the uroboros of consciousness - Constructivist Foundations

Radical Constructivism

The Uroboros of Consciousness Between the Naturalisation of Phenomenology and the Phenomenologisation of Nature Sebastjan Vörös • University of Ljubljana, Slovenia • sebastjan.voros/at/gmail.com

Phenomenological Concepts in Radical Constructivism

> Context • The burgeoning field of consciousness studies has recently witnessed a revival of first-person approaches

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based on phenomenology in general and Husserlian phenomenology in particular. However, the attempts to introduce phenomenological methods into cognitive science have raised serious doubts as to the feasibility of such projects. Much of the current debate has revolved around the issue of the naturalisation of phenomenology, i.e., of the possibility of integrating phenomenology into the naturalistic paradigm. Significantly less attention has been devoted to the complementary process of the phenomenologisation of nature, i.e., of a (potentially radical) transformation of the theoretical and existential underpinnings of the naturalist framework. > Problem • The aim of this article is twofold. First, it provides a general overview of the resurgence of first-person methodologies in cognitive sciences, with a special emphasis on a circular process of naturalising phenomenology and phenomenologising nature. Secondly, it tries to elucidate what theoretical (conceptual) and practical (existential) implications phenomenological approaches might have for the current understanding of nature and consciousness. > Results • It is argued that, in order for the integration of phenomenological and scientific approaches to prove successful, it is not enough merely to provide a firm naturalistic grounding for phenomenology. An equally, if not even more important, process of phenomenological contextualisation of science must also be considered, which might have far-reaching implications for its theoretical underpinnings (move from disembodied to embodied models) and our existential stance towards nature and consciousness (cultivation of a non-dual way of being). > Implications • The broader theoretical framework brought about by the circular exchange between natural sciences and phenomenology can contribute to a more holistic conception of science, one that is in accord with the cybernetic idea of second-order science and based on a close interconnection between (abstract) reflection and (lived) experience. > Constructivist content • The (re)introduction of first-person approaches into cognitive science and consciousness studies evokes the fundamental circularity that is characteristic of second-order cybernetics. It provides a rich framework for a dialogue between science and lived experience, where scientific endeavour merges with the underlying existential structures, while the latter remains reflectively open to scientific findings and proposals. > Key words • Cognitive science, phenomenology, first-person approaches, naturalisation, phenomenologisation, lived experience, non-dualism.

Introduction « 1 » The purpose of this paper is to delineate the contours of a recent revival of phenomenological approaches in cognitive science. As a revolt against the “third-person absolutism” (Siewart; quoted in Zahavi 2007), these approaches argue for the significance of complementing scientific studies of experience with disciplined first-person methodologies. Yet for the most part, the current debate has centered on the possibility of integrating phenomenology into the naturalistic paradigm; little or no attention has been given to the question of how phenomenological insights might influence the edifice of natural sciences. This paper purports to show that the issue of the naturali-

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sation of phenomenology is merely the flip side of a complementary process of the phenomenologisation of nature. This dialectical (Janus-faced) exchange between experience and the natural sciences is reflected in the paper’s somewhat mysterious title, which harks back to the imagery of the ancient Greek serpent Uroboros greedily devouring its own tail, symbolising the circular exchange between phenomenological and scientific views on the mind, nature, and consciousness.1 The introduction of phe-

nomenology into cognitive science is thus not merely a quantitative addition to and extension of a pre-determined framework of natural sciences, but involves a qualitative transformation of our fundamental understanding of nature and science: cognitivescience-cum-phenomenology represents a leap from the first-order science of observed systems (consciousness as an object in the world) to the second-order science of observing systems (consciousness as a sine qua non of the self and the world).

1 | The idea of the phenomenologisation of nature is not new, and has been floating about the academic community for more than a decade (cf. Bitbol 2014; Petitot et al. 1999; Thompson 2007). The present article tries to build and elaborate on

previous research by (a) providing a systematic overview of its conceptual background and (b) explicating its theoretical and existential implications for our understanding of and living in/ through nature and consciousness.

