The rights and status of the Christians as a religious minority in Sudan ...

The rights and status of the Christians as a religious minority in Sudan Guma Kunda Komey Abstract Since independence in 1956 the dominant ruling elites projected Sudan as an Arab-Islamic state at the expense of its African and non-Muslim identities. The practical dimension of that early political stance continued to be sustained as manifested in a series of actions taken by the successive governments to the present day. This policy impacted negatively on the non-Muslim minorities, particularly the Christians, despite the fact that successive national constitutions recognised religious freedom and rights in Sudan. This article reviews the situation of the Christian minority in Sudan. The overall analysis implies that improving religious freedom and rights in Sudan is a vital necessity for improving its international image and relations. Keywords: Christian minorities, Islamization, religion and politics, religious freedom and rights ‫المستخلص‬ ‫حقوق ومكانة المسيحيين كأقلية دينية في السودان‬ ‫جمعة كوندا كومي‬ ‫ وعبر مختلف الحقب والنخب‬6591 ‫تستعرض هذه المقالة وضع األقلية المسيحية في السودان منذ االستقالل في عام‬ ‫ اتخذت‬.‫الحاكم باعتبار السودان دولة عربية إسالمية تتعايش فيها هويات افريقيه وعربية مسلمة و غير مسلمة‬ ‫الحكومات المتعاقبة مواقف سياسية كثيرة عقبتها سلسلة من اإلجراءات لها انعكاسات أثرت سلبا او اجابا على‬ ‫األقليات المسلمة وغير المسلمة على الرغم من أن الدساتير الوطنية المتعاقبة اعترفت بالحرية الدينية وحقوق اإلنسان‬ ‫ توصل الكاتب الى أن تحسين الحرية الدينية وحقوق اإلنسان في السودان هو ضرورة حيوية لتحسين‬.‫في السودان‬ .‫الوضع العام لألقليات في السودان‬ ‫ الحرية الدينية والحقوق‬,‫ السياسة السودانية‬,‫ األسلمة والدين‬,‫ األقليات المسيحية‬:‫الكلمات الدالة‬ Introduction Since independence in 1956, the dominant ruling elites projected Sudan as an Arab-Islamic state at the expense of its African and non-Muslim identities. Although he recognised that Sudan is African for geographical, ethnic, and cultural reasons, Muhammad Ahmed Mahjoub, twice Sudanese Minister (1965-66 and 1967-69), insisted that it will continue to be Arab in outlook and destiny, and, as a country, it is a geographical spearhead of the Middle East into Sub-Saharan Africa (Mahjoub 1974). The practical dimension of that early political stance continued to be manifested in a series of actions taken by the successive governments, including the expulsions of Christian missionaries in the 1960s vide the Missionary Act of 1962, and subsequent attempts to Islamise the national constitution; the introduction of Arabicisation and Islamisation among the non-Muslims and African communities in southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile; the introduction of Islamic sharia Laws in Sudan in 1983; and declaration of jihad during the civil war in early 1990s, among others. The aggregate result of these exclusionary policies and politics, I argue, contributed to a large degree to the separation of southern Sudan in 2011, while hardening the predicament of the remaining Christian 14

