the promise and limitations of realist foreign policy ... - Springer Link

Explaining why state X made a certain move last Tuesday: the promise and limitations of realist foreign policy analysis Anders Wivel Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Rosenborggade 15, Copenhagen K DK-1130, Denmark. E-mail: [email protected]

What are the main challenges facing realist foreign policy analysis today? Which strategies might realists follow in order to answer these challenges? This article argues that contemporary realism faces two fundamental challenges when attempting to explain foreign policy. The first challenge is to combine structural factors with other variables without ending up with a collection of ad hoc arguments. The second, and related, challenge is to combine the realist emphasis on the continued importance of materialist factors such as power with the observation that these factors are interpreted and perceived — not objectively measured — by human beings making foreign policy. The article explores the potential of contemporary realism in order to shed light on the nature of the challenges and discuss how they might be answered. Journal of International Relations and Development (2005) 8, 355–380. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800064 Keywords: foreign policy analysis; neoclassical realism; postclassical realism; structural realism

Introduction Why have European and Asian states not formed an alliance against the overwhelming power of the United States (US) in order to avoid dominance and to influence the big issues of the world today? What are the most important factors explaining China’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War? How should the world’s countries, including the US, respond to the threat posed from terrorism? These questions are central to foreign policy makers and citizens in most of the world today, but if they look to contemporary realist theory for an answer, they are likely to be disappointed. This is not because realists refrain from foreign policy analysis or the policy prescriptions that follow. In contrast, many realists legitimize their theoretical perspective partly by their role as advisors to foreign policy makers and the relevance of realism for analyzing the problems of contemporary security Journal of International Relations and Development, 2005, 8, (355–380) r 2005 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 1408-6980/05 $30.00

www.palgrave-journals.com/jird

Journal of International Relations and Development Volume 8, Number 4, 2005

356

policy (cf. Gilpin 1986; Elman 1996), and realists have repeatedly criticized other approaches to the study of international relations, including liberalism, postmodernism and formal theorizing, for telling us too little about how to solve the security problems faced by states in international relations today (Walt 1991, 1999; Gilpin 1996; Mearsheimer 2001a). However, realist foreign policy analysis presents us with its own set of problems. In particular, contemporary realism seems to leave us with two equally unattractive options when attempting to explain foreign policy: either the indeterminate and highly abstract assumptions of structural realism or the context-specific ad hoc analyses of neoclassical and postclassical realism. The aim of this article is to discuss two important challenges to contemporary realist foreign policy analysis and to explore which strategies realists should pursue in order to answer these challenges. The article is intended as a discussion piece surveying the relevant literature — including discussions of realism and foreign policy as well as realist foreign policy theories and applications of these theories — and seeking to advance the debate by identifying major challenges to realist foreign policy analysis and exploring how to answer these challenges from a realist point of departure.

The Challenges to Realist Foreign Policy Analysis Structural realism explicitly aims to tell us only a few, but important, things about the effect of international structure (conceptualized as anarchy and polarity) on international outcomes. Its ‘defensive’ variant often referred to as neorealism and arguably the most widely used realist perspective since the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics 25 years ago, argues that the anarchic structure of the international system encourages states to act defensively and balance power in order to maximize security. The parsimonious and provocative formulation of the theory is no doubt important to its success and has resulted in important debates on the nature of international relations among realists and between realists and their critics. However, as ‘strictly a theory of international politics’ (Schweller 2003: 317), which explains ‘the constraints that confine all states’ (Waltz 1979: 122), but not ‘why state X made a certain move last Tuesday’ (Waltz 1979: 121), neorealism is left with little relevance for the analysis of foreign policy and many of the international problems facing states around the world today. Offensive structural realists self-consciously position themselves as the direct competitors of Waltz’s neorealism (cf. Mearsheimer 2001a: 19). The theory assumes the anarchic structure to lead states to the opposite behaviour of defensive realism: in order to maximize security in an anarchic international system states tend to maximize power, because the most powerful state is also

A Wivel Why state X made a certain move last Tuesday

357

the most secure. Like neorealism, this is a ‘highly abstract, purely structuralsystemic’ theory (Schweller 2003: 345), which looks to the structure of the international system in order to explain international relations. Structural realists frequently comment on foreign policy (e.g. Elman 1996; Waltz 2000; Mearsheimer 2001b), but the link between their general assumptions about the logic of the international system and the foreign policy of individual states is underspecified: they cannot explain why states behave differently when subject to the same structural pressure. A foreign policy maker looking for guidance in generalizations about how a state tends to act, when subject to an anarchic structure, will find little concrete advice for policy actions. Contemporary realist foreign policy analysis — sometimes branded neoclassical or postclassical realism (Brooks 1997; Rose 1998; Schweller 2003) — tackles this problem directly. Recognizing the limitations of the structural realist framework, these realists explicitly seek to explain foreign policy and specific historic events. They acknowledge the importance of the structure of the international system but find that ‘anarchy is a permissive condition rather than an independent causal force’ (Walt 2002a: 211). Since anarchy and polarity do not determine the actions of states (as acknowledged by structural realists as well), neo- and postclassical realists argue that we need to incorporate other variables in order to explain foreign policy. Accordingly, they draw on classical realist writings to identify the intervening variables between the structural pressures of the international system and foreign policy. However, as in the case of structural realism, foreign policy decision-makers seeking advice may be disappointed. Neo- and postclassical realists incorporate non-structural variables in order to enhance the explanatory power of their theories, but whereas this may be a successful research strategy in regard to the selected case studies they choose to study, it risks compromising the generality and predictive power of the theories leaving the reader confused about their internal logic and whether they may be successfully applied to other cases. Thus, paradoxically, neo- and postclassical realists seem to face the same problem as their structural realist counterparts: they are unable to account systematically for the link between international structure and foreign policy. This problem reflects two more fundamental challenges to contemporary realist foreign policy analysis. The first challenge is to combine structural factors with other variables without ending up with a collection of ad hoc arguments. Relying solely on structural factors leaves us with highly indeterminate predictions about foreign policy behaviour, but adding variables ad hoc based on single case or very few selected case studies seems equally problematic. The second, and related, challenge is to combine the realist emphasis on the continued importance of objective, materialist factors such as power with the observation that these factors are interpreted and perceived — not objectively measured — by human beings making foreign policy. These two


