The Social Organization of Arrest

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The Social Organization of Arrest Author(s): Donald J. Black Reviewed work(s): Source: Stanford Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 6 (Jun., 1971), pp. 1087-1111 Published by: Stanford Law Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1227728 . Accessed: 13/10/2012 11:30 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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The Social Organizationof Arrest* DonaldJ.Blackt ThisArticle offers a setofdescriptive onthesocialconditions materials underwhichpolicemen arrests in make routine encounters. At thislevel, itis a modest increment in theexpanding on thelaw'sempirical literature face.Scholarship on law-in-action hasconcentrated uponcriminal law in generalandtheworldofthepolicein particular.' Justwhat,beyondthe offacts, theseempirical hoarding studies willyield, isstillunclear. however, a degreeofplannedchangein thecriminal Perhaps willfoljusticesystem low,be itin legaldoctrine orinlegaladministration. In anyevent, evaluationcertainly appearstobe thepurpose, andreform theexpected outcome, ofmuchempirical research. ThisArticle a different pursues sortofyield fromitsempirical study:a sociological oflaw.2The analysis theory is selfinattentive consciously to policyreform or evaluation of thepolice;it is intentionally bloodless in tone.It examines in ordertoinfer arrest patterns toan understanding relevant ofall instances oflegalcontrol. The empirical analysis querieshowa number of circumstances affect theprobability ofarrest. The factors considered are:thesuspect's race,the oftheallegedcrime,theevidenceavailablein thefield legalseriousness thecomplainant's setting, forpoliceaction,thesocialrelationpreference shipbetween thecomplainant andsuspect, thesuspect's degreeofdeference towardthepolice,andthemanner inwhichthepolicecometohandlean in response whether incident, to a citizen's requestor through theirown initiative. The inquiryseeksto discover generalprinciples according to * The Article'sfindingsderivefroma largerresearch projectunderthe directionof Professor AlbertJ. Reiss,Jr.,Departmentof Sociologyand Instituteof Social Science,Yale University. The projectwas coordinated at theCenterforResearchon Social Organization, of Sociology, Department of Michigan.It was supportedby GrantAward oo6, Officeof Law Enforcement University Assistance,U.S. Department of Justice, undertheLaw Enforcement Assistance Act of I965, and bygrants fromthe NationalScienceFoundationand the RussellSage Foundation. tA.B., I963, Indiana University; M.A., I965; Ph.D., I968, University of Michigan.Assistant Professor of Sociology,Yale University; Lecturerin Law, Yale Law School. I. See generallyE. SCHUR, LAW AND SOCIETY (I968); Skolnick,The Sociologyof Law in America:Overviewand Trends,in LAW AND SOCIETY 4 (I965) (supplementto I3 SOCIAL PROBLEMS Bordua & Reiss, Law Enforcement, (i965)); in THE USES O0F SOCIOLOGY 275 (I967); Manning, thePolice,in OBSERVING DEVIANCE (J.Douglas ed., forthcoming). Observing The empiricalliterature is so abundantand is expandingso rapidlythatthesepublishedbibliographic discussionsare invariablyinadequate. 2. It shouldbe notedthatthe Article'sapproachto legal lifediffers quite radicallyfromthe approachof Philip Selznick,one of the most influential Americansociologistsof law. Selznick's sociologyof law attempts to followthepathof naturallaw; myapproachfollowsthegeneraldirection of legal positivism. In Lon Fuller'slanguage,Selznickis willingto toleratea confusionof theis and ought,whileI am not. L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 5 (I940). See P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (I969); Selznick,The Sociologyof Law, 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 50 (D. L. Sills ed., I968); Selznick,Sociologyand NaturalLaw, 6 NATURAL L.F. 84 (I96I).

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andthus theirpowertoarrest, useorwithhold routinely whichpolicemen arrest. of toreveala partofthesocialorganization3 Next ofthefieldmethod. discussion beginswitha skeletal The Article toplacearrest policeworkdesigned ofroutine ethnography a brief follows first arethenpresented, onarrest Thefindings context. itsmundane within and a suspect, and botha citizencomplainant involving forencounters specufinally The Article withlonesuspects. secondforpoliceencounters at thelevelofa genfindings oftheempirical latesabouttheimplications froma sociologyofthepolice thefocusshifting ofleaal control, eraltheory

oflaw. toa sociology

T. FIELD METHOD

obofI966bysystematic duringthesummer The datawerecollected in Boston, Chicago,and Washingtransactions ofpolice-citizen servation

withlaw,socialscience,and police observers-persons ton,D.C.4 Thirty-six between ofencounters observations backgrounds-recorded administration trainingand supervision and citizens.The observers' patrolmen uniformed

acin thethreecities.Observers identical purposes, was,forall practical on all daysoftheweekforseven on all workshifts patrolmen companied

moreofourmanhoursweredevotedto weeksin eachcity.Proportionately high,namelyeveningshifts, timeswhen policeactivityis comparatively weekendevenings.Hence, to a degreethe sampleoverand particularly thatarisemoreon eveningsand thekindsof socialdisruptions represents chosenas observation weekendsthanat othertimes.The policeprecincts of lowersocio-ecositesin each citywere selectedto maximizescrutiny areas.Two prenomic,highcrimerate,raciallyhomogeneousresidential wereused cinctswereusedin bothBostonand Chicago,and fourprecincts however,were in Washington,D.C. The Washington,D.C., precincts, thanwerethosein Bostonand Chicago. moreraciallyintegrated Observersrecordedthedata in "incidentbooklets,"formsstructurally schedules.One bookletwas used foreach incident.A similarto interview situation involving policeactionwas classifiedas an "incident"if it field or by a attention by the policeradio system, was broughtto the officer's himselfnoticed or if theofficer citizenon thestreetorin thepolicestation, 3. As used in thisArticle,the broadconcept"social organization"refersto the supraindividual principlesand mechanismsaccordingto whichsocial eventscome into being,are maintainedand refersto thedescripPut anotherway,socialorganization arranged,change,and go out of existence. ofsocialevents. tivegrammar 4. At thiswriting,the data are over fouryearsold. However,therehas been littlereformin police routinepatrolworksinceI966. This is in partbecausethepoliceworkin question-everyday contactwithcitizens-is not as amenableto plannedchangeas otherformsof policework,suchas Moreover,the data have value even if or vice enforcement. regulation, crowdor riotcontrol,traffic conduct,sincetheyremainusefulfordevelopinga theoryof theyno longerdescribecontemporary A generaltheoryof law has no timelimits.Indeed,how fineit would be law as a behaviorsystem. if we possessedmoreempiricaldata fromlegal lifepast.

