The Perceptibility of the Invisible Cosmology

The Perceptibility of the Invisible Cosmology Religious Rituals and Embodied Spirituality among the Bahraini Shi‘a El-Sayed el-Aswad Abstract: This article analyses the relationship between the seen and the unseen in the cosmology and practices of Bahraini Shi‘a. Rather than contrasting the visible and the invisible, the study delineates the hierarchical relations between them, within a whole or cosmology, as reflected in various discursive and nondiscursive actions that are supported by the religious beliefs of Bahraini Shi‘a. Issues of the Hidden Imam, concealment, dissimulation and other unseen dimensions of the cosmos are discussed. The article finds that the Shi‘a construct the invisible in their social world by using visible ways of creatively enacting their hidden thoughts and beliefs, as represented in their religious discourses, rituals and body symbolism. Their belief in a divine higher power provides a source of emotional, spiritual and socio-political empowerment. Keywords: Bahrain, cosmology, Hidden Imam, invisibility, rituals, Shi‘a, spirituality, symbolism

Introduction Departing from enquiries that focus largely on Shi‘i political power in various countries,1 this study attempts to explicate the significance of cosmology to Bahraini Shi‘a2 within a broad perspective that encompasses their relationship to the world with its seen and unseen dimensions. Although the details of different modes of thought among Bahraini Shi‘a are not comparable, the principles by which collective representations are organised may be generalised. The subject matter is treated not as an ideological abstraction but rather as an active and meaningful engagement that is reflected in people’s everyday actions, as well as in objects and bodily displays symbolising social significance. As such, it comprises both ethnographic research3 – conducted in the Anthropology of the Middle East, Vol. 5, No. 2, Winter 2010: 59–76 © Berghahn Journals doi:10.3167/ame.2010.050205

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capital city Manama4 and in five villages5 – and phenomenological inquiry that incorporates objective description and subjective interpretation. By examining their inner perspectives and social imaginary, the study shows how Bahraini Shi‘a use visible ways of creatively enacting and embodying their hidden thoughts and beliefs as represented in sanctified places, religious discourses (husainiyya)6 and ‘Ashura7 mourning rituals. A further concern of this research is the impact of religious discourses and rituals on the visible socio-political lives of Bahraini Shi‘a.

Theorising the invisible Scholars such as Beeman (1982), Geertz (1960), Gilsenan (1982) and Pinault (1992), among others, have made distinctions between two paradigms of Muslim experience: one visible, seen, material, textual or apparent (z.āhir); the other invisible, unseen, imagined, spiritual, mystic, inner or hidden (bāt.in). These ideological antitheses, however, express the views of scholars who choose not to examine them from the emic perspective of the Muslim people themselves. Most of these studies that present visible and invisible domains as opposites pay little attention to their interconnected and multi-dimensional levels, which encompass cosmological, social and personal elements. An alternative view, proposed here, envisions these categories as standing in relation to one another rather than in opposition. This relation can be best comprehended through applying Dumont’s idea (1986) of hierarchical complementary opposition, in contrast to the binary symmetric opposition of Lévi-Strauss (1963) in which two opposites have equal status. Dumont (1986: 8) argues that ‘hierarchy is implicit in various aspects of people’s cosmology and social life’. His method seeks to delineate hierarchies of relations within a whole as akin to the mode of comparison by ‘proportioning’, meaning ‘the relation as to magnitude, degree, quantity, or importance that exists between portions, parts, a part and the whole, or different things’ (Tambiah 1990: 125–126). Rappaport (1999: 72) points to hierarchical levels of meaning in which high-order meaning, based on unification with the other, the cosmos, or the divine, may be experienced ‘as effects of or as parts of, that which they signify’. Shi‘i cosmology is based on an eschatological construct anchored in a messianic figure: the Invisible (Awaited) or Hidden Imam (al-Mahdi al-Muntaz.ar).8 For Bahraini Shi‘a, the relationship between al-Mahdi and the invisible Shi‘i cosmos can be comprehended through focusing on the hierarchically complementary relationship between the part and the whole (Dumont 1986). Invisibility is a holistic yet multifarious concept that connotes ideological and social meanings. Ideologically, invisibility indicates what is existentially absent, unseen, spiritual, imperceptible, internal and hidden. As expressed by a Shi‘i person, one can speak about hidden worlds, the Hidden Imam, hidden meaning, hidden knowledge, hidden sentiments, inner lives and an unknown

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future. Socially, invisibility signifies specific liminal and underprivileged social categories, such as suppressed religious sects, minorities, immigrants, women, children and the unemployed, as well as traditional groups whose marginal status has been aggravated as a consequence of local and global socio-political factors. Such groups seek possible alternatives, both to restore meaning or visibility to their particular heritage and to reduce the eroding elements of their identities.

