The Organization and Consequences of Social Pasts in Criminal Courts Author(s): Jeffery T. Ulmer Source: The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Summer, 1995), pp. 587-605 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Midwest Sociological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4120782 . Accessed: 28/03/2014 13:04 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
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THE ORGANIZATIONAND CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL PASTSIN CRIMINALCOURTS JefferyT. Ulmer*
PurdueUniversity
of KatovichandCouch's(1992)formaltheThisarticledemonstrates thecontributions of socialworldcontextsandprocessualorder ory of socialpaststo conceptualizations datafromthreecriminalcourts,I andobservational (Strauss1978;1993).Usinginterview features:(1) theorganization focuson theinterrelationship of twosocialworldcontextual of participants' socialpasts,and(2) thedegreeof ideologicalconsensusbetweenparticipantsin termsof sentencing goals. Thesetwo factorsinteractto influenceinterorganizain thethreecourts;and,in combination withindividual criminalcase tionalrelationships influenceactors'caseprocessingstrategies.Thearticleconcludesby discharacteristics, courtsandorganizaof theorganization of socialpastsin criminal cussingtheimplications of alternativeaction tional arenasin generalfor the availabilityand attractiveness in organizational decisionmaking.I of uncertainty as well as themanagement strategies, also suggestseveraldirections forfurtherresearch. An insistenceon takingtemporaldimensionsof social organizationseriouslyhas long been a key contributionof the symbolic interactionistperspective(Maines, Sugrue,and Katovich 1983). Two importanttreatmentsof temporalcontextsand social organizationare Katovich and Couch's (1992) theoryof social pasts and Strauss's(1993) processualordertheory'sconceptualizationof social worlds. My maingoal is to show how Katovichand Couch's conceptualizationof social pastscan augmentStrauss'sprocessualordertheoryby demonstratingthe importanceof sharedand commonpasts as a featureof social worlds. Using three criminal courts as examples of social worlds, I discuss the organizationand consequencesof social relationsand pasts, in connectionwith othersocial world dimensions,for interorganizational action strategiesof attorneysandjudges. SOCIAL PASTSAND SOCIALWORLDS As partof a formaltheoryof social processes,Katovichand Couch(1992) and Couch (1992) provide a sharp and focused conceptualizationof social pasts. They distinguishbetween shared and commonpasts, and describethe uses of these for the transactionof identitiesand situatedaction on the basis of these identities. Sharedand commonpasts are importantnot only in face-to-face interaction,but are also importantfeaturesof organizationalcontexts (Katovichand Couch 1992, p. 33): "Membersof complex organizationsroutinelyuse their commonand sharedpaststo bothstructuretheirinternalactivitiesandto structuretheiractivities to externalcontingencies." IN47907. of Sociology,1365StoneHall,Purdue to JefferyUlmer,Department WestLafayette, *Directall correspondence University, Volume36, Number3, pages587-605. TheSociological Quarterly, Society. Copyright? 1995by TheMidwestSociological in anyformrequested. All rightsof reproduction ISSN:0038-0253.
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Actors in a situationare said to have sharedpasts when they have engaged in situated transactionswith one anotherbefore, and these pasts "reflectthe mutualand simultaneous experienceof joint acts that are within 'restorablereach' of the interactors"(Katovichand Couch 1992, p. 27; see also Couch 1990, pp. 33-34). Accordingto Katovich,when actors drawupona sharedpast,they can quicklyplace one anotherin congruentfunctionalidentities, which involve the mutualimputationof behavioralexpectationsto projectthe close or distal futureactions of one another,and thus guide the interactionsat hand(see also Stone 1962). As Katovich(1986, p. 334) puts it, "Withthe establishmentof congruentfunctionalidentities the specific possibilities and limits of an interactionalencounterare presumedand acted upon." Among the types of congruentfunctionalidentitiesare interpersonalones, situating actors to interacton a personallevel, and/orcategoricalidentities,which situate actors to transactroles based on larger-scalestructuralcategories(cf., Stone 1977). Interpersonaland categoricalidentitiesarenot, of course,mutuallyexclusive-a situationalencountercan entail the transactionof both simultaneously:for example,an encountermightproceedprimarilyon the basis of interpersonalidentities,with categoricalidentitiesas a social structuralbackdrop. On the basis of congruentinterpersonalidentities,sharedpasts also enableactorsto project complex joint futures--to predictone another'sbehaviorand manageuncertaintyin future interactions(Couch 1990, pp. 42-43). Whenactorshave previouslytransactedcongruentinterpersonalidentitiesand constructedjoint acts together,theirsharedpast makescurrentconstructionof acts easier because each can draw on their previouslytransactedinterpersonal identitiesand the expectationsfor the presentand futurethey mobilize (Couch 1990, p. 34). Accordingto Couch (1992, p. 129): "Sharedpasts allow people to instantaneouslyactivate complex forms of sociationthe momentcopresenceand mutualrecognitionis established." Sharedpasts vary in robustness,from brief priorinstrumentalencountersto lengthy,close, personalrelationships.The more robustthe sharedpast, the easier and quickeractors can place one anotherin congruentinterpersonalidentitiesand constructactionstrategies,such as cooperation,negotiation,or conflict (Katovichand Couch 1992). By contrast,commonpasts reflect"theindependentexperienceof similarjoint acts in differentcontexts"(KatovichandCouch 1992,p. 27). Commonpastsinvolve: (1) mutualplacement in categorical(ratherthan interpersonal)identities,cued by such things as situational settingsor frames(Goffman1974), titles, demeanor,language,and so on, (2) actorsmobilizing common stocks of knowledge(Schutz and Luckmann1973) that are implicitlymutually held, such as implied objective pasts (Maines et al. 1983), and (3) predictingeach others' behaviorand projectingfuturesituationalcontingenciesbasedon expectationsor typifications (Bergerand Luckmann1967) associatedwith the categoricalidentitiesand/orimpliedobjective pasts (Katovich 1986, pp. 339-341). Katovichdescribesthe importanceof categorical identitiesin bureaucraticorganizationalarenas: and activatingcategoricalidentitiesfreesactorsto relatewithinspecified Announcing and andone "formal" them... In the thousand thatsimultaneously constrain boundaries and our we in of as members encounters collectively categories, organizations daily engage andtheirrelationship to the senseof the structural background agreeduponappearance maze. easeus through(andas Weberargued,lockus into)thebureaucratic Whenactorslack sharedpastsbut have participatedin similaractivitiesin differentsettings and with differentpeople before,commonpastscan also be used to manageuncertaintyin the
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constructionof presentjoint action(Katovichand Couch 1992, p. 34-35; Couch 1992). The use of commonpasts is most typicalin, butnot limitedto, short-livedinstrumentalencounters. Commonpasts can thus be seen as abstractionsof experiencesthat actorsostensiblyhold in common. This allows strangersto transactcategoricalidentities,assess actionstrategiesbased on behavioralexpectationsmobilizedby these identities,and constructacts (negotiation,manipulation,conflict,etc) morequicklythanactorswho lack such commonbackgrounds.Thus, the transactionof categoricalidentitiesandmobilizationof commonpastsis an importantway in which larger-scalemacro- and mesostructuralarrangementsbecome operative at the microlevel of face-to-faceinteraction,and a way in which microlevel encountersenact and reproducelarger-scalearrangements(Maines 1982). Katovich and Couch's (1992) conceptualizationof social pasts can extend and refine processual order theory's conceptualizationof the temporaldimensions of social worlds. With concepts such as trajectories,biography and identity processes, and social world processes, Strauss's(1993; 1978) processualorderperspectivestronglyemphasizesthe embeddednessof social interactionprocessesin multilayeredcontexts, includingtemporalones (Clarke1991), andthe notionof sharedandcommonpastscan augmentthese concepts. Studies of hospitals (Strauss,Schatzman,Bucher, Erlich, and Sabshin 1963), prisons (Thomas 1984), science (Clarkeand Fujimura1992) art worlds (Becker 1982), and other arenas of social organization(see Maines and Charlton1985) have illustratedthe dialecticalinterrelationshipsbetweeninteractionprocesses,social structures,andtemporalcontextsat the micro-, meso-, and macrolevel(Hall 1987). Strauss(1978; 1993) posits thatthe organizationof arena participants'past interactionswith one anothercan have importantconsequencesfor the types of action strategiesselected by participants(e.g., unilateralmanipulation,negotiation,conflict) and theirconsequences. Intermsof negotiativestrategies,for example,Strauss(1978, p. 238) implies the importanceof social pasts as a featureof negotiationcontextswhen he discusses whethernegotiationsare"one-shot,repeated,serial,multiple,or linkedto othernegotiations." Further,Strauss(1993, pp. 90-91; see also Bergerand Luckmann1967) emphasizes that sharedperspectives,stocks of knowledge, and repertoiresof routinizedaction develop throughpeople interactingtogetherover time and can be transferredto othersthroughcommunication. Using the example of criminalcourts as social worlds, this article augments conceptualizationsof the contextualdimensionsof action set by social worlds by applying Katovichand Couch's (1992) formalconceptualizationof social pasts.