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a situation Alsoincludedas anddecidedthatitrequired policeattention. whichthepolicenoticed incidents werea handful ofsituations themselves butwhichtheychosetoignore. inthepresence Theobservers ofpolicedidnotfilloutincident booklets men.In fact, thelineofficers weretoldthattheresearch wasnotconcerned withpolicebehavior butonlywithcitizenbehavior towardthepoliceand thekindsofproblemscitizensmakeforthepolice. The observers recordeda totalof 5,713incidents, but thebase forthe

present analysis isonlya little morethan5 percent ofthetotal.Thisattrition

resultsprimarily fromthegeneralabsenceofopportunities forarrestin patrolwork,wheremostof theincidentsinvolvenon-criminal situations or criminalsituationsforwhichthereis no suspect.Trafficencounters also were excluded,even thoughtechnically any traffic violationpresentsan opportunity forarrest.Othercaseswereeliminatedbecausetheyinvolved factorsthatcould invisiblydistortor otherwiseconfusethe analysis.The encountersexcludedwere thoseinitiatedby citizenswho walked into a policestationto ask forhelp (6 percentof total) or who flaggeddown the policeon thestreet(5 percent).Thesekindsofencounters involvepeculiar situational features warranting separatetreatment, thougheventhatwould be difficult, given theirstatistically negligiblenumber.For similarreasons encountersinvolvingparticipants of mixed race and mixed socialclass status5were also eliminated.Finally,the sampleof encountersexcludessuspectsunderi8 yearsof age-legal juvenilesin moststates-and suspectsofwhite-collar status.6 Thus,itinvestigates arrestpatterns in police encounters withpredominantly blue-collaradultsuspects. II.

ROUTINE POLICE WORK

In some respects, selectingarrestas a subjectof studyimplicitly misrepresents routinepolicework.Too commonly, theroutineis equatedwith theexerciseofthearrestpower,notonlybymembersofthegeneralpublic but bylawyersand evenmanypolicemenas well. In fact,thedailyround of thepatrolofficer infrequently involvesarrest7 or evenencounters witha 5. This meansthatencounters involvinga complainantand suspectof different raceswere excluded.Similarly,thesamplewould not includethe arrestof a blackman witha whitewife.However,it does not mean theexclusionof encounters wherethepolicemanand suspectwerenotof the samerace. 6. Becausefieldobservers had difficulty in judgingtheage or socialclassof a citizen, occasionally theywere told to use a "don't know" categorywhenevertheyfeltthe dangerof misclassification. Two broadcategories of social class,blue-collarand white-collar, wereemployed.Since the precincts sampledwerepredominantly lowerclass,theobserverslabeledthe vast majorityof the citizenparticipantsblue-collar.In fact,not enoughwhite-collar cases were availableforseparateanalysis.The small numberof adultsof ambiguoussocial class were combinedwith the blue-collarcases into a sampleof "predominantly blue-collar"suspects.The observersprobablywere reasonablyaccuratein classifying suspectsbecausethepolicefrequently interviewed suspectsabouttheirage and occupation. 7. In thisArticle,"arrest"refersonlyto transportation of a suspectto a police station.It does notincludetheapplicationof constraint in fieldsettings, and it does notrequireformalbookingof a

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on thejob ofthepoliceman observation Themostcursory suspect. criminal citizens ofa manwhomakeshislivingparcelling theimagery overturns intojail.

aregearedto respondto citizencallsfor Modernpolicedepartments thepolicehandlearisewhena citiofincidents thegreatmajority service; sendsa patrolcartodealwith thepoliceandthedispatcher zentelephones in a widerangeof human becomesimplicated The officer thesituation. andmanyofwhichhavelittleor mostnotofhisownchoosing, troubles, peopletothe He transports lawenforcement. todo withcriminal nothing beand mediates and arbitrates ofautoaccidents, writesreports hospital, and tenants, andwives,landlords husbands tweendisputants-neighbors, directs reports, He takesmissing-person andcustomers. andbusinessmen abanandidentifies reports, dogbite writes controls crowdsat fires, traffic, andoccasionally hazardsfromthestreets, safety donedautos.He removes disdainthiskindofwork,buttheydo scoopsup a deadanimal.Policemen comin arrest;theynevertheless result rarely incidents Such it every day. in situaencounter patrolmen uniformed halfoftheincidents prisenearly alsospendmuchof Policemen byphonecallsfromcitizens.8 tionsinitiated to pertaining typically a policecategory trouble," theirtimewith"juvenile of adultpeace-noisygroupsof teendisturbances youthful distinctively orplaying in in thestreet, trespassing ball-playing corner, agersona street Thesesituaor construction sites,and rock-throwing. deserted buildings viewhandlingjuvenile tions,too,rarelyresultin arrest.Someofficers The same ofneighborhood grouches. asworktheydo intheservice trouble tocitizen inanswer complaints. violations parking maybesaidofticketing muchunexciting paperwork. All thesechoresnecessitate arisingfroma citizentelelessthanhalfoftheencounters Somewhat otherthan a misdemeanor or a crime-a do with to have felony phonecall areso constituted situationally incidents Yetevencriminal trouble. juvenile is present ofcases,becauseno suspect in themajority arrest as topreclude situations ofthefelony whenthepolicearriveat thescene.In 77 percent citizen the situations of the major misdemeanor only in and 5I percent ofothercasestheonlycitizen In a handful is a complainant.9 participant is availablein the Whenno suspect orbystander. is an informant present outcomeis a crimereport,thebasicdocuthetypicalofficial fieldsetting, and theoperational areconstructed statistics crime official which from ment division. of further by the detective investigation prerequisite suspectwitha crime.See W. (I965).

LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 4

8. D. Black, Police Encountersand Social Organization:An ObservationStudy,51-57, Dec. of Michigan).See also in Departmentof Sociology,University 15, I968 (unpublisheddissertation Guide and Friend,I2 SOCIAL PROBLEMS Cumming,Cumming,& Edell, Policemanas Philosopher, 276 (I965). 9. D. Black,supranote8, at 94.

