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Business and Politics Volume 5, Issue 1

2003

Article 3

The Structures of Interest Coalitions: Evidence from Environmental Litigation Andrew B. Whitford∗

∗

University of Kansas

c Copyright 2003 by the authors. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher, bepress, which has been given certain exclusive rights by the author. Business and Politics is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://www.bepress.com/bap

The Structures of Interest Coalitions: Evidence from Environmental Litigation Andrew B. Whitford

Abstract This paper addresses the intersection of coalition formation, judicial strategies, and regulatory politics. Coalitions are a low-cost means for assembling minority interests into more powerful blocs. However, in most cases in regulatory politics, judicial strategies are high cost efforts. I argue that coalitions among interests form one basis for judicial participation, but that participation manifests in an array of coalition “microstructures.” For any one event, the microstructure of the interest group coalition varies, but across events the coalitions take on general forms. The paper offers evidence for a variety of coalition microstructures in interest group participation as amici curiae (“friends of the court”) in cases before the United States Supreme Court. The evidence is drawn from the case of the Group of Ten, a stable, long-term coalition of environmental interest groups that operated from 1981 to 1991.

Business and Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1, April 2003

The Structures of Interest Coalitions: Evidence from Environmental Litigation ANDREW B. WHITFORD1 University of Kansas

ABSTRACT This paper addresses the intersection of coalition formation, judicial strategies, and regulatory politics. Coalitions are a low-cost means for assembling minority interests into more powerful blocs. However, in most cases in regulatory politics, judicial strategies are high cost efforts. I argue that coalitions among interests form one basis for judicial participation, but that participation manifests in an array of coalition “microstructures.” For any one event, the microstructure of the interest group coalition varies, but across events the coalitions take on general forms. The paper offers evidence for a variety of coalition microstructures in interest group participation as amici curiae (“friends of the court”) in cases before the United States Supreme Court. The evidence is drawn from the case of the Group of Ten, a stable, long-term coalition of environmental interest groups that operated from 1981 to 1991.

Studies of nonmarket forces in regulatory settings often focus on the power of businesses to assemble groups of interests and generate leverage for their own benefit. As Baron suggests, in a firm’s nonmarket strategy, the spotlight is on the social, legal, and political institutions that structure interactions outside of markets.2 In this environment, interest coalitions are a primary mechanism for assembling diverse interests, whether through peak or trade associations, or ad hoc coalitions. Once assembled, coalitions may press claims in both governmental and nongovernmental venues. This paper addresses the intersection of coalition formation, judicial strategies, and regulatory politics. Specifically, coalitions are a low-cost means for assembling minority interests into more powerful blocs. However, in most cases in regulatory politics, judicial strategies are high cost efforts.3 What is the impact of interest coalitions on judicial strategies? How do interest coalitions participate in judicial venues? I argue that coalitions among interests form one basis for judicial participation, but that participation manifests in an array of coalition “microstructures.” That is, for any one event, the microstructure of the interest group coalition varies, but across events the coalitions take on general forms. I offer evidence for a variety of coalition microstructures in interest group 1. Correspondence: Department of Political Science, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 66044-3177. E-mail: [email protected]. Author’s note: I thank the following for their suggestions about this paper: Lee Epstein, Bill Lowry, Norman Schofield, and Ken Kollman. All errors that remain are my own. 2. Baron (2000). 3. Baron (2000), p. 242.

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1369-5258 print/ISSN 1469-3569 online/03/010045-20  2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/1369525032000100599 Reprinted by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006

Andrew B. Whitford participation as amici curiae (“friends of the court”) in cases before the United States Supreme Court. The evidence is drawn from the case of the Group of Ten, a stable, long-term coalition of environmental interest groups that operated from 1981 to 1991, in part as a response to the Reagan Administration’s management of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The distinct advantages of the environmental arena are that groups regularly engage in litigation strategies, that litigation is often a group’s best response to either a governmental decision or another group’s action, and that groups know and understand the consequences of those actions for their goals and interests.4 This case provides unique and direct insight into the temporal performance of a long-term stable interest coalition across multiple nonmarket events. Coalition formation among diverse interests is not unusual.5 However, those coalitions, often characterized as alliances, are rarely stable and often shortlived. Similarly, groups regularly file amicus briefs, for many reasons and with varying success.6 But existing studies fail to address how groups in coalition operate in judicial settings. More importantly, they fail to address the long-term maintenance and operation of group coalitions. The microstructure of a coalition’s participation as amici curiae provides an exact lens on these concerns. The microstructure of participation is an important, if often overlooked, aspect of group coalitions. As recent studies suggest, the network aspects of group coordination—the specific interconnections between groups—may be as important as whether participation occurs at all.7 This paper characterizes the microstructure of participation in Supreme Court litigation as a mechanism for coalition performance by examining how amicus participation changes in collections of groups over time. Specifically, microstructure reveals an important side benefit of coalition behavior for interests: coalition represents a credible commitment device to insure against within-coalition conflict in future deliberations. The paper proceeds as follows. First, I review reasons for the existence and persistence of interest coalitions. I then address groups’ use of judicial strategies of participation as amici curiae before the U.S. Supreme Court. Second, I offer evidence on the microstructural aspects of environmental interest group participation as an amicus curiae coalition. Last, I offer implications for the use of judicial strategies by interest coalitions in the balancing of group preferences by political decision-makers.

