The Social and Technological Dimensions of Scaffolding and Related ...

The Social and Technological Dimensions of Scaffolding and Related Theoretical Concepts for Learning, Education, and Human Activity Author(s): Roy D. Pea Source: The Journal of the Learning Sciences, Vol. 13, No. 3, Scaffolding (2004), pp. 423-451 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1466943 . Accessed: 14/07/2013 15:12 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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THE JOURNALOF THE LEARNINGSCIENCES,13(3), 423-451 Copyright? 2004, LawrenceErlbaumAssociates, Inc.

COMMENTARY

The Social and Technological Dimensions of Scaffolding and Related TheoreticalConcepts for Learning, Education,and HumanActivity Roy D. Pea School of Education StanfordUniversity

I amperhapsnotthe only one who feels thattheconceptof scaffoldinghasbecome so broadin its meaningsin the field of educationalresearchand the learningsciences thatit has become unclearin its significance.Perhapsthe field has puttoo muchof a burdenon the term, and we need a more differentiatedontology to make progress. Perhapsscaffoldinghas become a proxy for any culturalpracticesassociatedwith advancingperformance,knowledge, and skills whethersocial, material,or reproduciblepatternsof interactivity(as in softwaresystems) areinvolved.This is surely too much complexity to takeon at once. Given these burdensat the level of a scientific accountof learningby the individual,I feel it is prematureto be extendingscaffolding considerationsby metaphoricalextensionto the level of a whole classroom of learnersoreven to aculturallevel, as Davis andMiyake(thisissue) suggestin their introductoryessay. I first see whetherI can garer some clarificationsandleverage fromuses of thetermscaffoldingfor specific instancesandclasses of its uses by individual learners(where the articlesin this issue focus theirattention). As with many such concepts thatarefelt to have useful powerin theoreticaland practicalschemes, it will be worthwhileto do some historicalexcavation,identify and circumscribethe early uses and roots of the concept, and then determine Correspondenceand requestsfor reprintsshouldbe sent to Roy D. Pea, School of Education,Stanford University,CubberlyHall, Stanford,CA 94305. E-mail: [email protected]


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whetherin the rich body of work that has developed since its origins roughly 30 years ago one can craft a conceptualmap relatingscaffolding and its many affiliated concepts such that the vitality of the issues raised in its initial conceptualization can be preservedand even extended. My goals for this articlewere to first provide a personalview on the history of scaffolding and relatedconcepts in its semiotic field and to then develop a frameworkfor what I believe to be its definitionalcore and contrastivetermsandthe primary issues and opportunitiesthey presentfor us as learningscientists and educators. I then consider the contributionsmade and the issues raised in this issue's collection of articles in terms of this framework.Reading the articles themselves will be importantfor the reader,as my goal is not to review them here but to reference them. Collectively, the four articles by Reiser, Quintanaet al., Tabak,and Sherin, Reiser, and Edelson (this issue) provide illuminatingconceptualizations that help advance the theory of scaffolding for instructionalsupport,primarily with a focus on learninghow to do scientific inquiryin the middle to high school grades. They offer a distinction between "structuring"and "problematizing" mechanismsof scaffolding for studentwork (Reiser,this issue), a scaffolding design frameworkencompassing an impressive arrayof categories arounddifferent componentsof scientific inquiryillustratedwith manysoftwaresystems (Quintana et al., this issue), the concepts of "distributedscaffolding"and "synergy"between differentcomponentsof distributedscaffolding(Tabak,this issue), and an analytical frameworkarguingthat scaffolding should be conceived of as a comparative analysis to be performedon learninginteractions(Sherin et al., this issue) rather than software featuresor situations.There is much to be learnedfrom these articles, as they provide a synoptic view of scaffolding researchin science learning. I recallfirstbecoming awareof the conceptof scaffoldingwhen I was a doctoral studentin JeromeBruner'slaboratoryon South ParksRoad in the Departmentof ExperimentalPsychology at OxfordUniversityaround1975. The context was one in which a numberof graduatestudents,postdocs, and visiting fellows (including CatherineUrwin, Michael Scaife, JohnChurcher,Alan Leslie, ChrisPratt,Alison Garton,ReniraHuxley,KathySylva, andlatervisiting studentsAlison Gopnikand Susan Sugarman)were studyingthe ontogenesis of language and thoughtand especially the emergenceof syntaxfrom the earlyprotolanguageand single wordperiod of child language. Yet others were studying imitation,perception,play, and other developmentalphenomena.We regularlyread paperstogether,had a lively weekly seminar series, and reviewed and analyzed video data and its interpretations together. The termscaffoldingwas one introducedby David Woodwith JerryBrunerand Gail Ross in an articlepublishedin 1976 andthe relatedidea "inthe air"amongour Oxfordgroupwas one thatJerrycalled "formats."The notionwas thatone of the potentialexplanationsfor how it is thatbabies acquiremeaningin early parent-child interactionis that there are regularlystructuredsituationsin which the range of


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meanings is actually quite limited and that these simple formatsprovide a highly constrainedsituationin which the child can bootstrapsome of the conventionsof turntaking and meaning making with words that are requiredof a language user (e.g., Bruner,1975a, 1975b, 1977). BrunerandSherwood(1976) illustratedthisline of argumentusing datafrom peekaboo interactionsbetween a motherand child. In Wood et al.'s (1976) article, the term scaffolding was first used, and it describes how an interactionbetween a tutorand a child concerninghow to construct a wooden pyramidalpuzzle employs "a 'scaffolding'process that enables a child or novice to solve a problem,carryout a task or achieve a goal which would be beyond his unassistedefforts"(p. 90). Formatsfor early language thus provideda form of scaffolding for learningto use words and the acquisitionof meaning. Inbothof these conceptualizations,whethermother-infantinteractionin the service of languagedevelopmentor for the developmentof the puzzle-solving behaviorsdescribedin theWoodet al. (1976) article,the firstthingto notice is thatthe situations of learningare neitherformal educationalnor "designed"in the traditional sense ofthe term(evenifthepuzzles weredesigned,as Tabak,thisissue, notes). Such interactionsas we werestudyingwereones we conceivedto be naturallyoccurringin an informalcontextandanexpressionof one of the socioculturallygroundedactivities typical of at least some families in Westernsocieties. Needless to say, the scaffolding achieved in these mother-infantencounterswas not computermediated. The workthatthe concept scaffolding is intendedto do in these psychologists' accountsof humandevelopmentis to bringto one's attentionthe functionthatparticular behaviorson the mother'spartappearto play in enablingthe performanceof a more complicatedact thanwould have otherwisebeen possible. In this sense, scaffolding appearsto be an aptturnof phraseas bothnounandverb-noun becauseit is a structure,guidedin specific formby tacitassessmentof a child'sindependentcapabilities andneeds,andmountedtemporarilyon thelearner'sbehalfuntilthechildcan self-sufficientlyproducethebehavioron his orherown-and verbbecausescaffolding is also a processbecausedifferentaspectsof anactivitywill needto be scaffolded in the conduct of performance over time unless independent performance is achieved.If theparentcontinuedto do suchstructuringonce thechildbecomes capable of autonomousactivities, one would find it strange. It was also currentat the time for our OxfordGroupand others such as Wood's groupat Nottinghamto be readingand thinkingaboutthe philosophy of language and accounts more broadlyof the psychology and developmentof language. We were reading attemptsby PatriciaGreenfield (Greenfield & Smith, 1976), John Dore (1972), ElizabethBates (1976), and othersto make sense of how it is thatinfants come to speak not only single words but also eventually sentences. So accounts of how to do things with words (J. L. Austin), of speech acts (J. Searle), of word meaning-as-use(L. Wittgenstein),and of functionalaccountsof languagein the developmentof thinking(Vygotsky, G. de Laguna)were of vibrantinterestto