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The minority of citizen-initiated crimeencounters wherea suspectis present whenthepolicearrive is theappropriate basefora studyofarrest. In thegreatmajority of thesesuspectencounters a citizencomplainant alsotakespartin thesituational so anystudyofroutine interaction, arrest mustconsider thecomplainant's roleas wellas thoseofthepoliceofficer andthesuspect.'0 Throughtheirown discretionary authority, policemenoccasionally initiate encounters thatmaybe calledproactive policework,as opposedto thereactive, citizen-initiated workthatconsumes thegreater partof the averagepatrolofficer's day."On an evening shift(traditionally 4 p.m.to a typicalwork-load midnight) fora patrolcaris 6 radio-dispatched encounters and oneproactive encounter. The ratioof proactive encounters varies enormously byshift, dayofweek,patrol beatorterritory, andnumber ofcarson duty.An extremely busyweekendnightcouldinvolve20 dispatches toa singlecar.Undertheserushed conditions theofficers mightnot initiate anyencounters on theirown.At another timein another areaa patrolcarmightreceiveno dispatches, buttheofficers mightinitiateas manyas 8 orio encounters onthestreet. Duringtheobservation study only I3 percent ofincidents cameto policeattention without theassistance of citizens."2 Still,mostofficers as wellas citizens thinkofproactive probably policingas theformthatepitomizes thepolicefunction. The police-initiated encounter is a bald confrontation betweenstate andcitizen. Hardlyeverdoesa citizen complainant takepartin a proactive fieldencounter and thenonlyifa policeman weretodiscover an incident ofpersonal victimization orifa complainant weretostepforth subsequent totheofficer's initialencounter witha suspect. Moreover, thearrayofincidentspolicemen handle-their operational jurisdiction-is quitedifferent whentheyhavethediscretion to selectsituations forattention compared to whatit is whenthatdiscretion is lodgedin citizens. In reactive police worktheyareservants ofthepublic,withoneconsequence beingthatthe socialtroubles theyoverseeoftenhavelittleif anything to do withthe criminallaw. Arrestis usuallya situational impossibility. In proactive policing theofficer is morea publicguardian andtheoperational jurisdictionis a policechoice;theonlylimitsare in law and in departmental policy.In proactive policework,arrest is totally a matter of theofficer's ownmaking. Yetthereality ofproactive policeworkhasan ironicquality lo. In fact,of all thefelonycasesthepolicehandlein responseto a citizenrequestbytelephone, includingcases whereonly a complainant,informant, or bystanderis presentin the situation,a mere3% involvea policetransaction witha lone suspect.D. Black,supranote8, at 94. iI. The concepts"reactive"and "proactive"derivefromthe originsof individualaction,the formerreferring to actionsoriginating in theenvironment, the latterto thoseoriginating withinthe actor.See Murray,Towarda Classification ofInteractions, in TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF ACTION 434 (I967). 12. This proportion is basedupon thetotalsampleof 5,7I3 incidents.

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policemen ofcrimein timeandspacedeprives aboutit.The organization occurin off-street Mostfelonies on freepatrolof legallyseriousarrests. Eventhosethatoccurina visible bycitizens. andmustbedetected settings ken.Whenthepolicehavean publicplaceusuallyescapethepolicemen's theoccasionis morelikelythannot an encounter, to initiate opportunity enofproactive themajority comprise violations Traffic a traffic violation. ofthe minor"disturbances concern counters, and mostoftheremainder inform, wherethepoliceroleis moststarkly a,ggressive peace.""In short, providepracand legallytrivialincidents is drablytrivial, thesubstance in proactive all ofthegristforarrest policeoperations. tically oftheeveryday thelegalsignificance flatters Perhapsa studyofarrest arrest situations are uncommon in even though Still, policeencounter. of thecriminalprocessaccountsformore routinepolicing,invocation morepubliccontrocases,morecourttrialsand sanctions, formal-legal As a in thelegalsystem. thananyothermechanism andconflicts versies criesoutforempirical study.14 oflegalcontrol, then,arrest majoroccasion III. COMPLAINANT AND SUSPECT

is a and a complainant botha suspect involving The policeencounter thestate, In it arepersonified ofa totallegalcontrol microcosm system. is to The complainant andthecitizenry. tosocialorder, theallegedthreat or a a whatan interest groupis to legislature plaintiff a policeencounter in policeendifference makesa dramatic His presence to a civillawsuit. This if he assumestheroleof situational lobbyist. counters, particularly restsnearlyas much Sectionwillshow,interalia, thatthefateofsuspects themselves. as itdoeswithpoliceofficers withcomplainants and a suspecta botha complainant involving Of theI76 encounters 13. Much proactive patrol work involves a drunken or disorderly person. Typically, however, arrest occurs in these cases only when the citizen is uncooperative; ordinarily the policeman begins Isis encounter by giving an order such as "Move on," "Take off," or "Take it easy." Arrest is an outcome of interactionrather than a simple and direct response of an officerto what he observes as an officialwitness. 14. Earlier observational studies have neglected patterns of arrest in the everyday work of uniformed patrolmen. Emphasis has instead been placed upon detective work, vice enforcement, policing of juveniles, and other comparatively marginal aspects of police control. See J.SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (I966) (patterns of arrestin vice enforcement); Bittner,The Policeon SkidBlack & Reiss, Police Controlof 32 AM. Soc. REV. 699 (I967); Row: A Studyof Peace-Keeping, juveniles, 35 AM. Soc. REV. 63 (I970); Piliavin & Briar, Police Encounters with juveniles, 70 AM. J. Several observational studies emphasizing other dimensions of police work also are SOC. 206 (I964). (I967); OF CRIME DETECTION & D. ROTiENBERG, D. MCINTYRE, directly relevant. See L. TIFFANY, OF POL. & Reiss, & Black, Interrogationand the Criminal Process, 374 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACADEMY SOC. SCI. 47 (I967); Project,Interrogationsin New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 15I9 There also have been a number of studies based upon official arrest statistics. See N. GOLD(I967). (I963); FOR COURT APPEARANCE OFFENDERS OF JUVENILE SELECTION DIFFERENTIAL MAN, THE

BEHAVIOR (I968); Green, Race, Social Stattus,and Criminal Arrest, 58 J.CRIM. L.C. & P.S. Terry, The Screeningof juvenileOflenders, 173 (I967). For a more speculative discussion see Goldstein, Police DiscretionNot to Invoke the of justice,69 YALE L.J.543 (I960). Decisionsin theAdministration CriminalProcess:Low-Visibility See generallyW. LAFAVE, supra note 7.

J.WILSON, 35 AM.