1. Groups in Coalitions and Court Are groups able to form coalitions? Are those coalitions stable? In sum, the possibility of coalition depends on a group’s purpose, its means of maintenance, and the benefits of coalition. Alliances between groups often determine the 4. 5. 6. 7.

For example, see Melnick (1983). Hojnacki (1997), pp. 61–87. Caldeira and Wright (1988), pp. 1109–27. Heinz, et al. (1993); Carpenter et al. (1998), pp. 417–44.

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The Structures of Interest Coalitions effectiveness of a group.8 Coalitions serve as ways to share information, reduce uncertainty, and broaden the member groups’ leverage. They persist mainly because they provide special and unique benefits to the groups and their members. First, a group’s purpose and its means of maintenance help determine the possibility of coalition. Generally, groups that provide public goods are fraught with free-rider problems, and thus use selective incentives to attract members; groups in the same policy domain will compete for membership, and rarely coordinate actions.9 For groups seeking to reduce public bads, the costs of not belonging can be high and may limit free-rider problems.10 However, while this means that groups may form more easily in the case of public bads, coalitions may be no easier to form. In contrast, coalition is easier to obtain when groups seek private goods (or indivisible but excludable goods) for their members.11 Yet, those coalitions will take a peculiar form: they will be minimal-winning and not minimal-connected.12 For example, in Yandle’s “Bootleggers and Baptists,” coalitions are explicit between regulated businesses and environmental groups,13 but only because the benefits are divisible and the groups’ constituencies are partitioned.14 In fact, coalitions are likely when groups have exogenous memberships because membership is then partially determined by social “marking,” and so competition for membership is low; endogenous groups compete for members, have high turnover, and are unlikely to coalesce.15 Coalitions may also form when groups seek to resolve conflict and share information. Groups with similar interests may coordinate to decrease the costs of fighting between rival entrepreneurs and share information;16 the ultimate coalition is the merger of two groups. For Laumann and Knoke, network structures control information and resource flows and allow for “coalition-formation, influence-mobilization, and bargaining-negotiation processes.”17 Groups communicate to limit uncertainty, and information serves an interpretive basis for coalition.18 Coalitions will form around major information sources; issue salience will determine how groups expend scarce resources. Information partitions the blocs of opponents, and binds together the members of the blocs. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18.

Tilly (1978). Olson (1965). Mitchell (1979), pp. 87–123; see also Hirschman (1970), p. 101. Dunleavy (1991), pp. 36–42; Walker (1983), pp. 390–406. Group coalitions organized in the same policy domain may be unstable, even if the gains from collective action are large (Aranson and Ordeshook (1985), p. 128). Yandle (1989), pp. 19–40. In traditional corporatism, long-term structural relationships develop between groups of groups and a regulatory authority, but there is little analysis of how groups balance competitive pressures with the benefits of coalition (Dunleavy (1991), pp. 27–36). The stability of group coalitions is especially problematic in the United States, where there is more access to government. Dunleavy (1991), pp. 63–71. Moe (1980), pp. 64–5. Laumann and Knoke (1987), p. 7. Laumann and Knoke (1987), p. 15.

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Andrew B. Whitford The central problem is that information-based coalitions are transitory; they usually involve only single events.19 In fact, little systematic attention has been paid to the persistence of interest coalitions over time and multiple interactions.20 The persistence of coalitions depends on the long-term payoffs to the groups and their members. Laumann and Knoke observe that stable coalitions exist when issues are both recurrent and oppositional, such as in labor policy.21 Perhaps the most rigorous theoretical basis for group coalition persistence is by V. Kerry Smith.22 Individuals join groups for many reasons. Additionally, those groups themselves may be members of a second club, a broader lobby such as the environmental movement.23 Each member in this club gains two benefits: utility from expressive advocacy activities, and utility from successful advocacy. Individuals joining a group also join the lobby; groups join the lobby to pool resources and attract new members through successful advocacy. The lobby is stable because no members exit due to a cost of not joining (a decrease in the amount of successful advocacy). Members of the groups also do not exit because there is a perceived cost of not joining. More recently, Hojnacki provides evidence for the advocacy benefits of membership in a larger, multi-group lobby.24 Most surprising, groups representing broad interests are more likely to ally, not groups representing narrow “niche” interests.25

Groups as Amici Curiae On occasion, interests pursue judicial strategies to obtain policy change and political benefits. In this section, I offer the choice of a specific judicial strategy—the participation of groups as amici curiae before the U.S. Supreme Court—as an analytic environment for assessing the operation of group coalitions. Of course, the use of the courts is a broad and well-known strategy for interest groups.26 Most discussion has centered first on groups’ use of two means of influence—litigation and amicus27 brief filings—and second, on explaining those choices. Primary explanations of litigation include political disadvantage on the part of groups,28 the protection of civil rights, the characteristics of their organization, and the compatibility of the court as a political institution with the groups’ interests.29 The problem of incompatibility is central: litigation is a 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

