The Regional Dimension of Education Hubs: Leading ... - Springer Link

Higher Education Policy, 2015, 28, (69–89) © 2015 International Association of Universities 0952-8733/15 www.palgrave-journals.com/hep/

The Regional Dimension of Education Hubs: Leading and Brokering Geopolitics Jack T. Lee Graduate School of Education, Nazarbayev University, 53 Kabanbay Batyr Avenue, Astana 010000, Kazakhstan. E-mail: [email protected]

Several education hubs have emerged in the last decade in Asia and the Middle East. These ambitious policy initiatives share a common interest in cross-border higher education even though diverse rationales underpin their development. While some claim to be an international education hub, others claim to be a regional education hub or simultaneously international and regional. Considerable rhetoric and assumptions of uniformity exist in the discourse of education hub development. This paper clarifies the regional dimension of education hubs in terms of concepts, rationales, and strategies of regional engagement. Policymakers pursue different definitions of region as they leverage higher education to gain geopolitical influence in targeted spheres. Furthermore, the distinction between the role of a regional leader and regional broker presents different opportunities for an education hub. The paper compares the development of three key education hubs in Asia: Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Higher Education Policy (2015) 28, 69–89. doi:10.1057/hep.2014.32 Keywords: cross-border education; internationalization; education hub; regional; geopolitics; soft power

Introduction Over the last decade, several countries in Asia and the Middle East have announced plans to become education hubs. Education city, knowledge village, and global schoolhouse are just some of the monikers for these ambitious policy initiatives. Education hubs share a common interest in cross-border higher education even though diverse rationales motivate their development (Knight and Lee, 2014; Mok and Yu, 2014). By recruiting foreign students, education providers, researchers, and industry partners, education hubs seek to build a critical mass of actors in higher education. While some jurisdictions boldly tout themselves as an international education hub, others claim to be a regional education hub. Interestingly, some use these two terms interchangeably to indicate a motif that is both international and regional. Research studies on education hubs also liberally reproduce the slogan of

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‘international’ and ‘regional’ partnerships without problematizing these concepts (Chan and Ng, 2008; Mok, 2011; Ng, 2011; Knight, 2014). While these two terms are not mutually exclusive, the discourse on education hubs contains considerable rhetoric and assumptions of uniformity. What makes an education hub international or regional? How do education hub policymakers conceptualize a region? What education hub strategies illustrate regional engagement? Although cross-border education is active in many countries (e.g. Japan and United Kingdom), only some jurisdictions self-identify as an ‘education hub’ and pursue policies and strategies to become one. Without policies and strategies, any claims of an ‘education hub’ remain rhetorical and problematic for research. This paper compares the development of three education hubs in Asia: Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Specifically, the paper sets out to investigate the regional dimension of education hubs by clarifying the underpinning concepts, rationales, and strategies. Malaysia and Singapore are two of the pioneers in education hub development, while Hong Kong only became serious about its plan in the last few years (Lai and Maclean, 2014). These three societies represent the leading education hubs in Asia in terms of policy planning and implementation compared to others such as South Korea and Sri Lanka, which are either very new or inactive (Knight, 2014; Mok and Yu, 2014). This paper draws from a large empirical study of education hubs in Asia. To gain comparative insights, the study utilizes policy document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation (e.g. townhall and planning meetings). Qualitative methods and specifically interviews with senior policymakers and institutional leaders were used to gain a deep understanding of policymaking (Taylor et al., 1997; Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). Policymakers shape the development of an education hub as a whole while institutional leaders implement specific strategies (e.g. student recruitment). Policymakers include individuals from government ministries, economic development agencies, advisory boards, and regional development bodies. Institutional leaders include university presidents and directors of international offices and research institutes. A total of 36 policymakers were interviewed: Malaysia (15), Singapore (8), and Hong Kong (13). A further 42 institutional leaders were also interviewed to gain a better understanding of implementation issues. Participant selection relied initially on public documents that identified key individuals and institutions in the development of education hubs. However, snowball sampling later became the main method, given the participants’ extensive knowledge of local developments in higher education. Policymakers and institutional leaders are identified in this paper by capital letters and small letters, respectively (e.g. HK01 and sg05). The first part of this paper provides a brief introduction of the three education hubs. The second part focuses on the regional dimension of these hubs. The third part compares the three cases and reflects on their developments in the Asian context. Higher Education Policy 2015 28