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us. We wantedto know how the baby crackedthe linguistic code and became able to do productivethings with words in interaction,and we were unsatisfied with Chomsky's (1966) nativist account of language acquisition. It is in this vein thatthe role of Vygotsky's (1978) concept of the zone of proximal development (ZPD) in conceptualizationsof scaffolding is noteworthy.Defined as the zone of activity in which a person can produce with assistance what they cannotproducealone (or can only producewith difficulty), the ZPD concept depended on a view of human developmentthat had a numberof importantand distinctiveproperties. The first centralpropertyis Vygotsky's (1962) sociohistorical conceptualization of the developmentof language and concepts. Unlike Piaget, who was a genetic Kantianarguingfor the child's constructionof the necessarycategoriesof experience (time, space, causality) from largely individualisticinteractionswith the physical and representationalworlds (Toulmin,1972), Vygotsky as a Marxistwas quite appositeto the view thathumannatureis a given. As MarxWartofsky(1983) famously pointedout, thereis solid historicalevidence of the world's construction of the child as much as the child's constructionof the world: "Childrenare, or become, what they are takento be by others, and what they come to take themselves to be, in the course of their social communicationand interactionwith others"(p. 190). I took this argumentto provide a vital issue for humanlearningaugmented with informationtechnologies: forces,but Accordingto thistheory,humannatureis nota productof environmental is of ourownmakingas a societyandis continuallyin theprocessof "becoming." Humankind is reshapedthrougha dialectic,or "conversation" of reciprocalinfluences: Our productive activities change the world, thereby changing the ways in

whichtheworldcan changeus. By shapingnatureandhowourinteractions withit aremediated,we changeourselves.(Pea,1987,p. 93) Second, as Vygotsky would have it, psychological development progresses from an interpsychological to an intrapsychological plane-it is through the child's experiencesof participatingin activitiesthatareinitiallyexternallyaccessible that the structuresand content of mental life that can be played out internally become possible, an account reminiscentof Wittgenstein's(1958) conception of learningas participationin "formsof life": Theveryessenceof culturaldevelopment is in thecollisionof matureculturalforms of behaviorwith the primitiveforms that characterizethe child's behavior. (Vygotsky,1981,p. 151) It was perhapsnot untilMichael Cole, John-Steiner,Scribner,and Souberman's translationandpublicationof selected Vygotsky essays in the landmark1978 vol-


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ume, Mind in Society: The Developmentof Higher Mental Processes, prompting the philosopherStephenToulmin(1978) to call Vygotsky "theMozartof Psychology," that the fertility of the ZPD concept was made broadly evident to Western psychologists and educational theorists. Michael Cole collaboratorJoe Glick's (1983) chapteron "Piaget,Vygotsky andWerner"helps set a contextfor the arrival of this work on the Americanscene and why it took root so quickly in an intellectualenvironmentin which "fixedcapacity"conceptionsof intelligence were losing favor. Glick distinguished "Vygotsky I" of Thought and Language (Vygotsky, 1962), a book thatVygotsky assembledhimself duringhis lifetime, and"Vygotsky II"of Mind in Society (1978), an editorialconstructionselected for its contemporaryrelevanceto Americanpsychology. (I cannotexplore this distinctionhere, but I recommendit to interestedreaders,especially those not enamoredby the "internalization"metaphorwith which Vygotsky has come to be identifiedwherebyculturalinfluences are interpersonallyinculcatedand subsequently"internalized.") InMindin Society(VygotskyII),theunderlying objectappearsto be the conceptual relationsandthe mannerin whichsign systemstransform organism-environment meansby whichmindbecomessocialized(Glick,1983,p. 43). Glick (1983) noted that the editors depicted these concepts by making several observationsafter first quoting Vygotsky: "The specializationof the hand-this implies the tool, and the tool implies specific

reactionof manon nature...theanimalmerelyuses humanactivity,thetransforming externalnature,andbringsaboutchangesin it simplyby his presence;man,by his bechanges,makesit servehisends,mastersit. Thisis thefinal,essentialdistinction tweenmanandotheranimals." Vygotskybrilliantlyextendedthisconceptof mediationin human-environment interaction to theuseof signsas well as tools.Liketool systems,signsystems(language,writing,numbersystems)arecreatedby societies over the course of humanhistoryandchange with the form of society andthe level of its culturaldevelopment.Vygotsky believed thatthe interalization of culturallyproduced sign systems brings aboutbehaviortransformationsand forms the bridge between early andlaterforms of individualdevelopment.Thus for Vygotsky,in the tradition of Marx and Engels, the mechanism of individual development is rooted in society and culture.(Vygotsky, 1978, Introduction,p. 7)

Glick (1983) also highlighted the importance to American psychology of Vygotsky's process-orientedapproachto evaluatingmentalcapacityin Vygotsky's conceptionof ZPD testing.Vygotsky's (1978) focus on the social foundationsof individualhighermentalfunctioningis exemplifiedin the ZPD concept,which he definedas the distancebetweena child's "actualdevelopmentallevel as determinedby independentproblemsolving" and the higherlevel revealedin "potentialdevelopment as determinedthroughproblemsolving underadultguidanceor in collabora-


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tion with more able peers"(p. 86). Vygotsky providedexamples of childrenwith equivalentindependentproblemsolving who, whendynamicallyassessed, havedifferentZPDs, andhe considersthe level of potentialdevelopmentmore relevantfor instructionthanthe actualindependentdevelopmentallevel. By the time of a widely readRogoff and Wertsch(1984) volume on Children's Learning in the "Zoneof Proximal Development"(also see Wertsch, 1978, who cited Wood et al., 1976), the ZPD was becoming a fundamentalcomponentof the learning and education research literature.1Inspired not only by Vygotsky but workin a similarvein by the clinical psychologist ReuvenFeuerstein,2Ann Brown and colleagues (e.g., Brown & Ferrara, 1985; Campione, 1989; Campione & Brown, 1984, 1990; Campione,Brown,Ferrara,& Bryant, 1984; for theirconnections with Michael Cole's "Laboratoryfor ComparativeHuman Cognition,"see Cole & Griffin, 1983) were workingon what they called "dynamicassessment"in which a cascadingsequenceof hints was providedto enable a dynamicassessment of how much supporta learnerneeded to complete variousbenchmarktasks. A preeminent example of work in this era was Scardamaliaand Bereiter's (1983, 1985) researchusing what they have called "proceduralfacilitation"as a pedagogicaltechniqueto supportthe use of more advancedwritingstrategies(also see Applebee & Langer,1983, on "instructionalscaffolding"for readingand writing). Proceduralfacilitatorswere at first physical note cards with lead-in components to sentencesthatwere designedto providestructuringdevices to scaffold the young writer's writing activities and as such were explicit models of more advancedformsof writing.Therewas no questionin this workthatthe proceduralfacilitatorswere intendedto be but a temporaryadjunctin the writing process. Pea and Kurland(1987) reviewed the state of the artat this periodin bringingtogether developmentalunderstandingof the writing process with the new computerwriting tools of adults and industrytowardwhat they called "developmentalwriting environments"that would directly facilitatethe developmentof writing skills and 1Asreportedin Gindis (1997), EducationalResourceInformationCenter(managedby the U.S. Departmentof Education)recordsrevealedthreetimes more referencesto Vygotskianresearchin education than Piagetianresearch. 2ReuvenFeuersteinis a clinicalpsychologistwho studiedwith JeanPiagetandhas for yearsbeen EducationProfessorat Israel's Bar Ian University.Feuerstein'sinspiringwork on the social and cultural conditionsfor modifiableintelligencewas rootedin his experiencesin the 1940s as codirectorandteacher in the School forDisadvantagedandDisturbedChildrenin Bucharestandhis workwith child survivorsof concentrationcamps.Feuerstein'stheoryof structuralcognitivemodifiabilityandthe Feuersteinmethod, whichhe calls "instrumental enrichment"involvesemergentpracticesof dynamicassessmentin whichhe places so called retardedchildrenandadults(manywith Down's syndrome)with often dramaticlearning resultsin whathe calls "shapingenvironments"thatprovidestructuredmediationto enrichthe qualityof theirinteractionswith otherssuch as parents,teachers,caregivers,andpeers so thattheirexperiencescan be graspedand integratedmeaningfully(e.g., Feuerstein,Hoffman,Rand, & Miller, 1980; Feuerstein, Rand,& Hoffman,1979;also see Kozulin& Rand,2000; Lidz, 1987). Formorerecentworkon dynamic assessment,see Pellegrino,Chudowsky,and Glaser(2001).