358

challenges are at the heart of realist foreign policy theorizing. As noted by Rynning and Guzzini in a recent discussion of realism and foreign policy analysis, the different realist approaches ‘share two basic ideas: that the interaction of objective and subjective factors define the essence of foreign policy; and that policy processes are pushed and shoved by international power dynamics’ (Rynning and Guzzini 2001: 16). They are also at the heart of debates on how we should study international relations. The first challenge is concerned with the level of analysis problem in international relations, whereas the second challenge is related to the debate between approaches aiming to ‘explain’ international relations by focusing on how similar events occur under similar conditions and approaches aiming to ‘understand’ international relations by focusing on the actors’ interpretation and ‘construction’ of their social worlds (Hollis and Smith 1990; Guzzini and Leander 2001). Interestingly, both of these debates are integral to the realist study of foreign policy and — as is the case more generally — not easily resolved. The two challenges are central to the current debate between realists and their critics as well. For instance, in a recent critique of contemporary realism, Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik argue that the invocation of ‘variation in other exogenous influences on state behaviour — state preferences, beliefs, and international institutions — to trump the direct and indirect effects of material power’ (Legro and Moravcsik 1999: 6) means that ‘the concept of ‘‘realism’’ has been stretched to include assumptions and causal mechanisms within alternative paradigms, albeit with no effort to reconcile the resulting contradictions’ (ibid.: 7). John Vasquez (1997), another prominent critic, finds that the development of the realist research programme over the past 25 years has produced little more than ‘semantic labelling’ used to hide empirical anomalies, and Stefano Guzzini (2004) argues that realists face an ‘identity dilemma’ between either distinctly realist but indeterminate explanations or improved but indistinctive explanations. Realists have responded to this critique by engaging in a debate on the nature of realism and its most recent developments (Waltz et al. 1997; Feaver et al. 2000; Walt 2002a), but so far they have largely failed to address the relevance of the critique for the study of foreign policy. This is a problem, because whether or not realism can be used to explain foreign policy influences the theory’s importance for ‘political, social and economic life, for understanding something that significantly affects many people’s lives, or for understanding and predicting events that might be harmful or beneficial’ (King et al. 1994: 15, cited in Elman 1996: 9, who makes this particular point in a discussion of neorealist theory). Moreover, understanding the potential and problems of realism as a foreign policy theory is likely to spill-back into our understanding of the general nature of the perspective and its applicability to


359

international relations. Even though Kenneth Waltz makes a clear distinction between theories of international relations and theories of foreign policy (Waltz, 1979), other realists rebel against this division and argue that the two are closely related (Elman 1996; Schweller 2001: 185; Mouritzen and Wivel 2005). In addition, the prominence of foreign policy analysis is increasing in the discipline of international relations. The end of the Cold War and the intensification of the European integration process have led to an increased interest in the analysis of the changing nature of American and European foreign policy. A new journal, Foreign Policy Analysis, launched by the International Studies Association is one example of this trend. If realists are to make a significant contribution to this development, they need not only to continue the current production of foreign policy case studies, but also to explore and evaluate the logic of their arguments. This is the aim of the remaining part of this article.

Combining Structural Factors with Other Variables As argued above, structural realism suffers from indeterminacy when explaining foreign policy. This problem is recognized by a number of scholars within the realist tradition, who find that neorealism suffers from ‘underspecified scope conditions’ (Schweller 1997: 929), suggest that ‘the principal rap against the neorealist theory of international politics is that it does not explain enough’ (Snyder 1996: 167) or conclude that Waltz’s theory only leads us to ‘the minimal inference that anarchy places a premium on self-help and accordingly concentrates attention on maintaining one’s relative power’ (Tellis 1996: 76). Kenneth Waltz is well aware of this limitation of structural realism and takes great care to stress that ‘structurally we can describe and understand the pressures states are subject to. We cannot predict how they will react to the pressures without knowledge of their internal dispositions’ (cf. Waltz 1979: 71, 1996). This shows the necessity of combing structural variables with other variables if we are to explain foreign policy from realist premises. Structural realists seem to agree with this argument and to acknowledge that their theories are underspecified in regard to foreign policy and emphasize that it is impossible to explain behaviour from purely structural assumptions. Thus, they argue that structure is a ‘selector’ (Waltz 1979: 73), which ‘influences behaviour by rewarding some types of behaviour and punishing others’ (Gilpin 1981: 85). According to Waltz and Gilpin, the individual cost–benefit analyses of the actors, not international structure, are decisive for the outcome of international relations. Waltz (1986: 331) notes that states are ‘sensitive to costs’ and Gilpin (1981: 10) finds that ‘[a] state will attempt to change


360

the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e. if there is an expected net gain)’. Thus, anarchy provides a setting affecting the costs and benefits of state action and therefore foreign policy. Yet, if we want to explain foreign policy, we need to combine international structure with other types of variables. As argued by Jennifer Sterling-Folker, structural realist assumptions about international anarchy provides a deductive basis for combining systemic and other variables and ‘[t]he simultaneous impact of environment and process explains why the choices groups make in anarchy are similar and yet not identical’ (Sterling-Folker 1997: 20).1 What happens when we move from principle to practice in the form of contemporary realist foreign policy analysis? Two different sets of variables have played a particularly important role in the recent attempts of realists to explain foreign policy. First, realists have attempted to combine structural and systemic factors. Rejecting the neorealist dichotomy between structure and units, adherents of this position argue that a third set of variables located neither at the structural level, nor at the unit level plays an important role in ‘shaping and shoving’ the actions of states (cf. Buzan 1993: 79), a role awarded to international structure by Waltz (1986: 343). Although representing a diverse body of literature, these realists tend to base their foreign policy predictions — either implicitly or explicitly — on the shared assumption that the effect of the structure of the international system on state behaviour is contingent on variations in the probability of military conflict (Brooks, 1997). States adapt their foreign policies to changes in factors affecting the likelihood that they are going to war. Far from advancing a common theory, these realists point to a number of systemic variables affecting foreign policy in this way. These include technological change (Buzan et al. 1993; Glaser 1995; Deudney 2000; Rhodes 2004), geopolitics (Walt 1987; Lake 1997; Levy 2004; Mouritzen and Wivel 2005) and economic change (Wohlforth 1994/1995; Brooks and Wohlforth 2000/2001; Gilpin 2000; Brawley 2004). They also include patterns of enmity/amity (Buzan 1991), patterns of common and conflicting interests (Snyder 1997) and patterns of institutional similarity (Lemke 2004). In essence, this body of literature, sometimes termed postclassical realism (Brooks 1997), seeks to explain variations in foreign policy over time and space by supplementing the structural assumptions of neorealism with a set of condition variables governing the size of the impact of anarchy and polarity on foreign policy.2 Second, realists have attempted to combine structural factors with domestic politics in order to explain foreign policy. This body of literature is now usually termed neoclassical realism (Rose 1998; Schweller 2003). Like postclassical realism, neoclassical realism does not reject structural


361

realism but seeks to incorporate its insights (Schweller, 2003: 318). Neoclassical realists argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical (Rose 1998: 146). Neoclassical realist foreign policy analysis stresses that foreign policy decisions are made by human beings, political leaders and elites, and therefore the decisions are influenced by their perceptions of relative power (Wohlforth 1993) and perceptions of intent (Walt 1987, 1996, 2002b), state motivations (Schweller 1998) and how the values of the leaders interact with their cost– benefit analysis in economic and security affairs in the formulation of foreign policy (Jervis 2005). They also explore the importance of the political tradition and identity of foreign policy elites (Friedberg 2000; Monten 2005) and how they manipulate low-level conflicts to mobilize support for their long-term strategies (Christensen 1996). In addition, they focus on the importance of the balance of power between domestic institutions (Zakaria 1998) and the building and propaganda of domestic coalitions (Snyder 1991) for foreign policy and the relationship between the threat environment and civil–military relations (Desch 1999) and the change of military doctrines (Rynning 2001) as well as the implications of dominant interpretations of national history — often perceived as lessons of the past — for foreign policy making (Mouritzen and Wivel 2005). Thus, the link between the external environment of the state and its foreign policy choices is viewed as indirect and complex and can only be uncovered through detailed case studies (Schweller 2003). More specifically, complex domestic political processes act as transmission belts that channel, mediate and (re)direct policy outputs in response to external forces (primarily changes in relative power). Hence, states often react differently to similar systemic pressures and opportunities, and their response may be less motivated by systemic-level factors than domestic ones (Schweller, 2004: 164). Or to put it slightly differently, like postclassical realism, neoclassical realism seeks to explain variations in foreign policy over time and space by supplementing the structural assumptions of neorealism with a set of condition variables governing the size of the impact of anarchy and polarity on foreign policy. Neoclassical and postclassical realism aim to explain foreign policy and most often their proponents reject the distinction made by Waltz between theories of


