UK-based institutions with substantial Arctic interests include the Scott Polar. Research Institute of the University of. Cambridge, the National Oceanography.
THE RUSI JOURNAL
THE UK AND THE ARCTIC THE STRATEGIC GAP Duncan Depledge and Klaus Dodds
The UK has a 400-year-old relationship with the Arctic. From its history of sixteenthcentury exploration to contemporary leading research on climate change, the UK is more than an interested observer. To ensure clear, evidence-based policy action on energy, maritime resources, scientific discovery and security issues, the UK needs a crossdepartmental, integrated strategic approach that signals its commitment to the region.
T
he Arctic Ocean is changing.1 No longer a ‘frozen desert’ or ‘remote military theatre’, the Arctic Ocean is increasingly being seen as a ‘northern Mediterranean’, indicative of a geographical and political shift in the world-view of policy-makers and other interested parties, including media and non-governmental organisations.2 The analogy with the Mediterranean is striking, highlighting on the one hand an area of common concern for neighbouring states (with the potential for both conflict and co-operation) but on the other, a space of transit. Likewise, military establishments in the Arctic’s five coastal states (the US, Canada, Russia, Norway and Denmark) and beyond, including NATO, are seeing the Arctic Ocean in a new light, recognising the potential for serious security challenges to emerge. In March 2010, the magazine The Diplomat reported the comments of Chinese Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo: 3
the region. The lack of coherent UK policy towards the Arctic was recognised in the House of Lords more than four years ago,4 yet it prompted little progress in the development of a crossdepartmental strategy. Despite a second debate in the House of Lords on the ‘Arctic ice cap’ in December 2010, this remains the case.5 Nevertheless, a growing number of voices from within the UK government are emphasising the importance of the Arctic. In a speech given at the joint NATO/Icelandic government conference in January 2009, the then-minister for international defence and security, Baroness Ann Taylor, outlined some of the challenges facing the Arctic region and UK interests there:6
The Arctic belongs to all the people around the world as no nation has sovereignty over it. The current scramble for the sovereignty of the Arctic among some nations has encroached on many other countries.
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Today, in having this discussion we are explicitly acknowledging that the changing Arctic climate has serious implications for us all … The UK government is evaluating the challenges and opportunities of a melting Arctic. The UK MOD has developed its first Arctic Strategy and this was endorsed by the Defence Board in December 2008 … it’s clear to us that security in the Arctic is not foremost a military concern. We are not returning to the Cold War. But security cannot be divorced from economic activity, environmental interests and political considerations. If ever that was the case, it is certainly not the case now.
The Arctic is hence an important space for UK defence planners. Significantly, the minister noted that military security was not the UK’s foremost concern in the Arctic, raising the question as to why the government has not developed a broader cross-departmental strategy that addresses the UK’s ‘softer’ security interests. If the interests of the UK are cross-cutting rather than exclusively focused on hard security in a Cold War sense, is the Ministry of Defence’s Arctic Strategy (officially restricted) sufficient for achieving the UK’s goals in the region? This article provides an audit of UK Arctic interests and outlines areas where the UK might articulate further the nature and scale of its interests. While the UK is not an Arctic Ocean coastal state, it is geographically proximate. As this article argues, the UK government needs to articulate a formal, cross-departmental Arctic strategy to help crystallise further co-operation between stakeholders within and beyond Whitehall, providing a level of coherence that conceptual policies and speeches alone cannot provide, while also reminding the wider international community of the UK’s longstanding and enduring interest in the Arctic region. A strategy would help tease out UK Arctic interests, ranging from the effects of further climate change to commercial opportunities such as energy, shipping and tourism, and would provide an opportunity to recognise the costs involved in such a development, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2011.591097
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The Northern Lights shimmer above HMS Ocean as it takes part in Exercise Cold Response off the coast of Norway. The UK may need an integrated strategy to articulate its Arctic interests beyond its security concerns. Photo courtesy of Bernie Henesy/ PA Images.
which include potentially alienating Arctic partners.