Laumann and Knoke (1987), pp. 344–5. See Loomis (1986), pp. 258–74; Hojnacki (1997), pp. 61–87; also see Chatfield (1969), pp. 298–312. Laumann and Knoke (1987), p. 317; see also Salisbury et al. (1987), pp. 1217–34. Smith (1985), pp. 132–47. Joining a club limits free-riding, but introduces congestion costs (Buchanan (1965), pp. 1–14; Pauly (1967), pp. 314–24; Cornes and Sandler (1986); Sandler (1992)). Hojnacki (1997), pp. 61–87. See Browne (1990), pp. 477–509. Barker (1967), pp. 41–69; Cortner (1968), pp. 287–307; Sorauf (1976); Schepple and Walker (1991), pp. 157–184. Olson (1984). Olson (1990), pp. 854–882; but see O’Connor and Epstein (1983), pp. 479–489. Schepple and Walker (1991), pp. 157–84.


The Structures of Interest Coalitions costly strategy, with costs driven by the exclusionary rules and procedures of the institutions. These explanations are reflected in political scientists’ long recognition that interest groups participate as amici curiae to increase their leverage in the third branch of national government. In recent years, O’Connor and Epstein show that conservative as well as liberal groups view amicus filings as an effective lobbying device.30 Spriggs claims that amicus briefs affect how agencies respond to Supreme Court decisions.31 Wahlbeck argues that amicus briefs help determine long-term legal change.32 Caldeira and Wright show that participation as amicus curiae helps determine the Court’s33 selection of its case docket.34 Caldeira and Wright also note that the Supreme Court is accessible to a broad array of organized interests, largely through amicus briefs. Hansford argues that the use of amicus filings will depend on a group’s organizational maintenance concerns.35 Few, if any, of these studies recognize the coalitional nature of amicus participation of groups. In fact, there are indications that groups coordinate actions in a number of policy areas.36 Given the costs of participation, coalitional behavior in amicus filings may be optimal for interest representation. No known study assesses the evidence for coalitional behavior among interests in litigation. However, coalitional behavior can take a number of forms in amicus brief filings. On one hand, strong coalitions may form—where an existing stable interest coalition represents its preferences in the legal arena as an extension of other, more established participation strategies in politics. On the other hand, ad hoc coalitions may form around specific issues and individual cases before the courts. However, in a very real sense, coalitions may have dual purposes. Coalitions may act as credible commitment devices to limit competition between groups in the same policy sphere. Coordinated action may take the form of limited or no opposition to the other members of an existing, stable coalition. In that case, interest coalitions represent credible commitments that are difficult to break and limit inter-group competition. Groups may file different briefs with an agreement to not disagree with each other; groups may agree not to disagree with each other by not filing multiple briefs on the same case; groups may choose not to file briefs where another member of the coalition was a party to the case. This variety of possible revealed actions on the part of interest coalitions reveals the importance of the microstructural aspects of coalition behavior. Just as in multiparty governance, the structure of coalitions—“which players will coordinate their actions and with whom will they coordinate?”—forms the basis for assessing the efficacy of coordinated action.37 Existing studies of both group 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

O’Connor and Epstein (1983), pp. 479–89; but see also Epstein et al. (1996), pp. 845–52. Spriggs (1996), pp. 1122–51. Wahlbeck (1997), pp. 778–802. Caldeira and Wright (1988), pp. 1109–27. Caldeira and Wright (1990), pp. 782–806. Hansford (2000). See Epstein (1993), pp. 639–717; Handler (1978); Kluger (1976); and Sorauf (1976); but also see Caldeira and Wright (1988), pp. 1109–27 and Caldeira and Wright (1990), pp. 782–806. 37. Ordeshook (1992), p. 259.


Andrew B. Whitford behavior both in coalition and as amici curiae neglects this basic aspect of coalition structure. Rather than “whether groups ally”, the central questions are “with whom do they ally and when?” Rather than “whether interests carry out judicial strategies through filing amici briefs,” the relevant questions are “with whom—and against whom—do they file briefs?” It is also worth noting that this test environment has an additional advantage. In the legislative and executive branches most interest group participation— especially with regard to information provision—is unobserved; the general exception is in campaign finance, where rules explicitly require that those actions be observable. In fact, many studies rely almost explicitly on surveys of groups to assess participation, and accordingly carry the possibility of strategic response bias. In the judicial branch, however, our study of interest group participation is aided by a paper trail that makes both the source and the content of the information that is transmitted observable. Interest coalitions form because the power of many is greater than the power of one. Judicial strategies are costly, and so coalitions increase any one group’s leverage and reduce the individual cost of participation. In the next section, I offer a specific test environment for assessing the role of interest coalitions in judicial strategies. This test environment takes a stable interest coalition as given; as indicated above, stability may be a rare but valuable attribute. In that context, I then inspect the microstructural aspects of individual amicus brief coalitions for the impact of that stable interest coalition on judicial participation.

