The Turnaround of Ownership Policy and Ownership ... - CiteSeerX

The Turnaround of Ownership Policy and Ownership Structure in Postwar Sweden *

by Magnus Henrekson and Ulf Jakobsson2 1

April 23, 2001

Abstract: We investigate the dramatic turnaround of ownership policies and ownership structure in Sweden. After WWII Swedish ownership policies were guided by a socialist vision where the ultimate goal was abolition of private ownership. These policies came to an end in the early 1980s. Since then a large number of Swedish firms have been acquired by foreign owners or merged with foreign firms. Concurrently, the foreign ownership share on the Swedish Stock Exchange has increased rapidly. A central question in our paper is whether this fast turnaround merely is a logical consequence of the current globalization, or whether this tendency is further reinforced by economic policies vis-à-vis the business sector in Sweden. We show that Swedish economic policy until the late 1980s – aimed at discouraging private wealth accumulation and favoring institutional ownership and debt financing – effectively precipated the rapid takeover by foreign owners of the Swedish business sector that gained momentum in the 1990s. The part of the policy package that aimed at creating a system of “capitalism without capitalists” can be said to have “packaged” the large Swedish corporations in terms of ownership and financing structure, so that a foreign take over was facilitated.

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Research Institute of Economic History Stockholm School of Economics P.O. Box 6501 SE-113 83 Stockholm Phone: +46-8-736 92 02 Fax: +46-8-31 32 07 e-post: [email protected]

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IUI, the Research Institute of Industrial Economics Box 5501 SE-114 85 Stockholm Tel: +46-8-665 45 02 Fax: +46-8-665 45 99 e-post: [email protected]

We thank Robin Douhan and Malin Hübner for research assistance and Assar Lindbeck, Johan Fall, Mattias Ganslandt, Per-Martin Meyerson and Erik Norrman for constructive comments and suggestions. Magnus Henrekson gratefully acknowledges financial support from Jan Wallanders och Tom Hedelius Stiftelse.

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1. Introduction Ägarstrukturen i de svenska företagen har under tiden efter andra världskriget genomgått dramatiska förändringar. De kan delas in i två faser. Den första fasen sträcker sig från 1945 till mitten av 1980-talet. Under denna period minskade det enskilda ägandet av företagen kraftigt. I början av perioden uppgick hushållens ägande till 80 procent av hela värdet av den börsnoterade företagssektorn. Vid slutet av perioden hade denna andel sjunkit till i storleksordningen 20 procent. Samtidigt ökade det institutionella ägandet i motsvarande mån. Det utländska ägandet begränsades under denna fas av juridiska hinder för utlänningar att förvärva egendom och kapital i Sverige. Dessa avvecklades under 1980- och början av 1990talet, vilket markerar övergången till den andra fasen. Avvecklingen blev startpunkten för en snabb uppgång av utlandsägandet av de svenska företagen. Mellan 1989 och 2001 steg andelen utlandsägande i de svenska börsföretagen från 7 till 43 procent. Enligt World Investment Report (UNCTAD 1999) var Sverige under perioden 1995–97 det land i världen som hade de största ingående direktinvesteringarna mätt som andel av de inhemska bruttoinvesteringarna. Det finns idag inga tecken på att trenden har brutits. Några påtagliga aspekter av denna utveckling är de många uppköpen av svenska företag, fusionerna mellan svenska och utländska företag, samt flytten av huvudkontor och ledningsfunktioner från Sverige till utlandet. Den skarpa kontrasten mellan de två faserna ter sig ur politisk synvinkel paradoxal. Ägarpolitiken bars under den första perioden upp av en långsiktig socialistisk vision, förankrad i det socialdemokratiska partiets ideologi. Ett tydligt mönster i politiken var en underminering av enskilt ägande. Det uttalade slutmålet var någon form av kollektivt/offentligt ägande av företagssektorn. Den definitiva slutpunkten för denna period sattes av avvecklandet av löntagarfonderna. Under den andra perioden tas svenskt näringsliv i rask takt över av utländska kapitalägare. Det förefaller som om vi nu är så långt ifrån den ursprungliga socialistiska

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visionen som det går att komma. Att förklara denna politiska omsvängning är inte någon lätt uppgift. Det socialdemokratiska partiet (SAP) har hela tiden dominerat politiken och den förda politiken har under båda faserna varit förankrad hos en majoritet i riksdagen. Någon mer omfattande ideologisk debatt kring den radikala omsvängningen i ägarpolitiken fördes aldrig. Det ökande utländska ägandet understöds av regeringen med en i huvudsak liberal argumentation. Samtidigt säger sig SAP i det senaste utkastet till nytt partiprogram (2001) vara ett antikapitalistiskt parti. En översikt över ägarpolitik och ägarstruktur under de båda faserna ges i Figure 1.

Figur 1 Stiliserad bild av den svenska ägarpolitiken och ägarstrukturen under efterkrigstiden. Phase I (1945–1985)

Phase II (1985–)

Ideologisk överbyggnad

Långsiktig vision om en socialistisk ekonomi; Marx, Schumpeter, Wigforss.

Oklar – marknadsliberalism, EU-anpassning och antikapitalism sida vid sida.

Praktisk politik

Inriktad på att motverka privat förmögenhetsbildning, främja institutionellt ägande, gynna stora företag, missgynna små och nya företag. Starka hinder mot utländskt ägande.

Avreglering och ökad marknadsinriktning. Borttagande av hinder för utländskt ägande. Skattemässig diskriminering av svenskt ägande.

Resulterande ägarstruktur

Kraftig uppgång i institutionellt ägande och motsvarande nedgång i enskilt ägande.

Kraftig uppgång i internationellt ägande och motsvarande nedgång i svenskt institutionellt ägande.

Syftet med denna artikel är att söka förklara och ge en bakgrund till det extremt snabba omslaget i ägarpolitik och ägarstruktur, som skedde i Sverige vid 1990-talets början. Det kan mot bakgrund av den mycket tunna politiska debatten i Sverige, vara frestande att helt hänföra det dramatiska omslaget i ägarpolitik till en förändring av de internationella förutsättningarna. Under den första fasen utvecklades i stort sett alla industriländer i riktning mot en ökad roll för staten, samtidigt som optimismen om statens möjligheter att styra ekonomin var mycket

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stor. Detta förhållande ledde Jan Tinbergen (1961), sedermera nobelpristagare i ekonomi, till att formulera hypotesen att ekonomierna i öst och väst konvergerade mot varandra för att så småningom mötas i en punkt där graden av socialism och statlig styrning i västekonomierna hade nått väsentligt högre nivåer än under 1960-talet. Mot slutet av 1960-talet och under 1970-talet tedde det sig för många, inte minst inom den svenska politiska eliten, som om Sverige i detta avseende var ett föregångsland bland västländerna. Från och med slutet av 1970-talet gick emellertid den politiska utvecklingen rakt emot Tinbergens förutsägelser. De kommunistiska ekonomierna föll samman och den ekonomiska politiken i västekonomierna fick en väsentligt mera liberal inriktning en tidigare. Privatiseringar och avregleringar hamnade högt på den politiska agendan i alla industriländer. Politiska centralfigurer i omslaget var Margaret Thatcher och Ronald Reagan. I många avseenden har det också tett sig som om vi bland industriländerna bevittnat en anpassning till den anglosaxiska politiken. According to many observers, ”the Washington consensus” now constitutes the basis for economic thinking in all industrialized countries. As a result, we have now arrived at a new convergence hypothesis stating that the economic structure in virtually all countries is converging towards the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism.1 Det svenska omslaget i ägarpolitik är väl förenligt med detta mönster. Som vi redan konstaterat var Sverige bland västländerna det ledande landet när det gällde att förverkliga Tinbergens konvergenshypotes. Efter omslaget, har Sverige, å andra sidan, tillhört de länder som allra snabbast fått se sitt näringsliv internationaliserat. Som vi skall se i denna uppsats är det en allt för stor förenkling att se det svenska omslaget som helt betingat av det internationella omslag som vi skisserat här.Vi pekar istället

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A typical formulation by Alan Greespan is the following: ”Thus, despite the meaningfully different views initially held of the way the world does, and should work, powerful global competitive forces appear for now to be driving the economic and legal paradigms of many nations into closer alignment around a more competitive market capitalism.” The quote is from the speech “Global Economic Integration: Opportunities and Challenges” given at a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming on August 25, 2000.

