The Unifying Negotiation Framework is an integrative model of policy negotiation. It flows ... accurately referred to as an organizing meta-narrative than a theory.
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The Unifying Negotiation Framework: A Model of Policy Discourse Steven E. Daniels Gregg B. Walker Jens Emborg
The Unifying Negotiation Framework is an integrative model of policy negotiation. It flows out of the discourse tradition in public policy and political theory. It conceptualizes decision processes as discourses that occur at three levels (micro, meso, and macro), and are affected by six different factors (culture, institutions, agency, incentives, cognition, and actor orientation and experience). Initial applications of the Framework show that it has value in training, ex ante evaluation and design, and ex post evaluation and analysis. It has the additional benefit of synthesizing the disparate literatures on participatory processes. Because the Framework does not lead to specific predictions, it is more accurately referred to as an organizing meta-narrative than a theory.
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he broad field of negotiated/participatory approaches for managing public policy conflict has been a hugely active area of scholarship and practice over the past twenty-five years. There is no comprehensive bibliography of this field, but the number of scholarly articles is surely in the thousands. This frenetic scholarship is distributed across many different problem domains, is drawn from experiences from virtually every region of the globe, and appears in many different academic literatures. Moreover, the sociopolitical phenomenon that this research attempts to interpret has sprung up largely outside of academic settings and researchers are struggling to keep pace with what is occurring in practice. One result of this highly disaggregated approach is that there are many terms used to describe these processes, among the most common: advisory groups, advocacy coalitions, appreciative
CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY, vol. 30, no. 1, Fall 2012 © Wiley Periodicals, Inc. and the Association for Conflict Resolution Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) • DOI: 10.1002/crq.21045
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inquiry, charettes, citizen involvement, citizen juries, civic science, consensus conferences, collaborative learning, co-management, community-based collaboration, collaborative public management, deliberative decision-making, facilitated dialogue, negotiated rule making, participatory governance, partnerships, platforms, pluralism, principled negotiation, public issues education, public participation, search conferences, social learning, strong democracy, and watershed councils. These participatory processes arise in a larger social context (e.g., in public planning and management (Forester, 1989; O’Leary and Bingham, 2009)). These situations typically involve several layers of complexity: multiple parties, multiple issues, deeply held values, important interests, expert knowledge, local knowledge, media, and socially embedded conflicts among them (Daniels and Walker, 2001). Each of these policy episodes represents a dynamic combination of these elements, which partly explains why it is difficult to draw out generalized “secrets to success” and broadly applicable best practices. So far the research field is characterized by many interesting case studies and comparatively few successful attempts to synthesize knowledge across them (with some notable exceptions such as Pagdee, Kim, and Daugherty, 2006; and Orr, Emerson, and Keyes, 2008). The primary focus of this article is the design of participatory processes in public policy, with a particular emphasis on the environmental–natural resource arena. It presents an integrative conceptual framework for thinking about participatory public processes in order to provide a map and compass that help people maneuver in complex conflict-laden multiparty negotiation landscapes. In doing so, it offers a secondary benefit of providing a unifying cognitive structure and terminology, which may offer an alternative to the proliferation of terms that sound quite different, yet describe fundamentally similar processes. The overall challenge facing process designers (and facilitators) is to competently operate on at least three different levels simultaneously: (1) to accurately read and understand the cultural and institutional context of the situation (i.e., power structures, norms, practices, history, legislation, and rules around the process) in order to create a process with a realistic likelihood of generating an implementable agreement; (2) to organize the process itself (to structure workshops, design activities, establish dialogue, and steer the negotiation among the stakeholders, etc.); and (3) to manage whatever is in the room (the people, issues, history, emotions, concerns, worries, claims, blame)—whatever flows out from the participants in the moment. CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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Our three-level conceptualization of the “designer’s challenge” is quite similar to that of Li, Tost, and Wade-Benzoni’s (2007) description of the challenges that individual negotiators face. They boil the challenges down to a two-level structure in which they distinguish “contextual effects” from “negotiator effects.” Further, they establish the contours of a systematic framework that “highlights the dynamic interaction between the two levels.” It is stated that the framework “leaves much room for further exploration of these dynamics” (p. 223). We build on their concept and intend to extend it further and more comprehensively in the form of a unifying public policy negotiation framework. From a collaborative governance perspective, the need for such an organizing framework has been expressed recently. The very last paragraph of O’Leary and Bingham’s The Collaborative Public Manager (2009) concludes: Public managers need a new framework for thinking about how to measure the results of collaboration, and there is much to be learned from other disciplines. The major test confronting the fields of public management and public administration, therefore, is not only to broaden and deepen our research. Our major challenge is to reach out, build upon, and learn from other disciplines in order to build knowledge, fully understand, and comprehensively evaluate the challenges for public management in a world of shared power [p. 269].
They call for a framework to support public administrators’ ability to evaluate the results of collaborative management effort. Although we concur, we contend that there is a fundamental need to generate a situational overview and create entry points to a vast interdisciplinary body of literature; these are equally important foundations for the design of collaborative public policy processes. The Unifying Negotiation Framework we propose meets these needs, and this article is its initial presentation in the peer-reviewed literature. It originated as the organizing structure for advanced graduate training in the Sustainable Forest and Nature Management Programme of the European Union’s Erasmus Mundus Initiative offered at the University of Copenhagen in 2008, 2010, and 2012. The specific purposes of the Unifying Negotiation Framework are variously to: • Help people organize their thinking about new or seemingly disparate cases. CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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• Help make cases more comparable by providing a generalized terminology. • Provide an analytic lens that moves scholarship forward. • Provide negotiation scholars with entrée into diverse academic fields that inform our work. • Support analysis and design. However immodest it might appear, the objective of the Framework is to be a globally applicable organizing meta-narrative. It is intended to be equally applicable in Australia, Angola, or Alaska. Although it was originally constructed to address environmental–natural resource situations, it has broader application (and this article is therefore framed in terms of public policy decisions more broadly). It is not a predictive model because it does not purport to predict which factors are likely to be most significant in any particular case, or which tactics are most applicable in specific situations. But it does offer an intellectual point of departure for asking questions about the characteristics of a decision situation, and how one might design a communicative process that can contribute constructively to it. And as we discuss again in the conclusion, it is very much a work in progress subject to continued revision, customization, and adaptation.