VARIETIES

OF POLICE

SOC. REV. 476 (1970);

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littleoverone-third wereallegedtobe felonies; weremistheremainder demeanors ofoneoranother Notsurprisingly, thepolicemakearvariety. restsmoreoftenin felony thanin misdemeanor butthediffersituations, enceisnotas wideas mightbe expected. An arrest occursin 58percent of thefelony encounters and in 44 percent of themisdemeanor encounters. Thepolice,then, releaseroughly halfofthepersons ofcrimes. theysuspect Thisstrikingly low arrest raterequires explanation."5 A. Evidence Factorsotherthanthekindof evidence availableto an officer in the fieldsetting affect theprobability of arrests, forevenexceptionally clear situational of evidence criminal doesnotguarantee liability thatarrest will followa policeencounter. One of twomajorformsof evidenceordinarily is present whenthe policeconfront a suspectin thepresence of a complainant: Eitherthe policearriveat thesetting in timeto witnesstheoffense, or a citizenusuallythe complainant himself-gives testimony againstthe suspect. Onlyrarelyis someotherkindof evidence suchas a physical available, clueonthepremises oronthesuspect's On theotherhand,in only person. threeofthecomplainant-suspect encounters was situational enevidence tirelyabsent.In thesefewcasesthepoliceacteduponwhatthevknew fromtheoriginalcomplaint as it was relayedto thembyradiodispatch and uponwhattheyheardaboutthecrimefromthecomplainant, but theyhadno otherinformation apparent in thefieldsituation linkingthe suspect totheallegedcrime. In a greatmajority offelony situations thebestevidence accessible to thepoliceis citizentestimony, whereasin misdemeanor situations the policegenerally witness theoffense themselves. Theseevidentiary circumstances areroughly equivalent as faras thelawofarrest is concerned, since therequirements fora misdemeanor arrest without a formal warrant are morestringent thanarethosefora felony arrest. In mostjurisdictions the policemustobserve theoffense oracquirea signedcomplaint before they mayarrest a misdemeanor suspect inthefield.Infelony situations, however, theyneedonlyhave"probable cause"or "reasonable grounds" to believe thesuspect is guilty. Thus,thoughtheevidence usuallyis stronger in misdemeanorthanin felonysituations, the law in effect compensates the policeby givingthemmorepowerin thefelonysituations wherethey I5. At thispointa word should be said about the explanatory to be followedin the strategy analysisof data. The Article'sapproachis radicallybehavioralor, more specifically, supramotivational,in thatit seeks out supraindividual conditionswith which the probability of arrestvaries. Implicitin thisstrategy is a conceptionof arrestas a socialeventratherthanas an individualevent. The mentalprocessesof the policeand the citizenswhose outwardbehaviorour observersrecorded are not important to thisanalysis.At thispointthe sole objectis to delineateaspectsof the social context ofarrestas a variety oflegalintervention.

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TABLE 1 ARREST RATES IN CITIZEN-INITIATED ENCOUNTERS ACCORDING TO TYPE OF CRIME AND MAJOR SITUATIONAL EVIDENCE

Crime

Felony

AllCrimes'

TotalNumber ofIncidents

Rate Arrest in Percent

(4)b

56 (O)

No Evidence

6 45 I o

PoliceWitness' CitizenTestimony OtherEvidence No Evidence

52 39 o 3

65 3I (o) (o)

PoliceWitness' CitizenTestimony OtherEvidence No Evidence

58 84 I 3

66 44 (O) (o)

Evidence

PoliceWitnessa CitizenTestimony OtherEvidence

(o)

a This category byother includesall casesin whichthepolicewitnessevidencewas supplemented typesofevidence. b Arrest in thisand latertablesare used wheneverthe totalnumber ratefiguresin parentheses of arrestrate. makinga generalizedassertion too smallto justify is statistically of incidents did not ascertainthecharacterof the evidence. e This excludes30 cases forwhichthe observer Thus thetotalis I46 cases.

the law of arrest would otherwisebe at a disadvantage.Correspondingly enjoy. theadvantagefelonsin theaggregatewould otherwise undermines Table i indicatesthatthe police do not use all the legal powerthey possess.They arrestonly slightlyover one-halfof the felonysuspects alevidenceis presentin the fieldencounter, againstwhom testimonial though"probablecause" can be assumedto have been satisfiedin nearly studythepolice duringtheobservation everysuchincident.Furthermore, felonious in allegedly observed 6 they the 2 of suspects felony released a sample upon based eventhough These twocasesarenoteworthy activity. severaltimessmallerthanthe othersamples.In misdemeanorsituations while whenthepoliceobservetheoffense, thearrestrateis abouttwo-thirds citizen's a from comes the evidence when one-third only about to it drops cannotacalone, therefore, An evidentiary legal perspective testimony. On theotherhand,evidence inpolicearrestpractices. countfordifferentials In noneofthe3 caseswhereno evito arrestdifferentials. is notirrelevant dencewas availabledid the police make an arrest,and wherethe legal situations standingof the police was at best precarious-misdemeanor low. evidence-thearrestratewas relatively withcitizentestimonial

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B. The Complainant's Preference Whilecomplainants whenpolicemen failto inarepresent frequently vokethelawagainst whoarehighly vulnerable toarrest, thecomsuspects plainants In 24 percent ofthemisdo notnecessarily resent policeleniency. demeanor situations and in 2I percent of thefelonysituations thecomplainantexpresses tothepolicea preference forclemency towardthesuspect."8 The complainant manifests a preference foran arrest in 34percent ofthemisdemeanors andin48percent ofthefelonies. In theremainder of encounters thecomplainant's is unclear;frequently preference thecomplainant's outward behavior ispassive, inmisdemeanor situations. especially The findings in Table 2 indicatethatpolicearrestpractices, in both felony andmisdemeanor reflect situations, thecomplainant's sharply preferences, whether theybe compassionate orvindictive. In felony situations wherea citizen's linksa suspectto thecrime,arrest testimony results in aboutthree-fourths ofthecasesin whichthecomplainant a prefspecifies forthatoutcome. erence Whenthecomplainant noarrest, prefers thepolice go againsthiswishesin onlyaboutone-tenth ofthecases.Passiveorunexpressive complainants seethepolicearrest in a littleundertwosuspects thirds ofthesituations wherethepolicehavea complainant's testimonial evidence. Thus,whenthecomplainant leavesthedecision toarrest wholly in policehands,thepolicearebyno meansreluctant to arrest thefelony suspect. Theybecomestrikingly reluctant onlywhena complainant exerts pressure onthesuspect's behalf. The findings formisdemeanor situations likewise showpolicecompliancewiththecomplainant's preference andalsodemonstrate therelevance ofsituational evidence tothesuspect's fate.Encounters wherethecomplainantoutwardly prefers arrest andwherethepoliceobserve theoffense itself haveanextremely highprobability ofarrest, 95percent, a proportion somewhathigherthanthatforfelony situations involving testimonial evidence alone.Whenthemajorsituational evidence is citizentestimony againsta misdemeanor suspect, theproportion dropsto 70 percent. On theother hand,evenwhenthepoliceobserve theoffense, thearrest ratedropstoless thanone-fifth in thoseencounters wherethecomplainant outwardly prefersleniency forhisadversary. Plainly, therefore, thecomplainant's preferenceis a morepowerful situational factor thanevidence, thoughthetwo operate jointly. Asmight beexpected, evidence isparticularly consequential x6. In suchcasesa complainant's preference is clearfromhis responseto the questionposed by the police.When police did not solicitthe complainant'sopinion,the observerclassifiedthe complainant'spreference accordingto the audible or visibleclues availableto him. Some complainants made explicitdemandsupon the police; othersappearedmore confusedand made no attemptto influence theoutcome.