The Ahfad Journal vol. 32, no. 2, December 2015, pp. 14-24

minority in the current Sudan. In view of this overarching assertion, the burning question is: what is the status, and therefore the rights of the non-Muslim minorities, particularly the remaining Christians in Sudan after the separation? The aim of this paper is to attempt to answer this question and the related issues. The focus is to analytically trace the government’s new policies and political discourses with regard to the state of the religious rights, namely the Christian minorities in postsecession Sudan. Although the overall analysis depends on secondary sources, the author’s own personal participatory observations and experiences enrich the discussion. As a background, the religious factor in politics, or rather politicisation of religion in Sudan is not something new but deeply rooted in its history. It is traceable throughout the Turco-Egyptian, the Mahdiyya and the Condominium eras (Gaddal 1985). Throughout the struggle for independence, religion was ever-present in the development of the Sudanese nationalism during the self-government regime in the 1950s. By the 1960s, religion started to emerge as a key factor in the Sudanese politics, reaching its apex during the 1990s. The heart of the matter here is that it is not religion as such; rather it is the “politicisation” of religion that matters (Manger 2001-2002). Indeed, the politicisation of religion in the contemporary Sudan is the major contributing factor to the protracted civil wars, violent conflicts and political instability throughout the postcolonial Sudan (Hasan and Gray 2002; Komey and Wassara 2008). Literature indicates that the then undivided postcolonial Sudan (1956– 2011) underwent a troubled socio-political process that culminated in the longest civil war (1983–2005) in the contemporary Africa. One direct result was persistent and multiple contestations of the Sudanese state itself that ended with its fragmentation into two political entities, i.e. sovereign states (the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan) in 2011 (Sørbø and Ahmed 2013). That was essentially due to political mismanagement of the multiple diversities of the Sudanese socio-cultural realities. In this aspect, although the Sudan was (and still is) multi-ethnic, multilinguistic and multi-religious, it was narrowly and wrongly constructed on the basis of Islamism and Arabism to an extent that “Sudanization, or becoming a citizen, essentially means Arabization and concomitantly, Islamization” (Komey 2010, p. 3). That was a false start in the processes of state-and-nation-building. Since then, Sudan has been misgoverned with recurring violent conflicts and political instability, and with an upsurge in politicising religion in public space. Thus, the paper maintains that politicisation and radicalisation of religion, namely Islam, in contemporary Sudan is a living text for the question of diversity management in Sudan.

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The rights and status of the Christians as a religious minority in Sudan Guma Kunda Komey

Religious rights in Sudan’s Interim Constitution: An overview Despite separation, Sudan remains one of the most diverse countries in Africa. It remains home to sizable minorities with distinct cultural heritages and languages, which still represent a considerable number of non-Muslim communities all over the Sudan, particularly Christian minorities of various denominations and followers of traditional African religions, such as the Copts, the Nuba and the Ingessana people, among many others. The status and rights of these minorities were legally protected by various constitutions. In the latest constitution, the Interim Constitution of 2005, a number of stipulations provide protection for religious freedom. Under subheading “Nature of State”, Article 1 proclaims that Sudan is a “multi-religious country” and an “all embracing homeland where religions and cultures are sources of strength, harmony and inspiration”. Likewise, Article 31 prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion. Moreover, under subheading “Religious Rights”, Article 6 provides a set of religious rights, stipulating that the state shall respect the religious rights to:  worship or assemble;  establish and maintain a place for these purposes;  establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions;  acquire and possess moveable and immovable property;  solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individual, private and public institutions;  observes days of rest, celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of religious beliefs; and  communicate with individuals and communities in matters of religion and belief on national and international levels. In Article 38 on Freedom of Creed and Worship, the Constitution assures that “[e]very person shall have the right to the freedom of religious creed and worship [and] no person shall be coerced to adopt such faith, that he/she does not believe in, nor to practice rites or services to which he/she does not voluntarily consent.” In addition, Article 27 (3) of Sudan’s Constitution explicitly states that international human rights instruments ratified by Sudan shall become part of the Constitution. In this respect, Sudan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1986. The ICCPR is legally binding and is monitored by the Human Rights Council. Furthermore, Sudan is a member of the UN, an organisation that recognised the importance of freedom of religion and belief in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 2007 with the formation of a Commission for the Rights of NonMuslims, Sudan seemed to take a step forward in observing its obligations to preserve freedom of religion. Indeed, the constitutional rights backed by the related international conventions are in theory more than sufficient to guarantee and protect the rights of religious minorities