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not only be useful for text production(see Pea, 1987, for a relatedanalysis of cognitive technologies for mathematicslearning).Inspiredby these efforts, Hawkins and Pea (1987) developed the INQUIREsoftwaresystem for inquiryprocess supportsin bridgingchildren'severydayand scientific thinkingwith modules such as Questions,Notes, Schemes, and Patterns. I believe thatthe seeds for the diffusionof the concept of scaffoldingarealready latentin Vygotsky's (1962) influentialwritings,for unlike the child language and play work fromBruner,Wood, andothersin which the concept was developedas a prospective mechanism of human development in naturallyoccurring activities andnot designed or technologicallymediatedones, Vygotsky's conceptionsof humandevelopmentbroughttogetherthe informalandthe formal,the naturalandthe designed, to achieve his theoreticalends. For in Vygotsky's (1962, 1978) view, even the naturallyoccurringinteractionsin which the mother scaffolds the baby were culturallyconstitutedproductionswith a historythatmade them akin in kind to the more historically recent instructionalinterventionsin formal educationby which we seek to teach a scientific view of concepts. So scaffolding was destined to become a concept, fueled with a Vygotskian (1978) sociohistoricalview of development,which is appliedso broadlyas to encompassfeaturesof computersoftware (e.g., Tikhomirov,1981; Pea, 1985a, 1985b), curriculumstructures,conversationaldevices such questions, and physically literalexamples of scaffoldingthe learningof a complex motoractivity like tennis (in which one may physically assist the novice tennis player,helping positionthe body, arm,and racketto facilitate a sense of making a first racketstroke).Nonetheless, there are noteworthydifferences between the ongoing culturalpractices of a communityin which informal scaffolding takes place in adult-child interactionpatternsand the scaffolding incorporatedin formalized activities within systems of designed books, software, materialsfor learningand other artifactscrafted specifically to promote learning activities. I believe thatwe have two primaryaxes for organizingthe theoreticalcontributions to supportsfor the processes of learning.One axis is social and most concerned with interactive responsiveness that is contingent on the needs of the learner,providingresourcesthatenable the learnerto do morethanhe or she would alone. The other axis is technological and about designed artifacts,writtenabout so articulatelyin HerbertSimon's (1969) TheSciences of the Artificial. For many of the contributionsto the theory and researchon human development, learning, and education, these two axes may be more or less dominantin theirconceptualizations.For early language and conceptualdevelopment,I argue thatthe social conception of between-people scaffolding and supportfor learning is not primarilyaboutthe uses of technological artifactsbut aboutsocial practices that have arisenover millennia in parentingand other forms of caring. More recently,as computertools have become increasinglyused for supporting learningand educationalprocesses in school and beyond, the concept of scaffold-


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ing has been more commonly employed to describe what features of computer tools and the processes employing them are doing for learning. The theoreticalchallengeis thatforhumankind,tools andsymbolizingtechnologies (such as writtenlanguageandnumbersystems) areamongourmost significant culturalachievementsand, as such, they havebecome partof the culturalresources that we utilize to propagate society across generations, providing significant value-addedto the social processes of between-people supportand caring in the learningprocess. Also, in online learningenvironmentsthatare mediatedby computertechnologies and computer-basedversions of symbolizing technologies for representinglinguistic, mathematical,scientific, and other concepts and relationships-but nonetheless incorporatingbetween-people supportcomponents-the ways in which scaffolding is made possible are extraordinarilydiverse. These two threadsof social process and tool/mediatingprocess in the scaffolding concept came together most noticeably for Western conceptualizationsof learningandeducationthroughthe translatedwritingsof Vygotsky in Thoughtand Language (1962) and Mind in Society (1978). Perhapsas Brunerwrote the Introductionto Thoughtand Languagefor publicationin 1962, his firstencounterswith Vygotsky's considerationsin these newly translatedwritingscame to play a seminal role in his later work with Wood and Ross and in language developmentas well. Vygotsky's concerns were also carriedforwardin the work of his students Luria(Cole, 1978) andLeon'tiev (1981) andin activitytheorysince thattime (e.g., Engestr6m, 1987; Engestr6m,Miettinen, & Punamaki,1999) as well as cultural psychology more broadly (Cole, 1996).

FRAMEWORKFOR THE DEFINITIONOF SCAFFOLDING Like severalof the authorsin this special issue, I find it productiveto returnto the discussions of scaffolding in Wood et al. (1976) and to consider currentwork on scaffolding in this light. There are several components to this definition, which I call here the what, why, and how of scaffolding. The what and why of scaffolding may be consideredtogether,and the how of scaffolding can be taken separately. First, as to the WHAT and the WHY of scaffolding:Scaffolding situationsare those in which the learnergets assistanceor supportto performa taskbeyondhis or her own reach if pursuedindependentlywhen "unassisted"(Wood et al., 1976, p. 90). Right away,one can see how fundamentalaspectsof this foundingsense of the termdifferfrom the work reportedin the four articlesin this issue. In the scaffolding activities of the adult when working with the child in the Wood et al. study, thereis a diagnosis of the learner'sproficiencyandan adaptivelevel of supportthat is providedby the adult,with the temporaldynamicsof the scaffoldingprocess implying cycles of comparisonbetween the assessed level of performancethe learner is exemplifying at any moment in time and the level of scaffolding that is respon-


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sively providedand with the dynamicof the process proceedingthroughsuch dynamic assessment cycles toward the learner's autonomous performance.Stone (1993, 1998a, 1998b) has also highlighted the dynamic natureof the scaffolding process dependenton cycles of assessment and adaptivesupport.A fundamental aspect of the scaffoldingprocess was thus consideredto be whatonly latercame to be called "fading"of the scaffold, to use the term thatI believe was introducedin Collins, Brown, and Newman (1989) and used by many others since: Oncethelearnerhasa graspof thetargetskill,themasterreduces(orfades)hisparticipation, providing only limited hints, refinements,and feedback to the learner,who

smoothexecutionof thewholeskill.(p. 456) practicessuccessivelyapproximating Such fading, I argue, is an intrinsiccomponent of the scaffolding framework: Withoutsuch a dismantlingmechanism,the kinds of behaviorsand supportsthat have been more recently describedas scaffolding actually reflect the much more pervasiveform of cognitive supportthat enables what some call "distributedcognition" (e.g., Hutchins, 1995) and what I have called "distributedintelligence" (Pea, 1993, 2002). From this perspective,the main sense of distributedintelligence emerges from the image of people in action whose activity is enabledby the configuringof distributedintelligence. However,thatintelligence is distributedacross people, environmentsincludingdesigned artifacts,and situations.This is in contrastto intelligence viewed as a possession of the individual embodied mind. I thus describe intelligence as accomplishedratherthanpossessed. As I (Pea, 1993) noted in my chapteron distributedintelligence and education Therearebothsocialandmaterialdimensionsof thisdistribution. Thesocialdistributionof intelligencecomesfromitsconstruction in activitiessuchastheguidedparor apprenticeship, or ticipationin joint actioncommonto parent-childinteraction throughpeople's collaborativeefforts to achieve sharedaims. The materialdistribution of intelligence originatesin the situatedinventionof uses of aspects of the envi-

ronmentor theexploitation of theaffordances of designedartifacts,eitherof which may contributeto supportingthe achievementof an activity's purpose.(p. 50)

I believe that clearly delineatingthe boundariesbetween scaffolding with fading and more general distributedintelligence without fading is a centralproblem for the learningsciences and for education,and the argumentstructuresand warrants used in markingthese boundarieswill be informative-as well as contentious. So manynew forms of humanactivitythatinvolve computingwould be simply unachievablewithout the computingsupportsenabling the acts of distributed intelligence. Fading is simply out of the question. People cannot do the activities withoutthe technologies, or it becomes meaninglessto ask whetherthey can do so.