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på tre faktorer som bidrog till den nya inriktningen på ägarpolitiken. För det första var givetvis det internationella omslag vi pekat på av stor betydelse. För det andra var det så att de faktorer som internationellt verkade för ett politikomslag också hade en självständig betydelse för den svenska utvecklingen. För det tredje kan styrkan i omslaget förklaras av kombinationen av en avreglering driven av internationella omständigheter, och den ägarpolitik som fördes under den första av de båda faserna under efterkrigstiden. Det är den tredje faktorn som står i centrum för analysen i denna uppsats. Den politik som ursprungligen var utformad med utgångspunkt i en socialistisk vision ”förpackade” det svenska näringslivet på ett sätt som gjorde det mycket öppet för utländska uppköp, så snart avregleringen mot internationella marknader öppnade denna möjlighet. Som vi skall visa är det i huvudsak tre delar av den drivna politiken som givit denna effekt: (i) den privata förmögenhetsbildningen har missgynnats; (ii) institutionellt ägande har gynnats i förhållande till enskilt ägande; och (iii) denna politik har ytterligare förstärkt det höga svenska storföretagsberoendet. Spegelbilden av detta är att nyföretagande och småföretagande relativt sett missgynnades. Till detta kan läggas att politiken har förhindrat utländskt ägande av svenska företag. Uppsatsen inleds med en analys av den första av de båda faserna. Vi behandlar först den idémässiga bakgrunden till dessa linjer vad gäller synen på ägarrollen (section 2) and the importance of large vs. small firms for economic growth and renewal (section 3). In section 4 we document what economic policy instruments the government used and that these policies were in line with the visions spelled out by Wigforss and LO in the 1940s and 50s. In section 5 we document that the policies pursued över ett brett fält fick de effekter som avsågs och som man enligt grundläggande ekonomisk teori kunde förvänta sig. Därefter analyserar vi vändpunkten i utvecklingen (section 6). Där diskuterar vi vilka faktorer som skapade förutsättningar för vändningen. Section 7 consists of an analysis of the development during

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Phase II, characterized by a rapid increase in the foreign ownership shar of the Swedish private sector. Section 8 concludes.

2. The Ownership Role In Fackföreningsrörelsen och den fulla sysselsättningen (Trade Unions and Full Employment), a major policy document from the Federation of blue-collar workers (LO) published in 1951, it is difficult to find any bias favoring large companies or institutionalized private ownership, although there is a clear inclination towards the view that collective ownership and state ownership should gain in importance. This view was largely shared by the leading Social-Democratic ideologue Ernst Wigforss, Minister of Finance in 1925–26 and 1932–49. However, Wigforss (1952) did not argue in favor of a nationalization of the corporate sector. He maintained that in the long run the large industrial corporations had to be converted into ”social enterprises without owners” (samhällsföretag utan ägare). In these enterprises individuals could still be shareholders, but the shareholders were no longer residual claimants; wages should be set in wage negotiations, dividends should be related to the level of interest rates in capital markets, and all ”excess profits” should remain within the companies. For LO and for Wigforss an increased collectivization of ownership was of course desirable in its own right, since it was in line with their underlying socialist vision. As we will see below private ownership was highly concentrated in Sweden at the beginning of the postwar period. If a strong concentration of ownership is seen as undesirable from a political point of view, an alternative to the policies actually pursued would have been a policy supporting a less concentrated and more broad-based individual ownership of the business sector. But such a policy would have run counter to the long-term goals of the Social-Democratic party. However, it should have been a very natural political course for the nonsocialist parties. Since they did not get into government until 1976 they never had the opportunity to pursue such a policy. Neither did they, during the 1950s and 60s, manage to

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create a broad-based support among Swedish voters for such a policy. In hindsight, it is difficult to discern any attempt by the bourgeois parties to spell out such an alternative.2 As we shall see, the industrial policies actually pursued promoted a development of the economy towards the visions of LO and Wigforss. In contrast, there were up until the middle of the 1970s very few attempts, by direct measures, to transfer ownership of firms from private hands to the government. However some steps were taken – especially in mining, steel and forestry – to increase direct state ownership of the corporate sector. Still, state ownership of the industrial sector was among the lowest in the OECD countries in the 1970s (Lybeck 1984). This policy has been named ”the historical compromise” (Korpi 1982). The industrial elite acknowledged and accepted that the Social Democrats by virtue of their political strength would use the political power to implement far-reaching welfare reforms, while the labor movement, on their part, abstained from socializing the industrial sector. However, from a Social-Democratic perspective this historical compromise must have appeared as a temporary social contract. Industrial policy was designed in line with the visions of LO and Wigfors and within the labor movement, the idea of “the third step of socialism”, i.e., a democratization of ownership of Swedish industry, had many advocates.3 In their comprehensive historical study of LO, Johansson and Magnusson (1998) describe how the trade union movement gradually developed a vision of ”capitalism without capitalists”. They claim that this vision is crucial, because it constitutes the link uniting collectivism and the dynamics of markets. As a result, capitalism can be salvaged – without requiring powerful owners or capitalists. Redistribution of income and large profits in the most dynamic firms can co-exist (p. 121).4 2

The tax-favored stock market savings scheme introduced by the nonsocialist government in the late 1970s marked the starting point for a rapid growth in the number of individual stock owners. This contributed to the turning point in the attitude towards private ownership to be discussed further below. 3 The first two steps were universal suffrage and co-determination (Hedborg and Meidner 1984; Pontusson 1992). 4 In Swedish: ”det sammanhållande kittet mellan kollektivismen och marknadens dynamik. På detta sätt kan kapitalismen äreräddas – samtidigt som det inte finns plats för starka ägare eller kapitalister. Inkomstutjämning kan ske samtidigt som de mest dynamiska företagen tillåts göra stora vinster.”

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This idea was transformed into a more tangible form in the mid 1970s. Explicit demands for increased collective ownership on a much grander scale were voiced at the 1976 LO Congress where Rudolf Meidner and his colleagues presented a plan for an inexorable transfer of ownership from private hands to collective ”wage-earner funds” (löntagarfonder) – see LO (1976) and Meidner (1978). This can be interpreted as a concrete plan for materializing Wigforss’ original vision to convert the large corporations to “social enterprises without owners”. The wage-earner fund scheme entailed a gradual transfer of ownership of all firms with more than 50 (or possibly 100) employees to wage-earners as a collective group. The firms should be obligated to issue new shares to the wage-earner funds corresponding to a value of 20 percent of the profits. Thus, the transfer of ownership would be more rapid, the more profitable the firm. Incidentally, assuming a rate of profit of 10 percent, it would take 35 years for the wage-earner funds to obtain a majority equity share in the individual company. The wage-earner equity thus acquired was intended to remain within the firm as working capital. The voting rights and other ownership prerogatives were to be exercised by the local unions until the wage-earner shares represented 20 percent of the total equity. At the point where the ownership share exceeded 20 percent the funds ownership rights would be transferred to more centralized bodies controlled by the national unions but including representatives of other interests in society. Since the shares were not supposed to be traded, labor’s influence over the allocation of investments across firms was not intended to increase, at least not in theory. But it is quite clear that the authors of the report saw the wage-earner funds as a means to democratize corporate investment decisions of strategic significance for the whole society. Among other things, they claimed that wage-earner funds might prevent Swedish multinational firms from moving employment and R&D abroad (LO 1976, pp. 68–76, 87–88). These explicit proposals

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to infringe on private ownership implied that the labor movement broke away from the old historical compromise struck in the late 1930s. In due course therefore, the wage-earner fund proposals met unprecedented opposition from capital owners. Leading Swedish capital owners literally took to the streets. On October 4, 1983 capital owners rallied across the country in defense of the right to retain ownership and control of their firms. Moreover, the original Meidner proposal never gained full acceptance within the Social-Democratic Party and subsequent joint proposals from the LO and the Social Democrats were less radical than the original plan. Politically, any proposals were blocked from being carried out until the Social Democrats returned to power in 1982. At this stage the public opinion had shifted against wage-earner funds, but under pressure from the LO the government introduced a considerably diluted version of wage-earner funds in 1984. The five wage-earner funds thus introduced were financed by a 0.2 percent pay-roll tax and a 20 percent tax on real profits above SEK 1 million, which in practice added approximately five percentage points to the formal tax rate (Agell, Englund and Södersten 1995). Most importantly, the build-up of the wage-earner funds was restricted to seven years. The funds were abolished in 1992 by the then non-socialist government. During the first phase of the postwar period the issue of foreign ownership played a negligible role in the ideological debate. From a Social-Democratic point of view it is obvious that a sizeable foreign ownership share of Swedish industry was not compatible with the visions of LO and Wigforss. It is also difficult in hindsight to identify any other groups that systematically argued in favor of lowering the threshold for foreign ownership. Neither promarket economists nor the nonsocialist opposition regarded this as an important issue. Thus, the regulatory measures protecting domestic owners were hardly debated at all while they were in place – they seem to have been taken for granted. It is therefore all the more surprising that the lifting of the regulations also came to be taken for granted.

