ scores and occupational role demands were confirmed in this sample of mental health care providers. Discussion and Conclusions

The results presented here support the hypothesis that Pepper’s metaphoric analysis of philosophical systems can be applied meaningfully to the cognitive systems used by both parents and professionals in interpreting children’s behavior. Indeed, Pepper’s four root metaphors prove so effective in organizing both formal theories and informal dispositions that it raises the question: To what degree are developmental theories just philosophical systems writ small? Their identity, if that be the case, may rest on the common cognitive process of deriving new knowledge through metaphorical extension of broad concepts that are successful in concrete or more familiar domains. This analogue theory of knowledge creation and use would apply equally to the process of scientific creativity and to routines of daily interaction with young children. Although the four root metaphors serve as a general basis for interpreting many different specific behaviors, they lack the content of ‘cultural models’ as that concept has been developed in psychological anthropology [see

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D’Andrade & Strauss, 1992; Holland & Quinn, 1987], or of ‘social representations’ as used in social psychological theory [e.g. Moscovici, 1984]. They are, in fact, metaphors, not theories. Nevertheless, it is evident that root metaphors are publicly available and shared constructs in Western society. The communication of these ways of thinking presumably takes place through a variety of channels, including informal, casual conversation among friends and neighbors as well as the formal dissemination of child rearing advice through public media. We have documented the individual negotiation of metaphoric models in the professional practice of pediatrics [Harkness, Super, Keefer, Raghavan, & Kipp-Campbell, 1996], and our own experience in the mental health context suggests that similar transactions take place during psychological interventions with children and families. The transmission of ideas between formal and informal theories is not unidirectional [Foucault, 1980], for an additional source of commonality between professional and popular models of the child is the individual scientist as member of a social group. LeVine [1980], among others, has commented that the origin of professional theories lies, in part, in the culturally based folk theories of the scientists who struggle to explore and evaluate in a systematic way their informal notions of children. ‘All empirical psychology’, he notes, ‘is folk theory to some degree, profoundly influenced by cultural assumptions that scientists share with non-scientists of the same background, and all folk psychology is empirical to some degree, embodying a folk wisdom effective in a specific milieu’ [LeVine, 1980, p. 77]. The origin of individual parents’ ethnotheories lies not only in the two public domains of informal discussion and formal transmission, but also in the private one of personal experience [Goodnow & Collins, 1990; Harkness, Super, & Keefer, 1992; Molinari & Emiliani, 1990]. The present studies document such effects of personal experience in the relationship of metaphoric preference to number of children and to education. More importantly, the framework presented here provides a way of understanding how individual differences exist and are organized within the larger social reality. Each of the four root metaphors is publicly represented in US and Dutch society, both in general and specifically with regard to interpreting children’s behavior. Each of them is especially useful for understanding certain kinds of phenomena and for acting on that understanding. The degree of which a parent or professional adopts one metaphor as a general model of child behavior would depend on their larger philosophy and on their history of exposure to particular patterns of behavior and behavior change, as well as their familiarity with specific professional interpretations. These patterns of exposure, in turn, are regulated in part by social forces associated with parenthood, peer group, and professional training. The congruence, or lack of it, between parents' understanding of their children, on the one hand, and the metaphoric base of therapeutic or educational interventions, on the other, may contribute to classic issues of patient dropout and effectiveness in mental health interventions. Finally, this work has implications for scholarship on developmental theory. Pepper’s four metaphors offer a simplifying scheme that is useful in highlighting similarities and differences among schools of thought. All major approaches in formal theory and clinical practice appear amenable to this analysis, and its organizational properties help understand the pattern of easy co-existence and potential conflict among various approaches. Rather than arguing that one or two perspectives offer the ‘best’ paradigm, which would lead us into the very dilemma Pepper

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was trying to understand, the present analysis suggests that each of the four root metaphors, when applied to developmental theory, captures especially well some important aspect of the enormously complex and abstract phenomenon of individual development in specific places and times. In this flexible overview – not really eclecticism as Pepper condemned it – theories of temperament and biologically based dispositions, learning theory, Eriksonian and Piagetian theories of internal growth, and the contextualism of existential psychology and life-course analyses all contribute special insights not easily available through the extension of other paradigms. The work reported here indicates that instead of looking for paradigm shifts to solve the contradictions in favor of one theory or another, we might better anticipate the continued refinement and maturing of scholarly traditions based on the four metaphoric understandings. Instead of wedding ourselves too strongly to the differences in world view, or, alternatively, ignoring them altogether, we can achieve a deeper and more practical appreciation of their strengths and limitations by recognizing their underlying metaphoric bases. Acknowledgments The authors are grateful to Frits Boer and participating staff at the Curium, Oegstgeest, The Netherlands; to participating staff at the Judge Baker Children’s Center, Boston, Mass.; to the pediatricians and participating parents at the Cambridge Center of the Harvard Community Health Plan, Cambridge, Mass.; and to Peter Stillman, who provided helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The work reported here was supported by grants from the Spencer Foundation and the National Science Foundation (award number BNS 8311084), and a Fulbright Senior Fellowhsip to the first author. All statements made and views expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors. References Allport, G.W. (1962). The general and the unique in psychological science. Journal of Personality, 30, 405–422. Altman, I., & Rogoff, B. (1987). World views in psychology and environmental psychology: Trait, interactional, organismic, and transactional perspectives. In D. Stokols & I. Altman (Eds.), Handbook of environmental psychology (pp. 7–40). New York: Wiley. American Psychiatric Association. (1987). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. Baltes, P.B., Reese, H.W., & Lipsitt, L.P. (1980). Life-span developmental psychology. Annual reviews of psychology, 31, 65–110. Boscolo, L., Cecchin, G., Hoffman, L., & Penn, P. (1987). Milan systemic family therapy: Conversations in theory and practice. New York: Basic Books. Brazelton, T.B. (1983). Infants and mothers. New York: Doubleday. Chess, S., & Thomas, A. (1984). Origins and evolution of behavior disorders. New York: Brunner/ Mazel. Chess, S., & Thomas, A. (1986). Temperament in clinical practice. New York: Guilford. Cooper, C.R. (1987). Conceptualizing research on adolescent development in the family: Four root metaphors. Journal of Adolescent Research, 2(3), 321–330. D’Andrade, R., & Strauss, C. (eds.). (1992). Human motives and cultural models. New York: Cambridge University Press. Dix, T.H., & Grusec, J.E. (1985). Parent attribution in the socialization of children. In I.E. Sigel (Ed.), Parental belief systems: The psychological consequences for children (pp. 201–234). Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. Elder, G.H., Jr. (1974). Children of the Great Depression. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Fisher, R.A. (1921). On the ‘probable error’ of a coefficient of correlation. Metron, 1, Part 4, 1–32. Cited in A.L. Edwards (1964), Statistical methods for the behavioral sciences. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston.

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