Court Communitiesas Social Worlds The researchof Eisensteinand associates (Eisensteinand Jacob 1977; Eisenstein, Flemming, andNardulli1988;Flemming,Nardulli,andEisenstein1992) depictscourtsthroughthe metaphorof court communitiesbased on members' sharedworkplace,loose coupling (see also Hagan,Hewitt,and Alwin 1979) and yet interdependencebetweenkey sponsoringagencies (prosecutors'office, judges' bench, defense bar). Courtsas communitiesexhibit local legal culturesencompassingtraditions,informalnorms,actorreputations,and grapevinecommunicationnetworks. Courtscan thusbe seen as social worlds,or communitiesof action and communication(see Ulmer 1994b;Eisensteinet al. 1988). Courtcommunitiesare particularlyappropriatedomainsto investigatethe organizationand consequencesof social pastsas dimensionsof social worldsin thatsocial pasts can potentially relationsbetweensponsoringagencies and,therefore,the availainfluenceinterorganizational action strategies. For example, Eisenstein and Jacob of different and attractiveness bility
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(1977, pp. 61, 244) imply that courtroomworkgroupswith robust sharedpasts-in which membershipis more stableand membersaremorefamiliar-will tendto have strongerinformal case processingand sentencingnorms("goingrates")than workgroupswith less robust sharedpasts. This in turnis said to makefrequentplea bargaining(i.e., a negotiativestrategy) easier and more cooperative,ratherthanunilateraldecision-makingstrategies(such as "open pleas" where the defendantpleads guilty withoutan explicit bargainedagreementbetween counsel) or adversarialstrategies(such as trials),both of which can predominateunderconditions of workgroupinstabilityand unfamiliarity.While Eisensteinand associates'treatment of courtcommunitiesdoes not addresspossible uses of commonpasts, it is likely that these are also importantin court communitiesby providingcategoricalidentities and stocks of knowledge with which participantscan project futures and manage uncertaintyin case processing,even when they lack robustsharedpasts. Further,the focal activitiesof criminalcourts,especially sentencing,are the potentialsite for considerableideologicalcontroversies.Especiallyinjurisdictionswherejudges andprosecutorsare publiclyelected (such as Pennsylvania),courtactivitiesand interorganizational relations are inherentlypolitical, and sentencingideologies are likely to be highly important issues in court communitypolitics (see Stumpf 1988; Altheide 1992). Therefore,the influence of a courtcommunity'ssocial pasts-particularly sharedpasts-might differ according to anotherdimensionof social worlds, ideologicalconsensus/conflict,in this case regarding dominantsentencinggoals (e.g., deterrence,incapacitation,retribution,or rehabilitation[see Savelsberg1994]). Of course,ideologicalconsensusand social pastscan be intertwined.For example, ideological consensus' can be a productof either sharedpasts of negotiationor cooperativeproblemsolving, commonpasts of adjustmentto similarproblematicsituations and developmentof similarperspectives(Becker 1964), or commonpasts of similarprofessional trainingor backgroundsocialization. I presentdata from three Pennsylvaniacriminalcourtsto focus on two contextualdimensions: (1) the organizationof social pasts among court participants,and (2) the degree of consensus between participantsregardingsentencingideologies, as these factors interactto influencecourtinterorganizational relations. I thendelineatethe combinedinfluenceon case of these two in features, combinationwith a thirdcontextualdimension--characprocessing teristics of individualcriminalcases. These three court context factors correspondrespectively to threedimensionsof social worldsidentifiedby Strauss(1993; 1978, p. 238): (1) the temporalityof interaction(social pasts), (2) the ideologies and perspectivesof participants, and (3) the complexityof issues involved. DATA I drawon datagatheredby myself andthreeassociatesfromthe springof 1991 to the summer of 1993 as partof a largermultimethodstudyevaluatingPennsylvania'ssentencingguidelines and investigatingsourcesof sentencingdisparity(see Ulmer 1993; 1994b). My analysiscomparingthreedifferent-sizedcountytrialcourts(identifiedby the pseudonymsMetro,Rich,and Southwest)is based on multiple,open-ended,semistructuredinterviewsas follows: sevenpublicdefenders, MetroCounty:sevencriminalcourtjudges,sevenprosecutors, fourprivatedefenseattorneys, andfourprobation officers(29 totalinterviews)
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RichCounty:all six criminal courtjudges,fiveprosecutors, fourdefenseattorneys (twoof these also workedas part-time officers(19 total and fourprobation publicdefenders), interviews) SouthwestCounty:all threecriminalcourtjudges,two prosecutors, two public/private in chargeof criminal defenseattorneys, fourprobation officers,andthecourtadministrator case processing. In Metro's large metropolitancourthouse,we could not interviewall participants.We therefore purposivelysampledactorsfor interviewsbasedon theircaseloadcharacteristics,centrality to routinecase processingactivities,and variationsin length of time workedin the court. Nearly all interviewswere tape-recordedand transcribedin full. Among otherdetails, these interviews focused on sponsoringagency organizationand relations,participants'interpersonal relations,case processingstrategies,political contexts, and sentencingideologies. In addition,I drawuponfield datafromall threecourts,such as observationsof guilty plea and sentencinghearings,bench andjury trials, and informalconversationswith participants. My analysisis also informedby analysisof convictionand sentencingstatisticsfromthe three counties,2 althoughthese are not discussedin detail here (for a fuller analysis of statistical datafromthe threecounties,see Ulmer 1993). These two sourcesof dataprovidesupplementary informationon organizationalarrangements,routinecase processingactivities, and sentencing patterns. SOCIAL PASTSIN THREECOUNTY COURTS My analysishighlightstwo dimensionsof the social worldsof the threecourts: (1) the robustness of sharedpasts and/orthe use of commonpastsamongparticipants,and (2) the degree of ideological consensusregardingsentencinggoals. These dimensionsin turncombine with a thirdsocial world contextualdimension,that of actors' definitionsof individualcase characteristics (e.g., case severity, evidence strength,characteristicsof defendants,Sudnow 1965; Albonetti1991) to influencecase processingstrategies,in particularthose identifiedby Eisenstein and Jacob(1977; i.e., plea negotiation,unilateraldecisions,adversarialstrategies). SuburbanaffluentRich Countyand ruralSouthwestCountyillustratedifferentconsequencesof sharedpasts, conditionedby differingdegrees of ideological consensus and/orconflict over sentencinggoals. LargeurbanMetroCounty'scourt,which like Rich's also