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Background Malaysia’s education hub initiative can be traced back to its experience with crossborder education in the 1990s. Due to an unmet demand for higher education, the government began to allow private institutions to partner with foreign institutions to deliver twinning programmes (i.e. student begins studies in Malaysia then completes it overseas). The unmet demand was due partially to affirmative action policies that favoured the economically disadvantaged Malay majority since the 1970s (Pereira and Tong, 2005; Tham, 2011). Strict ethnic quotas at public universities marginalized large numbers of Chinese and Indian students, who then enrolled in private institutions or left the country entirely. As early as 1986, the government recognized that this exodus was draining the country of foreign currency (5th Malaysia Plan, 1986). The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 interrupted this exodus when the ringgit depreciated and placed an overseas education beyond the reach of many families (Tham, 2010). Ultimately, the government allowed private institutions to deliver foreign degree programmes entirely in Malaysia without an overseas component (i.e. franchised programmes). Malaysia also recognized early on that these programmes could attract international students and become a profitable industry (6th Malaysia Plan, 1991). Today, Malaysia continues to embrace the liberalization of its higher education sector by amassing international students, cross-border programmes, and branch campuses. In addition to the national initiative to become an education hub, Malaysia is also building an education city inside an economic zone (Iskandar) as well as positioning itself as an Islamic finance education hub. Singapore began to view education as a potential service industry in the 1980s when policymakers realized that low-value manufacturing could not sustain the country’s economic growth (Economic Committee, 1986; Tan, 2002). The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 followed by an economic recession in 2001 injected a sense of urgency to recalibrate the country’s economy and reshape its higher education landscape concomitantly (Economic Review Committee, 2003). In 1998, the government announced a plan to attract at least 10 world-class universities to establish operations in the city-state. A few years later, the government expanded on this initiative by launching its Global Schoolhouse plan with the goal of becoming the ‘Boston of the East’. By 2005, 16 foreign institutions had accepted Singapore’s invitation. These institutions include MIT, the Wharton School of Business, INSEAD, Shanghai Jiao Tong, and the Technical University of Munich. In recent years, Singapore has expanded the scope of its education hub to emphasize research partnerships with foreign universities and multinational companies (MNCs) as it attempts to become Asia’s Innovation Capital (A*STAR, 2011). With generous funding for research infrastructure and subsidies for international students, Singapore is keen to recruit talent for a knowledge economy to mitigate the challenges presented by its declining birthrate and lack of natural resources (Lee, 2014). Hong Kong’s education hub initiative began in 2004 when its Chief Executive announced a plan to recruit non-local students, given the city’s esteemed universities. Higher Education Policy 2015 28


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A regional focus oriented towards China was apparent in policy pronouncements on the education hub (Li, 2004; UGC, 2004). However, implementation details for the hub did not materialize until 2007–2008 when a global recession spurred the government to reevaluate its economy and propose six industries as growth sectors for the future. Education was one of the proposed industries. Due to a strong interest among Mainland Chinese students for Hong Kong higher education, over 90% of the non-local students in the city come from the Mainland. While the Hong Kong executive government is eager to privatize higher education and recruit large numbers of non-local students, policymakers and institutional leaders remain largely sceptical of this commercial approach. Rather, the rationale of talent development (both local and foreign) motivates policymakers to support the education hub initiative (Lee, 2014).

Regional Engagement in Higher Education and Geopolitics Malaysia Malaysia’s education hub initiative exhibits a strong desire to exert influence at a regional level. From the 1970s to the 1990s, the Malaysian economy registered impressive growth rates compared to many of its Southeast Asian neighbours (Stubbs, 1999; World Bank, 2012). This trajectory informs the development of higher education in Malaysia today as the country aims to elevate its regional status. In interviews, numerous research participants referred to Malaysia as a ‘regional education hub’ rather than the international one endorsed by policy documents and promotional materials. The following comments from policymakers at the Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE) address this discrepancy: Actually the two [regional and international] are interchangeable. When you say international, to be practical, we mean regional. But even becoming regional is very difficult. But if you’re talking about step-by-step push, it’s better to do first what is attainable. (MY03, MOHE) Of course we want to go international. I think there is a distinction between what is regional and what is international. It is not just geographical. It’s not just putting ourselves there but also making us accepted by our neighboring countries first … But it’s not planned or structured in the sense that we go regional first and then we go international. It is about getting that recognition.(MY02, MOHE) In another discussion, a MOHE policymaker reiterated the desire to gain regional recognition through its education hub: If you want to prosper, your neighbours must also prosper. If you are the only one that is prosperous, in the long run you will end up not prosperous because no one else is there. (MY01, MOHE) Higher Education Policy 2015 28


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These comments reflect not only the gap between policy rhetoric and the realities of implementation, but they also highlight the constructivist nature of region as a concept mediated by perceptions and mutuality. Rather than prescribe a linear process or standard recipe for building an education hub, policymakers emphasize the complexity of cultivating higher education as a national development strategy. In its Internationalization Policy 2011, MOHE identified several priorities with a regional scope: building regional research centres, creating regional studies programmes, and engaging with regional associations (MOHE, 2011). Contributing to regional prosperity is also evident in MOHE’s strategic plan, Malaysia’s Global Reach, which emphasizes development aid: Malaysia can put to use her experience to facilitate sustainable and transformative development of the higher education sector. This is in line with the Prosper-Thy-Neighbour policy that has been adopted by Malaysia in reducing the developmental gap amongst members of ASEAN countries.1(NHESP2, 2011, 23) Implicit in this statement is Malaysia’s desire to become a role model in Southeast Asia. Although this aid policy is commendable, in reality it translates largely into student recruitment for now. Most Malaysian higher education institutions are presently not engaged in development aid projects. Malaysia’s Global Reach is a very new policy that speaks more about aspirations than reality. In discussions with both policymakers and context informants, the topic of regional engagement often elicits examples of student recruitment strategies and education fairs held in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Malaysia is also very active in multilateral higher education initiatives in Southeast Asia. In 2008, the Malaysian Quality Assurance Agency helped the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organisation (SEAMEO) establish the ASEAN Quality Assurance Network. Malaysia is also currently assisting the development of SEAMEO’s credit transfer system. In addition, it also participates in the MalaysiaIndonesia-Thailand (M-I-T) Student Mobility Programme Pilot Project, an initiative launched in 2009 with the hope of spurring further harmonization of higher education in Southeast Asia (SEAMEO, 2010). A closer examination of Malaysia’s regional engagement reveals that its intentions and strategies are not confined to Southeast Asia. Rather, policymakers spoke frequently about partnering with developing countries worldwide. As a middle-income country on the cusp of becoming a developed economy, Malaysia projects more credibility and sensitivity in resolving Third World challenges than advanced Asian economies. As an example, Malaysia is keen to recruit students from developing countries: When you train people in Malaysia they will then have links and affinity for the country. We have seen some of the advantages and benefits of this. For Higher Education Policy 2015 28