Historical and Social Contexts Bahraini Shi‘a, locally known as ‘Baharna’, designating the Arab Shi‘a who consider themselves to be the original inhabitants of the country (Louër 2008b: 11), adopted Shi‘ism from the first days of the Islamic community, following Imam ‘Ali bin Abi Talib9 (Bahry 2000: 132). They believe in the Twelve Imams and are therefore also referred to as ‘Twelvers’ (ithna ‘ashariyya).10 Like other Shi‘a, they believe that Imam ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib should have been the first imam (caliph) or successor of the Prophet. The martyrdom of Imam Husain (680 ce)11 (son of Imam ‘Ali, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad and the third imam of the Shi‘a) and his companions is considered the epitome of sacrifice and the foundation of Shi‘i culture.12 The Arab population of Bahrain was Shi‘i centuries before the country was conquered in 1783 by the ruling Sunni family, who alienated and excluded the Shi‘a from power (Bahry 2000: 133; Holes 2005: 145; Louër 2008b: 16). However, the ‘ulama (religious scholars) of Bahraini Shi‘a, through dissimulation (taqiyya) and diplomacy, have since played a conciliatory role. Taqiyya involves passive resistance, emphasising manoeuvring and artful forms of resistance instead of direct confrontation with opposing authorities (Scott 1985). Religiously, Bahraini Shi‘a embraced Akhbari, acting compromisingly towards the established orders.13 ‘Bahrain is one of the few places, if not the only one, where Akhbari has maintained a strong presence to this day, becoming the distinctive attribute of Bahraini Shiism’ (Louër 2008b: 19). The strategic location of Bahrain is significant, and its proximity to Iran is felt in the Shi‘i community, just as the proximity to Saudi Arabia is felt in Sunni religious spheres (Shehadeh 2004: 26). Bahrain is ‘a country known for its religious tolerance’ (Bahry 2000: 131; see also Shehadeh 2004: 32), and there has been ‘a negligible probability for civil war in Bahrain’ (Laitin 2009: 40). However, while the Shi‘a have ‘never revolted against the Sunni rulers, resentment was high against those they considered alien conquerors’ (Louër 2008a: 38). Such a conflict ‘had little to do with sectarian antagonism’ (ibid: 11). Hence, it is not violent conflict between Shi‘a and Sunni but rather notions of injustice (z.ulm) that have influenced the circumstances of two different groups, one (Shi‘a) subordinated to the other (tribal ruling elite) through historical inequality. As seen in recent studies, Bahraini Shi‘a have


employed socio-political activities, ranging from petitions to streets demonstrations (masīrāt), to express their discontent.14 The suffering caused by discrimination and injustice has resulted in a solemn yearning to establish societal justice (‘adl), an essential principle in Shi‘i religious, social and political views. The idea of an invisible reality taking precedence over the visible world sustains the notion that ‘justice will inevitably be attained by a higher power’ (el-Aswad 2002: 90). For the Shi‘a, al-Mahdi, a living cosmic figure, is expected to return as the divinely guided ruler to establish a reign of justice at the end of time. Until then, the ‘ulama serve as the link to the Awaited Imam. The ‘ulama and ordinary Shi‘i people are viewed as standing in a complementary and hierarchical position in which each group holds qualities that uniquely equip its members for certain duties and responsibilities. Hierarchically, the ‘ulama mediate between the imam and Shi‘i folk, who, in turn, seek guidance from the ‘ulama. Shi‘i people further differentiate between sayyid and shaikh or ‘ālim. As opposed to the shaikh, a person of religious learning, a sayyid is a descendant of the Prophet’s family (āl al-bayt) and is distinguished by wearing a black turban (see fig. 1), especially when certified in religious knowledge. Society and the cosmos are viewed by the Shi‘a as composed of levels in which some entities have greater intrinsic dignity or value than others. This Figure 1: The author (centre) with a sayyid (left with black turban) and shaikhs (wearing white turbans)


hierarchical differentiation is believed to be the proper order of things. Holy persons, particularly imams, are depicted as having enduring and powerful souls. During my fieldwork, Noriyya, a young Shi‘i woman, explained that ‘the Infallible Imams (al-ma‘asumīn) have greater dignity and value than others. They are religious leaders with authority to whom we, the Shi‘a, have an inner attachment and to whom obedience is obligatory’. This accounts for the high esteem that the Shi‘a accord to their religious leaders, especially sayyids, who are expected to lead them in religious and non-religious matters such as civil activities and political demonstrations.

The Unseen in the Shi‘i Cosmology The notion of cosmology refers to ‘assumptions concerning the structure of the universe, and is extended here to include ecology and society as well as human and nonhuman beings and forces, both perceptible and imperceptible, as constituting integrated parts of that universe’ (el-Aswad 2002: 2; see also el-Aswad 2010).15 Cosmology, as embodied in the practices and discourses of large groups of ordinary people, indicates inner meaning systems made of such assumptions and images in accordance with which the universe, society and individuals are constructed (el-Aswad 2003). The concept of invisibility encompasses two notions, one applicable to Islam in general, the other to Bahraini Shi‘ism. The general notion of the unseen, which goes beyond any specific Muslim sect and is associated with overarching Muslim worldviews (both Sunni and Shi‘a), embraces al-ghaib or what is unknowable, imperceptible, spiritual and existent (although absent).16 The invisible framework among Bahraini Shi‘a has a number of distinctive features. First, it is associated with certain sanctified places, where unseen entities are geographically substantiated. Second, it underlies discursive and non-discursive actions whereby Shi‘i individuals show great concern for the metaphysical dimensions of the universe as represented in their belief in and actions towards the Hidden Imam. Third, non-discursive actions, collective performances, rituals (especially those associated with ‘Ashura) and public protests are socially recognised ways for revealing and negotiating hidden aspects of society.