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If the supportdoes not fade, then one should considerthe activity to be distributed intelligence, not scaffolded achievement.I returnto this core issue later on. Second, as to the HOWof scaffolding,the Wood et al. (1976) articlewas especially useful in defining several of the propertiesfor how such assistance functioned for the learner.These propertiesfell into two primarygroups, with shorthand names I use for them (not used by Wood et al.): 1. Channelingand focusing: Reducing the degrees of freedom for the task at handby providingconstraintsthatincreasethe likelihood of the learner'seffective action; recruitingand focusing attentionof the learnerby markingrelevanttask features(in what is otherwise a complex stimulusfield), with the result of maintaining directednessof the learner'sactivity towardtask achievement. 2. Modeling: Modeling more advancedsolutions to the task. Although channeling and focusing appearto be closely related, they may be distinguishedin the following way: Whereasthe scaffoldingprocess of channeling reducesthe degrees of freedomfor the task at hand,thereis nonethelessthe potential for the learnernot to be focusing on the desiredtask componentor propertyin a temporalsequence of task-relatedbehaviors.So the scaffolding process of focusing is a more restrictive,limiting aspect of scaffolding.

CRITICALCONSIDERATIONOF THE ARTICLES IN THIS SPECIAL ISSUE In the remainderof my commentary,I reflect on the issues raised in the four articles in terms of the scaffolding concept and its relationto distributedintelligence andraise questionsthatI feel warrantcontinuedattentiontowardmakingadvances concerningthis centralconcept in the learningsciences and instructionaltheory. The WHATand WHY of Scaffolding It is significantthatthe dynamicassessmentintrinsicto the scaffoldingframework thatI have outlined,which was integralto the originalWoodet al. (1976) definition of the term, is absent in the software systems that are describedin the articles in this issue as is acknowledgedby the authors,for example,Reiser (this issue): "The sense in which tools can scaffold learnersundersuch conditions are clearly quite differentthanexpertteacherswho can tailortheiradvice to an assessmentof the individual learnerstate" (p. 298). Thus, the microgenesis of scaffolding processes evidentin the problem-solvingsupportby the adultas the child works on the pyramid puzzle or in the peekaboo games characterizedby Bruner and Sherwood


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(1976) or Cazden (1979) is not an ingredientto the presumedscaffolding of these software systems. The reasons for this absence are apparentand noted by authorssuch as Reiser (this issue): Ourfield simply does not have the design knowledge as yet for how to providediagnosticassessmentthatis responsiveto what the learnerneeds for such complex cognitive tasks as the conduct of scientific inquiry.Intelligent tutoring systems for proceduraldomains such as algebra problem solving or geometric proof,by contrast,do seek to reasonaboutthe statesof individuallearnersandprovide next-step,responsive support.Reiser (this issue) thus observes how "the approachin the scaffoldedcognitive tools has been to embed supportwithin the system as promptsor representedin the structureof the tool itself,"leaving adaptation "underthe controlof the learnerswho can exploreadditionalpromptsor assistance available[or] attemptto follow or work aroundthe system's advice"(p. 298). The scaffolding need in this case might even be called metascaffolding:If the learner does not know how to structuretheir problem-solvingprocess for productiveinquiry,how is it that they are expected to know how to decide among nonadaptive choices for scaffolding?They need scaffolds for the scaffolds. This may be a useful locus of teachersupportin whatTabak(this issue) in her articlecalls "synergistic scaffolding"when studentsare using such software. Nonetheless, Reiser's (this issue) effort to distinguishwhat he calls the "structuring"and "problematizing"aspectsof scaffoldingbearscloser scrutinyon the issue of adaptivesupportvital to the scaffolding definition. Reiser seeks to explain by what "mechanisms"a softwaretool provides scaffolding for learnersand what model will accountfor how the tool has benefited learners.Reiser (this issue) differentiatestwo such mechanisms:task structuring("guidinglearnersthroughkey componentsand supportingtheirplanningandperformance"[p. 273]) and content problematizing("tools can shape students'performanceand understandingof the task in terms of key disciplinarycontent and strategiesand thus problematizethis importantcontent"[p. 273]). Reiser's (this issue) goal is to make the problematizingmechanismof scaffolding a more centralissue for our attentionin scaffoldingtheory anddesign, and this is quitesignificant,as it could lead to productiveuses for the scaffoldingconcept in instructionalactivity design. Reiser distinguishes structuringtasks to make them moretractablefrom shapingtasks for learnersto make theirproblemsolving more productive.I foundthis distinctionhardto maintainas I workedthroughreviewing eitherthe softwaresystems he describesor those of the otherarticles.Forexample, the same tool featuresmay both simplify andproblematizeby focusing learnerson task componentsthatthey have not yet accomplished.Reiser (this issue) defines a broadarrayof characteristicsthathe believes createproblematizingconditionsfor scaffoldingincludingdirectingattentionof the studenttowardan issue that"needs resolution,"a triggeringof affective componentssuch as "creatinginterest"in advancingunderstanding,establishinga sense of "dissonanceor curiosity,"andmore


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generally,"engagingstudents."In the end, I startedto see thatI could identify examples of task simplificationwithoutproblematization,and so I grantthat any existence proof for the value of the distinctionReiser wantsto makeprovideswarrant for his distinction. Yet it remains an open empirical question under what conditions it is thata specific scaffoldingfeatureand affiliatedscaffoldingprocess work to problematizetasks for any given learnerdependingon the natureof the tasks; the learner'sbackgroundknowledge, capabilities,andinterests;andthe social context. As Reiser (this issue) notes, "thesocial contextof collaborativeproblemsolving is often integralto the problematizingnatureof the tool" (p. 289), which suggests thatthe problematizingbroughtaboutby scaffolding is less a mechanismin the tool thana social functionof its interpretationin the particularsof the discourse of a learningsituation. I also was not sure what Reiser (this issue) meantby mechanism.For physical tools, a mechanismis a method,procedure,or process involved in how something works.Forlearning,one is familiarwith proposedmechanismsof learning,such as assimilation-accommodation(Piaget, 1952) or knowledge compilation (Anderson, 1983). However, I found the hybrid use of the term confusing, as it is used interpretivelyto markwhat Reiser as theoristbelieves to be what is happeningfor the learneras the software scaffolding featuresare used in the conduct of a complex task of inquiry.So it is neitherabout a descriptivefeaturefor a physical tool nor a proposalaboutan internalmechanismfor learningbut a hypotheticalcharacterizationconcerninghow (external)scaffolds work for (internal)learning.When mechanismis used in this way, it is importantto ask whatwill count as evidence for claims concerninghow scaffolds work. Reiser (this issue) provides illustrative examples of problematizingstudent workin characterizinghow, as studentsinteractwith high school biology scaffolding tools andcreateartifacts,they areconstrainedto using importantepistemic featuresof the discipline embodied in softwaremenu choices: "Ratherthanjust writing down their explanation,the tool forces them to consider how to express their hypothesis and its supportwithin a disciplinaryframeworksuch as naturalselection"(p. 291). Even with examplesof studentdiscoursewhen using this software,I could still not determinewhat datacounts as evidence in supportof a claim for any given instancethat a particularfeatureof a scaffolded cognitive tool functionedto scaffold learningin terms of one, the other,or both of these two proposedmechanisms. However,the distinctionhas promise and can be developed in its empirical groundingin futurework. The Sherinet al. articlein this issue also usefully foregroundsthe need for the comparativeanalysis intrinsicto the scaffolding process definition in Wood et al. (1976). Perhapsbecause the call for papersrequestedconceptualwork ratherthan empiricalstudies,Sherinet al. (this issue) do not provideany empiricaldataon this count except for theiroccasional referenceto comparisonsof the "hypotheticalbehavior of learnerswith and without the innovation"(p. 398). A challenge for the