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example, key people in Turkey, one is now the foreign minister and I think one is an advisor to the Prime Minister. They were educated at the Islamic University in Malaysia. So they have close [connections with Malaysia] … same thing with people in Africa. So the policy is good for developing countries that are coming up that we get to know their potential leaders. (MY13, Member of the National Economic Action Council) When we had franchising [programs], we also realized it attracted students regionally — the influx of Indonesians coming to study, then there were South Asians, and Africans … Initially it was just for Malaysians [students] but now we realize we can really become an education hub. (MY18, Prime Minister’s Office) Region is therefore broadly conceived as the sphere of developing nations rather than the geographical area of Southeast Asia. By using the level of economic development as a marker for a larger collective, Malaysia seeks to expand its influence beyond its vicinity. This approach to international relations taps into an imagined solidarity among developing nations. For example, one college president deduced that Malaysian education programmes are equally relevant to other developing nations when explaining the country’s accreditation process: When we submit the application [to MOHE to start a new program], we have to give the rationales on why we want to start this program. And because Malaysia is a developing country and the students who come to us are also from developing countries, so whatever is applicable to us applies to these people. (my09, Private College) While building camaraderie among developing nations is clear, Malaysia’s regional engagement is further circumscribed by a prominent neoliberal interest. In Malaysia’s Global Reach, MOHE clearly identifies developing countries that have a high demand for higher education and a reasonable level of income as the ideal recipients of aid. This comprehensive policy contains a partnership matrix akin to market segmentation. Developing countries that have very low GDPs (i.e. financial capability) are therefore not ideal partners (NHESP2, 2011). As the policy states, The only way Malaysian higher education can survive the test of time and competition is by leveraging on its niche areas and sharing knowledge generated to a wider audience and society at large, particularly countries which are currently developing their higher education systems. This approach of global engagement is not only noble but could also bring long term loyalty, brand equity and positive goodwill to Malaysian higher education. Malaysia … has a good reputation among Muslim countries as well as neighboring ASEAN countries …(NHESP2, 2011, 26) Higher Education Policy 2015 28


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This policy sums up this approach as ‘aid before trade’. In short, Malaysia’s national plan to become an education hub targets Southeast Asia as well as a conceptual region composed of developing nations worldwide. However, neoliberal interests set parameters on this engagement by prioritizing states that can afford higher education services. On a different scale, Malaysia’s EduCity Iskandar also illustrates neoliberal objectives in engagement even though it is qualitatively different from the national education hub initiative. Rather than emphasize an imagined solidarity or target developing nations that can afford education services, Iskandar engages at the personal and institutional level. In discussions with Malaysian policymakers on the impetus for creating EduCity Iskandar, nearly every participant cited the phenomenon of thousands of Malaysian students commuting to Singapore daily for schooling. This extreme example of student mobility is possible only because a narrow strait separates the two countries. By setting up education institutions in Iskandar, Malaysia hopes to educate more of its students on its shores. Concurrently, Iskandar is also recruiting students (Singaporeans and children of expatriates) and education institutions from Singapore. Many promotional materials for EduCity Iskandar contain the following line: ‘Iskandar Malaysia is strategically located within eight hours flight time from major cities in Asia, ideal for international players to build market presence and to be closer to their student catchment market in Asia’ (IRDA, 2011, 26). The availability of land and the lower operational costs in Malaysia appeal to Singaporean entrepreneurs. For example, Raffles Education, an established Singaporean corporation and the largest private education provider in Asia-Pacific, recently opened an international school and a university in Iskandar. The Management Development Institute Singapore will also establish an institute in Iskandar. At the newly opened Marlborough College Malaysia, an elite British boarding school, approximately half the students come from Singapore (Ang and Kwok, 2012). In fact, Singapore is the largest foreign investor in the Iskandar economic zone having poured US$2 billion into the zone since it was created in 2006 (Borneo Post, 2013). In essence, Iskandar has become Singapore’s de facto hinterland at only 15 km away. Prime Minister Najib of Malaysia reflected on the potential of Iskandar laconically: I told Prime Minister Hsien Loong [of Singapore], ‘I don’t mind, you can be the Manhattan, we’ll be New Jersey. But we’ll prosper together’ (quoted in Borneo Post, 2013) While region in this instance is defined as an amorphous catchment area in southern Malaysia, the objective is nevertheless for Malaysia to exert influence through the provision of education. Another strategy in Malaysia’s regional engagement is to emphasize its heritage as an Islamic state. Malaysia’s plan to become an Islamic finance Higher Education Policy 2015 28