2. The Group of Ten In environmental politics, there are broad divides between the left and the right, and between business and environmental public interest groups. But within each wing, not all groups are the same; just as not all business groups argue for the same level of government intervention, not all environmental groups agree on the extent of regulation. Broadly speaking, though, environmental politics is a group-dominated process.38 At a minimum, environmental interest groups historically have divided into three camps: the mainstream, the Greens, and the grassroots.39 Mainstream groups tend to be older, more established groups with significant Washington representation; examples include the Sierra Club, National Audubon Society, Environmental Defense (EDF), and Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). The Greens include Greenpeace and Earth First! Grassroots groups, an innovation dating to the 1980s, tend to concentrate on localized or “NIMBY” issues, such as waste facilities. Over time, some of these groups have coordinated their actions, in part due to change and flux in the environmental policy domain. Ad hoc cooperation occurred for reasons that include commonalities among the groups, the evolution of issues over time, and changes in the policy arena and regulatory authority. Here, I concentrate on the single most important coalition to form: the Group of 38. Lovrich and Pierce (1986), pp. 307–26. 39. Bosso (1991), pp. 151–76.


The Structures of Interest Coalitions Ten. In 1981, the leadership of ten major nonprofit environmental interest groups met in an informal session to plot strategy, discuss problems, and consider the possibility of further cooperation. Four years later, the Group of Ten released An Environmental Agenda for the Future, a comprehensive agenda for the environmental movement. In 1991, the Group disbanded and in its place arose an informal coalition of fifteen to twenty major groups involved in environmental and population issues on local, national, and international levels.40 The Group of Ten included the National Wildlife Federation (NWF), National Audubon Society, Wilderness Society, National Parks and Conservation Association (NPCA), Izaak Walton League of America, Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth (FOE), NRDC, EDF, and Environmental Policy Institute (EPI). These groups range from the very old (Audubon) to the relatively new (EPI), from no membership (EPI) to large (NWF), from the relatively resource poor (EPI) to well off (Sierra, NWF).41 The older conservation groups concentrate on wildlife, land use, and water issues. During the 1960s and 1970s, new groups, like NRDC and EDF, formed concerning specific issues or action strategies, such as litigation. Both old and new groups have proved viable in part due to the existence of perceived environmental or political threats, and an elemental environmentalist ideology.42 Funding primarily came from memberships and foundations. Mitchell notes that most groups were quite small until the 1960s, and that key foundation grants underwrote membership drives for some groups in the 1970s.43 In 1979, the major national groups had a membership of at least one million adults. In many ways, these groups have acted as traditional theories predict, competing with one another by carving out policy niches to retain and attract membership and funding.44 NRDC is especially active on toxics and stratospheric ozone depletion; Sierra emphasizes coastal pollution and the petroleum industry. EDF was a major force behind the Clean Air Act Amendments and the removal of DDT. Audubon has a longstanding commitment to the wildlife protection and pesticide reduction. FOE and EPI each have specialized in issues of environmental protection in the developing nations. One example is the groups’ use of symbols to highlight their niches (e.g., the wolf, the penguin, the whale, Meryl Streep). The Group of Ten, as leaders of the environmental movement, faced four years of the Reagan Administration and important changes in their issues of interest, including changes at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of the Interior. Access to decision-makers was no longer a certainty with the ascendancy of James Watt at Interior and Anne Gorsuch (later Burford) at EPA. Budget cutbacks and agency-wide reductions were threatened for professional staff at EPA. These changes occurred following increased emphasis during the previous Carter Administration on the use of economic tools 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

Greenwire, 15 May 1992. Bosso (1991), pp. 151–76. Ingram and Mann (1989), pp. 115–45. Mitchell (1979), pp. 87–123. Browne (1990), pp. 477–509.


Andrew B. Whitford such as benefit-cost analysis. At a minimum, there was a perception that business groups enjoyed greater access to regulatory authorities. Similarly, the groups themselves experienced change regarding their organization and strategy. NWF and others added dedicated fundraising staff, along with increased computerization and direct mail access.45 The dominance of the traditional groups like Sierra and Audubon fell.46 Changes at the EPA led to an influx of experienced staff to environmental groups. Together, these events combined to alter the groups’ strategies in profound ways. For example, from 1977 on, EPA officials obtained the groups’ agreement to not pressure the EPA, such as on its failure to enforce the 1982 deadlines of the Clean Air Act (CAA) for states to meet national air quality standards; EPA Assistant Administrator David Hawkins (formerly of NRDC) obtained the lobby’s agreement that resource constraints required priority setting about controlling pollution.47 But with political change, groups comfortable with inside strategies during the Carter years no longer enjoyed that access to the Reagan Administration’s EPA.48 The Group of Ten stepped into that void. As the Group’s central document, An Environmental Agenda for the Future, notes: “Early in 1981, we, the chief executives of 10 major environmental and conservation organizations, began meeting informally to enhance our effectiveness in helping to protect the nation’s environmental quality.”49 This document represented an explicit policy agenda for the Group, offered in part at Sierra and Audubon’s behest. It addressed almost all issues that impact the environment, including nuclear energy, population control, water, toxics, wildlife, land use and agriculture, protected lands, urban and international issues. Advice and data came from eleven task forces composed of staff from members of the Group and select smaller groups; funding was from four major foundations. Although they carefully disclaim speaking for the entire environmental movement, the Group argued that the agenda was the result of the collaboration of representative conservationists.50 In many ways, the Group of Ten came together for a simple reason: to share information about the Reagan Administration, the science of developing issues, and planned strategies; as part of the lobby, the individual groups pooled risk. As in Smith, coalition formation and maintenance, as an individually rational decision, provided a stable and continuing set of benefits to the coalition’s 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