The Sanctification of Geographic Locations and the Invention of Spiritual Territory Locally, Bahraini Shi‘a bestow identity and sanctity on certain places believed to be linked to al-Mahdi and other spiritual figures. There are various locations in Bahrain known as al-qadam (literally, ‘foot’) or qadamal-Mahdi in which footmarks of Imam al-Mahdiare are believed to be engraved.17 The qadamal-Mahdi


is a cubic building a few metres in height, width and length that is crowned with a green dome (qubbah) encasing each of the engraved footprints. These sites, which serve as indexical relations between the Shi‘a, Imam al-Mahdi and the land, are in locations where the invisible is believed to be felt most fervently. I saw Shi‘i people place colourful pieces of cloth on al-Mahdi’s footmark for the purpose of transmitting baraka or blessing to themselves. Shi‘i women use some of these colourful pieces of cloth to make knots (rabt.), accompanied with supplications for marriage, pregnancy, recovery from illness and the like. When their prayers are answered, they return to untie the knots and confirm their vows. When I asked Abdulla, a Bahraini Shi‘i high school teacher, about such practices, he explained, ‘It is about intentions (niyya). Those who have sincere intentions and steadfast belief in Allah, the Prophet, the Prophet’s family and the Hidden Imam will have their wishes fulfilled.’ If qadam al-Mahdi represents a model in which sainthood and place overlap and identify with each other, the same pattern can be found, on a smaller scale, with regard to the shrines of local saints and small communities.18 These shrines set symbolic boundaries within the region and bear testimony to the notions of belonging and localisation as reflected expressions of spiritual territory. Visitations (ziyāra) are made to the shrines and graves of imams and saints for the sake of baraka and mystical intercession (shafā‘a). Such shared symbolism allows the Shi‘a to converse about the hidden dimensions of reality. While the stories of the first eleven imams are historical in nature, the history of the Twelfth Imam is mystical. For the Shi‘a, the Awaited Imam disappeared by divine command as a five-year-old child on the day that his father, the eleventh imam, Hasan ‘Askari (who because of political persecution lived in hiding and dissimulation), died in 873 ce.19 The Shi‘a believe that this Twelfth Imam hid himself in a cave below a mosque in Samarra in Iraq. The cave is blocked by a gate called the ‘Gate of Occultation’ (bab al-ghaiba), a sacred site at which the faithful gather to pray for the return of the Hidden Imam. In Bahrain, however, the locations of the footmarks of Imam al-Mahdi (i.e. the qadam al-Mahdi) are indexical sanctified sites that keep Shi‘i beliefs alive.

Seeing the Unseen in Ma’tam and Husainiyya Discourses The connection between the unseen and the seen or ‘religious theory and practice is fundamentally a matter of intervention – of constructing religion in the world (not in the mind) through definitional discourses, interpreting true meanings, excluding some utterances and practices and including others’ (Asad 1993: 44). There are other sites and structures, such as the ma’tam (also called husainiyya), that reaffirm spiritual embodiment. The ma’tam – a large hall used for religious, social and political gatherings, as well as for special events, such as death rituals and marriage ceremonies – is considered a public place in which speakers and listeners, or hosts and guests, observe common


social and cultural codes. Buildings such as ma’tams and mosques function to substantiate beliefs (Rappaport 1999: 145). The discourses of the husainiyya allow communication between the unseen (the Hidden Imam, martyrs) and the seen realities. Put differently, the hidden cosmology and spirituality that exist in the minds and hearts of the Shi‘i people are substantiated in the discourses of the husainiyya. In the ma’tam, several copies of the Qur’an are read by young and old men alike. Here, the youth are oriented more towards sacred scripture than towards social entertainment. Moral pedagogy, especially the willingness to learn and teach about the ethics and events surrounding the Battle of Karbala, is a critical constituent of the ma’tam. Interestingly, in the ma’tams, I observed people praying in prostration on at-turba al-husainiyya, a small piece of dried clay brought from the earth of Karbala.20 Another critical constituent is an event known as ‘āda that is hosted by a family to commemorate and honour the imams by reciting the Qur’an and performing rituals led by a shaikh. This practice is conducted regularly within communities by families who are continuously socialising and commemorating the imams, especially Imam Husain. Although public figures and religious leaders defend the gender roles and practices that are perceived as most appropriate for both men and women, women are still active in cultural performances and, more specifically, in gendered public zones, such as those of women’s ma’tams and majlis. Shi‘i women participate in ma’tams specifically designed for them in which religiously trained adult females, called shaikha or mullāya, play the role of the preacher.21 In her study of a Shi‘i community in Pakistan, Hegland (1998: 252) observes that at a majlis everyone is both a performer and an audience member. This observation is applicable to the majlis of Bahraini Shi‘i communities. There are various ma’tams in Manama and its surrounding villages named after prominent families, holy persons or the professions of their founders, such as al-Gassab (the butcher) and Samamik (the fisherman). During my fieldwork, I attended several ma’tams, including ma’tam Ben Rajab, ma’tam Ben Salloum, ma’tam al-Gassab, ma’tam Samamikand and ma’tam Haj ‘Abbass in Manama. On these occasions, regionally and nationally reputable shaikhs or faqīh (e.g. Hamid al-Mubarak, Sayyid ‘Ali Sa‘id al-Durazi and Muhammad Sanad) lectured about various relevant and contemporary aspects of people’s daily lives, including, for instance, social and political reform, democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and acceptance of the other. It is interesting to note that some Sunni Muslims willingly attended the ma’tams.22 On several Friday afternoons I attended gatherings of the al-‘Asfury family in al-Duraz village. Shaikhs were invited to conduct husainiyya recitations commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Husain. Shi‘i Muslims congregated to recite verses of the Qur’an, to read poems collectively in praise of the Prophet and his family, and to narrate mournful elegies (ta‘ziyas). On one occasion, a Qur’anic reciter (qāri’) recited the Qur’an preceding the shaikh who delivered the sermon.23 ‘We are in the presence of Imam Husain, the Infallible