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education hub illustrates the role of a regional broker. Since 2010, this plan has been a top national agenda item embedded in the government’s Economic Transformation Program (ETP, 2010). Islamic finance is a rapidly growing niche area of the banking industry that has attracted the attention of both Islamic and non-Islamic banks (PWC, 2008). Today Malaysia has one of the largest Islamic finance markets in the world with assets worth US$ 1 trillion (RM 3.2 trillion) and ownership of 67% of the world’s Islamic bonds (ETP, 2010). A policymaker involved in leading this initiative explained the project’s mediating role: The education hub will not be comprised of just local experts. We provide the avenue, the platform. Therefore, we can have various other experts from all over the world congregate in Malaysia. Physically they can be here to train internationals. If they cannot be here, the world of connectivity … we can go via Internet … so you don’t necessarily have to be in Malaysia physically. (MY16, Islamic Finance Education Hub) As the planner emphasized, a broker must transcend physical constraints such that Malaysia can exert influence in the teaching, training, and practice of Islamic finance. Malaysian experts recently created a standard curriculum for Islamic finance and hope to disseminate it to other jurisdictions interested in teaching Islamic finance. In summary, Malaysia’s varied education hub initiatives aim to position the country as a leader in education and training under different conceptions of region. For the national education hub plan, the region of interest includes Southeast Asia and selected developing countries in the Middle East and Africa. For EduCity Iskandar, region is defined by the market demand for education services in southern Malaysia. Finally, the Islamic finance education hub seeks to exert influence both as a regional leader and broker, whereby region is a civilization. These overlapping definitions of regions provide a platform for Malaysian higher education to exert geopolitical influence in different but overlapping spheres.

Singapore As a small country well embedded in the global economy, Singapore has a penchant for pursuing opportunities worldwide. Few Singaporeans interviewed for this study expressed an interest in Southeast Asia or the desire to contribute to its development. In response to the question about the regional dimension of its education hub, a senior member of the Economic Development Board (EDB), the agency responsible for the Global Schoolhouse initiative, answered: Are we aiming for regional or international hub? There’s no such thing as regional hubs. You’ve got to be international. We can’t afford [to be] regional. Higher Education Policy 2015 28


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What’s our region? ASEAN? Come on, what’s that? If you’re relevant only to ASEAN, you can’t grow. Now, do we want to be relevant in ASEAN? Yes, because you want to be relevant to your neighbors. But Singapore is in a neighborhood which is less developed than it is — that’s useful. And we want to help that, but we also need to be relevant to a global economy because they [the world] are the ones with the money to buy our stuff. So, innovation hub has to be international. In terms of the market, it’s international. In terms of the ideas, it has to be international. (SG13, EDB). Singaporean higher education’s lack of connection with Southeast Asia is even more striking, considering its earlier contributions to multilateral initiatives. In 1959, Singapore established a regional centre for higher education research and collaboration. In 1993, this centre was re-organized under the auspices of SEAMEO and relocated to Bangkok. Today Singapore is largely absent from the activities conducted by this regional centre. If Southeast Asia appeared in discussions with Singaporean policymakers, it was often limited to the region’s unmet demand for higher education and Singapore’s unrivaled development in relative terms. Like Malaysia, Singapore recognizes the value in recruiting students from nearby developing countries. A policymaker explained the benefits behind this recruitment: If you look at the top five markets of international students who come here: China, India, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia (not in that order) … Look at Vietnam, we have huge alumni there. Huge alumni in Myanmar. And now that Myanmar is opening up, guess what? So it’s useful. (SG13, EDB) This very limited yet pragmatic connection with Southeast Asia is essentially an investment in social capital to further Singapore’s economic interests in the region. In the minds of Singaporean policymakers, the region of utmost importance is pan Asia rather than Southeast Asia. Singapore is far too strategic to ignore the unbridled opportunities that Asia can offer. Some Singaporean policymakers pointed to the current economic woes of the United States and Europe to underscore the necessity to engage with Asia. However, recruiting students from neighbouring countries represents only a small fraction of Singapore’s engagement with Asia as the following discussion will illustrate. Singapore’s recent drive to become an innovation centre is intimately tied to its regional ambitions. Contrary to the grandiose vision presented by some policymakers during interviews and perpetuated in the literature, Singaporean policies and strategies exhibit a strong orientation towards Asia rather than the world at large. These policies position Singapore as ‘Asia’s Innovation Capital’ in a dynamic region (A*STAR, 2011). As the latest Economic Strategies Committee states, We should capitalise on our cultural affinity with the region, and develop Singapore into the pan-Asian location of choice — from which consumer Higher Education Policy 2015 28


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insights are developed, consumer-centric businesses are grown and managed, products and services developed, tested and launched, and intellectual property and trademarks owned and anchored. (Economic Strategies Committee, 2010, 19) A key actor in Singapore’s innovation drive is the Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR), which funds and coordinates a large portion of the research in the country on behalf of the state. An A*STAR policymaker provided a nuanced explanation of regional engagement: We’re seeing more and more companies recognize that what you can do in Singapore what your R&D people can do in Tokyo, in Bay Area, in Cambridge — same quality of work, same output, but the fact that this [Singapore] is more important because it will go straight to the Asian market. That means Singapore may not be a place where you invent but as a site where you can do subsequent product development and commercialize. (SG04, A*STAR) This comment challenges the conventional wisdom that an innovation centre must generate innovation by its very definition. Rather, Singapore aims to be a regional broker that mediates ties between MNCs and the large consumer market of Asia. For pharmaceutical companies, Singapore’s multiracial microcosm presents a compelling case for clinical trials in the Asian context. EDB’s track record in guiding MNCs through the Asian marketplace (Schein, 1996) can help these companies commercialize products. The country’s lack of corruption and superior research infrastructure also stand out in a region with shortcomings on both fronts. Brokering ties between Asia and the world at large is therefore a more realistic role for Singapore’s research sector at the moment than churning out innovations. Integral to the success of Singapore’s innovation agenda is a robust regulatory framework for intellectual property (IP). Without a framework to safeguard the fruits of high-stake investments in research, venture capitalists and MNCs alike would be hesitant to participate. However, the primary purpose of a regulatory framework is not to serve the domestic consumer market. Rather, Singapore views IP as a currency of influence in the Asia region. In 2001, the Ministry of Law established the Intellectual Property Office of Singapore (IPOS). In 2005, the World Intellectual Property Organisation set up its first office outside the US and Europe in Singapore and later added an arbitration and mediation centre. Together with IPOS, this regional office promotes IP development and standards throughout Asia. Given the country’s robust legal and financial systems and growing investments in research, Singapore is well positioned to specialize in IP (Shanmugam, 2012). Recently, the Ministry of Law produced a 10-year master plan to develop the country into a ‘Global IP Hub in Asia’ (IPSC, 2013). Interestingly, the hub is now simultaneously global and regional. A closer inspection of this master plan reveals that global refers to the origin of intellectual properties (i.e. MNCs) while region refers to the targeted Higher Education Policy 2015 28