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3. Small versus Large Firms It is apparent that the most important Social Democratic thinkers have seen the large industrial corporation as the major unit of production. Ernst Wigforss is quite clear on this point. For instance, in his essay on Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Wigforss 1956) he seems to agree with Schumpeter on the inevitability of the movement in capitalist societies towards progressively larger companies and production units. Schumpeter (1942) saw the declining economic importance of the entrepreneur as one of the major forces in the transformation from capitalism to socialism. Schumpeter claimed that by means of modern techniques and modern modes of organization the innovation process would become more and more automated. Innovations would no longer be connected with the efforts and the brilliance of a single person. This would have far-reaching consequences for capitalism (Schumpeter 1942, p. 142): This social function [entrepreneurship] is already losing in importance and is bound to lose it at an accelerating rate in the future even if the economic process itself of which entrepreneurship was the prime mover went on unabated. For, on the one hand, it is much easier now than it has been in the past to do things which lie outside familiar routine – innovation itself is being reduced to routine. Technological progress is increasingly becoming the business of teams of trained specialists who turn out what is required and make it work in predictable ways.

Schumpeter maintained that the large number of self-employed and the entrepreneurs constituted the requisite political base for a capitalist society. The numerous members of the small-business community formed the backbone of the bourgeoisie, without which capitalism would lose both its institutional base and its political legitimacy. But as production gradually became increasingly concentrated to a few large corporations, small firms waned in importance. As a result, modern capitalism would undermine its own political and institutional base. Schumpeter also agreed with Karl Marx that the increased concentration of production to large firms would be concomitant with increased concentration of ownership.

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Eventually, popular resistance towards socialization of the means of production would vanish, since the general public would consider the difference between the state and the few remaining giant corporations to be negligible.5 Following the extinction of the bourgeoisie there would be no important group left in society that identified with and actively defended capitalism. Hence, socialism was bound to supersede capitalism as the economic system in mature industrialized economies. From a Swedish perspective the theories of both Marx and Schumpeter appear relevant in the context of this study. At the dawn of the postwar period the Swedish firm structure was characterized by a marked predominance of large firms and highly concentrated ownership (Lindgren 1953). The Norwegian sociologist Gudmund Hernes (1991) has emphasized the connection between Marx’s theory of economic development in mature industrialized economies and the Scandinavian Social-Democratic Model. A key component in Marx’s theory of the development of capitalism was the growing importance of economies of scale, which would gradually result in the elimination of the small and also most of the large firms. In the visions of Marx and Schumpeter small firms and entry of new firms are of marginal importance. Wigforss hardly finds this disquieting. Instead this state of affairs facilitates the desired collectivization and and socialization of the productive capital stock, which is the ultimate goal of the labor movement, according to Wigforss. Furthermore, Wigforss (1952, p. 125–126) finds it essential to focus on the large industrial corporation for non-economic reasons: That is where the adversarial relationship between owners and employees is most fundamental, and where the collective form of ownership and management can be most easily used as a means to

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It is also interesting to note that Schumpeter (1942, p. 167) did not doubt the productive efficiency of socialism: “Can socialism work? Of course it can.“ Further on he states that (p. 196): “It is undeniable that the socialist blue-print is drawn at a higher level of rationality, which partly results from the fact that in the capitalist order improvements occur as a rule in individual concerns and take time and meet resistance in spreading. In the socialist order every improvement could theoretically be spread by decree and substandard practice could be promptly eliminated.”

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achieve more equality, freedom and solidarity. Their crucial importance for the national economy and the standard of living of the people is self-evident.6

In short, the notion that large-scale production and a social order with strong collectivist elements promoted economic development had many advocates at the time. It was also easy to find inspiration from prominent social scientists in other countries. The most influential thinker on these counts in the 1950s and 1960s was probably John Kenneth Galbraith and in particular his two books American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power (1956) and The New Industrial State (1967). Especially the latter book provided an important rationale for an economic policy oriented towards the large corporation. Galbraith forcibly argues that in the modern industrial society innovative activity as well as improvements in current products and production processes are most efficiently carried out within the realm of the large industrial corporation. Individual efforts, and hence individual incentives, dwindle in importance.7 It is quite clear that during the first phase of the postwar period the Social Democrats considered small firms and entrepreneurs as marginal elements in the process of economic development, and in due course they would probably be anachronistic. A late example of this thinking is the book Folkhemsmodellen (Hedborg and Meidner 1984), where small firms play a negligible role. In fact, the authors mainly stress that the existence of many small firms renders it more difficult to increase taxes (p. 218–219).

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In Swedish: “Den socialistiska politikens intresse just för storföretagen behöver inte ytterligare förklaras. Det är i dem som motsättningarna mellan ägare och anställda blir mest påtaglig, och där den kollektiva formen för äganderätt och förvaltning lättast inställer sig som vägen till både mer jämlikhet, frihet och gemenskap. Deras avgörande betydelse för hela landets ekonomi och folkets levnadsstandard är självklar.” 7 A famous Galbraith quote illustrating this point is the following: ”There is no more pleasant fiction than that technical change is the product of the matchless ingenuity of the small man forced by competition to employ his wits to better his neighbor. Unhappily, it is a fiction” (Galbraith, 1956, p. 86).

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4. Economic Policy In this section we will document that Swedish tax and capital market policies from the 1950s at least through the 1970s were well in line with the visions spelled out by Wigforss and LO in the 1940s and 1950s.

4.1

Tax Policies

We have already noted that a central element in the Social-Democratic economic policy was to discourage wealth accumulation at the individual level. One important instrument used to attain this goal was wealth taxation. This taxation has largely adhered to the same principles throughout the postwar period. The amount exempt from wealth taxation has been adjusted for inflation roughly every 5 years. In 2001 wealth tax is levied at a rate of 1.5 percent oof taxable wealth exceeding SEK 900,000 for the household. The tax rate has been reduced since the mid 1980s. At that time the maximum tax rate was 3 percent (for all households with taxable wealth exceeding approximately SEK 2 million in 2001 prices). The rules for how taxable wealth is assessed varies considerably across assets: 100 percent for interest-bearing assets, 80 percent of the market value for listed stock, roughly 75 percent for the market value for housing and zero percent for unlisted stock, art, antiquities et cetera. In Figure 2 we illustrate the evolution of the actual wealth tax rate for selected years in the postwar period for taxable wealth of SEK 2 and 10 million, respectively in 1996 prices. The figure clearly shows that the wealth tax was very high during the 1980s.

Figure 2

The Wealth Tax Rate on a Taxable Wealth of SEK 2 and 10 Million, Selected Years, 1950–2000 (1996 prices, percent). Enclosed

Source: Tax rates from Grosskopf (1976), Grosskopf, Rabe and Johansson (1997) and own calculations.

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Of particular importance are the rules for how taxable wealth is assessed in the business sector. Before 1970 100 percent of the net worth (the book value of assets minus the book value of debt) of unlisted companies was considered as taxable wealth. A slight reduction of the wealth tax for small firms owned by a maximum number of 10 owners was introduced in 1970. In 1977 only 30 percent of the net worth was subject to wealth tax. Since 1992 there is no wealth tax on unlisted stock and the net worth of companies. On listed stock, 100 percent of the market value constituted taxable wealth until the early 1990s. This has been reduced to 80 percent in order to avoid paying wealth tax the deferred tax on unrealized capital gains. In pratice, the wealth tax on on individually owned corporate assets were very high in the 1970s and 1980s. (Grosskopf 1976; Grosskopf, Rabe and Johansson 1997). The wealth tax was not deductible at the company level, so funds required to pay the wealth tax were first hit by the income tax and the mandatory payroll tax. If the total marginal tax rate on labor income including payroll taxes was 85 percent, this meant that the owner of a business had to withdraw 1/(1 – 0.85) ≈ 6,67 kronor as wage income in order to pay one krona in wealth tax.8 On the other hand, capital gains taxation was designed so that it was exceptionally favorable for individual owners to sell their firms. Before 1966 there was no taxation of longterm (> 5 years) realised capital gains on shares and the sale of partnerships.9 Between 1966 and 1976 only 10 percent of the sales proceeds minus sales costs constituted the taxable capital gain for assets held for at least 5 years. No taxes were paid, unless the nominal capital gains exceeded five percent of the sales proceeds. Between 1976 and 1990 for assets held more than two years 60 percent of the nominal capital gains were exempt from taxation, for assets held less than two years 100 percent of the nominal capital gains were subject to taxation. With a typical marginal tax rate of 75 percent, 8

Alternatively, the owners could decide to pay themselves dividends, but this resulted in an even higher tax burden, because of the combined effect of a corporate tax rate of 55 percent and the full marginal tax rate paid at the owner’s level.