Why Now? The time is ripe for the UK government to produce a formal Arctic strategy. In the past twelve months, the Arctic has received renewed attention from the government: for example, in 2010 at the Canada–UK Colloquium on ‘The Arctic and the Northern Dimension of World Issues’,7 as well as in House of Lords debates. Despite a change of government in 2010, the UK’s commitment to the High North remains firm. Moreover, as the UK government looks to develop and cement its strategic relationship with Northern Europe (for example, bilaterally with Norway and multilaterally through the so-called ‘Northern NATO’), part of this ‘Nordic drive’ must necessarily demonstrate the UK’s long-term commitment to the ‘northern dimension of world issues’.8 As Liam Fox, the secretary of state for defence, declared in November 2010: ‘For too long Britain has been looking elsewhere, not in Northern Europe, where Britain exists’.9
Over the coming year, UK public interest in the Arctic is also likely to grow as increased media attention is paid to high-profile business deals, such as BP’s ongoing attempts to negotiate a deal with Rosneft in Russia, and efforts by NGOs to raise awareness of the environmental consequences of increasing activity in the Arctic, particularly in light of the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe off the US coast in 2010. In the autumn of 2011, the BBC will broadcast a new documentary series entitled Frozen Planet, which is also likely to reignite the popular imagination and interest in the region.10 More broadly, the seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council in Nuuk, Greenland, in May 2011 was an important milestone for the intergovernmental forum of Arctic states, permanent participants and observers. The meeting confirmed the creation of a permanent secretariat based in Tromsø, Norway, and witnessed the signing of a search and rescue agreement for the Arctic Ocean. The application for observer status by China, Japan, the EU and South Korea was not resolved at this
meeting, but the Council’s institutional strengthening reinforced the need to retain Britain’s observer status at a time of change.
Analysing UK Arctic Interests The UK has a 400-year-old relationship with the Arctic, created and consolidated by exploration, science, security, resources, commerce and the popular imagination. While the UK is not an Arctic state per se, it should still be considered part of the sub-Arctic and is clearly influenced by the physical geographies and climatic systems of the High North, such as the ‘Arctic Oscillation’ which triggered the UK’s severe weather in the winter of 2009 and December 2010.11 Within government, the main departments with Arctic interests are the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the Department of Trade, the Department of Business, Industry and Science, and the Department of Energy and Climate Change. Within the Foreign Office, primary responsibility lies with
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the Polar Regions Unit (PRU). The Foreign Office has also established an ‘Arctic Network’ to share information with other government departments and, where appropriate, to co-ordinate UK policy regarding the Arctic. In addition, it took the lead in creating an Arctic stakeholder community within the UK, with a conference of UK Arctic stakeholders held in Scotland in March 2008.12 One of the conference’s key findings was the need to re-assert the importance of engagement in international organisations, including the Arctic Council, and of liaison with coastal states and near neighbours, because they provide the best mechanisms for promoting UK interests in the region. The UK’s Arctic interests can be broadly categorised under four headings: security, politics, economics and the environment, with an important contribution to the perception of the Arctic made by its place in the popular imagination. Taken together, these interests represent the diverse and interrelated ways in which the UK is connected to the High North.
Security: Minimising Tensions As a NATO member, the UK has long viewed the Arctic and North Atlantic as a theatre vital to Britain’s trading and strategic interests. Presumably this was the rationale behind the MoD’s preparation of its own Arctic Strategy. In both government and opposition, the current defence secretary, Liam Fox, has been particularly vocal in parliament about the need to maintain military capabilities for the defence of the ‘Northern Flank’. In a recent meeting of defence ministers of the Nordic and Baltic States in January 2011, he stated:13 The deepening of our bilateral and multilateral relationships with partners in the Nordic region is well worth exploring. We would like to create a broader framework that makes it easier for both NATO and non-NATO members to have a closer relationship in the region.
During the Cold War, the so-called Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap was a major zone of interest, alongside
fishing interests in northern Atlantic waters. While the post-Cold War era has altered the strategic environment, the UK continues to operate nuclear submarines in Arctic waters for the purpose of deterrence against potentially hostile states, and remains militarily committed to the region through NATO and other EU allies, such as Sweden and Finland. These commitments are likely to be strengthened if the government continues to push for a more consolidated geostrategic role in the future of Northern Europe.14 Importantly, if the 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone takes the Shetland Islands into account, then the UK’s security interests extend into the southern reaches of the Arctic Ocean – making the Arctic a clear security concern.