Hays (1987), p. 64. Mosher (1980), p. 2116. Melnick (1992), p. 92. Ingram and Mann (1989), pp. 115–45. Cahn and Dunlap (1985), p. 1. The Group flowed from other, notable attempts like the Alaska Coalition, which influenced the expansion of protected lands (Hays (1987), p. 107). In 1981 and 1982, the environmental lobby fended off efforts by a coalition of automobile interests to weaken the CAA (Harris and Milkis (1989), p. 269). In 1989, the Group was active on an upcoming vote on liability limitations for oil producers and shippers (Reuters 12 September 1989). Also in 1989 the Group signed on to Blueprint for the Future, an agenda for the Bush Administration (Comp, 1989). In 1990, the Group indicted the Canadian and U.S. governments on toxic pollution in the Great Lakes Basin (States News Service, 12 January 1990). Its most noticeable success was the placement of William Reilly of World Wildlife Federation and the Conservation Foundation as the Bush Administration’s head of EPA.


The Structures of Interest Coalitions member groups.51 Of course, unlike in legislatures, interest coalitions are not contractual: members may defect with only limited repercussions. But coalition also binds the hands of member groups, both by lowering the cost of certain forms of participation, and by raising the costs of defection. The Group of Ten as Amici Curiae Member groups have long participated as independent amici curiae; an example is NRDC’s participation on a brief in the cases Environmental Protection Agency v. National Crushed Stone Association, et al. (1980) and Douglas M. Costle, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency v. Consolidated Coal Company, et al. (1980) 449 U.S. 0064. Groups have participated as parties to a case, such as in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Citizens for a Better Environment, Inc., Northwestern Ohio Lung Association, Inc., Anne M. Gorsuch, et al., (1984) 467 U.S. 0837. Other unusual allies have been American Cyanamid Company, the Chemical Manufacturers Association, FMC Corporation, and Union Carbide Corporation (Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al., 470 U.S. 0116). In this paper, I examine the microstructural aspects of interest coalition participation in the judicial arena. I offer evidence from the fifty-nine cases, dating from 1980 to 1992, identified in the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database52 as relating to the environment. I identified cases where Group of Ten members participated as a party, as an independent amicus, or as a member of an amicus coalition. In these cases, I expect that members of the Group of Ten rarely filed separate independent amici curiae briefs, that the members rarely coalesced with non-members, and that the members attempted to balance competing interest coalitions. In each of these incidences, the microstructural form of the coalition—“which players will coordinate their actions and with whom will they coordinate?”—provides the observation of the Group’s actions. First, members participated as amici or parties in roughly 40 percent (24) of the cases chosen. Twenty-five percent of these cases were decided in a proenvironment manner (as coded in the database). At first glance, this is not TABLE 1. Summary statistics for cases involving the Group of Ten (N ⫽ 58)

Members of just G10 Members of G10 and others Grassroots only Solo members of G10

Litigation (%)

Amicus filing (%)

4.2 37.5 4.2 0.0

4.2 58.3 33.3 8.3

51. Smith (1985), pp. 132–47. 52. Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research Study No. 9422. The data were obtained for those cases with issue code 638 and with unique Supreme Court docket identifiers. This allows me to trace amicus participation across the cases as they were brought to the Court. All decision types were included.


Andrew B. Whitford particularly impressive, but it does confirm the long-held view that judicial participation is costly. Further, Table 1 suggests that the Group of Ten, while not the only environmental judicial participants, were actively involved in judicial representation—through both direct litigation and amicus participation. This participation revealed itself in a number of specific forms. For example, members have coalesced with one another exclusively, even for traditional non-litigators like the Friends of the Earth (see Table 2). This first amicus brief is notable, not just for the joint action of the Sierra Club and FOE, but also because David Brower founded the FOE after leaving as head of the Sierra Club. Brower then resigned from FOE in 1985. Again, this highlights the role of personal connections in the formation of interest alliances. But as Table 2 also shows, coalition between the Group of Ten groups did not exclude joint action with smaller regional organizations. In the second combined case, NWF provided an organizing point for smaller environmental and community interest spread across a wide geography. Sierra and NRDC appear regularly both in direct litigation and amicus participation. As California Coastal Commission, et al. v. Granite Rock Company (1987) indicates, Sierra and NRDC are frequent contributors. As noted, NRDC specifically employs litigation strategies and retains significant legal resources; Sierra’s Legal Defense Fund is modeled in part after the NAACP’s use of legal strategies. In Halmstrom and Halmstrom v. Tillamook Company (1987), Sierra and NRDC teamed with a traditional non-litigator, Audubon, and a significant non-member, Defenders of Wildlife. Again, though, the Group of Ten members formed the central core of this amicus coalition. Since the 1980s, grassroots organizations have made inroads on the contributor and membership base of the mainstream environmental interest groups. Following the events at Love Canal and Times Beach, local organizations claimed a leading role in advocating for restrictions on the use of toxic substances. The fifth example offered in Table 2 reveals an interesting opportunity for the Group of Ten to collaborate with a leading grassroots organization, the Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides, which formed as a response to forestry spraying in Oregon. Six of the Group of Ten formed the core of this coalition. FOE played a specific role in the Group. In 1985, Brower left the FOE in part due to differences of opinion on the placement of FOE in the larger environmental movement. He advocated closer ties with the Greens; the FOE Board saw the need for ties with the mainstream movement. The sixth case of Table 2 reveals how Group members often coalesced with other groups when serving as direct parties to cases. But in this event, FOE coalesced independently with the American Cetacean Society to bring suit against the Japan Whaling Association and the Japan Fisheries Association, and other notable members included the Defenders of Wildlife and the primary voice of the Greens in the U.S., Greenpeace U.S.A. The last example in Table 2 reveals the strength brought to the coalition by Group members like NWF and Audubon. Through historical development, the semi-independence and strength of local chapters provided opportunities to expand the set of coalition members beyond the Group of Ten’s Washington 54 http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol5/iss1/art3