Imams and Imam al-Mahdi,’ the religious leader proclaimed. ‘May Allah praise Muhammad and his family’ (allahuma s.allī ‘ala Muhammad wa-āla Muhammad) was loudly and collectively resonated three times by the audience, following the leader’s mention of each imam and member of āl al-bayt. Such verses and phrases were uttered to get the attendees to chant in unison as well as to transport them from the material world into a more spiritual realm. This unique atmosphere of spirituality is believed to deepen communication between participants, who assert that blessing exists when people pray, work and eat together. Within this holy milieu, it is believed that the spirits of saints and imams, including al-Husain and al-Mahdi, descend to participate in collective gatherings. I heard Shi‘i persons say, with reference to al-Mahdi, ‘When will you appear, O, son of al-Husain?’ It is within this cosmic imagery imbued with divine wonders that al-Khidr, the invisible cosmic saint24 known as the ‘pious slave’ (al-‘abd as.-s.ālih.), upon whom Allah has bestowed divine hidden knowledge (‘ilm ladunnī), is also believed to be present (and sometimes perceptible) among those who call his name. Such discursive acts and related symbols constitute a reality for the Shi‘a. Religious symbols ‘point to linguistically mediated, already conceptualized aspects of reality’ (Schilbrack 2005: 445). Since ‘“saying” may be a form of “doing”, so may “doing” be a substantial way of “saying”’ (Rappaport 1999: 144). I regularly observed discursive and non-discursive actions, such as the Shi‘a saluting the Hidden Imam through bodily displays when they heard his name spoken (‘al-Mahdi’ or ‘al-H . ujjah’) or saw his green-robed image with his face veiled by white paint.25 Postures of salutation – lowering the head, lightly patting the forehead with the right hand, closing the eyes, uttering invocations to Allah to bring about the speedy reappearance of the Hidden Imam, and the like – are substantiated, performative or self-referential messages that render the invisible visible and the spiritual indexical. In these cases, ‘the effect achieved is not only conventional but material’ (Rappaport 1999: 143). ‘Corporeal representation gives weight to the incorporeal and gives visible substance to aspects of existence which are themselves impalpable, but of great importance in the ordering of social life’ (ibid.: 141).

The Islamic Month of Muharram and the Passion of ‘Ashura Starting with the Islamic month of Muharram and ending with the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (in Rabi‘ al-Awwal, the third month of the Islamic calendar),26 the Shi‘a maintain a state of mourning for almost two and a half months (75 days). During this period, including ‘Ashura and the observation of the Fortieth,27 the Shi‘a hang black flags, banners and posters on houses, mosques, ma’tams and wooden stands in the streets. These tokens are visible, collective and public signs that evince the hidden sorrowful feelings associated


with the historical events of Imam Husain at Karbala. ‘The culture of mourning’ (thaqāfat al-h.uzn) was a phrase I heard from a Shi‘i person expressing the notions of martyrdom, passion, suffering and death as core constituents of the Shi‘i ethos. Happy celebrations such as marriage ceremonies never take place during the mourning period.28 Instead, large communal feasts are publicly arranged, both inside and outside ma’tams. Competition peaks between local dominant ma’tams, which offer free goods and services. The best in food, beverages and entertainment, including presentations and performances by nationally or regionally reputable shaikhs and reciters of mourning husainiyya poems (such as Basim al-Karbala’i and Shaikh Husain al-Akraf), are provided. The prestige of the presenter lies in his ability to move the audience to deep, tearful passions through heartfelt recitations and re-enactments of the Battle of Karbala. Such performers know how to exploit successfully the ideational shapes of their culture in order to generate powerful, effective communication (Beeman 1982). In particular, on the eve of ‘Ashura, there is a sad, serious and sorrowful atmosphere. On our way to the ma’tam of Blad al-Qadim village, where he subsequently delivered a mourning narration related to the martyrdom of Imam Husain, Shaikh Muhammad Habib al-Miqdad said, ‘On this night we have mus.ība, the tragedy of Imam Husain’, connoting images of loss, grief and tribulation. Haydar al-Khal, the host of the ma’tam, elaborated: ‘We, the Shi‘a, live in deteriorating and disastrous conditions. We mourn Imam Husain for the injustice he suffered, as we mourn our lives for the injustice we encounter in our country.’ While walking in the shabby streets of Blad al-Qadim, al-Khal remonstrated: ‘Do you believe that you are walking in the streets of a rich Gulf (Khalījī) country? Do you know that people of the Gulf call us “slaves” (‘abīd) and “Indians of the Gulf ” (hunūd al-Khalīj) because we accept low-paying manual jobs?’ In the ma’tam, the shaikh passionately narrated the dreadful episodes, whether real or imagined, of the Battle of al-Taff (near Karbala) in which Imam Husain was martyred.29 He recounted that when the decapitated head of Husain was brought in a pot to ‘Ubayd Allah ibn Ziyad, the governor of Kufa, a child tugged at the robe of the sultan and told him that the eyes in the severed head were moving. In the same sermon, the shaikh relayed that ibn Ziyad inserted a stick into the head’s mouth, bared its teeth and consequently further dehumanised the martyr.30 In yet another version, the head spoke with wisdom, much like the head of Yahya ibn Zakariyya (John the Baptist).31 By reinventing the traditions and rendering this distant history of martyrdom real, recent and visible or perceptible, such narrations create an emotional response in the participants. These tragic representations of holy personalities have an impact on the way that Bahraini Shi‘a view themselves and their society. The traumatic events that are described bring death into the space of the living, resulting in a perception of life as endurance. Public crying (bukā’) is acceptable for both men and women. In each ma’tam, before the shaikh begins his mourning recitations,