The Role of Russia The future of UK engagement in the Arctic cannot be divorced from questions about Russia’s intentions in the region.15 While the UK has firm relationships with Canada, the US, Norway and Denmark, its relations with Russia are less stable due to recent diplomatic episodes as well as commercial tensions involving BP.16 Since the planting of the Russian flag on the floor of the Arctic Ocean in August 2007, there has been apprehension about what Russia ‘wants’ from the Arctic. Russia has made it explicitly clear that it regards its Arctic territory as the source of future economic and political power, largely because of the vast amounts of energy and other resources that it can potentially access without encroaching on the central Arctic Ocean basin. Liam Fox remains wary of Russia’s Arctic re-militarisation programme and the latent potential for even non-Arctic disputes with Russia to escalate into confrontation in this theatre.17 UK concerns have been more widely expressed through its participation in NATO’s Exercise Cold Response,18 which has postulated scenarios involving resource-based conflict in the Arctic Ocean with an imaginary country, thinly disguised as Russia. There are three major players in the Arctic: Russia, Canada and the US. Canada lags far behind in its development of Arctic surveillance and projection
capabilities and the US is still hesitant about committing resources to the region; Russia is the dominant actor in the Arctic. The UK therefore has a keen interest in minimising political and security tensions with Russia in order to facilitate the pursuit of economic opportunities in the region. It is also in Russia’s interest to maintain the Arctic as an area of low tension.19 Russia is well aware of its need for European technology and expertise – particularly that of Norway – to help exploit the resources within its land and maritime territories; and also the importance of the EU market for Russian gas (65 per cent of which is sold to European markets), fish and other resources.20 Russia, like the US, also has other domestic concerns to worry about at its southern and eastern borders. Russia has continued to act in accordance with its international commitments in the Arctic. After Russia’s first submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2001 was judged to need further geological data, it has been conducting further scientific research in order to support a renewed submission in the near future. Moreover, Russia has conducted itself cordially in relations with Norway to settle a forty-year border dispute to the satisfaction of those in the region. Norway and Russia are also collaborating in other areas: Statoil (a Norwegian energy company, with the Norwegian government as the largest stakeholder) holds concessions in the Chukchi Sea and works on Russian onshore production fields in the Siberian Kharyaga oilfield, with further co-operation envisaged in the case of the Shtokman gas field. On the question of outer continental shelf delimitation, it is in the mutual interest of all five coastal states to co-ordinate their submissions to the CLCS in order to avoid expensive and protracted conflicts (both inside and outside of courts), and this may well happen in 2013–14. Aware of this, the UK has, by and large, adopted a cautious attitude towards Russian interests in the Arctic region. In 2009, the House of Commons Defence Committee recognised the potential for tensions in the Arctic to escalate and advised avoiding
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unnecessarily militarising Arctic issues, particularly at the expense of wider, more critical aspects of Arctic security, including economic, environmental and legal considerations. At the same time, the UK has demonstrated an appreciation of Russia’s desire to develop the region, recognising in parliament, for example, that Russia’s 2008 Security Strategy was not just about militarisation, but also included plans for social and economic development, ecological security, science and technology and international co-operation.21 Much of this will have been taken into account by the MoD’s Arctic Strategy. However, a formalised, crossdepartmental Arctic Strategy would have the added benefit of demonstrating the UK’s long-term commitment to the region, ensuring that it is considered a credible security partner for Northern European states.