Discourse as an Organizing Concept The Unifying Negotiation Framework is informed by the recently emerging literature that views public policy decision processes as a form of social discourse, which in turn builds upon the work of Habermas and Foucault. This article uses the term discourse at two different levels. First, it is viewed expansively, encompassing the full range of processes through which political and social decisions emerge. A discursive view of policy processes focuses on the nature or character of communicative interaction and the ways in which competing storylines are constructed and variously granted primacy in policy processes. Viewing a decision process as discourse does not necessarily presume that the process is highly participatory or inclusive. The laundry list of methods provided in the introduction all promote participatory discourse. But by the same token, the most rigid, technocratic, and narrow policy decision process imaginable is also a form of discourse. Discourse focuses more on the nature of the interaction than on specific CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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techniques or formats for achieving that interaction. Dialogue is a behavior that promotes a certain kind of discourse and is therefore something one often encounters in discourse, but that dialogue may be highly mediated or occur through nonverbal channels. It is much more about the emergence of shared norms of interaction, independent of whether those norms arise organically from group process or are administratively defined rules of participation. The goal of discursive policy analysis is to identify resilient storylines and shared narratives rather than presume that the decision is predicated merely upon objective facts. Hajer (1995) provides an early example of a discourse-based analysis of public policy innovation in his study of environmental policy in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, and draws extensively upon Foucault. Habermas developed a discourse-based conceptualization of environmental democracy. The second use of discourse in the Unifying Negotiation Framework draws upon Fischer’s (2003) application of Habermas and Foucault specifically to public policy analysis. Fischer criticizes conventional public policy science because of its extensive reliance on a neopositivist perspective, which seeks to find the unifying principles of social behavior–policy formation through reductionist empirical science. His contention is that fifty years of neopositivist inquiry has been essentially fruitless, and he argues that it is more useful to think about policy formation as a process of social construction of shared meaning through discursive processes. If policy conflict is viewed as competition between alternative discourses, Fischer contends that we can understand the outcomes far more readily and richly: It is here that the constructionist view helps us see that in such policy debates it is often the deeper social and cultural factors, rather than the “facts” of the arguments, that play a decisive role in the citizens’ assessment of the competitive views. By drawing our attention to the sociocultural contexts that underlie the citizen-expert relationship, the constructionist approach shows how citizens interpret the “objective” assessments of professional experts within the context of their own normative cultural experiences and the social dependencies inherent to them [p. 129].
Discourse is both a verb and a noun. It is a verb when it is the process of engaging in meaningful discussion about competing frames, values, meaning, alternatives, and consequences. But in the language of the theorists such as Foucault (1984), one should also regard the resulting decision as CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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being a discourse: a socially constructed text that reveals the values and beliefs that gave rise to it. The more important point is that analyzing policy through a discourse paradigm takes a holistic view of the context, the actors, and their interactions: Thus, underlying a discourse-analytic approach is an emphasis on interpretive analysis. The complexity of the problem, the uncertainty of the available data, the absence of other data, the different social contexts in which it takes place, as well as competing rhetorics, make clear that the task of explaining environmental politics and policy will remain a task for interpretation. An empirical, predictive causal theory is not one of the possibilities. . . . [Fischer, 2003, p. 114].
By contrasting the more common neopositive-empiricist-rational view of policy formation with a discursive–social constructionist paradigm, Fischer contends that a social constructionist viewpoint focuses more on the ways that competing worldviews and value sets jockey for position in the policy process, rather than on viewing policy formation as a rigorously analytical process wherein objective data are used to develop policies that provide the greatest good for the greatest number. And while he makes a compelling case for a discursive model of politics and policy formation, his argument leaves one key question largely unanswered: If policy is the result of discourse, could we improve the policy if we improved the discourse? Stated another way, what kinds of discourse designs improve policy formation? Certainly recent work by Wagner (2008) shows that potential exists, at least in international negotiation, and Innes and Booher (2010) argue that discourse lays the foundation for a collaborative rationality that provides policy resilience in the face of ever-increasingly complex operating environments. This charge—to improve policy decisions through explicit efforts to deepen and enrich the discourse that gives rise to them—is the springboard for the development of the Unifying Negotiation Framework. The countless grassroots efforts in collaborative public management (Weber, 2003; Koontz and others, 2004) are striving to engage in precisely that richer discourse, although they are surely not burdened by wondering “What would Foucault do?” This emphasis on discourse as a foundation for designing participatory approaches to public management has several advantages. The most notable is that it makes no presumption about the presence of conflict, and, as such, a discourse paradigm can accommodate either a pre-escalated CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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strategy or an overt conflict management strategy. A second advantage of a discourse-based approach is that it moves away from being rhetorically anchored in a specific outcome or format and methodology. A term like consensus building presumes that the goal is one specific type of agreement. Discourse can build consensus, but it may also identify deeply seated dissensus just as usefully. Other terms, like collaborative workshops, charettes, and citizen juries, are all specific types of participant interaction, which seem to put the emphasis on a tactic rather than on the underlying communicative interaction being encouraged. Discourse could variously employ any of the tactics listed above. But the key is that they would be utilized when they encourage the desired discourse, not because the terminology being used makes them the default. In sum, public issues and policy responses to them are not singular, objective, and consensual. Rather, they are socially constructed through the intersections of history, culture, society, and materiality (Feldman and others, 2006). According to Feldman and colleagues, “the way that public issues are known changes over time and in relation to other public discourses and technological advancements” (p. 90, citing Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). Public policy decisions can be viewed as discourse-based decisions constructed through the interactions of parties and the negotiation of meanings.