boxes of tissues are distributed so that participants can wipe away the tears that will be wept in reaction to the narrations. Tears are understood as the embodiment of the participants’ spiritual state and inner response of sadness and sorrow.32 In such a context, the Bahraini Shi‘a seem to locate moods in events themselves, as is the case with a Fiji Indian community in Bhatgaon (Brenneis 1987: 240). As opposed to Western culture, where the locus of emotion is typically the individual, the collective mood related particularly to ‘Ashura is more highly valued than the personal feelings associated with it. As one young Shi‘i man explained, ‘You can call our culture “the culture of teardrops” (dam‘a).’ To summarise, these collective recitations of the Qur’an and narrations of husainiyya substantiate the conviction that the spirits of the imams (especially that of the Hidden Imam) and other unseen entities are present and active, and can be felt and seen. However, despite the symbolic recitation of words that render the invisible visible, it is the visible social activities that cohesively bind people together. In short, participants seek to establish an intimate social relationship with each other, as well as with unseen forces, through verbal and socially mediated but religiously propagated public exchanges. What is achieved collectively is the result of the shared performances of the shaikh and the attendants. Audiences should not be looked on as passive targets for rhetorical strategies; rather, they are active interpreters, critics and respondents (Brenneis 1987: 236). In brief, both the shaikh and the attendants react with passion to a past, invisible and historical event that is rendered present, visible and alive through ritual narration.

Body Symbolism and the Spirituality of ‘Ashura Rituals ‘Ashura rituals give physicality to the living but unseen cosmology. A ritual is a symbolic action or a ‘visible behavioral form requiring decoding’ (Asad 1993: 77). Symbolisation is an act that calls something to exist, and the symbolising is part of the symbolised (Todorov 1982: 119–121). The ‘Ashura mourning rituals and processions (mawākib al-‘azā’) that I observed in the villages of Blad al-Qadim, ‘Arad, Bani Jamrah, Buri, ad-Dayh, Karrana, Shahrakkan and Sitra commenced nearly one hour after sunset. Each village commemorated Muharram and carried out its own rituals honouring historical and religious personalities in ma’tams, art displays and processions through the main streets. Most participants left their villages around 10:00 pm and went to Manama to participate in grand processions until dawn, symbolising Shi‘i unity and visibility. Although not political events in themselves, these gatherings sent politically and significantly visible messages seeking social reform from the state. In some of these processions, I heard Shi‘i participants shouting, ‘We renew our allegiance and loyalty to men of religious learning’, thus placing religiously significant matters above mundane concerns. Also, I observed certain public places in Manama, especially those located in al-Husain Street,


that became spectacular arenas in which documentary videotapes of prisoners being tortured by government authorities during the uprisings of the 1990s were shown.33 These viewings attracted substantial numbers of both Shi‘i and Sunni people, who expressed sympathy for the victims. Although the tenth day of Muharram (‘Ashura) was considered the highlight of the mourning period, the most spectacular events were those that occurred during the public ‘central gatherings’ in the days following ‘Ashura, which further confirmed the visibility and unity of Shi‘a communities. During these gatherings, processions from almost every town and village congregated in turn and in central locations, namely, in villages such as ad-Dayh and ‘Aali. In ad-Dayh, the groups began to amass around 2:30 pm, and the events lasted for about three hours, during which time the parades and processions of the participating towns and villages came through the main road of the hosting village, welcoming concentrated gatherings of various Shi‘a communities while performing emotionally laden mourning rituals. Symbols, iconic images and replicas (tashbihāt) of characters and events of the Battle of Karbala were depicted in the processions, as well as in displays on street corners and sidewalks, accentuating the participants’ religious views. In each procession (mawkib), accompanied by drummers, singers and reciters with microphones carried on wooden posts, men walked in two rows shouting the phrase ‘Yā Husain’. Each procession had its own banner, slogan and style of performance that included mild to more severe forms of selfflagellation. The mild forms included beating the left side of the chest with the right hand and the right side of the chest with the left hand (lat.mah). Some used only the right hand to beat the left side of the chest.34 Severe forms included scourging one’s back (zangīl)35 or piercing one’s head (tat.bīr) until blood flowed.36 A significant aspect of these performances is the dramatic way that hidden feelings and intense passions are made visible. Such manipulation of the body communicates to both one’s self and to others not only the message that would be conveyed in an accompanying set of words (‘Yā Husain’, ‘Yāmaz.lūm’ or ‘O Husain, the oppressed’), but also a commitment of the living self to the message of resistance against any aggression. Central to these performances, then, is the notion of revealing hidden truth and justice. ‘Such physical acts seem to be more than “mere talk.” It is the visible, present, living substance – bone, blood, gut and muscle – that is being “put on the line”’ (Rappaport 1999: 146). Human thought and feeling are structured by what bodies are like and how they function in the world (Fuller 2007: 27). For the Shi‘a, the performance of lat.mah empowers and energises the participants, especially the young men, who despite their exhaustion feel revitalised and welcome as forces of social change. I heard young men in the mawkib shouting loudly, ‘Yā Husain, amal wa ‘amal (hope and action).’ When I asked an informant what the young men meant by the word ‘amal, he explained that in this specific context, it meant not only action, indicating a broad meaning, but also a job, work and employment