Politics: The Arctic Club The UK holds observer status in both the Arctic Council and Barents Euro-Arctic Council.22 A number of benefits accrue from this, primarily because these forums provide a more ‘relaxed atmosphere’ through which the UK can engage with Arctic states.23 Cross-departmental attendance at Arctic Council meetings provides considerable opportunity to discuss collaboration at a senior level in many areas, including transport, energy, fisheries, the environment and science. One Foreign Office source noted that the recently signed memorandum of understanding on science with Canada was facilitated by the UK’s involvement with the Arctic Council, highlighting the importance of this discussion space for bilateral dialogue.24 Maintaining observer status is also important for the UK’s reputation as a country with ‘Arctic’ interests. On the face of it, the UK may not gain much from being part of this Arctic club given that the UK’s direct influence is limited as an observer. However, given the country’s longstanding commitments to the Arctic, as well as its close relations with many Arctic states, especially Canada, Denmark, Norway and the United States, the UK would be extremely reluctant to be excluded from the region. The UK
needs to remain aware of the sensitivities that exist among the Arctic states and Northern European communities regarding the sovereign rights of the coastal states and of indigenous peoples – and these in turn should shape UK engagement in the region. One of the reasons cited by Canada for rejecting the EU’s application for permanent observer status was that it showed a lack of sensitivity about and awareness of the Arctic region, especially regarding the ban on sealing products.25 Later this year, the Arctic Council is due to report on its deliberations about the future of both the Council itself and the status of its observers. As part of this, the Council established a permanent secretariat in May 2011, and is considering budgetary issues as a way of ensuring it remains the main international body for the Arctic region. The UK is calling for more effective engagement between observers, such as itself, and the Arctic Council. This means formalising the role of observers, making it clear exactly what their role is, particularly with regard to any future funding demands that might be made of them. The recent agreement between Arctic states to co-ordinate Search and Rescue activities (SAR) is likely to serve as a starting point for a more actively involved Council, which could, in the foreseeable future, result in a significant shift in the Council’s role from being a decision-shaping body to a decisionmaking body. The SAR proposals are, at the very least, indicative of a growing desire within the Arctic Council to develop norms and practices designed for the Arctic region itself.26 Of more immediate concern to UK interests in the Arctic region is the growing relevance of the ‘Arctic Five’. Since 2008, the five Arctic Ocean coastal states have twice met to assert their exclusive role in the governance of the region, to the detriment of relations with the non-coastal states, Iceland and the indigenous peoples who were angered by their exclusion.27 The significance of this new forum is that while political and security matters are off the table at the Arctic Council, there are no such restrictions when the Arctic Five meet. More regular meetings of the Arctic Five
would, it is feared by others, undermine the role of the Arctic Council, potentially reducing its relevance to Arctic issues beyond coastal state jurisdictions. The Arctic Five’s championing of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as the mechanism for resolving Arctic Ocean governance was in part directed at EU-level interventions and speculation regarding an Arctic treaty, a proposition wholly rejected by the Arctic states which regard the High North as part of their sovereign domains.28 While the UK respects the right of these states to assert their sovereignty in the region, any further sidelining of the Arctic Council could be a significant blow to the UK’s ability to have a voice in Arctic affairs. The UK’s continued involvement as an observer within the Arctic Council is clearly critical, as is maintaining bilateral relations with countries such as Canada and Norway. These networks and relationships allow the UK access not only to the Circumpolar Arctic, but also facilitate the role of a country with a longstanding interest in both the Arctic and Antarctic. A formalised Arctic strategy would represent and reinforce the UK’s commitment to the region, while also signalling to the Arctic Five that attempts to exclude non-littoral states (whether the UK or China) from the region is likely to prove detrimental to the political climate of the High North.
Economics: Oil and Financial Expertise UK-based companies such as BP and Shell have longstanding and deepening involvement in oil and gas exploration in the Arctic region.29 Smaller operators such as Cairn Energy also are active in offshore exploration in Greenland. More generally, other commercial and traderelated interests include fishing, tourism, shipping and the insurance industry. Prime Minister David Cameron recently announced that the government is expanding its trade links with the Nordic and Baltic states, currently worth around £54 billion per year. The UK has also entered into partnership with Norway to work together on oil exploration and the development of offshore wind farms, further binding the UK to the region’s future.30 UK-based companies
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are further involved in the insurance, shipping and tourism sectors. In the case of the insurance and marine services industry, the City of London is well represented in areas such as premium setting and loss adjusting, and hull premiums are charged on the basis of ships remaining within agreed, standard navigational limits both in and beyond the Arctic region, which is defined as north of 70° North. As Arctic observer, Ed Struzik, has noted: ‘London is the centre of the international banking, maritime shipping, insurance, engineering and environmental consulting industries. These and other forms of expertise will play an important role in any future developments in the polar world.’31 An Arctic strategy would tease out the scale of UK economic interests in and beyond the region. Indeed, one consequence of the globalisation of the Arctic has been to emphasise that this region remains connected to a web of places including the City of London, as well as a series of ports and cities across the UK.
