allocating it to the designated recipient, such as the schools. This form of individual corruption ...... The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of social norms. Cambridge, MA, USA: ..... 279â299). Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing.
VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT
The Social Psychology of Corruption
ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT
ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, op gezag van de rector magnificus prof.dr. V. Subramaniam, in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie van de Faculteit der Gedrags- en Bewegingswetenschappen op vrijdag 16 februari 2018 om 11.45 uur in de aula van de universiteit, De Boelelaan 1105
door Nils Christopher Köbis geboren te Meerbusch, Duitsland 1
promotor:
prof.dr. P.A.M. Van Lange
copromotoren:
dr. J.W. van Prooijen dr. F. Righetti
2
Contents The Social Psychology of Corruption Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 2
Prospection in Individual and Interpersonal Corruption Dilemmas
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“Who doesn’t?” - The Impact of Descriptive Norms on Corruption
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The Look Over Your Shoulder: Corruption and Cheating Decreases in the Presence of Another Person
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The Road to Bribery and Corruption: Slippery Slope or Steep cliff?
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Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
General Discussion
5
113
References
131
Appendix
171
Nederlandse Samenvatting (Dutch Summary)
175
Acknowledgements
183
Curriculum Vitae
189
Kurt Lewin Institute Dissertation Series
194
3
4
Chapter 1
Introduction
5
6
Corruption occurs daily around the world – causing immense damages. To name a few: corruption depletes national wealth (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2006), causes overexploitation of the environment (Ostrom, 2000; Rothstein, 2011a) and threatens democracy (Johnston, 2005). It overall disproportionately affects the most vulnerable parts of societies (Azfar, Lee, & Swamy, 2001); increasing inequality as well as poverty (Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 2002; Stiglitz, 2012) and undermining general trust towards other people (Dinesen, 2012). Not just scholars recognize the importance of corruption. In 2014, a poll from the online activist network Avaaz surveyed 116,000 people in 194 countries to assess the most significant obstacle for the improvement of global well-being. On top of the list was ‘fighting political corruption’; in total 37% of the poll listed it as the primary societal problem (Merrick, 2014). One important step to effectively fight corruption lies in evidence-based anti-corruption programs (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2017). Hence, a pressing demand exists for scientific investigation into causes and consequences of corruption. Hitherto, corruption research as well as anti-corruption efforts have largely neglected the role of psychological processes (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2017; Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2012). Corruption, it has been argued, is a “crime of calculation, not passion” (Klitgaard, 1998). At the same time behavioral research has investigated various related forms of unethical behavior such as cheating or lying and emphasized the immense importance of psychological factors (Ariely, 2012; Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2013; Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011). Yet, corruption – commonly defined as the “abuse of entrusted power for private gains” (Transparency International, 2010) – and its social psychological drivers remain largely unknown. Understanding the social psychological underpinnings of corrupt behavior bears great relevance for corruption research. Even though some questions such as the link between economic growth and corruption (Mauro, 1995) are beyond the scope of social psychology, its 7
theoretical and methodological toolkit enables unique contributions to crucial, and relatively unexplored, questions such as: What are the different psychological decision-making dynamics involved in the manifold forms of corrupt behavior? Given that corruption research repeatedly emphasizes the importance of social norms (Rothstein, 2000), could the social psychological distinction between social norms (Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993) help to shed new light into how social norms shape corrupt behavior? More specifically, what type of social norm impacts corruption more strongly: is it the moral evaluation (injunctive norms) or the perception of what everybody else does (descriptive norms)? Also, while major corruption scandals draw substantial media attention – think for example of the Madoff case – the question how severe corruption emerges over time has hardly been addressed empirically. Recent advances in behavioral research methods allow studying the question whether severe forms of corruption come about gradually, resembling a “slippery slope” process or whether they arise abruptly, rather resembling a “steep cliff”. On the brighter side, what minimal interventions can reduce corruption? Given that many attempts to curb corruption through harsher punishment regimes have failed (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2017), might psychological factors such as the presence of another person help to reduce corrupt behavior? The present dissertation This dissertation addresses these and further questions. By integrating insights from social psychology and behavioral ethics with the existing interdisciplinary corruption literature, it seeks to contribute to corruption research on the theoretical, methodological and empirical level. First, as a theoretical contribution, Chapter 2 introduces a conceptual framework that models the decision to engage in corrupt behavior as a social dilemma. It serves as a novel tool to differentiate between two distinct types of corrupt situations: individual and interpersonal corruption dilemmas. Each of the two corruption dilemmas 8
entails different, at times even opposing, social psychological mechanisms. Second, the methodological contribution of this dissertation consists of a new behavioral paradigm to experimentally study corruption, used in the studies reported in Chapter 3,4, and 5. It enables novel behavioral research on the mostly under-investigated psychological factors of corrupt behavior. Third, the dissertation presents empirical data on the intricate social dynamics of corrupt decision-making (Chapters 3-5).1 These three empirical chapters illuminate the link between an individual, (corrupt) decision-maker and the social environment. The first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) focuses on how an individual perceives the social environment. Three studies explore how perceived social norms impact the willingness to engage in corruption. Chapter 4, then, investigates the opposite link running from others to the decision-maker. Two studies test how the physical presence of another person influences an individual’s inclination to behave unethically. Finally, Chapter 5 scrutinizes the psychological dynamics between multiple corrupt agents. Four studies investigate how severe corruption emerges over time comparing a gradual to an abrupt process. These chapters are outlined in more detail below.
Chapter Overview Chapter 2: Corruption Dilemmas Chapter 2 (Köbis, van Prooijen, Righetti, & Van Lange, 2016) addresses the lack of theoretical frameworks to distinguish and study the psychological decision-making processes involved in different forms of corruption. With an emphasis on the role of mental forecasting (prospection), this chapter differentiates between two broad categories of corrupt acts: (1) individual corrupt acts, which refer to a power holder individually abusing entrusted power; and (2) interpersonal corrupt acts, which refer to a power holder abusing entrusted power in 1
Data for each of the empirical studies and the material for the corruption game are openly accessibly on the Open Science Framework via DOI 10.17605/OSF.IO/6GZU8.
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collaboration with other corrupt agents. The new theoretical framework models the decision structure as two inherently different social dilemmas: individual corruption requires a power holder to prospect own and collective consequences, whereas interpersonal corruption requires a prospection of self-interest, the interest of corrupt partner(s) conflict and collective interests (nested social dilemma). Individual and interpersonal corruption dilemmas rest on different prospective decision-making processes, which are illustrated along intrapersonal factors (expected costs and benefits, self-control, guilt) and interpersonal factors (social norms, trust). Closing the chapter, the discussion addresses the advantages of this novel distinction for theory development, experimental corruption research, as well as anticorruption efforts.
Chapter 3: Descriptive Norms of Corruption As one of the most important factors that influences corrupt behavior, Chapter 3 (Köbis, van Prooijen, Righetti, & Van Lange, 2015) investigates the influence of perceived social norms on the inclination to behave corruptly. Considerable advances have been made in understanding corruption on a macro level, yet the psychological antecedents of corrupt behavior remain largely unknown. To explain why some people engage in corruption while others do not, Chapter 3 explores the impact of descriptive social norms on corrupt behavior by using a novel behavioral measure of corruption. Three studies test whether perceived descriptive norms of corruption (i.e. the belief about the prevalence of corruption in a specific context) influence corrupt behavior. The results indicate that descriptive norms highly correlate with corrupt behavior – both when measured before (Study 3.1) or after (Study 3.2) the behavioral measure of corruption. Finally, an experiment investigated the causal effect of descriptive norms on corruption (Study 3.3). Corrupt behavior in the corruption game significantly drops when participants receive short anti-corruption descriptive norm primes 10
prior to the game. These findings indicate that perceived descriptive norms can impact corrupt behavior and, possibly, could explain inter-personal and inter-cultural variation in corrupt behavior in the around the world. The discussion of this chapter addresses implications of these findings and draws avenues for future research on social norms and corruption.
Chapter 4: The Presence of the Other Effect Chapter 4 (Köbis, van Prooijen, Righetti & Van Lange, forthcoming) seeks to answer a basic and highly relevant question: Does the presence of another person curb unethical behaviour? The growing literature on behavioural ethics has repeatedly emphasized that “others” crucially influence individual unethical behaviour. Yet, in the vast majority of studies participants made decisions in isolation with no other person physically present. Two experiments examine whether the presence of another person, who has no formal means to sanction, suffices to reduce unethical behaviour. In both studies a second person was present with the participant in the lab. Study 4.1 also investigated the quality of the relationship towards that second person, either being a stranger or a well-known friend. Study 4.2 tested if the stakes of the other person influenced the participant’s behaviour, by manipulating whether the other person benefitted from cheating or not. Using different behavioural paradigms, two main results become apparent: first, the presence of another person curbs levels of corruption and cheating, and second, neither the relationship towards that other nor the payoff structure for the other person matters for this effect to occur. The discussion of this chapter outlines the implications of this “presence of another person effect” for research and policy.
Chapter 5: The Road to Bribery and Corruption – Steep Cliff or Slippery Slope Chapter 5 (Köbis, van Prooijen, Righetti, & Van Lange, 2017) tackles the emergence of severe corruption between two corrupt agents because major forms of corruption constitute a 11
strong threat to the functioning of societies. The most frequent explanation of how severe corruption emerges is the slippery-slope metaphor—the notion that corruption occurs gradually. While having widespread theoretical and intuitive appeal, this notion has barely been tested empirically. Four experimental studies tested whether severely corrupt acts happen gradually or abruptly. The results reveal a higher likelihood of severe corruption when participants face the opportunity to engage in it (abrupt) compared to when they had previously engaged in minor forms of corruption (gradual). Neither the size of the payoffs, which were kept constant, nor evaluations of the actions could account for these differences. Contrary to widely shared beliefs, sometimes the route to corruption leads over a steep cliff rather than a slippery slope.
In closing, it is worthy to note that all chapters are based on separate scientific articles that have been published or are currently under review at academic journals – the summaries above draw on the abstracts of the respective articles. Hence, some theoretical overlap between the chapters is unavoidable. Each chapter may be read independently yet at the same time deals with different aspects of the social psychology of corruption.
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Chapter 2
Prospection in Individual and Interpersonal Corruption Dilemmas
This chapter is based on Köbis, N. C., van Prooijen, J.-W., Righetti, F., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2016). Prospection in individual and interpersonal corruption dilemmas. Review of General Psychology, 20(1), 71–85. http://doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000069 13
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On the 12th of January 2010, an earthquake shattered Haiti. In the aftermath, death tolls far exceeded 100,000. In an attempt to explain these atrocious consequences, researchers argued that it was not the mere magnitude of the earthquake but the rampant level of corruption that was responsible for the high number of casualties (Ambraseys & Bilham, 2011). Corruption eroded the quality of the buildings, the infrastructure and the medical care system. Yet, it does not take earthquakes to illustrate the devastating effects caused by corruption around the world. Corruption is in fact one of the most serious and complex societal problems that nations, societies, and organizations face today. It undermines democracy, trust, and state development (Lee-Chai & Bargh, 2001; Mauro, 1995), increases inequality in societies (Stiglitz, 2012), and causes degradation and over-exploitation of the environment (Ostrom, 2000; Rothstein, 2011a). Not surprisingly, corruption has spurred extensive scientific interest (Serra & Wantchekon, 2012). However, at the very core of the understanding of what actually constitutes corrupt behavior and how corrupt decision-making draws on prospective thinking yawns a void. Laypersons and scientists alike refer to essentially different behaviors when talking about “corruption”: the same word can refer to a cleptocratic state leader embezzling public funds, gift exchanges between public officials and citizens, or an accountant in a private company cooking the books – and many more behaviors that classify as “abuse of entrusted power for private gains” (Graycar & Smith, 2011). As we will outline, such lumping together of various distinct forms of corrupt behaviors undermines scientific progress and hinders the understanding of the causes of corruption because the prospective processes involved in different forms of corruption vary substantially – most importantly along the division line of individual versus interpersonal corruption dilemmas. The present article advances a psychological analysis of corruption by focusing on the prospection processes involved in these different acts of corruption. Prospection (also known 15
as mental forecasting) refers to the ability to mentally simulate and pre-experience future events (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Gilbert, 2006) and, as such, plays a central role for corruption. Humans are uniquely equipped to pre-experience the hedonic value of events that might be far removed in the future, and even of events that they have never experienced themselves (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). Whether this simulation of the potential event appears pleasurable or painful crucially influences whether a person choses a particular course of action (Schwarz & Strack, 1999). In order to take a closer look at the metal forecasting dynamics involved in corruption, we model corruption as a social dilemma, broadly defined as situations in which short-term self-interest is at odds with longer-term collective interests (Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). In the context of corruption, a power holder faces a conflict between abusing power and using the power responsibly: corruption (power abuse) serves short-term selfinterest and no corruption (using power responsibly) serves long-term collective interest (Blau, 2009). Furthermore, to understand the complex dynamics involved in corruption, we additionally outline a distinction between individual and interpersonal corruption. As we will describe, each of them entails different decision-making processes regarding the mental representation of expected future outcomes. Individual corruption describes corrupt acts in which one agent single-handedly abuses entrusted power for private gains (e.g. embezzlement and public theft), whereas interpersonal corruption refers to corrupt acts in which multiple agents abuse entrusted power for private gains in collaboration (e.g. bribery, kick-back payments and established corrupt networks). With the help of this distinction, we discuss the most important psychological factors of
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corruption to illustrate how anticipating consequences of corruption differs between individual and interpersonal corruption (see Figure 2.1).2 To illustrate these differences in prospective cognition between individual and interpersonal corruption and to emphasize the importance of the novel distinction, consider the following examples: Imagine a public administrator who is entrusted with the power to manage the education budget of a local municipality. The administrator detects a loophole in the accounting system that allows the misreporting of the actual education fund and enables the administrator to pocket parts of the funds. The administrator now faces a social dilemma, in which he or she must foresee the cost and benefits of embezzling the money versus allocating it to the designated recipient, such as the schools. This form of individual corruption becomes more likely if the administrator anticipates low chances of formal punishment and low psychological costs such as the feeling of guilt towards the victims of that corrupt act, i.e. the designated recipient of the education funds. On the contrary, in interpersonal corruption, the public administrator requires help from the accountant to divert the public funds. This time, both people need to arrange a corrupt collaboration (Weisel & Shalvi, 2015). If the accountant instigates the corrupt deal, the administrator faces a nested social dilemma between acting according to self-interest, the accountant’s interest or the collective interest – a decision that involves more complexity considering future consequences. Here, the expected behavior of the accountant influences the cost / benefit analysis (e.g., there is an increased chance of detection through whistleblowing). Furthermore, the administrator faces an intricate decision in which a moral trade-off between fairness principles (“be fair, allocate the funds in the collective interest”) and loyalty principles exists (“be loyal, act in the interest of the corrupt dyad”; Dungan, Waytz, & Young,
2
Although we acknowledge that all forms of corruption involve a social network at some level, we argue that the act of corruption itself can be either individual – involving only the corrupt agent – or interpersonal, hence involving multiple corrupt agents.
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2014). If the later trumps the former, the administrator expects to feel guilty for not engaging in interpersonal corruption. Thus, as we will outline in more detail, the considerations of future consequences for interpersonal corruption dilemmas are characterized by more complexity than for individual corruption dilemmas because more corrupt agents are directly involved. Individual and interpersonal corruption thus mark essentially different forms of corrupt behavior and draw on different psychological decision-making processes. Although distinctions between different forms of criminal activity (Clinard & Quinney, 1973; Finney & Lesieur, 1982) and corruption (e.g. Amundsen, 1999; Heidenheimer, 1970; Pinto, Leana, & Pil, 2008) exist, a theoretical framework to focus on these processes is lacking. This lack is partially due to a relative neglect of corruption in the fields of personality, moral, and social psychology, which is surprising given the immense societal relevance of corruption and its multifaceted prospective decision-making processes. In the following sections, we first explain the social dilemma structure inherent to corruption. We use this social dilemma framework to describe the general psychological mechanism involved in all forms of corruption. We then highlight the profound differences in prospective cognition between individual and interpersonal corruption along five of the most important psychological factors involved in corruption.
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Figure 2.1 Illustration of the intra- and interpersonal dynamics of corruption and how they differ for individual and interpersonal corruption.
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Corruption as a Social Dilemma From the perspective of a power holder a potentially corruption situation represents a social dilemma because a conflict between (often short-term) self-interest versus (often longer-term) collective interest occurs (Blau, 2009; Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). When facing such a “corruption dilemma”, the power holder forms a mental representation of the expected consequences of corruption. This means the power holder engages in prospection. 3 In order to better understand the prospective cognition involved in corruption let us take a closer look at the specific circumstances in which corruption occurs. Since corruption entails power asymmetry over shared resources, we formalize corruption dilemmas as an extension to social dilemmas dealing with shared resources. These are common pool resource dilemmas (Ostrom, Burger, & Field, 1999). Such common pool resource dilemmas can take the form of take-some dilemmas (common resource dilemmas) or give-some dilemmas (public goods dilemmas). In a common resource dilemma, a group extracts from a shared resource – for example common fishery (Ostrom, 2000). The group seeks to avoid overuse so that the resource will not be depleted (Hardin, 1968). Conversely, in a public goods dilemma, a group of people contributes to the provision or maintenance of a shared good – for example tax payments to sponsor the public infrastructure (Fehr & Gächter, 2000). The group has to ensure tax payments and avoid free riding so that the common contribution can sustain the public infrastructure.
3
In our theoretical model, we focus solely on the power holder. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the important role that non–power holders play in corruption. Frequently a briber who is not in a power position might instigate the corrupt transaction. However, we argue that corruption only occurs if the power holder accepts this bribe. Therefore, the act of corruption requires a power holder abusing power.
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In the original formulations of these two common pool resource dilemmas, each member of the group decides individually and freely how much to contribute to and / or how much to extract from the common good (Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965). Extensive research shows that free decisional structures lead to common resource depletion (Fehr & Gächter, 2000). One crucial reason for this “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968) lies in the incapability of each individual to adequately foresee the long-term collective costs that are caused by pursing immediate self-interest – e.g. to overfish the common fishery grounds. Although on an individual level, myopia seems to trump long-term planning, humans are at the same time uniquely equipped to collectively foresee how each individual’s selfish urges lead to undesirable outcomes for the collective (Seligman, Railton, Baumeister, & Sripada, 2013). Therefore, institutional arrangements have emerged to collectively curb people’s short-term interest and promote better common resource use (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995; Ostrom, 2000). Indeed, laws, rules, and norms exist to avoid resource overuse in the case of a common resource dilemma (e.g. fishery regulations), and to enforce contribution in a public goods dilemma (e.g. legal enforcement of tax payments). Individuals, groups and firms are entrusted with power to manage a common resource in the interest of all members of the group (e.g., fishery regulators and tax collectors; Ostrom, 2000) – thus to ensure that people act in the collective interest. Corruption happens when this entrusted power is abused for private gains (Eigen, 2002; Lambsdorff, 1999; Nye, 1967). In that sense, corruption describes the peculiar phenomenon of institutional power that is set up to curb selfishness in turn being abused for selfish interests. Consider for example a public official who is entrusted with the power to restrict access to fishing rights only to authorized fishers. Corruption occurs if the public official grants these fishing rights to unauthorized fishers because of private interests (e.g., bribe
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payments). Similarly, in the context of public goods dilemmas, corruption occurs if a tax collector permits tax evasion in exchange for private favors (e.g., job promotion). 4 This has implications for the actual prospective cognition that is involved in corruption dilemmas. Corruption prospection involves at least two parties. For one, a power holder who faces a corruption dilemma mentally forecasts the own outcomes. Secondly, due to the entrusted power over shared resources, a power holder also prospects the collective outcomes, which importantly include the power holder as well (Blau, 2009). For example, a corrupt police officer benefits from a bribery transaction in the short-run but suffers from a less trustworthy police force in the long-run. Psychologically, one’s own immediate consequences are plotted against collective longterm consequences. Because of temporal discounting (Joireman, Balliet, Sprott, Spangenberg & Schulz, 2008; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989), the negative long-term consequences for the collective are generally discounted in comparison to the immediate consequences for oneself. This temporal dilemma is at the heart of all forms of corruption and underlines the important role of prospective cognition in corrupt decision-making.
Difference between Individual and Interpersonal Corruption Dilemmas Besides these basic commonalities, there is a profound difference between the social dilemmas of individual and interpersonal corruption: the number of corrupt agents that are directly involved in the corrupt act. Individual corruption entails a trade-off between two parties (power holder vs. collective). Yet, interpersonal corruption represents a nested social dilemma in which three parties’ interests are at odds with each other (power holder vs. corrupt partner(s) vs. collective). Besides the dilemma between collective and self-interest,
4
It is beyond the scope of this contribution to discuss what constitutes such an abuse of entrusted power; for a more thorough discussion see Kurer (2005).
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interpersonal corruption additionally contains a sub-dilemma between the corrupt partners. This sub-dilemma adds complexity to the forecasting involved in corrupt decision-making. The following example elucidates the complex social dynamics of interpersonal corruption dilemmas in more detail: consider a businessperson who offers a bribe to a politician in return for insider information. In this example, the exchange resembles a sequential prisoner’s dilemma with the bribing businessperson being the first mover.5 The politician now faces the aforementioned nested social dilemma and has to predict the consequences of the potential corrupt deal for the three parties: the self, the corrupt partner and the collective. Pocketing the bribe without providing the insider information would maximize the short-term benefit for the self. This option is especially appealing when the politician does not expect to interact with the businessperson again because in such one-shot encounters the likelihood of retaliation by the corrupt partner is low. A successful corrupt transaction would create the best outcome for the businessperson and the politician but creates negative effects for the collective. As the complex decision-making structure shows, engaging in corruption entails multiple prospective elements. Psychological Processes We draw on the rich literature on social dilemmas (Van Lange et al., 2013; Parks, Joireman, & Van Lange, 2013) and existing experimental corruption research (Serra & Wantchekon, 2012), to identify some of the most important psychological factors involved in corruption dilemmas. Along these intrapersonal (cost-benefit calculations, self-control, guilt) and interpersonal psychological factors (social norms, trust), we discuss crucial differences in the prospection involved in corrupt decision-making between individual and interpersonal corruption.
5
The sequential prisoners’ dilemma is a version of the prisoners’ dilemma, in which one player decides first whether to cooperate or to defect. The second player knows the decision of the first player and then decides himself or herself whether to cooperate or not.