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this implied a capital gains tax rate of roughly 30 percent on assets held for more than two years. From 1991 capital gains are taxed as capital income at a flat rate of 30 percent. All nominal capital gains are taxed. For unlisted firms where the owners are active in the firm, there are two tiers of taxation. On the first 100 base amounts (basbelopp, roughly SEK 3.8 million in 2001) of nominal capital gains, half is taxed as wage income (no payroll tax) and half as capital income, resulting in an aggregate tax rate of approximately 43 percent. On capital gains exceeding 100 base amounts the tax rate is 30 percent (Grosskopf 1976; Grosskopf, Rabe and Johansson 1997). Until 1990 dividends were hit by the owner’s marginal tax rate on the order of 80–85 percent and before that a corporate tax rate of roughly 55 percent had been levied (see Henrekson 1996 for details). Thus, we note that the combined effect of taxation on capital gains, wealth, profits and dividends forcibly led individuals away from the ownership of firms before the 1991 tax reform. Until the 1990/91 tax reform Swedish tax policy greatly disfavored new, small and less capital-intensive firms, while large firms as well as institutional ownership was highly favored. During an extended period of time, for three decades beginning in the early 1960s, there were extreme differences in taxation for different sources of finance and owner categories: (i) debt was the most favored and new share issues the most disfavored; (ii) households/individuals were taxed substantially more heavily than other owner categories. To provide a sense of the magnitude of the distortions caused by the Swedish tax system, Table 1 presents effective marginal tax rates for different combinations of owners and sources of finance. Three categories of owners and sources of finance are identified, and the effective marginal tax rate is calculated assuming a pre-tax real rate of return of 10 percent. A negative 9

Taxation of gains on the sale of partnerships and shares was roughly identical until 1992. After 1992 the taxation of the gains from sales of (shares of) partnerhips has become stricter, and normally a larger parter of the

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number means that the real rate of return is greater after tax than before tax. Around 1980 the distortive traits of the system were most prominent. An investment yielding a pre-tax real rate of return of 10 per cent financed by a debt instrument meant that the tax-exempt institution received a real rate of return of 18.3 per cent after tax. For a household investing in a newly issued share with the same real rate of return the situation was very different: 10 per cent before tax became –3.7 per cent after tax. Naturally, tax rules benefiting debt financing relative to equity financing and institutional relative to individual ownership systematically favored large, real capital intensive, publicly traded and well-established firms. This entailed an encouragement of capital accumulation and investments within existing firms without creating good conditions for private wealth formation. In the next section we will deal with this aspect more in depth. Since 1985 the differences in tax wedges across different owners and sources of finance have been considerably evened out. After 1995 the differences in tax wedges have increased anew, largely following the old pattern. However, the tax system at the beginning of the 21st century is very far from the extreme situation pertaining before the 1990/91 tax reform. For our discussion the tax treatment of foreign owners is of particular interest during the second phase when all restrictions on foreign ownership are lifted. In this case, the tax burden varies in accordance with the tax rules of the respective owner’s home country. It is reasonable to assume that roughly the same tax wedges as in Sweden applies to tax exempt institutions. In Table 2 we present a representative tax calculation for different owners using the 2001 tax code. It is evident that the Swedish tax system greatly favors foreign ownership relative to Swedish individual ownership. In plain words, the more favorable tax situation of foreign owners implies that foreign owners can have lower required rates of return before tax than Swedish owners (except for Swedish tax-exempt institutions), i.e., that they, ceteris capital gains has to be taxed as labor income. However, the rules are complicated.

16

paribus, ca pay a higher price for Swedish corporate assets than Swedish (rival) owners. As is clear from Table 3 there are also a large number of countries that have a lower level of taxation of stock holdings for individuals than Sweden in 2000.

Table 1

Effective Marginal Tax Rates for Different Combinations of Owners and Sources of Finance, 1960, 1980, 1991, 1994 and 1995 (real pre-tax rate of return 10% at actual inflation rates). Debt

New share issues

Retained earnings

1960 Households Tax exempt institutions Insurance companies

27.2 –32.2 –21.7

92.7 31.4 41.6

48.2 31.2 34.0

1980 Households Tax exempt institutions Insurance companies

58.2 –83.4 –54.9

136.6 –11.6 38.4

51.9 11.2 28.7

1991 Households Tax exempt institutions Insurance companies

31.3 –10.0 14.0

62.0 7.3 33.5

54.6 20.4 32.0

1994 Households Tax exempt institutions Insurance companies

32.0/27.0† –14.9 0.7

28.3/18.3† 21.8 32.3

36.5/26.5† 21.8 33.8

1995 Households Tax exempt institutions Insurance companies

32.0/27.0† –3.5 21.0

67.7/57.7† 25.7 53.3

48.0/38.0† 25.7 50.4

†Excluding wealth tax. The wealth tax on unlisted shares was abolished in 1992. Note: All calculations are based on the actual asset composition in manufacturing. The following inflation rates were used: 1960: 3%, 1970: 7%, 1980: 9.4%, 1991: 5%, 1994: 3%, 1995: 3%. The calculations conform to the general framework developed King and Fullerton (1984). The average holding period is assumed to be 10 years. Source: Calculations provided by Jan Södersten, see Södersten (1984, 1993).

17

Table 2 Taxation of Dividends for Different Owner Categories according to the 2001 Tax Code – Investment of SEK 10,000 and 10 percent Return Paid out as a Dividend. Swedish household

Swedish pension fund

Swedish foundation

Corporate tax

280

280

280

280

Income tax

216

90

0

0

Wealth tax

120

0

0

0

Net return

384

630

720

720

62

37

28

28

Tax rate (%)

Foreign investment fund

Note: The household is assumed to pay full wealth tax (on 80% of the market value) on its stock holding. An individual foreign owner has the same tax burden as a foreign investment fund in those countries where there is no wealth tax on stock holdings and where dividends are taxed at the firm level only, see Table 3. Source: Erik Norrman.

Table 3 Some Important Aspects of the Taxation of Shareholders in Selected Industrialized Countries, 2000. No wealth tax

Low wealth tax/large exemptions and/or low/no taxation of dividends

No capital gains tax on long-term holdings

Capital gains tax > 0 but ≤ 20% on longterm holdings

Finland

Austria

Finland

Austria

Ireland

France

Australia*

France

Belgium

Italy

Germany

Belgium

Luxembourg

Denmark

Japan

Greece

Canada

Portugal

Germany

Luxembourg‡

Italy

Denmark

Spain

Greece

Norway

Luxembourg

Germany

Switzerland

Korea*

Poland

New Zealand*

Greece

Luxembourg

Spain

Norway

Ireland

Mexico*

U.S.A.

Spain

Italy

Netherlands

U.K.

Japan

Poland

Netherlands†

Portugal

New Zealand

U.K.#

No taxation of dividends at the owner’s level

Poland Portugal U.K. U.S.A. Not: #Large exemption. †Effective from 2001. ‡50% of the income tax rate, i.e., a maximum rate of 23%. *Pertains to 1999. The definition of ”long-term holdings” varies between 3 months and 5 years. Sometimes the situation refers to a representative case. Source: The Federation of Swedish Industries, Institutet för Utländsk Rätt and European Tax Handbook (published by KPMG).

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4.2

Capital Market and Savings Policies

A policy aiming at high aggregate investment and saving rates and low private wealth accumulation provides a stiff challenge for capital market policy. These aims were fulfilled by a combination of large public savings surpluses, tax policy and a highly regulated capital market. The central government often had an overbalanced budget and the social security system had large surpluses. The mandatory national pension system (ATP) instituted in 1960 transformed the public sector into the most important supplier of credit. Large surpluses were accumulated in the national pension funds, the so-called AP funds. In the early 1970s, the AP funds accounted for 35 percent of total credit supply (Pontusson 1992). As shown in Table 4 close to two thirds of net saving took place in the public sector in the 1960s and 1970s.

Table 4

Net Saving as a Percentage of GDP in Sweden, Annual Averages, 1950–99 (percent).

Total Household Corporate Consolidated government

1950–59 11.9 4.5 4.0 3.4

1960–69 14.7 3.6 2.6 8.4

1970–79 11.5 1.8 3.0 6.7

1980–89 4.7 0.5 4.6 –0.4

1990–96 1.9 3.1 2.7 –4.0

1997–99 6,4 1,7 4,0 0,7

Source: Statistics Sweden, National Accounts.