The Environment: A Barometer for Climate Change Environmentally, UK government ministers and agencies have reiterated the importance of the Arctic in both global and regional terms. In spring 2010, the National and Environmental Research Council (NERC) announced a £15 million Arctic Research Programme to run during 2010–15. The official release noted the following:32 The Arctic is a region of higher than average climate change and is predicted to remain so. It represents a critical region for global environmental change and one where the UK has significant strategic interests. Understanding the drivers and feedbacks of rapid climate change in the Arctic, and predicting their scale and rate on timescales from months to decades, represents a major and urgent global scientific challenge of great societal importance.
Science is an area in which the UK excels and has the ability to build alliances with both coastal and non-coastal states, as well as provide linkages with indigenous peoples. This was demonstrated by the
recent signing of the memorandum of understanding between the UK and Canada to better co-ordinate scientific research.33 The UK scientific community has contributed to a better understanding of Britain’s regional relationship with the Arctic through research into the paths of migratory birds and fish, pollution patterns and weather patterns. UK scientists have contributed to projects such as the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna. The Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC) is another forum in which the UK contributes to the ecological understanding of the Arctic region. In the House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology’s Tenth Report in 2007, the notion that the Arctic and the Antarctic are central to earth systems was explicitly recognised, and has since been reiterated in both the NERC science strategy34 and in the British Antarctic Survey’s ‘Polar Science for Planet Earth’ project.35 The UK also has a NERC-funded research station in Ny-Ålesund, in the Svalbard archipelago, which is involved in international bodies such as the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), the Arctic Ocean Sciences Board (AOSB) and the Secretariat of Arctic Science Summit Week. UK-based institutions with substantial Arctic interests include the Scott Polar Research Institute of the University of Cambridge, the National Oceanography Centre at Southampton and the Arctic Office recently established by the British Antarctic Survey, in the midst of the International Polar Year (2007–08), in order to co-ordinate further UK Arctic research on climate change. Lastly, an issue of ongoing concern for the UK is that of climate change. It is well established among the scientific community that understanding climate change in the Arctic (and Antarctic) is vital to understanding the likely speed, extent and variability of climate change around the world. Indeed, what makes the UK distinct in comparison to some Arctic coastal states is a willingness to consider similarities between the Arctic and Antarctica (for example, by participating in the NERC Planet Earth initiative) and to
explore them through activities such as using British Antarctic Survey vessels and planes in both polar regions. In 2007 the House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology cited evidence from NERC research centres that suggested more attention needed to be given to the Arctic as a barometer for rapid climate change. The North Atlantic is likely to be among the first areas to feel the effects of changes in the Arctic. As a country facing rising sea levels and ‘out of season’ weather patterns, as well-aspiring to lead the global response to climate change, the UK not only needs to be engaged with the Arctic science community, but an active participant helping to shape the direction of research.36 Without a clear understanding of what changes in the Arctic environment will mean for the UK, there is a risk that the UK could potentially either undercommit or over-commit to its interests in the region, both of which could prove costly in the long term. In these financially straitened times, it is increasingly difficult to justify interventions in areas where there is simply too much uncertainty about the long-term costs and benefits of such action. It is therefore vital that the UK maintains a scientific presence in the region in order to develop a capacity for evidence-based policy action towards energy, fisheries, future science and security. An Arctic strategy which incorporates an explicit science section would remind domestic and international audiences of the scale and scope of the activities undertaken and the contribution to peer-review knowledge creation made by British science and scientists. For agencies such as the British Antarctic Survey (with its Arctic interests), alongside other organisations including the university sector, it would serve as a reference point for assessing the impact and knowledge transfer implications of British Arctic science.