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learningsciences to work on whatkindsof dataandanalyses will help us betterunderstandthe role of scaffoldingprocesses using softwaretools towardthe targeted autonomousperformances. The HOW of Scaffolding: Channeling and Focusing, Modeling Channeling and focusing in the articles. The articles offer many examples that illustratethe channelingfunctionof scaffoldinglearneractivities including systems dynamics model-buildingtask decompositionin Model-ItT, inquiry process scaffoldingusing KnowledgeIntegrationEnvironmentor ProgressPortfolio, planning notations, progress maps, and constrainedepistemic forms such as "what I know" and "high level question" in Computer-SupportedIntentional LearningEnvironments.Reducing task complexity is a function of many of the categories of scaffolding defined by Quintanaet al. (this issue) such as process managementguides for mapping complex stages in an inquiry process with reminders and guidance toward progress and task completion. Reiser (this issue) also describes how some tool componentsautomatethe execution of some of the taskcomponents.Manyof the softwarefeaturesdescribedin the articlesalso focus a learner'sattentionby markingrelevanttask featuresto maintaindirectednessof their activity towardtask achievement. I found the category system comprising seven scaffolding guidelines and 20 scaffoldingstrategiesin Quintanaet al.'s (this issue) articlequiteinterestingandan impressiveformulationof an exceptionallycomplex field of softwaresystems and theiruses for science instructionand otherareasof learning.As one point of methodology, it would seem importantto develop interraterreliabilitydataon classifying softwaresystems or specific instructionalpracticesin termsof these guidelines and strategies.As with any classification,even one done with the meritsof a combinationof top-down and bottom-upanalysis such as this one, only time will tell whetherthese categories (forms of scaffolding) merit distinctionas their uses are put to the test in design, analytic, and empiricalwork. What looks good as a theoreticaldistinctionmay be moot-or not-for the learningthat results from its deployment in specific subject matterdomains and implementationsituations(e.g., dependingon the teacher'sroles, learningin groups ratherthan individually,student backgroundsand interests,etc.). Reiser (this issue) describeshow both featuresof the softwaretools andthe artifacts producedby studentsin using them reveal the problematizingmechanismof scaffoldinginsofaras the tools studentsuse to access, analyze, andmanipulatedata are structuredso thatthe implicit strategiesof the discipline are visible to students and in that the work productscreatedby studentsare designed so as to represent importantconceptualpropertiesof explanationsin the discipline (these featuresreflect scaffolding Strategy2b and scaffoldingGuideline 2 in Quintanaet al., this is-


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sue). Reiser (this issue) characterizesthese issues in terms of the Galapagos Finches software,which enables learners"toinvestigatechanges in populationsof plantsand animalsin an ecosystem and serves as a platformfor learningprinciples of ecosystems and naturalselection"(p. 286). The softwarescaffolds embody two differentstrategiesfor examining ecosystem data:throughtime longitudinallyor cross-sectionally (by some dimension such as male-female, young-adult). The empiricalquestion one may ask is whetherthe forced choice of strategiesin using such templatesto producethe students'artifactsyields continueduses of the strategies andexpressionsof the discipline's strategiesin artifactsonce the studentis no longer using the tool. Thus, the generalissue with which I am concernedis whetherstudentsusing a constrainedset of formsfor producingthe workartifactsof scaffoldedscientific inquiries are "parroting"back disciplinaryforms of thinkingratherthanperforming with understandingof whattheyhavecreated(like the horseCleverHanswas doing when he seemed to be counting and doing arithmeticbut was being scaffolded by subtle cues from his owner;Pfungst, 1911). It remainsan empiricalissue whether Reiser's (this issue) having "tools force them into decisions or commitmentsrequiredto use the vocabularyandmachineryof the interface"resultsin learnerswho attendto such structuralfeaturesof knowledgeand inquirystrategiesin the science domain without such scaffolding around.Anothersoftwaresystem called Animal Landlorddistinguishes"observations"from"interpretations" (a preferredscientific and look as students at animal behaviorvideos, and epistemic distinction) practice theartifactsthattheyproducerequireuse of thisdistinction.Oncetheyhaveusedthis system, what is known aboutwhetherstudentsare more likely offline to spontaneously differentiateobservationsfrom interpretationsin their uses of scientific inquiry strategiesand distinctions? Modeling in the articles. Therearenumerousscaffolds describedby the authorsin this issue thatseek to establishin bothinquiryprocess andproductartifacts a model for more developmentallymaturescientific inquiryforms of activity.I see two issues of concern here. My first issue is where is the data in supportof the model attributionfor expertise? The second issue is the difference between a and a scaffolding "person-as-a-model." "model-without-a-person" On the first issue, all of the articles but perhapsmost clearly Quintanaet al.'s (this issue) talk about the "targetpractices"of "expertknowledge"towardwhich they hope their scaffolding softwarefeaturesand processes will guide the student as learner(also see Sherinet al.'s, this issue, "idealizedtargetperformance").In the characterizationsof the science inquirygoal statesfor learners,where do these attributionsof expertknowledgecome from?Fromwhat I can tell, muchof it is built from rational reconstructions and prototypical idealizations of inquiry (e.g., Krajcik,Berger,& Czeriak, 2002) and laboratorystudies (e.g., Klahr,2000), not social practicestudiesor cognitive ethnographicstudiesof actualmaturescientific


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practices. Such empirical work in this vein, identified with work in the field of "science studies"(e.g., Bowker & Star, 1999; Galison, 1987, 1997; Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Latour & Woolgar, 1979/1986; Nersessian, 2004; Ochs & Jacoby, 1997; Rheinberger,1997; Star, 1989), both challenge existing idealizations of science practice on which the scaffolding models are based and introducenew forms of scientific expertisethat such idealizationsrarelyinclude (e.g., distributedreasoning; see Dunbar,1999). These issues of empiricallygroundingthe targetstate for learningin empiricalstudiesof scientists are significantones and warrantone's attentionto the science studiesliteratureandthe increasingfocus on technology-mediated practices in scientific inquiry.To take but one case in point, extensive research defining "novice-expert differences" reasoning and task performancein science was used to informpedagogy (Chi, Glaser,& Farr,1988), butit did not sufficiently heed the adaptiveexpertise of the maturepractitionerin contrastto routine expertise (Hatano& Oura,2003). On the second issue concerning modeling, note that because the scaffolding provided in the software systems characterizedin these articles lacks human agency for the learnerto interactwith, they may be missing what could come to be a key property of such modeling-a socially interactive other. One should consider the likely importancein scaffolding processes of a model in the sense of a role model, someone whose performancesand knowledge one could personally aspire to as a culturalissue and involving at its core a sense of identity, an affiliation with that person and their values, language, and activity components as a partof a communityof practice (e.g., Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner,& Cain, 1998; Holland & Lave, 2001, Lave & Wenger, 1991). Having such a model may have very different consequences for learning than working within a nonhuman model structureof a task model that has been developed as a generic pattern prompterfor scientific inquiry. Reiser (this issue) acknowledges as importantbut does not treat empirically in his article how the teachers'interpretiveand discourse practices, among other propertiesof the classroom system, are essential to achieving the desired educational results from uses of the scaffolded cognitive tools. It would be good to see references to such empirical work on such practices and how they contributeto the benefits that software scaffolding may provide. Tabak (this issue) provides fertile examples of what she calls "synergisticscaffolding,"an organizationthat brings togethersoftwarefeaturesdesigned for scaffolding and teacher's scaffolding activities. However,this concept is not developed in terms of what properties of their interactions make such synergies work-or not. Such analyses would comparativelyexamine whetherboth software and teacher scaffolding functions could be achieved by software alone, by teacher alone, and what this says about whether it is importantthat the teacher's supportis human and socially interactive or simply that it needs to be interactiveand adaptivein nature(as software may eventually enable).