Author’


The Uroboros of Consciousness Sebastjan Vörös

« 2 » The article consists of four parts. After a brief delineation of the general context of the debate (section 2), some of the most common critiques of the idea of incorporating phenomenology into cognitive science will be explained and countered (section 3). Having established phenomenology as a valid research programme with unique methodology and aims, this paper will go on to argue that it is not only science that makes demands on phenomenology (naturalisation), but that phenomenology (in its transcendental dimension) also exerts demands on natural sciences (phenomenologisation) (section 4). The last two sections will provide a broad outline of the theoretical/conceptual (section 5) alternative (the so-called 4EA) models of cognition and practical/existential (section 6) implications – a transformed way of being/experiencing. It is argued that this twofold dynamic of phenomenologisation is of utmost importance for the study of consciousness, and a call is made for further ’s Response: interdisciplinary exchange.

The story of the “ugly duckling”: Enter the firstperson methodologies « 3 » Not until recently did the idea of the systematic study of consciousness enter the “sciences of the mind.” In this regard, cognitivism and – later – connectionism, the two predominant approaches in cognitive science since its inception in the 1950s and up until the so-called “experiential turn” in the 1990s (Froese 2011; Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991), proved to be loyal heirs to behaviourism: although daring enough to look inside the notorious mental black box, they simultaneously precluded all talk of what is happening for the black box: “To put it in a nutshell, Cognitive Science purports to say how the cognitive mind/brain works in itself and not how it comes to seem to be working for itself […]” (Petitot et al. 1999: 12). Consciousness and lived experience were brushed aside, as cognitive scientists embarked on the study of information-processing mechanisms of either a “symbolic” or “connectionist” variety. « 4 » Yet slowly, but persistently, the question of consciousness found its way into mainstream cognitive science. This can be seen as the end result of a two-tiered pro-

cess. On the one hand, several philosophers of mind have put forward a series of challenges to the predominant view of the mind as an “information-processing machine,” arguing that such a conception inevitably leaves out something crucial: the what-is-itlike (Nagel 1974), qualitative (Jackson 2002) or phenomenal (Jackendoff 1987) character of consciousness. For David Chalmers (1995), the “hard problem of consciousness” boils down to “the problem of experience”:

” (Froese

and is still struggling for recognition. 2010: 81)

while the other was shunned as the ugly duckling

« 6 » Yet it was precisely this “ugly duckling,” with its turn from first-order “observed systems” to second-order “observing systems” and its emphasis on the active role of the observer and circular causality (Foerster & Glasersfeld 1999; Scott 2004), that has provided a much needed impetus for the revival of first-person approaches in the cognitive sciences. Tom Froese (2011), for instance, argues that Francisco Varela’s “experiential turn” can actually be seen as an elaboration of Heinz von Foerster’s insights into the importance of the observer with the first-person pragmatics of phenomenology.3 « 7 » The confluence of the two processes – the experience-oriented criticism internal to cognitive science and the observer-oriented impetus external to it – is what revived interest in the first-person study of experience. Thus, from the late 1980s and the early 1990s onwards, several proposals have been put forward arguing for the need to integrate studies of consciousness into mainstream cognitive science (e.g., Chalmers 1995, 1996; Flanagan 1992) and develop improved methodologies for the study of experience (e.g., Gallagher 1997; Marbach 1993; Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991; Varela 1996a; Varela & Shear 1999). It has been suggested that the dichotomy of either “scientific (and thus unexperiential) objectivism” or “introspectionist (and thus unscientific) subjectivism” promulgated by the adherents of the classical cognitive science is false, and that first-person approaches to consciousness are not to be conflated with naïve just-take-a-look introspectionism, but must be rigorously and systematically explored. Therefore, in searching for an appropriate first-person methodology, many authors have turned to phenomenological tradition in general and Husserlian phenomenology in particular. The reason for this extraordinary, and for many a more traditionally-minded philosopher of mind almost blasphemous, alliance was twofold: first,

2 | Incidentally, by omitting its cybernetic roots, Gardner, who is famous for noting that cognitive science “has a very long past but a relatively short history” (Gardner 1985: 9), actually managed to make its history even shorter.