The Arctic in Popular Imagination Finally, it is also worth noting that the UK has historical interests in the Arctic, which shapes a great deal of contemporary UK engagement with the
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region. From exhibitions to novels and television programmes, the Arctic enjoys high visibility within British popular culture.37 This stems from a history of exploration, discovery and commercial development of the region, dating from at least the sixteenth century. The recent National Maritime Museum exhibition entitled The North-West Passage: An Arctic Obsession (2009–10) catalogued not only the explorers who had sought this passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, but also the visual culture such as painting and panoramas that recorded and commemorated the fabled quest. Importantly, other Arctic and sub-Arctic states recognise this historical legacy as a reason for the UK’s continued involvement in Arctic affairs, especially as an observer state within the Arctic Council. Any Arctic strategy worth its salt would include an assessment of the popular appeal and resonance of the region for British audiences. The mere word ‘Arctic’ continues to conjure up a sense of excitement and intrigue. Moreover, if the UK government is to continue to invest in the region then it does matter that British public opinion is supportive, especially in an era of funding restrictions. As other governments, such as that of Canada, recognise, public events involving general interest and specialist workshops and exhibitions are a useful way of reminding audiences that the Arctic matters.
The Disadvantages of an Arctic Strategy The UK is facing, and will continue to face, many challenges as a result of ongoing changes in how the Arctic is envisioned as a new geopolitical space. Included among these issues (in a list that is by no means exhaustive) are the UK’s status as an observer at the Arctic Council, the growing significance of the ‘Arctic Five’ as a discussion forum that excludes all non-coastal states, questions about Russia’s intentions in the region, and the need to address continuing uncertainties about climate change. However, whether the implications of these issues for UK interests, both within and external to the region, are enough to justify the production of a formal
UK strategy document for the Arctic is a different question. The benefits that would come from a more explicit strategy must be weighed against the potential costs of pursuing such a course of action. One of the biggest problems with publishing a formal strategy is that it could give the impression that the UK is demanding something from the Arctic states and the region itself. While the Arctic has unquestionably caught the world’s attention and, in that sense is already a place in demand, established Arctic actors, whether states or organisations of indigenous peoples, are already concerned about the possible future intentions of near-neighbours and extra-regional players such as China and the EU. Another problem with publishing a formal strategy is that it gives other states (particularly Arctic states) a written document that can be used to evaluate and judge UK policies and practices. This may, paradoxically, serve to make the UK far less flexible in its policy towards the Arctic region. Thus, the feeling among some government personnel is that a formal strategy could be more of a hindrance than a help to UK engagement in the region.38
The Advantages of an Arctic Strategy On balance, despite the potential disadvantages of formalising UK interests in an Arctic strategy, the UK does need a strategy to articulate the range and scope of UK stakeholders and their interests. These interests are varied, embrace civilian and military affairs, and include a broad spectrum of government and non-government agencies and actors. A single-department strategy, such as that of the MoD, is simply insufficient to address the diverse, yet cross-cutting range of UK interests in the region, whether they relate to security, politics, economics, the environment or the popular imagination. In order to protect, let alone enhance, its Arctic interests, the UK needs to better understand the impacts of climate change and pollution on flora and fauna populations, including fishing stocks. It will also need to maximise the commercial advantage to be gained
through resource extraction, tourism, shipping and insurance. Politically and scientifically, the UK is embedded in a wide range of consortiums, forums and networks designed to enhance the visibility of the Arctic. Militarily, the UK seeks the maintenance of a peaceful and stable Arctic region, where all parties respect international legal rules governing the rights of the innocent and transit passage – a position that would be strengthened by a strategy that establishes a firm commitment to such principles. A UK Arctic strategy does not need to be, nor should it be, interpreted as an intervention in a region jealously guarded by the Arctic states. To view a strategy in such a way is narrow-minded and rejects the possibility of using such a document to communicate why the Arctic matters to the UK. The formal articulation of a strategy does not mean that the UK is staking a claim to the region. Instead, it is about clarifying the areas where further change would be desirable from a UK perspective, to give direction to businesses, scientific communities and the policy community alike, in order to develop a more co-ordinated approach to the Arctic. For example, one area might be environmental governance, and the need to develop an Arctic equivalent of the 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR), which helps to regulate offshore oil and gas industry standards in Europe. Another might be the further development of common standards regarding search and rescue, safety at sea and marine pollution in the Arctic region, using UK expertise such as the UK Coast Guard where appropriate. As a country with established interests in the hydrocarbon sector, while mindful of the environmental and scientific importance of the Arctic, the UK is well placed to press for appropriate safeguards in the wake of the Gulf of Mexico disaster in April 2010 – a point which should be addressed in a UK Arctic strategy document.39 The UK Arctic strategy should also formalise and expand the vision for existing arrangements and activities which serve UK interests in the Arctic.