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Fading in the articles. I am struckwith the absence of referenceto empirical accounts of fading or transferin any of the articles in this issue, including the Quintanaet al. article,which seeks to be synoptic in its scope, covering dozens of systems in use in the field. Are thereknownresultsfrom measureddiagnosisof unaided performanceand differentforms of scaffolding provided(as requiredin the comparativedefinition of scaffolding and in its original formulations)?Are there theory-informedeffortsto fade such presumedscaffolds duringthe course of their uses for the learners?What are the known empiricalresults from learners'uses of scaffolds and their fading over time as unaidedperformancebecomes possible? I am concernedthatthe reasonfor such silence is thatmanyof the softwarefeaturesin the systems describedappearto functionnot as scaffolds-with-fadingbut as in a way thatwill requirethem to continueto be used by scaffolds-for-performance the learnersto be able to have themdeliverthe performancesthataredesired.Thus, thereis distributedintelligence,not scaffold-with-fading.Some of these scaffolding designs, such as the Quintanaet al. (this issue) category of "processmanagement supports,"look like theycouldbe useful for the adultpracticingscientist,too; others in sense makingmay ormaynotbe useful to the scientist,butwherethereis overtembeddingof scientificdisciplinarystrategiesin the tool menusit certainlycalls outfor learningdatafrom scaffold-with-fadingto avoid the CleverHans interpretationof studentperformancesin usingthesetools. Of course,scaffolding-with-fadingcanbe useful for adultlearning,too, butI thinkthatmanyof the supportsdescribedin these categorieswould functionusefully as aides to the distributedintelligence achieved in the activities of adultsor childrenwithout such fading. However,the surpriseis in the Sherinet al. article(thisissue) on thispoint:Sherin et al. arguewith the assumptionin the originalWoodet al. (1976) articleon scaffolding thatfading is a requiredcomponentof the definition.Yetunderstandingthe dynamicsof scaffoldingprocesses,includingthe selection andcalibrationof scaffolding structuresduringinteractions,lies at the heartof developmentaltheoryand the science of learningandroles that scaffoldingplays in them. Although Sherinet al. havemadegood progressin helpingus analyzescaffolding,theymustnow moveforwardto makeheadwayon the issue of change over time. To not takeon this issue is self-defeating and only a statementof the currentlimited state of the art that, as Sherinet al. (thisissue) note, "inthe case of technologicalartifacts,thereis less of an opportunityfor interactivetuningof scaffolding"(p. 403). Infact, it is not at all obvious thatSherinet al.'s frameworkcannotbe appliedto changesovertime, andin the closing sections of their article,they even suggest thatit can be so extended. Relation of Scaffolding With Fading to Distributed Intelligence More Generally In this section, I considerhow scaffoldingwith fading as one of its integralcomponents relates to distributedintelligence more generally. As Stone (1998b) high-


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lighted and Tabak(this issue) highlights, scaffolding is not at all a theoretically neutralterm.It is rootedin ZPD conceptions of learningand developmentand activity theoreticconceptualizationsof the relationsamong people, tools, and environment. It is activity and performance centered (e.g., Engestrom, 1987; Leont'iev, 1981; Vygotsky, 1978; Wertsch, 1991), not cognitive structureor task analysis centeredto point to a very differenttheoreticaltraditionin cognitive science (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Newell, 1990). Tabak'sarticle(this issue) providesa rich discussion of how scaffoldingrelates morebroadlyto mediationof activitywith culturaltools such as mathematicalrepresentational systems for place value multiplication and how this helps problematize,in interestingways, the boundariesbetween (a) scaffolding considered in the context of instructionaldesign and learningsupportand (b) distributed cognition more generally,which is commonly mediatedby culturaltools and scaffolds createdby othersor by oneself as designs for achieving activities that would be errorprone, challenging, or impossible otherwise. If one consideredscaffolding activity to be assisting performancegenerally,it would problematically span an exceptional range of human behaviors that includes adults, not only children, and many activities that people do not consider learning such as walking up stairs, sitting in chairs, flying in planes-each of which is assisted performancethat would not be possible if unaided (stairs provide a physical scaffold for achieving greaterheight in a building, chairs provide a scaffold for activity in an intermediatestate between standingand lying down, planes provide a scaffold for rapid travel avoiding those pesky mountains,etc.). Learning to scale heights without stairs, compose a sitting position without a chair, and unaided fast motion in the air are not goals of these scaffolds, and no one expects fading to be an integralpartof the use of stairs, chairs, and planes as scaffolds. Closer to the examples of these articles on inquiry are the computer-supportedactivities of adult scientists using advanced scientific visualizations for reasoning about qualitative and quantitativerelations about physical variables as in global warming, or making inferences about statistical relations in census data (without the revolutionaryadvances in exploratorystatisticaldata analysis methods and software pioneered by Tukey, 1977), or longitudinaldata modeling (using computationallyintensive analytic methods;e.g., Singer & Willet, 2003). Insofar as I am aware, we are not asking adults using these methods to function autonomously without such tools. Although certainly not the first,3one of the most significant formulationsof the uses of computing to enable people to do what they could not do at all or could only do poorly without computing is in the seminal technical report on "augmentingthe human intellect" written by Douglas Engelbart (1962, 1963) shortly before he and his group developed the first personal computer at Stanford Research Institute (SRI; Bardini, 2000; Hafner & Lyon, 1996; Waldrop, 2002). Engelbart (1962) wrote the following:


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It has been jokingly suggested several times during the course of this study that what we are seeking is an "intelligence amplifier."... At first this term was rejected on the groundsthat in our view one's only hope was to make a bettermatch between existing humanintelligence and the problemsto be tackled, ratherthan in making man more intelligent. But ... this term does seem applicableto our objective. Accepting the term "intelligenceamplification"does not imply any attemptto increase native human intelligence. The term "intelligence amplification" seems applicable to our goal of augmenting the human intellect in that the entity to be producedwill exhibit more of what can be called intelligence than an unaided human could [italics added];we will have amplified the intelligence of the humanby organizinghis intellectual capabilities into higher levels of synergistic structuring. What possesses the amplified intelligence is the resulting H-LAM/T system [Human using Language, Artefacts, and Methodology in which he is Trained;italics added], in which the LAM/T augmentationmeans represent the amplifier of the human's intelligence. In amplifying our intelligence, we are applying the principle of synergistic structuringthat was followed by naturalevolution in developing the basic humancapabilities.What we have done in the developmentof our augmentation means is to constructa superstructurethat is a synthetic extension of the natural structureupon which it is built. In a very real sense, as representedby the steady evolution of our augmentationmeans, the developmentof "artificialintelligence" has been going on for centuries. (p. 19)

3SeeVannevar Bush'sastounding 1945essay"AsWeMayThink"(Bush, 1945a),imaginingthefutureof computers as "memex" machinesthatwouldsupporthumanactivitiesfromscientificdiscovery tobusinessdecisionmakingusingassociativeindexing[whichcametobe calledhypertext]: Forexample Considera futuredeviceforindividualuse,whichis a sortof mechanized privatefile andliwill do.A memexis a devicein whichanindividualstores brary.It needsa name... "memex" all his books,records,andcommunications, andwhichis mechanizedso thatit maybe consultedwithexceedingspeedandflexibility.Itis anenlarged intimatesupplement tohismemory. ... Whollynewformsof encyclopedias willappear, trails readymadewitha meshof associative Thelawyerhas runningthroughthem,readytobe droppedintothememexandthereamplified. at his touchtheassociatedopinionsanddecisionsof his wholeexperience,andof theexperienceof friendsandauthorities. Thepatentattorneyhason call themillionsof issuedpatents, withfamiliartrailsto everypointof his client'sinterest.Thephysician,puzzledby a patient's reactions,strikesthe trailestablishedin studyingan earliersimilarcase, andrunsrapidly to theclassicsforthepertinent throughanalogouscasehistories,withsidereferences anatomy andhistology.Thechemist,strugglingwiththesynthesisof anorganiccompound, hasall the chemicalliterature beforehim in his laboratory, withtrailsfollowingthe analogiesof comand to chemical behavior.(p. 106) side trails their and pounds, physical Bush was the firstPresidentialScience Advisor whose strategicandfuturisticthinkingalso directlyled to Congressionalauthorizationfor the NationalScience Foundation(Bush, 1945b). Engelbartwas very inspiredby Bush's vision in his inventions.