exhibitedconsiderableideologicalconsensusregardingsentencinggoals, illustratesimportantuses of common pasts to reduce uncertaintyin case decisions and courthouseinteraction. Social Pasts and Sponsoring Agency Organization The three courtcommunitiesdifferedin the numberof centralparticipantsand the robustness of sharedpasts, as indicatedby the membershipstabilityand familiaritybetweenrepresentativesof the three key sponsoringagencies. MetroCounty's highly bureacraticDistrict Attorney's(DA's) office employeda very largestaff of young, relativelyinexperiencedassistant attorneys(ADAs), with high staff turnover(ADAs usually moved to privatepracticeor positions in otherjurisdictionsafter one or two years). Overall, the defense bar exhibited greatermembershipstabilitythanthe DA's office, althoughmembersof the public defender's office (who handledthe largemajorityof cases) variedwidely in theirlength of work experience in the court community. Less experiencedpublic defenders(PDs) relied mostly on grapevinereputationsfor their knowledge of judges' attitudesand sentencingpreferences,
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while a handfulof long-timeprivateattorneysand PDs had developedextensive familiarity with individualjudges throughprior face-to-facecourtroomexperience. The Metro bench was the most stable(andpowerful)sponsoringagency,since the majorityof judges hadoccupied the benchfor at least five yearsand severalfor over ten years. Further,manyjudges had previouslyworkedin the courtcommunityas public and/orprivatedefense attorneys. In general,routineinteractionsbetweenPDs andADAs were anonymousandtruncated.In additionto the high turnoverin the DA's office, two other factorscontributedto such anonymity. First,the sheernumberof ADAs (roughlyseventy) and defense attorneys(over fifty PDs and dozens of privateattorneys)militatedagainstthe developmentof robustsharedpasts between most ADAs and defenders. Second,becauseof high case volume and the necessity to process cases quickly to avoid a backlog, in routine cases the two groups of attorneys generallylackedthe time for extensiveface-to-faceinteractions,such as plea negotiation. For example,both ADAs andPDs typicallydid not attendto routinecases untilthe morningof the day cases were scheduledfor trial, leaving little if any time for explicit face-to-face plea bargaining.Finally,the administrative judge assignedcases to the twenty-fivecriminalcourt in a semirandom and neither manner, judges judges nor PDs specializedin the types of cases handled. This method of case they assignmentlargely preventedprosecutoror defender DAs or defenders "judgeshopping"(i.e., steeringcases to favoredjudges, such as those witha for harshness or reputation leniency [Flemminget al. 1992, pp. 182-189]) and formationof stable courtroomworkgroups,such as those describedby Eisensteinand Jacob(1977) in Chicago's courts. Thus, comparedto the othercourts,Metro'sprosecutorsand defense attorneys in particularexhibitedmuch less robustsharedpasts. As discussedlater,however,these two groups of attorneysdrew upon common pasts derived from common work experiencesof applyingformalrules (i.e., sentencingguidelines)andparticipationin grapevinecommunication networks. Rich County's court communitymembersexhibitedmuch more robust sharedpasts than Metro,with extensivepersonal,professional,andpoliticalcommitmentsgoing back for many years between membersof the DA's office, bench, and defense bar. Members'interactions with each otherwere primarilyon the basis of interpersonalidentities,againstthe moreformal structuralbackdropof the categoricalidentitiesgiven by their formaljob titles. Most of the major players in this medium-sizedsuburbancourt communityshared social relationships outside the courthouse,playinggolf at the same clubs, attendingthe same social events, and participatingin activities with the county's powerfulRepublicanParty.3 Not only did the DA's office, public and privatedefense bar, andjudges' bench exhibit greaterstabilitythan Metro,the three sponsoringagencies also exchangedpersonnelperiodically,in a patterndescribedas "incestuous"by one privatedefense attorney. For example,in contrastto Metro's dominantbench, the DA's office was the centerof political power and a stepping-stoneto careeradvancementin the courtcommunity. Eachof the six criminalcourtjudges had either servedas chief or assistantchief DA beforebeing electedto the bench. In fact, while serving as chief DA twelve yearsearlier,the currentpresidentjudge hadhiredthe currentchief DA as an assistantprosecutor.Anothercurrentjudge had also servedas chief DA and had hiredthe currentchief PD as an assistantprosecutor.Further,membersof the DA's and PD's offices often crossed back and forth between the two sponsoringagencies. A defense attorneydescribedhow personalfamiliaritybetweencourtactorsinfluencedcase processingandsentencing. "I know all the judges, and some are close personalfriends. You may appearin frontof
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a judge that you're especially friendly with, and that judge is going to give you a break sometimes. It's not generallyfor the client, it's for the lawyer." Rural SouthwestCounty's small numberof court communityparticipants,together with their mutualexperiencein othercapacities,allowed considerableinterpersonalfamiliarityin and out of the courtroom.Thus, as in Rich County,court communityparticipantsin Southwest interactedprimarilyon the basis of interpersonalidentitiesagainstthe backdropof their categoricalidentitiesof judge, prosecutor,as do on. Two of the threejudges had had long careersas defense attorneysin the county, and the thirdjudge had been a former county solicitor. One of the threejudges describedthe familiarityand cohesionof the small bench in SouthwestCounty: "Thereis a real camaraderiebetweenus. We all have our strengthsand weaknesses,and we all have very differentpersonalities.But it's nice because we can draw on each other's strengthsand sort of help each other out with our weaknesses." In theirrespectivecapacities,eachjudge hadworkedwith the chief DA extensivelyover his eight years in office and also with the chief PD and his fourrelativelyyoung part-timeassistants. An atmosphereof familiarinformalitypermeatedmuch of court communitylife, as interviewsand courthouseobservationshowed. Forexample,the threejudges coordinatedthe docket schedule and other administrativemattersover breakfasteach week, and one judge handledtwo-thirdsof all criminalcases on one day each week during"accelerated" guilty plea hearingsdesignedto avoid docketbacklogs. In contrastto the othertwo courts,routinecourtroom proceduresin Southwestlargely dispensedwith legalistic trappingsand formality,and participantsoften referredto each otherby first names even in court. In sum, the comparatively small numberof judges and regularattorneysin SouthwestCounty exhibitedrobust sharedpasts.