The Unifying Negotiation Framework The Unifying Negotiation Framework is a cognitive structure that aids in managing the intellectual complexity of designing participatory approaches to policy decision making. It can be visualized as a matrix consisting of three rows and six columns (see Figure 1). It is a fundamentally static and descriptive representation of features that a comprehensive discourse design effort must variously attempt to manage, accommodate, and respond to. The Layers
The rows in the Unifying Negotiation Framework refer to scales of social aggregation. The micro layer is the only scale with an unambiguous definition—it is the individual person. The meso (or middle) scale is the level at which the process being designed is intended to occur. This scale must be meaningful in terms of the administrative, biological, and social CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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Figure 1. The Unifying Negotiation Framework Culture
Institutions
Agency
Incentives
Cognition
AOE
Macro
Meso
Micro
systems at issue (often the community or watershed). It is possible for a discourse-based approach to be too geographically large to be relevant to potential participants and thereby undermine its effectiveness (Cheng and Daniels, 2003), and certainly we can imagine policy processes that are not undertaken at a meaningful biological scale (e.g., trying to manage an environmental process such as acid rain on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction level even though the process greatly transcends them). The macro scale is defined as everything above the meso scale. It is the external social and political structures and forces that establish the operating context for efforts to engage people in the discourse process occurring at the meso scale. The Six Columns
Each column in the Unifying Negotiation Framework refers to a major factor that may be significant in understanding the operating environment in which a discursive process is being undertaken. The universality of the Framework emerges largely from these six factors, their breadth, and the interaction among them. There are no a priori assumptions about how these factors would play out in any given situation; that is why the Framework makes no claim to be a predictive model. But it serves as an organizing meta-narrative because it assumes that all six factors will in fact play some role in the eventual outcome. It is useful to explore the Framework by first considering three highly contextual factors (culture, institutions, and agency) and then proceeding to three more individualistic factors (actor orientation and experience, cognition, and incentives). Culture is the leftmost column in the Unifying Negotiation Framework. The conceptualization of culture used in the Framework would be CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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readily recognizable to most social scientists working on the topic; it is shared learned behaviors and meanings. Internally, culture is visible as language, values, beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, morals, and so on. External manifestations of culture are variously roles, structures, and rituals. The perspective on culture that is the most useful in terms of a discourse process design is perhaps that developed by Hofstede (2001) and subsequently operationalized by a large number of authors, primarily focusing on crosscultural organizational behavior. This conceptualization of culture focuses upon differences across five dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus collectivism, masculinity versus femininity, and long-term versus short-term orientation. Each of these has relevance to the design of discourse process; the kinds of egalitarian, level-playing-field activities that might work well in the United States or Scandinavia would likely be less successful in India where extreme power distance is the legacy of the caste system. In addition, the pace at which a process might proceed could vary greatly between cultures. Bluntly stated, any effort at designing a participatory decision model that ignores culture has limited prospects for success. An important way in which the Unifying Negotiation Framework goes beyond the Hofstede school is that Hofstede’s research typically uses nationality as a proxy for culture. The Framework demands a much more nuanced definition that can tease out multiple cultures within a nation. These distinct cultures might be based on profession, place of residence, ethnicity, religion, rural versus urban, and so forth. It is often the subtle differences in values between seemingly similar groups that are the most significant in shaping the outcome of discourse, or are the most treacherous when attempting to convene a discourse process. The collection on negotiation and culture edited by Gelfand and Brett (2004) is also an important source of insights on how cultural differences create distinctly different scripts of shared expectations on how a social interaction ought to play out. Kremenyuk (2002) is also a broad collection of writing on international negotiation and contains a particularly relevant chapter by Faure on the cultural dimensions of international negotiation. Institutions is the column immediately adjacent to culture in the Unifying Negotiation Framework. Again, institutions are defined in a conventional manner: they are the structures, organizations, and ritualized patterns of behavior (i.e., rules) that variously organize our social lives and also regulate interactions. Institutions can include organizations like the church or the university, but they are equally constituted through the Lutheran CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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Women’s Tuesday lunch group or the pattern of granting teaching assistantships to male students more frequently than to female students. At a more conceptual level, institutions are defined in Scott (2008) as being “comprised of regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life” (p. 48). Elinor Ostrom’s scholarship on institutional analysis and development is particularly useful in the Framework because it draws links between institutional structures and patterns of resource allocation and use (Ostrom, 1998, 2005, 2007). Arts and Leroy (2006) provide a useful entrée into the European institutional literature. Agency is the ability of groups and individuals to protect their interests and achieve their goals. As such, this use of the term differs from the more common definition of an agency being an administrative organization. In the Framework, we are concerned with why a group (or individual) might or might not have agency, and what factors are shaping agency. Agency can be viewed as having two distinct components: power and capacity. Power is a straightforward concept: it is the ability to successfully exert one’s will. The ways in which power can be manifest in a discourse process are quite varied, including the ability to: • Unilaterally make the final decision. • Force the decision process into a particular venue. • Define the set of issues being considered. • Define which groups may or may not participate. • Make procedural decisions (format, agenda, deadlines, etc.). • Grant legitimacy to some forms of knowledge or scientific data. • Force other stakeholders to accept outcomes that are suboptimal to them. Identifying where power comes from and how it operates is more complicated than merely defining it (see Zartman, 2008, particularly the Structuralists’ paradox). The sources of power are often culturally grounded and institutionally defined, structured, and reinforced at the macro level. Property rights, legal procedures, and administrative authority are all institutionally derived sources of power. But power can also emerge much more organically at the micro level: a persuasive and charismatic person, or a member of a socially privileged group (a village elder), can have disproportionate CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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influence in group deliberations. Power may also emerge over the course of a policy discourse as coalitions or self-reinforcing policy networks form. Power does not exist in a vacuum; it is largely socially constructed. Even though it exists to large measure because people choose to grant it and conform to it, there are key control mechanisms and influence strategies that powerful parties can use to perpetuate their advantage. Foundational readings about power in social discourse processes