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in Sudan, if there is a political will to do so by the ruling elites and state institutions. These constitutional rights were, to some degree, observed by the successive governments of Sudan, though there are always serious violations in practices, particularly during intensive war. As detailed below, those violations were essentially due to the fact that many laws contradict the Constitution, such as the 1991 Criminal Code, the 1991 Personal Status Law of Muslims, and state-level Public Orders. They have restricted religious freedom for all Sudanese but they are more repressive on the non-Muslims. A recent report of United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) noted that: For more than 20 years, the 1991 Criminal Code, the 1991 Personal Status Law of Muslims, and state-level “public order” laws have restricted religious freedom for all Sudanese. These laws contradict Sudan’s constitutional and international commitments to freedom of religion or belief and related human rights. The 1991 Criminal Code imposes the ruling NCP’s interpretation of Shari’ah law on Muslims and Christians: it allows death sentences for apostasy, stoning for adultery, crossamputations for theft, prison sentences for blasphemy, and floggings for undefined “offences of honor, reputation and public morality,” including undefined “indecent or immoral acts.” Prohibitions and related punishments for “immorality” and “indecency” are implemented through state level Public Order laws and enforcement mechanisms; violations carry a maximum penalty of 40 lashes, a fine, or both. (USCIRF 2015, p. 65) In a nutshell, although the politicisation of religion during the protracted conflicts has always had some negative impact on the Muslim-Christian relationship in independent Sudan, Christians continued to enjoy some constitutional rights, including but not limited to the following:  Christian education continues to be part of school curricula to the present day;  December 25 (Christmas Holiday) is observed officially as a national holiday for all Sudanese, while Christians enjoy another two days apart from that:  Christians working in government institutions enjoy rights of going to attend worship services in their respective churches every Sunday;  the government continues to respect and protect Christians’ worship places and services;  the government continues, to some extent, to allow churches to establish regional and international religious networks, including soliciting funds from private and public institutions at national, regional and international levels;

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 the government continues to allow individuals from church partners worldwide to come and stay in Sudan with the purpose of supporting church activities, such as training, capacity-building , and humanitarian assistance; and  as part of the CPA obligation, a Commission for the Rights of NonMuslims was established in 2007. Today, as detailed below, most of these fundamental rights remain, in theory, protected by the constitution. In practice, however, the government’s recent practices point to a radical shift away from adherence to respecting these fundamental religious rights. An important point to note here is that this shift is done essentially by the government institutions and politicians, and not by the more tolerant wider Sudanese society. Thus, it is argued here that, unlike many other countries, politicisation of religion in Sudan is not about societal relations (Muslims vs. Christians). Rather, it is essentially about state-citizen relations. In other words, it is about the existence of a political will of the Sudanese state authorities to adhere to religious tolerance practiced widely in the Sudanese society at different levels of its social organisations. The rights and status of the Christian minority: Current practices and experiences It is true that Sudan lost a substantial part of its Christian population to South Sudan when the latter became an independent state in 2011. But it is equally true that the post-secession Sudan, with an overwhelming Muslim majority, remains a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multicultural state. Focusing on religious diversity, a recent report provides the following estimates of the religious composition of Sudan after the separation: Muslims (90.7%); Christians (5.4%); Traditional Religions (2.8%); other religions (0.1%); and unaffiliated (1.0%).1 Despite these facts, there is a sweeping shift in the Sudanese state practices with regard to diversities, especially those related to Christian minorities, whereby religious intolerance, driven by state politics and policies, becomes the most conspicuous problem in Sudan today. Reference can be made here to two public statements made by President Al-Bashir, on the eve of the referendum: If South Sudan secedes, we will change the constitution and at that time there will be no time to speak of diversity of culture and ethnicity. Sharia and Islam will be the main source for the constitution, Islam the official religion and Arabic the official language.2 In a speech to leaders of the spiritual Islamic Sufi tradition in Khartoum, Al-Bashir declared that: [w]e want to present a constitution that serves as a template to those around us. And our template is clear, a 100 percent Islamic