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Intrapersonal Dynamics of Corruption Prospected costs and benefits. Power holders confronted with a corruption dilemma attempt to predict the material, legal, moral, and social consequences (Messick & Bazerman, 1996). Due to the multiple corrupt agents involved, the consequences of interpersonal corruption are less predictable and thus require more prospective thinking. Frequently, the corrupt partners can pose a threat to each other by potentially undermining the corrupt transaction, for example by defection, cheating a bribe (i.e. pocketing a bribe without reciprocating) or whistle-blowing (Lambsdorff, 2012). Especially in one-shot interpersonal corrupt transactions, a corrupt agent must include this interpersonal threat as an additional variable in the cost-benefit calculation. To elaborate further on this point, prior to entering a corrupt transaction, a corrupt agent has to estimate the “corruptibility” (Abbink, 2004) of the potential partner. Making a corrupt offer to a non-corrupt agent can lead to trouble: Probability of detection is high and the corrupt agent runs the risk of punishment – especially in low corruption environments (i.e. contexts in which corruption only seldom occurs). Here, detection of corruption likely results in (severe) punishments. But even if the deal has been agreed on, both corrupt partners have to remain careful and assess whether the other corrupt agent is likely to cheat the bribe (Lambsdorff, 2012) or to blow the whistle (Armantier & Boly, 2012; Glazer & Glazer, 1989). There is twofold support for the theorized link between number of corrupt agents involved and complexity of the prospection of cost and benefits: First, social dilemma research shows that outcome complexity of any social dilemma situation increases with the number of parties involved (Kelley et al., 2003). Second, criminological research shows that collaborative crimes are generally more risky than individual crimes (Nguyen & McGloin, 2013). To conclude, future cost-benefit calculations in interpersonal corruption entail a higher level of complexity, uncertainty and unpredictability compared to individual corruption. As 24
we will outline in more detail below, interpersonal corruption dilemmas frequently include several interpersonal dynamics (e.g. trust, reciprocity, communication) to facilitate the corrupt collaboration. Anticipated guilt. As the literature on social and moral dilemmas suggests, the decision to engage in corruption is not only determined by the rational pre-calculation of cost and benefits but also by the way power holders “pre-feel” the consequences (Epley & Caruso, 2004; Haidt, 2001, 2003; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Corruption research has largely neglected the role played by moral emotions in corrupt decision-making, although (expected) emotions matter for both individual and interpersonal corruption. Previous research suggests that emotional reactions that are triggered by an imagination of a prospective act serve as a benchmark to make a decision (Schwarz & Strack, 1999). With regards to corruption, a power holder might pre-feel positive emotions caused by the potential gain or the self-satisfaction stemming from the “cheaters high”, i.e. the positive affective response after getting away with unethical behavior (Ruedy, Moore, Gino, & Schweitzer, 2013). These expected positive emotions pull the power holder towards engaging in corruption. This tendency further increases if the potential corrupt act appears like a one-time “golden opportunity” (Köbis, van Prooijen, et al., 2017). On the flipside, corruption always has a victim which can range from a concrete other (known) person to the entire society or abstract constructs like public trust (Rothstein, 2000). Harming the victim triggers expected negative emotions such as shame and guilt. In contrast to the positive emotions associated with the potential gain, the affective forecasting of negative emotions push power holders away from corruption. Guilt deserves special attention as it is one of the most commonly experienced emotion in response to ethical transgressions (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Stillwell, 1994; Posner & Rasmusen, 1999). Guilt is shaped by upbringing, individual experiences, and social as well as 25
cultural background (Haidt & Joseph, 2008). Therefore, there is inter-individual variance in the propensity to feel guilt, which is called guilt-proneness (Tangney, 1995). Guilt-prone individuals feel guilty more frequently. Extensive research links guilt-proneness to lower levels of a wide range of unethical behaviors: Guilt-prone adolescents engage less frequently in delinquent behavior (Stuewig & McCloskey, 2005); guilt-prone adults indicate a lower willingness to steal (Tangney, 1994) and report less criminal activity (Tibbetts, 2003); guilt-prone individuals generally value moral traits (Cohen, Panter & Turan, 2012) and guilt-proneness increases moral norm conformity (Pinter et al., 2007). Most of the studies that explore the relationship between unethical behavior and guilt conceptualize unethical behavior as a decision between right and wrong, for example between acting honestly versus cheating. A similar decision structure occurs in individual corruption where the power holder has to forecast the consequences of being corrupt, which means harming the victim, versus acting in the interest of the collective. Hence, the aforementioned findings of guilt-proneness being negatively related to crime likely translate to individual corruption. Guilt-prone individuals pre-experience guilt when faced with an individual corruption dilemma and are thus less likely to commit such acts than less guilt-prone individuals – especially if the victim of corruption is salient and concrete. However, in interpersonal corruption guilt unfolds more complex dynamics. In contrast to individual corruption, in interpersonal corruption different moral principles frequently clash. Most notably, interpersonal corruption often constitutes a conflict between fairness and loyalty principles (Dungan et al., 2014) – both of them being basic moral values (Haidt, 2007, 2013; Henrich, et al., 2010). While fairness essentially requires an equal treatment to all persons and groups, loyalty dictates a preferential treatment of one's own in-group over other groups (Waytz, Dungan, & Young, 2013). Loyalty has evolved as a mean to ensure continued 26
cooperation among close kin groups (Haidt, 2007) and thus has a strong prospect for the future – it enables in-group members to ensure future cooperation with their kin. In many instances of interpersonal corruption, fairness principles conflict with loyalty principles – a person needs to decide whether to be loyal towards the corrupt partner(s) (i.e. be corrupt) or to act fairly (i.e. act in the collective interest). The experience of guilt then depends either on which moral principle (fairness or loyalty) trumps or on the salience of the reference group of guilt (i.e., whom to feel guilty towards, Ketelaar & Tung Au, 2003). Hence, an individual who values loyalty over fairness might pre-experience guilt when considering to not engage in interpersonal corruption (e.g., letting down corrupt partners, patronage, or family members, Pinter et al., 2007). Since corrupt cooperation latches on to loyalty norms, it can therefore foster interpersonal corrupt acts. Put differently, the prospect of letting down the corrupt partner(s) triggers guilt. Various theoretical elaborations and empirical findings support the idea that guilt (proneness) may potentially increase interpersonal corruption. First, people generally expect to feel guilty towards people who are visibly affected by their actions (Baumeister et al., 1994). In the nested dilemma of interpersonal corruption, the corrupt partner is usually more proximate and more visibly affected than the victim (Wit & Kerr, 2002). Hence, the anticipated guilt towards potential corrupt partners likely overshadows the anticipated guilt towards the victim. The fact that the victim is usually non-visible, abstract and affected in the temporal distance further fosters this tendency. Second, guilt fosters cooperation (de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2007; Ketelaar & Tung Au, 2003) especially among in-group members (Gouldner, 1960; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Since interpersonal corruption requires corrupt collaboration (Shalvi, Weisel, Kochavi-Gamliel, & Leib, 2016; Weisel & Shalvi, 2015) and due to the importance of the aforementioned loyalty norms among in-group members, failing to cooperate with corrupt 27
partners triggers negative moral emotions. Thus, people may often experience guilt when not cooperating with the salient corrupt partner(s). The power asymmetry inherent to corruption can further augment this tendency. Previous research suggests that the chances of corrupt cooperation likely increase when instigated by the power holders as people frequently feel guilt when not adhering to authority (Messick & Bazerman, 1996). For example, an official might feel such emotional distress when not agreeing to a corrupt deal that the supervisor instigates. Interestingly, this tendency of obedience to authority is strongest for agreeable individuals – for those who value kindness, sympathy and warmth, and hence do not want to disappoint the authority (Bègue et al., 2014). Otherwise desirable traits, such as agreeableness and guilt-proneness, can unfold unexpected negative effects in interpersonal corruption dilemmas. Third, the fact that the other corrupt agent(s) stand to gain from the corrupt act facilitates the justification process and additionally alleviates guilt towards the victim (Ayal & Gino, 2011; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008a; Shalvi et al., 2016). Extensive research reveals that the (salient) membership (e.g. kinship, friendship) affects distributive fairness decisions (cf. Greene, 2014) and indicates that people readily violate fairness norms when the own ingroup can gain from it (Gino et al., 2013). This trend increases when the in-group has to compete with an out-group over scarce resources (cf. parochial altruism, Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2015; Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006; Shalvi & De Dreu, 2014). The number of partners involved in a corrupt network additionally amplifies this effect as the other network members provide a shield of anonymity (Schopler, Insko, Drigotas, & Wieselquist, 1995) and increase diffusion of responsibility (Bandura, 1999; Darley & Latané, 1968). Put differently, in big and established corrupt networks, each corrupt agent feels less responsible for the negative externalities caused by corruption compared to smaller corrupt networks. This tendency minimizes the anticipation of guilt. 28
With the harmful externalities far removed and the mutual personal benefits for the corrupt partners immediate, interpersonal corruption deals might appear like a “win-win situation” (Nielsen, 2003), or even like a “victimless crime” (Azfar et al., 2001). As each involved corrupt partner has an interest in reducing potential distress caused by guilt they might mutually reinforce the tendency to mentally construe the victim in the most abstract and distant way possible. Hence, through abstract mental representation of a potential victim, guilt towards the victim might be obliterated altogether – an assertion supported by existing research on construal level theory (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002). Reducing the salience of the victim helps the corrupt partners to ignore the fact that interpersonal corruption, in reality, represents a win-win-lose situation. Taken together, anticipated guilt and guilt-proneness might create opposing effects for individual and interpersonal corruption. Anticipation of guilt towards the victim reduces the likelihood of individual corrupt acts. However, depending on the salience of the reference group and the moral principle, anticipation of guilt may often increase the likelihood of interpersonal corrupt acts. Self-control. Even in situations in which the odds of success are low, the likelihood of punishment almost certain, and the prospect of feeling guilty on the horizon, people nonetheless engage in corruption. In these cases, vivid mental simulations of the benefits of corruption spur a corrupt temptation and can override the expected costs of corruption. Philosophical thinking dating back to Aristotle (Aristotle, 1980; Horstkötter, 2015) as well as a wealth of social psychological research propose self-control to be the prime candidate to explain why some people give into these temptations while others resist (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Baumeister & Tierney, 2011; Baumeister, Vohs & Tice, 2007). Self-control describes the “the capacity for altering one’s own responses, especially to bring them into line with standards such as ideals, values, morals, and social expectations, and 29
to support the pursuit of long-term goals” (Baumeister, et al., 2007, p. 351). A power holder who disapproves of corruption and, thus formed the long-term goal to remain non-corrupt, needs high self-control capacities to recognize the corruption dilemma and to resist the corrupt temptation. First, previous research shows that recognizing and reasoning through moral dilemmas requires high self-control capacities (Gino, 2016). Conversely, being depleted of self-control capacities undermines the ability to recognize potential negative consequences of one’s own behavior. In corruption dilemmas, where the victim is frequently psychologically and temporally distant, this tendency might be especially pronounced. Mentally representing the potential negative consequences of corruption requires conscious deliberation (Fujiwara & Wantchekon, 2013). Without recognition of the possible negative consequences for the collective, the corruption dilemma might not even appear to be a dilemma. As outlined above, especially in interpersonal corruption, other corrupt partners have a vested interest to make corruption appear like a win-win situation or as a victimless crime. Hence, especially the prospection of potential negative consequences in interpersonal corruption requires selfcontrol because the potential negative consequences might be harder to recognize in interpersonal corruption dilemmas compared to individual corruption dilemmas. In addition to that, resisting corrupt temptations also needs self-control, especially if the option of behaving in a corrupt manner appears unexpectedly. Self-control plays a vital role to explain behavior in situations in which decisions are made impulsively and, contrary to the common perception, many forms of criminal (corrupt) behavior are not well planned and happen unwarily (Gailliot et al., 2007; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). It is thus not surprising that empirical research points in the same direction: Besides being frequently associated with individuals’ ability to resist daily temptations, such as binge eating, smoking, and alcohol abuse (Baumeister et al., 2007; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010), self-control also 30
predicts cheating (Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009) and other unethical behavior (Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012). In fact, low levels of self-control are a major contributor to criminal behavior (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Muraven, Pogarsky, & Shmueli, 2006; Pratt & Cullen, 2000) and one of the strongest predictors of criminal recidivism (Virkkunen, De Jong, Bartko, Goodwin, & Linnoila, 1989). In individual corruption dilemmas, self-control enables people to resist the temptation of acting in a selfish way that fulfils short-term interest and, instead, to achieve the overarching goal to be fair. Self-control capacities help to explain why some people engage in individual corruption and others do not, especially if the opportunity for corruption occurs unexpectedly. For example, a notary whose responsibility involves the execution of a last will might face the temptation of misrepresenting the actual amount of the heritage and pocket some of the money. Besides the estimation of cost and benefits and the prospected guilt, self-control crucially helps to explain whether the notary will be likely to engage in this act of embezzlement. Similarly, self-control may also help individuals to abstain from interpersonal corruption. We base this assumption on recent findings linking impulsiveness and cooperation: People under time pressure, hence low in self-control, show higher levels of cooperation than those who have time to deliberate about cooperation (Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012). Since cooperating with a corrupt partner is at the heart of interpersonal corruption, we assume a similar link between low self-control and corrupt cooperation. Studies investigating sacrifices within (romantic) relationships further support this assumption (Righetti, Finkenauer, & Finkel, 2013). Romantic partners who were low in self-control showed a greater willingness to sacrifice for their partner. Similarly, in interpersonal corruption, people’s impulsive tendencies might be to comply and cooperate with the corrupt 31
partners, especially if the two individuals are close to each other or have repeatedly engaged in interpersonal corruption together. Taken together, when faced with the decision to engage in individual or interpersonal corruption, we assume a link between low self-control and corruption – especially when this situation occurs unexpectedly (impulsive) or when the corrupt cooperation (in the case of interpersonal corruption) takes place with a well-known corrupt partner. However, what if the power holder actually has formed the overarching goal to remain in power at all costs and to be corrupted when convenient? In this circumstance, such a power holder requires self-control to keep engaging in corruption without being detected. In contrast to situations in which the power holder has the overarching goal of behaving ethically, we argue that motivated and repeated engagement in corruption requires high levels of selfcontrol. Due to the societal illegitimacy and illegality of corruption (Rothstein, 2000; Widmalm, 2008), corrupt agents cannot openly disclose their corrupt activities even if they might consider them acceptable themselves. A repeated engagement in corruption therefore forces corrupt agents to deliberately hide their corrupt practices and instead give the impression of being innocent – thus, moral hypocrisy emerges (cf. Batson, Thompson, & Chen, 2002; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999). In these cases, prolonged corruption becomes part of the corrupt agents’ identity. Yet, towards others corrupt agents have to continuously feign an honest appearance and cover up corrupt traces. This way, repeated engagement in corruption implies a management of multiple conflicting identities. This form of deception, double-standard and cognitive dissonance reduction likely requires high levels of self-control (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Felps, & Lim, 2009; Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005). Repeated interpersonal corruption is even more demanding than repeated individual corruption because it requires interaction and cooperation with corrupt partners. First, the 32
corrupt agent has to incorporate the repeated corrupt behavior in the self-concept – through moral disengagement like rationalizations and the aforementioned abstract victim representation, the repeated corrupt transgressor likely reduces cognitive dissonance (Bandura, 1999; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Mazar et al., 2008b). Hence, the corrupt agent might have a positive self-view, even in the light of repeated corrupt engagement. Second, towards the corrupt partners, corrupt agents have to appear corrupt. They have to adhere to the “codes of the underworld” (Gambetta, 2009), which dictate a willingness to cooperate with corrupt partners. Third, outside of this whelm of corrupt partners, corrupt agents have to give the impression of not being corrupt. Hence, corrupt agents need to manage their impressions in conflicting norm environments (see also Vohs et al., 2005) and upholding this “role distance” (Goffman, 1959) draws on the limited resource of self-control (Vohs et al., 2005; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000) – especially if the corrupt partner(s) stay the same (Joosten, van Dijke, Van Hiel, De Cremer, et al., 2013). Taken together, continuous engagement in corruption is a taxing task that requires high levels of self-control. That is especially the case for interpersonal corruption, where being corrupt means navigating through different social (and reputational) whelms: one in which to appear like “a gangster” and one in which to appear like “a good citizen”.
Interpersonal Dynamics of Corruption As the discussion so far suggests, the demands of the anticipatory processes involved in interpersonal corruption dilemmas exceed those involved in individual corruption dilemmas. To further illustrate the intricate social dynamics of interpersonal corruption, we take a closer look at the importance and the emergence of “corruption norms” (i.e. the notion that corruption is normal) and show the twofold role that trust plays in interpersonal corruption (i.e. undermining generalized trust while requiring particularized trust). In this discussion, we 33
will mostly focus on interpersonal corruption and only briefly mention the relevance of these two factors for individual corruption. Social norms. One of the most important benchmarks for predicting the future consequences of corrupt behavior are social norms (Banuri & Eckel, 2012; Barr & Serra, 2008; Dong, Dulleck, & Torgler, 2012; Fisman & Miguel, 2007). Social norms describe shared understandings about actions that are obligatory, permitted, or forbidden (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995). Predictions about the (corrupt) behavior of others rest on perceived norms (Köbis et al., 2015; Rothstein, 2000). As such, two main types of social norms exist – injunctive norms and descriptive norms (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993; see for similar distinctions in economics and sociology Bicchieri, 2005; Goffman, 1969). An anticipated corrupt act can be evaluated according to whether it is permissible (injunctive norms) and whether others engage in it as well (descriptive norms). As previously mentioned, corruption is a behavior that is disapproved, even in high corruption contexts (Widmalm, 2008). As a case in point, power holders virtually never publicly admit their own corrupt behavior. Hence, injunctive norms about corruption frequently trigger negative pre-experiences, such as anticipated guilt or shame. However, descriptive norms can work against these corruption-curbing mental simulations. The perception that the majority engages in corruption alleviates the negative pre-experience of corruption. Descriptive norms can thus serve as a rationalization – “I know it is wrong but everybody does it” (Köbis et al., 2015). These rationalizations for selfish behavior are frequently construed prior to the actual engagement in the behavior (Gino & Ariely, 2012) and reduce anticipated guilt and shame. Especially the prospective element in these norms representations – “if I don’t do it, somebody else will” – pave the way for corruption. Since most people have an inflated moral self-view (Messick & Bazerman, 1996; Van Lange, 1991) this “other” potential corrupt agent 34
is likely represented as a less moral person and is thought to be likely to behave in a corrupt manner. As such, social norms matter for individual and interpersonal corruption, yet to varying degrees. For individual corruption, perceived social norms serve as a decisional benchmark that influence corrupt decisions in ways outlined above. That is, perceiving that a certain corrupt behavior is common and accepted – an assessment that is often skewed towards selfish interests – drastically increases the likelihood of the respective individual corrupt behavior to occur (Köbis et al., 2015). For example, if a tax collector perceives embezzlement to be normal, chances are that he or she will act likewise. In interpersonal corruption, perceived norms bear even more importance as they directly affect the expected success of corrupt transactions. Especially perceived descriptive norms convey crucial information about the chances of success for a corrupt transaction. Think for example of the practice of bribing a police officer after having violated a traffic rule. If the traffic offender believes that corruption is widespread, initiating a bribe payment, (e.g. by slipping a note into your driver’s license) might help to avoid a hefty fine. In this context, the expected value of the police officer accepting the bribe outweighs the expected punishment. However, if the traffic offender believes that corruption hardly ever occurs, such a practice might cause bigger trouble than just the speeding fine. In this second scenario, the potential punishment for attempting a bribe outweighs the expected value of bribe acceptance. Besides shaping the prospections about the behavior of potential corrupt partners, a second dynamic of norms can evolve. Repeated corrupt transactions with the same corrupt partners can lead to the formation of established corrupt networks. Within these emerging (corrupt) networks the norms among its members shift (Pinter et al., 2007; Wilder, 1986) and corruption becomes the behavioral standard (see normalization of corruption; Ashforth & Anand, 2003). Thus, once corrupt transactions have been repeatedly carried out, new local 35
“corrupt norms” may emerge, resulting in a normative pressure to benefit the corrupt in-group (Cohen, Montoya & Insko, 2006; Wildschut & Insko, 2006). Corruption norms dictate corrupt cooperation while sanctioning non-cooperation within a corrupt network (Gambetta, 2009). These norms facilitate the prospective decisions for each involved agent as they signal mutual cooperation. Through such corruption norms, corrupt collaborations become more predictable – a highly relevant feature for interpersonal transactions (Van Lange & Joireman, 2008). One example for this complex social dynamic is the codex of Omertá among Mafiamembers. Omertá dictates cooperation among its members and prohibits information about illegal transactions to surface by threatening severe punishments upon misconduct (Oudemans, 2008). Needless to say, these norms within the Mafia network conflict with general societal norms and as outlined above, managing the impressions in conflicting norm environments requires self-control on the part of the corrupt agents. These corrupt norms serve another important purpose among corrupt network members: they nurture trust. Trust. Trust is another crucial interpersonal ingredient of corruption that shapes the prospective decision-making process. It plays two important yet entirely different roles in corruption. On the one hand, the formation and maintenance of interpersonal corrupt transactions requires trust between the corrupt partners (i.e. particularized trust; Lambsdorff & Frank, 2011; Pinker, Nowak, & Lee, 2008; Uslaner, 2005). On the other hand, both forms of corruption – individual and interpersonal corruption – generally undermine the public’s trust in the society (i.e. generalized trust; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). Let us first illuminate the dynamics of particularized trust – the belief that another person is positively concerned about the outcomes for oneself (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013). Similar to generic cooperative situations (Wright, 2001), corrupt cooperation requires trust (Lambsdorff & Frank, 2011; Lambsdorff, 1999; Ryvkin & Serra, 2012). Corrupt agents need to expect that the other(s) reciprocate and not cheat the deal even when tempted to do so 36
(Abbink, 2004; Hunt, 2004). However, the form of particularized trust involved in interpersonal corruption differs from trust in generic cooperative situations in two important ways. First, the illegitimacy (and illegality) of corruption prevents a formal or legal enforcement of corrupt deals (Gambetta, 2009). A corrupt agent cannot file a lawsuit if the corrupt partner did not provide the promised service or cheats a bribe. Therefore, anticipating whether the corrupt partner reciprocates relies more heavily on trust than generic forms of cooperation do. Second, due to the nested social dilemma structure of interpersonal corruption, trust between corrupt agents implies also a willingness to harm the collective. While cooperation is generally deemed desirable – one of the main requirements for any sort of society (Szathmáry & Smith, 1995) – corrupt cooperation produces negative outcomes for the collective (Rothstein, 2011a). It reflects a type of “negative cooperation”. To elucidate this point, particularized trust in interpersonal corruption entails the belief that corrupt partners care about the positive outcomes for each other, but at the same time disregard the negative outcomes for the victim. A corrupt deal thus requires a form of “corrupt trust”, as corrupt partners have to mutually anticipate corrupt behavior (Platteau, 1994). For example, a student who offers a teacher a bribe in exchange for a better grade has to prospect that the teacher will care about the positive outcome for the student and will reciprocate. Importantly, though, the student also has to prospect that the teacher ignores the negative outcomes that this transaction creates for the other students in the class. Recent empirical research confirms the assertion that particularized trust fosters corrupt cooperation (Jiang, Lindemans, & Bicchieri, 2015). The outlined intricacy of trust involved in interpersonal corruption raises the question: how do corrupt partners ensure particularized trust? Communication is one way for corrupt partners to increase trust and thus to reduce the prospective complexity (Balliet, 2010). 37
Indirect speech acts are frequently used in the initial stages of novel corrupt transactions (Pinker, 2007; Pinker et al., 2008). To elucidate how indirect language fosters especially novel interpersonal corruption: when instigating a corrupt transaction, both potentially corrupt agents face the challenge to convey the willingness to engage in corruption without (a) accusing the other of being corrupt or (b) stepping into dangerous legal territory of admitting the own corruptibility (Gambetta, 2009). People willing to engage in interpersonal corruption can achieve this balancing act by using indirect language as it transmits a willingness to engage in corruption while granting plausible deniability (Pinker, 2007; Pinker et al., 2008). Once a corrupt deal has been agreed on, communication between corrupt partners facilitates particularized corrupt trust by enunciating promises and threats. Speaking to another about the prospective corrupt deal enables corrupt partners to co-create and share prospections and thus make common plans (Seligman et al., 2013). This way, corrupt partners can mutually reinforce the positive prospection of the positive consequences resulting from a corrupt deal – “Imagine all the money we can make” – and reduce the salience of a potential victim – “Nobody will be harmed”. But, communication can also be used to ensure corrupt trust by menacing force. For example, in order to ensure mutual corrupt collaborations, corrupt partners can trigger concrete mental images of what will happen if the partner elects to defect – one can think of the often gruesome threats and punishments among criminal gangs like the Mafia. Such threats of punishments trigger immediate strong emotional responses, such as fear, which enforces corrupt collaboration. Thus, communicating about the future outcomes of interpersonal corrupt deals augments particularized trust among corrupt partners. A second important aspect that increases this form of trust is the prospect that a (corrupt) cooperation situation occurs again (Van Lange, Klapwijk, & Van Munster, 2011). The “shadow of the future” (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981) makes people aware of the fact that certain behavior (e.g., corrupt cooperation) in the present might lead to positive outcomes in 38
the future (e.g., reciprocal payback). Since a longer time horizon enables lasting and healthy relationships (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003), it allows a prospection of future benefits of corrupt transactions for oneself and the corrupt partners. A longer time horizon therefore enables trust between corrupt partners to develop. For one, the mental pre-experiences of positive future outcomes resulting from ongoing reciprocation are activated (Barclay & Van Vugt, 2015). Accepting and reciprocating a bribe is potentially a first step in an ongoing quid-pro-quo corrupt relationship (Hunt, 2004). Second, expecting repeated transactions also activates the expected threat of potential repercussions when rejecting the corrupt offer. The aforementioned threats and prospects of punishments for not cooperating are most effective when the corrupt partners likely interact again. Empirical support stems from research showing that punishments systems are generally more effective when the time horizon is long (Gächter, Renner, & Sefton, 2008). Taken together, the willingness to engage in interpersonal corruption and the particularized trust among corrupt partners increases if the corrupt partners expect transactions to take place again in the future (Banuri & Eckel, 2012). Although the act of interpersonal corruption requires high levels of particularized trust, on the societal level, trust and corruption negatively correlate (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2004; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). Since corruption per definition involves an abuse of entrusted power, corruption undermines the level of trust in a society (Graycar & Smith, 2011; Johnson & Mislin, 2011; Platteau, 1994). Especially harmful to the societal trust are interpersonal forms of corruption that involve a transaction between citizens and public officials (Guiso et al., 2004; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). Citizens who make first hand experiences with the crookedness of public officials lose their trust in public institutions, politics and their fellow citizens (Uslaner, 2005). This direct experience with corruption also
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shapes the aforementioned representations of social norms and hence has a direct influence of what citizens can expect when interacting with public institutions. The intricate dynamics of trust and corruption become especially apparent when again using the example of the Mafia: within the Mafia, high levels of trust exist to ensure repeated cooperation among its members (Gambetta, 1996). Credible threats, vicarious punishment and rigid inclusion criteria as well as the aforementioned codex of Omertá ensure that members of the Mafia can expect reciprocation from fellow members. However, having the Mafia in the neighborhood reduces generalized trust among citizens of this area. One of the main reasons for the reduced trust is that the Mafia erodes the functioning of public institutions (Meier, Pierce, & Vaccaro, 2014). The interaction between citizens who are not in the Mafia and public institutions are characterized by uncertainty and unreliability. Citizens cannot count on public service delivery and thus stop trusting the public institutions. To summarize, trust plays an even more vital part in corrupt transactions than it does in generic cooperative situations. Particularized trust entails the expectation of reciprocity between the corrupt partners, as well as the belief that the corrupt partners are willing to harm the collective. On the societal level, the opposite relationship between trust and corruption exists, with corruption being one of the main contributors to low societal trust.