that young people are looking for. Also, the phrase ‘Husain is alive, not dead’, used by the Shi‘a to denote the martyrdom in Karbala, still holds powerful ethical and political symbolism for the oppressed and marginalised. Such rituals and physical displays not only symbolise the struggle against injustice, but also act to change any ideological or materialistic force that precludes individuals from exercising their rights. For one who performs a ritual, ‘to act’ is to take an action that affirms or even brings into being a significant order and also states his acceptance of it. It may transform that order or himself. The ritual, in other words, ‘“does something”, it is an action that is meant to affect the world and it is likely to do so’ (Rappaport 1999: 136). Although most of the participants in the parades were young men, old men and young boys also took part by walking in front and carrying banners. Some processions, such as those of Dhu al-Janah (named after the horse that came back alone from the battle in which Imam Husain was martyred), however, were organised exclusively by old men. A white horse marked with red spots (reminiscent of Husain’s blood), coffins (representing the martyrdom of Husain), cradles (representing Abdulla, the slaughtered son of Husain), and posts elevating the hands of al-‘Abbas (Husain’s brother) were displayed. In addition, smaller processions, such as those commemorating the wedding of al-Qasim,37 were performed by male children. Girls participated as well, although in fewer numbers. At times and in some processions, boxes of colourful sweets were distributed for the audience to enjoy. Women did not participate in these processions, but rather in demonstrations by walking behind men. When I asked Sakina, a young Shi‘i woman, why women did not participate in public processions (mawākib), she replied, ‘Women do not take part in these rituals because they involve bodily activities and emotional intensity that is inappropriate for women. In addition, some men keep their upper parts naked while beating their chests, an action that might attract women.’

Conclusion For the Bahraini Shi‘a, notions such as belief in the Hidden Imam, dissimulation, mourning rituals and related forms of body symbolism are the means through which the unseen and the remote are rendered perceptible, visible and present. The idea of invisibility and the related concepts of subjectivity and spirituality point to the possibility of a more complete socio-political, cultural and religious experience. The specificity of current Bahraini Shi‘ism lies in the cosmologicalsocial context within which the actions of concealment, subterfuge and secrecy can be understood. Bahraini Shi‘a observe dissimulation (taqiyya), a concept connoting extreme caution through which a person is rendered socially and politically invisible (by means of abstinence, withdrawal, avoidance or reservation). This occurs when a Shi‘i individual’s belief is questioned or his or her life is jeopardised. Intention (niyya) is inseparable from taqiyya: the Shi‘a’s


deep concern with people’s intentions leads them to develop sceptical attitudes towards strangers, outsiders or those with whom they are unfamiliar. In terms of hierarchical encompassment, without the invisible and imagined domain, the visible and tangible world would be devoid of meaning. Because invisible reality takes precedence over the visible, it also follows a different logic, thus helping people to overcome the limitations of common-sense experience. The Shi‘i invisible cosmology constructs a sense of reality that is reinforced, not only by participating in the imaginative cosmology, but also by acting out inner thoughts and emotions that are related to past events of particular religious and societal significance. Despite differences in political orientations, the Shi‘a, having negligible influence in the government, reinvent their communal identity through religious rituals, discursive traditions of husainiyya and annual festivals commemorating Imam Husain. In a word, the socio-political invisibility of Bahraini Shi‘a is rendered visible and active through religious discursive and non-discursive actions that express and make observable their protestations, in addition to other more quotidian aspirations. The invisible cosmology, as embodied in narratives of Shi‘i imams (more specifically, the Hidden Imam) and ‘Ashura rituals, reconstructs Shi‘i traditions and generates imagined worlds that are awash with possibilities for a better life. The Shi‘a envision the future through the commonly shared anticipation of the emergence of the Hidden Imam, who, it is believed, will restore justice, both locally and globally. By means of sanctified places, recitations, rituals and body symbolism, that which is invisible, absent and incomprehensible becomes comprehensible, imaginable, visible and enactable. Hierarchically, the cosmological view of both Shi‘i intellectuals and ordinary Shi‘i people, which endows them with a unique, imaginative sense of engagement with a spiritual, transcendent and superior reality, accentuates the theme of an invisible, divine and cosmic higher power that surpasses all others. For the Bahraini Shi‘a, such a belief represents an inexhaustible source of spiritual, emotional and socio-political empowerment.