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whenthecomplainant no clearpreference forpoliceaction,and expresses

in thosecasesthesuspectis almosttwiceas likelyto be arrestedwhen the policeobservetheoffense as whenthemajorevidenceis thecomplainant's or anothercitizen'stestimony. As notedabove,however,thecomplainant does make his preference clear in the majorityof encounters, and that preference appearstobe strongly associatedwiththearrestrate. C. RelationalDistance When police enterinto an encounterinvolvingboth a complainant and a suspecttheyfindthemselves notonlyin a narrowlegal conflict but also in a conflict betweencitizenadversaries withina socialrelationshipone betweenfamilymembers,acquaintances, neighbors, business friends, or totalstrangers. associates, The data in Table 3 suggestthatpolicearrest practicesvarywiththerelationalnatureof complainant-suspect conflicts. The probability of arrestis highestwhen thecitizenadversaries have the mostdistantsocial relationto one another,i.e.,when theyare strangers. The felonycasesespeciallyrevealthatarrestbecomesmoreprobableas the relationaldistanceincreases.Forty-five percentof suspectsare arrestedin a familymemberrelationship, 77 percentin a friends, neighbors, acquaintancesrelationship, and 7 outof8 or 88 percentin a stranger relationship.17 In the misdemeanorcases the patternis not so consistent. Althoughthe likelihoodofarrestis stillhighestin conflicts betweenstrangers, thelowest likelihoodis in situationsinvolvingfriends,neighbors, or acquaintances. Whenthecomplainant's preference is unclear,orwhenhe prefers no arrest, no difference of any significance is discernible acrossthecategoriesof relationaldistance;thetypeofsocialconflict embodiedin thepoliceencounter visiblyaffectsarrestprobability only when the complainantpressesthe policetomakean arrest. D. Race, Respect,and the Complainant Table 4 demonstrates thatpolice arrestblacks at a higherrate than whites.But no evidencesupportsthe view that the police discriminate againstblacks.Rather,the race differential seemsto be a functionof the relatively higherrateat whichblacksuspectsdisplaydisrespect towardthe police.Whenthearrestrateforrespectful blacksuspects is comparedtothat forrespectful whites,no difference is apparent.Beforeexaminingthislast findingin detail,however,theimportance ofcitizenrespectin itselfshould be established. Consideringfelonyand misdemeanorsituationstogether,the arrest 17. Littleconfidence can be placed in findingsbased on less than Io cases. Nevertheless, the Articleoccasionallymentionssuch findingswhen theyare strikingly consistent with patternsseen in thelargersamples.In no instances, however,do broadergeneralizations restupon theseinadequate statistical bases.

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on theotherhand,can overthepolice.A displayofrespectfortheofficers, jeopardy. comethesuspect'sevidentiary Arrestpracticesdifferto a degreein encountersthe police initiate. While again arrestratesforcivilblacksand civilwhitesare the same,no of civil suspects emergesbetweenthe vulnerability difference significant words,neither other towardthepolice.In and thatofsuspectsdisrespectful on arrestrates effect theracenorsuspect'sdegreeof respecthas predictive suspects.The absenceof withmisdemeanor in police-initiated encounters is themajordifferand civilsuspects varianceinarrestratesfordisrespectful Moreover, encounters. and citizen-initiated ence betweenpolice-initiated presentedin thisArticle,one that it is themajoranomalyin thefindings werelarger. encounters mightdisappearifthesampleofpolice-initiated V.

GENERALIZATIONS

ofthisstudyin theformofemthemajorfindings This sectionrestates whichshouldprovidea manageableprofileofpolice piricalgeneralizations When appropriwherearrestis a possibility. behaviorin routinesituations to abstract propositions more materials from these aredrawn ate,inferences mayreveal at thelevelofa generaltheoryof legalcontrol.Arrestpatterns accordingto whichlegal policyis defined,legalresources broadprinciples made."9 mobilized,and dispositions A. Mobilization arisethroughcitizenratherthanpoliceinitiative. Mostarrestsituations In thissense,thecriminallaw is invokedin a mannernot unlikethatof thatare mobilizedthrougha reactiveprocess,dependsystems private-law ofcitizenclaimantsinpursuitoftheirowninterests. the enterprise ingupon In criminallaw as inotherareasofpubliclaw,althoughthestatehasformal, to bringlegal actions,the averagecriminalmatteris proactiveauthority theproductofa citizencomplaint. ofthispatternis thatmostcriminalcasespassthrough One implication a moralfilterin thecitizenpopulationbeforethestateassumesitsenforceenforceforcriminal-law mentrole.A majorportionof theresponsibility mentis keptoutofpolicehands.Much like courtsin therealmof private A further of thecitizenry. implilaw, thepoliceoperateas moralservants of function is that the deterrence of reactive this of policing cation pattern to an important degree,dependsuponcitizenwillingthecriminalprocess, i9. These three functional foci of legal control-prescription, mobilization, and dispositioncorrespond roughly to the legislative,executive, and judicial dimensions of government,though they are useful in the analysis of subsystemsof legal control as well as total systems. For instance, the police can be regarded as the major mobilization subsystemof the criminal justice system. Yet the police subsystemitselfcan be approached as a total system involving prescription,mobilization, and disposition subsystems.Cf. H. LASSWELL, THE DECISION PROCESS 2 (I956).

June I97I

ORGANIZATION

]

OF ARREST

I1I05

function ofprivate nesstomobilize thecriminal law,justas thedeterrence law dependsso muchuponcitizenplaintiffs.20 Sanctions cannotdeterilifthelawliesdormant becauseofan inefficient legalbehavior mobilization In thissenseall legalsystems process.2" relytoa greatextent uponprivate citizens.