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In Doug Engelbart's(1962) remarkablereportcreating a new frameworkfor thinkingnot only aboutcomputingbut its relationto the historyof humanthinking andactivity,he conjecturedthatcomputersrepresenta fourthstage in the evolution of humanintellectualcapabilitiesbuildingon (a) thebiologically basedconceptmanipulationstage, (b) the speech and writing-basedstage of symbol manipulation, and(c) theprinting-basedstageof manualexternalsymbolmanipulation,andnow Inthisstage,symbolswithwhichthehumanrepresents theconceptshe is manipulatbeforehis eyes,moved,stored,recalled,operateduponaccording canbe arranged ingto extremelycomplexrules-all in veryrapidresponseto a minimumamountof information suppliedby the human,by meansof specialcooperative technological devices. In the limit of what we might now imagine, this could be a computer,with

whichwe couldcommunicaterapidlyandeasily,coupledto a three-dimensional colordisplaywithinwhichit couldconstructextremelysophisticated imageswith thecomputer beingableto executea widevarietyof processesonpartsorallof these imagesin automatic responseto humandirection.Thedisplaysandprocessescould providehelpfulservicesandcouldinvolveconceptsnot hithertoimagined(as the thinkerof stage2 wouldbe unableto predictthebargraph,theprocessof pregraphic longdivision,or a cardfile system).(p. 25) This traditionof using computersas what came to be called "cognitivetechnologies" at Xerox Palo Alto ResearchCenter (PARC)in the 1970s and 1980s (see history in Rheingold, 1985/2000) was fueled significantly when the new center hiredalmost all of Engelbart'sSRI groupwhose talents were then turnedto creating the first commercially available personal computer,the Xerox Alto (Hiltzik, 2000). The interestingwrinkle in this history that then begins to connect up with developmentalpsychology and learningis thatAlan Kay, the PARCimpresarioof portable personal computing with his vision of a Dynabook, brought the neo-Piagetian ideas and child-centeredsensibilities of MIT professor Seymour Papertinto the design of the PARC'scognitive technologies with his leadershipof PARC's Learning Research Group. The development of bit-mapped computer screens, the SmallTalkobject-orientedand message-passing programminglanguage, constantpilot testing of PARCprogramuser interfaceswith childrento see if they found themcompelling anduseful as "fantasyengines,"andpoint-and-click interactivitywere all partof the emergenceof the artof humaninterfacedesign at PARCin the early 1970s (Kay & Goldberg,1977), and laterthe Macintoshteam at Apple Computertook on this legacy (and significantly,some of its key staff). Now consider-with tonguein cheek-a differentspinon today'spersonalcomputerandits accessible user interfaceswith this design history:Imaginean account of personalcomputingthatwas developednot by the likes of Kay but by educators who insisted on scaffolding-with-fadingof the kinds of supportsprovidedby the cognitivetechnologiesthatthe computeraffordedinsteadof integraluse of comput-


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ers in a coevolved patternof activity in which the humanand the machineroles in conducting complex inquiries and performingadvanced scientific modeling and simulationsneededto transferto thelearner,alone,workingwithoutthecomputer. Withdistributedintelligence,the point is often not aboutfading at all, butbeing able to act in a context of assumptionsof availabilityof tools-representational, material, and other people-for achieving ends. Educators, policymakers, and learnersneed to weigh the perceived risks affiliatedwith the loss of such support with the value of the incrementaleffort of learninghow to do the task or activity unaidedshould such tools and supportsever become inaccessible, and the answer has to do with the social and technological assumptionshumansmake. As we approach a world in the coming years with pervasive computing with always-on Internetaccess, reliable quality of service networks,and sufficient levels of technological fluency, the context assumptionsthat help shape culturalvalues for distributedintelligence versus scaffolding with fading are changing. So that is one of my concerns here. I believe the authorsin these articles have been makingsignificantprogressin providingtechnologicalandpedagogical supportsto the conductof scientific inquiryin its bootstrappingphases. I see two large vistas of questions for the work ahead. First is the fascinating and challenging question of sorting out empiricallywhich of the sense making, process management, and articulationand reflection supportsthat they and others have created should be conceived of as scaffolds-with-fadingto be pulled down and whisked away once the learneris able to performas expected withouttheiruse-and which of these supportsdeserveto serve in an ongoing way as partof a distributedintelligence scientific workbench and as fundamentalaides to the doing of science whose fading is unnecessaryand unproductive. The second vista is engaged more with culturalvalues than with empiricism. For the most part(except Tabakand briefly, Reiser, this issue), the articles in this issue do not takeon developmentsof any specific social practicein science inquiry whose performancesare scaffolded (for contrast,see Hutchins, 1995, on navigation in relationto its instrumentsand social practices).Yetthe issue looms large.If one can assume regular access to the scaffolding supportsby the person using them, and if theiruse may acceleratebroaderaccess to the forms of reasoningthat employ them (such as science inquiry),the questionis pressing:Why fade? Tabak provides a historical considerationof scaffolding and its relation to distributed cognition, and Reiser hints at it. Sherin et al. (this issue) note that "it is not even clear thatit makes intuitivesense to call the calculatora scaffold,"as it has become so common that "if a calculator is a fixed component of mathematics problem-solving activity,can it still be called a scaffold?"(p. 390). Sherinet al. (this issue) go on to correctlyobserve how "themore thatour learningartifactstransform the task, the harderit will be to understandhow the learnermight be 'doing the same thing"' (p. 395). So these value considerationsin relationto issues of scaffolding as an educationalconcept are a vital need, particularlyin termsof the his-


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torically changing relationbetween scaffolding-with-fadingand distributedintelligence.

What Does It Mean to Test Scaffolding Theory? It is importantto begin testing the claims of scaffolding theory in which scaffolding theory involves specific formulationsof what distinctiveforms and processes of focusing, channeling,andmodeling areintegralto the developmentof expertise. It also appearsthatembodiedwithin a theoryof scaffoldingneeds to be a theoryof transferof learningfor autonomousperformanceas well, or, more likely I would argue,a theoryof scaffoldingneeds to be situatedwith respectto a theoryof the development of the distributedintelligence, as learningto "worksmart"(Bransford & Schwartz,1999; Bransfordet al., 1998) will often involve, as adaptiveexpertise, learningto establish one's own scaffolds for performance,4and fading these may be beside the point-fading of supportsas a somewhatPuritanicalconcept that is inappropriatefor modem times. Among the considerationsin such a formulation,it seems to me, would be the following: 1. A theoryof scaffoldingshould successfully predictfor any given learnerand any given task what forms of supportprovidedby what agent(s) and designed artifacts would suffice for enablingthatlearnerto performat a desirablelevel of proficiency on that task, which is known to be unachievablewithout such scaffolding. Thus, one needs independentevidence that the learnercannot do the task or goal unaided. One would imagine as a primaryconcern the need to take on issues of over what range of situationsthis determinationwould be made or inferred.This concernis also implied in the comparativeformulationof scaffoldingby Sherinet al. (this issue). Such a theory of scaffolding would also need to account for recognition processes by which a learnerrecognizes a situationas an appropriateone for deploy4Teachingfor the design of distributedintelligence ... would encourageandrefine the natural tendencyfor people to continuallyre-createtheir own world as a scaffold to their activities. ... In mathematicsand science education, one might develop a metacurriculumoriented to learningaboutthe role of distributedintelligence in enablingcomplex thought ... They would come to see throughtheir activities where the bottlenecksof complex mentationreside. They would recognize how physical, symbolic, and social technologies may providethe supportsto allow for reachingconceptualheights less attainableif attemptedunaided.This goal might be achievedthroughexaminationof living, everydayexamples (buildingfrom cases wherethey alreadydo distributedintelligence in the world), and,perhaps,throughcase studiesof the roles of informationstructures(e.g., matrices,flowcharts,templates)and social structures(workteams; apprenticeships)in mediatinglearningand reasoningas activity systems of distributedintelligence. (Pea, 1993, pp. 81-82)