Government savings were channeled to the capital markets primarily by means of the AP funds buying bonds in the regulated bond market. A large part of these bonds were issued by the so-called intermediary institutions (mellanhandsinstituten), which granted credits directly to firms. Until the deregulation of credit markets in the mid 1980s the effective real rate of interest after tax was invariably very low, and in most cases strongly negative. Hence, the price of capital could not function as an efficient allocative mechanism in capital markets, as investments with a low and even negative social rate of return became privately profitable given that credit was granted.

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Saving was either the result of noneconomic considerations as in the public sector or it was induced through strong tax incentives within the business sector. For the household sector the banks provided incentives for saving by letting bank saving provide the entry ticket into the highly subsidized housing market. In general, credits were granted through politically determined quotas. Since the real borrowing cost was negative, the granting of a loan implied a subsidy to the firm, where the size of the subsidy was directly proportional to the size of the loan.10 Generally, there are strong reasons to believe that a rationed credit allocation system of this type provides great advantages for large, incumbent firms (SOU 1982:52). In addition, there were a number of supplementary schemes that also tended to favor incumbent firms. One such scheme was the so-called ”lending back” scheme (återlån) from the AP fund system where employers were allowed to borrow up to half the amount they had paid in to the fund during the previous year. The potential for using this credit channel was therefore proportional to the wage bill of the firm. One important consequence of credit market regulations has, as we have already noted, been weak saving incentives. This effect was reinforced by the tax system. The desired effect was to curb private wealth accumulation. It is clear from Table 5 that household saving in Sweden has been low by international comparison. Since saving is the means by which wealth is accumulated, the effect of this policy lingers for a long time, even if the incentives for private wealth accumulation are substantially strengthened.

10

See Jonung (1994) for a detailed examination of Swedish capital market regulations in the postwar period.

20

Table5

Household Net Saving as a Share of Disposable Income in Sweden, OECD and OECD Europe, 1960–97 (percent). Sweden OECD OECD Europe

1960–69 6.1 9.7 12.0

1970–79 4.0 12.1 13.6

1980–89 1.1 11.2 11.6

1990–97 5.4 9.8† 10.9‡

†1990–95. ‡1990–96. Source: OECD, Historical Statistics 1960–1980 and 1960–1995; OECD, Economic Outlook, Vol. 65, 1999.

The low level of private wealth accumulation that resulted from the capital market and tax policies in turn contributed to a deterioration of the conditions for entrepreneurship and startup activity. The availability of equity financing is a critical factor for both start ups and the expansion of incumbent firms. In general, the riskier the business, the greater the reliance on equity relative to debt financing. The existence of collateral notwithstanding, a sizeable infusion of equity is often a prerequisite to obtain credit. In addition, a large infusion of equity by the owners signals their belief that the project offers favorable risk and return characteristics, which increases the willingness of banks and other outsiders to grant credit. The smaller and newer the firm, the more difficult for outside financiers to assess the viability and profitability of the proposed investment project. Thus, ceteris paribus, small and newly established firms are more dependent on equity financing than large, well-established firms. A distinct point is that there is substantial scientific evidence supporting the idea that the individual wealth position has important effects for the probability of becoming an entrepreneur and for the propensity to expand (Evans and Leighton 1989; Evans and Jovanovic 1989). Several studies also find a positive relationship between private wealth formation and start-up activity, see, e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) and Lindh and Ohlsson (1996). One important part of the regulatory framework during this period was the impediments for foreigners to own Swedish firms and Swedish real estate. These rules included public approval of foreign direct investments and acquisitions, översätt: förbudet för

21

utlänningar att förvärva fast egendom samt systemet med bundna och fria aktier, där de bundna aktierna endast kunde förvärvas av svenskar. I praktiken uteslöt dessa regler ett mer omfattande utländskt ägande av svenska företag during the first of our two phases.

5. The Effects of the Policies Pursued We have pointed out the link between political ideology and the policies pursued. It is now time to discuss the link between the policies pursued and their effects on outcomes. We begin by examining the situation at the end of the 1940s. According to Spånt’s calculations the households then held 75 percent of all Swedish listed stock. The calculations apply to final owners, which implies that ownership by investment companies and other intermediate owners has been netted out. The final owner categories are households, institutions and foreign owners. Private ownership was highly concentrated at this point.11 This is clearly documented by Lindgren (1953) in a study based on the 1945 Census. He shows that 6–7 percent of the stock owners controlled 65–70 percent of the stock market value. His findings regarding the ownership control in the large companies (more than 500 employees) are of even greater interest in our context. In no less than 60 percent of the large firms one single individual represented the majority of the votes at the shareholders’ general meeting. In more than 90 percent of the firms three owners or less constituted the majority at the shareholders’ meeting. In addition, frequently the same individuals or families held a majority position in a number of firms. Against this background the then leader of the Communist party C. H. Hermansson coined the expression “the fifteen families” in his 1962 book Monopol och storfinans (Monopoly and Big Business). According to him these fifteen families controlled 11

Roine (2000) provides one possible economic explanation why economic policy was designed as described above. He shows theoretically that if private wealth is very unequally distributed initially, a political coalition ca arise between low income earners and the rich. A prerequisite for this coalition is the introduction safety

22

Swedish industry. This view of the world was later confirmed by the government commission on ownership concentration (Koncentrationsutredningen, SOU 1967:7) and by Glete (1987, 1994). According to Shumpeter’s analysis in CSD Swedish industry had already at this stage come pretty close to the point where the socialization of the industrial sector would become politically inevitable. As we have discussed at some length, the tax policies initated at the beginnng of the postwar period encouraged an increasing institutionalization of business ownership, but it also spurred the development towards increased concentration of ownership and firms. In the previous section we noted that the policy package discouraged private wealth accumulation and strongly favored institutional ownership of the business sector. By inspecting Figure 3 we can observe that this policy had a profound impact on the ownership structure: during the postwar period the household ownership share fell sharply while the institutional share rose commensurately.

Figure 3

The Distribution of Ownership of Swedish Quoted Stocks across Ownership Categories, 1950–2000 (percent). Enclosed

Source: Spånt (1975), Norrman and McLure (1997), Statistics Sweden and OM Stockholmsbörsen.

As we have noted repeatedly, the tax code favored the accumulation of retained earnings in firms. From the perspective of the individual household this implied that existing corporate wealth owned by households was locked into incumbent firms. According to traditional financial theory this within-firm saving should be translated into household wealth through appreciated stock market values.

valves/breaks in the tax system for the initially rich, so they can avoid being substantively affected by increased aggregate taxation.

23

In practice, it did not work in this fashion. Until the early 1980s stock market values were extremely depressed, which in most cases implied that the net worth of the companies greatly exceeded their stock market value. This state of affairs is illustrated in Figure 4. It shows that Tobin´s q (the stock market value of the firms divided by their replacement value) fell from 60 percent to 30 percent between 1970 and 1980. According to calculations in Södersten (1984) Tobin´s q was approximatively unity in 1960. Another indication of the low market values are given by the price earnings ratios for the large Swedish companies. The figure reports the P/E-ratios for Ericsson, Electrolux and Atlas Copco, respectively. In the early 1970s, companies like these were typically valued at P/E-ratios around 2–3 (Figure 4). Since the regulatory and policy environment induced a development towards increased institutional ownership, the stock market boom starting in 1979–80 only fuelled household wealth accumulation to a limited extent.

Figure 4 Tobin’s q in 1970–80 in the Swedish Engineering Industry and the Evolution of the P/E-Ratio in Three Swedish Engineering Firms in 1970–98. Enclosed Note: Tobin’s q is defined as the stock market value/calculated replacement cost for the 13 leading engineering corporations in Sweden; the P/E-ratio is defined as the stock market value/profits before tax and extraordinary items. The evolution of the the P/E-ratios have been fitted to a linear trend. Source: Tobin’s q: Södersten (1984); P/E-ratio: Findata.

Hushållens alltmer urholkade ägarsituation gick, paradoxalt nog, hand i hand med en växande privat maktkoncentration i de största svenska företagen. Närmare bestämt kom familjen Wallenberg att bli alltmer dominerande i de svenska storföretagens styrelser under efterkrigstiden. Detta framgår av Glete (1994). Han studerar maktsituationen i de 25 största företagen 1925, 1945, 1967 och 1990. År 1925 hade familjen Wallenberg en kontrollpost i två av de 25 största företagen. År 1945 hade motsvarande tal stigit till fem för att år 1967 ha stigit till tio. År 1990 hade familjen styrelsekontroll i nio av de 25 största företagen.