Sentencing Ideologies and InterorganizationalRelations Importantly,the consequencesof the social pasts of courtparticipantsdifferedin relationto anothersocial world contextualdimension: the degree of ideological consensus regarding sentencing goals. In particular,the role of robust sharedpasts differedbetween Rich and Southwestdue to high consensusabout sentencinggoals in Rich and deep (and politicized) conflictaboutsuch goals in Southwest. In Metro,a lack of political conflictaboutsentencing relations, goals was one factor facilitatingsmooth,efficient,bureaucraticinterorganizational which in turnfacilitatedthe mobilizationof congruentcategoricalidentitiesand use of stocks of knowledgefrom commonpasts (discussedlater). In MetroCounty,all but one of the criminalcourtjudges were Democrats,and manywere formerdefense attorneys.Onejudge articulatedthe Metrobench's characteristicemphasison not only "justdeserts"(von Hirsch1976) for violent offendersbut also opportunitiesfor rehabilitationfor propertyor small-timedrug offenders: Peoplewho steallike fouror five dollarsworthof stufffromthe grocerystore,or are withintentto deliver,one or two monthsin jail chargedwithpossessionof marijuana It will doesn'tdo thatpersonanygood. makeyouloseyourjob andyourplacein society. I wouldn'tgive anybodya monthor twoin jail. Butit's differentif it's violence,whatI andhitthemin the deemsenselessviolence."Theyweresleeping,whydidyougo upstairs head?Therewasno reasonto do that!"I alwaysconsiderthenatureof theoffense,the in general...A lotof it is therehabilidefendant's andattitude priorrecord,theircharacter tativepotentialof thedefendant.
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Most PDs and "courthouseregular"privateattorneyshad developeda trustof judges through both common pasts of learningjudges' grapevinereputations(primarilyamong less experienced attorneys)and sometimessharedpastsof face-to-facecourtroominteraction(primarily amongmoreexperiencedattorneys).A PD with nearlytwenty-fiveyears of experiencein the court stated: Becausea lot of them[judges]areformerdefenseattorneys, or havebeenon thebencha longtime,we knowprettywellthewaythey'rethinking...eitherbecauseyou'vehandled caseswiththembeforeoryou'vetalkedto someonethathas... So there'sa lotof "leaveit to thejudge"attitudes, it's betterto leaveit to thejudge... becauseyouknowyou'llcome outall right. Defense attorneysdescribedthe chief DA (also a Democrat)and his staff as "liberal"and "practical."In contrastto the DA's offices in the othertwo counties,most MetroADAs did not disparagerehabilitationas a sentencinggoal, downplayedthe importanceof deterrence and incapacitation,and were usually willing to implicitlyor explicitly sacrificemore severe sentencesfor quick and easy guilty pleas in routinecases. Membersof Rich County's court communitywere invariablymembersof the county's dominantRepublicanParty. In fact, one illustrativestory in the courtcommunity'slore concerneda new PD who refusedto changepartiesfromDemocratto Republicanandwas subsequently fired. In addition to the close personal and professionalties, court community members(includingmost defenseattorneys)sharedan adherenceto a "gettough"approachto sentencingemphasizingpunishmentand deterrenceas primarygoals. For example, a Rich Countypublic defenderstated: "I put a lot of people away when I was in the DA's office, at high rates of conviction. And the personalside of me still believes in that. Sentenceshave gotten tougher,and professionallyI don't like it but personallyI do." A Rich Countyjudge noted: "I know some countiesjust bringin people and send them out just to get rid of the numbersand say, 'Hey, we disposedof 1,000 cases this month.' Well sure, everybodygets probation!That doesn't accomplishanything. There'sno deterrence,no moralcommunication as to the wrongfulnessof the conduct.'4 Adversarialencounterswere rareandconsidered disruptive. As a Rich Countyprosecutorsaid, "You know the defense attorney,he knows you, so you get a lot of (negotiated)pleasjust becausethe defense attorneyknows you won't make a mistake." As anotherexample,appealsof sentenceswere very rare(in markedcontrastto SouthwestCounty). Perceivedexcesses in prosecutorialzeal5 and especiallydefendant advocacytendedto ruffle feathersand incurpotentialfuturecosts for cases and careers. Forexample,a defenseattorneycautionedagainstsouringpersonalrelationswith prosecutors: "Therewas anotherdefense lawyeraroundhere that went out of businesspracticingcriminal law because he was such a miserablecur. He found himself going to trial on every case becausehe could neverget a deal with anybodybecausehe was such a rottenperson. Hejust didn't play the game very well." Rich Countyactors' robustsharedpasts, along with their ideological agreement,provideda foundationfor a negotiatedorder that encouragedcase processingmethodsmaximizingcooperativenegotiationand maintaininga traditionof tough sentencing. In contrastto Rich, the robustsharedpasts betweenthe SouthwestDA's office and bench includedmany past disagreementsaboutsentencingand laid the basis for protractedconflict in and out of the courthouse. As the judge in charge of the managingthe criminaldocket
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described: "We have a DA's office here that hates the fact that we don't have summary executions... We've had a runningfeud ever since I came on the bench." Anotherjudge relatedthe story of a past case in'which the DA's actions particularlyrankledthe bench: on and Thiscase withJudgeX-a teachertoucheda girl'sprivateswithherunderwear to a pleaagreement-andshe[JudgeX] really JudgeX gavehim90 daysinjail according aboutthe sentence! got in hotwaterwiththe localmedia...becausethe DA complained it. .. She'snot Thatwasoneof herfirstcasesas a judge,andtheyhaven'teverforgotten knowJudgeX about bitter She's from now. that ten shake to it...I pretty years going asideandsay,"Comein here,youdummy!That wouldhavelovedto takethosereporters notby theassistantbutby theDA himselfl"6 was a pleaagreement, negotiated Over time, a coalition betweenjudges and PDs developed out of a sharedpast of mutual participationin strategiesof bypassingthe chief DA's severe chargingpracticesand harsh sentencing recommendationsby open pleas to state guideline sentences (discussed later), which were used to legitimatemore lenient sanctions. A PD describedthis process: "This court[thejudges]just keeps gettingbetterand betterfor us. .. Because these DAs, who have neverbeen defense attorneys,are out of control. They have these hardenedattitudes."While Rich County illustratesthat robustsharedpasts can provide the basis for easier negotiation and cooperationunderconditionsof greaterideologicalconsensus,Southwestshows that robust sharedpasts can also providethe basis for conflictivestrategiesand interorganizational segmentationsand coalitionsunderconditionsof ideological conflict.