362

international politics and theories of foreign policy. The move from a universal realism predicting some general tendencies in the international system (selfhelp, balance of power) and seeking to explain why ‘states behave similarly and, despite their variations, produce outcomes that fall within expected ranges’ (Waltz 1988: 43) to a contingent realism seeking to explain the variations within these ranges leads postclassical and neoclassical realists to ask a different set of questions from neorealists (Wivel 2000: 139–44, 2002: 439–43; Wohlforth 2004: 215–19). For instance, in a recent volume on Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Paul et al. 2004), Waltz continues as the standard reference in the literature on the subject, but in general the contributors are less interested in the logic of systemic balance of power than in the security behaviour of states, a subject which, ‘[t]raditional conceptions of balance of power may not be able to capture fully’ (Paul 2004: 13). Thus, they seek to specify different types of balancing behaviour (hard, soft, asymmetric) and to identify the key strategies associated with them. Accordingly, the contributions to the volume concentrate on answering questions such as what strategies other than balancing and bandwagoning best capture the behaviour of states in a given region, whether states pursue a mix of liberal and realist strategies, whether soft balancing is now more common than hard balancing, and what role terrorism plays in the security strategies of states and their cooperation (ibid.: 17–18). Other contingent realist analyses ask how the effect of international anarchy on state action varies with the ability of states to signal their intentions through weapons technology (Glaser 1995; van Evera 1999), how variations in the strength of the state and the governing regime affects the strategies of the political elite (David 1991; Schweller 2004), how the strategy of the world’s only superpower, the US, affects the dynamics and durability of unipolarity (Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999; Wohlforth 1999, 2002; Kagan and Kristol 2000; Walt 2001/2002), and why military occupations succeed or fail (Edelstein 2004). Neoclassical and postclassical realism are most usefully viewed as analytical distinctions — not coherent theoretical schools or independent research programmes.3 They begin from neorealist assumptions about international structure but supplement them with systemic and domestic variables. My description of the two positions shows that in practice some analysts include both systemic and domestic factors in their analyses. For instance, Stephen Walt (1987, 1996, 2002b) uses a combination of power (aggregate and offensive), geopolitical location and the foreign policy makers’ perception of intent to explain foreign policy, and Mouritzen and Wivel and their collaborators (2005) show how present geopolitical location influences foreign policy, but only after being interpreted by foreign policy elites using the perceived lessons of past geopolitics as a guide for the present. Universal and contingent realism should not be seen as opposites and whether one is to be


363

preferred over the other depends on the type of question that we are endeavouring to answer. As noted by Robert Keohane in his defence of the realist research programme, ‘[t]o achieve a more finely tuned understanding of how resources affect behaviour in particular situations, one needs to specify the policy-contingency framework more precisely. The domain of the theory is narrowed to achieve greater precision’ (Keohane 1986: 188; cf. Schweller 2003: 336, 346). Thus, rather than posing the choice between universal and contingent versions of realism as a clear-cut, either/or choice between parsimony and contextual subtlety, we should instead view it as a question of stages. At first we should seek parsimony and then gradually add complexity in order to enhance the explanatory power of the approach. We begin with the universal assumptions of neorealism from which we get the most basic assumptions about the international system and its actors (Zakaria 1998: 16). Then we move on to explore the systemic constraints of those actors before identifying the effect of domestic politics. Each stage takes us one step away from the general theory of purely structural realism and one step closer to the specific foreign policy explanations. In principle, a complete realist explanation of international relations would include all three stages and yet, depending on the object of analysis, most analysts choose to focus on one over the other (Wivel 2002: 442–43). The greatest achievement of post- and neoclassical realism is that they enable us to make predictions about specific states and explain why they acted in a particular way. As noted by Stephen Walt (1996: 339) in regard to his own work, compared to purely structural accounts ‘we obtain a more complete picture of the forces that shape state behaviour’. Thus, we get closer to explaining ‘why state X made a certain move last Tuesday’ (cf. Waltz 1979: 121), and predicting the consequences of this move for state X by applying the logic of the theory to state Y and Z. Based on this, we are able to provide a more detailed explanation of the foreign policy of individual states and the patterns of cooperation and conflict that follow. In addition, contingent realism allows us to build a bridge between the two versions of structural realism, offensive and defensive realism. Structural realism is based on an admirably simple logic. States are rational, unitary actors with the primary aim of survival in the international system’s anarchic structure. In the defensive variant, this logic leads states to strive to maintain their position in the international system, rather than to maximize their power, because conquest does not pay and may even be counterproductive. Conquest endangers the security — and ultimately survival — of the state in order to maximize power, because at some point an alliance will form in order to balance the state’s power, which may pose a threat now or in the future. Offensive structural realism builds on the same simple structural logic of rational, unitary actors striving to survive in anarchy, but the theory predicts


364

the opposite behaviour: states are expected to maximize power and, ultimately, strive for hegemony. This is because the most powerful state is also the most secure state. Therefore, according to this understanding of international relations, there is no such thing as status quo powers. Contingent realism allows us to build a bridge between the two versions of structural realism, because their disagreement does not originate in different conceptions of international structure. Neither defensive, nor offensive behaviour follows necessarily from the structural realists’ conception of the anarchic structure of the international system. Rather, the difference emanates from how much value offensive and defensive realists expect states to put on security in an anarchic world (Snyder 2002: 154–55). As noted by Snyder ‘it seems ironic that these two structural realists should differ most basically about a ‘‘unit-level’’ factor: that is how much security do states desire’? (ibid.: 155). Moreover, there is considerable variation in how much value states put on security and we cannot explain this variation by a constant such as anarchy. Fortunately, contingent realism offers a bridge over the divide between offensive and defensive structural realists that allows us to explain this variation. Rather than arguing that states per se act offensively or defensively, they allow us to deduce a number of hypotheses under which conditions we would expect states to follow one strategy or the other. For instance, we might hypothesize on the effect of systemic factors such as technological and economic change for state strategies (Wivel 2004) or how elite consensus and barriers to mobilization affect the strategic response of states to changes in relative power (Schweller 2004). This allows contingent realists to refocus the intra-realist debate. Instead of debating whether states tend to pursue offensive or defensive strategies, they ask when and how states pursue which strategies. Contingent realism allows us to explain the foreign policies of states with more precision than structural realism and provides the necessary nuances to the debate between offensive and defensive realists. However, there is a tension in many of these analyses between on the one hand providing a theoretical explanation, which ‘generalizes across regimes, cultures, and peoples’ (Zakaria 1998: 16) and on the other hand giving a rich empirical account of the foreign policy of a particular country or set of countries. This tension often results in vagueness when contingent realists try to identify exactly what it is they are striving to explain. For instance, Fareed Zakaria in his analysis of American foreign policy begins by asking the question ‘[w]hat turns rich nations into ‘‘great powers’’’? (Zakaria 1998: 3) but quickly narrows this down to ‘why America expanded in the 1890s’, which is to be studied in a comparative perspective with earlier periods (ibid.: 5) and then finally ‘[t]he search for a dominant cause that explains the course of late-nineteenth century American foreign policy’ (ibid.: 8), in effect 1865–1908, while still maintaining that ‘under what conditions do states expand their political interests abroad?’ is ‘the central