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area of regulation and consumption (Asia). In many ways, this approach parallels Singapore’s education hub initiative whereby education providers are largely Western while students are largely local and regional. A senior policymaker at IPOS noted this asymmetry: I think the producers of IP, the creative side, are still for sometime to come in North America and certain parts of Europe. But the consumers will be in Asia, so there’s this flow of ideas and obviously there will have to be a flow of ideas across the world. (SG12, IPOS) The same policymaker affirmed the geopolitical opportunity facing Singapore: So the role of Singapore [as an IP hub] is not quite the role of a physical Singapore but the role of Singapore as a concept where we are sufficiently neutral for this transaction to take place. We are a trusted node. Our legal system is neutral, not subjective, and I think we are comfortable culturally and acceptable culturally for both the East and the West, so they are quite comfortable to do their business here. They use Singapore as a place to transact ideas. It’s no different from say the Harvard Square. You go there, and you see nothing. People play chess, go to bookshops, and have coffee. Nothing is being created there physically, but it is a place for people to interact, transact ideas and hopefully create ideas. (SG12, IPOS) This lucid metaphor positions Singapore once again as a regional broker — one that is eager to mediate the convergence of global interests in Asia. The physical constraints of Singapore, its small domestic market, and the pressure to innovate become less relevant compared to the broader goal of succeeding as an indispensible broker trusted by MNCs and foreign governments. Another prime example of a higher education initiative with a regional scope is Nepal Hill, an area designated by the Singaporean government for business schools to provide training and conduct research on human resource issues pertinent to Asia (JTC, 2010). While the Global Schoolhouse initiative receives little attention in Singaporean media these days, there is great interest in Nepal Hill. According to the chairman of EDB, which is developing Nepal Hill, a cluster of business schools and consulting firms ‘will generate new thought and practice leadership on talent management and leadership development in Asia, for Asia and the world’ (Yip, 2011). An early tenant of Nepal Hill is Unilever, an Anglo-Dutch consumer goods giant that owns over 400 brands. Unilever aims to deliver half of its worldwide corporate training in Singapore in conjunction with local universities such as Singapore Management University. Through human resource training for Asia, Singapore acts as a regional broker and exerts influence far beyond what its size may suggest. Each year approximately 7,000 Chinese government officials come to Singapore for management training (IE Singapore, 2013). In these programmes, Singapore imparts its expertise in Higher Education Policy 2015 28


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governance, policymaking, and urban planning. In January 2013, the government launched the Singapore Talent Development Alliance to provide education and training customized for the Chinese market.2 The Chinese Government aims to train 10 million government officials and 4.5 million technicians in the coming decade, and Singapore intends to capitalize on this demand (IE Singapore, 2013). Training Chinese government officials is a strategy that strikes closer at the heart of geopolitical influence than educating international students en masse because the latter may not assume positions of power to further bilateral ties. On another front, Singapore is now exporting its education hub model along with its formulas in governance and policymaking. With several elite higher education institutions and 15 years of experience in building its own education hub, Singapore can now confidently advise others interested in similar ventures. In 2010, construction began on the Sino Singapore Guangzhou Knowledge City (GKC). Singapore’s sovereign fund, Temasek, co-owns this project together with Chinese enterprises and the Guangzhou Municipal Government. The goal is to attract 10 world-class universities to this hub (reminiscent of Singapore’s own initiative in 1998). Singaporean institutions operating in this knowledge city include National University of Singapore, Nanyang University, and Nanyang Polytechnic. Singapore has also provided training for Chinese officials involved in this project. Planners state that GKC is the model for Guangdong’s economic transformation, and ‘products and services that have proven successful within GKC can expect demand from other parts of southern China’ (GKC, 2013). This project builds on Singapore’s experience in creating industrial parks in China and India as the ‘second wing of its economy’ (Schein, 1996). For example, Singapore collaborated with the Chinese government to build the Suzhou Industrial Park and Tianjin Eco-city in 1994 and 2007, respectively. In 1998, Singapore helped India build its very first IT park, International Technology Park Bangalore, which has become the model for other technology parks in India. All three parks are government-to-government collaborations that involve senior political leaders from both countries and significant financial investments from Singapore. Singapore has also built similar parks in Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. These initiatives essentially provide another platform for Singapore to extend its geopolitical influence throughout Asia via knowledge production projects. From these examples of regional engagement, it is clear that Singapore has its eyes set on Asia as the region of importance rather than Southeast Asia. Changes in Singapore’s external trade over the last few decades also reflect its growing distance from Southeast Asia. In the 1960s and 1970s, Singapore’s trade with ASEAN members decreased because its economy matured and processed fewer raw materials from Malaysia and Indonesia (Wong et al., 2009). Since the 1980s, Singapore’s rapid industrialization has steadily brought it closer to advanced economies outside ASEAN. To become a regional leader and broker in Asia, Singapore is creating new institutions, investing in biomedical research, accruing expertise in IP rights, training foreign government officials, and building knowledge cities and technology Higher Education Policy 2015 28