24

Det är onekligen paradoxalt att en enskild familj kunnat stärka sin maktställning på ett så påtagligt sätt, samtidigt som politiken motarbetat det privata ägandet och samtidigt som det institutionella ägandet ökat kraftigt. I praktiken har givetvis kontrollen över företagen baserats på en allt mindre andel av ägarkapitalet i de kontrollerade företagen. Det förefaller som om familjen Wallenberg på ett väsentligt skickligare sätt än de övriga gamla ägarfamiljerna kunnat utnyttja det vakuum på ägarsidan som uppstod genom den starka institutionaliseringen av ägandet under efterkrigstiden. Ur ett politiskt perspektiv behöver utvecklingen inte nödvändigtvis ses som motsägelsefull. Den följer väl det av Schumpeter förutsagda mönstret med en alltmer ökad koncentration av det privata ägandet. Det är enligt Schumpeter ett koncentrerat ägande som pekar framåt mot ett socialistiskt maktövertagande, medan däremot en omfattande spridning av ägandet skapar legitimitet för kapitalismen. Att i detalj kartlägga politikens effekter inom de områden som vi intresserar oss för här är inte möjligt inom ramen för denna uppsats. Vi skall emellertid ange några viktiga stylized facts som karaktäriserade svenskt näringsliv i slutet av den första fasen. Dessa indikerar att politiken över ett brett fält fått den effekt som avsetts och som man med utgångspunkt i regelsystemen kunnat förvänta sig: •

Household saving in Sweden has been very low throughout the postwar period caompared to other rich countries. This has in turn resulted in low financial wealth per capita relative to other contries. See Table 5 and 8.

•

The institutional ownership share of the business sector was in all likelihood very high by interantional standards by the late 1980s when the internationalization of business ownership began take off.

•

The foreign ownership share of the Swedish business sector was small until the late 1980s (Figure 3 and 5).

•

Corporate control of the large firms has been dominated by just a few families (Glete 1994).

•

The debt-equity ratio in the Swedish business sector had been rising for a long time and it was very high when the deregulation of financial markets began (Långtidsutredningen 1982; Josefsson 1988).

25

•

New firm formation and small firm activity have been and probably still are low by international comparison (Delmar and Davidsson 2000; OECD Employment Outlook, July 1992).

•

Large firms eventually bexame more predominant in Sweden than in almost any other country (Jagrén 1993; Henrekson 1996, Ch. 3) and the willingness to grow among small firms has been weak (Rickne and Jakobsson 1999; Henrekson and Johansson 1999; Davidsson and Henrekson 2001).

•

The popular support for a capitalistic, privately-owned business sector fell to very low levels (see next section).

Sammantaget befann sig det svenska näringslivet vid åttiotalets ingång i en situation som inte föreföll vara så avlägsen från LO:s och Wigforss visioner från tiden efter krigsslutet. Med ett näringsliv som dominerades av ett mindre antal stora företag och som bars upp av en liten och starkt koncentrerad privat förmögenhetsmassa så kunde den socialisering som Schumpeter (1942) förutspådde komma att te sig mer som en formsak än som ett avgörande systemskifte. Utvecklingen kom dock att ta en annan väg.

6.

The Turning-Point

Vi har något stiliserat beskrivit utvecklingen och politiken gentemot företagssektorn som en rätlinjig process där den naturliga slutpunkten var en socialisering av näringslivet i en eller annan form.12 Löntagarfondernas införande och därpå följande avskaffande kom att markera en vändpunkt för den politiklinje vi beskrivit. Det ligger utanför ramen för vår framställning att förklara varför det blev så. Vi skall endast peka på några i sammanhanget betydelsefulla förhållanden. Vid slutet av 1970-talet skedde en omsvängning i den internationella synen på marknadsekonomi och ekonomisk planering. Under efterkrigstidens första decennier fanns det i alla industriländer, hos såväl politiker som ekonomer, en stark tro på möjligheterna att planera ekonomin. Under denna period tedde sig en växande roll för staten i samhällsekonomin som en oundviklig trend. Många, t.ex. nobelpristagaren i ekonomi Jan

26

Tinbergen (1961), förutspådde en konvergens mellan väst- och östekonomierna, där inslagen av planering och statlig styrning skulle komma att bli allt större i väst. I öst skulle byråkratin bli mer flexibel, medan det politiska förtrycket skulle mildras. I denna process sågs Sverige under denna tid på många håll som ett föregångsland bland västländerna. Under senare delen av 1970-talet inleddes emellertid en marknadsekonomisk renässans i de ledande industriländerna. Denna hade bland annat sin grund i besvikelsen över resultaten av de omfattande offentliga ingripandena i väst och i planekonomiernas misslyckanden i öst.13 Denna utveckling, i kombination med det begynnande sammanbrottet för östblockets socialistiska system, medförde att en fortsatt utveckling i socialistisk riktning för Sveriges del skulle ha gjort oss alltmer isolerade. Slutet av 1970-talet blev också en slutpunkt på en lång period av växande dominans för de stora företagen och tilltagande marginalisering av de mindre företagen. Världen över uppstod en renässans för entreprenörskapet. Det är belagt att den genomsnittliga företagsstorleken minskat i industriländerna sedan 1970-talet (Brock och Evans 1986; Loveman och Sengenberger; 1991). Det finns flera skäl till detta:

•

Coase (1937) used transactions cost analysis to explain why many activities were carried out more efficiently within a firm than through deliveries between independent firms, i.e., outside the purview of the market. However, technological change in recent decades has resulted in a dramatic reduction of transaction costs in the market, which has led to increased specialization across firms and sharper focus on each firm’s core business. Outsourcing and corporate downsizing are concrete manifestations of this change (Carlsson 1999; Piore and Sabel 1984).

•

Since the 1960s there has been a sizeable shift away from industries characterized by large firms and establishments (manufacturing, extraction, construction) towards service industries where as a rule firms and establishments are smaller (see, e.g., Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh 1996).

12 13

A similar view of the history of this period can be found in Hedborg and Meidner (1984). See Yergin and Stanislaw (1998) for a comprehensive but easily accessible account of this development.

27

•

In tandem with increased incomes consumers have come to demand more differentiated products rather standardized products suitable for large scale production and distribution (Piore and Sabel 1984; Carree and Thurik 1999).

•

Large, mature firms cannot in many cases introduce genuinely new products and production methods efficiently. In the long run, radically new technology is required to sustain a high growth rate, since firms in other countries at lower income levels will sooner or later imitate current technologies. Large firms often excel in increasing productivity in the production of existing products, while totally new products are often produced more efficiently in newly-established firms, which have been started with the purpose of producing these very products (Baldwin and Johnson 1999; Audretsch 1995).

•

Carlsson (1999) emphasizes the role of small entrepreneurial firms as crucial agents of change. Since these firms are entrepreneurial they are also motivated to grow, and hence they are likely to play a particularly important role in the growth process.

•

The small business sector can also function as an inexpensive mechanism for identifying and developing entrepreneurial and managerial talent. Since fewer assets are at stake, managerial blunders or simple ineptitude are less costly when they occur in smaller firms (Davis and Henrekson 1997; Lucas 1978).

De tre första faktorerna ovan pekar mot att fler varor och tjänster än tidigare produceras mer effektivt i mindre företag och anläggningar – på grund av såväl strukturella som teknologiska skäl. De tre avslutande faktorerna är mer dynamiska till sin natur. De antyder att det i större utsträckning än förr är små och nya företag som är bättre skickade att bidra till den teknologiska och organisatoriska förnyelsen och att därigenom tillväxt i hög grad manifesteras i att små entreprenöriella företag med kraftfulla affärsidéer snabbt växer sig stora (Birch and Medoff 1994). Det är också troligt att de avregleringar som påbörjades under slutet av 1970-talet underminerade den monopolistiska situation som de då etablerade företagen hade, vilket skapade nya affärsmöjligheter för entreprenörer och småföretagare. Situationen sammanfattades i början av 1980-talet av Ronald Reagan på följande sätt: ”We have lived through the age of Big Industry and the age of the giant corporation. But I believe that this is