3 | One can already detect this convergence of interests in Varela’s ideas in his (now almost legendary) paper Not one, not two (1976); for an autobiographical account of his diverse intellectual heritage, see Varela (1996b).

It is widely agreed that experience arises from “ a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does. (Chalmers 1995: 201)

”

There is, in other words, an “explanatory gap” (Levine 2002), which separates the conscious (phenomenological) domain from the neural (physiological) domain. « 5 » On the other hand, the “experiential turn” in cognitive science seems to have been brought about by the fruition of some of the ideas developed in second-order cybernetics. Varela, Thompson & Rosch (1991), Dupuy (2009), and Froese (2010) argue convincingly that the seeds of the central tenets of cognitivism and connectionism were already sown during the cybernetic era in the 1940s and early 1950s, a legacy that has been deliberately belittled by the cognitive science mainstream up until recently.2 Situating itself in opposition to the introspectionist movement, first-order cybernetics was an attempt to “mechanize the mind” and explain it in terms of feedback mechanisms, algorithms, and nonlinear dynamics. However, after the so-called “Ashbyian crisis” in the early 1950s, first-order cybernetics plunged into a state of turmoil and the field split into two branches, namely cognitivism and second-order cybernetics: [T]he one was the golden boy that became the “ foundation of the prestigious cognitive sciences,

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Phenomenological Concepts in Radical Constructivism 98

when it comes to (disciplined) first-person approaches, (Husserlian) phenomenology is claimed to be the best game in town, and second, there seems to be a surprising correspondence between phenomenological descriptions of experiential data and recent findings in cognitive science (Petitot et al. 1999). The spectre of phenomenality, long kept at bay by the behaviourist-cum-cognitivist suspicion towards everything experiential, has been resuscitated and has set out to haunt the sciences of the mind.

Kleingeld, or can phenomenology be naturalised? « 8 » However, not everyone was enthused about the prospect of integrating phenomenology into cognitive science. The proponents of the idea quickly found themselves caught in the crossfire of ferocious criticism from both camps of the academic divide. On the one hand, sceptics in mainstream cognitive science (Dennett 1987, 1991; Metzinger 2003) questioned the benefits of incorporating phenomenological approaches into cognitive science, claiming that phenomenology was a “discredited research programme” (Metzinger 1997), an “introspectionist bit of mental gymnastics” (Dennett 1987) with a knack for “obscurantism” that had “failed to find a single, settled method that everyone could agree upon” (Dennett 1991), and had therefore been “intellectually bankrupt for at least fifteen years” (Metzinger 1997). In other words, phenomenology, or any other first-person approach for that matter, is “a discipline with no methods, no data, no results, no future, no promise,” and is thus of no use to cognitive science: “It will remain a fantasy.”4 On the other hand, sceptics in the phenomenologist camp (Glendinning 2007; Moran 2013) raised concerns about Edmund Husserl’s categorical anti-naturalism, maintain4 | Dennett in “The Fantasy of First-Person Science,” a written version of a debate with David Chalmers, held at Northwestern University, Evanston IL, 15 February 2001, supplemented by an email debate with Alvin Goldman. Retrieved from http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/ chalmersdeb3dft.htm on 30 April 2014.