365

question’ of his study (ibid.: 8) and emphasizing his intention to ‘test y two theories of foreign policy’ (ibid.: 10). These quotes exemplify that in the eyes of contingent realist scholars, their perspective ‘straddles diplomatic history and international relations theory’ (Schweller 2003: 344). Although, Schweller sees this as a strength which allows this group of realists to satisfy ‘the discipline’s thirst for both richness and rigor’ (ibid.: 344), this is easier said than done. In addition to the trade-off between empirical richness and analytical rigor that is always involved in this kind of research, the development of political science and history since the second world war reflect very different political and methodological trends as well as different disciplinary conditions, as the US plays a much bigger role internationally in political science research than in historical research (Jervis 2001). These are important reasons for the intellectual differences between the two disciplines, most importantly their different approaches to theory building and case studies. For the political scientist — at least the one working within the same mainstream soft-positivist tradition as contemporary realists — theory-building, understood as ‘developing, elaborating, and criticizing constructs at a fairly high level of abstraction’, is seen as important in itself and new theoretical statements are regarded as interesting and valuable contributions to the literature if they come anyway near accepted empirical documentation (ibid.: 393). Using their theories, political scientists often deduce hypotheses from their theoretical constructs in order to test or at least apply them, thereby ‘inevitably produc[ing] some flattening of the historical record in order to achieve analytical rigor and parsimony’ (ibid.: 394). In general, historians disagree with this approach criticizing it for ‘tak[ing] things out of context’ and usually prefer a much closer integration of description and explanation (ibid.: 396). Whereas political scientists typically regard cases as specific examples of more general phenomena, historians find that this ‘assume[s] generality that is not likely to be present and to downplay if not deny what is central to their concerns, which is to understand why things happened as they did in that instance’ (ibid.: 392). As exemplified by the quotes from Zakaria, contingent realists want it both ways — to understand and to explain, to test without flattening the historical record, to develop general theories and to delve into particular case studies — but they tell us little about how this is possible and how we should go about it in practice.4 In essence, what they have not yet developed is a ‘user’s guide’ for potential contingent realists telling them how to go about their research and why. This is not to argue that the attempt to bridge the study of international relations and the study of diplomatic history is futile or that it may not succeed eventually. As argued by Wohlforth (2001), both disciplines will gain from learning from each other and few political scientists or historians would argue that their theories cannot be improved, but for now at least scholars from each


366

of the disciplines seem to be speaking different languages even when they explicitly aim to communicate.5 Contingent realism — the neoclassical variant in particular — borrows from both, but whether contingent realists are straddling the disciplines or just stuck in the middle between them remains to be seen in the years to come as contingent realists refine their theoretical and methodological identity. In this development, one of the most important challenges will be to clarify the theoretical contribution of the theories. As noted by several critics, the theoretical contribution of contingent realism is unclear. The lack of clarity pertains to the contribution of individual theories as well as their combined contribution to the realist tradition. In regard to individual theories, so far this body of literature has only presented us with ‘first-cut theories’, that is, focused and testable candidate solutions to their research puzzles, but based on radical simplifications of reality that do not pretend to give a complete explanation (cf. Zakaria 1998; Wivel 2000). Thus, even though contingent realists agree that they wish to explain foreign policy, none of them argue that they explain each and every aspect of foreign policy (or for that matter that it is possible to explain foreign policy as such). In general they keep their analysis focused on explaining why and when states pursue particular strategies, but they tell us virtually nothing about the day-to-day politics of foreign policy-making.6 Thus, even though they add variables to structural realism in order to achieve greater analytical precision, they do not explain ‘what state X did last Tuesday’. This is not necessarily a problem as long as this limitation is made clear by the analysts, but it does leave the theories vulnerable to arguments that the grand strategies of the presidents and prime ministers that they seek to explain is gradually modified and shaped by the day-to-day politics left out of the theories. Another aspect of this problem is that the inner logic of the theories is generally weak. As noted by Glenn Snyder the rather abstract and imprecise nature of structural realism may be seen as a good reason to sacrifice ‘parsimony and logical elegance y in favour of greater ‘‘realism’’ (Snyder, 2002: 157). However, the cost of this process has been a less compelling logic of the realist arguments. The problem is illustrated in balance of threat theory. Balance of threat theory is generally considered one of the strongest additions to the realist research programme after Waltz. It has survived 20 years of radically changing security environments from the bipolar stalemate of the Cold War in the 1980s to the unipolar world order and the challenge of terrorism in the early 21st century and has been used to analyze a remarkably diverse set of case studies.7 The theory aims to explain foreign policy by four variables: aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions. However, what is the inner logic of the theory? Obviously, these variables are important sources of threat, but so are historical


367

experience, political tradition and culture, the personality of decision makers and ideology. Why should our explanation rely on the first set of variables rather than the second, or a third for that matter? One possible answer is that the first set of variables fits into structural realist balance of power theory, balance of threat theory’s explicit point of departure. However, two of the theory’s four variables, geographic proximity and perception of intent, seem antithetical to structural realism. Geographic proximity is excluded from neorealist theory, which is concerned with the systemic balance of power, not regional or sub-regional balances. Only systemic great powers count in structural realism, and variations in foreign policy are explained by shifts in polarity. Even though Waltz writes of the ‘position’ of powers, it is their power position in the international system, not their geopolitical position he is concerned about. Perceptions of intent are even more difficult to integrate into a neorealist framework. In structural realism intentions do not matter, because it is the mere possibility of conflict in anarchy and the distribution of capabilities that prompts state behaviour. In contrast, perception of intent originates in domestic politics, not in the international structure. In essence, claiming that the selection of variables is guided by its point of departure in structural realism seems unjustifiable. A second possible answer is that the first set of variables explain ‘more’ than the second set of variables, that is, that the first set of variables corresponds better to reality. Obviously, Ceteris paribus, we would choose variables that explain much over variables that explain little. In order to do this we could derive hypotheses from the two sets of variables and test them against each other. The problem is that even if we test the two sets of variables on a number of cases we still do not know exactly which variable(s) determined the outcome, only that it was included in the more successful of the two sets. In effect, balance of threat theory presents us with a grab bag argument. If one element in the theory does not explain state action, another probably will, but the exact conditions under which they apply as well as the relation between the variables remain underspecified. The methodological part of this challenge to realist foreign policy analysis is not insurmountable and to answer it realist foreign policy analysts should specify the choices they make in regard to research design and case selection and outline the consequences of these choices. For instance, they can take care to specify the status of the case(s) in relation to other potential cases and their reasons for case selection (cf. Walt 1987) and they may conduct ‘plausibility probes’ exploring the general applicability of a theory applied to a single or multiple case study (Mouritzen and Wivel 2005). Still, even if the methodological part of the challenge is answered, critics may find the inner logic of the theories is too weak, since different aspects of the theories are incompatible. Once the analytical boundary between theories of international politics and theories of foreign policy is rejected, it becomes


368

difficult to separate material power from the interpretation of it. Thus, if we acknowledge that foreign policy is made by real people interpreting their environment, including the structure of the international system, then we need to engage in a discussion of how we understand the interplay between materialist and idealist variables. This challenge to realist foreign policy analysis is the subject of the next section.