El-Sayed el-Aswad received his PhD from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and is a Professor of Anthropology at the United Arab Emirates University. He has previously taught at Tanta University, Wayne State University and Bahrain University. He has published widely in both English and Arabic on the topics of religion, worldviews, folklore, identity, applied anthropology and Arab Americans. He is currently a member of the editorial advisory boards of Digest of Middle East Studies and Muslims in Global Societies Series. His research focuses on cosmology, spirituality, Islam (Sunni and Shi‘a), Muslim diaspora, gender, globalism and cyber-ethnography.


Notes 1. For the current global debate concerning ‘Shi‘i power’ in Iraq, Iran and Lebanon, see Korinman and Laughland (2007), Nakash (2006) and Nasr (2006). 2. The Arabic word ‘Shi‘a’ is used as a noun, indicating both the sect and its adherents (partisans of Imam ‘Ali), while the word ‘Shi‘i’ is used as an adjective. 3. I conducted extensive ethnographic research from February to April 2005, January to March 2006, November 2006, February to April 2007 and September 2007 to March 2008. To delineate the various aspects of religious practices in different urban and rural communities, I participated in numerous gatherings (ma’tams, husainiyyas and mosques) and ‘Ashura mourning rituals. I took part in visitations to the shrines of Shi‘i local saints (there are no Sunni saints in Bahrain) and conducted in-depth interviews with 30 Shi‘i and 10 Sunni individuals from different economic and social backgrounds, as well as 7 influential Shi‘i religious leaders. 4. The Kingdom of Bahrain, an island, is the smallest country in the Arab Gulf, having a total land area of 620 square kilometres (Cordesman 1997: 34). Unlike the other Arab Gulf states, Bahrain has a Shi‘i majority, reaching as high as 70 per cent among native Bahrainis (Bahry 2000: 132; Fuller and Francke 1999: 120). In 2008, the population of Bahrain totalled 1,050,000. Muslims (Sunni and Shi‘a) constitute 99 per cent; the rest are Hindus, Christians, Jews and Bahais. Ethnic groups are as follows: Bahraini Arabs, 63 per cent; Asians, 19 per cent; other Arabs 10 per cent; and Iranians (‘Ajam) 8 per cent (Kazim 2009). Manama, located in the north-eastern part of the country, is one of the most active economic centres in the Arab Gulf (Fuccaro 2005: 53; Mohammed 2003). 5. These five villages are ‘Arad, ad-Dayh, Bilad al-Qadim, al-Duraz and Bani Jamrah. Despite tremendous changes that have resulted in a shift towards cosmopolitanism, advanced technology, modernity and economic liberation, most Bahrainis continue to live in villages. However, Bahraini Shi‘a are the most economically and politically marginalised, inhabiting the least developed areas in both rural and urban communities (Khury 1981: 26). 6. The term husainiyya, derived from the name Imam Husain, refers to Husain-related recitation, as well as a building where such recitation is performed. 7. ‘Ashura is on the tenth day of Muharram in the Islamic calendar. It is commemorated as a day of mourning for Imam Husain, who was martyred by Umayyad forces at the Battle of Karbala in 680 ce. 8. This Shi‘i view postulates ‘that prophetic hermeneutics is not concluded and will continue to bring forth secret meanings until the “return”, the parousia, of the awaited Imam, of him who still be the “seal of the Imāmate” and the signal for the resurrection of Resurrections’ (Corbin 1969: 29). 9. ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (600–661 ce) was Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law and the fourth of the ‘Rightly Guided Sunni Caliphs’. Ethnographically, I observed that when involved in heavy work, Shi‘i men and women sought to enhance their strength by invoking the power of the Imam saying, ‘Yā ‘Ali’ (O, ‘Ali). 10. The Arabic word ‘imam’ means ‘leader’, but in a religious context it indicates, for both Sunni and Shi‘i Muslims, any person who leads others in prayer. However, the term is used differently by the two groups. For the Sunni, an imam (synonymous with the word ‘caliph’) is a leader of the Islamic community, as well as the person responsible for maintaining shari‘a (Islamic law). Also, ‘imam’ is used by the Sunni as an honorific title, such as Imam Shafi‘i and Imam Malik, the founders of two of the four Sunni schools of law. For the Shi‘a, who believe in the Twelve Imams, ‘imam’ refers to one of the twelve successors of the Prophet Muhammad. For a short history of the Twelve Imams, see Momen (1987) and Newman (2000). 11. Imam Husain was martyred, along with 72 family members and followers, by the mighty army of Yazid ibn Mu‘awiya under the command of ‘Umar ibn Sa‘d ibn Abi al-Waqqas (Halm 2007; al-Muqarram 1963; al-Mutahhari 2003).