B. Complainants thepreferences Arrest practices sharply reflect ofcitizencomplainants, whenthedesire isforleniency particularly andalso,though lessfrequently, whenthecomplainant demands arrest. Thepolicearean instrument ofthe complainant, then,intwoways:Generally handle what they thecomplainantwantsthemtohandleandtheyhandlethematter in thewaythecomplainant prescribes. ofthepolicecomment Oftenstudents thata community has thekind ofpoliceitwants, as ifthecommunity outlines thepolicefunction bysome sortofde factolegislative Thatviewis vague,ifnotmistaken. process.22 thepoliceservean atomized Instead, massofcomplainants farmorethan theyservean organized The greater community. partofthepoliceworkload is case-by-case, isolatedcontacts betweenindividual policemen and individual In complainants. thissensethepoliceservea phantom master whodwellsthroughout thepopulation, whois everywhere butnowhere atonce.Becauseofthisfact,thepoliceareatoncean easyyetelusivetarget forcriticism. Theirfieldworkevadesplannedchange, butas shifts occur in thedesiresof theatomizedcitizenry who call and directthepolice, changesrippleintopolicemen's routine behavior. ofpolicecompliance The pattern withcomplainants givespolicework a radically democratic The result character. is not,however, uniform standardsofjustice, sincethemoralstandards ofcomplainants doubtlessly vary tosomeextent acrossthepopulation. Indeed,bycomplying withcomplainantsthepolicein effect perpetuate themoraldiversity theyencounter in thecitizen mass.23 In thisrespect again,a public-law system bearssimilarity 20. Contemporary literature on deterrence is devoted primarily to the role of sanctions in criminal law. See, e.g., Andenaes, The GeneralPreventive EFfects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949 (I966). But see R. VON JHERING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW (i879). 2I. Roscoe Pound concludes that the contingentnature of legal mobilization is one of the major obstacles to the effectivenessof law as a social engineering device. See Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action,27 INT'L J.ETHICS I50 (I9I7). See also H. JONES, THE EFFICACY OF LAW 2I-26 (I969); Bohannan, The DifferingRealms of the Law, in THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LAW 33 (I965) (supplement to 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 33 (I965)).

22. See, e.g., P. SLATER, THE PURSUIT OF LONELINESS: POINT 49 (I970).

AMERICAN CULTURE AT THE BREAKING

23. This generalization does not apply to proactive police operations such as vice control or street harassment, which seldom involve a citizen complainant. By definition, street harassment is the selective and abrasive attention directed at people who are, at best, marginally liable to arrestfor example,

a police

command

to "move

on"

to a group

of unconventional

youths.

Proactive

policing may involve an attack on particularmoral subcultures.Compare J. CLEBERT,THE GYPSIEs 871 I9 (I963), with Brown, The Condemnation and Persecution of Hippies, TRANS-ACTION, Sept. 1969 at 33, and W. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES (I966).

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andinvisibly, visibly seemorganized, Bothtypes law.24 ofprivate tosystems Whoever citizens. to thedemandsoftheirdispersed so as to givepriority call many sovereigns is applied, the law the law and however mayprescribe orin thattheirformal arepeculiar systems Public-law thelawtoaction.25 complainants andpursuecaseswithout allowsthemtoinitiate ganization suchas thepolicebelies systems ofpublic-law Still,thereality as sponsors. uniformity undermines continually The citizenry appearance. theirformal organidemocratic Perhaps enforcement. as wellas private-law in publicof legalconin theapplication uniformity jeopardizes zationinvariably trols.2"

C. Leniency theyuse their practices; arrest The policearelenientin theirroutine however, thanthelawwouldallow.Legalleniency, arrest powerlessoften and sector27 in theprivate-law is hardlypeculiarto thepolice.Especially ofgrievances forredress process theofficial areasofpubliclaw,28 alsoinother andpublicofficials Citizens is detected. lessoftenthanillegality isinvoked toillegality, response towieldlegalpowerinimmediate reluctance display thefactthatlegalcases oflaw musttreatas problematic and a sociology ariseat all. D. Evidence in theevidence The stronger in arrest. is an important factor Evidence Whenthepolicethemselves themorelikelyis an arrest. thefieldsituation, than thesuspect offense a criminal theyaremorelikelyto arrest witness the do a from third the offense Rarely about hear party. whentheyonly The GeneralTheoryof Law and Marxismin SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY III, 24. See Pashukanis, (H. Babbtransl.1951). the usuallyhave made thecitizencomplainant as well; legal systems 25. This is truehistorically posinga directthreatto political exceptundercircumstances sine qua non of legal mobilization, order.A well-knownexamplewas the Romanlegal process,whereeven extremeformsof personal sanctionswere imposed.See violencerequiredthe initiativeof a complainantbeforegovernment generallyA. LINTOTT, VIOLENCE IN REPUBLICAN ROME (I968). A theoryof legal controlshould to initiatecases and sanctionvioof governments the capacityand willingness treatas problematic latorsin the absenceof an aggrievedcitizendemandingjustice.See generallyS. RANULF, MORAL INDIGNATION AND MIDDLE CLASS PSYCHOLOGY: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY (1938). of publiclaw in advancedsocietiesis a norm in systems reflected 26. The normof universalism But by givingcomplainThe policeare expectedto enforcethe law impersonally. of impersonalism: of outcomes,the police personalizethe criminallaw. This ants a strongrole in the determination patternallows fellowfamilymembersand friendsto mobilizethe police to handle theirdisputes At the level vith littledangerthatthe police will imposestandardsforeignto theirrelationships. however,the same patternof police compliancewith complainants of disputesbetweenstrangers, A law enforcement enforcement. resultin a formof discriminatory can, givcn moral diversity, processthattakesno accountof the degreeof intimacybetweencomplainantand suspectmay also See Kawashima,Dispute Resolutionin upset the peculiarbalance of close social relationships. Contemporary Japan,in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 4t (A. von Mehrened. I964). Study,28 AM. Relationsin Business:A Preliminary 27. See, e.g., Macaulay,Non-Contractual SOC. REV. 55 (1963). 28. See, e.g., M. Mileski,PolicingSlum Landlords:An ObservationStudyof Administrative Yale University). of Sociology, in Department dissertation Control,June14, 1971 (unpublished