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ing the transcendental orientation of Husserlian phenomenology to be incompatible with the naturalistic worldview in principle. As Helen De Preester put it wryly: “A naturalized phenomenology is no longer phenomenology” (De Preester 2002: 645). « 9 » The first task for the proponents of integration was thus to demonstrate that such an undertaking was actually feasible, i.e., that the project of naturalising phenomenology is both possible and worthwhile. To this end, it had to be shown that, pace critics in cognitive circles, phenomenology is not merely an attempt to restore a discredited introspectionist programme, but a research project in its own right; and that, pace critics in phenomenological circles, the basic tenets of phenomenology are not principally incommensurable with, and could therefore be integrated into, the naturalist framework. Since the question of the possibility of naturalising phenomenology has currently been at the forefront of discussions about the interrelationship between phenomenology and cognitive science, I suggest we explore both “lines of attack” separately. « 10 » Starting with the cognitive camp, there are good reasons to believe that the objections of Daniel Dennett and Thomas Metzinger miss the mark completely. First of all, phenomenology is not to be conflated with introspectionism.5 This point was already made by Varela in his seminal paper on neurophenomenology (1996a: 334; 338– 339), and was later elaborated by many other authors (e.g., Gallagher & Zahavi 2008; Petitot et al. 1999; Zahavi 2007). Dan Zahavi, for instance, points out that Husserl, as well as other major figures in the phenomenological tradition, was adamant in his refusal to equate “the notion of phenomenological 5 | This claim merits a brief qualification. Although it has become commonplace in modern cognitive science to posit a sharp distinction between phenomenology and introspection, some authors have gone to considerable lengths (a) to show that the connections between introspection and phenomenology are historically established and methodologically fruitful (cf. Vermersch 2011); and (b) to develop modern methods of introspection that focus on individual experiences, but with the aim of procuring intersubjective invariants (e.g., Petitmengin et al. 2013; Petitmengin & Bitbol 2009).

intuition with a type of inner experience or introspection,” denouncing the suggestion that phenomenology tries to resuscitate introspectionism as “preposterous and perverse” (Zahavi 2007: 29). For one thing, phenomenology is not interested “in the subject’s experience qua their own private and subjective (psychological) experience,” but only insofar as they are suggestive of “the invariant self-organizing structure of experience” (Gallagher & Brøsted Sørensen 2006: 121). In other words, phenomenology is not merely a special kind of psychological self-observation, a “turning of gaze inwards (introspicio)” (Zahavi 2007: 28) and taking note of individual tokens of experience, but is the cultivation of a special reflective attitude towards reality (the so-called phenomenological reduction), an attitude that enables us to bracket or suspend our everyday beliefs and preconceptions about ourselves and the world and grasp the essential structures and conditions of possibility of specific types of experience as well as of experience as such. Phenomenology and introspectionism differ in their fundamental take on “reality”: introspection presupposes the dualist “natural attitude” grounded in subjectobject dichotomy, i.e., in the idea that consciousness is “in the head” and is separated from the world “out there,” while phenomenology questions the subject-object split and tries to unearth the “underlying” nondualist structures that precede it and enable the co-emergence of the self and the world (ibid: 29–31). « 11 » Second, although it would be an exaggeration to claim that Husserl produced a universally accepted methodology, he nevertheless provided a set of methodological guidelines that have been elaborated and refined by his followers (Depraz, Varela & Vermersch 2003; Schmicking 2010; Varela 1996a; Varela & Shear 1999). These guidelines are aimed at developing techniques for a disciplined cultivation of the reflective attitude alluded to above and at providing a firm platform for the systematic investigation of experience. Note that since phenomenological analysis is interested in the invariant structures of experience and not in the individual “experiential atoms,” its descriptions are not irredeemably private, but publicly accessible and verifiable. This flies in the face of Metzinger’s claim that phe-



nomenology cannot generate knowledge because it lacks reliable means to intersubjectively settle issues à la “this is the purest blue anyone can perceive” vs. “no it isn’t, it has a slight green hue” (Metzinger 2003: 591); as Gallagher and Zahavi rightly point out, this is precisely the type of claims that phenomenology is not interested in (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008: 20–21). Further, to reject phenomenology, as Dennett does, on the grounds of its inability to settle on a universally accepted method is simply too extreme, as it would eo ipso necessitate the rejection of several scientific theories, i.e., the theory of evolution (Varela 1996a: 334; Zahavi 2007: 37). It might be objected that phenomenology is still incorrigibly fallible and therefore of no use to any serious (“scientific”) study of experience. To this it might be replied that, first, it is by no means clear that, for the reasons provided above, phenomenology is indeed incorrigibly fallible, i.e., that it cannot provide publicly verifiable data, and second, fallibility is not the same as falsity, and one can but wonder what the edifice of modern science would look like if it were shorn of all fallible methods and theories. In the eloquent words of Zahavi: What physician would ever argue that we “ should adopt a stance of neutrality vis-à-vis the existence of breast cancer because mammography is not a foolproof screening method? (Zahavi 2007: 38)