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constitution, without communism or secularism or Western (influences). […] And we tell non-Muslims, nothing will preserve your rights except for Islamic sharia because it is just.3 Practically, such political rhetoric came to have direct and far-reaching negative consequences on the status and rights of the Christians in Sudan. Thereafter, the government started to take some practical steps that jeopardised the constitutional rights and consequently the status of the Christian minorities. Several sources have documented with some details the recent practices that point to the beginning of wellorchestrated religious intolerance by the state institutions.4 The following are a few cases: First, the government silently dissolved the Commission for the Rights of Non-Muslims and no mechanism has since replaced it. The dissolution of the Commission implies that the government has purposely done away with its two main constitutional responsibilities, i.e., “(a) to ensure that the rights of Non-Muslims are protected”, and (b) “to ensure that the Non-Muslims are not adversely affected by the application of the sharia law in the National Capital” (Sudan Interim Constitution 2005, Article 157(1)). Second, for several decades, every year Christmas used to be a public holiday. In 2012, the government cancelled Christmas as public holiday. Instead, it made it a holiday for the Christians only. That governmental decision implies its intolerance towards respecting religious diversity after separation of the South Sudan. Since then, the Christians no longer enjoy the Christmas holiday socially for two main reasons. First, the Christians celebration without the participation of their Muslim neighbours makes “religious co-existence” an empty catchphrase, for the social dimension of the celebration has a meaning when Muslim families share the event with their Christian counterparts in their respective neighbourhoods. Second, some Christians find themselves forced to work on that Christian holiday. For example, in 2013 one Christian female university student was forced to abandon Christmas worship service, in order to attend a practical laboratory test the marks of which counted in the final grading. Third, the government started to expel many expatriates from churches’ partners worldwide. For example, a senior South Sudanese Catholic priest, Father Maurino, and two expatriate missionaries have been deported on 12th April 2013. The two missionaries, one from France and the other from Egypt, worked with children in Khartoum. According to Fr. Maurino, no reason was given for the deportations.5 Fourth, the government announced publicly its new policies of stopping issuance of approvals for new church buildings in Sudan. The Sudanese Minister of Guidance and Endowments announced in Khartoum on 19th April 2013 during a speech to Parliament that no new licenses will be issued for building churches, and that the existing churches are more than enough for the faithful, indeed, that many churches are being

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abandoned. He, however, assured that freedom of religion will be respected.6 Church leaders reacted with discontent. The SecretaryGeneral of the Sudan Council of Churches, Reverend Kori el-Ramli responded by saying that the statement made by the minister contradicts the country’s constitution. “Yes, we are a minority, but we have freedom of worship and belief just like the rest of the Sudanese as long as we are Sudanese nationals like them,” he explained.7 Fifth, the government started closure, demolition, and/or confiscation of some church properties on the ground that either they were built without approval from the relevant authorities, or they were illegally turned into worship premises, or they belong to Christians from South Sudan who are no longer citizens of Sudan. A few concrete examples attest to this development. A church belonging to the Sudan Pentecostal Church in Soba Al-Aradi, a suburb of the capital Khartoum, was destroyed on 2nd January 2013 by representatives of the Ministry of Infrastructure who were accompanied by police, on the ground that the site ‘belongs to a church whose members are South Sudanese, but they are no longer citizens of Sudan’. On 15th and 16th January, seven other buildings in Khartoum as well as a health centre run by the Sudan Council of Churches were destroyed. The buildings belonged to the Catholic Church, the Presbyterian Church of Sudan, the Africa Inland Church, the Episcopal Church of Sudan, the Sudan Pentecostal Church, and the Seventh-day Adventist Church.8 In a more recent incident, on 1st July 2014, government officials destroyed the Sudanese Church of Christ in Bahri (North Khartoum). Within a 24-hour notice, 70 government officials turned up to demolish the church, which hosted a congregation of more than 600 people. The church administration appealed for the demolition to be postponed until the end of the rainy season, but the officials refused. In this aspect, Reverend Kori el-Ramli insisted that “[w]e want the government to give us new plots so we can build a new church. We are citizens and the constitution says there is freedom of religion and worship so we are using this to try to get our rights”.9 Throughout the rest of 2014 and early 2015, both the Bahri Evangelical Church and an Anglican church in Khartoum continued legal battles to maintain ownership of their churches and the land they occupy. On 2nd December 2014, Sudanese authorities partially destroyed the Bahri Evangelical Church and arrested 37 protesting congregants. They were later released (USCIRF 2015, p. 67). In 2015, the church premises of the Sudan Presbyterian Evangelical Church in Bahri (Khartoum North) were systematically being raided by police who use forces to allow Muslim investors to take away part of the church land property and turn it into market shops at the expense of worship places. It arrested leaders and members of the church including women to enable the investor to control church land property.10 It is worth noting that Sudan Presbyterian Evangelical Church (SPEC) owns properties in strategic places in central Khartoum, Bahri (Khartoum North) and Omdurman. Through the Ministry of Guidance and Religious