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1107

withoutsomeevidence;evenmore policeconfront personsas suspects The importance ofsituational rarely arearrests unsupported byevidence. evidence hardlyconstitutes a majoradvancein knowledge. Evidencehas a rolein everylegalprocess. ofevidence, It is thedefinition notwhether evidence isrequired, acrosslegalsystems. It shouldbe emphathatdiffers sizedthatevenwhentheevidence a suspect isverystrong, thepolice against frequently takeactionshortofarrest. Evidencealone,then,is a necessary butnota sufficient basisforpredicting invocation ofthelaw. E. Seriousness is higherin legallyseriouscrimesituations The probability of arrest thanin thoseofa relatively minornature.This finding is not certainly unexpected, butit hastheoretical The policelevyarrest significance. as a tocorrespond sanction ofthecriminal withthedefined seriousness event in muchthesamefashion as legislators andjudgesallocatepunishments. The formallegalconception ofarrest contrasts withthispractice sharply byholdingthatarrest ofanycriminal follows upondetection actwithout distinguishing amonglevelsof legalseriousness. theoffender Assuming population is awarethatarrest represents legislation and adjudication by policeofficers, arrestpractices shouldcontribute to deterrence of serious fortheperpetrator crime, whoseactis detected risksa greater likelihood of arrest aswellasmoresevere punishment. Thehigher riskofarrest, oncethe suspect confronts thepolice,mayhelptooffset thelowprobability ofdetectionforsomeof themoreseriouscrimes.29

F. Intimacy therelational Thegreater distance between a complainant anda suspect, thegreater is thelikelihood ofarrest. Whena complainant demandsthe ofa suspect arrest thepolicearemostapttocomplyiftheadversaries are Arrest islesslikely iftheyarefriends, strangers. neighbors, oracquaintances, anditisleastlikely iftheyarefamily members. Policemen alsowriteofficial crimereports tothesamedifferential."0 according Relational distance likewiseappearstobe a majorfactor intheprobability oflitigation incontract andotherprivate-law disputes3" contexts.82 One maygeneralize thatin all 29. See Black,Production of CrimeRates,35 AM. Soc. REV. 733, 735 (1970) (remarkson dctectiondifferentials in policework). 30. Black,supra notc 29, at 740. JeromeHall hypothcsizes thatrelationaldistanceinflutences theprobability ofcriminalprosecution. J.HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY 3I8 (2d ed. 1952). 31. Macaulay, supranote27, at 56. 32. For example,in Japandisputesthatariscacrossratherthanwithincommunities are more likelyto resultin litigation. See Kawashima,supranotc 26, at 45. In Americanchinatownsdisputes thatarisebetweenChineseand non-Chineseare farmorelikelyto resultin litigationthandisputes betweenChinese.See Grace,Justice, ChineseStyle,CASE & CoM., Jan-Feb.,1970, at 50. The same is trueof disputesbetwecngypsiesand non-gypsies as comparedto disputesbetweengypsies.See J.CLEBERT, supranote23, at go. Likewise,in theUnitedStatesin the firsthalfof the igth century, crimescommitted betweenIndiansgencrallywereleftto thetribes.See F. PRUCHA,AMERICAN INDIAN

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theprobaffects betweentheadversaries distance relational legalaffairs it teaches thatlegal is true, the generalization If litigation. offormal ability oforder littletodo withthemaintenance mayhavecomparatively control andamongintimates. between may in policearrestpractices distance on relational Yet thefindings conwhen sublegal only operates the fact that control legal reflect merely thelessis thelikedistance, therelational The greater trolisunavailable.33 Thisproposition ofcontrol willoperate. lihoodthatsublegalmechanisms salienceof forunderstanding theincreasing evenseemsa usefulprinciple delivers Overtimethedriftof history in socialevolution.34 legalcontrol whoneedthelaw toholdthem moreandmorestrangers proportionately and andapart.Law seemstobespeakan absenceofcommunity, together ofcommunity proceeds.35 asthedissolution lawgrowsevermoreprominent G. Disrespect toward isdisrespectful whena suspect increases ofarrest Theprobability patrol behavior,36 appearsin youthofficer thepolice.The samepattern bythe withjuveniles,37 andin theuseofillegalviolence officer encounters of sortsfrom receivea penalty complainants Evendisrespectful police.38 official to receive recognition.39 are less likely complaints thepolice,as their in ismuchthesameas "contempt" ina policeencounter Inform, disrespect Unlike theprocessing Itisa rebellion system. against hearing. a courtroom has no speciallegalweaponsin his thepoliceman thejudge,however, at a to defertohisauthority who refuse with citizens arsenalfordealing diffurther as thelegalsystem level.Perhaps symbolic verbalorotherwise Froma radically ofpolice"willemerge. a crimeof"contempt ferentiates, thequesindeed,thiscrimehas alreadyemerged; behavioral standpoint, law. in the written be it will formalized is when tion POLICY

IN THE

FORMATIVE

YEARS:

THE

INDIAN

TRADE

AND INTERCOURSE

ACTS

I88-2I2

(I962).

In

medievalEngland the same sortof patternobtainedin the legal conditionof the Jews.Ordinary Englishrulesappliedto legal dealingsbetweenJewsand theKing and betweenJewsand Christians, but disputesbetweenJewand Jewwere heard in Jewishtribunalsand decidedunderJewishlaw. See I F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 468-75 (2d ed. I898). FROM THE BARRIO 54-62 (I968) (for a stark illustrationof this THE VIEW 33. See L. PEATTIE, pattern).See generallyR. POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 18-25 (1942); S. VAN DER SPRENKEL,

LEGAL

INSTITUTIONS

IN

MANCHU

CHINA:

A

SOCIOLOGICAL

54 CALIF. L. REV.I20I ChineseMediationon theEve of Modernization,

ANALYSIS

(I962);

Cohen,

(I966); Nader,An Analysis

404 (I964); Nader & Metzger, Conflict Resolution in Two of Zapotec Law Cases, 3 ETHNOLOGY 584 (i963); Schwartz, Social Factors in the DeMexican Communities, 65 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 63 YALE L.J. 47I (I954); velopmentof Legal Control:A Case Studyof Two IsraeliSettlements, notes 26, 30-3I supra. 34.It is at this level that Pound posits his thesis concerning the priorityof sublegal control.

R. POUND, supranote33, at 33. See also Fuller,Two Principlesof Human Association,II NOMOS3 and Social Controls,I7 VAND. L. REV.79 (I963). (I969); Selznick,Legal Institutions 35. See F. TONNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY 202 (C. Loomistransl.I957). 36. Piliavin& Briar,supranote I4, at 2IO. supranoteI 4, at 74-75. 37. Black& Reiss,PoliceControlofJuveniles, 38. P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEW YORK CITY 5I-83

(I969);

Reiss,

Violence I968, at I8; Westley, TRANS-ACTION, July-Aug., to Key Questions, PoliceBrutality-Answers and thePolice,59 AM.J.Soc. 34 (I954). 39. Black,supranote29, at 742-44.