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« 12 » Although these considerations are far from definitive, they indicate that phenomenology is not merely a recycled version of introspectionism, but a distinct research programme (broadly construed) with a unique set of (partially established and partially emerging) methods for a systematic study of experience. It would therefore seem that the ground has been cleared for a putative détente of the previously strained relationship between phenomenology and cognitive science. With its rigorous analyses and clear conceptualisations of (different modes of) experience, phenomenology seems to be an invaluable heuristic tool in the (neuro-) scientific study of consciousness (Marbach 2003),6 and for this reason, several concrete 6 | After the initial excitement about the idea of bringing phenomenology “into the house

proposals have been put forward as to how it might be integrated into natural sciences: formalised phenomenology, neurophenomenology, and front-loaded phenomenology. An in-depth account of the three proposals would take us too far afield, so I confine myself to a few general remarks about each. The central idea behind formalised phenomenology is that phenomenological analyses should be translated into a formal language, be it a formal symbolic language (Marbach 1993, 2003) or mathematics (especially mathematics of dynamic systems) (Petitot et al. 1999), which might serve as a “neutral meeting ground” for phenomenological and scientific accounts. The goal of neurophenomenology (Varela 1996a; Lutz & Thompson 2003) is to establish a pragmatic platform for an integration of phenomenological analyses into neuroscientific studies. This, in turn, requires training subjects to employ phenomenological methods, combining rigorous phenomenological accounts with neurophysiological measurements, and mathematical modelling of thus procured data. Unlike neurophenomenology and its emphasis on the training of subjects, the third proposal, front-loaded phenomenology (Gallagher 2003), tries to apply phenomenology prospectively, i.e., by informing experimental designs with previous phenomenological findings. These proposals have not remained mere theoretical musings, but have been successfully put into practice, either by giving rise to novel experimental designs or by shedding new light on ongoing debates in cognitive science.7 Yet as significant as they might have been on a pragmatic level, they may be classified (slightly figuratively) as that which Husserl referred to as Kleingeld (German for “small change”), i.e., of science,” Marbach seems to have become dismayed by the prospect and has embraced a more sceptical attitude towards the idea of naturalisation (Marbach 2010). 7 | The collaboration between cognitive science and phenomenology (construed primarily as a heuristic tool) has proved fruitful in many areas: epilepsy (Le Van Quyen & Petitmengin 2002), pain (Price, Barrel & Rainville 2002), schizophrenia (Gallagher 2004; Gallagher & Varela 2003), alien hand (Gallagher & Brøsted Sørensen 2006), intersubjectivity (Gallagher & Hutto 2008), perception (Lutz et al. 2002; Lutz & Thompson 2003), etc.

“minute and careful analyses at the expense of developing ambitious and speculative systems” (Zahavi 2010: 17). Far from being irrelevant to the overall phenomenological project – in fact, Husserl was known to demand Kleingeld from his students whenever a debate entered murky metaphysical waters – it was nonetheless of secondary importance with regards to his “transcendental project.” This brings us to the other (phenomenological) set of objections against the prospect of integration: even if turns out that phenomenology is worthwhile, it remains unclear whether its fundamental tenets are, in fact, compatible with the scientific worldview. The issue is best approached through Husserl’s anti-naturalism (Zahavi 2004: 333). The reasons for the latter seem to comprise two aspects. On the one hand, Husserl opposed naturalism for scientific reasons. Briefly put, Husserl claimed that the study of experience falls under the category of “descriptive eidetics,” which deal with non-exact essences, while disciplines such as mathematics fall under the category of “axiomatic eidetics,” which deal with exact essences. For this reason, he was convinced that it is impossible to formalise phenomenology, and since formalisation is crucial for naturalisation, phenomenology cannot be naturalised. To counter this contention, Petitot et al. emphasise that Husserl’s negative attitude towards naturalisation is “the result of having mistaken certain contingent limitations of mathematical and material sciences of his time for absolute ones” (Petitot et al. 1999: 42). Modern mathematics (especially morphodynamical tools) have shown Husserl’s arguments to be obsolete and have paved the way for a potentially successful integration of phenomenology into the natural sciences (ibid: 37–43; Zahavi 2004: 334–335). « 13 » However, as Zahavi points out, scientific objections are not crucial to Husserl’s anti-naturalism; more important by far are his transcendental philosophical objections. As was pointed out above, phenomenological inquiry is not interested in experiential atoms, but in the essential conditions of the possibility of experience. Its primary concern is therefore not consciousness as yet another empirical object in the world, but consciousness as transcendental subjectivity, i.e., that which enables both subjectivity and