FOE

Appalachian Coalition, Council of the Southern Mountains, Illinois South, Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Tug Valley Recovery Center

NWF

On Cert Petitioners

On Cert

Sierra

Cecil N. Andrus, Secretary of the Interior v. Virginia Surface Mining And Reclamation Assoc., Inc., et al. (1981); Cecil N. Andrus, Secretary of the Interior, et al. v. State of Indiana, et al. (1981)

State Of Nevada v. United States of America, et al. (1983); Truckee-Carson Irrigation District v. United States of America, et al. (1983); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, et al. (1983)

Big Sur Foundation

Wilderness Society

Sierra NRDC

On Cert Petitioners

California Coastal Commission, et al. v. Granite Rock Company (1987)

Defenders of Wildlife

Wilderness Society National Audubon Society

Sierra NRDC

On Cert Petitioners

Halmstrom and Halmstrom v. Tillamook County (1989)

Trustees for Alaska, Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides, Oregon Natural Resources Council

Wilderness Society National Audubon Society

Sierra NRDC EDF, EPI

On Cert Respondents

Donald P. Hodel, U.S. Department of the Interior, Amoco Production Company, et al. v. People of the Village of Gambell, et al. (1987) California Coastal Commission, et al. v. Granite Rock Company (1987)

TABLE 2. Amici coalition microstructures I

Animal Protection Institute of America, Animal Welfare Institute, Center for Environmental Education, Connecticut Cetacean Society, Defenders of Wildlife, The Fund for Animals, Greenpeace U.S.A., Thomas Garrett, The Humane Society of the United States, International Fund for Animal Welfare, The Whale Center

FOE

Et al. are:

Japan Whaling Assoc. Japan Fisheries Assoc. v. American Cetacean Society, et al. (1985)

Oregon Natural Resources Council, Washington Environmental Council, Washington Native Plants Society, Siuslaw Task Force Headwaters

Central Oregon, Kalmiopsis, Pilchuk, Portland, Lane County, Siskiyou, Umpqua Valley Audubon Societies

NRDC, Oregon NRDC

Et al. are:

F. Dale Robertson, Manuel Lujan v. Seattle Audubon Society, et al. (1992) (cases joined)

The Structures of Interest Coalitions

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Andrew B. Whitford office representation. In this case, Audubon’s chapters coalesced with NRDC and its Oregon chapter. In many important ways, this coalition formation strategy resembles suggestions in the nonmarket strategy literature about the analysis of a firm’s “rent chain” for assembling broad ad hoc coalitions. Table 3 provides the amici microstructures for three coalitions that formed on United States of America v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., et al. (1985). In the first coalition on petition for writ of certiorari, five of the Group joined with five local chapters of Audubon and NWF and a broad array of local groups and states representing a wide geography. That coalition both expanded and contracted after cert was granted. The final coalition in support of the petitioners did not include NRDC, but added the National Audubon Society, another local NWF chapter, and a number of new local groups. In opposition, the Pacific Legal Foundation, a core conservative land use legal foundation coalesced with two associations. A regional group filed a third brief. This collection of microstructures reveals the leverage the Group provided to pro-environmental amici coalitions during the 1980s. On one hand, traditional access to the executive and legislature dropped. On the other, coalition between the mainstream groups—with selective inclusion of geographically representative local groups—provided a substantial counterbalance to the conservative groups representing the land use politics associated with the growing Sagebrush Rebellion in the American West. Table 4 provides a unique lens on the microstructural aspects of coalition behavior in the courts. In this case, two cases were eventually joined. For the two combined, one minor environmental player filed a single brief supporting the respondents. This is contrasted with the behavior of four competing coalitions that formed around each case. In the first, Sierra participated as a party in the case, in coalition with local groups. NWF, NRDC, and the Wilderness Society participated as a direct amicus coalition. In the second case, eight of the Group formed a formal amicus coalition. It was opposed by a broad array of local groups and associations. There are two central themes in this collection of microstructures. First, the Group acted as supporting players for other members of the Group in litigation, even if that role was limited to filing briefs. Second, those briefs balanced other, competing briefs from local groups and associations with strong development ties. Table 5 directly addresses three final points on the microstructures of coalitions in judicial settings. First, the activity of the Group of Ten—and in some ways, its successes—did not go unnoticed. Other, opposing groups followed the Group’s lead and expanded both the use of the amicus brief and the formation of interest coalitions. The best example of this is the amicus brief supporting the petitioner in Arkansas v. Oklahoma (1992), which reveals the central role of the Mountain States Legal Foundation and the Farm Bureau’s local chapters. Second, other environmental groups created their own, often local, interest coalitions. The first brief filed on the writ of certiorari in support of the respondents provides evidence of a growing “mainstream versus grassroots” divide. Third, the Group of Ten itself fragmented, as shown in the dueling amici briefs—both supporting the respondents—filed by Sierra, and NRDC, EDF, and NWF. 56 http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol5/iss1/art3