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ing the knowledge or skills in an autonomousmannerthat was developed through scaffolding. 2. In readingthe articles, I was astonishedto find that they do not distinguish learnersat different developmentallevels of knowledge or of distinctive beliefs aboutknowledge and learning(e.g., Hofer & Pintrich, 1997), even within science tasks or in termsof epistemological views on the natureof science-although extensive literatureis available in science education that uses such developmental levels (e.g., Carey,Evans, Honda, Jay, & Unger, 1989; Halloun, 1997; Hammer, 1994; Kuhn, Amsel, & O'Loughlin, 1988; Linn & Songer, 1993; Redish, Steinberg,& Saul, 1998; Roth & Roychoudhury,1994; Smith,Maclin, Houghton, & Hennessey,2000; Songer & Linn, 1991). It would seem that scaffoldingtheory by its very natureneeds to characterizea developmentaltrajectoryfor levels of performanceon the tasks that it is designed to dynamically scaffold. The diagnoses and adaptivesupportthat scaffolding as a process provideswould move stepwise with the learnerup the developmentallevel sequence until such masteryhas been achieved that the fading has been accomplished.5 It seems possible to imagine "mixed initiative"6designs of scaffolding processes in which people andmachinesjoin togetherin helping someone learnsomething in the sense thatcertainscaffolding activities can be the responsibilityof the teacher(or peers) andotherscaffoldingactivitiesprovidedby the software.Even if the softwarecannotdo an assessmentof the learnerandthenprovideadaptivescaffolding on its own, it seems entirelypossible thatthe teachercould do such an assessment and thenbe in chargeof switching levels of scaffoldingthatareprovided by the software.In this way, a scaffoldingpartnership,or synergy,as Tabakwould call it, could be achievedin supportof the learner'sadvances.How these "divisions of labor"should be achievedis a theoreticallyfertile areafor learningsciences research (e.g., Stevens, 2000). 3. Testingscaffoldingtheoryfor the purposesof informinginstructionaldesign has some distinctively different issues affiliated with it. The designer needs to know how to scaffold what facets of the scientific inquiryprocess when, and with what expected results, along a learning trajectoryin which new answers will be given to what is needed. The complexity of the scientific inquiryprocess is such thatit cannotall be scaffoldedat once. (Therearestronganalogshereto the writing process and forms of scaffolding thathave been providedfor learningto write in5Davis (2003a, 2003b) has providedan example of work that can inform the making of such connections in her studies of how studentswith differentbeliefs aboutscience learningused andbenefited from differenttypes of scaffolding. 6Carbonell(1970) is most identifiedwith the concept of mixed initiativesystems for learningsupport.Carbonellcreatedthe first intelligenttutoringsystem, and its design was such thateithera human teacheror the computerprogramcould ask questions. Today,such mixed initiative systems are commonly providedin customer-relationshipmanagementandcall centers,in complex planning,and more recently to aid information-seekingbehavior.


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eluding writer'sworkshopsand varioussoftwaretools.) Yet from readingthese articles, the instructionaldesigner does not have at hand any rules for making decisions about what kinds of scaffolds (among seven scaffolding guidelines and 20 scaffoldingstrategiesin Quintanaet al., this issue) to providein whatkindof adaptively relevantsequencingfor advancinga learner'scapabilities. 4. In the activitiesof scaffoldingfor learning,what specifically requiresthe social face-to-face of scaffolding versusthe interactivitythatmight be providedby a software artifact?Is contingency of responding all that matters (e.g., Reeves & Nass, 1996; implied in most of these articlesas well), or is it humanagency thatis crucial in the scaffolding process? It is entirelypossible that issues of identitydevelopment, community or culturalvalues, a sense of belonging/affiliation,faith, trust,individualcaring, and responsibilityweigh into these mattersand that without the "humantouch"of scaffolding and fading from agents that truly represent these dimensionsof experience,scaffoldingandfadingfor learningmay be less effective (or unhelpful altogether).Reminding a child of a rule to be followed in a game may provide both a metacognitivescaffolding promptbut also be emblematic of a caring response that motivates its consideration (e.g., Lepper & Woolverton,2002). In this respect, it is somewhat worrisomethat what is valued by people in the uses of these scaffolds is too distantand relativelyinvisible in the scaffoldingartifactsthataredevelopedandused by Reiser (this issue) andothersin these articles.A learnercannothave a dialog with the scaffoldingsupportsin an inquiry system such as the BGuILEExplanationConstructor-likeone could a person doing BGuILE-likeinterpersonalscaffolding in a classroom-about why one needs to answera questionin a certainway. Conveyingthe rationalesfor performing different scientific practices by means of a prescriptionbuilt into a software scaffold, as recommendedby scaffolding Strategy5b in Quintinaet al.'s article, may not have enough of a humantouch.

CONCLUSION Like the term communityin learningtheory and educationaluses of phrasessuch as "community of practice," "community of learners" "online community of learning,"it is importantto note that theoreticalissues are not settled by definitions per se (Barab,Kling, & Gray,2004; Renninger& Shumar,2002). Yet definitional issues and category systems of kinds of scaffolds and scaffolding occupy a large proportion of the pages in these articles. The vital question, ontologies aside, is this: What work does the concept of scaffolding do in theories of learning and instruction?How does the scaffolding concept, however articulated, stand in relation to the specific goals of explanation,prediction, and the coherence of theoreticalclaims for a theory of learning,encompassinglearning in everyday cognition, work practices, and in formal education? How does


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the scaffolding concept stand in relation to its effective use in what Bruner (1966, 1996) has called a "theoryof instruction"to guide the structureand sequencing of its instructionaldesigns, its situated practices, and its outcomes? Reflecting on these questions, I recommendseveral new emphases (a) on establishing systematic empiricalinvestigationsof how the scaffolding process relates to learning and not only to performanceand (b) in designing and researching uses of mixed-initiative systems that combine human help from teachers and peers with software system features that aid scaffolding processes. One thing for sure: Scaffolds are not found in software but are functions of processes that relate people to performancesin activity systems over time. The goals of scaffolding researchgoing forwardshould be to study how scaffolding processes-whether achieved in partby the use of software features,human assistance, or other materialsupports-are best conceived in ways that illuminate the natureof learning as it is spontaneouslystructuredoutside formal education and as it can most richly inform instructionaldesign and educationalpractices. In either case, to advancethe prospectsof learners,thickly texturedempiricalaccounts are now needed of how scaffolding processes in such activity systems work in comparisonto their independentperformances,even when (and perhaps especially when) the results deviate from the best intentions of their designers. We need to see best practices (when scaffolding systems work as planned) but also the troublesthat arise when learnersturnout not to act in the ways that designers hoped and when addressingtheir needs can stretchour imaginations,theories, and designs. These articles have focused more on propertiesof software and curriculum for science inquiry than they have learner performances and transfer of learning considerations. When software designed to scaffold complex learning is used, the burdenof proof is on the researcherto (a) document how it is that it serves to advance a learner'sperformancebeyond what they would have done workingalone (i.e., the ZPD comparisonneeds to be warranted)and (2) what processes of fading need to be employedto sustainthe learner'sautonomousperformanceof the capabilitiesin questionacross transfersituationsthatmatter.Such proof needs to be providedfor each learner,not only selected learnersor groups that serve to illustratethe best practicesof scaffolding processes. Finally, these articles provocativelycall one's attentionto the boundaryissue between scaffolding defined with fading as a necessary condition and distributed intelligence in which scaffolded support enables more advanced performances than would be possible without such supportbut in which fading is not a cultural goal. Such boundaryissues are at once empiricaland normativeas we debatevalues for what learnersshould be able to do with and without such designed scaffolds-debates nonetheless informed by empirical accounts of learners'performances in the diversity of situations in which their knowledge and adaptive expertise should come to play.


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