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objectivity. If the natural sciences simply presuppose the existence of the (independent) natural world, populated by a host of different objects, phenomenology brackets this supposition and inquires into the background structure of experience as experience (Zahavi 2010: 4–7). Thus, it seems that


to suppose that naturalising phenomenology is “ simply a matter of overcoming some traditional

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ontological divide is to fail to see that the difference between phenomenology and neurobiology is not just a difference with respect to the objects of their investigation, but a fundamental difference in their theoretical orientation. (Murray, quoted in Zahavi 2004: 338)

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« 14 » In other words, it appears that phenomenology and natural sciences are incompatible not only in practice, but in principle, and if this is the case, then the prospect of naturalisation seems forlorn. However, as De Preester (2002: 642) and Zahavi (2004: 340–310; 2010: 10–11) point out, although the situation is grim, it is not necessarily hopeless. A partial solution may be found in Husserl’s distinction between “empirical psychology,” “phenomenological psychology,” and “transcendental phenomenology.” Namely, unlike empirical psychology, phenomenological psychology is a form of descriptive-eidetic psychology that takes the first-person approach seriously and investigates different aspects of consciousness; yet unlike transcendental phenomenology, phenomenal psychology remains rooted in the natural attitude, i.e., it investigates consciousness as a part of the world, not as its condition. For this reason, phenomenological psychology, a theoretical amphibian of sorts, might serve as a potential link between (transcendental) phenomenology and (naturalist) cognitive science. « 15 » The main problem with this solution, however, is that “a good part of what makes phenomenology philosophically interesting is abandoned,” i.e., the kind of phenomenology we end up with is a “psychological form of phenomenology,” a firstperson heuristics, and not “phenomenology understood as a philosophical discipline, tradition, or method” (Zahavi 2004: 340). So, even if Petitot et al. (1999) had managed to mathematise phenomenology, what this would amount to is (perhaps) the natu-


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ralisation of phenomenological psychology, but definitely not to the naturalisation of phenomenology strictu sensu, as the latter – due to its transcendental nature (pun intended) – cannot be naturalised. If Husserl’s transcendental concerns are well-founded, then the best thing cognitive science could hope for is a watered down version of phenomenology, a far cry from the “mutual enlightenment” Shaun Gallagher (1997) was pleading for.

Grabbing the serpent by its tail: From naturalisation to phenomenologisation « 16 » At this point, the phenomenologically inclined cognitive scientist is left with three choices. First, to abandon the project altogether and pronounce phenomenology and cognitive science to be non-overlapping magisteria with separate objects and orientations of inquiry. Second, to adopt the “beggars cannot be choosers” attitude and resignedly divide phenomenology into two parts: the “psychological” that can be integrated into cognitive science, and the “transcendental” that is forever out of its reach. Third, to persist in her original inclination, but pause to rethink the concept of naturalisation. Not being ones to throw in the towel or be content with mere leftovers, we opt for the third choice. This, however, requires us to open a little black box of our own. So far we have been using the term “naturalisation” and its derivatives generously, but also loosely, without specifying their meaning. Drawing on this semantic openness, the cognitive scientist is again left with three options. « 17 » First, she might cash in on the vacuity of the term or the so-called Hempel’s trilemma: [G]iven the history of scientific revolutions “ (…), we have every reason to believe that our best current physical theory is wrong not merely in its minor details but in major respects; but on the other hand, if we assume that we will eventually have a true theory of the nature of the physical world, and that our best current physical theory will be continuous with it, then we are either appealing to a theory that does not yet exist or merely begging the question. (Hanna & Thompson 2003: 27)