Case ProcessingStrategies The organizationof social pastsin the courtcommunities,in combinationwith the character of interorganizational relations,in turninfluencedthe dominantstocks of knowledgefor uncertaintyreductionin strategiesfor processingroutineand problematiccases. Actors' definitions of case characteristicsconstitutea thirdcontextualdimension. Courtactorstend to view cases on a continuumof routine"normalcrimes"and"normaldefendants"versusproblematic cases that presentanomaliesin deciding how to handle them (Sudnow 1965). These data, alongwith priorcourtresearch(EisensteinandJacob 1977;FarrellandHolmes 1991), suggest thatcase characteristicsinfluencingwhethera case is viewed as relativelyroutineor problematic typicallyinclude(1) evidencestrengthor weakness,(2) the severityof the offense andthe severityof the potentialsentence,and(3) perceptionsof defendantcharacteristics,both legally prescribedones such as priorcriminalrecord,and extra-legalones such as demeanor,race, gender,age, employmentstatus,and family stability. Further,each of these threesets of case factorscan influencecourtactors'perceptionsof the dangerousness,blameworthiness,or rehabilitativepotentialof defendants(see Emmelman1994; Farrelland Holmes 1991; Steffensmeier, Kramer,and Streifel 1993). Thoughbeyond the scope of this article, statisticaland qualitativedatafromthese threecountiesshow importantextra-legalsentencingdifferencescontrollingfor offense type/severity,priorrecordand other legal and court contextualfactors-in that whites receive more lenient sentencesthan AfricanAmericans,women receive more lenient sentencesthan men, and those who are convictedby trial receive much stiffer sentencesthan those who plead guilty (see Ulmer 1993; 1994b). These kinds of extra-legal sentencingdifferencesare particularlypronouncedin Rich County.
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Rich County'sextensivesharedpastsplus ideologicalconsensusfostereda negotiatedorder of collegial bargainingand informal,tough"goingrates"sentencingnormsthatencompassed the above legal and extra-legal,formaland informalconsiderations.These local normswere developed over years of negotiationbetweenparticipantsand were their primarysource of uncertaintyreductionin routinecase negotiationand decision making (cf., Eisensteinet al. 1988; Flemminget al. 1992). As a PD explained: "I know that when I'm walking in, in a situationsimilarto someoneelse, I'm not walkingout with a worse deal thanthe otherguy. If that's the best deal they'll [DA's office] give me, that's fine. As long as the next guy behind me doesn't get a betterdeal." A Rich Countyprosecutoralso describedthe court community's strong informalplea bargainingnorms: "Call the case for what it's worth. A good prosecutor,a good defenseattorney,if they sit down they can counta case withintwo months of what it shouldbe. It's like selling cars!" This negotiatedorderof informalgoing rateswas so strongthatit often supersededthe state'ssentencingguidelines. Thatis, locally developed sentencingstandardsbased in the sharedpasts of cooperativenegotiationand agreementon ideological goals providedrules for plea bargainingand sentencingdecisions that were seen as superiorto externallydeveloped and legitimatedstate sentencingpolicy. The sentencing guidelineswere merely supplementalto the court's informalsentencingnormsand traditions in processingroutinecases, as a Rich Countyjudge stated: "Whatthe guidelinesareis a place to say, 'Okay, where do we start.' You look at it and say, 'that'snot too bad,' or 'that'snot enough.' And in a plea bargainingsituation,they arenot the firstorderof reference. All in all I don't thinkthey've had too much effect here." As other analyses of these data show (Ulmer 1993), the informalsentencingnorms and traditionsin Rich Countytendedto significantlydisadvantageAfricanAmericandefendants, particularlyyoungblackmale defendantsfromthe metropolitanareaadjacentto Rich County, in decisions regardingprobation,county jail, and state prison sentences. The sentencing guidelines,a state policy intendedto reducesuch race, gender,and otherextra-legaldisparities, were often only influentialin moreproblematiccases whereparticipantsagreedthatthe local "goingrates"could not easily be applied. The situationin Rich Countythus illustrates the importantpoint that sharedpasts based in personalrelationshipscan subvertexternally constructedand imposedpolicies. While plea negotiationwas the bread-and-butter strategyfor routinecase processingin Rich more cases were resolved County, problematic typically throughopen pleas, wheredefendants before a without a pleaded guilty formallynegotiatedplea bargain(82 percentof all judge Rich Countyconvictionswere negotiatedplea agreements,as opposedto roughly 15 percent open guilty pleas and 3 percentbenchandjurytrials). In contrastto Metro(discussedbelow), Rich County's open plea strategiesreflectedparticipants'sharedpasts and tacit understandings geared toward mutual protectionand face-saving, as this quote from the chief DA illustrates: different aboutit andneedssomethoughtor Openpleashappenwhena casehassomething review... Youhavea defenseattorney whowantsprobation, a departure belowguidelines. Youfeelyoucan'tagreeto that,butyouwantto givethedefensetheopportunity to sellhis caseto thejudge. Thatmightbejustenoughto makehimpleadguilty. So yousay,"we will standupandmakeno recommendation." Nowthejudgehascompletefreedomto do whathe wants.Andhe doesn'tmind,becausehe knowswe'renotgoingto go outin the hallandcomplainthatthejudgewaslenient.
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Thus, even Rich's open plea strategies,which would seem to primarilyinvolve unilateral decision making,actuallyinvolved tacit negotiationsbased on implicit expectationsderived frompast face-to-faceexperiencewith the same participantsin similarproblematicsituations. Overallthen, participants'sharedpasts and ideologicalconsensus facilitatedcooperativenegotiationas the dominantstrategyfor both routineand more problematiccases. In Metro,ADAs and defense attorneyslargely lacked robustsharedpasts in dealing with each other. However, common pasts of learningand applying stocks of knowledge about sentencingguidelines,judges' reputations,and the knowledgeof the courts' bureaucraticorder serveduncertaintyreductionpurposessimilarto the robustsharedpasts betweenDAs and defendersin Rich County. Experiencein using the statesentencingguidelinesand knowledge of judges' grapevinereputationsprovidedcommonpasts thatboth sets of attorneyscould use to reduceuncertaintyin theirbrief interactionswith each other. By drawingupon these two stocks of knowledge,and by mutuallyassumingthat one anotherpossessed these stocks of knowledge,prosecutorsand defenderswho were relativelyunfamiliarwith each other could place one anotherin congruentcategoricalidentities and predicteach other's likely guilty plea strategiesand sentencingoptions. Similarly,when ADAs or defenderslackedpriorexperience beforejudges, they relied heavily on the "menu"of sentencesprovidedby the guidelines and on judges' grapevinereputationsof how they tended to sentence in terms of the guidelinesin variouscircumstances. Actors' abilities to draw on these commonpasts fosteredunilateraldecision making as a dominantcase processingstrategyin Metro County. In contrastto Rich, negotiatedguilty pleas accountedfor only 20 percentof convictionsin MetroCounty,while open guilty pleas made up 70 percent. A more importantcontrastto Rich is that MetroCounty's open pleas actuallyrepresentedunilateraldecisions on the part of defenders,prosecutors,and judges. The charges were typically decided upon unilaterallyby the ADA throughconsulting the sentencing guidelines, without negotiatingwith defenders. Most judges unilaterallygave sentencesat the bottomof or below the guidelinesas a rewardfor pleadingguilty in routine cases, often regardlessof whethertherewas a negotiatedplea agreement.7In describingthe informationused in makingunilateralopenplea decisions,a MetroPD said: "There'sa whole list of types of cases thatyou know will more than likely be probation,no matterwhat. And your knowledgeof this is based prettymuch on the guidelines. We also know what will fly and what won't in certainjudges' courtrooms.You get to know the differentjudges' reputations." A MetroADA describeda similaruse of sentencingguidelinesandjudges' grapevine reputationsin their unilateralchargingdecisons: I bringoutthislittlegraybook[guidelines manual]andI openit up andI say thatI can of thiscrimeandhe hasthispriorrecordso thisnumber convictthedefendant youputon the charthereandthisnumberoverhereandthisis whathe is goingto get. Moreand more,the longerI havebeenhere,theguidelineshavebecomea crutch.I don'thaveto worryaboutanything. Metro County attorneys,lacking Rich County's robust sharedpasts and the accompanying traditionsand norms, relied on common pasts of working with sentencing guidelines and dealingwith the diverse styles and preferencesof the county's powerfuljudges in unilateral case processingdecisions. These commonpastsinvolvedmutualplacementin congruentcategoricalidentitiesthatpresupposedone another'spossessionof such stocks of knowledge. In