The Perceptibility of the Invisible Cosmology → 73 12. The Shi‘a, like all Muslims adhering to the Qur’an and Islamic tradition, maintain that a martyr (shahīd, a person who sacrifices his soul defending his religion, country, honour and property) lives on in heaven and enjoys the prominent status of being close to Allah (Qur’an 2:154, 3:169). As a martyr, Imam Husain is depicted as the ‘Master of the Youths of Paradise’. 13. Akhbari scholars considered the Qur’an and reports from the Prophet, as transmitted by the imams, to be sufficient sources to elaborate Islamic law (Louër 2008b: 18–19). 14. For a more detailed discussion of the political activities of Bahraini Shi‘a, see Bahry (2000), Gause (2007), Khury (1981) and Louër (2008a, 2008b). 15. With the exception of Löffler’s study (1988) addressing Shi‘a worldviews of Iranian villagers, studies of Bahraini Shi‘i cosmologies are woefully scant. 16. The Qur’an contains both visible (exoteric) and hidden (esoteric) meanings. There are two interconnected religious ways of knowledge: one is acquired (kasbī) or the shari‘a, which is aimed at worshiping God; the other is spiritual or internal (bāt.in) reflected in the truth (h.aqīqa), which is aimed at knowing God (el-Aswad 2006). 17. The various locations where qadamal-Mahdi can be found include villages such as alQadam, al-‘Adliyya, Abu-Sayba‘, Bilad al-Qadim, al-Duraz, al-Mahuz, Magaba, al-Musalla, al-Jufair, Karzakkan, al-Saqiya, Sar, Shahrakkan and al-Shakhura. 18. These shrines include, for example, those of Nabih Saleh, located on an island named after him; Shaikh Aziz, located in al-Sahla village; Shaikh Mohammad Sabsab, located in the village of Dar Kulayb; and Shaikh Abu Rummana, located in the village of Karzakkan. 19. The ‘minor occultation’ (al-ghaiba al-s.ughra) of the Hidden Imam started in 873 ce and ended in 941 ce. The ‘major occultation’ (ghaiba al-kubra) began in 941 ce, when the last representative of the Twelfth Imam died, and will continue until his reappearance (z.uhūr) (Corbin 1969). 20. Sunni Muslims do not observe this practice. Further, some Shi‘a rosaries are made of the earth of Karbala (at-turba al-husainiyya). 21. Studies of Aghaie (2005), Chelkowski (1979), Deeb (2006), Hegland (1998) and Torab (1996) show gender-coded symbols being used within religious and political discourses in various countries, such as Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Pakistan. 22. Shi‘i people, along with moderate Sunnis, follow a strategy of cross-ethnic and largely secular political alliances. Lower-class Sunnis, who are less than happy with their socioeconomic position, show great sympathy towards Shi‘i efforts to reform the existing political and social order (Fuller and Francke 1999: 142). 23. Compare the roles of the Qur’anic reciter (qāri’) and shaikh or faqīh with those of the preacher (vā‘iz) and narrator (rauzeh-khān) in Iran (Thaiss 1972: 354). 24. According to the Qur’an (18: 60–81), al-Khidr, whom Moses met at a place where two seas conjunct, is alive. 25. Green is cherished as the natural colour of Paradise. 26. For the Shi‘a, the Prophet’s birthday is the seventeenth day of Rabi‘ al-Awwal, while for the Sunni, it is the twelfth day. 27. In addition to commemorating ‘Ashura, Shi‘a observe the ceremony of the Fortieth (al-Arba‘īn), referring to the forty days that follow the day of ‘Ashura. However, the mourning period is observed during Safar, the second month in the Islamic calendar, in which unfortunate events, such as the deaths of the Prophet Muhammad and Imam Hasan, as well as the arrival of Imam Husain’s captive relatives to Yazid’s palace in Syria, took place. 28. After the Prophet’s birthday, the Shi‘a celebrate happy and festive occasions. The black material covering the furniture or hanging on the walls is replaced with green material – green being the beloved colour of the Prophet. 29. Yazid’s soldiers also captured women, among them Zaynab, Husain’s sister, and brought them to Kufa and then Damascus (Halm 2007: 15; al-Muqarram 1963: 320; Thaiss 1972: 351–352). Some sources mention that there were 20 captured women related to Imam Husain and his companions (al-Muqarram 1963: 320).

74 ← El-Sayed el-Aswad 30. Such incidents are documented in accounts describing the Battle of Karbala. See, for instance, al-Muqarram (1963: 341–342). 31. Some Shi‘i writers argue that Imam Husain and John the Baptist have equal significance and status, with Yahya or John the Baptist being second only to Jesus, and al-Husain second only to the Prophet Muhammad (Sindawi 2004: 39). 32. For the notion of sorrow among Shi‘i women of Iran, see Flaskerud (2005) and Torab (1996). 33. In the mid-1990s, Shi‘i people, led by religious leaders, organised themselves in demonstrations calling for their constitutional rights. The government authorities mismanaged the uprising and arrested prominent clerics, among whom was ‘Abd al-Amir al-Jamri, a national leader recognised by both Shi‘i and Sunni opponents of the government. Inspired by Mahatma Ghandi, al-Jamri advocated passive resistance, ‘a strategy that according to British officials had generally been preferred by Shi‘is in Bahrain in the twentieth century’ (Nakash 2006: 67). 34. In private, Shi‘i women practise the lat.mah by beating their laps. In public arenas, however, they use their cloak (‘abāya) to hide their hands while beating their breasts. 35. Darb al-zangīl is a performance in which Shi‘i men use chains made of light metal to beat their backs until they bleed. 36. Certain parts of the body are used symbolically in Shi‘i culture. The hand and the head are core symbols embodying martyrdom, sacrifice, wisdom and strength. While the head is directly associated with the decapitation and martyrdom of Imam Husain, the hand is related to the hands of al-‘Abbas, Husain’s brother, which were dismembered by the enemy when al-‘Abbas attempted to fetch water for his thirsty companions under siege. 37. Regardless of the controversy surrounding the marriage of al-Qasim, the son of Imam Hasan and nephew of Imam Husain, Bahraini Shi‘a, like other Shi‘a elsewhere, celebrate his wedding on the seventh day of Muharram.

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