Combining Materialist and Idealist Arguments How can realist foreign policy analysts reconcile the continued emphasis on the importance of materialist variables with the idealist variables involved when focusing on the perceptions of decision makers interpreting the materialist forces of international relations? To answer this question, we need to specify what we mean by idealist and materialist variables. I understand materialist variables as those related to ‘the capabilities or resources, mainly military, with which states can influence one another’ (Wohlforth 1993: 4; cf. Mearsheimer 2001a: 55–82). I understand idealist variables as ‘motives’, that is, ‘those basic psychological driving forces which determine which particular goals the actor will pursue’ (Chittick and Freyberg-Inan 2001: 69) as well as ‘beliefs held by individuals’ (Keohane and Goldstein 1993: 3), that is, their ‘world views’ (religions, political ideologies), ‘principled beliefs’ (allowing actors to distinguish right from wrong) and ‘causal beliefs’ (ideas about cause–effect relationships guiding the actors on which means to employ in order to achieve their goals) (ibid.: 8–10). Realists do not dismiss that ideas sometimes influence the actions of foreign policymakers, but when it comes to integrating motives and ideas into the analytical frameworks of realism, the critics cited in the beginning of this article are right that contingent realism as it stands now seems to present us with ad hoc frameworks due to the weak inner logic of the theories described above. However, this need not be the case. Assumptions about motives and ideas are already integral to the realist framework, and moreover, impossible to escape. Thus, realists need to make sense of how ideas fit into their theoretical framework. The aim here is neither to put forward a grand synthesis between the materialist assumptions of realism and the idealist assumptions of some of its critics, nor to develop a specific realist theory which integrates idealist factors into the realist framework. Instead I present a template for thinking about this issue with the specific aim of furthering and systematizing the debate on realism and ideas, in general, and realism and foreign policy, in particular. In order to do this, I will suggest three ways in which ideas could be coupled more systematically to the realist framework in order to strengthen the potential of realist foreign policy analysis. Including examples from


369

contemporary realist foreign policy analysis, I intend to show that possible solutions to the problem are already present in contingent realism, although they would benefit from further theoretical explication and development. I begin with the solution with the most limited role for non-materialist variables and then gradually expand the role for ideas and motivations. First, realists can ask to what extent the foreign policy of states is ‘optimal in the light of material incentives’ (Wohlforth 2005: 168). Here, the role for ideas is to explain the deviation of actual state action from materialist, realist expectations. A good starting point for doing this is balance of threat theory, because it presents us with distinguishable materialist and idealist variables. Thus, we can start out by assessing the foreign policy under scrutiny in the light of aggregate and offensive power and geographic proximity and then move on to perceptions of intent in order to explain what is not explainable in terms of materialist variables. Stephen Walt’s own applications of the theory come close to doing this. For instance, he explains the lack of a stable international coalition against the overwhelming power of the US in the contemporary world order as a combination of the relative geographic isolation of the US, the deterrent capabilities of other states (and thus the lack of offensive power of the US), and the ability of the US so far to signal that it ‘may be self-righteous, overweening and occasionally trigger-happy, but it is not trying to acquire additional territory’, which has disinclined other states to balance American power (Walt 2002b: 139). Another important challenge, responding to alQaeda and international terrorism after 11 September, 2001, is interpreted in a similar way. The attacks are interpreted as a response to the combination of overwhelming American power and the global engagement of the US. This response is extreme, but in combination with the response of other actors inside and outside the Arab and Islamic world, it is seen as an indication of widespread concerns of the American power and policy in the present world order. Accordingly, ‘the ability of the US to remain actively engaged at an acceptable cost will depend in large part on whether it can reduce these costs by making its dominant position more acceptable to the rest of the world’ (Walt 2001/2002: 76). In accordance with this understanding, the war in Iraq is seen as detrimental to American security interests, because of the combined effect of the diversion of material resources from more pressing dangers and the risk of undermining support for the US and the war against terrorism (Hunter 2003; Mearsheimer and Walt 2003). Second, realists can ask how materialist and idealist variables interact in foreign policy behaviour. Basically realists can give either an offensive or a defensive answer to this question. The defensive answer is to accept theoretical and methodological pluralism as a consequence of the complexity of foreign policy making. Recognizing the difficulty of dividing the possession of power from the perception of power, classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau and


370

Hedley Bull combined systemic and material pressures with intersubjective meanings and thereby adopted a position of theoretical and methodological pluralism. This position, now often associated with the English School in the study of international relations, is different from the position of Waltz and other structural realists but not necessarily inferior to it (Buzan and Little 2000: 43–47). It allows us to conduct richer case studies and avoid the analytical blind spots inevitable when staying within the confines of either ‘explaining’ or ‘understanding’. Furthermore, pluralism could be seen as a necessary consequence of a more complex international environment following from the end of the Cold War and the attacks on Washington and New York on 11 September, 2001. The realist insights on international relations, it could be argued, are not as deep and important as they used to be during the Cold War, when superpower rivalry dominated most international issues. Realists seem to acknowledge this as they are now ‘using other types of theories and tools for analyzing other types of dangers’ including weak states and terrorist networks (Glaser 2003: 407). There are important potential costs to this research strategy if adopted by realists. Most importantly, it means giving up on the possibility of creating a strong explanatory theory of foreign policy. As noted in a recent discussion of Morgenthau’s classical realism, he ‘offers no theoretical account of when and why a state will choose one strategy over another’ (Donnelly 2000: 46). This has important consequences for his theory, because it ‘simply cannot tell us whether a state will seek safety or gain, prefer to attack or to defend, accept or eschew the risks of expansion. This indeterminacy is theoretically fatal because these objectives separately may imply radically different policies and together cover an immense range of possible behaviours. As such, his theory does not explain state action but ‘merely provide[s] a typology for categorizing a wide array of divergent, even contradictory, behaviours’ (ibid.: 46–47). Moreover, a pluralist approach sacrifices some of realism’s analytical clarity and rigor. As acknowledged by Buzan and Little, it is virtually impossible to know when we should stop adding new dimensions of reality to an analysis conducted from this point of view (Buzan and Little 2000: 46). Just as importantly: as we keep adding new dimensions it becomes increasingly difficult to discern what we are actually analyzing and which elements of our explanation or understanding are more important than others (cf. Copeland 2003). These drawbacks are not as devastating as they might seem. The discussions above have shown that contemporary realist foreign policy analysis is not based on unambiguous and easily testable theories. Structural realist hypotheses on foreign policy are indeterminate and contingent realist hypotheses tend to be ad hoc and tied to specific cases. The discussions of contingent realism imply that theoretical and methodological pluralism is already implicit — perhaps unavoidable — in realist foreign policy analysis as