include Sharp (1973) and Bacharach and Lawler (1976). Conceptually and operationally, capacity is a broad construct. Generically, capacity refers to volume (e.g., carrying capacity), legal entitlement (e.g., via a contract), or output (e.g., production capacity). In the Framework, capacity is a dynamic concept that varies according to context and level. Related strongly to both the macro and meso levels, system capacity “is the ability of a whole system to plan, monitor, and address public problems. . . . It includes the ability of a system to reflect on and use information from communities, and to synthesize what is learned into new procedures, policies, cultures and practices” (Dodd and Boyd, 2000, p. 10). The policy area of sustainable development emphasizes social capacity development; over the past twenty years donor agencies (e.g., USAID) and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) have increasingly emphasized capacity as a major development issue (Matsuoka, 2003). Prior to the 1990s, development work emphasized the transfer and application of new technologies without adequately considering (and at times undermining) local capacity (Matsuoka and Komatsu, 2007). Recent work on capacity and sustainable development recognizes multiple scales in a manner consistent with the Framework’s macro, meso, and micro levels. The “Agenda 21” report on sustainable development, a product of the 1992 “Earth Summit,” states that “the ability of a country to follow sustainable development paths is determined to a great extent by the capacity of its people and its institutions as well as by its ecological and geographical conditions. Specifically, capacity building encompasses the country’s human, scientific, technological, organizational, institutional, and resource capabilities” (chap. 37; cited in Janicke, 2002, p. 1). The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also recognizes that capacity issues correspond to different levels. Capacity building to support fragile states, for example, is important at the macro level. The OECD Informal Group on Capacity Development has linked capacity to state building. State building, the OECD group reported in 2009, is “an endogenous process of strengthening the capacity, CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations. . . . Key dimensions of state building include: political processes that drive statebuilding, state-society relations, legitimacy of the state in society, [and] capacities of the state to provide key functions” (OECD, 2009a). Furthermore, the OECD defines capacity building as the “means by which skills, experience, technical and management capacity are developed within an organizational structure (contractors, consultants or contracting agencies)— often through the provision of technical assistance, short/long-term training, and specialist inputs (e.g., computer systems). The process may involve the development of human, material and financial resources . . . to perform functions, solve problems and achieve objectives” (OECD, 2009b). The deep interconnectedness between power and capacity argues for their integration into the broader construct of agency. Agency includes both the ability to be successful in the process (power) and the ability to successfully implement the decisions that emerge from it (capacity). Agency is a meaningful concept at all three scales in the Framework: individuals exhibit agency, communities and groups can, and nation-states have varying levels of agency. Actor Orientation and Experience (AOE) is the rightmost column in the Framework and focuses our attention on a suite of psychological concepts that can significantly impact people’s willingness to become involved in a discourse process, and, if they do, what they are likely to value in the process. No policy negotiation occurs in a historical and relational vacuum. All of the participants bring to the process their experiences with other groups, their values and preferences about the issues, and their beliefs, values, fears, and aspirations. Any attempt to design a public policy discourse process must recognize that each potential participant evaluates the process through his or her own lenses of orientation and experience. Actor orientation and experience can be operationalized by focusing on four more precise psychological concepts: personality, affect, attitudes, and attributions. As these categories indicate, this is the most explicitly psychological column in the Framework. Personality is one’s long-term disposition: curious, timid, extroverted, trusting, and so forth. Affect is the current emotional state (also referred to as mood). Personality and affect are closely related, but to the extent that personality is analogous to climate, so affect is to weather. Affect can be impacted by very recent events (did you get a speeding ticket on the way to tonight’s meeting?). Behavioral research in both social dilemma problems and negotiation has shown both
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personality (Weber and Messick, 2004) and affect (Barry, Fulmer, and van Kleef, 2004) to be correlated with behavior and outcomes. Attitudes is a broad term that refers to the values one assigns to things (wilderness is good, litter is bad, etc.). Attitudes play a critical role in public policy discourse processes because they are the basis for the parties’ interests. Attributions are similar to attitudes, but they are values that one assigns either to people (she is trustworthy) or to events (he wrecked my car). Taken together, these are a bundle of psychological conditions and processes that each participant brings into the process. The relevance of these psychological variables is that every public discourse process involves key individuals; they may be the village headman, or a forest supervisor, or the chair of the local environmental NGO. Because of their influential roles in their communities, their behavior relative to a discourse process can be hugely influential in the outcome, and these behaviors emerge to a considerable extent from their personalities, affect, attitudes, and attributions. Values, motivations, preferences regarding process, preferences regarding outcomes, and willingness to work with other stakeholder groups all emerge from the actors’ orientations and experiences. Cognition is the column next to AOE; this refers to the psychological term for information processing and decision making. Three specific realms of cognition are particularly important to the Unifying Negotiation Framework: cognitive biases, social cognition, and learning. There is a large literature dating back to Kahneman and Tversky (1972) that shows that people do not process information in the rational manner that the economists and game theorists often assume (also see Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, 2002, for a more recent review). Behavioral negotiation scholars have shown that these biases affect our decision making in general (Bazerman and Moore, 2008) and in negotiation tasks more specifically (Thompson, Neale, and Sinaceur, 2004). Social cognition is the process of making cognitive judgments about social events and interactions, as well as the impact of social settings and stimuli on cognitive performance. A critical aspect of social cognition as it relates to discursive processes is the widely studied ingroup–out-group effect. To the extent that people cognitively frame a situation as an us-versus-them problem, the likelihood of fixed pie–competitive negotiation behaviors increases (Bazerman and Neale, 1983; Thompson and Hastie, 1990). The third component of cognition is learning. Any discourse design effort must actively seek to manage the cognitive load on the participants, but also realize that different stakeholder groups may need to