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Endowments, some government circles seek full control of SPEC assets by imposing a church leadership loyal to their policies.11 Sixth, church leaders are frequently being summoned, detained and interrogated by the government authorities as part of its new policies aiming at curbing Christian expansion spiritually and materially. The process ends usually by releasing the detainees without any legal charges. For example, four pastors and volunteers from the Sudan Presbyterian Evangelical Church (SPEC) were arrested in Khartoum on 17th July 2013. On 23rd February 2014, SPEC minister Rev. Yahya Abdelrahim Nalu was escorted by security from his church in Omdurman, shortly after finishing Sunday worship service with his congregation. Reports stated that some officials at the Federal Ministry of Guidance and Religious Endowments sought to replace the Rev. Nalu, the church’s senior leader and moderator of the SPEC’s Synod, with a government-appointed committee within the church whose members favour turning SPEC land properties into real estate investments in collaboration with some Muslim businessmen strongly linked with governmental circles.12 Seventh, within the legal system, almost all of Sudan’s religious minorities remain under the constant threat of accusations of heresy and apostasy. Article 126 of the Sudanese 1991 Penal Code is designed specifically to oppress any form of dissent against the state’s official interpretation of Islam. The danger of such an article is not only that it can be used against any group that is deemed heretic (or suspected of heresy) by the state, but also, and more critically, it destroys any notion of freedom of belief stipulated in the constitutions and international human rights conventions. The case of Mariam, which has widely been reported in global media, illustrates vividly the plight of the Sudanese Christian minorities.13 Also, the story shows that there is no consensus among the Muslim scholars in Sudan on such cases: On May 15, 2014 the government of Sudan sentenced Meriam Yahia Ibrahim Ishag to death by hanging because, although she said she was raised a Christian, a family member said she was raised a Muslim and thus was guilty of apostasy for converting. In addition, because the court did not recognize her marriage to a Christian man, she also was found guilty of adultery and sentenced to 100 lashes. While imprisoned in the Omdurman Federal Women’s Prison with her two-year-old son, Meriam gave birth on May 27 to a baby girl. On June 23, an appeals court cancelled the apostasy charges and death sentence and ordered her release from prison, finding that she was not an apostate. (USCIRF 2015, p. 66) These state-driven gross violations of the religious rights and freedom have put Sudan in an odd situation, not only with its own citizens but also with the international communities. For example, the USCIRF Annual Report of 2015 classifies Sudan among the worst countries worldwide in religious violations. In fact, based on the USA’s International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Sudan has been on the list

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of Countries of Particular Concern (CPC) for the last fifteen years. In 2015, USCIRF recommended to re-designate the following nine countries as CPCs, among them Sudan (USCRIF 2015, p. 66). Conclusion The article concurs with many reports that demonstrate beyond doubt that the oppression of Christians, which also includes the destruction of places of worship, religious materials and the harassment of individuals, is causing great fear and a sense of vulnerability and anxiety among the Christian minorities in the country. However, the fact that different churches and denominations are suffering the same plight of persecution and discrimination beg for their unity and solidarity. The crux of the matter here is that main challenge facing different Christian denominations from taking stronger collective positions and actions, with respect to their religious rights, is their varied stand toward the government’s negative practices and policies. For example, some denominations, like the Coptic Church, have established closer positive engagement and relations with the government than others. These varied positions by different Christian denominations have weakened their collective actions as manifested by the present inability of their legitimate paramount institution, the Sudan Council of Churches, to respond more effectively to the repeated gross violations of the Christian minorities’ rights and freedom. Without political will from the government of Sudan to adhere to the constitutional rights of the religious minorities, the religious minorities’ status and rights are likely to deteriorate further. Sadly enough, the situation seems gloomy given the current political instability in the country. The deteriorating rights of the Christian minorities in Sudan must be placed in the context of the wider Sudanese political crisis and bad governance prevalent throughout the postcolonial Sudan. The overall analysis implies that improving religious freedom in Sudan is vital not only for Sudan’s domestic political and social peace and stability but also for improving Sudan international relations. Note on contributor Guma Kunda Komey is an associate Professor of Geography and director of the Centre for Peace and Development Studies at the University of Bahri. References Gaddal, M. 1985. Religion in a changing socio-political structure: A case study of Islam in nineteenth-century Sudan. In Modernization in the Sudan: Essays in honor of Richard Hill, edited by Martin W. Daly. New York: Lilian Barber Press: 49-56. Hasan, F. and Richard, G. eds. 2002. Religion and conflict in Sudan: papers from an international conference at Yale, May 1999. Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa. Komey, Guma Kunda and Samson Wassara. 2008. Challenges of interfaith relations in Sudan. In Kobai, A. and Tareken, A. Striving