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]

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All legalcontrol notonlythepoliceandthejudiciary, systems, defend and dispatch. theirownauthority withenergy To question or assaultthe ofa legalcontrol is toinvite legitimacy a sanction, process legalinvocation, is at issuein a givenconfrontation. or a moreserioussanction, whatever Law seemstolashoutatevery revolt itsownintegrity. against Accordingly, itmight be usefultoconsider towarda policeman tobe a minor disrespect formofcivildisorder, orrevolution thehighest formofdisrespect. H. Discrimination No evidence existstoshowthatthepolicediscriminate on thebasisof race.Thepolicearrest blacksata comparatively highrate, butthedifference between theracesappears toresult primarily fromthegreater rateatwhich blacksshowdisrespect forthepolice.The behavioral difference thuslies withthecitizenparticipants, notthepolice.40 Thisfinding conflicts with someideological conceptions of policework,butit is supported by the of severalstudiesbasedupondirectobservation findings of thepolice.4 Thesefindings shouldbe takenas a caveatthatin generalimproper or illegalbehavior towardblacksdoesnotin itself constitute evidence ofdiscrimination toward blacks.A finding ofdiscrimination orofnondiscriminationrequires a comparative ofbehavior analysis towardeachracewith othervariables suchas levelofrespect heldconstant. No studyofcitizen opinionsor perceptions42 or ofofficial statistics43 can holdthesevariables constant. In closing thisSection itisimportant tonotethatthefindings onracial discrimination bythepoliceshouldnotremotely suggest thatlaw is obliviousto socialrank.On thecontrary, broaderpatterns in theformand substance oflegalcontrol seematanyonetimetoreflect andtoperpetuate of socialstratification. existing systems That thedegradation of arrest is 40. Of course,"discrimination" can be definedto includeany de factounequal treatment, regardlessof its causes.See L. MAYHEW, LAW AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 59-60 (1968). The evidence in the Articlesimplyindicatesthatblacksare treateddifferently notbecauwetheyare blacks,but because theymanifest otherbehavioralpatterns, such as disrespect forthepolice,morefrequently than whites.The questionof why blacksdisproportionately show disrespect forthe policecannotbe addressedwiththe observational data. We could speculate,forexample,thatin anticipation of harsh treatment blacksoftenbehavedisrespectfully towardthe police,therebysettingin motiona pattern thatconfirms theirexpectations. Despite the Article'sfindingof nondiscrimination the police officers observeddid revealconsiderableprejudicein theirattitudes towardblacks.See generallyBlack & Reiss,Patternsof Behavior in Policeand CitizenTransactions, in 2 PRESIDENT'S ON LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION AND ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE,

STUDIES

IN CRIME

AND

LAW

ENFORCEMENT

IN

MAJOR

METROPOLITAN

132-39. See also Deutscher, Wordsand Deeds: Social Scienceand Social Policy,13

SOCIAL

AREAS PROBLEMS

235 (I966). 41. See generally W. LAFAVE, supranote 7; J. SKOLNICK, supranote 14, at 83-88; L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE, & D. ROTENBERG, supranote I4; Piliavin & Briar, supranote 14 (despite innuendos to the contrary); Project, supranote 14, at I645, n.g. These studies do not reportevidence of discrimination or failaltogether to mentionraceas an analytically important variable. 42. E.g.,Werthman & Piliavin,Gang Membersand thePolice,in THE POLICE: SIX SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS56 (D. Bordua ed. I967). 43. See N. GOLDMAN, supranote 14, at 45; J.WILSON, supranote 14, at 113; Green, supranote 14, at 481.

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by lowerstatus committed forthekindsof illegality primarily reserved ofthelawin action. tendency thisbroader exemplifies citizens REMARKS VI. CONCLUDING

from is todislodgethediscussion ofthisArticle A majorcommitment andtoraisethedegreeofabstraction findings in empirical itsgrounding theboundaries atthislevelignore Statements theory. tothelevelofgeneral about and constrain generalization contain thatordinarily anddistinctions law, oflaw-criminal subsystems Thevarious lawas a socialphenomenon. prolaw,criminal law,property law,family constitutional contracts, torts, As elements. common tocontain law-are assumed administrative cedure, also control of legal theory general a faint-hearted, too ifthisaimwere oflaw: dimensions functional in several present patterns seekstodiscover thearticulation or,respectively, anddisposition; mobilization, prescription, and oflegalcasesbylegalorganizations, theengagement oflegalpolicy, law of of sort This sociology oflegaldisputes. resolution thesituational disciEach matter. ofitssubject theinclusiveness withjurisprudence shares oflaw.Foreach, understanding fora universal plineactsupona longing illustrate legalsystems andother ofthepresent, therelevance thepastshares problems of law abjures sociology however, ourown.Unlikejurisprudence, bypasses oflaw,jurisprudence unlikesociology character; ofa normative description. theordealof concrete A closingnoteshouldstatewhattheArticlehas notdone.Arrestmight thathave theirown be examinedfroma numberof otherperspectives For example,arof discourse. kind vocabularysuitedto theirown special netbe conceivedas one stagein an elaborateprocessing restmayusefully metaphor work,an assemblylineofinputsand outputs.This technocratic Another system. justice of the criminal studies in recent been popular has how the and When event. as a political mightsee everyarrest perspective arrestpoweris used saysmuchaboutthenatureof a politicalsystemand thequalityof lifewithinit. Then, too,arrestis partof a job. It is a role Police work may be contemfunctionary. of a bureaucratic performance withstandardsand subculture platedas it arisesfromitsrichoccupational values thatpolicemenshareand enforceamong theirpeers.And every therefore, Not surprisingly, arrestis envelopedby thepolicebureaucracy. are undersomedegreeof surveilthearrestpracticesofindividualofficers as well as theirpeers.Finally,a studyof arrest lancefromtheirsuperiors The interaction. can informand benefitfromthesociologyof face-to-face its own dypoliceencounteris a small groupwithits own morphology, mayhavelesstodo withcrimeand namics.Whathappensin an encounter law thanwiththe demandsof situationalorder,with social etiquetteor An arrestmaybe the of groupsize or spatialconfiguration. thepressures

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bentonrestoring onlymeansavailabletoa policeman ordertoa fieldsituation,yetothertimesitis thesurest orderbymakinga waytoundermine situation disintegrate. Someencouragement maybe takenfromthedevelopment of social scienceto thepointwherea subjectsuchas arrest can occasionso many diverse ofthisdegree, perspectives. Diversity castsa filmof nevertheless, arbitrariness overwhatever theoretical framework is chosen.Although themanyperspectives availabletoa studyofarrest surely mirror theempiricalnatureofarrest itself, itstheoretical identity is precarious and unstable.Hereit is sanction and justice;thereinput,coercion, expectation, job,criterion, orgesture. Anysingletheoretical viewofarrest is inevitably incomplete.