Trust and norms – Past, present, and future We have repeatedly touched on the importance of past behavior for the formation of mental representation of future (corrupt) events. Experience with corruption influences the way corrupt acts are anticipated, even more so, because memory and prospection rely on the same brain areas (Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009). Based on extensive research on memory bias, it is safe to assume that successful past corrupt acts are frequently represented in more positive light than they actually occurred (Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005; Gilbert & 40
Wilson, 2007). For example, corrupt agents remember the victims of corruption less saliently than the gains that they obtained (Bandura, 1999). These distorted memories of past behavior then serve as benchmark for current decisions (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). Even small previous corrupt acts can transform the decision-making process and let corruption appear less problematic (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Darley, 2005). With repeated experience, deciding whether to engage in corruption or not becomes more automatic and prospection occurs quicker and less deliberately (Lee-Chai & Bargh, 2001). Such forms of implicit corruption rely more heavily on the most salient expected hedonic experience, which due to the aforementioned temporal discounting frequently is the (material) gain that can be obtained through corruption. Consequently, successful experience with corruption and the distorted memories of these events paves the way for prospections that increase the chances of corruption. However, past behavior does not automatically result in future behavior. Past experiences and the memories thereof serve as a source that people selectively use to construct prospections (Seligman et al., 2013). Understanding prospection involved in corruption helps to better understand transformative processes of corruption and might offer a synthesis to understand the interplay of the past and the future. While acknowledging the importance of the historic circumstances such as colonialism (Ostrom et al., 1999), and own previous corrupt behavior, a prospective perspective rejects the notion that past behavior necessarily predicts future behavior. This interplay between past behavior and mental construction of the future can be best illustrated by looking at social norms and trust. As previously mentioned, on a societal level the perceived level of corruption can lead to the formation of “corruption norms” and undermine the level of trust. Previous experience with corruption and the distorted memories of these acts impacts the anticipations of citizens and can lead to a mental representation of 41
corruption being the “normal thing to do” (Olivier de Sardan, 2015). One famous example underlining the importance of mental representations based on past behavior is a cleverly designed study with UN diplomats in New York (Fisman & Miguel, 2007). The results show that the perceived level of corruption of the diplomat’s home country correlates with the diplomat’s parking violations. Since diplomats enjoyed legal immunity and did not face legal punishment, “culture” and “corruption norms” seem to explain corrupt behavior. Yet these mental representations are malleable. Twofold empirical support with regards to trust and norms exists. First, studies show that people migrating from low trust to high trust countries quickly adjust to the new level of societal trust (Dinesen, 2012; Van Lange, 2015). They themselves become more trusting because they adjust their expectations about the behavior of others by comparing it to novel observations (Seligman et al., 2013). Second, an experimental study conducted at a British university with students from various national backgrounds indicates that a) the level of perceived corruption from the home country does in fact influence corrupt behavior in a corruption game but importantly b) also show that the time the participants spent in the UK mitigates the influence of the homecountry’s corruption level (Barr & Serra, 2008). In other words, the longer participants from high corruption countries stayed in the UK, the less likely they were to engage in corruption in the game. This study provides empirical evidence that expectations about corruption are frequently updated and that past behavior does not automatically translate to future behavior. People seem to recognize the “rules of the game” and rapidly adjust to them. It shows that their mental representations are not merely the deterministic result of past behavior and acquired habits but allow room for learning new behavioral patterns.
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Corruption and Prospection: Future Issues Clearly, corruption dilemmas entail complex prospective dynamics, yet to varying degrees. Power holders anticipate the hedonic value of engaging in corruption for oneself and the collective. Besides the intricate prospective processes involved in all forms of corruption dilemmas, we have outlined how individual and interpersonal corruption dilemmas differ. We discussed five factors – prospection of cost-benefits, guilt, self-control, social norms and trust – that illustrate how corrupt decision-making differs for individual and interpersonal corruption dilemmas. This distinction between individual and interpersonal corruption dilemmas and the discussion of the respective psychological decision-making processes bring theoretical, empirical and societal benefits.
Value of new distinction and corrupt prospection We offer a social dilemma framework to conceptualize corrupt behavior, differentiate between different types of corrupt behavior, and to enable a closer look at the prospective decision-making processes. This way we hope to promote consensus among scholars about the definitional properties of different corrupt acts – especially when it comes to the distinction between individual and interpersonal corruption. Currently, some broad definitions include both individual and interpersonal corruption (Amundsen, 1999; Bardhan, 1997; Klitgaard, 1991; Lambsdorff, 1999; Nye, 1967; Transparency International, 2010) and others define corruption more narrowly, thus only interpersonally (Abbink, Irlenbusch, & Renner, 2002; Groenendijk, 1997; Heidenheimer, Johnson, & LeVine, 1989; Mény, 1996; Rabl & Kühlmann, 2008). More refined differentiations mark the first step to avoid referring to essentially different phenomena when using the term corruption (Jain, 2001) and enable a more thorough situation-based analysis of corruption, one in which the prospective cognitions involved in each form of corruption dilemma can be recognized. 43
The lack of distinction also profoundly influences the empirical study of corruption, which becomes especially apparent in the growing field of experimental corruption research. A multitude of corruption games have been developed (Serra & Wantchekon, 2012). These games operationalize corruption at times as an individual act (Abbink & Ellman, 2005; Azfar & Nelson, 2007; Barr, Lindelow, & Serneels, 2009) and at times as an interpersonal act (Abbink et al., 2002; Frank & Schulze, 2000; Lambsdorff & Frank, 2011; Mazar & Aggarwal, 2011; Weisel & Shalvi, 2015), yet without systematic differentiation between the two. Consequently, psychological decision-making dynamics in general and the prospective cognitions in particular involved in each form of corruption are hardly understood. In fact, contradicting empirical insights exists. A case in point is the link between communal orientation and corruption. On the one hand, empirical studies indicate that communally oriented power holders are less selfish and corrupt than exchange-oriented individuals (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001). On the other hand, a cross-national study finds a positive link between communal orientation and corruption (Mazar & Aggarwal, 2011). While the former seems to suggest that a communal orientation curbs corruption, the latter suggest the opposite. Closer examination can resolve this contradiction: communal orientation might positively correlate with interpersonal corruption due to a desire to maintain a positive future relationship with the corruption partner, while being negatively or not related to individual corruption (i.e. being more selfish). Streamlining the different corruption operationalizations along the basic distinction of individual and interpersonal corruption helps to avoid such empirical confusion and enables an integration of the psychological insights gained about the prospective processes involved in the respective form of corruption. Such conceptual integration also paves the way for analyses of corrupt acts on the aggregate level, such as meta-analyses.
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A refined distinction also brings about potential societal benefits as it enables the design of tailored anti-corruption measures. Recognizing the whereabouts of the corrupt behavior at hand determines the success of anti-corruption programs (Klitgaard, 1991). A better understanding of the prospective dynamics underlying corrupt behavior is needed to increase the chances of curbing corruption. Combating individual corruption requires different measures than interpersonal corruption because the prospective cognition involved in both forms of corruption differ. The description of prospective thinking involved in both forms of corruption offers several tentative recommendations. For example, fighting corruption by stimulating whistle-blowing has better chances when targeted at interpersonal corruption than at individual corruption, because the prospective threat of whistleblowing through corrupt partners is more imminent. Gaining a better theoretical understanding of corruption combined with empirical insights about the prospective psychology of corruption can potentially contribute to building better (public) institutions and reduce corruption. Our contribution is among the first ones to look at the prospective elements of corrupt decision-making. Besides outlining the importance of prospection for corrupt decisionmaking we hope to spur interest of researchers working on prospection to contribute to the corruption literature. Corruption represents an intricate behavior with complex prospective dynamics, of which many facets remain to be investigated empirically: How do power holders mentally represent the prospective threat of formal vs. social punishment in interpersonal corruption? How does the situation in which a corrupt dilemma occurs influence the prospections – for example, in a boardroom vs. on the golf course? How do corruption prospections differ depending on whether the power holder instigates or receives a corrupt offer? How can the expectations about the corrupt behavior of others be changed? And are there ways to increase the salience of the expected negative consequences for the victims of corruption? These are some of the many relevant questions that deserve attention. 45
Concluding Remarks Theoretical models revealing the psychology of corruption are scarce. A theoretical framework that helps to distinguish between different forms of corrupt behavior and to understand the prospective cognition of corruption lacks altogether. This void costs very dear, especially when considering the immense societal relevance of corruption, one example being the horrific consequences of the Haitian earthquake, and the importance of prospection to understand behavior. To fill that void, we advance an analysis of corruption based on the basic principles of social dilemmas, in that corruption entails the main features of common pool resource dilemmas with asymmetric power distribution. Corruption prospection thus rests on a trade-off between own short-term interest and long-term collective interest. We propose an essential distinction between individual and interpersonal corrupt acts: Unlike the individual corruption dilemma, interpersonal corruption dilemmas include a nested social dilemma as corrupt agents collaboratively abuse the entrusted power. This corrupt collaboration is what sets interpersonal corruption apart from individual corruption and increases the complexity of the anticipatory decision-making process involved. We discussed these differences along five of the most important psychological factors of corruption. Guilt reduces individual corruption, while it potentially increases interpersonal corruption. The effects of self-control depend on the long-term plan that the power holder has formed: It can help to abstain from corrupt temptations but also contribute to successful ongoing engagement in corruption. Besides these intrapersonal factors, especially interpersonal corruption dilemmas entail complex interpersonal dynamics too: We highlighted how social norms and trust serve as important prospective benchmarks. It is unrealistic to expect “one-size-fits-all” solutions to this massive problem but we suggest that advancing a theoretical distinction between individual and interpersonal corruption dilemmas and outlining the prospective cognition involved in each of them, marks a first step towards 46
coherence in the wealth of research findings. It should foster our theoretical understanding of corruption, promote specific research agendas, and eventually help reduce corruption in groups, organizations, and societies at large.
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Chapter 3
“Who doesn’t?” - The Impact of Descriptive Norms on Corruption
This chapter is based on Köbis, N. C., van Prooijen, J.-W., Righetti, F., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2015). “Who Doesn’t?”-The Impact of Descriptive Norms on Corruption. PloS One, 10(6), e0131830. http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.013183 49
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Imagine the following situation: you work as a CEO of a construction company, which competes for an enormous bridge building contract. The Ministry of Public Affairs allocates this contract to the company with the best tender. Yet, instead of going down the legal path and trying to out-compete the other companies, you discover another way to attain the contract: the responsible Minister has a soft spot for Paris and would love to go on a private vacation. You realize that using some of your company’s budget to invite the Minister to a vacation might be money well spent. Such an invitation will ensure you an advantage in the bridge building project while putting the other competitors in a disadvantaged position. Would you do it? This example portrays a form of corruption – defined in this context as “misuse of an organizational position or authority for personal or organizational (or sub-unit) gain, where misuse in turn refers to departures from accepted societal norms” (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2004). Corruption generally disrupts the functioning of groups, organizations, and societies (Rose-Ackerman, 2006). Empirical corruption research highlights various detrimental societal effects of corruption, including impaired state development (Mauro, 1995), degraded national wealth (Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, & Schankerman, 2000), and over-exploitation of natural resources (Bardhan, 1997; Ostrom, Burger, & Field, 1999b). Corruption has elicited considerable research from various fields (Andvig, Fjeldstad, Amundsen, Sissener, & Søreide, 2000). On the macro level multiple correlates of corruption have been identified, ranging from lack of transparency (Rose-Ackerman, 1997), over colonial history (Treisman, 2000), to extractive institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012) – to name a few (Lambsdorff, Taube, & Schramm, 2005; see for a more thorough overview, Rose-Ackerman, 2006; Rothstein, 2011a). So far, corruption research has devoted much less attention to psychological factors that help to explain why corruption is rampant in some contexts while being almost non-existent in
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other contexts (see for some meaningful exceptions, Darley, 2005; Dungan et al., 2014; LeeChai & Bargh, 2001; Mazar & Aggarwal, 2011). With regards to impactful psychological factors of corruption, political scientists (Rothstein, 2000) and economists (Lambsdorff & Frank, 2011) alike emphasize the importance of (perceived) social norms – the commonly held beliefs about the behavior of others (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). As we will outline, descriptive norms help corrupt agents to estimate the likelihood of success of corrupt deals and serve as a decision-making benchmark. Given this importance, we explored the impact of descriptive norms on the decision to engage in corruption using a behavioral measure of corruption in three empirical studies. In order to understand the way norms influence corrupt behavior we have to differentiate between two main types of norms: descriptive and injunctive norms. Descriptive norms convey information about how most people behave in a given situation. They describe the perceived frequency of a specific act. Injunctive norms convey information about the particular acts that most people approve or disapprove of – hence, whether this specific behavior is appropriate and/or ethical (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993). In the present contribution, we focus on the impact of descriptive norms on corrupt behavior for two main reasons. First, descriptive norms are subject to more inter-societal variance. That is, descriptive norms about corruption vary considerably within a given societal context (Kurer, 2005; Persson et al., 2012; Rothstein & Eek, 2009) – people hold diverging beliefs about the frequency of corruption (Lambsdorff et al., 2005). Yet, injunctive norms about corruption vary less strongly within the same societal context. People largely hold converging beliefs about corruption being generally unethical and wrong – even in contexts in which corruption is rampant (Karklins, 2005; Widmalm, 2008). This moral condemnation is also reflected in the law: corruption marks a crime according to most 52
national codes of law (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006) and international conventions (Olken & Pande, 2012). Second, injunctive norms are less malleable than descriptive norms (Rothstein, 2000). While the aforementioned views about corruption being wrong and inappropriate are relatively stable, the beliefs about the descriptive norms about corruption can be subject to change. Especially, in domains in which people do not have own experience with corruption, the beliefs about the frequency of corruption are malleable. In fact, changing descriptive norms is suggested as one of the most promising ways to fight corruption (Rothstein, 2000). In sum, descriptive norms about corruption might vary substantially across and within societies, and might be malleable. In some societal contexts corruption is perceived to be ubiquitous, in other contexts it is perceived to be almost non-existent (Bicchieri & Rovelli, 1995; for a game theoretic model of this distinction see Kosfeld, 1997). Groups, organizations and societies can rest in a high corruption equilibrium or a low corruption equilibrium depending on the frequency and the perceived frequency of corruption in this specific context. Importantly, such equilibria are not always stable (Bicchieri & Rovelli, 1995). In fact, a system can move from a state of high descriptive corruption norms to low descriptive corruption norms and vice versa (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). For such a change to occur, the belief about the frequency of corruption is theorized to crucially impact corrupt behavior (Bicchieri & Rovelli, 1995; Dong et al., 2012; Rothstein, 2000). Think for example of bribing a police officer after having violated a traffic rule. If you believe that this type of corruption is widespread, initiating a bribe payment – like slipping a note into your driver’s license – has a high prospect of success and might help you to avoid a hefty fine. In this context, the expected value of the police officer accepting the bribe outweighs the potential punishment. However, if you believe that this form of corruption hardly ever occurs, such a practice might get you into bigger trouble than you were in the first 53
place. In this second scenario, the potential punishment for attempting a bribe outweighs the expected value of bribe acceptance. In line with this example, it is frequently argued that the variance of corrupt behavior largely depends on whether people think others are corrupt as well and not on whether it is generally inacceptable or illegal (Ariely, 2012; Dong et al., 2012; Olivier De Sardan, 1999). Taken together, these arguments indicate that descriptive norms crucially influence corrupt behavior. Previous research has not yet tested this link experimentally, partly due to a lack of suitable methodology to assess corrupt behavior. Hence, besides making a novel contribution to corruption research by examining the impact of descriptive norms on corrupt behavior, the present study also introduces a novel corruption game. In this game, we place participants in the position of a CEO of a construction company and let them decide whether to bribe the official who allocates a bridge building contract (more details below). It resembles a frequently occurring corruption situation in the real world yet one about which the vast majority of the participants should have no first-hand experience. Hence, behavior will be more strongly impacted by perceived descriptive norms and less based on the participants’ own experience. By embedding these bribe transactions in an economic game framework, we mask the corrupt act as invitations of a public official to different events that bring about business advantages. So instead of being explicitly asked to pay a bribe or bluntly paying money to the official, participants can engage in more subtle types of bribery. Masking corruption in that way helps to increase the variance of corrupt behavior in the game as it reduces the impact of social desirability (i.e. people not engaging in corruption because it is socially unacceptable). However, this behavior was nonetheless perceived as ‘corrupt’ as participants across all three studies perceived the invitations of the public official as significantly more corrupt than not inviting the public official (all ps < .016). 54
In this work, we set out to test whether descriptive norms – the belief about the frequency of corruption in a given context – predict corrupt behavior. Using the novel corruption game, we conducted three studies. First, we tested with two correlational studies whether the perceived descriptive norms before (Study 3.1) and after (Study 3.2) the corruption game correlate with corrupt behavior in the game. Second, in order to test the causal relationship, we set up an experiment in which information about descriptive norms was manipulated to tests its impact on the subsequent corrupt behavior (Study 3.3).
Study 3.1
Materials and Method In the first study, we investigated whether perceived descriptive norms of corruption correlate with corrupt behavior. For that purpose, we assessed the perceived frequency of this specific corrupt behavior with one item prior to the corruption game (described in more detail below). Participants. Students from the VU University Amsterdam (N = 66, Mage = 26.79, SDage = 15.49; 51.5% = female) took part in the study in exchange for course credit or money (2€). Participants first answered several items assessing the perceived norms about work place related behavior – one item assessing the specific corrupt practice modeled in the ensuing corruption game. Ethics statement. All studies reported in this contribution utilize the same basic experimental setup. Our faculty’s ethical review board (VCWE) approved of this experimental setup. In all the studies reported in this chapter, prior to completing any scales, participants signed a written informed consent form. Upon completion of the study, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. In all reported studies, prior to 55
debriefing we assessed age, gender and education level of the participants. These demographic factors had no statistical significant effects on the corrupt decision in any of the reported studies (all ps > .122). A Priori Norms. The Work Place Norm scale (Jones, 1991) assesses work related behavior with 5 items (α = .724; e.g. “Copy a company owned software for your own use”). Participants indicated the perceived frequency of the described behavior on a 100-point slider answer scale ranging from ‘0’ (= nobody does it) to ‘100’ (= everybody does it). Higher scores reflect a higher perceived frequency of the respective behavior. Since none of the existing items assessed the specific corrupt behavior in the game and due to the context specificity of corruption (Andvig et al., 2000), we formulated one new item to assess the norms specifically related to the corrupt behavior in the corruption game. This item states “Invite a public official for a private vacation on the company’s expenses to ensure business advantages”. Corruption Game. The corruption game entails three players. In an auction fashion, two players compete for a total prize of 120 credits. The third player administers the prize to the highest bidder (see Figure 3.1). Each round both competing players receive a budget of 50 credits to make bids. The competing players can choose from an array of options, which range from not bidding at all (0 credits) to bidding their entire budget for the round (50 credits). The competing players keep the credits that they do not allocate in a bid. While the highest bidder wins the total prize, in case of both players offering the same bid, the prize is split equally between the two. The bidding process lasts for five rounds.
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Figure 3.1. Triadic structure of the corruption game in which participants take the role of the potentially corrupt player. The payoff matrix (see Table 3.1) depicts all possible outcomes of this bidding process. Allocating 50 credits in the bid is the dominant strategy of this bidding process – this option results in a strict Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950). Put differently, for each player bidding 50 credits yields the best outcomes independent of the choice of the other player. We include a corrupt option for one player in this fair bidding structure. Our approach resembles the triadic structure typical for many corrupt transactions in procurement situations: two (or more) competing players – one potentially corrupt player and one fair player (i.e. a potential victim of corruption) – and a third player who resembles an official allocating the price to the highest bidder. We place all participants throughout all the experiments presented here only in the role of the potentially corrupt player.
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Table 3.1. Outcome matrix of the fair bidding game. Player 2 50 40 30 20 10 0 50 60 60 120 10 120 20 120 30 120 40 120 50 40 10 120 70 70 130 20 130 30 130 40 130 50 Player 1 30 20 120 20 130 80 80 140 30 140 40 140 50 20 30 120 30 130 30 140 90 90 150 40 150 50 10 40 120 40 130 40 140 40 150 100 100 160 50 0 50 120 50 130 50 140 50 150 50 160 50 50 Note. The matrix illustrates the outcomes for each player before the corrupt option is introduced to the game. The range of bidding options for each player are in italics. The outcomes for player 1 are shaded in grey. The dominant strategy for both players is allocating 50 credits.
The participants can offer a bribe to the official in order to circumvent splitting the price with the other competing player and thus ‘breaking’ the equilibrium into their favor. The game is set up so that the other player does not have the chance to bribe the Minister. As participants were informed each round which player won the tender, they could infer whether the other player outbid them or not. We note that theoretically, both competing players can be corrupt, yet for the sake of reducing complexity in the first implementation of the corruption game, we only introduced a corrupt option for the participant. To translate this basic structure to a real-life scenario, we ask participants to take the role of a CEO of a construction company. In this game, the Ministry of Public Affairs advertises a big bridge building contract. Two companies are competing for this job by making bids over five rounds from the company’s budget (400.000 game-dollars). The best tender, i.e. the highest bid wins the entire bridge building contract (worth 120.000 $ each round). Equal bids lead to a split of the contract (60.000$ each). To ensure that participants understand the bidding structure of the game, we illustrate the structure with several examples and ask five test questions. When answering a question wrongly, participants had a second chance to answer the question correctly (across all three studies, participants answered more than 72% of the questions correctly on the first trial). 58
The participants then face the decision whether or not to bribe the Minister. This criterion variable of corruption consisted of two levels in order to model a step-wise engagement in corruption (for an illustration of this decision structure see the game-tree in Figure 3.2). In a first instance, participants decide whether to invite the Minister to a company banquet, which ensures a bidding advantage in 50% of the equal biddings. This process is common in business transactions yet could be considered corruption as it ensures private benefits to the Minister and leads to a bidding advantage for the player (Heidenheimer et al., 1989). Due to its common practice and legality (e.g. lobbyist practices), we refer to this choice as ‘ambiguous corruption’ in this chapter.