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learn different things about the situation in order for the process to succeed. Some of the learning may be substantive (about the issues), some may be procedural (about the set of available process options), and yet other learning may be relational (about the other participants and their values). Perhaps the most extensive incorporation of a learning approach into natural resource decision making in the U.S. literature is Daniels and Walker (2001); the Australian book by Keen, Brown, and Dyball (2005) covers much the same issues; and Steyaert and colleagues (2007) provide an entrée into the European social learning literature. Incentives are represented by the column that lies just to the left of the cognition column. Incentives are the payoffs (or penalties) created by the process. Some of the incentives relate to outcomes from a process, and other incentives relate to behavioral issues. The outcome incentives are things to be gained or lost in the process; they constitute the reasons for becoming involved in the process. The behavioral incentives are processrelated features that may encourage certain behaviors by the potential participants in the process. A great deal of the traditional negotiation research focuses on the outcome incentives, by invoking concepts such as BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) analysis (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 2003) and the game theoretic research that was pioneered by Walton and McKersie (1965, 1991) and the motivations that people bring to it. Incentives can be best understood as a blend of game theoretical predictions and internal motivations. A focus on incentives can explain why many processes that involve conventional arbitration (the disputants present competing offers and a third party will settle an impasse) actually encourage extreme rhetoric and discourage concession-making. It is also important to note that the incentives are not created wholly by the process design; there are also important interaction effects between process attributes and the individual participants’ motivations. The well-known concept of “ripeness” of a dispute can be understood through incentives: often as the incentives become more defined and salient to the parties, their willingness to participate increases. Key Features of the Framework
In the process of developing, refining, and applying the Unifying Negotiation Framework, several of its features have proven to be more important and useful than they perhaps initially appeared to be. First, the relative location of the columns is critical to the Framework’s function. Each of the columns is CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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placed adjacent to others in a theoretically intentional fashion, and the interaction between the culture and institutions columns exemplifies this intentionality. In many ways, the difference between culture and institutions is quite blurry. Even though there are cultural features that are not explicitly institutional, it is quite hard to conceptualize institutional patterns that do not have a significant cultural foundation. The social power and relevance that institutions possess flow out of their cultural relevance; by the same token, much of the power that culture manifests is channeled through various institutions. So as we think about culture being reflected through governance norms and agency-regulatory processes, placing institutions between culture and the rest of the Framework reflects the mediating role that institutions perform. In many ways, institutions are the codified and habituated embodiment of more abstract cultural values and constructs, and this relationship is reflected in the spatial arrangement of the Framework. The cognition column plays an important role between the incentives and AOE columns. The experimental literature on negotiation and social dilemma problems has clearly shown that personality features are significant determinants of behaviors that depart in systematic ways from the incentives that are present in a situation. For example, experiments involving iterated prisoner’s dilemmas, which clearly reward competitive behaviors, show that people who demonstrate high trust in others also exhibit low frequency of competitive-exploitive behaviors (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993). Second, the Framework has evolved to have two distinct halves, with the left side being more contextual and the right side being more individual. This construction was significantly informed by and also extends the literature review/theory paper by Li, Tost, and Wade-Benzoni (2007), which advocates a dual approach to negotiation research that explicitly considers negotiator behavior as emerging from the dynamic interaction between individual factors and the cultural-organizational context. Inasmuch as the dynamic interaction between the individual and the culturalinstitutional context is of paramount importance, the key interface in the diagram is the boundary between agency and incentives. That is the margin between the columns that are largely (but not wholly) contextual and those that are largely (but not wholly) individual. The interaction across the columns of the Unifying Negotiation Framework becomes more visible in Figure 2, which shows the dominant influence flows in the diagram. The cultural-institutional influences emerge primarily from the macro level, whereas the cognition and AOE
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Figure 2. Dominant Influence Flows in the Unifying Negotiation Framework Culture
Institutions
Agency
Incentives
Cognition
AOE
Macro
Meso
Micro
influences arise primarily in the micro level. These two sets of forces converge in the meso level at the interface between agency and incentives. So a suite of social-contextual factors comes cascading into a process design from the macro level, and another set of individually manifest factors come bubbling up from the micro level. In this conceptualization, the process designer’s task is to explicitly and simultaneously balance contextual considerations with individual idiosyncrasies. The integration of these disparate factors offers the potential for a more comprehensive and robust process than would otherwise be the case. In this sense, the central portion of the diagram (meso-level agency and incentives) can loosely be understood as the design space (see Figure 3). That is the region of the Framework within which the process design has the most direct control. A discourse process consequently accomplishes several tasks by creating new institutional structures and processes, by mobilizing resources and creating collective capacity, and by influencing cognition. Discourse-intensive decision processes have the potential to aggregate the resources held by various stakeholders into a meaningful collective capacity. One stakeholder might own critical private land, another might have technical expertise, another might have access to volunteer effort, and yet another might have regulatory authority. Working independently, none has the critical mass of resources needed to move an agenda forward (even though all might agree with the logic of doing so), but their collective capacity might well be sufficient if they could work collectively. By the same token, as any given discourse-based approach becomes an accepted way to make policy decisions, it becomes part of the institutional landscape. Discourse can thereby become part of the institutional column and thus shape how yet other institutions operate. And finally, discourseintensive activities have the potential to affect the cognition of the participants. CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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Figure 3. The “Design Space” in the Unifying Negotiation Framework Culture
Institutions
Agency
Incentives
Cognition
AOE
Macro
Meso
Design Space
Micro
To the extent that part of the challenge in natural resource decision making is in simultaneously managing the technical complexity of the situation as well as the penchant for controversy (Daniels and Walker, 2001), discourse-based approaches offer a means of managing the cognitive load that the participants bear. They allow the stakeholders to learn their way to improved decisions, and go well beyond merely providing a forum that allows for distributive bargaining across predetermined preferences and alternatives. They also allow for reframing the situation away from fixedpie cognitive frames that often arise in public policy decision processes. A final feature of the Framework relates to the interaction between the culture and AOE columns. Presumably because they are shown as being at the extreme ends of the framework, they are markedly different concepts in the Framework. But if we loosely define culture as being values, beliefs, and behaviors that emerge at the collective level, and AOE as values, beliefs, and behaviors that emerge at the individual level, then the two columns represent concepts that are far more similar than they are different. In fact, it is possible to think about wrapping the Framework into a loop so that the culture and AOE columns are adjacent to each other (see Figure 4). This mental image reinforces the realization that individuals are inevitably the product of their cultural context, and that disentangling their individually held values and beliefs from that social milieu is a fruitless endeavor.
