Liverpool Hope University Press, UK. ISBN: 978-0-9515874-3-6. Other research web host: https://www.academia.edu/3512727/Palmer_C._and_Torevell_D.
Book Title:
The turn to aesthetics: An interdisciplinary exchange of ideas in applied and philosophical aesthetics
Edited by:
Clive Palmer and David Torevell
Contributions from:
Peter Lamarque, Heather Höpfl, Keith Owens, Steve Brie, Lynn Hilditch, Mark Wynn, Donna Lazenby, David Clayton, Tim Prentki, Margaret-Catherine PerivoliotisChryssovergis, Leila Hojjati, Patrick Carr, Graham McFee, Doug Sandle, Alexandra Mouriki, Mark Titmarsh, Nikolaos Gkogkas, Avril Loveless, Cordula Hansen, Peter Jordan, John Lindley, Neil Campbell, Joel Rookwood, Matthew Thombs, Clive Palmer, Val Sellers, Stephan Wassong, Karl Lennartz, Thomas Zawadzki
Author(s) and Chapter:
Graham McFee Foreword
Publisher:
Liverpool Hope University Press, Liverpool, Merseyside, UK.
ISBN:
978-0-9515874-3-6
Date:
September, 2008 th
th
Reporting on an international conference held at Liverpool Hope University 5 – 8 June 2007. This was a wideranging inter-disciplinary conference which encouraged submissions from three general strands of study including; those subjects which have enjoyed a substantial history of involvement in the field such as Theology and Philosophy, those relatively new to the study such as Sports Studies and Management, and those which focus upon such applied dimensions as the Arts and Education. The overall aim of the conference was to learn from interdisciplinary debate and to encourage an exchange of ideas on research of the highest quality. To reference this chapter: McFee, G. (2008) Foreword (pp. xv-xviii). In Palmer, C. and Torevell, D. (Eds.) The turn to aesthetics: An interdisciplinary exchange of ideas in applied and philosophical aesthetics. Liverpool Hope University Press, UK. ISBN: 978-0-9515874-3-6 Other research web host: https://www.academia.edu/3512727/Palmer_C._and_Torevell_D._2008_The_Turn_to_Aesthetics_An_Interdiscipli nary_Exchange_of_Ideas_in_Applied_and_Philosophical_Aesthetics
Graham McFee
Foreword At the end of the conference that spawned this volume, the editors expressed to me the hope that the volume would accurately reflect that conference which, as they rightly noted, had been marked by a willingness to look optimistically across one’s disciplinary fences, and commitment to engaging with the concerns of others, while recognising the commonalities between their approach and one’s own. As I then pointed out, achieving this character in the volume would require that presenters — in writing up their contributions for publication — both respond to the event itself (where appropriate) and yet retain the flexibility and fluidity that might be associated with oral presentations. For only a ‘juggling act’ of this sort would achieve what they hoped (and desired) for the volume. Now, readers must decide for themselves whether the volume succeeds in this aspiration. I can only reinforce for them my impression that this was certainly true of the conference; and hope that they can find that spirit in this text. It may help to comment briefly on both volume and event. Thus, the volume should not be treated simply as a record of the conference; in attempting to capture the spirit of the conference (in particular, its spirit of collaborative contribution to shared concerns). Certainly the directives to authors were in line with the aspirations noted initially: that is why, although texts were re-drafted where appropriate, they remain papers (rather than chapters), with something of the spoken word about them. The voices here were to reflect, as the title had it, the turn to aesthetics — with that ‘turn’ taking place within academic disciplines, fields of study, research areas, and the like. So, very crudely, the major presenters at the conference were invited as having something to say about ‘Aesthetics and X’, where “X” stands for different disciplinary areas within the academe, or different fields of study — I only came to realise this structure when it dawned on me that my topic was supposed to be aesthetics and sport; that (in this scheme) Peter Lamarque was there to represent philosophical aesthetics. But it is typical of the mood of the conference that this point was never made to me explicitly: consonant with the desire to theorise a turn to aesthetics, the organisers were happy to see that turn manifest in any way, shape or form — as long as it might seem fruitful to others. And, since their hope was precisely that we should escape from the boundaries of our backgrounds — as represented by those Xs — they were glad when the boundary fences were jumped almost immediately. To an outsider (and perhaps there could be no real insiders to this project), a striking feature was the variety of topics/disciplines to whom the idea of a turn to aesthetics xv
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made sense: one would readily have expected some cases — those where judgement or assessment might realistically take place in terms of grace, or line, or beauty, and the like (or their opposites?). But this simplistic version did not circumscribe the range of topics debated. It might seem, though, that philosophical aesthetics had some key position here, as not needing a turn to aesthetics. Nonetheless, the survey of the current state of AngloAmerican analytic aesthetics provided initially stressed a return within philosophy to a concern with aesthetics. This presentation was exemplary in at least three ways. First, it set the scene for the conference by discussing how a traditional strand of thinking had conceptualised the aesthetic; second, it pointed out that debates about the extension of the concept “art” — that is, debates about whether or not such-and-such was an artwork — could productively be separated from debates about the meaning (or some such) of the concept “art”. Thus, you and I might agree on the meaning of the term “art” and still debate the place — or otherwise — of Carl Andre’s Equivalent VIII (the firebricks from the Tate Gallery): is it art? That is, is it within the extension of the concept? And, third, this presentation manifested both the clarity and the detachment at which this mode of philosophising aims. Much that followed drew, to some degree or other, on the framework-ideas thus introduced. Of course, as another representative of philosophical aesthetics (if not exactly the designated one), there were some debates which, from my perspective, resulted from the fairly recent ‘turn to aesthetics’ by some presenters and