Figure 3.2. Game tree of the corruption game used in Study 1 in which participants make step-wise decision about whether to invite the Minister or not. 59
For those who invite the Minister to the banquet a second invitation opportunity emerges which consists of an invitation of the Minister to a private vacation from the company’s budget. This invitation ensures advantages in 100% of the equal biddings. This second decision reflects a more severe and unequivocal act of corruption as the company’s budget is used to ensure private benefits for the Minister in return for full advantages in the allocation of the bridge building project. Due to its illegal character, we label this choice ‘severe corruption’. Results The primary goal of the present study was to test the theorized positive link between perceived frequency and actual engagement in a specific corrupt behavior (see Table 3.2 for an overview of the frequency of corruption). For that purpose, we conducted two binary logistic regressions. In the first regression, we used the a priori corruption item as a predictor and the decision to invite the Minister to the banquet (no invitation vs. invitation) as a dependent variable. Results reveal that the perceived frequency of the corrupt act significantly influences the decision to invite the Minister to the banquet (B = 0.77, Wald = 5.08, Exp(B) = 1.86, p = .024). An increase in the perceived frequency of corruption of one standard deviation increased the odds of inviting the minister to the banquet by a factor of 1.86.
Table 3.2. Overview of the participants’ decisions in Study 1. Did participants invite the Minister? Yes
No
First decision (invitation to banquet)
42
24
Second decision (invitation to vacation)
22
20
Note. The table illustrates the number of participants choosing to invite or abstain from invitation in both occasions. Note that only participants who invited the Minister to the banquet faced the second decision of whether to invite the Minister to the vacation 60
In the second binary logistic regression, we used the same predictor and used the decision to the vacation as a dependent variable (no invitation at all vs. invitation to vacation). Again, we find a significant effect (B = 0.64, Wald = 3.85, Exp(B) = 1.89, p < .05). An increase in the perceived frequency of corruption of one standard deviation increased odds of inviting the minister to the vacation by a factor of 1.89. For both types of corruption, the more frequent the participants perceived corruption to be, the more likely they engaged in it. Importantly, the work place norm scale did not significantly predict any of the dependent variables (all ps >.236).
Discussion The results confirm our hypothesis and show that the perceived norms about a specific corrupt behavior are associated with corrupt behavior. If participants perceived that inviting a Minister to a private vacation from company’s budget to obtain business advantages is relatively common, then they were also more likely to engage in this form of corruption themselves. Additionally, these perceived norms also predicted the likelihood of engaging in less severe and more ambiguous forms of corruption – inviting the Minister to the banquet. This is likely due to the strong similarity between the two types of invitations. The fact that only the corruption specific item – and not the entire work place norm scale – predicts corrupt behavior again underlines the context specificity of corruption. To acknowledge an alternative explanation for the results, the possibility exists that answering the question about beliefs might have increased the salience of norms (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009). Participants might have acted more in accordance to their reported norms than they would have done otherwise. To exclude this possibility, we conducted a second study. This time we assessed perceived norms after the corruption game so that the assessment of corruption norms does not affect the decision to engage in corrupt behavior. 61
Study 3.2 Materials and Method In the second study, we also simplified the corruption game by removing the twostepped structure of the dependent variable. We used such a step-wise structure of corruption to model many real-life occurrences of corruption that follow a slippery slope process (Darley, 2005). Consequently, only those participants who engaged in ambiguous corruption faced the decision whether or not to engage in more severe corruption. This decision structure excluded a considerable proportion of the sample from making the second corruption decision. In order to distil the interpretability of the findings and to show the relationship between perceived norms and more severe forms corruption more clearly, we excluded the ambiguous corruption option. Participants therefore directly faced the choice whether they wanted to invite the Minister to the private vacation (i.e., more severe corruption) yielding advantages in 100% of the bidding rounds (see Figure 3.3 for a game tree of the simplified corruption game). Participants and Protocol. Students from the VU University Amsterdam (N = 119, Mage = 21.57, SDage = 2.80, 63% = female) participated for course credit or money (2€). Participants first played the simplified corruption game and afterwards indicated their perceived descriptive norms. Apart from the simplification of the dependent variables, the game was administered in the identical way as in Study 3.1.
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Figure 3.3. Game tree of the simplified corruption game in which the participants directly face the decision whether to invite the Minister to the vacation.
Post hoc norms. After completion of the corruption game all participants answered one question which assessed the perceived frequency of the invitation to the vacation (i.e. ‘How many people do you think chose to invite the minister to the vacation’) to which answers are given on a 6-point scale ranging from ‘1’ (= nobody) to ‘6’ (= everybody). In between those end points of the scale participants could choose four percentiles of frequency (1-25%; 2650%; 51-75%; 75-99%). We also manipulated public awareness with three conditions. The participants were either in a cubicle that had a webcam switched on, a webcam switched off or no webcam at all. This manipulation had no effect on any of the reported results.
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Results In Study 3.2, we tested whether descriptive norms (measured after the corruption game) were associated with corrupt behavior. We calculated a binary logistic regression with the perceived norms as a predictor and the corrupt decision (i.e. invitation to vacation) as the dependent variable. We found a significant effect (B = 1.42, Wald = 26.72, Exp(B) = 4.162, p < .001). An increase of the perceived corruption norms by one standard deviation increased the odds of inviting the Minister to the vacation by a factor of 4.16. Given the importance of priming effects (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999) we also checked whether filling in the WPN scale in Study 1 triggered unethical behavior. We tested whether the level of corruption was higher in Study 3.1 compared to Study 3.2, in which participants did not fill in the WPN scale prior to the corruption game. We find no difference between the invitation to the vacation (χ² =.119, p =.730), nor when comparing ambiguous corruption in Study 1 with severe corruption in Study 2, hence the first choices in both studies, (χ² = 1.16, p = .28).
Discussion The results again show a strong link between corrupt behavior and the descriptive norms about this form of corruption. In Study 3.2, participants were asked for their norms perception after they played the corruption game. It is possible that participants changed their norms perception according to their behavior in the game (i.e. norms serving as a rationalization). Taken together with Study 3.1, in which norms were assessed before the corruption game, we find strong support for the close link between descriptive norms and corrupt behavior in the game. The more frequent participants perceived the corrupt behavior to be, the more likely they were to behave corruptly in the corruption game themselves.
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Study 3.3 One way to interpret the obtained post hoc norm differences in Study 3.2 are rationalization strategies. People might rationalize and justify corrupt behavior by indicating that it is ‘a common thing to do’. Previous research investigating unethical behavior supports this notion (Ariely, 2012; Mazar et al., 2008b) by showing that people cheat and lie more if they have excuses or explanations at hand. Descriptive norms might function as such an excuse (Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1997) and a normalization process of corruption might come into motion (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). That is, people might adjust their own perceived norms to their own behavior. We argue that besides functioning as a rationalization of corrupt behavior, descriptive norms also provide an a priori benchmark for corrupt behavior. In order to investigate this assumption and to provide causal evidence, we set up a third study in which we tested whether a manipulation of descriptive norms can influence corrupt behavior. Previous research indicates that small morality related primes can reduce unethical behavior such as cheating (Bryan, Adams, & Monin, 2012; Mazar et al., 2008b). Using descriptive norms related primes has been shown to impact a wide array of behavior ranging from an increase in tax compliance (Wenzel, 2004) to enhanced energy saving behavior (Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). However, an empirical test of the impact of descriptive norm primes on corruption is lacking. To investigate the causal link from perceived norms to corrupt behavior we set up an experiment in which we manipulated descriptive norms by presenting short primes to participants prior to the corruption decision.
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Materials and Method We used the same simplified study design as in Study 3.2. Additionally, we reduced the rounds of bidding from five to one in order to reduce the complexity of utility calculation for the participants. Previously the participants had to anticipate the advantage of corruption for five rounds of bidding, now they merely had to anticipate the advantage of corruption for one round of bidding. In economic terms, the benefit of corruption remained the same yet the calculation of the benefits of corruption was easier for the participants. Participants and Protocol. We conducted an online study (N = 259; Mage = 35.65; SDage = 11.54; 42.1% = female) in English via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants needed to reside in the United States, and have more than 5000 approved HIT with an approval rate of at least 98%. Participants were reimbursed with 1$ for their participation. Participants first read the instructions to the corruption game. Before making the decision about whether or not to invite the Minister to the vacation, they received one of three norm statements. In the anticorruption norms condition, we presented the participants with a prompt stating ‘Almost nobody invites the Minister’. In the pro-norm condition the prompt read ‘Almost everybody invites the Minister’. In the control condition, participant received no such prompt. After completion of the corruption game, we again assessed the perceived descriptive norms with the same question as in Study 3.2. In addition to that, half of the participants received a time pressure prompt, which did not affect the reported results.
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Results Measurement of perceived descriptive norms. In order to check whether the norm manipulation did indeed influence the perceived norms of corruption, we conducted an ANOVA with the norm manipulation (three levels) as a predictor and the perceived norms item (assessed after the game) as the dependent variable. The results reveal significant differences in perceived norms between all three groups (R² = .34, F (2,257) = 70.91, p < .001). Participants in the in the anti-corruption norms condition perceived corruption to be least common (M = 2.57, SD = 1.33), compared to participants in the control condition (M = 4.03, SD = 1.25) who in turn perceived corruption to be less common than participants in the pro-norm condition did (M = 4.74, SD = 1.06). All post-hoc group-wise comparisons are significant (all ps < .002; Bonferroni corrected). Hypotheses testing. First off, in comparison to the other two studies, we find that the overall corruption level was higher in the online study compared to the previous two lab studies (χ² = 9.37, p = .009), most likely to due to the increased anonymity of the internet. We then tested whether the manipulation of norms significantly affected the decision to engage in corruption by calculating logistic regression analyses with the norm manipulation as a predictor variable and the decision to engage in corruption as a dependent variable. In this third study, participants in the anti-corruption norms condition were significantly less likely to engage in corruption than participants in the control condition (B = 0.83, Wald = 6.43, p = .011, Exp(B) = 2.30). The odds of engaging in corruption were 2.3 times lower in the anticorruption norm condition than in the control condition. In addition, we find a significant effect between the anti-corruption norms condition and in the pro-corruption norms condition (B = 0.79, Wald = 5.87, p = .015, Exp(B) = 2.30). The odds of engaging in corruption were 2.3 times higher in the pro-corruption norms condition compared to the anti-corruption norms condition. No significant difference between the 67
control and pro-norm condition existed (p = .89). Hence, the anti-corruption norm prime significantly reduced the level of corrupt behavior in the game compared to the control and the pro-corruption norm condition. We additionally tested whether perceived norms mediate the effects of manipulated norms. Two mediation analysis using bootstrap analyses for the two significant effects (anti vs. control; anti vs. pro norms) indicate full mediation in both cases (anti vs. control: CI95% [-1.83; -0.73]; anti vs. pro norms: CI95% [-2.59; -1.2]).
Discussion The results of the third study illustrate that descriptive norm prompts can influence subsequent levels of corrupt behavior. When participants received a short prompt indicating a low frequency of corrupt behavior the level of corruption decreased drastically in comparison to the control and pro-corruption norms condition. Interestingly, the results suggested no difference in corrupt behavior between the pro-corruption norm condition and the control condition, which indicates that the respective corrupt behavior was generally perceived to be common.
General Discussion The impact of descriptive norms on corrupt behavior has been frequently theorized but – as far as we know – never experimentally tested (Bicchieri & Rovelli, 1995; Rothstein, 2000). The present set of studies provides first empirical support for the assumed link. Perceived descriptive norms were associated with the subsequent corrupt behavior (Study 3.1). In order to rule out that increased salience of norms caused this effect, we showed that the perceived norm differences also exist when assessing norms after the behavioral measure of corruption (Study 3.2). Finally, short statements containing descriptive norm information 68
successfully influenced the likelihood of making corrupt decisions. Specifically, information that indicates a low frequency of corrupt behavior (anti-corruption norms) reduced the level of the ensuing corrupt behavior (Study 3.3). Anti-corruption norms likely drove the effect because the perceived frequency of corruption in the sample was relatively high. People rely on descriptive norms as a guideline to make corrupt decisions, especially in situations in which they have little or no own experience (Cialdini et al., 1990; Hogg, Hohman, & Rivera, 2008). We put participants in such a novel and uncertain situation in which descriptive norms are primarily based on beliefs and not on own experience. The fact that participants heavily relied on norms indicates that people who encounter such novel situations might be especially prone to rely on descriptive norms as decision benchmarks. Think of newcomers in organizations who do not have their own experiences about the business practices: if these newcomers apprehend that corruption is not commonplace they likely abstain from it as well. Our results sketch a new tentative path how norm related reminders might shape low corruption norms. Small reminders and prompts could potentially provide a ‘nudge’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) to reduce corruption – especially in contexts in which people do not have first-hand experience and/or falsely believe that a high proportion engages in corruption. From a methodological perspective, the corruption game provides a novel experimental tool that allows researchers to look at the psychological aspects involved in corruption. Furthermore, it allows testing corrupt decisions in a context in which participants have little own first-hand experience, even though it represents a typical corruption dilemma. By masking corruption in a bidding game, it allows to empirically study corruption while avoiding social desirability effects. Using the novel corruption game, we provide a first illustration of the link between perceived descriptive norms and corruption.
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It is noteworthy that neither monetary incentives nor punishment existed in the three studies presented in this manuscript. Considerations regarding material outcomes, or costbenefits calculations unlikely account for the present findings. Contrary to most corruption research in which reward and punishment play vital roles, we opted for this design as it enabled us to identify descriptive norms as a prime candidate for uncovering the complexity of corruption in an isolated environment. Indeed, one important issue for future research lies in the examination of how normative influences work across a variety of contexts, including those where incentives, and punishment, are bound to affect corruption. Future research could also look at whether descriptive norms influence the perceived punishment of corruption. Further, does the perceived frequency of corruption increase when the potential gain is high? While the link between frequency of punishment and descriptive norms might seem plausible, how is the relationship between severity of punishment and descriptive norms? This question is especially interesting in moral gray areas like in the ambiguous corruption presented in Study 3.1. In Study 3.3, we show that norms are subject to external influences as short prompts successfully influenced perceived descriptive norms. On a positive note, we found that especially anti-corruption norm prompts effectively reduce the level of subsequent corrupt behavior. Since we used a rather explicit manipulation of norms in Study 3.3, using more implicit manipulations is another interesting avenue for corruption research, especially given that many forms of abuse of power happen without conscious awareness of it (Lee-Chai & Bargh, 2001). The present set of studies shows that the belief about the frequency of corruption influences the likelihood of engaging in corruption. The fact that we asked participants to imagine a situation of corruption rather than actually placing them in a potentially corrupt situation limits the generalizability of the findings. Yet given the illegal character of 70
corruption, studying corruption in its real-life context poses a major challenge for corruption research. Corruption games, such as the one presented here provide a way to study corruption experimentally. Future studies could increase the generalizability of the obtained results by additionally including economic factors such as rewards and punishment, testing the impact of descriptive norms on other forms of corrupt behavior (Dungan et al., 2014) and using more diverse samples (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Additional studies could also explore how corruption norms are shaped. For example, how does news coverage of corruption in the media impact corrupt behavior? Previous research suggests that media coverage thoroughly impacts descriptive norms which in turn lead to imitation of highly publicized behavior (Cialdini, 2006; Phillips, 1974). Whether a similar ‘copycat’ corrupt behavior follows highly publicized cases of corruption (e.g. the Madoff case), could be a fascinating topic for future research. Conclusion We provide first empirical support for the importance of the more subtle psychological factors of perceived descriptive norms on corrupt behavior. Perceiving that corruption is widespread crucially influences the decision to engage in corrupt behavior – a perception that can be influenced with small norm prompts. Due to the importance of descriptive norms for daily decisions, Elster referred to social norms as the ‘cement of the society’ (Elster, 1989). In highly corrupt social contexts the ‘cement of social norms’ stabilizes corruption while in low corruption context it does the opposite: enabling non-corruption to be the ‘normal thing to do’. To come back to the initial example, the current set of studies suggest that your answer to the question whether you would invite the Minister depends on your beliefs about this corrupt behavior of others. Believing that nobody invites the Minister lowers the chances of acting corruptly while perceiving that such an invitation reflects a common business practice increases the chances of you doing likewise, thinking: “I invite the Minister, who doesn’t?” 71
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Chapter 4
The Look Over Your Shoulder: Corruption and Cheating Decreases in the Presence of Another Person
This chapter is based on Köbis, N. C., van Prooijen, J.-W., Righetti, F., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (forthcoming). The Look over your shoulder: Corruption and cheating decreases in the presence of another person. Manuscript under review at European Journal of Social Psychology.
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“No one believes justice to be a good when it is kept private, since, wherever either person thinks he can do injustice with impunity, he does it.” - Plato, The Republic 360c(1998)
Remember when you were a child and faced a tempting situation, like stealing a piece of candy that you were not allowed to eat. Picture it lying on the shelf, within reach! What was the first thing you did when deciding whether to take it or not? You likely looked over your shoulder to inspect the social environment for cues of other people being present. Seeing another person that is equipped with the authority to punish your misbehaviour – like a parent – probably greatly reduced the chances of you taking the candy. Yet, what if the other person has no such means to sanction but is simply present? To find an answer to this question we turn to behavioural ethics, the branch of experimental research on human behaviour in ethical dilemmas – situations in which behaving ethically clashes with immanent self-interest (Eisenberger & Masterson, 1983; Gino et al., 2011; Shalvi et al., 2016). Thanks to recent methodological advances, thousands of participants around the world have been placed in such trade-off situations to find out when and how people break ethical (and legal) rules (Ariely, 2012). One of the main conclusions stemming from extensive research is that many people cheat but only to the extent that they can justify it – to themselves but also to others (Shalvi, Gino, Barkan, & Ayal, 2015). Although these studies underline the importance of “others”, the overwhelming majority have studied individuals in isolation and if any, only used non-human cues of observation such as cameras or watching eyes (Cai, Huang, Wu, & Kou, 2015). To fill that gap, we conducted two experiments to explore three main questions: First and most basically, do people act more honestly in the actual presence of another person? The second question targets the relationship towards that other: does unethical behaviour increase 75
or decrease when a friend versus a stranger is watching you? Third, we study the effect of different payoff-structures for that other person: are participants more willing to break ethical rules if others co-benefit from it? Put differently, if the other person is not a mere observer but a potential “partner in crime”, does the level of unethical behaviour increase? In the following sections, we outline the theoretical underpinnings for these research questions and derive specific hypotheses.
How others impact (unethical) behaviour Let us briefly go back to the initial example: one main explanation why a child might forgo the opportunity to take the candy when somebody is around lies in the other person’s ability to sanction and punish. More authority and means to sanction have a larger deterrent effect on unethical behaviour (Becker, 1968). Hence, in the most extreme case, the other person discourages unethical behaviour directly through social control (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). With a threat of punishment lurking in the back of the mind, the likelihood of violating an ethical norm drops significantly. For example, a parent in visible sight likely deters the tempted child to take the candy in fear of being scolded. This direct deterrent influence of potential punishment by others has been theoretically outlined (Treviño, 1986) and empirically illustrated: for example, people cheat less frequently if their behaviour is traceable and punishable by others (Mazar et al., 2008b), like a supervisor (Pascual-Ezama, Prelec, & Dunfield, 2013). Hence, in the presence of others, who might (formally) sanction a wrongdoer, ethical misconduct decreases. Would the presence of another person who has neither the means nor the authority to punish suffice to activate psychological mechanisms that curb unethical behaviour? One reason why it indeed might be enough for another person to simply “be there” lies in the immense importance that people generally ascribe to what others think of them (i.e. their 76
reputation). People usually want to appear in a favourable light towards others (Goffman, 1959) and abide to the respective social norms (Reno et al., 1993). Evolutionarily, this mutual monitoring of behaviour in a group has assured cooperation in societies, especially when controlling institutions, are not available or unable to be effective (Alexander, 1987; D’Arms, 2000; Haidt, 2007). Empirical findings show that reputational concerns can propel cooperation (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Van Vugt, Roberts & Hardy, 2007) and enforce social and moral norms (Haidt, 2003; McElreath & Boyd, 2008; Wu, Balliet, & Van Lange, 2016). They also impact unethical behaviour: people cheat less when they stand to lose their reputation (Ayal & Gino, 2011; Gino, Gu, & Zhong, 2009) and conversely show a heightened willingness to engage in corruption when others do so as well (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009; Köbis et al., 2015). The concern for one’s reputation and the salience of social norms increase when people’s public self-awareness is activated – that is, when they feel observed by others (Batson et al., 1999; Wicklund, 1975). Previous lab research has triggered public self-awareness in multiple ways. Some studies have used moral reminders like prompts stating “Don’t be a cheater” (Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011), while others have asked for personal identification of the participants to make them more aware of their identity (Diener, Fraser, Beaman, & Kelem, 1976). More recently, studies have investigated whether the mere image of eyes suffices to illicit such norm adherence. Although some studies suggested that cues of watching eyes can reduce selfish behaviour (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Manesi, Van Lange, & Pollet, 2016; Nettle et al., 2013), research looking specifically at unethical behaviour shows no attenuating effect of such artificial social cues (Cai et al., 2015). Hence, much of the previous research has made assumptions about these social factors of unethical behaviour without studying the actual presence of another person. Conversely, whereas the presence of others has been extensively investigated in the context of 77
performance – e.g. social facilitation (Guerin, 1993) – it has not been investigated in the context of morality, ethics, and cheating. Yet, in everyday life situations that allow the crossing of moral boundaries we frequently are observed by others who are unlikely to punish us (think for example of free-riding in public transport). How does this influence our ethical behaviour? We put this assertion to the test and studied whether the presence of another person suffices to curb unethical behaviour. Although no formal means of regulation exist, we argue that the importance of appearing moral towards others will lead to lower levels of unethical behaviour. Hence our first hypothesis states: H1: People engage in more unethical behaviour when being alone compared to when another person is present.
Study 4.1 Besides testing whether the presence of another person influences unethical behaviour we also sought to examine whether the quality of the relationship with that other person matters for the decision to breach ethical norms. Extending previous research (Kroher & Wolbring, 2015), we manipulated the degree of proximity between the participant and the passive observer – either being a stranger like in previous research or a close friend. If we find that people are more likely to cheat in the presence of a close friend compared to a stranger it would indicate that being in the presence of a close other leads to more disinhibition (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1982), and thus more unethical behaviour. However, if participants are more willing to engage in corruption in the presence of a stranger, it would indicate that people could feel more pressure to uphold a positive image towards someone they actually know. This would confirm previous work that shows that people care more about their reputation toward in-group members than strangers (Balliet et al., 2014). Acting unethically in
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the presence of a close other than a stranger poses a bigger potential reputational threat. Hence, we formulate two competing hypotheses: H2a: People in the presence of a close other engage in more unethical behaviour than people in the presence of an unknown other. H2b: People in the presence of a close other engage in less unethical behaviour than people in the presence of an unknown other. In Study 4.1, we examined corruption as a form of unethical behaviour and tested whether people are less likely to engage in corruption if another person is present in the cubicle. We further examined whether close others have a stronger corruption-curbing effect than strangers.