371

soon as we go beyond purely structural explanations. Therefore, explicit pluralism could be an improvement on the theoretical and methodological uncertainty often present in realist analyses of foreign policy. Adopting pluralism as an explicit strategy rather than an implicit default position would make realists more conscious of their theoretical and methodological choices and allow them to learn from the experience of classical realists, the realist segment of the English School and other adherents of this methodology and thereby to avoid some of the potential pitfalls associated with it. Still, this research strategy implies that realists should accept ad hocness as a permanent and inevitable characteristic of their foreign policy theories and for this reason it will be unsatisfactory for many contemporary realists, in particular in the US (Little 2003). An offensive answer to the question of how materialist and idealist factors interact would be to explore the consequences of this interaction systematically through theoretical discussion and empirical investigation, that is, to explore how the materialist aspects of the world interact with our ideas and perceptions of these aspects in the production of foreign policy. A good example of this is the work of William Wohlforth (1993) on the balance of power during the Cold War. Starting with the insight of classical realists — and the defensive research strategy discussed above — that the nature of material power cannot easily be divided from the nature of the perceptions of power, Wohlforth analyses Soviet and US perceptions of the balance of power during the Cold War and shows how the ideas and perceptions of power affected superpower behaviour from 1945 to 1989. Wohlforth’s analysis may serve as a key inspiration in the future development of realist foreign policy analysis for three reasons. First, it illustrates the benefits from tackling the materialist/idealist challenge head on. Power is the central concept of realist analyses of international relations and foreign policy. But what is power? And how does it affect the decisions of foreign policy makers? Exploring the nature of power theoretically, Wohlforth shows how a purely materialist definition of power, as preferred in most of the recent realist literature following Waltz’s focus on the capabilities of states, is highly problematic, not least if we want to analyze foreign policy: it is difficult to measure and its effects are almost impossible to divide from the calculations and perceptions of foreign policy makers. As noted by Wohlforth, his discussion ‘calls into question the very idea of ‘‘real’’ power’ (ibid.: 10), and accordingly he breaks down power and the balance of power into four aspects (the elements of power, the distribution of power, the mechanics of power and prestige) providing a template for his systematic exploration of the interaction of the materialist and idealist components of power and their effect on foreign policy. Second, his analysis shows that it is possible to account systematically for behaviour by including changes in perceptions, despite the difficulties associated with identifying perceptions and measuring their effect. As he notes


372

in the final chapter of the book ‘[t]he experience of the Soviet Union and the US in the Cold War suggests that perceptions of power may indeed follow definable patterns and that knowledge about them will add something beyond the bounds of each case study’ (ibid.: 293). Finally, Wohlforth focuses just as much on the difficulties of his own analysis as he does on its strengths. He stresses the ambiguity of power and perceptions and the methodological difficulties such as ‘sorting out opportunistic from more genuine articulations’ (ibid.: 30). Even though he rarely comes up with watertight solutions to these problems, his balanced and honest discussion of the challenges he encountered and the way he tried to answer them provides a valuable first draft of a road map for realist foreign policy analysis. Third, realists can ask what the micro-foundations of their perspective are. Structural realism does ‘not make reference to motivation but, instead, explain international systemic outcomes primarily with reference to environmental constraints, such as the distribution of power in the international system’ (Freyberg-Inan 2004: 96). They rely on implicit assumptions about actors ‘always adopting a worst-case perspective’ (Brooks 1997: 446), because they are highly fearful.8 The problems of keeping motivational assumptions implicit become obvious when we engage in foreign policy analysis. Without explicitly identifying the range of motivational possibilities, realists are unable to specify their assumptions about how decision makers will react to changes in their international and domestic environments. In order to do this, realists may choose between at least three strategies. First, realists may begin from the motivational assumptions already present in realist theory and seek to develop these further. Realist discussions of motives, in general, share an ‘emphasis on self-interest’ (Donnelly 2000: 56), but derive many different predictions about state behaviour from this assumption. Therefore, an important task for realists would be to systematize these accounts in order to clarify to which extent they are complementary or mutually exclusive and specify when and why certain types of state behaviour occur instead of others. Stephen Brooks’ distinction between realist theory basing its behavioural expectations on the possibility of conflict and realist theory basing its behavioural expectations on the probability of conflict can be seen as a useful first-cut at doing this (Brooks 1997). Second, realists may begin their specification of motivational assumptions from international relations theory and political science more generally. For instance, realists may base their motivational assumptions on game theory (e.g. Grieco 1990) or on the literature on the role of individual personalities in international relations (e.g. Byman and Pollack 2001), or they may explore how motivational assumptions derived from realism can be combined with motivational assumptions derived from other theoretical perspectives on international relations (Mowle 2003; Freyberg-Inan 2004: 162–68).


373

Finally, realists may look outside political science in order to base their motivational assumptions on more robust foundations than those provided by either structural or classical realism. For instance, Bradley Thayer argues that evolutionary theory will provide realism with scientifically acceptable microfoundations (Thayer 2000). Even though Thayer’s argument is disputed (cf. Bell, MacDonald and Thayer 2001) and its socio-biological arguments will be unacceptable to many realists, his contribution is an explicit attempt to explicate realist assumptions about human motivations and to outline the implications for international relations. Less controversially, realists may look to psychology for a solid foundation for and specification of their motivational assumptions.9

Where Do We Go From Here? From a Theory of International Politics to a Theory of Foreign Policy The publication of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics in 1979 effectively set the stage for scholarly debates on realism and its applicability to international relations the following 25 years. It also effectively closed the realist debate on foreign policy analysis for much of the same period. Focusing narrowly on how the structure of the international system affects international outcomes and self-consciously excluding discussions of ‘why state X made a certain move last Tuesday’ (Waltz 1979: 121) put the theory at the centre of debates on the nature of the international system, the possibility of international cooperation, and the sources of peace and war in international relations, but also marginalized the realist study of foreign policy. Realists are unlikely to make a significant contribution to the current development of foreign policy analysis unless they explore and evaluate the logic of their arguments in order to move beyond the highly abstract and indeterminate arguments of structural realist explanations. This article took one step in that direction by discussing two important challenges to contemporary realist foreign policy analysis. The first challenge was to combine structural factors with other variables without ending up with an ad hoc argument. The second challenge was to combine an emphasis on the continued importance of objective, materialist factors with the observation that these factors are interpreted and perceived by human beings making foreign policy. Exploring these challenges showed the promise as well as the limitations of contemporary realist foreign policy analysis. So far, with few exceptions, realists have ignored the need for thorough discussions of their basic concepts and the applicability of these concepts to the analysis of foreign policy, and despite the large and growing realist literature on the subject, there has been little accumulation of the results of the individual studies. Still, aspects of the


374

recent development of realist foreign policy analysis show promise for the future. The rapidly growing contingent realist literature has produced a set of first-cut theories that will serve as a starting point for future theory development, and even though there has so far been surprisingly little debate among realists on how to construct and apply realist foreign policy theory, recent additions to the literature suggest that realists are now finally beginning to explore systematically the relationship between realist assumptions and foreign policy behaviour in a dialogue with non-realists (e.g. Paul et al. 2004). Where should we go from here? The discussions within this article lead to three recommendations for the development of realist foreign policy theory. First, realist foreign policy analysis is not an either/or choice between rigorous theoretical parsimony and empirically rich case studies. Instead, realist foreign policy analysis should ideally proceed in stages from the parsimonious and highly general starting point in structural realism to the rich case studies allowing us to explain the specific foreign policy of individual countries. Second, foreign policy is made by human beings. Even though realists contend that these human beings are subject to structural pressure and that this tends to affect their decisions considerably, we know little about how this will affect their decisions until we add assumptions about motivations and human nature. Classical realists had strong views on human nature and its importance for international relations, but in contemporary realism assumptions about human nature and motivations are often implicit. This is often overlooked in analyses of international relations, but as shown by the discussion above, it is an integral aspect of foreign policy analysis and realists need to take it seriously. The strategies sketched above provide a starting point for thinking systematically about this issue from a realist point of departure. The final recommendation is that realists should devote less attention to specific case studies and more attention to the general conceptual and theoretical basis of their foreign policy analyses. In the 15 years since the end of the Cold War, realists have successfully moved into new territory by explaining international cooperation and institutionalization (e.g. Grieco 1990; Schweller and Priess 1997; Gruber 2000), the security problems of weak states (e.g. David 1998; Ayoob 2002) and even globalization and European integration (e.g. Wivel 2004). Most of these extensions of realism have been based on solid theoretical discussions. In contrast, the development of realist foreign policy analysis has mainly been based on single case studies, producing a number of interesting, detailed and empirically rich analyses, but most often without dealing with the fundamental challenges and dilemmas of analyzing foreign policy from a realist perspective. Shedding light on these challenges will allow realists not only to explain foreign policy better than today — and thereby to increase the real-life relevance of their theories — but also to engage in much more fruitful discussions with other theoretical perspectives. Following this