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The UK’s continued involvement as an observer within the Arctic Council is clearly critical, as is maintaining bilateral relations with countries such as Canada. The UK can further strengthen its position as an observer and play an important role by liaising between member states and observers, including China and the EU. One suggestion has been for the UK to be an honest broker in helping the EU, and especially the European Parliament, better understand the complexities of Arctic governance. Recent European-level discussions pertaining to the need to develop an Arctic treaty in order to create a single regulatory regime for the region were negatively received by coastal states such as Canada and Norway, as well as by Denmark. While not having a strategy may give the UK more room for manoeuvre in its relations with Arctic actors, conversely a lack of transparency around the UK’s intentions can also arouse suspicion. That the UK ‘wants’ something from the Arctic is obvious from its historical and strategic engagement with the region and, in the current context, is not something that is begrudged by Arctic actors who have shown a considerable degree of interest
in including the UK. At the same time, a formalised strategy could also be used to send a clear message to the Arctic Five that, while their sovereignty in the region is indisputable, continuing along a course of greater exclusivity is neither constructive nor warranted, given the interests of other actors in the region, including the UK. In particular, in outlining such a strategy, it is vital that the UK remains mindful of the particular challenges, issues and personalities of the Arctic actors and how they envision the future of the Arctic. Any strategy towards the Arctic must delimit the scope of UK interests in the region in a way that is respectful to those with an established stake there, such as its inhabitants.
Going Forward As parliamentarians have frequently acknowledged, the UK enjoys substantive interests in the Arctic. It can contribute to debates within and beyond the Arctic Council pertaining to the Arctic future, and, perhaps specifically, make an invaluable contribution in areas where it is highly regarded, such as in the field of science and technology. At the same time, the UK should position itself to benefit
from emerging opportunities, including scientific and commercial collaboration, while remaining ever mindful of the profound environmental challenges facing the Arctic. But these areas and interests need to be championed and mobilised. Any UK Arctic strategy needs to be ‘owned’ across government departments and not be allowed to vanish into a sea of good intentions. A special representative for the UK’s Arctic interest would help us maintain a focus within and beyond Parliament – the Arctic is a region in demand and the UK needs to be prepared. ■ Duncan Depledge is a research analyst at RUSI and is also undertaking a PhD at Royal Holloway, University of London. His research focuses on the contemporary geopolitics of the Arctic and the implications of climate change for national and international security. Klaus Dodds is Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway, University of London and Editor of The Geographical Journal. His research interests include the contemporary geopolitics of the Arctic and Antarctic.
Notes The authors thank the Canada-UK Colloquia for funding and supporting their attendance at the 2010 workshop on ‘The Arctic and the Northern Dimension of World Issues’, held in Iqaluit and Ottawa. 1
2
Arctic Council’s Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, ‘Snow, Water, Ice and Permaforst in the Arctic (SWIPA)’, May 2011, . Klaus Dodds, ‘Polar Mediterranean? Accessibility, Resources and Sovereignty in the Arctic Ocean’, Global Policy (Vol. 1, 2010), pp. 303–11.
3
The Diplomat, ‘China’s Arctic Play’, 9 March 2010, , accessed 5 May 2011.
4
House of Lords Debates, ‘International Polar Year 2007–08’, 15 January 2007, , accessed 10 February 2011. 5
House of Lords Debates, ‘Arctic Ice Cap – Question for Short Debate’, 6 December 2010, , accessed 10 February 2011.
6
Baroness Ann Taylor, Minister for International Defence and Security, speech delivered at the Joint NATO/ Icelandic government conference, Reykjavik, Iceland, 29 January 2009.