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parks throughout Asia. These activities surpass the conventional strategy in crossborder education of recruiting and educating international students — both in terms of resource requirements and policy sophistication. Although Singapore’s policy rhetoric may be about global competition and eminence, Asia continues to be a compelling region for engagement given the lackluster economic performances of many parts of the world in recent years. As an education hub, Singapore hopes to replicate its success in hosting MNCs by hosting foreign universities and research labs. EDB, which leads Singapore’s hub initiatives, continues to reflect the ‘strategic pragmatism’ coined by Edgar Schein in his seminal study of EDB in the 1990s (Schein, 1996). Hong Kong Among the three hubs, Hong Kong policymakers placed the greatest emphasis on regional engagement. In multiple interviews, they expressed concerns over the future of Hong Kong in a regional context. Unsurprisingly, policymakers spoke implicitly about different kinds of regions: pan Asia, East Asia, Greater China, southern China, and the Eastern civilization. Noticeably, Hong Kong’s chequered history as a British colony at the doorstep of China has inculcated a keen sense of geopolitics among its policymakers. In a discussion with a former Chairperson of the influential Education Commission, the person identified three main reasons for developing Hong Kong as an education hub. One reason is for Hong Kong ‘to exhibit leadership in education regionally’ because ‘an education hub is not just for Hong Kong people!’ (HK23, Education Commission).3 Several other policymakers insisted that an education hub must contribute to regional development as a bare minimum. At the most superficial level, Hong Kong policymakers view Asia as the key region. A senior policymaker at the Education Bureau clarified that its education hub is unequivocally focused on Asia at this early stage of its development, while the scope may later expand to an international one (HK01, EDB). In speaking about the education hub’s connection with Asia, policymakers often highlight student recruitment and sometimes curriculum design as the key activities of engagement: We target recruitment of Mainland and Asian students. We don’t target Americans or Europeans because they’re too far away, plus they also have very good universities. So it’s not our incentive or objective to recruit them. We’re interested in East Asia, China, and maybe India. (HK06, Central Policy Unit) Our programs are very different from university education in that vocational is very regionally focused. Our programs serve the local and regional economies! Hong Kong is driven by what’s happening in the region — which includes South China, Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan. (hk25, Vocational Training Council) Higher Education Policy 2015 28


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Another policymaker spoke about Hong Kong as a hub for educational and professional testing services, a niche area that the government is trying to develop as one of the six pillars of the service industry: Because of Hong Kong’s international connections … we can do short courses as the education hub develops — things like regional training programs. For example, executive training, or just qualification examinations of various kinds all can be done in Hong Kong because here the system is clean, fair, no corruptions … So a qualification that comes from Hong Kong you can be quite sure those are very rigorous. (HK10, Education Commission) These generic views on engagement with Asia and East Asia do not differ much from Malaysia and Singapore’s engagement with Southeast Asia as key markets for education services. On a more substantive level, Hong Kong policymakers’ most passionate views on regional engagement focus on Greater China and, more specifically, southern China. In discussing these regions, the complexity of engagement began to emerge. With China’s rapid economic growth and guardianship of Hong Kong, a gravitational pull towards the Mainland is only natural for Hong Kong as an education hub. Hong Kong’s relationship with Southeast Asia was very strong in the 1970s and 1980s when lower labour costs spurred Hong Kong industries to relocate production southward. However, with the opening of China, enthusiasm has shifted dramatically away from Southeast Asia. The head of the Central Policy Unit (CPU), which advises the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, underscored the connection to Greater China in a recent speech: As a regional education hub, Hong Kong education should serve the region. “Region” has two meaning here. The first meaning is more concrete; it refers to the geographic region. The second meaning refers to the cultural region: the Greater China region. (Lau, 2010) Lau repeated the need for a ‘Greater China Agenda’ and ‘Greater China Strategy’ in the development of Hong Kong as an education hub. Hong Kong is keen to recruit students from Mainland China. But rather than recruit large numbers of student for the sake of generating revenue, Hong Kong aims to cultivate top talent for Greater China. With a demand that far outstrips supply, Hong Kong universities can be very selective in their admission of Mainland students. One policymaker view China and southern China as prime areas to recruit students: As a metropolitan city, it has to be an education hub whether you like it or not. If you are not, that means you are not fulfilling your responsibilities. You should have the top class of universities. We have it, but we don’t have the top class students [locally]. That’s a contradiction. Like a pyramid, the universities Higher Education Policy 2015 28