Method Participants and design. In total, 96 participants (Mage = 22.60, SDage = 2.55; 64.1% = female) took part in the study conducted in a psychology laboratory in the Netherlands. Demographic information for seven participants was not recorded and coded as missing. Participants either received course credit or money (€2) as a compensation for participation. Our faculty’s ethical review board (VCWE) approved all studies reported in this manuscript. Thus, in both studies, prior to completing any scales, participants signed a written informed consent form and upon completion of the study, were debriefed and thanked for their participation. Procedure. After giving informed consent, participants first answered several questions unrelated to the purpose of this study and then played the corruption game in one of three experimental conditions (outlined in more detail below). Study 4.1 manipulated the presence of another person with three conditions in the following way. First, in the Alone condition (n = 31) participants played the corruption game while being alone in a research cubicle. Second, 79
in the Close Other condition (n = 35), participants were instructed to bring a close same-sex friend with them to the lab. Together with that friend, participants were placed in the cubicle and played the corruption game. Third, in the Stranger condition (n = 30), participants were randomly paired with another participant, who they did not know prior to the experiment. Instructions on the computer screen explained the upcoming task. The data was collected within a two-week data collection window in which we aimed for the maximum cell size possible.
Measures Corruption Game. In order to assess corrupt behaviour, we used a recently developed corruption game (Köbis et al., 2015; Köbis, van Prooijen, et al., 2017). The basic structure of the game is a three-player normal form auction game in which two competing players are bidding for a total good (g) of credits administered by the third player (see Figure 3.1). Each round both bidding players are endowed with the same budget (b). From this budget (b) both players make competing bids (k) in an auction fashion for the good (g). The action space for each player is restricted to six options ranging from bidding nothing (k = 0) to allocating everything (k = b). Credits not allocated in a bid are kept by the player. Hence, the credit after bidding a is b-k. The single highest bid (b1 vs. b2) wins the good (g). If both players offer the same bid, the good is split equally between the two, hence if b1 = b2 g/2 for both players. All possible outcomes of this bidding process are shown in a payoff matrix (see Table 3.1). As can be seen in the pay-off matrix, bidding the maximum of k = b is the dominant strategy of the game, constituting the strict Nash equilibrium. That means, that for both players allocating their entire endowment in the bidding yields the best payoff independent on the bid of the other player.
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To transform the fair auction into a model of corruption we include asymmetry among the players. Namely, an extra endowment of (e) is given to one of the players, who therefore becomes the potentially corrupt player (PCP). This player can in turn use this money to directly transfer it to the Institution Player to circumvent the even splitting of the good with the other bidding player who does not have this option (= the Fair Player). The Potentially Corrupt Player can thus decide to initiate a corrupt transaction with the Institution Player resulting in negative externalities for the Fair Player. The participant took the role of the Potentially Corrupt Player and the Fair Player was simulated by a computer program to act strictly rational to reduce complexity. We addressed social desirability concerns and increased comprehensibility by translating the basic structure of the game into a real-life economic framework, for more details see (Köbis et al., 2015). We set up two test questions using example cases to ensure that participants sufficiently understood the rules of the game. Giving a wrong answer to the test questions resulted in the display of an explanation. The vast majority of the participants (> 88.0%) answered both questions correctly – independent of the condition they were in (p =.60). After making sure that participants understood the logic of the game, they faced the decision whether to bribe the Institution Player and thus to gain an advantage over the Fair Player in the game. The only difference between the conditions was whether they made that decision (a) alone in the cubicle, (b) in the presence of a stranger or (c) in the presence of a well-known friend. Demographics. After the game, we assessed standard demographics of age and gender.
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Results In the first step of the analysis, we tested whether the level of corruption differed between the Alone and both “presence of another person” conditions. We conducted a binary logistic regression analysis with a dichotomous dummy variable (Alone = 0 vs. presence of another person = 1) as a predictor and the dichotomous decision whether to bribe a public official in the corruption game as a dependent variable. The analysis revealed significant group differences (B = 1.28, Wald = 4.80, p = .028, Exp(B) = 3.25), indicating that the odds of bribing were 3.25 times higher when the participants faced this decision alone compared to when another person was with them in the cubicle. This result confirms the first hypothesis. We then tested the second hypothesis whether the degree of closeness of the other person had an additional effect on the level of bribery by conducting another binary logistic regression analysis, this time with the three-stepped independent variable (Alone vs. Close Other vs. Stranger) as a predictor. The analysis revealed a significant group difference between the Alone and Close Other Condition (B = 1.24, Wald = 4.32, p = .038, Exp(B) = 3.46; see Table 4.2). The odds of bribery were 3.46 times higher in the Alone condition compared to the Close Other condition. We also find a marginally significant difference between the Alone and the Stranger condition (B = 1.10, Wald = 3.12, p = .075, Exp(B) = 3.01), indicating that the odds of bribery were 3.01 times higher when participants were alone than when an unknown other was present in the cubicle. Interestingly, the binary logistic regression reveals no differences between the two “presence of another person” conditions (Exp(B) = 1.15, p = .78). Hence, we find no support for Hypothesis 2a or 2b.
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Table 4.2. Overview of the bribery decisions across the three treatments in Study 4.1. Decision No Bribery
Bribery
N
%
N
%
Alone Condition
5
16.1
26
83.9
Close Other Condition
14
40.0
21
60.0
Stranger Condition
11
36.7
19
63.3
Discussion Our results suggest that participants were more likely to engage in bribery when being alone compared to when another person was with them in the cubicle. The presence of another person reduced the frequency of bribes even though that other person had no (formal) means of sanctioning the behaviour of the participant. Interestingly, we do not find group differences between close others and strangers. This finding suggests that the presence of another person reduces bribe levels in the game independent on the relationship to the other person. Study 4.2 In Study 4.1 the other person had no stake in the game. Would the results change if the other person stands to gain from the unethical behaviour? Such local social utility has been shown to increase cheating levels (Shalvi et al., 2016; Weisel & Shalvi, 2015), while reducing both experienced guilt (Gino et al., 2013) and perceived unethicality of cheating (Wiltermuth, 2011). We therefore hypothesized the following: H3: Cheating levels are higher when the other person stands to gain from cheating compared to when the other person does not stand to gain from cheating.
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We also improved the methodology. First, to test whether the obtained “presence of another person” effect generalizes from bribery to cheating, we used the well-established die rolling paradigm in which the participants roll a die in private and report the outcome to the experimenter (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Shalvi et al., 2012). If participants reported to have rolled a six, they received €1.5. We also used a confederate to take the role of the other person in the cubicle. This procedure allowed to reduce unexplained variance due to interpersonal dynamics in the lab. For example, by giving the confederate a behavioural script that prevented any communication with the participants, we can rule out that communication between participant and observer influenced the obtained results. The third main difference to Study 4.1 lies in the payoff structure. We manipulated whether the other person stood to gain from the participants’ cheating or not. In the Observer condition the behaviour of the participant did not affect the other person (= only the participant potentially gained €1.5). Yet, in the Partner in Crime condition, the other person could gain the same amount of money as the participant (= both participant and second person won €1.5). Like in Study 4.1, the Alone condition existed in which participants faced the same ethical dilemma by themselves.
Method Participants. In total, 134 participants (Mage = 23.19, SDage = 7.07; 61.2% female) took part in a lab study and were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (Alone, n = 45; Observer, n = 45; Partner in Crime, n = 44). We aimed for a cell size of 45 participants per cell. Procedure. We used the intra-university sign up system (Sona) to enable participants to enrol for the experiment. Upon arrival in the lab, participants were led to the cubicle. In the 84
Alone condition, participants gave informed consent and completed the tasks outlined below. In the two “presence of another person” conditions (Observer and Partner in Crime), a second person was also led to the cubicle. This second person was a female confederate. The experimenter told the participant that this experiment required a second person to be present in the cubicle for the first part of the study. The experimenter also stated that further instructions would be given on the screen. As an explanation for the presence of the additional person in the cubicle the same instruction text as in Study 4.1 was used. After giving informed consent, the experiment began with the instructions to die-rolling task. In the Alone and Observer condition the instructions read “In the following task you get the chance to win an extra €1,5 for you”. In the Partner in Crime condition, the instructions stated: “in the following task you get the chance to win an extra €1,5 for you and the second person in the room”. In all three conditions, instructions informed participants that they would be forwarded to a website (random.org) on which they would throw a virtual die to determine whether they win the €1.5. After rolling the die participants reported the number they rolled to the experimenter and were paid out in case they reported a six. In the two “presence of another person” conditions the other person left the cubicle. By themselves, the participants then filled in a short questionnaire entailing post-game questions and demographic information (for more details see information on the online repository). Measures Die-Rolling Paradigm. We used a modified version of the standard die-rolling paradigm (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). In this paradigm, a person rolls a six-sided die in private. Rolling a six resulted in an extra win of 1.5€. Since the die roll happened outside of the view of the experimenter, participants could misreport the number they rolled. The modifications to the original version of the die rolling paradigm were the following: instead of rolling the die under a cup, participants rolled a virtual die, similar to a previous study 85
(Kocher, Schudy, & Spantig, 2016). Also, the instructions informed participants that they would be forwarded to an external website (www.random.org) on which they could roll the die by clicking on a “throw die” button and report the rolled number to the experimenter. The rules clearly instructed participants to only roll the die once. The program recorded the number of times they rolled the die. Demographics. We assessed standard demographics of age, gender, education level, employment status and country of birth.
Results First, we tested whether participants appeared to have cheated in the die rolling paradigm by comparing the expected distribution of reported numbers with the observed distribution of reported numbers. If participants reported the number they rolled honestly each number would be reported with a likelihood of 16.66% (black bar graph in Figure 4.1). A χ²test reveals that the distribution of reported numbers significantly deviates from this expected distribution (χ² (5, N = 134) = 13.50, p =.019). Participants reported “6” more often than would be expected by chance – an indication of cheating (see grey bar graphs in Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1. Expected and reported die rolls across all three conditions Note. The grey bars indicate the expected die rolls if participants report the numbers honestly, the green bar shows the actual reported numbers. As a next step, we analysed whether the degree of cheating differed between the experimental conditions by conducting separate χ²-test of the distribution of reported numbers for each condition. In the Alone condition, the χ² test reveals significant deviations from the expected distribution (χ² (5, N = 45) = 17.14, p = .004; black bars in Figure 4.2), which suggests that participants cheated more than could be expected on the basis of chance alone. In the two “presence of another person” conditions, the observed distributions do not differ significantly from the expected distribution (χ² < 7.66, ps > .17; dark grey and striped bars in Figure 4.2). This finding suggests that participants on average did not cheat in these conditions.
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Figure 4.2. Expected die rolls and reported die rolls, separated for all three conditions. Note. The expected frequency of each die roll is marked with grey bars. The observed frequency of reported die rolls is marked in blue (Alone condition), purple (Observer condition) and yellow (Partner in Crime condition).
We then compared the level of rule bending first between the Alone and the two “presence of another person” conditions. Rule-bending was operationalized by analysing the number of times the participants rolled the die. If they rolled the die more than once – thus more than allowed by the rules – and if they then reported a six we interpreted their behaviour as cheating through rule bending. That is, participants rolled the die until they rolled a six. We created a binary variable in which this form of cheating was recorded (0 = no cheating through rule bending; 1 = cheating through rule bending). Similar to Study 4.1, we conducted a binary logistic regression analysis, in which both “presence of another person” conditions were collapsed and compared to the Alone condition. The analysis revealed a significant difference (B = 1.52, Wald = 5.62, Exp (B) =4.45, p = .018). That means, that the odds of cheating by rule bending were 4.45 times higher in the Alone condition compared to the two “presence of another person” conditions. This again supports the first hypothesis. 88
Testing the third hypothesis, we ran a second logistic regression analysis in which we compared the two “presence of another person” conditions. We find no significant difference between the two presence of another conditions (p = .98), which indicates that Hypothesis 3 is not supported. Hence, we find that cheating through rule bending is significantly more likely to occur when alone in the cubicle compared to either of the two conditions in which another person is co-present in the lab, independent on the payoff scheme for the second person.
General Discussion Our findings suggest that looking over your shoulder and seeing another person curbs the willingness to bribe and cheat. The physical presence of another person, who importantly had no means of sanctioning, attenuated unethical behaviour. This effect occurred across two studies using different behavioural paradigms. Introducing the actual presence of another person to the rapidly growing stream of behavioural ethics research, our experiments provide some of the first empirical insights into the real social aspects of dishonesty. Importantly, others curtailed unethical behaviour independent of the level of proximity (close other vs. stranger) or local social utility (other benefitting or not). With most of our behaviour occurring in the presence of others and contrarily the overwhelming majority of experimental social science research investigating individuals making decisions in isolation, these insights bear relevance for the advancement of the understanding of unethical behaviour and might provide useful insights for the design of interventions. So why exactly does the presence of another person reduce unethical behaviour? For one, others trigger the salience of social norms as they increase public self-awareness. When in the presence of another person one might simply be more aware and concerned about the prevalent social norms (Köbis et al., 2016; Reno et al., 1993). Violating the existing social norms, results in reputational loss because both bribing a public official in the corruption 89
game and deceiving the experimenter about the die roll in the die rolling paradigm are considered as unethical (Köbis et al., 2015; Shalvi et al., 2015). We find indirect evidence for this assumption using two different paradigms. Limitations and future research. However, the studies presented here did not assess perceived social norms, public self-awareness or reputational concerns as possible moderator variables. Instead, this set of findings first establishes the existence of the effect without focusing on the process through which it arises. Hence, future research specifically targeted at this aspect needs to establish these underlying dynamics of the effect more directly. Another limitation of the current studies lies in potential experimental demand effects (Orne, 1962). We placed participants in a somewhat odd situation compared to the average experiment conducted in social science laboratories. Hence, participants might have wondered why that other person was present with them. Manipulating the presence of others in a more natural and / or subtle way (Rajecki, Ickes, Corcoran, & Lenerz, 1977) is a promising avenue for future research. On a related note, future research could also investigate whether knowledge by the other person was a crucial explanatory factor for the reduction of unethical behaviour. That is, do participants act more ethically because the other can see that they did so? Or would the mere presence of others suffice to curb unethical behaviour? The “die-under-the-cup”-paradigm provides a useful method to test the mere presence in the context of cheating as only the participant can actually see the rolled number through the hole in the cup (Shalvi et al., 2011, 2012). Other avenues for future research include the combination of both treatments used in our studies. For example, will cheating and bribery increase if a close other can gain from it? Also, how does the presence of another person compare to other previously used cues of public self-awareness like images of eyes on the wall or mirrors in the room? Finally, does the 90
“presence of the other”-effect increase in rural areas in which reputational concerns are relatively stronger compared to urban areas (Henrich et al., 2001)? Practical Recommendations and Conclusion. The obtained findings of the “presence of another person”-effect allow for some speculative thoughts on ways to reduce unethical behaviour in the society. In line with the policy recommendation of the four-eye principle (Poerting & Vahlenkamp, 1998), it may indeed be advisable to assign multiple decisionmakers to sensitive tasks. The policy of letting those responsible for cash flow operations in organizations work in dyads rather than alone represents one such example. Or closer to home, academic fraud might be attenuated by encouraging students and scientists to work together on data collection (and analysis). Generally, the present findings suggest that removing the “illusion of anonymity” (Yap, 2016) by relatively simple tools could effectively reduce unethical behaviour. Our findings also emphasize the importance of the social aspect of social science research. Experimental research on corruption and cheating has largely studied decisions in isolation (Serra & Wantchekon, 2012). The few exceptions (Weisel & Shalvi, 2015) highlight the importance that “others” can play. As some of the first studies, our studies investigate unethical behaviour in the actual presence of others. It demonstrates a very basic yet extremely relevant aspect of social life in general and unethical behaviour in particular: the importance of the presence of other people. The look over your shoulder might be a first glance into how others can curb unethical behaviour even without any means to formally sanction.
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Chapter 5
The Road to Bribery and Corruption: Slippery Slope or Steep Cliff?
This chapter is based on Köbis, N.C., van Prooijen, J-W., Righetti, F., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2017). The road to bribery and corruption: Slippery slope or steep cliff? Psychological Science, 1, 1–10.doi:10.1177/0956797616682026
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New cases of corruption are reported in the media almost daily, and these cases occur in various contexts, such as banking, sports, and politics. Such scandals raise questions about how severe corruption emerges. Following the popular media, many scientists suggest that severe ethical transgressions such as corruption occur gradually, a process that is frequently referred to as a slippery slope (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Bandura, 1999; Darley, 2005; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Gino & Bazerman, 2009). The belief is that power holders progressively neglect the interests of other individuals while pursuing selfish interests and thus “slide into” corruption (Kipnis, Castell, Gergen, & Mauch, 1976). While this widespread belief has strong intuitive appeal, no experimental research has examined whether such a gradual process indeed leads to major forms of corruption. In four experimental studies, using a recently developed methodology, we examined the validity of the slippery-slope metaphor and contrasted it with a steep-cliff metaphor that posits that corruption occurs when people seize a one-time opportunity for severe corruption.
Slippery Slope Versus Steep Cliff Corruption is an unethical behavior that is defined as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International, 2010, response to Question 1). In explaining why people commit ethical transgressions such as corruption, researchers suggest that people consistently seek to maximize material self-interest while maintaining a positive self-image (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008a). Extensive research shows that people can commit minor ethical transgressions while retaining their positive moral self-view (cf. Ariely, 2012). Severe ethical transgressions, on the other hand, require an update of one’s self-concept (Mazar et al., 2008a) and are widely believed to be the result of a gradual transformation process – a slippery slope (cf. Darley, 2005). This view implies that people start with minor corrupt transgressions that they view as implicit benchmarks from which to 95
make decisions about new ethical dilemmas (Gino & Bazerman, 2009). Because of several moral-disengagement processes such as rationalization (Bandura, 1986, 1999), over time, more and more ethical transgressions can be incorporated into the moral self-concept (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). Eventually, corruption becomes normalized (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). These lines of reasoning add credence to the widely shared belief that people gradually engage in more increasingly severe forms of corruption (Darley, 2005). In opposition to the slippery-slope argument, the steep-cliff metaphor posits that people are often somewhat overwhelmed by an unexpected opportunity—a chance that might appear to be a golden opportunity. An abruptly occurring situation characterized by the immediacy of large benefits is extremely tempting (Ariely, 2012). The combination of large and immediate benefits paired with the apparent uniqueness of the opportunity might pave the way for corruption-enhancing justifications. A single severe act might be easier to rationalize than repeated unethical acts (Mazar & Ariely, 2006), in that single behaviors can be more easily discounted (recalling the German proverb “einmal ist keinmal,” or “once does not count”). Conversely, repeated challenges to the moral self-concept might be psychologically demanding—especially within a short time span. Thus, although the belief that corruption is a slippery slope is widely promulgated within and outside the scientific literature, there are also arguments in support of the steep-cliff metaphor. In the present research, we conducted four novel experiments that put both metaphors to a test. Overall, little quantitative research has investigated sequential unethical behavior. Previous studies have focused on third-party observers’ acceptance of gradual versus abrupt unethical acts (Gino & Bazerman, 2009) or on the role of self-control and moral disengagement on the slippery slope of minor cheating acts (Welsh, Ordóñez, Snyder, & Christian, 2014), but experimental investigation comparing gradual with abrupt occurrences of corruption is lacking altogether. Recent advances in experimental methodology on 96
corruption research (cf. Serra & Wantchekon, 2012) allow a first examination of these different processes while keeping the economic costs and benefits constant. In the present research, we used a recently developed corruption game (Köbis et al., 2015).
Study 5.1 In Study 5.1, we conducted a first test of whether severe corruption is more likely to emerge gradually or abruptly. Method Participants. A total of 86 students (age: M = 21.63 years, SD = 6.47; 62.8% female, 37.2% male) participated for money (€2.50) or course credit. Each was randomly assigned to either the steep-cliff condition, in which severe corruption would occur immediately, or the slippery-slope condition, in which the severity of corruption would gradually increase. Since the dependent variable was binary, we calculated the a priori sample size for binary logistic regressions (for details, see Demidenko, 2007). To achieve a power (1 – )of at least .8 and a detectable odds ratio of 3.0, we set the cut-off criterion to 40 participants per cell. Participants who had already begun the study when this threshold was met were still included. 6 Measures and procedure. The corruption game is a three-player auction game consisting of five rounds. Two competing players receive a budget of 50 credits in every round. In an auction fashion, they make bids (between 0 and 50 credits) for a prize of 120 credits. The third player (the allocator) awards the prize to the highest bidder (see Figure 3.1). The competing players lose the credits they allocate and keep the credits that they do not allocate in a bid. The player with the highest bid wins the total prize. If both players offer the same bid, the prize is split equally between the two. Earned credits accumulate across all five rounds.
6
The ethical review board of Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam approved all the studies reported in this manuscript.
97
The payoff matrix (see Table 3.1) depicts all possible outcomes of this bidding process. Bidding 50 credits is the best strategy for both players to maximize winnings—this option results in a strict Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950). However, one of the two players gets the option to circumvent the fair bidding process by bribing the allocator. In the present study, the participant was assigned to this role of the potentially corrupt player. After each round, participants were told who won the prize. We translated the basic structure of the auction game and the credits (numbers were multiplied by $1,000) into a real-life scenario. The competing players took the role of CEOs of a construction company, and the allocator played a public official. We used several scenarios, asked three test questions to ensure that players understood the bidding process (> 84.9% answered correctly), and provided participants with extensive explanations in case they gave a wrong answer.7 In the steep-cliff condition, participants had the option to directly invite the public official on a private vacation (severe bribery), which ensured that participants had an advantage in all rounds of the bidding. Specifically, when both player’s bids were equal, the player who engaged in severe bribery would receive the full prize rather than the half he or she would otherwise have been awarded. In the slippery-slope condition, participants initially had the option to invite the public official to a banquet (mild bribery), which ensured that participants had an advantage in 50% of the bidding rounds. That is, in rounds in which both players’ bids were equal, players who engaged in mild bribery would be awarded the full prize, but only half of the time. After extending the invitation, participants in the slipperyslope condition could increase their advantage to 100% in the following round by also inviting the official on vacation (severe bribery; see Figure 3.2). The costs for abrupt, severe
7
Half of these participants received a time-pressure prompt, which had no effect on any of the reported results (all ps > .125)
98
bribery and the aggregated costs for both steps of slippery-slope bribery were identical (i.e., $40,000). In addition to standard demographic measures (age, gender, education), we assessed how corrupt and fair participants perceived their behavior to be with one item each (“How corrupt [fair] do you think your own actions were?”). Answers were given on a scale from 1, not at all, to 6, very.
Results A binary logistic regression analysis with condition (steep-cliff vs. slippery slope) as a predictor and the likelihood of severe corruption as a dependent variable showed a significant difference between conditions, b = 1.57, Wald = 11.35, p = .001, Exp(B) = 4.82. The odds of abrupt severe bribery were 4.82 times higher compared with the odds of gradual severe bribery (see Table 5.1).8
8
In all studies reported in this manuscript, the significant main effects of condition on the likelihood of severe corruption and the main effects of perceived corruptness and perceived fair- ness remained significant when we controlled for gender, age, and education (all ps < .002)
99
Table 5.1. Distribution of Bribery Decisions in Studies 5.1 Through 5.4 No bribery
Mild bribery
n
%
n
%
n
%
Steep cliff
15
34.9%
—
—
28
65.1%
Slippery slope
4
9.3%
27
62.8%
12
27.9%
Steep cliff
27
33.8%
—
—
53
66.3%
Slippery slope
29
44.6%
9
13.8%
27
41.5%
Reverse slippery slope
30
34.9%
9
10.5%
47
54.7%
Steep cliff
7
16.7%
—
—
35
83.3%
Slippery slope
10
24.4%
11
26.8%
20
48.8%
Reverse slippery slope
11
26.2%
7
16.7%
24
57.1%
Steep cliff
24
24.0%
—
—
76
76.0%
Slippery slope
18
18.0%
17
17.0%
65
65.0%
Study and condition
Severe bribery
Study 5.1
Study 5.2
Study 5.3
Study 5.4
Note: Mild bribery occurred when participants extended the invitation to the banquet but not to the vacation. Severe bribery occurred when participants extended the vacation request either abruptly (without extending the banquet request first) or gradually (by first extending the banquet request and then extending the vacation request).