Applying the Unifying Negotiation Framework The motivation for developing the Framework was to provide an integrative structure within which to think systematically about the huge array of onthe-ground efforts to improve governance and also advance our theoretical CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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Figure 4. Linking Cultural and Individual Factors in the Unifying Negotiation Framework Culture
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ability to think rigorously about these efforts. But the Framework also offers assistance to practitioners who are trying to facilitate discourse-based processes. It provides that assistance by enhancing the ability to conduct assessments and design processes that respond to those assessments. CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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A widely shared notion in the public policy negotiation–facilitation field is that assessing a conflict situation to determine the potential for successful resolution is a critical early phase of any intervention (e.g., Carpenter and Kennedy, 1988; Lewicki, Barry, and Saunders, 2006). But knowing what to assess and how to use the information gleaned through an assessment is not so universally agreed upon. Part of the art of conflict assessment is to embrace the unique attributes of each situation (and they are all unique unto themselves) while at the same time linking back to some organizing principles that offer some hope of putting some meaning and structure to one’s understanding of the situation. Assessment
The Unifying Negotiation Framework is valuable to someone charged with developing a participatory approach not because it has all the answers, but because it may help identify some of the critical questions. The crucial interface in the Framework is between agency and incentives. A successful discourse approach must recognize the power that people have been granted through existing institutions—because they are a village elder, because they have private property rights, because they have authority granted them in their role as an agency employee, and so on. A discourse-based approach must create incentives that are reasonably cognizant of the existing power structures; if it fails to do so, local actors may either choose to boycott it or might actively seek to undermine it. It is important to bear in mind that each situation where one is designing a policy negotiation is a unique constellation of factors creating both opportunities and constraints. Being situationally responsive and highly tuned in to the nuances of each new setting is part of the art. But there is often so much complexity in a new setting that it is hard to know how or where to start. By breaking a situation into discrete factors, some contextual and others more individualistic, the designer can begin to systematically deconstruct it into manageable components, while never losing sight of the interconnectedness in the system. Design
It is entirely possible that a thorough assessment can reveal that a discoursebased approach is neither feasible nor prudent. That fundamental go–nogo decision is one of the core purposes of doing assessment. But assuming that the assessment has identified sufficient potential for a discourse-based CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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approach to make a substantial difference, the next task is developing a situationally responsive design that reflects the issues that the assessment identified. To some extent, the results of the assessment could be lumped into two broad categories: factors you control and factors you consider. These can also be thought of as design variables versus constraints. The factors you control are more to the center of the Framework (i.e., the design space shown in Figure 3) and the factors you consider are in the outside columns (culture and AOE). Given that each situation is a unique constellation of factors and the interactions among them, each process design needs to be a similarly unique set of responses. An Application Example: The United Nations Climate Change Negotiations
The consensus regarding a climate change crisis within the scientific community is quite compelling. In a 2004 Science essay, Naomi Oreskes writes that while the question of what to do about climate change remains open, “there is a scientific consensus on the reality of anthropogenic climate change. Climate scientists have repeatedly tried to make this clear.” She points out that “the scientific consensus is clearly expressed in the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)” and that “others agree. The American Meteorological Society, the American Geophysical Union, and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) all have issued statements in recent years concluding that the evidence for human modification of climate is compelling” (Oreskes, 2004, p. 1686). Robin Mearns and Andrew Norton of the World Bank call the scientific evidence “unequivocal” and observe that “climate change is widely acknowledged as foremost among the formidable challenges facing the international community in the 21st century” (2010, p. 1). While there is little scientific disagreement regarding the evidence of anthropogenic climate change, there are considerable differences over climate change policy. This is particularly evident in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations. The United Nations negotiations on climate change have evolved over two decades, becoming increasingly complex and controversial. Progress has been made on a number of issues (e.g., clean development mechanisms or CDM and forest management or REDD), but a final, comprehensive treaty remains elusive. The Unifying Negotiation Framework provides a multifaceted lens for examining the climate change negotiations. It draws attention to the CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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negotiation discourse from a variety of perspectives and factors. In an ongoing project, Walker (2010, 2011) has been employing the Unifying Framework to assess the climate change negotiations. Data in the project come from a range of sources, including observations of plenary and contact group sessions at UNFCCC meetings (field notes and reflective notes), conversations with delegates and other civil society observers (reflective notes), published daily reports at the UNFCCC meetings (e.g., IISD’s Earth Negotiation Bulletin), and UNFCCC documents (e.g., a chair’s negotiation text and delegations’ interventions). While there are numerous commentaries to explain the progress (or lack thereof ) of the UN climate talks, no research has examined the negotiation discourse in depth. The negotiations involve multiple discourses that compete for dominance as well as illuminate opportunities for common ground and agreement. Plenary session discourse is typically positional, with some delegates making statements of principle and others responding to a specific provision in the chair’s general text. In contrast, delegates in contact groups labor through a negotiation text on specific agenda items (e.g., training programs and workshops as part of capacity building). Conversations with delegates are informal and provide a way to check observations as well as gain knowledge about what happens in the coalition meetings (e.g., the Group of 77 and China; the Association of Small Island States; the European Union). Viewed through the Unifying Framework, discourses from all these venues reveal some insights and interactions. For