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routinecases, unilateralchargingdecisionsthatmaximizedthe probabilityof a fast open plea to a sentencewithin the guidelineswere often the most attractivestrategyfor ADAs. As the above quotefromthe PD illustrates,unilateraldecisionsin favorof open guiltypleas basedon the predictionthatthejudge would almostautomaticallygive a discountedsentencewas often the most attractivestrategyfor defense attorneys.In moreproblematiccases thatwere "really worththe effort,"as one privateattorneyput it, defenderswould attemptto negotiatea plea agreementwith the ADA. As a PD described: "On more serious cases, or ones with problems,I will talk with the DA aboutthe case and aboutany possible deals we can reach. Try to have it hammeredout before the day of the trial. You know that it will be a little tougherto negotiate,though." As anotherPD described,the relativeanonymityand inexperience of many ADAs presenteddifficultiesin plea negotiation: "You know, it is only the experiencedADA who can go with the facts of the case and make a reasonabledecision. So becausethey have such a young staff, you can't reallywork deals with them..,. it's not like if you have someone you've worked with for a long time... Sometimesyou have nothingto work with, you might as well go to trial." In such cases, however,defenderscouldalso opt for anotherunilateraldecisionstrategy-a bench trial-in hopes of leniency from the judge. As an experiencedPD described: Mostjudges,you'reneverafraidto takea benchtrialto, becauseyou knowyou'llcome outall right.Youjustgo in andmakeyourcaseandtheygiveyoua decisionrightthen. a caseandwon't TheDA'srarelymakea stinkaboutit... likewhenthepoliceovercharge fortheguy,things lessbecausethey'vegota hard-on let theDA'sofficechargesomething likethatis whena benchtrialis useful. The Southwestcontext includedrobust sharedpasts of ideological conflict between the Southwestjudges and DA's office, thus illustratingthat sharedpasts can not only facilitate cooperationand collegiality(as in Rich) butalso can mobilizeconflictivestrategiesand coalition formation. Here, the judges used the guidelinesas a scheduleof sentencingrewardsfor defenderswho convinced their clients to enter fast (usually open) guilty pleas, and as an externallylegitimatedset of standardsfor less severe sentencingthanthe DA's office wanted. stoodin starkcontrastto Rich's due to the ideologSouthwest'scase processingarrangements ical conflictover sentencingbetweenjudges and defenseattorneys,on one hand,andprosecutors on the other. In more problematiccases, the DA's office and defenders'attemptsto negotiateplea agreementsresembledgames of "chicken,"in which attorneyswould wait to see which side would cave in and acceptthe others'plea termsbefore the day of trial. Open guilty pleas to originalchargeswithouta negotiatedsentenceagreement,however,by-passed the process of protractedhaggling with the DA's office in routinecases, and the judges encourageddefendersto pursuethis strategy. Southwest'sproportionof convictionsaccounted for by open pleas morethantripled(from 11 percentto 34 percent)fromthe time the current judges took the bench in 1989 to 1991 (see Ulmer 1994b). A Southwestjudge explains: thata casecannevercometo courtwithanopenplea. Everything ThePDshadtheattitude of"nomoreMr.NiceGuy"... no hadto be a pleaagreement...theDAadoptsanattitude concessions.Then,whenthe PD won'tplead,or the DA isn'treadyfortrial,they'llbe backlog dealingthenightbeforetheypickthejury.Thenwe'rerightbackbuildinganother of cases. I say, makeit an openplea! They[PDs]canjust trustthatI'll do whatthe
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orelsego belowthem... Now,I don'tdo thison rapesormurders, but guidelinesrequire, the PDsoughtto havefiguredoutafterall thistimethatI'mnotgoingto sendanyoneto jail forbadchecksor retailtheftor something. This use of open pleas in routinecases allowedthejudges anddefense attorneysto controlthe courts'case flow, by-passDA sentencingrecommendations,and reducethe risks of political damagemobilizedby the chief DA. Judgescould simply claim thatthey were doing whatthe guidelinesrecommended.As Southwest'schief DA complained: I thinkwe would Therearea lotof timeswhereif we didn'thavethatsentencing guideline, be successfulin gettingthecourtto imposea greatersentence.Inthatrespect,I thinkthe a pleaorgettinga goodsentence.Now,thedefensewill guidelineshindermynegotiating go in withan openplea,theywon'ttakeourpleaagreement.We ask for a substantial sentenceandthecourtdoesn'tgive it to us. In sum, the social worldcontextin Rich Countycombinedrobustsharedpasts and ideological consensusbetween participants,and this in turn providedthe basis for negotiationas a dominantcase processing strategy. Metro's context of less robust sharedpasts, consensus between sponsoringagencies, and actors' use of common pasts fosteredunilateraldecision makingin routinecases. The Southwestbench and DA's sharedpasts plus ideological conflict conditionedstrategiesof conflict and coalition formation. CONCLUSIONS This study drawson Katovichand Couch's (1992) conceptualizationof sharedand common pasts and their consequencesto augmentStrauss's(1993) frameworkof social worlds and processualorderingand their consequencesfor action strategies. I conclude by suggesting some propositionsregardingthe consequencesof social pasts for the actioncontextsof courts in particularand social worlds in general. Given some limitationsto this study,8these propositions are meantto sensitize furtherresearchratherthan to be definitiveor exhaustive. The first propositionconcernsthe influenceof social pasts on perhapsthe focal issue for social worlds noted by Strauss(1978; 1993): the relative availabilityand attractivenessof alternativeactionstrategies,such as unilateraldecisionmaking,negotiation,adversarialstrategies, coalitions,or appealsto externalauthority.Regardingcourtorganization,Rich County supportsEisenstein and Jacob's (1977) contentionthat workgroupfamiliarityand stability condition strong informalcase processingnorms (going rates) and heavy reliance on plea negotiationas a preferredcase processingstrategy,while Metrosupportstheir argumentthat less workgroupfamiliarityand stabilityfoster unilateraldecision making. The more general point is thata comparisonof MetroandRich Countiessupportsthe notion,impliedby Strauss and made explicit by Couch(1992, p. 122), thatrobustsharedpasts and the identitiesforged and sedimentedthroughthem facilitatenegotiationas an interactionstrategy.9 On the other hand,the SouthwestCountyexamplesuggeststhatsharedpasts can providesituatedidentities for processes of conflict and coalition(cf. Katovichand Couch 1992, p. 33), and appealsto externallylegitimatedauthority(e.g., sentencingguidelines)as a tactic in those conflicts and coalitionformations. The analysis also suggests the importantrole of common pasts in providing categorical identitiesand stocks of knowledgeto be used by actorsin the absenceof robustsharedpasts.