We also tested whether participants perceived bribing the official as corrupt and unfair. We found a significant difference in perceived corruption, F(2, 83) = 15.37, p < .001, p2 = .27, and perceived fairness, F(2, 83) = 9.87, p < .001, p2 = .19, between the different bribery decisions (no bribery vs. mild bribery vs. severe bribery). Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons indicated significant differences in perceived corruptness among all three bribery 100
decisions (ps < .032). Obtaining full advantages in the game through bribery was perceived as more corrupt (M = 3.75, SD = 1.52) than obtaining partial advantages (M = 2.89, SD = 1.25), which in turn was perceived as more corrupt than refraining from bribery altogether (M = 1.68, SD = 1.05; see Table 5.2).
Table 5.2. Self-Evaluations of Perceived Corruptness and Fairness in Studies 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4 Perceived corruptness Perceived fairness Study and outcome
M
SD
M
SD
No bribery
1.68a
1.05
4.68a
1.33
Mild bribery
2.89b
1.25
3.85a
1.26
Severe bribery
3.75c
1.52
2.97b
1.54
No bribery
1.55a
1.02
4.86a
1.21
Mild bribery
3.11b
1.97
4.17a
1.54
Severe bribery
4.25c
1.69
2.66b
1.72
No bribery
29.50a
29.50
—
—
Mild bribery
59.59b
23.70
—
—
Severe bribery
66.58b
31.32
—
—
Study 5.1
Study 5.2
Study 5.4
Note: Mild bribery occurred when participants extended the invitation to the banquet but not to the vacation. Severe bribery occurred when participants extended the vacation request either abruptly (without extending the banquet request first) or gradually (by first extending the banquet request and then extending the vacation request). Within studies, means with differing subscripts in a column are significantly different (p < .01, based on Bonferronicorrected pairwise comparisons).
101
For perceived fairness, we found significant differences between severe bribery and both other choices (ps < .043), while the difference between no bribery and mild bribery was not significant (p = .159). Severe bribery was perceived as significantly less fair (M = 2.97, SD = 1.54) than mild bribery (M = 3.85, SD = 1.26) and no bribery (M = 4.68, SD = 1.33; see Table 5.2). We found no interaction with condition for either corruptness or fairness ratings (all ps > .250), which indicates that participants perceived obtaining full advantages as most corrupt and least fair independently of whether they invited the official on vacation directly or only after the banquet invitation.
Discussion Study 5.1 revealed that severe corruption is more likely to occur when presented as a single choice than as one of a series of choices. Bribing the public official was perceived as more corrupt and less fair than refraining from bribery—independently of the path toward corruption.
Study 5.2 In Study 5.2, we added a third condition, in which the second corrupt act was less severe than the first. With this reverse-slippery-slope condition, we tested whether the repeated engagement or the increasing severity of the slippery slope would keep participants from engaging in a second corrupt decision. Method Participants. In total, 244 participants recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (age: M = 33.52 years, SD = 10.49; 41.6% female, 58.4% male) were randomly assigned to three conditions (slippery slope, reverse slippery slope, steep cliff). Because this data set was
102
collected online, we increased the cell sizes to at least 80 participants per cell. We excluded 13 participants from the analysis because they did not complete all questions. Measures and procedure. Procedures were the same as in Study 5.1, except as follows. We created a reverse-slippery-slope condition and to make it comparable with the slipperyslope condition, we adopted the following cost-and-benefit scheme. Inviting the public official to the banquet cost $10,000 and yielded an advantage in 25% of the bidding rounds. Inviting the official on vacation cost $30,000 and yielded an advantage in 75% of the bidding rounds. The slippery-slope and reverse-slippery-slope conditions merely differed in the order in which these options were presented. The steep-cliff condition consisted of one decision (invitation to the vacation), which instantly yielded advantages in all bidding rounds and cost $40,000. The costs for obtaining full advantages in the bidding were identical across all three conditions. We assessed perceived corruptness and fairness using the same items as in Study 5.1.
Results We again found a significant group difference in severe bribery between the steep-cliff and the slippery-slope condition, b = 1.01, Wald = 8.66, p = .003, Exp(B) = 2.76, which replicated the results of Study 5.1. The odds of severe bribery were 2.76 higher when participants could exercise this option immediately compared with when they first had to engage in milder forms of corruption (see 5.1). We found no significant difference in the likelihood of severe corruption when comparing the steep-cliff with the reverse-slippery-slope condition nor when comparing both slippery-slope conditions (all ps > .112). Participants’ self-evaluations of their behavior were again influenced by the decisions made in the game, both for perceived corruptness, F(3, 224) = 54.21, p < .001, p2 = .421, and perceived fairness, F(3, 224) = 35.59, p < .001, p2 = .323 (Table 3). Participants who 103
refrained from bribery perceived their behavior as less corrupt (M = 1.55, SD = 1.02) and more fair (M = 4.86, SD = 1.21) than those who obtained full advantages in the game through bribery (corruptness: M = 4.25, SD = 1.69, p < .001; fairness: M = 2.66, SD = 1.72, p < .001). No other group differences were significant (ps > .210). Again, the way in which full advantages were obtained did not affect the corruptness and fairness ratings, as the interaction between decision and condition was not significant (ps = .125–.860).
Discussion Study 5.2 replicated the finding that severe corruption occurs more frequently when the opportunity to exercise it is presented abruptly rather than gradually. We found no difference between the steep-cliff and reverse-slippery-slope conditions, which might be because after committing the more severe form of bribery, the second act appears less problematic. However, participants’ self-evaluations of corruptness and fairness were not influenced by the different slopes. Independently of condition, severe corruption was perceived as most corrupt and least fair. Study 5.3 To increase the stakes of the decisions in the game and to increase mundane realism, we introduced real monetary incentives for participants to make corrupt decisions in Study 5.3. Method Participants. In total, 125 participants (age: M = 21.50 years, SD = 5.18; 76.8% female, 23.2% male) completed the third study. In this laboratory experiment, we again aimed for at least 40 participants per cell. We adopted the same experimental design as in Study 5.2, with the addition that participants received a monetary payoff at the end of the game. Specifically, they were paid between €0.10 and €1.20 in proportion to how many game dollars they had earned at the end of the final round (see the Supplemental Material in Appendix). 104
Measures and procedure. Procedures were the same as in Study 5.2, but to expand the scope of the moral evaluation of participants’ behavior, we used the Multidimensional Scale for Evaluations of Business Ethics (Reidenbach, Robin, & Dawson, 1991; MSEBE; Reidenbach & Robin, 1990) instead of the self-evaluations of corruptions and fairness. Participants were instructed to rate their behavior in the game on eight 101-point slider scales, which formed the following three subscales. First, the moral-equity subscale assessed broad moral-equity concerns using four sets of opposing scale anchors (e.g., just vs. unjust; morally right vs. not morally right); this subscale showed high internal reliability ( = .89). Second, the relativism subscale measured relativistic moral evaluation using two sets of scale anchors (e.g., culturally acceptable vs. culturally unacceptable; = .75). Third, the contractualism subscale measured deontological moral reasoning with two sets of scale anchors (e.g., violates an unwritten contract vs. does not violate an unwritten contract); this subscale had acceptable internal reliability ( = .60).
Results Replicating the results of Studies 5.1 and 5.2, Study 5.3 showed that the chances of severe corruption differed significantly between the steep-cliff and the slippery-slope conditions, b = 1.65, Wald = 10.22, p = .001, Exp(B) = 5.25. The odds of severe bribery were 5.25 times higher when participants could exercise this option immediately than when they first had to engage in milder forms of corruption (see Table 5.1). In addition, we found a significant difference between the steep-cliff condition and the reverse-slippery-slope condition, b = 1.32, Wald = 6.50, p = .011, Exp(B) = 3.75; specifically, the odds of severe bribery were 3.75 times higher in the steep-cliff condition than in the reverse-slippery-slope condition. The difference between the slippery-slope and the reverse-slippery-slope conditions was not significant (p > .250). 105
Participants’ self-evaluations of their moral behavior differed significantly on two of the three moral dimensions assessed by the MSEBE. We found significant differences in moral equity, F(3, 120) = 5.46, p = .002, p2 = .12, and relativism, F(3, 129) = 3.70, p = .014, p2 = .01, depending on whether or not participants bribed the official (see Table 5.3). Bonferronicorrected comparisons indicated that participants who refrained from bribery perceived their behavior as less equity violating (M = 30.31, SD = 26.62) and more culturally acceptable (M = 48.54, SD = 26.85) than those who engaged in severe bribery (moral equity: M = 52.35, SD = 25.67; relativism: M = 29.94, SD = 24.41; all ps .001). No other differences between bribery decisions were significant (ps > .250). Entering deontological moral reasoning as a dependent variable yielded no significant difference between the different bribery decisions (p > .250). Table 5.3 Self-Evaluations of Moral Equity, Relativism, and Contractualism in Studies 5.3 and 5.4 Moral equity Study and outcome
Relativism
Contractualism
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
No bribery
30.31a
26.62
29.94a
24.12
60.77a
30.17
Mild bribery
44.50ab
16.75
41.77ab
18.28
54.77ab
17.69
Severe bribery
52.35b
25.67
48.54b
26.85
53.38a
25.19
No bribery
33.38a
23.69
36.94a
52.43
65.69a
25.03
Mild bribery
49.96ab
17.78
48.24ab
18.60
53.68ab
19.68
Severe bribery
57.91b
28.35
50.64b
27.01
48.68b
28.64
Study 5.3
Study 5.4
Note: Mild bribery occurred when participants extended the invitation to the banquet but not to the vacation. Severe bribery occurred when participants extended the vacation request either abruptly (without extending the banquet request first) or gradually (by first extending the banquet request and then extending the vacation request). Within studies, means with differing subscripts in a column were significantly different (p < .01, based on Bonferronicorrected pairwise comparisons). 106
Discussion Study 5.3, in which real monetary incentives were used, replicated the steep-cliff effect: Severe corruption occurred more frequently as a result of a single opportunity than as the result of a gradual process. Independently of whether the slope of severity increased or decreased, there was a general reluctance to repeatedly engage in corruption. The moral evaluations of the behavior in the game indicated that bribing was perceived as unethical. More specifically, in this study, bribery was perceived rather as a violation of moral equity (“it creates injustice”) and social norm (“it is culturally unacceptable”) than as a violation of an unspoken rule. Study 5.4 The previous three studies did not include a real victim of the corrupt behavior. We therefore conducted a fourth study in which all roles in the game were taken by participants, which meant that bribery would incur monetary costs to another existing participant. Also, in this study, we quadrupled the incentives given to participants who engaged in corruption. Method Participants. We commissioned the Qualtrics Panels Team (see https://www.qualtrics.com/online-sample/) to recruit a stratified sample of 400 participants (100 per cell) from a research panel that is nationally representative of the U.S. population. These individuals (age: M = 44.81 years, SD = 16.16; 51.2% female, 48.8% male) took part in an online experiment. Measures and procedure. We used the same paradigm as in the previous studies, with the following modifications. First, all roles in the game were taken by actual participants, which resulted in four conditions (n = 100 each) to which participants were randomly assigned. As in the previous studies, two groups of potentially corrupt players faced the decision to engage in bribery either abruptly (steep-cliff condition) or gradually (slippery107
slope condition)—we did not include a reverse-slippery-slope condition so as to facilitate the matching procedure (see next paragraph). In addition, a third group of participants adopted the role of the player who had no opportunity to bribe—the potential victim. The fourth group played the role of the public official. To keep the decisional structure for the potentially corrupt players as similar as possible, we limited the action space of the player assigned the role of the public official so that he or she always accepted bribes and acted accordingly. We used the strategy method (Brandts & Charness, 2011) to match the decisions of the potentially corrupt players to the decisions of the players in the other two groups to determine the final payoffs. This was done so that participants’ decisions would actually affect other participants. Second, we increased the potential monetary gain of corruption so that it would yield up to $6 in Amazon gift vouchers (see the Supplemental Material for an overview of the payoff scheme). We combined the postgame measures used in the previous studies. Hence, we assessed perceived corruptness with the item used in Studies 5.1 and 5.2 (perceived fairness was not assessed), while perceived morality was measured with the MSEBE—which consisted of the subscales moral equity ( = .93), relativism ( = .85), and contractualism ( = .86). All answers were given on 100-point slider scale.
Results In line with Studies 5.1 through 5.3, the results of Study 4 revealed that the odds of severe bribery were 1.71 times higher when participants could exercise this option immediately than when they had to do so gradually—a marginally significant difference, b = 0.53, Wald = 2.88, p = .090, Exp(B) = 1.71 (see Table 5.1). An ANOVA on participants’ selfevaluations of their behavior showed significant differences in perceived corruptness, F(3, 197) = 24.10, p < .001, p2 = .197, between those who refrained from bribery and those who 108
engaged in either mild or severe bribery (ps < .002; see Table 5.1). We also found significant group differences for each of the subscales of the MSEBE—moral equity, F(3, 197) = 13.71, p < .001, p2 = .12, relativism, F(3, 197) = 4.46, p = .013, p2 = .043, and contractualism, F(3, 197) = 6.29, p = .002, p2 = .06. Participants who refrained from bribery rated their behavior as more moral on all three subscales than did those who engaged in severe bribery (all ps < .010; see Table 5.3)—which again indicates that participants who engaged in severe bribery perceived their behavior as less moral and more corrupt than those who refrained from it. For all measures, we found neither significant differences between mild and severe corruption (ps > .74) nor an interaction between condition and decision (all ps > .22). Next, because Studies 5.1 through 5.4 differed in a number of respects (e.g., procedure, sample size), we conducted a meta-analysis to address the generality of findings across the four studies. We computed 2 values from the logistic regression analyses for each study and first tested whether the overall odds of severe corruption differed between the slippery-slope and the steep-cliff conditions. This random-effects analysis drew on all four studies (N = 514) and revealed a significant difference (point estimate = 0.38, 95% confidence interval, or CI = [0.22, 0.61], z = 3.87, p < .0001). Participants across all studies were significantly more likely to engage in severe corruption in the steep-cliff condition than in the slippery-slope condition. Moreover, comparing the steep-cliff condition with the reverse-slippery-slope condition (Studies 5.2 and 5.3, overall sample size = 234), we also found a significant difference (point estimate = 0.50, 95% CI = [0.27, 0.93], z = 2.15, p = .003). Finally, it is noteworthy that the slippery-slope condition did not significantly differ from the reverseslippery-slope condition in Studies 2 and 3 combined (point estimate = 0.22, 95% CI = [0.49, 0.03], z = 1.71, p = .08). Taken together, these findings show that the odds of severe corruption are significantly higher in the steep-cliff condition than in the reverse-slipperyslope condition and the slippery-slope condition. 109
Discussion In Study 5.4, we again found support (albeit marginal) for the steep-cliff effect: Participants were more likely to engage in abrupt than in gradual bribery. Across four independent studies, evidence suggests that under the circumstances of our role-playing game, corruption is more strongly rooted in a single tempting opportunity than in a two-step process. General Discussion Contrary to the widespread belief that people gradually slide into corruption down a slippery slope, the present studies provide novel evidence that people may instead jump into severe corruption over a steep cliff. Across four studies, people were more likely to engage in severe corruption when this option was presented abruptly rather than gradually, even though they did acknowledge the unethicality of severe corruption. In fact, moral self-evaluations of severe corruption as well as the (combined) economic costs and benefits did not differ significantly across the different conditions. Given that most scientists and laymen alike believe in the slippery-slope analogy, it is important to ask the obvious: How can one account for evidence favoring the steep-cliff metaphor rather than the slippery-slope metaphor? One line of reasoning is that the intuitively compelling notion that repeated transgressions lower moral thresholds may not always be true. Rather than following a process of habituation and moral disengagement, it is possible that people seek to avoid repetition of corruption because it is expected to be psychologically taxing—especially when the opportunities for corruption occur in short succession (Mazar et al., 2008b). It poses another threat to one’s self-image and therefore even a second, more minor form of corruption can be undesirable (Study 5.3). When deciding whether to engage in unethical behavior, people take both the external and the internal psychological cost and benefits of the respective act into account (Messick & Bazerman, 1996). Unlike in previous studies (Welsh et al., 2014), the economic costs and 110
benefits were kept constant across the different conditions in the present studies. Thus, our findings point toward a new psychological factor—the sequence of decisions. A single severe act, directly presented to participants, might be easier to justify than a two-step process and thus could cause less tension between being a moral person, on the one hand, and enjoying the benefits of dishonesty, on the other hand (Batson, 2016). A complementary argument is that a single act requires less intentionality and planning than repeated behaviors (Batson & Powell, 2003). Large benefits might reinforce a selective focus on self-interest rather than on a positive self-image. In contrast to previous work (Welsh et al., 2014), the present studies looked at bribery, a form of unethical behavior that requires a collaboration between multiple corrupt agents (Köbis, Van Prooijen, Righetti, & Van Lange, 2016; Weisel & Shalvi, 2015). The resulting local social utility (“My actions are also helping the other person”; Ayal & Gino, 2011) might further facilitate these self-serving justifications. Clearly, future research is needed to examine the underlying mechanisms and boundary conditions of corruption. For example, how severe corruption emerges under varying punishment regimes is still unclear. Yet given the ubiquity of the belief in the slippery-slope analogy, we conclude with two lessons from the present research. One is that people may be more willing to engage in severe, single (and perhaps unexpected) instances of corruption than is widely believed—even if they recognize the immorality of these behaviors. Another lesson is that repeated forms of unethical behavior may be more psychologically taxing than is generally believed, especially if the second occasion brings about smaller benefits for the self than a single occasion does. These findings thus shed light on an unexplored area of sequential corrupt decision-making. Overall, our findings suggest that individuals who are willing to engage in bribery seek to obtain the biggest advantage for the lowest moral price. Instead of repeatedly engaging in corruption (sliding down a slippery slope), they seize a onetime opportunity (jumping off a steep cliff). 111
112
Chapter 6
General Discussion
113
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This dissertation is inspired by the immensely negative impact that corruption has on people around the world and by the belief that understanding the social psychological dynamics of corruption can help to reduce it. So far, psychological factors in general, and social psychological factors in particular, have been widely neglected in the quest to understand and curb corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2017; Persson et al., 2012). Hence, the present dissertation aims to invigorate a stream of social psychological corruption research. To recapitulate the theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions of each chapter the ensuing General Discussion is structured along three main questions: What are the new insights into the social psychology of corruption that this thesis offers? How can these insights eventually prove useful to counteract corruption? What are avenues for future research? After this review of the topics of Chapter 2-5, the discussion moves beyond these subjects and illustrates for two concrete examples how a social psychological perspective can both enrich long-standing debates as well as newly emerging trends in corruption research. Finally, the General Discussion concludes with four main take-home messages. Prospection in Individual and Interpersonal Corruption Dilemmas Novel insights. The first contribution of this dissertation lies in the theoretical framework put forth in Chapter 2. Capturing the recent theoretical advances in the corruption literature, it models the decision to engage in corruption as a social dilemma (Chen, Jiang, & Villeval, 2015; Köbis, Van Lange, & Mkwella, 2017; Rothstein, 2000). To describe the corruption dilemma in simple terms: All citizens in a given society are collectively better off if nobody bribed. Yet, each citizen individually benefits from bribing – a situation in which individual rationality leads to collective irrationality (Kollock, 1998). As an extension of existing social dilemma models of corruption, the theoretical chapter introduces a distinction between two main types of corruption dilemmas. The number of corrupt agents that are directly involved in the corrupt act determine whether it is a form of 115
individual or interpersonal corruption. While the first represents a “typical” social dilemma – a decision between short-term self-interest and long term collective interest – the second resembles the structure of a nested social dilemma. Here, a threefold conflict of interests for a corrupt agent exists: The (a) self-interest, (b) the corrupt partner’s interest and (c) the collective interest, are at odds with each other. Consequently, the decision to engage in individual and interpersonal corruption rest on different social psychological mechanisms. Recognizing these differences helps to foster the understanding of corrupt behavior and is also a prerequisite to designing successful anti-corruption strategies. Implications for Anti-Corruption Efforts. An analysis of the type of corruption at hand is needed to calibrate anti-corruption efforts. This need for differentiation becomes apparent when taking a closer look at the different psychological decision-making mechanisms involved in individual and interpersonal corruption. As outlined below, these mechanisms can be grouped into three main categories: a) some social psychological factors only matter for interpersonal corruption, b) some matter for both types of corruption and c) some have opposite effects for each type of corruption. First, several psychological factors exist that matter only for interpersonal corruption, such as trust, reciprocity, and communication. Anti-corruption efforts aimed at these factors might help to reduce interpersonal corruption while leaving individual corruption mostly unaffected. These efforts typically target corrupt collaborations. One example is staff rotation. It describes the forced changing of positions within a company with the aim to undermine the stabilization of corrupt collaborations (Abbink, 2004; Gross, Leib, Offerman, & Shalvi, forthcoming). Individual forms of corruption are largely impervious to such efforts. The second category comprises factors that matter for both types of corruption, yet to different degrees. One example are prospective cost-benefit estimations. People mentally forecast the likelihood and severity of detection and compare it to the prospected gains, both 116
in individual and interpersonal corruption dilemmas. Many existing anti-corruption efforts seek to reduce corrupt behavior by increasing the likelihood of detection. One concrete way to do so are whistleblowing schemes. Although whistleblowing programs can also help to uncover forms of individual corruption, such schemes have even bigger prospects at curbing interpersonal corruption. The reason lies in the outlined collaboration between the corrupt partners, who mutually pose a direct detection threat to one another (Waytz et al., 2013). Additional incentives, such as granting amnesty to whistleblowers through leniency provisions amplifies this detection threat for interpersonal corruption (Lambsdorff & Nell, 2007). Hence, due to the direct transaction between multiple corrupt agents, the threat of detection through whistleblowing is augmented for interpersonal corruption compared to individual corruption. Third, some factors have opposite effects on both types of corruption such as the intricate workings of guilt. Triggering guilt to prevent corruption requires a close look at the reference group of guilt because it matters a great deal who the potentially corrupt agents feel guilty towards. To illustrate this point: In individual corruption dilemmas, the only possible reference group is the victim of corruption. That victim can range from a concrete person to abstract entities such as the society as a whole. However, in interpersonal corruption, due to its nested social dilemma structure, two possible reference groups for guilt exist: the victim but also the corrupt partner(s). Here, guilt can propel corruption. Corrupt agents might feel guilty for not engaging in corruption which can even be seen as a loyalty violation (Köbis, Iragorri-Carter & Starke, in press). While general cues of guilt might thus backfire, situational cues that are calibrated to elicit guilt towards the victim could help to reduce both individual and interpersonal corruption. Behavioral ethics research draws a promising picture (Mazar et al., 2008a), as moral reminders can successfully reduce the level of unethical behavior (Bryan et al., 2012; 117
Shu et al., 2011; Shu, Mazar, & Gino, 2012). Recognizing the different moral concerns that are at work in both forms of corruption increases the chances of success of such nudges. Future Research. The distinction between individual and interpersonal corruption dilemmas is by far not the only distinction of corruption types (see for example, Bauhr & Nasiritousi, 2011; Blau, 2009; Huberts, Lasthuizen, & Peeters, 2005; Köbis & Huss, 2017; Pinto et al., 2008; Rose-Ackerman, 2006). The combination of existing corruption distinctions epitomizes an important pathway for future conceptual research. An integrative theoretical framework, a sort of atlas of corruption types (Kelley et al., 2003; Köbis & Huss, 2017), would help to differentiate the multiple forms of corruption that are currently subsumed under the same umbrella term. In a subsequent step, future research could investigate the psychological underpinnings involved in each of these multiple types of corruption.