example, culture, institution, and agency factors intersect throughout the negotiations, particularly in formal plenary session discourse and informal conversations with delegates (Walker, 2011). Both plenary session statements and conversational comments from developing countries emphasize culture-based messages. In contrast, delegates representing developed countries often voice institutionbased views. Figure 5 provides a visual representation. Developing country discourse at the April 2010 intersession meeting in Bonn provides an illustration. This was the first all-party negotiation gathering following the Copenhagen conference that disappointed so many parties. That December 2009 event (COP 15) had produced the “Copenhagen Accord,” a very general agreement among 28 select countries. The Bonn meeting was dedicated to procedural reform: improving the climate change negotiation process so that it would be more productive and not generate agreements outside of the Framework. At the opening, plenary speakers from developing-nation coalitions (such as the G77 and China, the African Group, and the Least Developed CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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Figure 5. Assessing the UNFCCC Climate Change Negotiations Culture
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Countries) commented on the “failures of Copenhagen.” The Yemen delegate expressed the importance of transparency, inclusiveness, and equity. He reaffirmed the process of multilaterality and the need for all countries to have voice. Many other developing countries reinforced this view. The Venezuelan delegate considered the Copenhagen accord a kind of “new colonial exercise” that marginalized many nations and violated trust. The Mauritanian delegate emphasized that the most vulnerable developing countries needed assistance now; the situation was urgent and without action some developing nations and their way of life might not survive. This discourse conveyed two important constructions of culture. First, developing country delegate statements emphasized the norms, traditions, and procedures of the “multilateral culture” of the UNFCCC. Second, some delegates talked of their own nations and national cultures when arguing for immediate action. The delegates sought to influence institutional integrity and reform through arguments grounded in culture. This discourse emerged from delegates as individuals (micro) and delegations speaking for coalitions (meso). The institutional reforms they urged in Bonn (such as a single contact group) would change agency (both power and capacity) in the UNFCCC. Throughout the negotiations of the past four years, developing nation discourse has often emphasized the survival of one’s nation—people, communities, and way of life. Substantively, developing nation delegates will emphasize the urgency of reducing greenhouse gases and the climate change impacts that their countries are experiencing currently. Procedurally, delegates from developing nations will stress the importance of transparency, trust, and respect for a UNFCCC consensus process that provides voice for all nations. The culturally grounded discourse urges institutional CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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action in support of building the capacity of developing countries to deal with the impacts of climate change. Consequently, the discourse draws on culture to link mitigation and adaptation, the two dominant issue areas of the negotiations. By contrast, the discourse from developed nation negotiators often reflects institutional forces. When discussing mitigation targets or a second commitment period (to the Kyoto Protocol), delegates from Japan and the United States will call on all countries (not just developed or Annex 1) to develop mitigation (and the related national communication) plans as part of long-term cooperative action. They advocate for a new institutional framework that eliminates a second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol, contending that a new structure would be more efficient. These discourses, one drawing from culture and one from institutions, emerge from both the micro level (views of individuals) and the meso level (delegations’ and coalitions’ statements) in an effort to preserve or change outcomes at the macro level. These discourses intersect in agency—they seek to improve multilateral capacity and reinforce or transform power. Small Island States, African Group, and Least Developed States delegates’ negotiation discourse will urge investment in capacity as part of an emphasis on adaptation programs. In doing so, the delegates stress responsibility and urgency. Developed country negotiators focus on accountability and economy, often noting that complex policies take time. Viewing the climate change negotiations through the Framework highlights the nature of the negotiation discourse. Relevant theories of cultural communication and negotiation extend the Framework. Giles’s theory of communication accommodation, for example, features convergence and divergence in group and cross-cultural interaction (Giles and Weimann, 1987; McCann and Giles, 2006). The climate change negotiators’ discourse converges within their coalitions but often clashes across coalitions. Developing countries’ culture-based appeals for institutional stability, reform, and immediacy diverge from developed countries’ arguments to emphasize efficiency, economic sustainability, and a long-term view. Similarly, differences appear when applying negotiation theories. Developed country delegates’ discourse focuses largely on institution factors, while exhibiting characteristics of interest-based bargaining (Fisher and others, 2003; Susskind and Field, 1996). In contrast, negotiators’ discourse from developing countries corresponds with identity-based conflict resolution and negotiation (Burton, 1996; Rothman, 1997; Sandole, 2011). Delegates from the United States, Canada, and Japan have stated CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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that the Kyoto Protocol should not be the basis for climate negotiations because it does not require all nations to develop mitigation plans and does not hold all nations responsible for greenhouse gas emissions. This interestbased approach seeks a legal agreement that applies the same procedures and standards to all countries. Developing country representatives’ discourse is more identity-based, calling for outcomes that display responsibility and the needs of vulnerable countries and communities. There are tentative implications from this analysis. Delegates (and climate change lobbyists and observers) need to recognize where and why their negotiation discourses compete and diverge. Further, comprehending the basis for the divergence can lead to transformative views that could accommodate both cultural and institutional factors. The result could be convergent discourse that can feature common ground on which to base policy. Mearns and Norton (2010) call for “adaptive policymaking” to address the complex and controversial nature of climate change decisions. They note that adaptive policymaking “will require policy makers to treat policies and programs as ongoing experimental and learning processes, based on targets and milestones, strong performance-based monitoring and evaluation systems, . . . enabling frameworks for interactive engagement with multiple stakeholders, [and] greater public participation” (p. 36). Examining the climate change negotiation via the Unifying Negotiation Framework can contribute to these efforts.