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In the case of interactionbetween Metrodefenseattorneysand prosecutors,commonpastsof using guidelinesand participatingin grapevinecommunicationfacilitatedunilateraldecision making. Furthercomparativestudies in otherorganizationalarenascould examinethe influence of the robustnessof sharedpasts and the availabilityand use of common pasts-in conjunctionwith othersocial world contextualdimensionssuch as degreeof ideologicalconsensus-on the availabilityand attractivenessof variousactionstrategiessuch as negotiation, unilateraldecision making, conflict and coalition formation,or appeals to authority(see Strauss 1978).lo In addition,this analysisillustratesvariousconsequencesof sharedand commonpasts for organizationaluncertaintymanagement,a focal concernof organizationalethnographyin general (see Weick 1979; Manning1992; Schwartzman1993), and a centralissue for sentencing policy in particular."'Both sharedandcommonpastsprovidesituationalidentitiesandstocks of knowledgethat can be used to manageuncertaintyin organizationaldecisionmaking. On one hand,the examplesof these threecountiessuggestthat organizationalworldswhereparticipantshave robustsharedpasts are morelikely to exhibitstronginformalnormativeorders (developed throughongoing negotiationor conflict processes), and these local norms will provideuncertaintyreductiontools thatare seen as superiorto externallyimposedand legitimatednorms. On the otherhand,in organizationalarenaswhereparticipantshave less robust sharedpasts, commonpasts of applyingexternallyimposedand legitimatednorms(e.g., senrules, along with knowledgeof grapevinenartencing guidelines),or navigatingbureaucratic rativesof otherparticipants'reputationsandpast actionswill be preferredtools of uncertainty reduction(see Weick and Browning1986). Thatis, externallyimposedpolicy rules provide an externallyconstructedstock of knowledge. Whenactorsshareexperiencein workingwith these rules, they draw on commonpasts of categoricalidentitiesand organizationalknowledge to manageuncertaintyin their interactions.Further,participationin bureaucraticstructures defines both the types of commonpasts availableand actors' probabilitiesof acquiring and using them. The robustnessof sharedpasts betweenactorsis arguablya factordifferentiating"bureaucratic"and "clan"organizationalstyles (Ouchi 1980; Daft 1989). In other words, the clan versusbureaucratic typologyof organizationalstyle and social controlactuallyencompassesa the consequencesof sharedpasts (e.g., "old boy" networks,longtension between potential and common standingfeuds) pasts (e.g., competenceat managingand manipulatingbureaucraticrules and controls). Further,the distinctionbetweenthe two styles of organizationand controlencompassesa distinctionbetweenwhich kinds of identities-interpersonalor categorical-are most salient for participantsin their encounterswith one another. Research could investigatethe degreeto which robustsharedpastsprovidethe basis for clan organizational style, with its dominanceof informalnormativeorders and informalsocial control basedin organizationalrelationshipswhereinterpersonalidentitiesare most salient(see Flemming et al. 1992). In addition,the role of commonpasts in bureaucraticstyle organizations could be explored. For example, researchcould examine the role of participants'common pasts of transactingcategoricalidentities,learningand applying formal knowledge stocks (e.g., formalrules and policies) and/orinformalknowledgestocks (e.g., grapevinenarratives, reputations)in social controland decisionmakingin bureaucraticstyle organizations,as well as ways in which bureaucraticorderscondition and constrainthe types of common pasts availableto participants.
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This studyimpliestwo additionaldirectionsfor research. First,the typology of sharedand commonpasts could be furtherrefinedalong the four analyticaldimensionsof temporalityin social life impliedby G.H. Meadandexplicatedby David Mainesandassociates(1983). That is, sharedandcommonpastscouldbe distinguishedin termsof theiruses andconsequencesas symbolicallyreconstructedpasts, social structuralpasts, implied objective pasts, or mythical pasts. As mentionedearlier, common pasts are somewhat analogous to implied objective pasts in their uses and consequencesfor situatedaction. Additionally,both sharedand common pasts could serve as symbolicallyreconstructedpasts, throughwhich past events are reinterpretedand made meaningfulin the present(Maineset al. 1983, p. 163). Sharedpasts would have particularlyinterestingconsequencesas social structuralpasts-or pasts that order interpersonaland interorganizational relationshipsthroughongoing interaction.Another importantresearchdirectionconcernshow rhetoricalstrategiesmay be used to mobilize common pastsandtheirconsequences.Researchcould examineways in which ideographs12(McGee 1980), impliedideographs(Bridger1994), and elementsof narrative(Mainesand Ulmer 1993) are used or manipulatedto invoke commonpasts to be used as implied objective or mythic pasts in mobilizingaction and exertingsocial control. Second,both Couchand associates(1986; Sink and Couch 1986) and Strauss(1978; 1993) recognize the crucialrole of commitmentprocesses in constructingand solidifying negotiations, conditioningsegmentationandconflicts,andprovidingthe "glue"thatholds complexes of joint actiontogether(see also Gerson 1976). Researchcould explore specific roles shared and commonpastsplay in the development,maintenance,and changeof the types of commitment identifiedby Michael Johnson(1991; see also Ulmer 1994a, p. 139), and the social organizationalconsequencesof these commitments. Obviously, the developmentof shared pasts involvesthe potentialdevelopmentof sourcesof structuralcommitment(e.g., closing off futurealternatives,irretrievableinvestments),personalcommitment(e.g., positive attitudes toward other participants),and/or moral commitment(e.g., patternsof culturally defined moralor ethicalobligations). For example,the configurationsof social pasts would influence relations(see Couch and patternsof commitmentin organizationalrepresentative-constituent Weiland 1986). Courtcommunitieswould be a fittingplace to studythis issue as well, since the developmentof sharedpasts of cooperativenegotiationcan potentiallyproducecomplex configurationsof personal,moral,and structuralcommitmentsbetweendefense attorneysand prosecutorsthat can underminevigorous defense attorneyadvocacy of clients (Eisensteinet al. 1988, pp. 287-290) or underminea sponsoringagency's controlover workgrouprepresentatives (Flemminget al. 1992). Commonpasts would also be importantin patternsof both structuralcommitment(e.g., mutuallyheld stocks of knowledgeallowing actorsto define the availabilityand attractivenessof futurealternatives),and moralcommitment(e.g., categorical identitiesinvokingculturallyexpectedrules of reciprocityor obligation). This article has demonstratedthe contributionsof Katovich and Couch's (1992) formal conceptualizationof social pasts to Strauss's(1978; 1993) processualordertheoryfor understandingorganizationalarenasin generalandcriminalcourtsin particular.I have also delineated a numberof interestingdirectionsfor futureresearch. Social pasts are an importantpart of social worlds,with implicationsfor the availabilityof alternativeaction strategiesand the managementof uncertaintyin decision making. A carefulconceptualizationof social pasts and researchregardingtheir consequencesoffers rich potentialfor explaining interrelationships between organizationalcontextsand trajectoriesof action.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am indebted to the late Carl Couch for his helpful comments on this article. I also thank Anselm Strauss, Michael Katovich, and anonymous TSQ reviewers for their constructive feedback. This research was made possible by funding and support from the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing and the Francis Sim Award for Graduate Research at Penn State University.