“Who doesn’t?” - The Impact of Descriptive Norms on Corruption Novel insights. As a first empirical contribution of this dissertation, Chapter 3 investigates the influence of social norms on corruption. More specifically, it applies the social psychological distinction between descriptive and injunctive social norms. The results of three studies suggest that the former trumps the latter when it comes to corrupt decisionmaking. Put into simple words, people often engage in corruption although they know it is morally wrong (injunctive norms), because they think others do it as well (descriptive norms). Hence, perceived descriptive norms pave the way for rationalizations that morally legitimize corruption: “If others are doing it, I don’t have to feel so bad about it myself” (Brandt, Köbis, & Starke, 2016). Yet, these perceived descriptive social norms do not only serve as a justification of one’s own unethical behavior, they also serve as a signal for the behavior of others (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009). An accurate estimation of whether a counter-part is corruptible inherently 118
determines the consequences of the decision “to bribe or not to bribe”. Put into game theoretic terms, corruption represents a frequency-dependent equilibrium (Bardhan, 1997) – the level of corruption in the society shapes whether bribing or abstaining is the best course of action (Bicchieri & Rovelli, 1995; Kosfeld, 1997; Rothstein, 2000). For instance, consider a police officer in a highly corrupt police force: Not accepting bribes does not just lead to lower short-term payoffs (= not earning a bribe) but is outright dangerous as the corrupt colleagues might punish deviation from the “corruption norm” – the officer is in a social trap (Rothstein, 2013). On the contrary, asking for a bribe as a police officer in a low corruption context can have adverse consequences due to high likelihood and severity of punishment. Social norms in general, and perceived descriptive norms in particular, serve as a marker for these different levels of corruption – they constitute the “grammar of the society” (Bicchieri, 2005). It is however important to note, that perceived injunctive norms – the moral acceptability of a certain course of action – are by no means irrelevant (for a discussion on that matter, see Bicchieri & Mercier, 2014; Mockus, 2013). Indeed, the moral evaluation of a given corrupt act also impacts its psychological justifications (see also, Shalvi et al., 2015). One example is the distinction between need and greed corruption (Bauhr & Nasiritousi, 2011; Tanzi, 1998). Think of a citizen who bribes a doctor to receive urgent medical treatment. On the other hand, consider a well-off businessperson who bribes to top-up a salary that was already in dizzy heights. The general tendency is to condone the behavior of the former because it happens out of need, and condemn the behavior of the latter as it is driven by greed. Recent research furthermore suggests that forms of corruption that involve nonmonetary exchanges are seen as more acceptable than those than involve pecuniary transactions (Köbis, et al., forthcoming). These differing moral evaluations reflect the
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differences in (perceived) injunctive norms, which in turn impact a person’s willingness to engage in corruption. Implications for Anti-Corruption Efforts. The transformation of social norms poses a big challenge but it also bears great potential to reduce corruption. While injunctive norms of a given behavior tend to be relatively stable over time, targeting descriptive norms could help to lower corruption levels. Research on trust and corruption suggests that people adjust relatively quickly to their social environment (Barr & Serra, 2008; Dinesen, 2012). They stop acting corruptly if they (rightly or wrongly) believe that others are not corrupt either. The challenge then lies in shifting these perceptions about corruption. One channel for change consists in the media portrayal of corruption cases (Starke, Wickberg, Aurelia, & Köbis, forthcoming) – conditional on the media being sufficiently free to report about corruption (Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Starke, Naab, & Scherer, 2016). The framing of a story covering a corruption case might specifically impact the perception of descriptive norms. A news piece that tells a story of yet another politician caught up in a corruption scandal caters towards the general belief that all (politicians) are corrupt. Such a frame might contribute to the formation or consolidation of corruption-inducing norms. However, a report, that focuses on the honest and brave police officer who detected the corruption case, might do the opposite (for more details on how to use the media to fight corruption see, Kindra & Stapenhurst, 1998; Köbis, Iragorri-Carter & Starke, forthcoming). Taken together, targeting and changing the beliefs about what others do could potentially help to reduce corruption – especially when it comes to interpersonal forms of corruption in which such perceptions of social norms fulfill an important signalling function. Future research. Related to the proposed anti-corruption strategies, future research at the intersection of psychology and political science could investigate how transformations of political systems affect the perception of social norms. How fast do people adjust to changes 120
in the “rules of the game” of corruption (Olivier de Sardan, 2013a)? Gradual shifts of corruption might lead to the persistence of existing social norms of corruption because people might not recognize the steady changes (Gino & Bazerman, 2009). On the contrary when political change occurs abruptly like a “big bang” (Rothstein, 2011b) people might quickly adjust their own behavior as well as the perceptions about the behavior of others to the sudden changes of the political climate. How different anti-corruption strategies might affect the perceptions of social norms could provide crucial insights into the psychological underpinnings of political change.
The Look Over Your Shoulder: Corruption and Cheating Decreases in the Presence of Another Person Novel insights. While Chapter 3 showed that the belief about what others do influences corrupt behavior, Chapter 4 amplifies this social element of corruption by investigating the impact of the actual presence of a second person on corrupt decision-making. Two studies show that the company of another person suffices to lower the level of unethical behavior. Remarkably, this reduction occurred even when the other person was a friend or could cobenefit from dishonesty. Possibly, reputation outplayed corrupt trust. The other person seemed to have swayed the needle of the individual’s “moral compass” (Moore & Gino, 2013). A supplementary interpretation of the obtained results is that secrecy characterizes most forms of corruption. Due to its illegitimacy and illegality, corruption typically takes place as a shadow transaction; corrupt deals rarely occur in plain sight (Mény, 1996). Think of the common practice to hide monetary bribes within an envelope or in other documents like a passport or driver’s license. This secret element of corruption also manifests itself linguistically. Instead of calling a bribe a bribe, people typically distance themselves from the 121
corrupt act by using indirect language (discussed in more detail in the Anti-corruption section of this General Discussion for Chapter 5) and euphemistic labels. Tea-money (=informal payment; Sub-Saharan Africa), baksheesh (= tip / gift; Middle-Eastern and Southern Asia), guanxi (= connections; China), jeitinho (= little way circumventing formalities; Brazil) or Seilschaften (= insider relationships; Germany) are just some of the many examples how everyday parlour softens corruption (Smith, Huang, Harb, & Torres, 2011). The obtained results support this notion of secrecy and distancing as participants were more willing to cheat and bribe when they could not be seen by others. Implications for Anti-Corruption Efforts. The findings also indirectly support a commonly proposed anti-corruption strategy: the four-eyes-principle (Hiebl, 2015; Lambsdorff, 2012). It describes that at least two public officials simultaneously share the decisional responsibility for a task. As a result, corrupt deals become more difficult to establish, in part because the communication process between a corrupt agent and an official becomes less private. The additional public official complicates the corruptibility estimations. A corrupt agent now needs to find not just one but two corrupt counterparts. The four-eyesprinciple, already implemented by many police forces, could potentially be extended to other domains that are prone to interpersonal corruption. Future research. Due to the relative lack of studies that investigate how the physical presence of others influences corrupt decision-making, multiple avenues for future research exist. To name a few, studies could specifically investigate the main driver of the obtained results by disentangling reputational concerns from mere presence effects (Rajecki et al., 1977). In the set of studies presented in Chapter 4, the other person could see the participant’s behavior. What if the second person is blind(-folded) and thus not able to observe what the participant does? Would the mere presence similarly reduce unethical behavior?
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Other research could explore whether the level of corruption in a given context moderates the effect. Both studies reported in Chapter 4 were conducted in the Netherlands, a country that ranked eighth on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index in 2016 (Transparency International, 2016). This relatively low level of (perceived) corruption begs the question: would the effect differ, or even disappear, when conducted in a country with higher levels of corruption? This research could in turn help to inform anti-corruption efforts. Quite plausibly, the four-eye principle works when corruption levels are low yet not when corruption is wide-spread; finding an extra corrupt counterpart might be less of a problem in systemically corrupt contexts (Gawthorpe, 2016). Hence, the policy recommendation of the four-eye principle might be contingent on the level of corruption. In low-corruption contexts, the presence of another person might help to prevent the occurrence of interpersonal corrupt deals.
The Road to Bribery and Corruption: Slippery Slope or Steep cliff? Novel insights. The last empirical chapter deals with the emergence of severe corruption. It presents some of the first experimental studies on sequential corrupt decisionmaking. A review of the social psychological literature, dating back to the seminal obedience studies by Milgram (1963), suggests that severe unethical behaviour emerges gradually – also referred to as a slippery slope process. According to it, people are willing to breach ethical norms, step-by-step. Four experiments compared this slippery slope process to a steep-cliff process, in which participants could abruptly engage in severe corruption. With overall costs and benefits identical in both conditions, results of four studies challenge the commonly held belief in the ubiquity of the slippery slope analogy. Instead, the new findings suggest that people at times engage in single more severe acts of corruption rather abruptly than gradually.
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Implications for Anti-Corruption Efforts. The steep-cliff-effect can be applied to anticorruption efforts, by impairing the spontaneous formation of severe corrupt deals between corrupt agents. One way to do so is the mandatory use of written communication for specific corruption-prone domains. Written communication aggravates the use of indirect language, a form of communication that facilitates spontaneous corrupt transactions (Pinker, 2007; Pinker et al., 2008). The multifaceted dynamics of indirect language deserve further elaboration: when instigating a corrupt transaction, both potentially corrupt agents face the challenge to convey the willingness to engage in corruption without (a) accusing the other of being corrupt, or (b) stepping into dangerous legal territory of admitting the own corruptibility (Gambetta, 2009). Indirect language allows this communicative balancing act and written communication thus aggravates spontaneous abrupt corrupt deals. As a positive side-effect, written communication also increases the risk of detection as written statements are more easily traceable to an individual than spoken word. It also reduces plausible deniability (Pinker, 2007; Pinker et al., 2008). For instance, the evidence of written email-correspondence about corrupt deals weighs more heavily on corrupt partners than alleged spoken words. E-government could be one domain in which this idea could be applied (Starke et al., 2016). For instance, written communication could hinder the ad-hoc extraction of bribes in the process of granting permits. Future Research. Many facets of sequential corrupt decision-making remain unknown. One important factor is punishment as the set of studies presented in Chapter 5 did not contain a potential threat of being detected and sanctioned for corruption. The experimental set-up thus reflects a state of impunity – a circumstance that occurs frequently when corruption has become endemic (Olivier de Sardan, 2013b). Here, formal sanctions for corruption are so unlikely that they do not deter corruption. The findings therefore again underline the importance of moral costs. Abrupt corruption meant avoiding the moral costs of repeated 124
corruption. Pairing sequential corrupt decision-making with punishment regimes could shed light into how corruption unfolds in contexts in which a realistic threat of punishment exists. Future research could also test whether in such contexts the slippery slope might reflect a learning process: People might first engage in small forms of corruption. When they realize that they get away with it and not get punished, they might go one step further and so on, until they engage in behavior that they never deemed possible (Welzer & Christ, 2005).
Weighing in on long-standing debates and emerging trends Beyond the topics discussed in Chapters 2-5, the contributions put forth in this dissertation can enrich long-standing debates as well as newly emerging trends in the corruption literature. To outline how, the ensuing part deals with two concrete examples: First, it discusses one of the most commonly proposed ways to reduce corruption: the increase of public officials’ salaries, also known as fair salary hypothesis. Second, it illustrates the psychological facets of using technological advances to limit corruption. Fair Salary Hypothesis. Paying higher wages to public servants in the hope to reduce corruption, marks one of the most frequently proposed anti-corruption policies, both by aid donors and corruption researchers (Azfar et al., 2001; Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Tanzi, 1998) One of the basic arguments behind the fair salary hypothesis, the so called “efficiency-wage” argument (Becker & Stigler, 1974; Van Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001), posits that the higher the salaries in the public sector, the bigger is the potential loss of getting caught at corrupt activities. If working for the government is actually a good job (e.g., well-paid) then public officials would try to avoid losing it. While this theorized link is plausible in countries with effective policing institutions, in many high corruption contexts the threat of being punished for corruption, let alone lose the job over it, is almost non-existent (Rothstein, 2000). Here, the aforementioned state of 125
impunity exists for public officials. It is thus not surprising that the empirical work on the subject, stemming from different disciplines, has yielded inconclusive evidence (Abbink, 2000; Van Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001; Van Veldhuizen, 2013). While some studies show that extremely high salary top-ups are needed to effectively reduce corruption (Van Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001), other studies show that increasing public wages can even led to more, not less, corruption (Foltz & Opoku-Agyemang, 2015). One reason for the lack of success of these efforts might lie in the theoretical model of corruption. Most of these previous studies on the topic have modelled corruption using a principal agent framework (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015), which assumes that an honest principal (e.g. honest police force or politicians) exists. This theoretical model tends to underestimate the pervasiveness of corruption in contexts where it has become systemic (Huss, 2016). Here, corruption becomes a second order collective action problem (Persson et al., 2012) as anti-corruption institutions themselves might fall prey to the existing corruption level (Engelbert, 2014). In the absence of formal punishment institutions, the social dilemma model, put forth in Chapter 2, might more adequately explain the ineffectiveness of salary top-up programs. Increasing public officials’ wages without any accountability mechanism in place, does not change the incentive structure for public officials – they thus have little reason to curb their corrupt behavior. Instead of allocating higher salaries to public officials it might make more sense to use the financial means to empower those who are affected by corruption. For example, a different mode of payment that empowers the recipients of public services and provides them with a means to reward impartial use of public power, could create the market for honesty that increased salaries have failed to deliver (Köbis, Soraperra, Efferson, Vogt, Offerman, & Shalvi, forthcoming).
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Novel technological advances. Besides contributing to long-standing debates in the corruption literature, recognizing the social psychological dynamics of corruption could also enrich novel trends in anti-corruption. For instance, consider technological innovations aimed at reducing corruption. Recent studies show that using modern banking technology, like biometric bank cards, can reduce leakages and embezzlement in cash transfer programs by up to 47% (Hanna, 2017). Similar technology could be used to avoid public expenditure disappearance in the education system and streamline the often highly complex payment systems of teaching staff (Brandt, forthcoming). Although first results are promising, the psychological consequences of introducing technological solutions need to be considered given that recent studies show that technological solutions can backfire: Citizens might respond with reactance to novel technological tools that substitute human elements (Laakasuo, Palomäki, & Köbis, forthcoming). The replacement of human governance with non-human governance and the psychological implications deserve more attention. Such implementations of automated decision-making already exist in many different forms; ranging from teaching staff using computerized exam corrections that impede partial grading to algorithms that are entrusted with autonomous decisional power to award public tender, like the public procurement software ProZorro in Ukraine. The decisional scope of such intelligent machines likely increases in the future which poses important questions, like: Whether, when and how should humans, who seem to have an inherent tendency to be biased (Kahneman, 2011), be replaced with unbiased machines? Which moral code should machines be programmed with (Wallach, 2010)? And what if the machine misbehaves? Who is to blame? These and other challenging questions mark crucial, yet fascinating avenues for future research on the intersection of psychology, philosophy, technology and (anti-)corruption.
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Taken together, a wide-open field for social psychological research on corruption exists. Although the dissertation provides some insights into when and how people are willing to instigate an abuse of entrusted power, many questions remain open. These questions bear relevance for the ever-growing field of corruption research, and the answers hopefully inform anti-corruption efforts. Future research endeavors, emphasizing the social and psychological tenants of corruption, can inspire new solutions to existing puzzles in the corruption literature – for instance the fair salary hypothesis – and identify emerging challenges ahead.
Take home messages More than five years ago I was discussing research ideas over a coffee with a friend. Inspired by game theory and interdependence theory, we started modelling games for Paul Van Lange’s expert workshop. We tweaked some aspects here, changed some parameters there. After a second or third coffee, we re-examined what we came up with. “This is corruption” one of us said, looking at the model that I had drawn up. That is how corruption came into my (academic) life. The fascination for the topic has not faded but has rather grown. After this initial coffee talk, I kept encountering corruption over and over again: in the news, during conversations with friends, colleagues and taxi drivers or when reading ostensibly unrelated literature. So, after more than five years of researching corruption and after having written this dissertation, I guess it is time to draw an interim conclusion and dare to spell out some take-home messages – of which there are four. The first take-home message that has become repeatedly clear to me is that corruption is an umbrella term than requires specification. The word corruption is (often loosely) used to describe a wide array of phenomena. Academics, journalists and the public parlour use corruption to describe various behaviors ranging from bribery to embezzlement, from lobbyism to nepotism, from match-fixing to any type of misbehavior by (political) decision128
makers. Researching, understanding and eventually curbing corruption requires closer differentiation. This dissertation introduces a theoretical model that combines state-of-the-art theories from the corruption literature with insights from social psychology and models the decision to act corruptly as a social dilemma. Dependent on number of corrupt agents directly involved in the corrupt act, the framework distinguishes two types of corruption dilemmas: individual and interpersonal corruption. Hopefully this theoretical framework lays the groundwork for more integrative frameworks to follow and inspires future conceptual work to create an atlas of corruption types. The second take-home message emphasizes the importance of focusing on key features of the social environment factors to understand corrupt behavior. All three empirical chapters of this dissertation explore this social element of corruption. The first empirical chapter examines the link from the individual to the social environment and indicates that the perception of what others do – i.e. perceived descriptive social norms – crucially shape the decision to engage in corruption. Social norms may also help to explain the vast differences in corruption levels around the globe. The second empirical chapter investigates link from the social environment to the individual and shows that the physical presence of another person, who has neither the authority nor the means to directly punish, can reduce unethical behavior. It underlines that people preferable engage in corruption when being out of sight of observing others. The third chapter explored sequential corrupt decision-making between corrupt individuals and challenges the commonly held believe that severe forms of corruption emerge gradually (“slippery-slope-effect”). Instead, results of four studies demonstrate that it frequently occurs abruptly (“steep-cliff-effect”). All in all, comprehending why an individual engages in corruption requires an analysis of the social context. The third take-home message stresses the importance of interdisciplinary research on the complex dynamics of corrupt behavior. Above-mentioned distinctions between corruption 129
types facilitate a research approach across disciplinary boundaries and seek to reduce misunderstandings when using the term corruption. Given the relative scarcity of social psychological literature on corruption, this dissertation is largely based on corruption literature stemming from various disciplines. Studying non-psychological literature nourished my curiosity and at the same time made me humble. A lot of insights have already been gained, yet a lack of exchange between the disciplines hinders its dissemination. Exchange and collaboration between corruption researchers from different disciplines hopefully results in a more comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted social phenomenon of corruption. Finally, to go back to the initial motivation of this dissertation, let us recapitulate the why of this dissertation: corruption poses one of the most pressing social and societal challenges to the current generation – and perhaps future generations – around the world. Misallocation of shared resources that benefits only a selected few increases social injustice and hinders peaceful (global) co-living. Fighting corruption requires evidence-based programs that are informed by (interdisciplinary) research conducted in the laboratory and the field. Thus, the final take home message is that social psychology needs to join the scientific quest to understanding and reducing corruption. Hopefully, the theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions of this dissertation inspire more research on the challenging, relevant and fascinating social psychology of corruption.
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Wiltermuth, S. S. (2011). Cheating more when the spoils are split. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115(2), 157–168. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2010.10.001 Wit, A. P., & Kerr, N. L. (2002). “Me versus just us versus us all” categorization and cooperation in nested social dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 616–637. http://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.83.3.616
Wright, R. (2001). Nonzero: The logic of human destiny. New York, NY, USA: Vintage.
Wu, J., Balliet, D., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2016). Reputation, Gossip, and Human Cooperation. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 10(6), 350–364. http://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12255
Yap, A. A. (2016). The Ergonomics of Ethics. In J. W. van Prooijen & P. A. M. Van Lange (Eds.), Cheating, Corruption, and Concealment (pp. 1–29). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
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Supplemental Material Chapter 5 Overview of the payoff-schemes for studies 5.3 and 5.4 translating game dollar to Euro (Study 5.3) and Amazon gift Vouchers (Study 5.4) Study 5.3 Study 5.4 Game dollar Actual money Game dollar Amazon Gift earned paid out (€) earned Voucher (US $) 400.000 0 400.000 0 450.000 0.10 450.000 0.40 500.000 0.20 500.000 0.80 550.000 0.30 550.000 1.20 600.000 0.40 600.000 1.60 650.000 0.50 650.000 2.00 700.000 0.60 700.000 2.40 750.000 0.70 750.000 2.80 800.000 0.80 800.000 3.20 850.000 0.90 850.000 3.60 900.000 1.00 900.000 4.00 950.000 1.10 950.000 4.40 >950.000 1.20 >950.000 4.80 Note: The initial endowment in the game is 400.000$. The more the participants earned the higher their real payoffs were. Playing entirely fair results in a real payoff of 0.10€ (Study 5.3) or $0.40 (Study 5.4).
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Corruptie heeft enorme negatieve gevolgen voor mensen over de hele wereld – het laat het nationaal vermogen slinken (Kaufmann et al., 2006), veroorzaakt achteruitgang van het milieu (Ostrom, 2000; Rothstein, 2011a), bedreigt de democratie (Johnston, 2005) en verhoogt het aantal ongevallen bij natuurrampen (Ambraseys & Bilham, 2011). Voor het effectief reduceren van corruptie zijn empirisch onderbouwde anti-corruptie programma’s nodig (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2017). Hoewel er uitgebreide en diverse literatuur binnen de politicologie, rechten, (ontwikkelings)economie en sociologie bestaat dat vooral kijkt naar corruptie op macro-niveau, is er bijna geen sociaal-psychologisch onderzoek dat de microdeterminanten van corrupt gedrag bestudeert. Om dat gat te dichten, levert deze dissertatie een drievoudige bijdrage: theoretisch, methodologisch en empirisch.
Ten eerste, een theoretisch hoofdstuk (Hoofdstuk 2) introduceert een nieuw conceptueel model dat corrupt gedrag weergeeft als een sociaal dilemma. Het model onderscheidt twee types van corruptie: individuele en interpersoonlijke corruptie. Door middel van dit onderscheid bespreekt het hoofdstuk enkele van de meest belangrijke sociaal psychologische factoren en hun verschillende invloeden op beide vormen van corruptie en illustreert het belang van het differentiëren tussen corruptie-types om de psychologische achtergronden te begrijpen.
Ten tweede, als methodologische bijdrage introduceert deze dissertatie een nieuw gedragsinstrument om corruptie experimenteel te bestuderen. Door het modelleren van een vorm van interpersoonlijke corruptie, namelijk omkoping, staat het nieuwe corruptiespel eerste empirische inzichten toe over hoe situationele, sociale en persoonlijke factoren corrupt gedrag tot stand brengen. Ten derde, drie empirische hoofdstukken geven inzichten over (a) hoe waargenomen sociale normen corrupt gedrag vormen (Hoofdstuk 3), (b) hoe de fysieke aanwezigheid van een (niet-straffende) andere persoon corrupt en ander onethisch gedrag kan 177
beïnvloeden (Hoofdstuk 4) en als laatste (c) hoe corrupt gedrag zich ontwikkelt over tijd (Hoofdstuk 5). De dissertatie eindigt met een Algemene Discussie waarin deze bevindingen geïntegreerd worden in een grotere context, waarbij ingegaan wordt op de vragen: Wat zijn de nieuw verkregen inzichten? Hoe kunnen ze helpen om corruptie te verminderen? En wat zijn de mogelijkheden voor vervolgonderzoek naar sociaal psychologische factoren van corruptie? Hieronder geef ik een kort overzicht van ieder hoofdstuk.