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are at the apex, but the students are in a normal distribution. So one thing to do is to expand Hong Kong’s education catchment area to at least southern China (regional) or even the whole nation. (HK11, Commission on Strategic Development) Interviews with members of the University Grants Committee and senior university leaders also affirmed this view. From this perspective, the education hub becomes intimately tied to the destiny of Hong Kong as a major urban centre in southern China. Poaching students from the Mainland is not simply an educational or manpower planning exercise for an education hub. Instead, talent development takes on a regional dimension vested with geopolitical motives. The region that generated the most intense interest among Hong Kong policymakers is the Pearl River Delta (PRD), a region in southern China that has witnessed rapid industrialization since the 1980s and become a national manufacturing hub. Since China began to open up in the late 1970s, Guangdong has become a living laboratory for economic development and liberal fiscal policies. PRD covers only a third of Guangdong, the most populous province in China, but it produces nearly 80% of the province’s GDP (PRDBC, 2012). It encompasses nine major cities and two special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macao) with a total population of 56 million. Recently, government authorities in the Mainland and Hong Kong have moved quickly to integrate the PRD region and liberalize trade within it. In the history of China’s national five-year plans, Beijing has never elaborated on Hong Kong’s future until recently. In the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015), China dedicated an entire chapter to the future of Hong Kong and Macao. In interviews, some policymakers drew attention to this milestone to underscore the opportunities facing Hong Kong higher education. The thinking behind regional integration is that different jurisdictions within PRD can complement each other. While Guangdong has a strong manufacturing base, its continual economic development requires an agile service sector to market, export, and manage distribution channels overseas — a task that Hong Kong is well qualified to support given its international links and expertise in the service sector (PRDBC, 2012). Consequently, the integration of PRD presents many opportunities for Hong Kong higher education: research with industrial applications, access to funding, training for Mainlanders, internships for Hong Kong students, and joint academic programmes. In a comprehensive report in 2010, the Pearl River Delta Business Council (PRDBC) provided many recommendations for closer educational linkages between Hong Kong and PRD.4 This report provides more details for the development of Hong Kong as an education hub than documents from the Hong Kong Education Bureau itself. One recommendation is to develop PRD into ‘an exemplary zone for national integrated education reform’ using Hong Kong’s expertise in areas such as institutional development, school leadership, and curriculum reforms (PRDBC, 2010, 142). These regional initiatives essentially allow Hong Kong to simultaneously Higher Education Policy 2015 28


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export its education services and influence the socio-economic development of southern China. The recommendations dovetail with the Hong Kong Government’s plan to develop education services as one of the six growth industries. In short, PRD functions as a hinterland for an overcrowded yet ambitious Hong Kong just as Iskandar is a hinterland for Singapore. A conspicuous sign of regional engagement is the growing number of satellite offices and research centres built by Hong Kong universities in the Mainland. Unlike most Malaysian and Singaporean universities, which remain physically rooted in their home countries, most Hong Kong universities today have a physical presence in the Mainland.5 In 2005, Hong Kong Baptist University (HKBU) and Beijing Normal University jointly created a college in Zhuhai, a key city in PRD.6 In a discussion with a senior administrator of this college, the person noted that senior leadership at HKBU embraces this project for two basic reasons: (1) to establish closer links with the Chinese government and (2) to cultivate a network of Chinese alumni to support HKBU’s future development (e.g. fundraising). On a more modest level of engagement, other Hong Kong universities have established research centres or study centres in the Mainland rather than full-fledged branch campuses. Many of these centres are located in Shenzhen, an industrial city located just across the border from Hong Kong. As early as 1999, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology opened a joint institute with Peking University in Shenzhen. Since then, it has added another research institute, a medical centre, and a small business enterprise in Shenzhen. Both the University of Hong Kong and Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) also operate research centres in Shenzhen. CUHK recently secured approval to open a branch campus in Shenzhen. There are also plans to link Hong Kong to Qianhai, a port district in Shenzhen, in order to form a cooperative zone specializing in service industries for the Asia-Pacific region. Education is one of the targeted industries. In addition, Hong Kong recently earmarked an area (Lok Ma Chau) near Shenzhen to be a higher education, science, and creative industries hub. These varied initiatives (PRD, Shenzhen, Qianhai, and Lok Ma Chau) are all subnational regions reminiscent of Malaysia’s economic zone Iskandar. Hong Kong higher education’s involvement in these initiatives is a strategic effort that illustrates the combination of neoliberal interests and geopolitical motives. In addition to exerting influence as a leader in southern China, Hong Kong also aims to broker relations between China and the West. In this sense, a region is broadly conceived as a civilization. Hong Kong’s historical role as the gateway between the East and West makes it a natural broker. An expert on Hong Kong– Mainland relations at CPU explained this intermediary role: Hong Kong is on good terms with the Western world and the Mainland, but the Mainland and the West may not always be on good terms. We’re in the middle. You don’t want to be caught in their fight. You want to somehow facilitate their understanding of each other. Hong Kong ought to tell to the Western world Higher Education Policy 2015 28


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China’s story: what has happened in the Mainland, what are their major problems, what are the major concerns of Mainland people, frustrations, problems, etc. Hong Kong also has to convince the rest of the world that China’s development is not a threat … (HK18, Central Policy Unit) This expert then explained that the education hub must be a conduit for this civilizational exchange. Similar to the previous comment that a metropolitan must be an education hub by its nature, the view here is that a gateway must contribute to exchanges as a regional broker. Hong Kong’s delicate position and unique status as a special administrative region was a key theme in many discussions with policymakers. While the role of regional brokerage remains more aspirational than concrete in contemporary Hong Kong higher education, there is nevertheless a strong conscientiousness among policymakers to fulfil this role.