7
The Canada-UK Colloquia, established in 1971, brings together British and Canadian politicians, parliamentarians, public officials, academics, business leaders, graduates and other opinion formers. The annual conference, held alternately between Canada and the UK, focuses on themes of immediate concern to both countries. Held under the Chatham House Rule, the aim of
8
Luis Simón and James Rogers, ‘British Geostrategy for a New European Age’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 155, No. 1, April/May 2011), p. 56.
9
SIKU News, ‘UK displays more interest in Arctic security’, 11 November 2010.
10 BBC One, ‘Frozen Planet’, 2011, , accessed 10 February 2011. 11 See, for example, Christian Science Monitor, ‘Winter storm raises the question: What’s going on with the weather?’, 3 February 2011; and
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Economist, ‘Oscilloscope: Britain’s Cold Snap is explained by Arctic Oscillation’, 11 January 2010. 12 UK Arctic Stakeholders, ‘Report of the Conference held at The Scottish Association for Marine Sciences (SAMS), Oban (10-12 March 2008)’, , accessed 10 February 2011. 13 Rick Rozoff, ‘Britain Spearheads “MiniNATO” In Arctic Ocean, Baltic Sea’, Inteldaily, 26 January 2011. 14 Simon and Rogers, op. cit., p. 56. 15 Roger Howard, ‘Russia’s new frontline’, Survival (Vol. 51, No. 2, 2010), pp. 141–56.
23 Private Interview with Foreign and Commonwealth Office official, 17 January 2011, London. 24 Ibid. 25 Leigh Phillips, ‘Arctic Council rejects EU’s observer application’, EUObserver, 28 April 2009. 26 Polar Conservation Organisation, ‘Arctic Council says search and rescue treaty could save lives’, 11 January 2011, , accessed 12 May 2011. 27 IceNews, ‘Arctic Nations in summit rift’, 31 March 2010.
17 House of Commons Debates, ‘Defence in the World’, Hansard, 4 June 2009, Col. 444.
28 European Parliament resolution on Arctic governance, 9 October 2008, , accessed 10 February 2011.
18 The UK has routinely participated in these NATO cold weather exercises in northern Norway. In February–March 2010, Cold Response also involved nonNATO member Sweden for the first time.
29 See, for example, Shell’s assessment on Arctic potential: , accessed 10 February 2011.
19 ‘Tromsø Declaration: On the occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of The Arctic Council’, 29 April 2009, , accessed 10 February 2011.
30 BBC News, ‘Cameron calls for northern European alliance’, 20 January 2011.
16 Financial Times, ‘BP face legal challenge to Russian deal’, 27 January 2011.
20 Charles Emmerson, ‘Russia’s Arctic Opening’, Foreign Policy, 30 March 2011.
31 Ed Struzik, The Arctic and Northern Dimensions of World Issues, 2010 Canada-UK Colloquium Rapporteur’s Report (2011), p. 5.
21 House of Commons Debates, op. cit.
32 More information is available at: , accessed 10 February 2011.
22 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, ‘Arctic Changes’, POSTnote (Vol. 334, June 2009).
33 Memorandum of Understanding on Polar Research, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, ‘Memorandum of
Understanding on Polar Research’ 12 February 2009, , accessed 10 February 2011. 34 NERC, ‘NERC Next Generation Science for Planet Earth 2007–2012’, , accessed 10 February 2011. 35 More information is available at British Antarctic Survey, ‘Polar Science for Planet Earth Overview’, , accessed 10 February 2011. 36 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, ‘Science and Technology - Tenth Report’, 9 October 2007. 37 Examples include the BBC Arctic programmes involving Bruce Parry, Ian McEwan’s novel Solar and public lectures and exhibitions at the National Maritime Museum, Royal Geographical Society and Scott Polar Research Institute at Cambridge. 38 Non-attributable interviews with personnel attached to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and British Antarctic Survey. 39 New permits for offshore exploration in the Beaufort, Chukchi and North Aleutian Basin are currently suspended in the aftermath of the 2010 Gulf of Mexico spill. Alaska remains the largest Arctic oil producer.
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