Summary and Future Applications The Unifying Negotiation Framework is an organizing meta-narrative, with value in both ex ante design of participatory methods of decision making and ex post process analysis. It is an interdisciplinary theoretical construct that integrates the perspectives of several distinct literatures. At a coarse level, it focuses upon the convergence of contextual factors (culture and institutions) with individual factors (actor orientation and experience and cognition) in the procedural arena (agency and incentives). It provides an orderly way to think through the complexity that inevitably seems to accompany efforts to make policy decisions in a participatory and discursive manner. It allows one to consider how specific factors (institutions, incentives, attitudes, etc.) might affect the collaborative potential in a situation, but also forces one to reflect on how the various factors interact with each other. CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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There are still aspects of the Framework that warrant additional thought. Although communication is the sine qua non of the Framework, it does not explicitly appear. Similarly, concepts such as knowledge systems are not represented. Finally, there is the classic lumper–splitter debate: Should the Framework be condensed or expanded? It could be represented with as few as three columns, or it could consist of twelve columns if Agency, Cognition, and Actor Orientation and Experience were each broken into their major components. The key is not to reify the Framework in any particular configuration, but to reflectively apply it. But even then it will be largely impossible to unambiguously declare the Framework as either “right” or “wrong,” because there can be no way to know whether choices based upon it were better or worse than the alternatives would have been. (Hoping that there could be more certainty about the value of the Framework falls squarely into Fischer’s critique of overly positivistic epistemology that provided part of the motivation for this effort. Falling into that trap at this point would be most ironic.) The best we are likely to do is conclude that the Framework is more or less useful, which would be measured by the insights that it offers, the assumptions that it forces us to examine, the questions it forces us to answer, and perhaps the mistakes that it allows us to avoid. References Arts, B., and Leroy, P. Institutional Dynamics in Environmental Governance. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2006. Bacharach, S. B., and Lawler, E. J. “The Perception of Power.” Social Forces, 1976, 55, 123–134. Bacharach, S. B., and Lawler, E. J. “Power dependence and power paradoxes in bargaining.” Negotiation Journal, 1986, 2,167–174. Barry, B., Fulmer, I. S., and van Kleef, G. A. “I Laughed, I Cried, I Settled: The Role of Emotion in Negotiation.” In M. J. Gelfand and J. M. Brett (eds.), The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004. Bazerman, M. H., and Moore, D. A. Judgment in Managerial Decision Making (7th ed.). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2008. Bazerman, M. H., and Neale, M. A. “Heuristics in Negotiation: Limitations to Effective Dispute Resolution.” In M. H. Bazerman and R. J. Lewicki (eds.), Negotiating in Organizations. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983. Burton, J. W. Conflict Resolution: Its Language and Processes. Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 1996.
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Carpenter, S., and Kennedy, W.J.D. Managing Public Disputes: A Practical Guide to Handling Conflict and Reaching Agreements. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988. Cheng, A. S., and Daniels, S. E. “Examining the Interaction Between Geographic Scale and Ways of Knowing in Ecosystem Management: A Case Study of Place-based Collaborative Planning.” Forest Science, 2003, 49(6), 1–14. Daniels, S. E., and Walker, G. B. Working Through Environmental Conflict: The Collaborative Learning Approach. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001. Dodd, J. D., and Boyd, M. H. Capacity Building: Linking Community Experience to Policy Making. Halifax, NS, Canada: Population and Public Health Branch, Health Canada, October 2000. Faure, G. “International Negotiation: The Cultural Dimension.” In V. A. Kremenyuk (ed.), International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues (2nd ed., pp. 392–415). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002. Feldman, M., Khademian, A. M., Ingram, H., and Schneider, A. S. “Ways of Knowing and Inclusive Management Practices.” Public Administration Review, Dec. 2006, pp. 89–99. Fischer, F. Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2003. Fisher, R., Ury, W., and Patton, B. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (2nd ed.). London: Random House, 2003. Forester, J. Planning in the Face of Power. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. Foucault, M. The Foucault Reader (P. Rabinow, ed.). New York: Pantheon, 1984. Gelfand, M. J., and Brett, J. M. (eds.). The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004. Giles, H., and Wiemann, J. M. “Language, Social Comparison and Power.” In C. R. Berger and S. H. Chaffee (eds.), The Handbook of Communication Science. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1987. Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., and Kahneman, D. (eds.). Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Hajer, M. A. The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Hajer, M. A., and Wagenaar, H. (eds.). Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Hofstede, G. Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations across Nations (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2001. Innes, J. E., and Booher, D. E. Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy. London and New York: Routledge, 2010. International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). “Earth Negotiations Bulletin,” various issues, 2007–2011. Retrieved from http://www.iisd.ca /process/climate_atm.htm CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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Walker, G. B. “Resilience, Creativity, and Constraints in the Climate Negotiations: Insights from the Unifying Framework.” Paper presented at the International Symposium on Society & Resource Management (ISSRM), Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia, June 2011. Walton, R. E., and McKersie, R. B. A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations. Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR Press, 1965, 1991. Weber, E. P. Bringing Society Back In: Grassroots Ecosystem Management, Accountability, and Sustainable Communities. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003. Weber, J. M., and Messick, D. M. “Conflicting Interests in Social Life: Understanding Social Dilemmas.” In M. J. Gelfand and J. M. Brett (eds.), The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004. Zartman, I. W. Negotiation and Conflict Management: Essays on Theory and Practice. New York: Routledge, 2008.
Steven E. Daniels is a professor in the Department of Sociology, Social Work, and Anthropology, and in the Department of Environment and Society, as well as a Community Development Extension Specialist at Utah State University. Gregg B. Walker is a professor in the Communication and Natural Resource Programs at Oregon State University. Jens Emborg is an associate professor in LIFE, Forest & Landscape, University of Copenhagen.
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