375

strategy, realists are likely to find that exploring ‘why state X made a certain move last Tuesday’ tells them a lot more than just that. Notes 1 Cf. Mouritzen (1997), who argues that whether combination is actually possible, depends on one’s metaphysical starting point (Mouritzen 1997: 75). IR realists are also metaphysical realists: they believe ‘in a reality existing independently from human language and its theoretical constructions. A segment of this reality corresponds to each level in our theoretical language. If factors belonging to various segments have co-produced the phenomenon for which we wish to account, then we should obviously in our explanation combine the corresponding theoretical levels’ (ibid.: 75). Thus, nothing should hinder IR realists in aiming for a combination. 2 On condition variables, cf. van Evera (1997: 11). 3 One of the most important neoclassical realist scholars, Randall Schweller, disagrees with this point. He sees neoclassical realism as a research programme. In addition, he tends to see scholars — rather than specific variables or particular works — as neoclassical. See Schweller (2003). 4 For a more positive evaluation focusing on neoclassical realism, see Schweller (2003). 5 Cf. the contributions to Elman and Elman (2001). 6 Also, they tend to tell us only little about whether the strategies succeed, because outcomes can only be explained when we include the actions of other actors (cf. Zakaria 1998). 7 The theory has been applied on alliance formation in the Middle East (Walt 1987; Priess 1996; Cooper and Taylor 2003), Southwest Asia (Walt 1988) and the transatlantic area (e.g. Walt 1998/ 1999), the wars that follow revolutions (Walt 1996) and American foreign policy (e.g. Mastanduno 1999; Walt 2001/2002, 2002b) and a modified version of the theory has been used to analyze German and Palestinian Terrorist organizations (Karmon 1999). Also, the prominence of balance of threat theory is illustrated by a recent volume Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, which sees Walt’s theory as a major modification of balance of power theory (Paul, Wirtz and Fortman, 2004; in particular the introduction by Paul 2004: 8). 8 As noted by Freyberg-Inan, structural realism ‘holds constant’ the motivation of states in order to examine the impact of systemic variables on the outcomes of state behaviour that are observable at the systems level’ (Freyberg-Inan 2004: 97). 9 For instance in a recent analysis, Jonathan Mercer shows how rationalist arguments depend on psychology (Mercer 2005).

References Ayoob, Mohammad (2002) ‘Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism’, International Studies Review 4(3): 27–48. Bell, Duncan S.A., Paul K. MacDonald and Bradley Thayer (2001) ‘Correspondence: Start the Evolution without Us’, International Security 26(1): 187–98. Brawley, Mark R. (2004) ‘The Political Economy of Balance of Power Theory’, in Thaza Varkey Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann, eds, Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 76–99, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Brooks, Stephen G. (1997) ‘Dueling Realisms’, International Organization 51(3): 445–77. Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth (2000/2001) ‘Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas’, International Security 23(3): 5–53. Buzan, Barry (1991) People, States and Fear (2nd edn), New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.


376 Buzan, Barry (1993) ‘Rethinking System and Structure, in Barry Buzan, Richard Little and Charles Jones’, eds, The Logic of Anarchy, 19–80, New York: Columbia University Press. Buzan, Barry and Richard Little (2000) International Systems in World History, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Buzan, Barry, Richard Little and Charles Jones (1993) The Logic of Anarchy, New York: Columbia University Press. Byman, Daniel L. and Kenneth M. Pollack (2001) ‘Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In’, International Security 25(4): 107–46. Chittick, William O. and Annette Freyberg-Inan (2001) ‘Chiefly for Fear, Next for Honour, and Lastly for Profit: An Analysis of Foreign Policy Motivation in the Peloponnesian War’, Review of International Studies 27: 69–90. Christensen, Thomas J. (1996) Useful Adversaries, Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press. Cooper, Scott and Brock Taylor (2003) ‘Power and Regionalism: Explaining Regional Cooperation in the Persian Gulf ’, in Finn Laursen, ed., Comparative Regional Integration, 105–24, Aldershot: Ashgate. Copeland, Dale C. (2003) ‘A Realist Critique of the English School’, Review of International Studies 29(3): 427–41. David, Steven R. (1991) ‘Explaining Third World Alignment’, World Politics 43(2): 233–56. David, Steven R. (1998) ‘The Primacy of Internal War’, in Stephanie G. Neuman, ed., International Relations Theory and the Third World, 77–101, New York: St Martin’s Press. Desch, Michael C. (1999) Civilian Control of the Military, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Deudney, Daniel H. (2000) ‘Regrounding Realism: Anarchy, Security and Changing Material Contexts’, Security Studies 10(1): 1–42. Donnelly, Jack (2000) Realism and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Edelstein, David M. (2004) ‘Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail’, International Security 29(1): 49–91. Elman, Colin (1996) ‘Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy’, Security Studies 6(1): 7–53. Elman, Colin and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds (2001) Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Feaver, Peter D., Gunther Hellmann, Randall L. Schweller, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, William C. Wohlforth, Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik (2000) ‘Correspondence: Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?)’, International Security 25(1): 165–93. Freyberg-Inan, Annette (2004) What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Friedberg, Aaron L. (2000) In the Shadow of the Garrison State, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gilpin, Robert (1981) War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gilpin, Robert (1986) ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, in Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics, 301–21, New York: Columbia University Press. Gilpin, Robert (1996) ‘No One Loves a Political Realist’, in Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal, 3–26, London: Frank Cass. Gilpin, Robert (2000) The Challenge of Global Capitalism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Glaser, Charles L. (1995) ‘Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help’, International Security 19(3): 50–90. Glaser, Charles (2003) ‘Structural Realism in a more Complex World’, Review of International Studies 29(3): 403–14. Grieco, Joseph M. (1990) Cooperation among Nations, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.