Conclusion The three case studies in this paper point to a conspicuous regional orientation among education hubs. While the hubs differ in their conceptions of region and formulations of strategies, a strong desire to parlay leadership in higher education into geopolitical influence is apparent. For Malaysia, a region is both geographical (Southeast Asia and Iskandar) and conceptual (Third World and Islamic civilization). While neoliberal interests steer Malaysia’s regional engagement, the country also selectively engages with developing countries and Islamic states on the premise of an imagined solidarity. This solidarity draws on shared levels of economic development and religious heritage as Malaysia recruits international students en masse. For Singapore, the operative region is no longer the confines of Southeast Asia, which supported the country’s formative years as a newly independent state. Rather, the region vital to contemporary Singapore is Asia at large with unbridled trade opportunities. Singapore’s regional engagement exhibits enduring neoliberal interests. More importantly, this engagement relies on a collection of states that are eager to adopt Singapore’s norms to replicate an economic miracle comparable to those experienced by the Asian Tigers (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea). From norms of governance to norms of development and knowledge production (e.g. technology parks and IP rights), Singapore is astutely exporting its recipe for success across Asia. As Deng Xiaoping remarked famously in 1978 after a visit to Singapore, ‘Singapore’s social order is rather good. Its leaders exercise strict management. We should learn from their experience, and we should do a better job than they do’ (quoted in Kristof, 1992). In short, neoliberal interests delineate Malaysia and Singapore’s regional engagements as education hubs, but shared identities and norms mobilize a broader agenda in geopolitics. This approach to regional engagement echoes the literature on social constructivism in international Higher Education Policy 2015 28


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relations as states and institutions draw on common identities, values, and norms in their interactions with each other (Wendt, 1992; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Economic interests and soft power rationales essentially reinforce each other to amplify the impact of an education hub. For Hong Kong, regional engagement is less about immediate returns on neoliberal pursuits or norm dissemination and more about contributing to the development of an emerging global superpower as a leading metropolis. The tenuous position of Hong Kong as a special administrative area within China informs its conception as an education hub. Rather than define region as a supra-national concept, Hong Kong is keen to become a leader in a sub-national geographical area: PRD. The opportunity to contribute and influence the development of a dynamic region in southern China captivates Hong Kong’s higher education sector. Similar to Malaysia and Singapore, this approach uses higher education to exert geopolitical influence — albeit among metropolitan cities rather than nation-states. Further research on the actual process of geopolitical influence as a regional leader in higher education would be beneficial to our broader understanding of education hubs and cross-border education. In addition to becoming a regional leader, some education hubs also aim to become a regional broker. Malaysia’s ongoing effort to become an Islamic finance education hub exemplifies both leadership and brokerage. An increasing number of financial institutions are drawn to Islamic banking given the sector’s market potential and a general aversion to speculative financial practices after the fiscal collapse of many corporations and states (PWC, 2008). By training professionals in Islamic finance, Malaysian higher education hopes to act as a broker between distinct civilizations. For Singapore, its reputation as a ‘trusted node’ and a regional base in Asia motivates its education hub to act as a regional broker. Through biomedical science research and its recent effort to become an IP rights hub, Singapore aims to guide MNCs operating in Asia. On a more abstract level, Hong Kong higher education seeks to mediate China’s connection with the West to promote mutual understanding. Compared to the role of leading a region, brokering ties for a region through education and research remain less defined and developed at the moment. Whether or not a regional broker is more effective than a regional leader remains to be seen. Certainly, brokerage suggests greater mutual benefits for all parties involved rather than a zero-sum competition for leadership and power. In terms of implementation strategies for regional engagement, education hubs differ markedly even if the rationales are the same. Granted, all three education hubs in this study aim to recruit large numbers of non-local students. In addition, Malaysia is presently offering development aid to selected partner countries under its ‘aid before trade’ policy. Its Islamic finance education hub will also focus on professional training and research rather than the typical undergraduate education programs. Singapore’s approach to regional engagement has moved far beyond the orthodoxy of student recruitment and undergraduate education. Rather, it supplements these conventional measures by exporting its expertise in governance, commercialization, Higher Education Policy 2015 28


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and human resource training. Hong Kong engages with Mainland China by educating large numbers of talented students as well as building satellite research centres, hospitals, and branch campuses. These outposts ensure that Hong Kong gains a foothold in southern China’s rapid development. Despite these differences, these strategies collectively generate geopolitical influence for each education hub through education, training, research, and norm dissemination. The development of education hubs in Asia exhibits a tangential departure from the traditional exporters of educational services in the world. While the United Kingdom and Australia are mainly cultivating cross-border higher education to extract a profit, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong equip their education hub initiatives with more complex rationales that include talent development, educational capacity building, innovation, and soft power (Olds, 2007; Knight, 2014; Lee, 2014). These additional rationales do not exclude the objective of turning education into an industry, but they do signal a broader agenda to leverage higher education for both competitive (Mok and Yu, 2014) and collaborative means. Revenue generation through the export of education remains important to many education hubs but not as important and authoritative as the literature suggests. Analyses of education hubs that rely on historical policy pronouncements also essentialize policy objectives without recognizing the dynamic nature of such large-scale initiatives. Similarly, an education hub does not exclude other national strategies such as becoming a financial hub (Hong Kong) or logistics hub (Singapore). Collectively, these national development strategies reinforce each other to carve out a key node in political economy at a regional and global level. Notes 1 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 2 This alliance consists of seven local Singaporean HEIs: the Civil Service College, ITE Education Services, Nanyang Polytechnic, Nanyang Technological University, National University of Singapore, NTUC Learning Hub, and Singapore Management University. 3 The other two reasons are ‘to provide people with choices in education’ and ‘to turn education into a business’ (HK23, Education Commission). 4 Hong Kong’s Roles and Positioning in the Economic Development of the Nation (PRDBC, 2010). 5 The National University of Singapore is an exception in that it has several offices overseas to serve its students. 6 Chinese regulations require all foreign education providers (including Hong Kong) to partner with a local institution when setting up a branch campus. Presently, there are efforts to exempt Hong Kong from this requirement.

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