Overzicht van de hoofdstukken
Hoofdstuk 2: Introductie van een theoretisch model
Hoofdstuk 2 richt zich op het ontbreken van theoretische modellen om de psychologische besluitvormingsprocessen bij verschillende vormen van corruptie te onderscheiden en bestuderen. Met een nadruk op de rol van mentale voorspelling (prospectie), differentieert dit hoofdstuk tussen twee brede categorieën van corrupte gedragingen: (1) individuele corruptie , wat betrekking heeft op een machthebber die individueel toevertrouwde macht misbruikt; en (2) interpersoonlijke corruptie, wat betrekking heeft op een machthebber die toevertrouwde macht misbruikt in samenwerking met andere corrupte mensen. Dit nieuwe theoretische onderscheid geeft de besluitvormingsstructuur weer als twee wezenlijk verschillende sociale dillema’s: individuele corruptie vereist een machthebber om eigen en collectieve consequenties te voorspellen, terwijl interpersoonlijke corruptie een voorspelling vereist van eigenbelang, het belang van de corrupte partner(s) en collectieve belangen – het geeft de structuur van een gelaagd sociaal dilemma weer. Zodoende gaan individuele en interpersoonlijke corruptie gepaard met verschillende psychologische besluitvormingsprocessen. Dit hoofdstuk behandelt deze verschillende dynamieken aan de hand van intrapersoonlijke (verwachte kosten en opbrengsten, zelfcontrole, schuldgevoel) en interpersoonlijke factoren (sociale normen, vertrouwen). Verder behandelt dit hoofdstuk de 178
voordelen van dit nieuwe onderscheid voor theorievorming, experimenteel corruptieonderzoek en anti-corruptie interventies.
Hoofdstuk 3: Sociale Normen van Corruptie
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt de invloed van waargenomen sociale normen op corrupt gedrag. Hoewel aanzienlijke vooruitgang is geboekt in het begrijpen van corruptie op macroniveau, de psychologische antecedenten van corruptie zijn nog grotendeels onbekend. Om te verklaren waarom sommige mensen zich schuldig maken aan corruptie terwijl anderen dat niet doen, onderzoekt dit hoofdstuk de invloed van beschrijvende sociale normen door een nieuwe gedragsmeting van corruptie te gebruiken. Drie studies testen of waargenomen descriptieve normen van corruptie (dus de overtuiging over hoe vaak corruptie in een specifieke context voorkomt) corrupt gedrag beïnvloeden. De resultaten laten zien dat descriptieve normen hoog correleren met corrupt gedrag – zowel wanneer vooraf gemeten (Onderzoek 3.1) als na (Onderzoek 3.2) de gedragsmeting van corruptie. De derde studie was een experiment waarin het causale effect onderzocht wordt van descriptieve normen op corruptie (Onderzoek 3.3). Corrupt gedrag in het corruptiespel verlaagt significant wanneer participanten korte primes met anti-corruptie descriptieve normen krijgen voorafgaand aan het spel. De bevindingen geven aan dat waargenomen descriptieve normen invloed kunnen hebben op corrupt gedrag en, mogelijk, interpersoonlijke en interculturele verschillen kunnen verklaren in corrupt gedrag rondom de wereld. Het hoofdstuk eindigt met een discussie over de implicaties van deze bevindingen en geeft mogelijkheden weer voor vervolgonderzoek.
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Hoofdstuk 4: De Aanwezigheid van de Ander Effect
Hoofdstuk 4 probeert een basale en tegelijkertijd zeer relevante vraag te beantwoorden: Remt de aanwezigheid van een andere persoon onethisch gedrag af? De groeiende hoeveelheid literatuur over gedragsethiek heeft herhaaldelijk benadrukt dat “anderen” individueel onethisch gedrag substantieel beïnvloeden. Echter, in het grootste deel van de onderzoeken maakten participanten afgezonderd beslissingen, soms met indirecte signalen die met de sociale aanwezigheid van anderen geassocieerd zijn (bijv. kijkende ogen), maar niet met een andere persoon die daadwerkelijk fysiek aanwezig was. Twee experimenten onderzochten of de aanwezigheid van een andere persoon, die geen formele middelen heeft om sancties op te leggen, voldoende is om onethisch gedrag te verminderen. In beide experimenten was er een tweede persoon aanwezig in het hokje met de participant. Onderzoek 4.1 heeft ook de kwaliteit van de relatie richting die persoon onderzocht, die oftewel een vreemdeling oftewel een goede vriend was. Onderzoek 4.2 onderzocht de effecten van het belang dat de andere persoon had in de beslissing van de participant: Profiteren van bedriegen versus niet. Door verschillende gedragsparadigma’s te gebruiken treden twee kernresultaten op: Ten eerste remt de aanwezigheid van een andere persoon de mate van corruptie en bedriegen, en ten tweede maakt noch de relatie richting de ander noch de opbrengsten voor de andere persoon uit voor dit effect. Het hoofdstuk eindigt met een discussie van de implicaties van dit “aanwezigheid van een andere persoon” effect voor onderzoek en beleid.
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Hoofdstuk 5: De Weg naar Omkoping en Corruptie – Diepe Afgrond of Hellend Vlak
Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt hoe zware vormen van corruptie tussen twee mensen onstaan. De meest voorkomende verklaring over hoe zware corruptie ontstaat is de “hellend vlak” metafoor – het idee dat corruptie geleidelijk ontstaat. Hoewel dit idee wijdverspreide theoretische en intuïtieve aantrekkingskracht heeft, is het nog amper empirisch getest. Vier experimentele studies hebben getest of zware corrupte handelingen geleidelijk of abrupt ontstaan. De resultaten toonden aan dat er een hogere kans op zware corruptie was wanneer participanten direct de mogelijkheid werd gegeven om daaraan deel te nemen (abrupt) in vergelijking met wanneer ze zich eerst hebben beziggehouden met mildere vormen van corruptie (geleidelijk). Noch de grootte van de opbrengst, die we constant hebben gehouden, noch evaluaties van de handelingen konden deze verschillen verklaren. In tegenstelling tot algemeen gedeelde overtuigingen, soms leidt de route naar corruptie via een diepe afgrond in plaats van een hellend vlak.
Conclusie
De inzichten die verkregen zijn door deze dissertatie leveren meerdere conclusies op: Ten eerste, de theoretische discussie toont aan dat het gebruik van de term corruptie specificatie nodig heeft. Het bestaat uit een breed scala aan gedragingen. Er is systematische onderscheid nodig om de verschillende vormen van corruptie te bestuderen, begrijpen en beperken. Het theoretisch model dat voorgesteld is in deze dissertatie legt de basis voor een dergelijk geïntegreerd kader en hopelijk inspireert het toekomstig conceptueel werk om een geïntegreerd instrument te ontwikkelen – een atlas van corruptie types – om de meerdere vormen van corruptie van elkaar te onderscheiden.
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De tweede kernconclusie komt voort uit empirische inzichten en benadrukt het belang om sociale elementen van corruptie te onderzoeken. De empirische bevindingen tonen aan dat het maken van corrupte beslissingen sterk wordt beïnvloed door andere mensen. Het eerste empirische hoofdstuk suggereert dat de waarneming van wat anderen doen – dus de waargenomen descriptieve sociale normen – de beslissing om deel te nemen aan corruptie sterk beïnvloed en zelfs kan helpen om de grote verschillen in corruptieniveaus in de wereld te begrijpen. Het tweede empirische hoofdstuk laat zien dat de fysieke aanwezigheid van een andere persoon, die noch de autoriteit noch de middelen heeft om direct te straffen, onethisch gedrag kan verminderen. Het hoofdstuk benadrukt dat mensen liever deelnemen aan corruptie wanneer ze niet gezien worden door anderen. Door het onderzoeken van opeenvolgende corrupte beslissingen tussen corrupte individuen, ondermijnt het derde hoofdstuk de algemeen geaccepteerde overtuiging dat zware vormen van corruptie geleidelijk ontstaan (“hellendvlak-effect”) door aan te tonen dat het vaak juist abrupt gebeurt (“diepe-afgrond-effect”). Al met al lijken sociale factoren van nature een individuele beslissing te beïnvloeden om aan corruptie deel te nemen.
De derde conclusie is dat voor het tegengaan van corruptie meer (interdisciplinair) werk nodig is over het onderwerp. De empirische resultaten in deze dissertatie tonen het belang aan van het bestuderen van voorspellers en gevolgen van corruptie door gedrag te beïnvloeden. In de toekomst komt hopelijk meer onderzoek, uitgevoerd in het laboratorium en het veld, dat belangrijke en nieuwe empirische inzichten zal geven in de sociale psychologie van corruptie.
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Acknowledgements
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A dissertation is no solitary effort. Over the course of this PhD, countless people have inspired, supported and improved this work. It has been an amazing journey and I sincerely thank each and all of you who have eased the way! First off, I want to thank my supervisors, Jan-Willem van Prooijen, Francesca Righetti, and Paul Van Lange. I deeply appreciate the way you have guided me in this process – finding a balance between letting me explore topics outside of the direct scope of my dissertation and at the same time curbing my enthusiasm so that I don’t get too carried away. It was an incredibly rewarding endeavor to explore this unknown scientific terrain of social psychology of corruption together with such an amazing team of experts. I also want to sincerely thank the NWO for funding this project and enabling us to do this work. Dank je wel and grazie mille! A big “Thank you!”, to all the great colleagues from the Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology at the VU Amsterdam. Whether it was over lunch, at the annual mini-conference or while having a beer at one of the Borrels, it has always been a pleasure to exchange ideas with you. Special thanks to my roommates, Ali Mashuri, Hannah Moore, Junhui Wu, Katherina Alvarez, Michael Laakasuo, Robert Meershoek and Zoi Manesi. Gracias, σας ευχαριστώ, 谢谢, dank je, terima kasih and kiitos, for enduring my repeated trips to the whiteboard with such patience and all the coffees that alleviated the bumps in the road to the PhD. I want to thank all the great co-authors that I have had the pleasure to write papers, articles and book chapters with. You have taught me countless tricks and tips! I also want to thank the Bachelor, Master and Research Master students that I have supervised over the past years – I hope you keep your curiosity and creativity going! During my PhD, I was fortunate enough to spend a month at the Department of Economics of the University of Zürich. I want to thank all colleagues at the chair of Ernst Fehr that I got to meet during that time. Special thanks to Sonja Vogt and Charles Efferson for inviting me! You have opened the door to economics for me, taught me a lot about how to 185
design and run experiments, for instance, the fact that corruption games do not only emerge out of coffee-induced brainstorming sessions but can be mathematically calculated. Merci vilmal, thank you very much and vielen Dank! I also had the privilege to visit several conferences and workshops to present this work, and have received feedback that was immensely valuable. Thanks to all the fascinating people I got to meet in Amsterdam, Bonn, Berlin, Düsseldorf, Duisburg, Hannover, Helsinki, Hong Kong, Kiev, Lisbon, Leiden, New York, Passau, Prague, Zeist and Zürich. I appreciate the encounters that these trips have enabled me to experience! Special thanks to the German-speaking corruption research colloquium, KorrWiss and to Johann Steudle and Jamie-Lee Campbell for introducing me to it. Meeting you has really been like discovering a treasure. I want to express my special gratitude to Anna Schwickerath, Annika Engelbert, Oksana Huss, Corinna Martin and the Volkshotel staff for helping me to organize the first Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Forum in Amsterdam. I didn’t expect that organizing a conference can actually be so much fun! It is amazing to see that our goal of bringing together (young) scholars working on corruption from different disciplines has resulted in the founding of the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network. It is an honor to be one of the founding members along such a great group of dedicated corruption researchers. Thank you, Danke, спасибі obrigado, and merci to Anna Schwickerath, Annika Engelbert, Corinna Martin, Ina Kubbe, Jessica Flakne, Oksana Huss, Steven Gawthorpe and Sofia Wickberg as well as the professors who volunteered to be on our advisory board, namely, Bo Rothstein, Janine Wedel, Jean Ensminger, Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Paul Heywood and Luis de Sousa. I look forward to all the exciting endeavors on the horizon together! I also want to thank my new colleagues at the Department of Economics and Business and CREED at the University of Amsterdam – and its foosball table. I would like to express 186
my special gratitude and a big תודהto Shaul Shalvi – as well as thank the “Moral-lab” crew and my roommates: Ivan Soraperra, Maël Lebreton, Margarita Leib and Suzanna Berg. It’s great to be your colleagues! I have learned a lot from you already and look forward to our joint work in the future. I want to send a heartfelt ‘kiitos’ up North to Finland addressing Michael Laakasuo for being a great friend, science-sparring partner, and for inviting me to be part of the Helsinki challenge team. It was an amazing experience to work with you, Jussi Palomäki, Marianna Drosinou, and Markus Jokela on the fascinating topic of Morality of Intelligent Machines. A little further South in Denmark, I want to send a ‘mange tak’ to Kristian Mølberg for the great cover design of this dissertation and all the conversations. Let’s keep the bridge between science and art alive! Speaking of art, much of this work has been written while listening to music. I don’t want to bore the reader with all the musicians (I happily provide the famous ‘Flöz’ playlist upon request), so let me just briefly thank my personal PhD Top 5 – Christian Löffler, Martin Kohlstedt, Kanye West, N’to and Nils Frahm – for making music that helps me get to work, concentrate and think! Some of these musicians – and countless other nuggets – I only got to know through the constantly refreshing exchange with my two “Paranimfen”, Chris Starke and Cyril Brandt. It is an tremendous privilege to know that you have my back, not just during the dissertation defense! I am extremely grateful that this work bears the hallmarks of our “Mind-Capoeira”approach. Another huge “thank you” to Mathias Roth! Talking to you is always elevating, and your moral support but also our Squash sessions, have fostered my mental and physical health. Vielen Dank, to my brother from another mother, Markus Stöckl, among many other things, for organizing our hiking trips! I want to also thank Johannes Odenkirchen, for all the discussions, whether it’s science, politics or basketball. Overall, I want to thank all my awesome friends who I haven’t named yet but who have donated to this dissertation in all 187
kinds of way – be it, by welcoming me at your place so that I felt at home around the world, bearing with the countless dinner table discussions about corruption or spending quality leisure time together. Thank you, Danke, merci, gracias, dank je wel, and mulțumesc to Andrea, Alexandra, Alice, Arian, Caroline, Corinne, Daniela, Ellen, Flo, Hannah, João, Kat, Katha, Matt, Laura, Rick, Sandra, Simon, Wendelin, Valy and the entire Freiraum Kollektiv! I want to express my deep gratitude to my family. First off, I sincerely thank my parents, Evi and Hajo for nourishing my curiosity, showing me the pleasure of finding out things and supporting me in countless other ways! Vielen Dank, to my sister, Rike! Your perseverance to fight for your passion has been an inspiration throughout this work! Lots of love and genuine Danke, asante, and muito obrigado to Ute, Gerhard, Wolfgang, Ulla, Christof, Frederik, Michi, Julia, Jochen, Daniel, Patty, Jannes, Romy, Madina, Mzee Issa, auntie Rahma Mzee Ali, Yassin, Mamuu, Mehdi, João, Marion and Pedro! Finally, I want to thank from the bottom of my heart my wife, Hadija. You have calmed me when I was stressed, cheered me up when I was down and helped me find a way when I was stuck. This dissertation was made possible through your caring patience. Sharing my life with you fills me with joy and optimism. For that, and so many other things, a heartfelt asante sana, mpenzi!
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Curriculum Vitae
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Nils was born on August the 17th 1986 in Meerbusch, Germany. After graduating from high-school, he went to Lisbon, Portugal to complete a year of civil service. Motivated by the experiences, he enrolled for a Bachelor Program in Psychology at the WWU University Münster back in Germany. Nils discovered his special interest in the social element of psychology during two internships in Rwanda and Tanzania and therefore decided to study a Research Master in Social Psychology at the VU University Amsterdam.
He graduated in 2012 (cum laude) and received the Master Thesis of the Year Award in Psychology (2012) for his work on corruption – a topic for which he developed a fascination during his final year of the Research Master. Together with Jan-Willem van Prooijen, Francesca Righetti and Paul Van Lange, Nils was able to obtain a NWO Talent Grant that funded their research on the social psychological elements of corruption. This grant also allowed Nils to organize a two-day conference on corruption. As a result of this event, together with several other researchers, Nils founded the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network9.
The interest in corruption has not vanished and so Nils has been invited to join Transparency International’s Anti-Corruption Solutions and Knowledge Network of Experts10 and was part of the UNODC Education for Justice Expert Roundtable that aims to foster tertiary education on anti-corruption11. 9
See http://www.ICRNetwork.org See http://www.transparency.org/experts_network 11 See https://www.unodc.org/dohadeclaration/en/topics/education-for-justice.html 10
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The work of his dissertation has been featured in the media; online (e.g. Scientific American), printed (e.g. Katapult), as well as in public radio shows in Germany (Bayerischer Rundfunk) and Great Britain (BBC4). Nils currently works as a Post-Doctoral researcher at the Faculty of Economics and Business and is a member of the Center for Experimental Economics and political Decision-making (CREED) at the University of Amsterdam, researching the collaborative roots of corruption.
Publications
Köbis, N. C., van Prooijen, J.-W., Righetti, F., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2017). The road to bribery and corruption: Slippery slope or steep cliff? Psychological Science, 1, 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797616682026 Köbis, N. C., Iragorri-Carter, D. & Starke, C. (in press). Social psychological perspectives on corruption and social norms. In I. Kubbe & A. Engelbert (Eds.), Corruption and Norms. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Köbis, N. C. & Starke, C. (2017). Why the Panama Papers did (not) shake the world - The relationship between Journalism and Corruption. Proceedings of the First Forum of Interdisciplinary Corruption Research. Amsterdam, Netherlands. Köbis, N. C., & Huss, O. (in press). Ein Atlas zur Unterscheidung von Korruptionsformen. In P. Graeff & S. Wolf (Eds.), Korruptionsbekämpfung vermitteln: didaktische, ethische und inhaltliche Aspekte in Lehre, Unterricht und Weiterbildung. Hamburg, Germany: Springer.
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Köbis, N. C. van Prooijen, J-W., Righetti, F., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (forthcoming). The Look over your shoulder: Corruption and cheating decreases in the presence of another person. Manuscript under review. Laakasuo, M., Köbis, N. C., Palomäki, J., & Jokela, M. (2017). Money for microbes-Pathogen avoidance and out-group helping behaviour. International Journal of Psychology. http://doi.org/10.1002/ijop.12416 Köbis, N. C., van Prooijen, J.-W., Righetti, F., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2016). Prospection in individual and interpersonal corruption dilemmas. Review of General Psychology, 20(1), 71–85. http://doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000069 Brandt, C. O., Köbis, N. C., & Starke, C. (2016). Korruption - Das machen doch alle so. Katapult, 1(1), 44–48. Saucier, G., Kenner, J. S., (…), Köbis, N. C., Luque, J., Hood, J., Chakravorty, D., Pal, A. M., Ong, L., Leung, A., & Altschul, C. (2015). Cross-cultural differences in a global ‘Survey of World Views’. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 46, 53-70. Köbis, N. C., van Prooijen, J.-W., Righetti, F., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2015). “Who Doesn’t?”-The Impact of Descriptive Norms on Corruption. PLoS ONE, 10(6), e0131830. http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0131830
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Kurt Lewin Institute Dissertation Series 2017-10 The “Kurt Lewin Institute Dissertation Series” started in 1997. Since 2015 the following dissertations have been published in this series: 2015-01: Maartje Elshout: Vengeance 2015-02: Seval Gündemir: The Minority Glass Ceiling Hypothesis: Exploring Reasons and Remedies for the Underrepresentation of Racial-ethnic Minorities in Leadership Positions 2015-03: Dagmar Beudeker: On regulatory focus and performance in organizational environments 2015-04: Charlotte Koot: Making up your mind about a complex technology: An investigation into factors that help or hinder the achievement of cognitive closure about CCS 2015-05: Marco van Bommel: The Reputable Bystander: The Role of Reputation in Activating or Deactivating Bystanders 2015-06: Kira O. McCabe: The Role of Personality in the Pursuit of Context-Specific Goals 2015-07: Wiebren Jansen: Social inclusion in diverse work settings 2015-08: Xiaoqian Li: As time goes by: Studies on the subjective perception of the speed by which time passes 2015-09: Aukje Verhoeven: Facilitating food-related planning. Applying metacognition, cuemonitoring, and implementation intentions 2015-10: Jasper de Groot: Chemosignaling Emotions: What a Smell can Tell 2015-11: Hedy Greijdanus: Intragroup Communication in Intergroup Conflict: Influences on Social Perception and Cognition 2015-12: Bart de Vos: Communicating Anger and Contempt in Intergroup Conflict: Exploring their Relational Functions 2015-13: Gerdientje Danner: Psychological Availability. How work experiences spill over into daily family interactions 2015-14: Hannah Nohlen: Solving ambivalence in context. The experience and resolution of attitudinal ambivalence 2015-15: Stacey Sanders: Unearthing the Moral Emotive Compass: Exploring the Paths to (Un)Ethical Leadership 2015-16: Marc Heerdink: Regulating deviance with emotions: Emotional expressions as signals of acceptance and rejection 2015-17: Danny Taufik: "Can you feel it" The role of feelings in explaining pro-environmental behavior 2015-18: Sarah Elbert: Auditory information and its parameters in health persuasion. The development of a tailored smartphone application to support behavior change
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2016-01: Anna van ‘t Veer: Effortless morality — cognitive and affective processes in deception and its detection 2016-02: Thijs Bouman: Threat by association: How distant events can affect local intergroup relations 2016-03: Tim Theeboom: Workplace coaching: Processes and effects 2016-04: Sabine Strofer: Deceptive intent: Physiological reactions in different interpersonal contexts 2016-05: Caspar van Lissa: Exercising Empathy: The Role of Adolescents' Developing Empathy in Conflicts with Parents 2016-06: Marlon Mooijman: On the determinants and consequences of punishment goals: The role of power, distrust, and rule compliance 2016-07: Niels van Doesum: Social mindfulness 2016-08: Leonie Venhoeven: A look on the bright side of an environmentally-friendly life: Whether and why acting environmentally-friendly can contribute to well-being 2016-09: Florien Cramwinckel: The social dynamics of morality 2016-10: Junhui Wu: Understanding Human Cooperation: The Psychology of Gossip, Reputation, and Life History 2016-11: Elise C. Seip: Desire for vengeance. An emotion-based approach to revenge 2016-12: Welmer E. Molenmaker: The (un)willingness to reward cooperation and punish noncooperation 2016-13: Liesbeth Mann: On Feeling Humiliated. The Experience of Humiliation in Interpersonal, Intragroup, and Intergroup Contexts 2016-14: Angela M. Ruepert: Working on the environment 2016-15: Femke Hilverda: Making sense of food risk information: The case of organic food. 2016-16: Debora E. Purba: Antecedents of turnover, organizational citizenship behavior, and workplace deviance: Empirical evidence from Indonesia. 2016-17: Maja Kutlaca: The Role of Values and Value-Identity Fit in Motivating Collective Action 2016-18: Felicity Turner: A New Psychological Perspective on Identity content, its Conceptualization, Measurement, and Application 2016-19: Tim W. Faber: When Imitation Falls Short: The Case of Complementary Actions. 2016-20: Daniela Becker: Self-control conflict in the eating domain: A cognitive, affective and behavioral perspective 2016-21: Zoi Manesi: Prosocial Behavior Under Surveillance: Understanding the Eye-Images Effect 2017-01: Tracy Cheung: Turning vice into virtue - when low self-control states facilitate goal-oriented behaviours
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2017-02: Pum Kommattam: Feeling the Other: Emotion Interpretation in Intercultural Settings 2017-03: Lotte Veenstra: Taming Tempers: A situated motivational approach to anger management 2017-04: Jolien van Breen: The path of most Resistance: How groups cope with implicit social identity threat 2017-05: Yuije Cheng: Creativity Under the Gun: How Threat Features and Personal Characteristics Motivate Creative Responding 2017-06: Eftychia Stamkou: The dynamic nature of social hierarchies: The role of norm violations and hierarchical concerns 2017-07: Anne Marthe van der Bles: Societal Discontent -- Deciphering the Zeitgeist 2017-08: Willem Sleegers: Meaning and Pupillometry: The Role of Physiological Arousal in Meaning Maintenance 2017-09: Julia Sasse: More Than a Feeling: Strategic Emotion Expression in Intergroup Conflicts 2017-10: Nils Köbis: The Social Psychology of Corruption
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