American Fisheries Society, American Littoral Society, Bass Anglers Sportsman Society, Chesapeake Bay Foundation, State of Florida, Michigan United Conservation Clubs, Scenic Hudson, Tennessee Conservation League, Wildlife Management Institute, Clean Water Action Project, State of Michigan, Trout Unlimited

EPI NWF Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina Wildlife Federations

Sierra EDF NRDC Florida Audubon Society

On petition Petitioners

On Cert Respondents

State of Alaska, American Fisheries Society, Pacific Legal Foundation, National Bass Anglers Sportsman Society, Chesapeake Cattlemen’s Assoc., Resource Bay Foundation, Development Council of Alaska Environmental Council of Rhode Island, State of Florida, State of Michigan, Michigan United Conservation Clubs, Scenic Hudson, Tennessee Conservation League, Trout Unlimited, Wildlife Management Institute

National Audubon Society Florida Audubon Society EPI NWF Alaska, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Wisconsin Wildlife Federations

Sierra EDF

On Cert

United States of America v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. et al. (1985)

TABLE 3. Amici coalition microstructures II

Citizens of Chincoteague for a Reasonable Wetlands Policy


57


Center for Environmental Education

On Cert Respondents

F. Dale Robertson, et al. v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, et al. (1989) John O. Mash, et al. v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, et al. (1989)

NWF NRDC Wilderness Society

On petition Petitioners

Methow Recreation, Methow Valley Citizens Council, Washington Environmental Council

Sierra

Et al. are:

F. Dale Robertson, et al. v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, et al. (1989)

Northwest Forest Resource Council, Associated Oregon Loggers, Douglas Timber Operators, Helicopter Logging Assoc., Northwest Forestry Assoc., Northwest Independent Forest Manufacturers Assoc., Northwest Timber Assoc., Southern Oregon Timber Industries Assoc., Washington Contract Loggers Assoc., Western Wood Products Assoc., Western Forest Industries Assoc., Williamette Timbermen, Inc.

On Cert Petitioners

NWF NRDC Wilderness Society NPCA EDF Izaak Walton League National Audubon Society FOE

On Cert Respondents

John O. Mash, et al. v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, et al. (1989)

TABLE 4. Amici coalition microstructures III

Andrew B. Whitford

58

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Champion International Corporation, American Paper Institute, National Forest Products Assoc., American Iron and Steel Institute, The Fertilizer Institute, Arkansas Poultry Federation

Assoc. of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies, The Arkansas Municipal League, The New Mexico Municipal League, The North Carolina League of Municipalities

Scenic Rivers Assoc. of Oklahoma, City of Tahlequah, Oklahoma, Lake Tenkiller Assoc., Tenkiller Area Community Assoc., Citizens Action for a Safe Environment, Save the Lower Illinois River, Calcasieu League for Environmental Action Now

Sierra

Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma

American Rivers

NRDC EDF NWF Assoc. of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies, The National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, The Municipal Leagues representing over 9000 cities in 26 states and five additional cities

Champion Colorado International Water Corporation, Congress American Paper Institute, National Forest Products Assoc., American Iron and Steel Institute, American Mining Congress, The Fertilizer Institute, Chemical Manufacturers Assoc., National Assoc. of Manufacturers, Associated Industries of Arkansas, Arkansas Federation of Air and Water Users, Inc., Arkansas Poultry Federation

Mountain States Legal Foundation; California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington State, and Wyoming Farm Bureaus; Wyoming Wool Growers Assoc., Wyoming Public Lands Council, Montana Wool Growers Assoc., Wyoming Stock Growers Assoc., Idaho Wool Growers Assoc., North Dakota Water Users Assoc., Inc., South Dakota Water Congress, Colorado Cattleman’s Assoc., New Mexico Mining Assoc.