28

the age of the entrepreneur”.14 I den mån detta förmodande var riktigt så innebar det att grundbulten i Schumpeters teori och i Wigforss vision hade ryckts loss. Vi fick också vid denna tidpunkt i Sverige en påtaglig opinionsmässig förändring i synen på företag och företagande. In Table 8 we report the results from two questionnaires where a representative sample of individuals have been asked about their attitudes towards entrepreneurship and business conditions. In 1978 only 30 percent of the respondents believed that it was important to encourage entrepreneurship and firm formation. In the 1980s people’s attitudes on this issue changed dramatically and by the mid-1980s approximately four quarters thought this was important. Perhaps even more striking is the fact that in 1978 only 37 percent of the respondents believed that business leaders/entrepreneurs were most efficient in running a firm. In the 1990s this had also changed and by 1997 the percentage who thought that business leaders/entrepreneurs were the most efficient was so high that the question had virtually lost its relevance. The reversal in popular attitudes towards self-employment, entrepreneurship and private industry in recent years has been confirmed in a number of studies. Puranen (2001) reports that 78 percent of both men and women aged 19–25 could consider starting their own business. In an opinion poll in 1998 TEMO found that 78 percent of the men and 67 percent of the women aged 20–24 could consider starting their own business.15 16 Schumpeters prediktion att en tilltagande storföretagsdominans skulle rycka undan det folkliga stödet för ett kapitalistiskt företagande förefaller alltså att i Sverige ha hållit streck fram till slutet av 1970-talet. Därefter ändrades emellertid opinionsläget i grunden. Från och med 1980-talets början fanns det i Sverige knappast längre folkligt stöd för en socialisering av företagssektorn. När löntagarfonder infördes 1984 så skedde detta trots en negativ opinion. 14

Cited from Brown, Hamilton and Medoff (1990, p. 1). Reported in Dagens Nyheter, May 30, 1998. 16 However, it is yet unclear whether these positive attitudes will be translated into a great deal of start-up activity. Delmar and Davidsson (2000) and Davidsson and Henrekson (2001) find that the number of nascent 15

29

Den faktiskt realiserade modellen kom också att bli halvhjärtad i förhållande till de ursprungliga ambitionerna.

Table 6

Results from Two Repeated Cross-Section Studies of Attitudes towards Entrepreneurship.

I. Question: Is it important to encourage entrepreneurship and firm formation? Share of respondents believing that it is important: Year Share (%)

1963 50

1967 41

1978 30

1981 72

1985 74

1997 88

II. Question: Who do you think is capable of running a firm most efficiently? Choose between (1) business leaders/entrepreneurs, (2) trade union representatives, and (3) do not know/equally good. Share of respondents believing that business leaders/entrepreneurs were most efficient: Year Share (%)

1978 37

1982 55

1995 80

1997 90

Source: SIFO, Demoskop and The Confederation of Swedish Employers, SAF.

Under 1980-talet i övrigt kom politiken, framförallt genom avregleringarna av de finansiella marknaderna, att få en marknadsekonomisk inriktning. Av särskild betydelse för den fråga vi diskuterar är avskaffandet av valutaregleringarna och det stegvisa avskaffandet av hindren för utlänningar att förvärva svenska företag. Dessa förändringar blev startpunkten för en snabb uppgång i det utländska ägandet av de svenska företagen. Detta har i sin tur dragit med sig en omfattande omstruktureringsprocess av den svenska företagssektorn som är långt ifrån avslutad.

entrepreneurs relative to the active-age population was still low in Sweden in the late 1990s relative to other comparable countries.

30

7.

Internationaliseringen och ägandet av de svenska företagen

Avvecklingen av hindren för företagsförvärv i Sverige, i kombination med den kraftiga internationaliseringsprocessen, har medfört att det utländska ägandet i Sverige har stigit utomordentligt snabbt under de allra senaste åren. Vi kunde redan i Figur 3 konstatera att den utländska ägarandelen på börsen steg snabbt under 1990-talet; från 8 procent 1990 till ca 40 procent 1999. Samma bild ger den statistik över börsföretagens ägande som tas fram av SIS Ägarservice – se Tabell 7. Enligt denna statistik har den utländska ägarandelen fortsatt att öka under 2000–2001, medan hushållens andel exklusive aktiefonder för närvarande har stabiliserats på 19–20 procent av börsvärdet.

Table 7

Börsvärdet fördelning på ägarkategorier, 1993–2001 (percent). Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Household s 26 25 17 18.3 17.8 30.6† 29.9 30.8 29.2

Foreign owners 19 24 32 34.9 36.4 34.9 38.2 42.7 42.8

Swedish institutions 55 51 51 46.8 45.8 34.5 31.9 26.5 28

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Note.: Avser läget vid årets början. †From 1998 ingår aktiefonder i hushållens ägande. Aktiefondernas andel av börsägande uppskattas till ca 10 procent. Source: Sundin and Sundqvist (1993–2001), SIS Ägarservice.

Dock fångar detta mått bara en aspekt av det ökade utländska ägarinflytandet i svenskt näringsliv. Även om utländska intressen äger en stor andel av aktierna i ett svenskt börsnoterat företag är det direkta inflytandet på hur företaget styrs i regel begränsat, dels finns då de (åtminstone röstmässigt) dominerande ägarna ofta i Sverige, dels är då det utländska ägandet i normalfallet splittrat på många händer.

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Det utländska ägarinflytandet blir däremot ett helt annat i de företag som i sin helhet är utlandsägda. Som framgår av Figur 5 har antalet anställda i helt utlandsägda företag ökat snabbt i Sverige under de senaste två decennierna. 1980 var ca 113,000 svenskar anställda i utlandsägda företag. Fram till 1999 hade antalet ökat till 400,000 och samma år var var sjätte näringslivsanställd anställd i ett utlandsägt företag. Fram till 1987 skedde ökningen av antalet anställda i utlandsägda företag genom att dessa byggde upp egna verksamheter från grunden i Sverige, men sedan ASEA 1987 fusionerades med Brown Boveri och blev ett företag ägt från Schweiz, så har ett stort antal, i många fall mycket stora, svenska företag övergått i utländsk ägo.17 Strandell (2000) anger de 30 största utlandsägda företagen i Sverige vid utgången av 1999. Såväl tillverkningsindustri som tjänstesektorn finns där företrädda. Särskilt tydlig är dominansen för utlandsägda företag inom läkemedelsindustrin där dessa har en ägarandel på 86 procent. Till en del är detta en utveckling som finns i alla industriländer, men Sverige är involverat i processen i högre grad än de flesta andra länder.18 Enligt vår analys är detta i hög grad en följd av den förmögenhets- och ägarpolitik som fördes framförallt under den första fasen av efterkrigstiden. Vi har visat att effekterna av denna politik har varit: •

låg privat förmögenhetsbildning

•

stor andel institutionellt ägande

•

hög andel stora företag i näringslivet

Genom att den inhemska privata förmögenhetsmassan, som framgår av Tabell 8, blev relativt liten är det är av rena volymskäl svårt för svenskt privat ägande att göra sig gällande i den omstrukturering av det internationella näringslivet som är en viktig del av internationaliseringsprocessen.

17

See Henrekson and Jakobsson (2001, Table A2) for a complete list of all foreign take-overs of Swedish firms with more than 1,000 employees between 1987 and 2000. 18 One clear indication of this fact is that both inward and outward direct investments are larger in Sweden relative to GDP than in almost all other industrialized countries (Jakobsson 1999, Table 4, p. 347).

32

När det gäller det institutionella ägandet vill vi hävda att denna ägarform är mer lämpad att förvalta en given företagsstruktur än att på ett aggressivt sätt delta i en omstrukturering inriktad på att utveckla den egna ägarpositionen. En i detta sammanhang viktig aspekt av svenskt institutionellt ägande har att göra med regelverken för de skattebefriade familjestiftelserna. Dessa är visserligen skattebefriade, men samtidigt tvingas de, för att erhålla skattebefrielse, att skänka 80 procent av sina utdelningsintäkter till välgörande ändamål. Detta minskar dels deras finansiella styrka, dels kan det liknas vid en skatt. Skillnaden i detta fall är bara att stiftelsen inom vissa ramar kan bestämma vad ”skatten” skall användas till. Under alla omständigheter skapar systemet incitamentsproblem. Så snart rent dynastiska ambitioner inte räcker som drivkraft kan de få svårt att på lång sikt upprätthålla en lika hög ägarkompetens som de ägare som själva fritt disponerar en större andel av avkastningen.

Figure 5 Number of Employees in Foreign-Owned Firms in Sweden and Their Share of all Employees in the Swedish Private Sector, 1980–99. Enclosed Source: Strandell (2000) and Institutet för tillväxtpolitiska studier, Internationella företag (www.itps.nu).