some areas. In these, in particular, the key questions were still being developed; and it was here that the interchange with others at the conference might prove the most useful. Two trends strike me as especially worthy of note. And discussing them will illustrate the potential for productive debate here. First, for some, granting weight (or space) to aesthetics was a kind of short-hand for not being hog-tied by concerns with the utilitarian or the functional — and this was not so very different from, say, a turn to ‘assessment’ in terms of beauty rather than (mere) use, or economic efficiency. But in fact, in such debates, the functional or the utilitarian tended to “wear the trousers” (as J. L. Austin memorably put it): we might not know what exactly the aesthetic amounted to in such contexts, but we knew in detail what it did not amount to. So here, in effect, the turn to the aesthetic might better be seen as a turn from … Or, in a related move, the ‘turn’ was to the sensory (or even the sensuous) as against, say, something quantifiable or numerical: the advocacy of different methods of assessment or evaluation, for instance. And, of course, the ancestry of the term “aesthetic” (In Classical Greek) sustains such a move — but the word “aesthetics” (and especially the perspective of aesthetics as an investigative discipline or process) has now moved us a long way from this root; say, about 300 years past it. Second, some other key concerns were marked by their insistence, as a prelude to enquiry, on an account (or, even, a definition) of the term “aesthetic” or “aesthetics”. Again, this is grist to my mill, reflecting a series of debates in philosophical aesthetics; and in philosophy more generally. Now, a fuller account would discuss what a definition is in this context, and why it might be wanted (why we might want xvi
Foreword
it, of course, depends on what it was!). But I simply take a definition to be a concise yet comprehensive characterisation of whatever, having an ‘exact fit’ on that notion. Then, here, I will simply state three aspects of my own conclusion. The first is that a definition (or something similar) will not really aid understanding since, to utilise it, one must understand the terms in the putative definition then offered; and one must know enough about the topic to recognise that the definition offered was actually false or mistaken: this means one must know a lot, even if not, perhaps, the actual word. Then, second, one can use a term effectively without being able to define it: in the classic case, I can do everything I want to with the idea of time, but without being able to define it. So definitions cannot always be essential. The third point grows from this one: if there is some formal definition of (in our case) the aesthetic — the sort of thing discovered by detailed conceptual analysis or conceptual history — It cannot be the basis of my understanding, since I presently do not know it. Further, knowing it cannot add anything to my understanding if I can do all I need to in the absence of my knowing such a formal definition. And here the first group mentioned above has a strong position, since they manifestly do know a great deal about what the term “aesthetic” amounts to in their contexts. But just to be raising the question can, of course, be a prelude to exploring the concept; and that process was begun in the discussion-sessions. Elsewhere, it was interesting to reflect on the variety of ways in which appeal to the aesthetic might find itself deployed, and the variety of explanations of the aesthetic thereby assumed or urged. For most of these (as above), it was revealing to ask oneself, “Aesthetic in contrast to what?” Some of the presentations, though, were working a street familiar to me, and deploying the concepts and categories of philosophical aesthetics in recognisable ways. For there seem to be at least two or three importantly different contexts for the aesthetic: the first is the naturally occurring — waterfalls and sunsets, say; the second is the man-made, the result of human agency, which allows the possibility that beauty, say, was intentional rather than accidental. And the man-made was in turn subdivided (for me) into a concern with art and a concern with the rest of the aesthetic. As this is a topic of my own contribution, I will say nothing about it now. But, of course, part of the appeal to the aesthetic in other papers is, say, to the beautiful effects of human agency (for instance, in sport); and part is to human intelligence as manifest in literature or dance. To plot relevant similarities and difference here, and determine what (if anything) they mean, is to do philosophical aesthetics, even if applied to some context. Then the practitioners in these areas may be better equipped than the philosophical aesthetician to provide the requisite understanding to such analysis. Nor would the spirit of the conference be adequately captured unless recognition were given to the poster-presentations: they offered a rich visual (and hence aesthetic) contribution, along with an intellectual one, enriching the debate on key themes from the conference as a whole. Similarly, the possibility for genuine engagement with the aesthetic — through the delivery of poetry and music — should be applauded by all participants. And it is rewarding to see those contributions acknowledged here. xvii
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The hope must be that the rich mix of concerns, reflected both in the conference as I have sketched it and in this volume, will be productive of future research. I am confident that it will be. Some, no doubt, will reflect individuals returning to their chosen fields with new ideas and (with luck) renewed vigour. Some of the research may itself be collaborative, reflecting some of the productive differences from both conference and volume. Both conference and event were generously supported — all involved should want to thank Liverpool Hope University, as well as the tireless efforts of both Clive Palmer and David Torevell. One final personal note: it is, of course, unusual for a contributor to a volume to — in addition — to provide a forward. And it might be said that this is an unusual forward. I can only suppose that the editors recognised both the objectivity of my comments (even where my own work was involved) and the depth of my commitment to the project of which, with any luck, this volume is the first step. Graham McFee Fullerton, California 2007
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