On Cert Supporting petitioner

Supporting petitioners

On petition Supporting petitioners

On Cert Supporting respondents

Arkansas v. Oklahoma (1992)

Environmental Protection Agency v. Oklahoma (1992) Arkansas v. Oklahoma (1992)

TABLE 5. Amici coalition microstructures IV


59


Andrew B. Whitford However, throughout this time, there is no evidence for coalitions between Group members and industry/conservative groups. Members of the Group of Ten rarely filed separate independent amici briefs; the ten large mainstream groups— those with the greatest incentive to compete with each other—rarely filed separate briefs. While members of the Group coalesced with non-members, this suggests that competition between these blocs of groups was minimal—at least until the early 1990s. The coalitions that did occur were with smaller or at least more differentiated groups. Last, the members of the Group balanced competing interest coalitions. The competition that did occur was between large blocs of groups at large ideological distances from one another in the policy space. Discussion The primary point of this paper is that coalitions among interests form one basis for judicial participation, but that participation manifests itself in an array of coalition microstructures. By addressing the intersection of coalition formation, judicial strategies, and regulatory politics, this argument extends—and in some ways, completes—central insights from studies of interest groups and judicial politics. Specifically, coalitions are a low-cost means for assembling minority interests into more powerful blocs. However, because judicial strategies are high cost efforts, coalitions become optimal strategies for groups seeking representation. This may be especially true for groups with limited access to other, more traditional institutions of political representation. In this context, for any one event, the microstructure of the interest group coalition varies, but across events the coalitions take on general forms. By examining a variety of coalition microstructures in interest group participation as amici curiae, this paper reveals how environmental interest groups—responding in part to the Reagan Administration’s environmental policies—turned to the U.S. Supreme Court for representation. In doing so, these groups formed a stable interest coalition, expanded the benefits of that coalition both geographically and downward, and competed with other, opposing interests. A direct result of this paper is to provide evidence on the temporal performance of a long-term stable interest coalition across multiple nonmarket events. A limitation of this paper is that it does not directly address the effectiveness of this coalition or this judicial strategy. However, effectiveness is truly a relative concept. Given that substantial change occurred at the EPA, in the White House, and even in the partisan balance of Congress during this time, the courts served as a stable access point, limited only by the ability of the groups to overcome differences. However, this limitation affects most studies of interest coalitions and judicial strategies. This paper, though, moves beyond past studies by emphasizing the actual shape of the coalitions. Doing so reveals how stable interest coalitions are observed over time, how judicial strategies are played out, how other groups respond to those coalitions and their strategies, and in the end, what the Court faces in making its decisions, for the Court is limited to choices framed by the information brought to it by participants. As Melnick argues, that fact that the Court faces this information disadvantage means that groups have incentives to create opportunities for extending this reach into the 60 http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol5/iss1/art3

The Structures of Interest Coalitions judiciary.53 Of course, their ability to do so—and to a degree, the Court’s ability to call upon that information—is a matter of legislative and executive choice, a choice that at least in environmental policy has varied over time. A singular advantage of the amicus strategy is that that type of participation remains fairly stable and while limited in scope and perhaps effectiveness, it is low cost if groups act in coalition. These themes suggest that the study of group coalitions through amicus participation—by public interest groups, business forces, or even moral interests—provides a unique and powerful lens on both groups and the judiciary. To that end, a number of future directions for research present themselves. That research agenda should seek to examine the role of groups as information providers and argument makers in the judicial settings that include the Supreme Court. To provide more powerful inferences about that role, it should systematically compare the participation of groups across policy areas (e.g., environmental, antitrust, civil rights) and across time to reveal the dynamic process of change in the conditions and structures of participation. The advantage of amicus participation is that research can extend to estimate the density of the microstructures of interest group participation in settings like the Court, and based on that calculation to then estimate the contribution of these microstructures to gaining the Court’s favor for a specific side. Clearly, data sources like Gibson’s “United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, Phase II: 1953–1993”54 can help fulfill the data requirements of this agenda. In addition to identifying amicus curiae brief filers, the data also detail the total number of amicus filers in a given case, whether they participated in oral argument before the Court, the stance or position taken on the briefs, and whether the Court mentioned a group’s amicus brief in its opinion. However, it is the development of modern tools of data analysis for these structures that allows researchers to reach beyond the data to calculate and then estimate the effects of microstructures on cases. The graphical analysis of the networks implicit in these coalitions is regular practice in the study of information diffusion processes and the analysis of computer networks. Moreover, programs also allow for the computation of decompositions, shortest paths, clustering coefficients, and the density of those networks.55 Additionally, the more recent development of model-based cluster analysis—based on an underlying probability model, with analysis of that model proceeding by Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods—presents a particularly useful point of departure for this agenda.56 More broadly, studies of nonmarket forces emphasize how interest coalitions can generate leverage for their own benefit. In this environment, interest coalitions are a primary mechanism for assembling diverse interests for pressing claims in governmental venues. But the power of interest coalitions is conditional; it depends on the strategic response of other, competing interests, their 53. 54. 55. 56.

Melnick (1983). ICPSR Study 6987. Principal Investigator: James L. Gibson. Knoke and Kuklinski (1982); Scott (1991); Degenne and Forse (1999). Fraley (1998), pp. 270–81; Fraley and Raferty (1999), pp. 297–306.


Andrew B. Whitford willingness and ability to cooperate with one another, and the effect of that cooperation on those competitors. Not all coalitions are stable, and few last forever, but just as with the Group of Ten, the grassroots, and the Sagebrush Rebellion, their footprint in American politics lasts well beyond their demise.

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