NOTES 1. My use of the conceptconsensushere drawsfrom Scheff's (1967, p. 36) treatment,in which he and defines consensusnot in termsof individuals'similarityon attitudescales, but as "co-orientation" betweenmembersof the group." Thus, for example,Rich County'scon"reciprocatingunderstandings servativeprosecutors,judges, and the largemajorityof the regulardefense attorneys,viewed deterrence and incapacitationas the primarygoals of sentencing,believedthatone anothersharedthese views, and orientedtheircourtroomactions accordingly. 2. The PennsylvaniaCommissionon Sentencinghas maintainedstatisticaldata on all trial court sentencesin the state since 1982 as partof its ongoing policy evaluationmandate. 3. In addition,three membersof the DA's staff were kin: a father,his son, and the son's wife all workedas ADAs. 4. The chief DA concurred:"Thiscountyhas alwaysbeen muchharsherin its treatmentof criminals. You can see it, we just reactharsher... and rightfullyso." 5. The chief DA describedsuch zeal: "I don't like what I call the 'Top Gun Syndrome,'where somebodyoffers twelve monthson a case worthsix just to get the defendantto trialso he can knockhis brainsout. I don't like 'hatchetpeople,' whojust go out andtryto hurtpeople. Forthe most part,I don't thinkwe have that. Anotherthing I don't go in for is judge-bashing.We have very good judges here, and they help us out." 6. This quote also illustratesthe importantpotentialrole of local news media in court community politics (for more detail, see Ulmer 1994b)and suggeststhe argumentsof Altheide(1992) and Altheide and Snow (1991) that media logic and formatsare increasinglyimportantin the politics of criminal justice, as well as otherarenasof publicpolicy. 7. Those pleadingguilty in Metrowere nearlythree times less likely to be incarceratedthanthose convictedby jury trial,controllingfor otherlegally prescribedfactorsanddefendantcharacteristics.See Ulmer (1993) for statisticalfindings. 8. First,althoughI restrictedmy focus in orderto illustratethat social pasts are key dimensionsof court communitycontexts (and often ignoredin the court literature),a numberof other proximaland distal contextualfactorsare often influentialin organizationalrelationsand case processingstrategies (see Ulmer 1993). These factorsincludestate-levelcriminaljustice politics,sentencingpolicies (suchas sentenceguidelines),local-level politicalprocesses,local media scrutinyof court activities, courtcase sponsoringagencyorganizationalstyles, andcrowdingin assignmentmethodsanddocketcharacteristics, state and local jails and prisons(see Nardulli,Eisensteinand Flemming 1988; Flemminget al. 1992; Ulmer 1993). Second, my basis of comparisonis limited to three court contexts in one state with a particularset of sentencingpolicies. Third,my directdataon face-to-faceinteractionprocessesare thin comparedto naturalisticlaboratoryresearchon social pasts and theirconsequences(see Molseed 1994; Couch, Saxton,and Katovich 1986). 9. This propositionis also implicit in Emile Durkheim's([1893] 1964) argumentthat a minimum level of precontractual solidarityis necessaryfor implicitor explicitcontractualrelations,such as negotiation (see Westby 1991, pp. 252-254). 10. More specifically,this studycontributesto the courtsand sentencingliteratureby illustratingthe influenceof courtcommunitystabilityand familiarity,in interactionwith the degreeof ideologicalconsensusaboutsentencing,on case processingstrategiesin courtcommunitiesof differentsizes. Eisenstein
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and Jacob(1977) studiedthreelargemetropolitancourts,while Eisensteinand associates(1988; Nardulli et al. 1988; Flemminget al. 1992) studiednine medium-sizedurbancourts. On one hand,a numberof contextualfeaturesthatcorrelatewith courtcommunitysize (e.g., strengthof going rates,availabilityand attractivenessof negotiativestrategies)may be highly intertwinedwith the robustnessof participants' sharedpasts (cf. Eisensteinet al. 1988, pp. 267-284). On the otherhand,the relationshipbetweencourt one. For examcommunitysize and the robustnessof participants'sharedpasts is not a straightforward ple, workgroupsin largemetropolitancourtscan exhibithigh familiarityandstabilityandstronginformal normativeorderssurroundingcase processing. In EisensteinandJacob's(1977, pp. 107-109)description of Chicago's court, for example, individualprosecutorsand defense attorneyswere assigned by their basis (in contrastto respectivesponsoringagenciesto individualjudges' courtroomson a semipermanent MetroCountyin this study). This methodof case assignmentnecessitatedalmost daily interactionbetween the same attorneysandjudges, and these workgroupsdevelopedstronginformalcourtroomnorms (and sanctions)emphasizingcooperativenegotiationin order to resolve chronic and sharedpractical problems. Thus, the relationshipsbetweencourtcommunitysize, the robustnessof sharedpasts, informal case processingnorms,and the availabilityand attractivenessof alternativecase processingstrategies are likely mediatedby other factors such as docket characteristicsand sponsoringagency case assignmentmethodsas well as the degree of ideologicalconsensus. 11. This argumentalso has implicationsfor the consequencesof sentencingpolicies thatseek to alter court actors' discretionand decision making,such as sentencingguidelines (see Walker 1993). Such externallyimposedpolicies will be influentialto the extent that their formalrules provide uncertainty reductiontools thatare seen as superiorto locally developedinformalnorms. The analysissuggeststhat such sentencingreformpolicies will be most influentialin courtcommunities,like Metro,whereparticipants lack robustsharedpasts, but where their common experiencein applying externalpolicy rules providesa commonpastto be used for uncertaintyreductionin case processingand sentencingdecisions. Such policies will also be influentialin court communities,like Southwest,where participantsexhibit robustsharedpasts, but where the formalrules legitimateone set or a coalition of actors' ideological goals in their conflicts with others. In court communitieslike Rich, where participantsexhibit robust sharedpasts, strongideologicalconsensus,and stronglocally developedinformalnormsand traditions, reformpolicies will be least influential(cf. Walker1993; Eisensteinet al. 1988, pp. 294-298). 12. Ideographsrefer to key words or phrasesin political rhetoric(e.g., "familyvalues,""toughon crime")that representandjustify ideologies,and are used to mobilize action in service of those ideologies (McGee 1980; Mainesand Bridger1992, p. 370).
REFERENCES Albonetti,Celeste. 1991. "An Integrationof Theoriesto ExplainJudicialDiscretion."Social Problems 38(2):247-266. Altheide,David. 1992. "GonzoJustice." SymbolicInteraction15(1):69-86. Altheide,David,andRobertSnow. 1991. Media Worldsin the PostjournalismEra. New York: Aldine. Becker, Howard. 1964. "PersonalChangein Adult Life." Sociometry27(1):40-53. 1982. Art Worlds. Berkeley,CA: Universityof CaliforniaPress. --. Berger, Peter, and Thomas Luckmann. 1967. The Social Constructionof Reality. GardenCity, NY: Doubleday. Bridger,Jeffrey. 1994. "Power,Discourse,and Community:The Case of LandUse." Ph.D. diss., The PennsylvaniaState University. Clarke,Adele. 1991. "SocialWorlds/ArenasTheoryas OrganizationalTheory."Pp. 119-158 in Social Organizationand Social Process: Essays in Honor of Anselm Strauss, edited by D. Maines. New York: Aldine. Clarke,Adele, and Joan Fujimura. 1992. TheRight Toolsfor the Job: At Workin Twentieth-Century Life Sciences. Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress. Couch, CarlJ. 1990. ConstructingCivilizations.Greenwich,CT: JAI Press.
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