377 Gruber, Lloyd (2000) Ruling the World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Guzzini, Stefano (2004) ‘The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations 10(4): 533–68. Guzzini, Stefano and Anna Leander (2001) ‘A Social Theory for International Relations: An Appraisal of Alexander Wendt’s Theoretical and Disciplinary Synthesis’, Journal of International Relations and Development 4(4): 316–38. Hollis, Martin and Steve Smith (1990) Explaining and Understanding International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hunter, Natasha (2003) ‘Interview with Stephen Walt’, History News Network: available at http:// hnn.us/articles/1351.html (16 February, 2005). Jervis, Robert (2001) ‘International History and International Politics: Why Are They Studied Differently?’, in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds, Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations, 385–402, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Jervis, Robert (2005) American Foreign Policy in a New Era, London: Routledge. Kagan, Robert and William Kristol (2000) ‘The Present Danger’, The National Interest (59): 57–69. Kapstein, Ethan B. and Michael Mastanduno (1999) ‘Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War’, in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds, Unipolar Politics, 1–27, New York: Columbia University Press. Karmon, Eli (1999) ‘Deutsche Terroristen — haben sie sich mit den pala¨stinensischen Terrororganisationen verbu¨ndet?’ Politische Studien 50(368): 71–94. Keohane, Robert O. (1986) ‘Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond’, in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics, 158–203, New York: Columbia University Press. Keohane, Robert O. and Judith Goldstein (1993) ‘Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework’, in Robert O. Keohane and Judith Goldstein, eds, Ideas and Foreign Policy, 3–30, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994) Designing Social Enquiry, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lake, David A. (1997) ‘Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach’, in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, eds, Regional Orders, 45–67, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Legro, Jeffrey W. and Andrew Moravcsik (1999) ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’, International Security 24(2): 5–55. Lemke, Douglas (2004) ‘Great Powers in the Post-Cold War World: A Power Transition Perspective’, in Thaza Varkey Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann, eds, Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 52–75, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Levy, Jack S. (2004) ‘What do Great Powers Balance Against and When?’, in Thaza Varkey Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann, eds, Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 29–51, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Little, Richard (2003) ‘The English School vs American Realism: A meeting of minds or divided by a common language?’, Review of International Studies 29: 443–60. Mastanduno, Michael (1999) ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy After the Cold War’, in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds, Unipolar Politics, 138–81, New York: Columbia University Press. Mearsheimer, John (2001a) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton. Mearsheimer, John (2001b) ‘The Future of the American Pacifier’, Foreign Affairs 80(5): 46–61. Mearsheimer, John and Stephen M. Walt (2003) ‘An Unnecessary War’, Foreign Policy 134; (January/February): 51–9.


378 Mercer, Jonathan (2005) ‘Rationality and Psychology in International Politics’, International Organization 59: 77–106. Monten, Jonathan (2005) ‘The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in US Strategy’, International Security 29(4): 112–56. Mouritzen, Hans (1997) ‘Kenneth Waltz: A Critical Rationalist between International Politics and Foreign Policy’, in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver, eds, The Future of International Relations, 66–89, London and New York: Routledge. Mouritzen, Hans and Anders Wivel, eds (2005) The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration, London and New York: Routledge. Mowle, Thomas S. (2003) ‘Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict’, Political Psychology 24(3): 561–92. Paul, Thaza Varkey (2004) ‘Introduction: The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory and Their Contemporary Relevance’, in Thaza Varkey Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann, eds, Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 1–25, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Paul, Thaza Varkey, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann, eds (2004) Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Priess, David (1996) ‘Balance-of-Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf Cooperation Council: An Interpretative Case Study’, Security Studies 5(4): 143–71. Rhodes, Edward (2004) ‘A World Not in the Balance: War, Politics, and Weapons of Mass Destruction’, in Thaza Varkey Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann, eds, Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 150–76, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Rose, Gideon (1998) ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics 51: 144–72. Rynning, Sten (2001) Changing Military Doctrine: Presidents and Military Power in Fifth Republic France, 1958–2000, New York: Praeger. Rynning, Sten and Stefano Guzzini (2001) Realism and Foreign Policy Analysis, Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, COPRI Working Papers 42/2001. Schweller, Randall (1997) ‘New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz’s Balancing Proposition’, American Political Science Review 91(4): 927–30. Schweller, Randall (1998) Deadly Imbalances, New York: Columbia University Press. Schweller, Randall (2001) ‘The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–39: Why a Concert Didn’t Arise’, in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds, Bridges and Boundaries, 181–212, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Schweller, Randall (2003) ‘The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism’, in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds, Progress in International Relations Theory, 311–47, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Schweller, Randall (2004) ‘Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing’, International Security 29(2): 159–201. Schweller, Randall and David Priess (1997) ‘A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate’, Mershon International Studies Review 41: 1–32. Snyder, Glenn (1997) Alliance Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Snyder, Glenn (2002) ‘Mearsheimer’s World — Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security’, International Security 27(1): 149–73. Snyder, Glenn H. (1996) ‘Process Variables in Neorealist Theory’, in Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism, Restatements and Renewal, 167–92, London: Frank Cass. Snyder, Jack (1991) Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Sterling-Folker, Jennifer (1997) ‘Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables’, International Studies Quarterly 41: 1–25.


379 Tellis, Ashley J. (1996) ‘Reconstructing Political Realism: The Long March to Scientific Theory’, in Benjamin Frankel, ed., Roots of Realism, 3–100, London: Frank Cass. Thayer, Bradley (2000) ‘Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism and International Politics’, International Security 25(2): 124–51. Van Evera, Stephen (1997) Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Van Evera, Stephen (1999) Causes of War, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Vasquez, John A (1997) ‘The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposition’, American Political Science Review 91(4): 899–912. Walt, Stephen M. (1987) The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Walt, Stephen M. (1988) ‘Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: the Case of Southwest Asia’, International Organization 42(2): 275–316. Walt, Stephen M. (1991) ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly 35(2): 211–39. Walt, Stephen M. (1996) Revolution and War, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Walt, Stephen M. (1998/1999) ‘The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart’, The National Interest (54): 3–11. Walt, Stephen M. (1999) ‘Rigor or Rigor Mortis: Rational Choice and Security Studies’, International Security 23(4): 5–48. Walt, Stephen M. (2001/2002) ‘Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping US Foreign Policy’, International Security 26(3): 56–78. Walt, Stephen M. (2002a) ‘The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition’, in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds, Political Science: The State of the Discipline, 197–230, New York: W.W. Norton. Walt, Stephen M. (2002b) ‘Keeping the World ‘‘Off-Balance’’: Self-Restraint and U.S. Foreign Policy’, in G. John Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivalled, 121–54, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1986) ‘Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics’, in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics, 322–45, New York: Columbia University Press. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1988) ‘The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory’, in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, 39–52, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1996) ‘International Politics is Not Foreign Policy’, Security Studies 6(1): 54–57. Waltz, Kenneth N. (2000) ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security 25(1): 5–41. Waltz, Kenneth N., Thomas J. Christensen, Jack Snyder, Colin Elman, Miriam Fendius Elman, Randall L. Schweller and Stephen M. Walt (1997) ‘Responses to John Vasquez’, American Political Science Review 91(4): 913–35. Wivel, Anders (2000) The Integration Spiral: International Security and European Integration 1945–1999, PhD dissertation, Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Social Sciences. Wivel, Anders (2002) ‘Realismen efter Waltz: udvikling eller afvikling?’ Politica 34(4): 431–48. Wivel, Anders (2004) ‘The Power Politics of Peace: Exploring the Link between Globalization and European Integration from a Realist Perspective’, Cooperation and Conflict 39(1): 5–25. Wohlforth, William C. (1993) The Elusive Balance, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Wohlforth, William C. (1994/1995) ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War’, International Security 19(3): 91–129.


380 Wohlforth, William C. (1999) ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’, International Security 24(1): 5–41. Wohlforth, William C. (2001) ‘Postscript: Historical Science and Cold War Scholarship’, in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds, Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations, 351–8, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wohlforth, William C. (2002) ‘U.S. Strategy in a Unipolar World’, in G. John Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivalled, 98–118, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Wohlforth, William C. (2004) ‘Revisiting Balance of Power Theory in Central Eurasia’, in Thaza Varkey Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann, eds, Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 214–38, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Wohlforth, William C. (2005) ‘The End of the Cold War as a Hard Case for Ideas’, Journal of Cold War Studies 7(2): 165–73. Zakaria, Fareed (1998) From Wealth to Power, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

About the Author Anders Wivel, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. His research interests include international relations theory, in particular the realist tradition, and European integration and security. He is co-editor, with Hans Mouritzen, of The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration (Routledge, 2005).