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in faith: Christians and Muslims in Africa. Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute, 37-55. Komey, K. 2010. Land, governance, conflict and the Nuba of Sudan. Woodbridge & Rochester: James Currey Mahjoub, A. 1974. Democracy on trial: reflection on Arab and African politics. London: Deutsch. Manger, L. 2001-2002. Religion, identities, and politics: defining Muslim discourses in the Nuba Mountains of the Sudan. Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies, vol. 4, pp. 132-152. Sørbø, M. and Abdel Ghaffar M. eds. 2013. Sudan divided: continuing conflict in a contested state. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. USCRIF (United States Commission on International Religious Freedom). 2015. Annual Report. Washington. Endnotes “Religion Freedom Report, 2015” by Aid to the Church in Need. http://religion-freedom-report.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/countryreports/sudan. Accessed 13/07/2012). 2 Reported, e.g., by Reuters (http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE6BI04I20101219), and quoted in Sørbø and Ahmed, 2013, p. 2. 3 Reported, e.g., by Reuters (http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/07/07/uk-sudan-constitutionidUKBRE8660IB20. Accessed 07/07/2012). 4 Apart from sources cited below, see, for example, “The dilemma of freedom of religion in Sudan” by Sudan Democracy First Group (http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article51185. Accessed: 10/05/2013) “Sudan: religious intolerance rares its ugly head” by News from Africa (http://www.newsfromafrica.org/newsfromafrica/articles/art_13860.htm l Accessed 10/05/2013); “Sudan. Rising restrictions on freedom of religion or belief” by Christian Solidarity Worldwide (http://docseu.livesiteadmin.com/dc3e323f-351c-4172-800e-4e02848abf80/201304-sudan--1-.pdf Accessed 10/05/2013); “Sudan. Freedom of religion or belief” by Christian Solidarity Worldwide (http://docseu.livesiteadmin.com/dc3e323f-351c-4172-800e-4e02848abf80/201311-sudan.pdf Accessed 10/05/2013). 5 Reported by Christian Solidarity Worldwide (http://www.csw.org.uk/2013/4/18/news/1438/article.htm. Accessed 10/05/2013). 6 Reported by Christian Solidarity Worldwide (http://www.csw.org.uk/2013/4/18/news/1438/article.htm. Accessed 10/05/2013). See also http://www.pravoslavie.ru/english/72207.htm. 7 Reported by TVC News (http://www.tvcnews.tv/?q=article/sudan-bansconstruction-new-churches. Accessed 10/05/2013). 1

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Reported by Morning Star News (http://morningstarnews.org/2013/02/christian-bookstores-raidedchurch-buildings-demolished-in-sudan/Accessed 12/05/2013). See also http://morningstarnews.org/2014/09/sudan-shutters-500-memberchurch-in-khartoum/. 9 Reported by Open Doors (https://www.opendoorsusa.org/newsroom/tag-news-post/meriamscase-highlights-plight-of-sudans-christians/Accessed 10/09/2014). See also http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/30/world/africa/sudan-churchviolence/. 10 Reported by Morning Star News (http://morningstarnews.org/2014/11/police-in-sudan-arrest-churchleaders-for-refusing-to-surrender-worship-property/ Accessed 02/11/2014). 11 Reported by The Christian Post (http://www.christianpost.com/news/sudan-arrests-threatens-pastorduring-sermon-as-authorities-try-to-intimidate-preacher-into-resigning115448/ Accessed 13/11/2014). 12 Reported by The Christian Post (http://www.christianpost.com/news/sudan-arrests-threatens-pastorduring-sermon-as-authorities-try-to-intimidate-preacher-into-resigning115448/ Accessed 13/11/2014). 13 Reported by Amnesty International (http://www.amnesty.org.uk/meriam-ibrahim-freed-death-row-sudanapostasy-pregnant-mother; http://www.amnesty.org.uk/pressreleases/sudan-meriam-ibrahims-release-welcomed. Accessed 13/11/2014). 8

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