De internationella företagsköpen drivs dels av en portföljanpassningsprocess, dels av omstruktureringar through mergers and acquisitions. På båda dessa områden bidrar storföretagsberoendet till att Sverige blir mer involverat i internationaliseringsprocessen än andra länder. Ser vi köpen ur ett portföljperspektiv så kan man räkna med att en utländsk placerare som går in i ett annat land i första hand väljer stora företag, därför att det är där som informationen och genomlysningen är bäst (Dahlquist and Robertsson 2001). Därtill kommer att de stora företagen relativt lätt låter sig jämföras med motsvarigheter i andra länder. Ett ytterligare argument kan vara att placeraren i sin diversifiering måste nöja sig med ett begränsat antal internationella företag. Det blir då naturligt att hålla sig till stora företag.

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Går vi sedan till omstruktureringsperspektivet kan vi konstatera att de stora svenska företagen är starkt internationaliserade med verksamheter i en rad olika länder. Därmed är de alla engagerade i de stora omstruktureringar av det internationella företagandet som internationaliseringen och globaliseringen för med sig. Detta bidrar starkt till ett ökat utländskt ägande i det svenska näringslivet. Genom att den inhemska förmögenhetsmassan är relativt liten – see Table 8 – så är det därtill svårt för svenskt ägande att göra sig gällande i processen. Till detta kommer att skattereglerna, som vi redan konstaterat, fortfarande gynnar utländskt ägande i förhållande till svenskt. Detta bidrar bland annat till att svenskägda företag tenderar att bli lägre värderade än motsvarande utländska företag. Därmed blir det svårt för ägarna av svenska företag att stå emot uppköpsbud även från relativt likvärdiga företag.

Table 8

Financial Wealth per Capita in Nine OECD Countries, 1990 and 1995 (Current US dollars). Country Canada France Germany Italy Japan Norway Spain Sweden U.S.

1990 28,233 23,580 28,463 32,374 39,707 2,857 9,345 7,152 51,827

1995 33,359 41,347 45,328 35,790 94,038 5,179 12,084 13,516 76,760

Source: Pålsson (1998), based on OECD, Financial Statistics (various years).

Sammantaget gör vi bedömningen att vi står inför en utveckling där de flesta stora svenska företagen inom några år kommer att befinna sig i utländsk ägo. Med den dominans de stora företagen har i den svenska ekonomin kommer detta att innebära att denna kommer att tillhöra de mest utlandsägda bland industriländernas ekonomier. På kort tid skulle vi därmed ha gått från ett läge med ett obetydligt utländskt ägande i det svenska näringslivet och en långsiktig

34

vision om ett socialistiskt ägande till en situation där utlandsägandet spelar en dominerande roll. Flera studier har dokumenterat att de stora multinationella företagen i många avseenden står för dynamiken i den svenska ekonomin. Tydligast framgår detta av att näringslivets FoU utgifter är mycket koncentrerade till de stora företagen. Det var detta förhållande som ledde OECD (1996) till följande karaktäristik av det svenska näringslivet i 1996 års Sverigerapport: Totalt sett blir intrycket att FoU-utgifterna återspeglar den svenska ekonomins dualism, en dynamisk och framåtskridande multinationell sektor som står i kontrast till en stagnerande småföretagssektor, och en statlig politik som inte har förändrat detta.

Under den allra senaste tiden har denna bild ändrats något genom den dynamiska utvecklingen på IT-området i Sverige. Kvantitativt är dock detta en liten del av ekonomin, varför OECD:s slutsats kvarstår – det är de multinationella storföretagen som står för huvuddelen av dynamiken i ekonomin. Det är denna dynamiska del av den svenska ekonomin som är på väg att övergå i utländsk ägo.

8.

Concluding Remarks

Den stora omsvängning i ägarpolitik och ägarstruktur som vi analyserat innebär en djupgående strukturell förändring. Förändringen får stora effekter på såväl den ekonomiska som den politiska sfären. Den uppgift vi förelagt oss i dena uppsats är att kartlägga denna utveckling och söka förklara drivkrafterna bakom densamma. Huvudfrågan i vår uppsats har varit vilka faktorer som drivit fram det extremt kraftiga trendbrottet, kring 1980-talets mitt, vad gäller strukturen på ägandet i den svenska företagssektorn. Vår slutsats är att den internationella omläggningen av politiken under 1980talet varit betydelsfull. Något stiliserat kan man säga att industriländerna gick från ”Tinbergen convergence” i politiken till ”Greenspan convergence”. Vi har också funnit att de faktorer som bidragit till den internationella politikomläggningen också varit verksamma i Sverige. Vi har dock särskilt lyft fram en tredje

35

faktor, nämligen samspelet mellan den tidigare ägarpolitiken, som bars upp av en långsiktig socialistisk vision, och den internationella avregleringen under 1980-talet. När liberaliseringen av de finansiella marknaderna öppnade möjligheten för utlänningar att köpa aktier i Sverige så hade den tidigare politiken ”förpackat” det svenska näringslivet på ett sådant sätt att det var mycket tillgängligt för utländska uppköp. De faktorer som banade väg för en socialisering av ägandet vid en sluten kapitalmarknad, kom när kapitalmarknaden avreglerades att bädda för ett snabbt utländskt övertagande av det svenska näringslivet. Vi har inte gått in på effekterna av den skisserade utvecklingen. Här finns ett stort fält för ytterligare forskning. Vi nöjer oss med att peka på tre områden där vi bedömer att effekterna kan vara betydande. Productivity and economic efficiency. Det finns två skäl varför vi kan förvänta oss att ett ökat utländskt ägande leder till ökad produktivitet och ökad effektivitet i företagen. För det första är det väl belagt att det vanligtvis genom de multinationella företagen sker en tekniköverföring från hemlandet till värdlandet (e.g., Blomström and Kokko 1998 and Baldwin, Braconier and Forslid 1999) Sålunda har de svenska multinationella företagens FoUsatsningar lett till att företagens dotterbolag i utlandet kunnat öka sin produktivitet (Forss 1996). Inflödet av direktinvesteringar till Sverige innebär att Sverige nu har en möjlighet att också hamna på mottagarsidan i denna internationella tekniköverföring. Det är också så att vi generellt sett kan räkna med att den ökade kapitalrörlighet som utlandsägandet representerar leder till ökad effektivitet i kapitalanvändningen och därmed till högre produktivitet i ekonomin. Modén (1998), som undersökt effekten av utländska uppköp i Sverige, finner också att produktivitetsutvecklingen i de uppköpta enheterna blivit bättre i de fall det varit utländska köpare jämfört med de fall där köparna varit svenska. Convergence in other policy areas. Föreställningen om konvergens mot det anglosaxiska mönstret omfattar hela den ekonomiska politiken. Huruvida vi haft någon sådan

36

konvergens eller ej är en akademiskt hett debatterad fråga.19 Man kan emellertid argumentera för att en ökad internationalisering av näringslivet i ett land tyder på att känsligheten för skillnader mellan länder i regelverk som är viktiga för företagen ökar. Sverige har på en rad områden anpassat politiken i marknadsliberal riktning.20 Fortfarande är dock skattetrycket mycket högt. En viktig fråga är om den höga internationalisgsgraden av näringslivet kommer att bidra till att pressa ned skattetrycket i Sverige. Avkorporativisering av Sverige. Under efterkrigstiden har korporativismen varit en viktig del av den svenska ekonomin. Centrala löneförhandlingar mellan arbetsgivare och fackföreningar och informella trepartsförhandlingar mellan regering, arbetgivare och fackföreningar har varit en del av denna bild. För att denna modell skall fungera torde det krävas en viss homogenitet och en nationell förankring på arbetsgivarsidan.21 Genom ett alltmera utbrett internationellt ägande av det svenska näringslivet försvinner dessa förutsättningar, varför man kan förvänta sig att internationaliseringen kommer att bidra till en ytterligare avkorporativisering av Sverige.

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19

See, e.g., Freeman (2000) and Audretsch and Thurik (2000) for contrasting views. See Davidsson and Henrekson (2001). 21 En betydande avkorporativisering av det svenska samhället påbörjdes redan under 1980-talet – se Rothstein och Bergström (1999). 20

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Figure 2 3

2,5

10 million

Percent

2 2 million

1,5

1

0,5

0 1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Figure 3 Share (%) 80 70

Swedish households Swedish institutions

60 50 40 30 20 10

Foreign owners

0 1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

41

Figure 4

p/e ratio

Tobin's q

20

0,8

Tobin's q (right scale) Ericsson

15

0,6

Electrolux

10 Atlas Copco 0,4

5

0

0,2

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

450000 400000 350000 300000 250000 200000 150000 100000 50000 0

Bar = No. of employees Curve = Employment share

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998

18,0 16,0 14,0 12,0 10,0 8,0 6,0 4,0 2,0 0,0

Share (%)

No. of employees

Figure 5