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« 18 » Since no one has a true theory of nature, the question of naturalisation is either meaningless or open. There is no way of knowing what the concept of nature will encompass in the future, so there are no a priori grounds for incommensurability between phenomenology and cognitive science. « 19 » Second, she might capitalise on the ambiguity of the term. The greatest difficulty with the first option is that it pins all its hopes on the future developments of science, which leaves the cognitive scientist working in the present empty handed. One way out is to appeal to the multitude of meanings associated with the term “naturalism” (Flanagan 2006; Papineau 2007): from non-supernaturalism and non-dualism to reductionism or even eleminitavism. Instead of letting “the reductionists monopolise the concept of naturalism” (Zahavi 2004: 343–344), the cognitive scientist might opt for a (non-reductivist) understanding of the term that is broad enough to incorporate phenomenology. « 20 » Finally, she might draw on the flexibility of the term. Namely, it is far from clear whether pinning one’s hopes on a broader conception of naturalism is enough to solve the “transcendental dilemma.” First of all, it is true that the term “naturalism” has different meanings, but it is equally true that its use in philosophy of mind is usually more restricted. Thus, it can be normally divided into an “ontological component,” which embraces a monistic worldview, claiming that “reality has no place for ‘supernatural’ or ‘spooky’ kinds of entity,” and a “methodological component,” which argues for “some kind of general authority for the scientific method” (Papineau 2007: 1). Furthermore, the naturalistic outlook is often tied to “an explicit endorsement of metaphysical realism,” according to which “[k]nowledge is taken to consist of a faithful mirroring of a mind-independent reality” (Zahavi 2010: 5). Now, we have seen that the previous solution – the idea of broadening the notion of naturalism – rests upon the belief that the greatest obstacle for incorporating phenomenology into cognitive science is reductionism; however, it is not clear whether nonreductive varieties would fare any better: It is not as if matters would improve if natu“ ralism opted for some version of emergentism or



property dualism. The real problem has to do with naturalism’s commitment to scientism and metaphysical realism. (Zahavi 2010: 7)

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« 21 » So, in order to integrate phenomenology into natural sciences, it is not enough to simply shun the reductionist materialism and opt for a non-reductionist variety (as attempted by, e.g., Schewel 2013): what is needed is not only broader naturalism, but naturalism transformed, i.e., naturalism founded on a radical reconceptualisation of the concept of nature, “one that has room for such issues as meaning, context, perspective, affordances and cultural sediments” (Zahavi 2010: 15). « 22 » The process of the naturalisation of phenomenology must therefore be reciprocated by a reverse process of the phenomenologisation of nature, a process that will “recast the very idea of nature and modify accordingly our modern conceptions of objectivity, subjectivity, and knowledge” (Petitot et al. 1999: 54). In this view, the “integration of phenomenology into cognitive science” does not amount to incorporating phenomenology into a pre-fixed theoretical and pragmatic network of natural sciences, but consists of actively reconstruing this very network in light of phenomenological insights. What this, in turn, entails is not only a radical theoretical modification of cognitive science, but also an equally, if not even more radical, modification of our modus vivendi.

The phenomenologisation of Nature I: A war of letters, 4EA vs. GOFAI « 23 » The first part of the process – the theoretical shift – has been underway for quite some time now, primarily under the heading of the so-called 4EA approach to cognition. It was originally inspired by a desire to rethink received views about consciousness, cognition, and the mind-body relationship against the background of phenomenology (especially late Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Martin Heidegger) and system theory (especially the theory of autopoiesis) (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991). The best way to outline its central tenets would probably be per negationem, i.e.,

by contrasting them with predominant cognitivist trends of the time, endearingly referred to as “Good Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence” (GOFAI) in computer sciences (cf. Haugeland 1985). The fundamental assumption of GOFAI is that the structure of the human mind is akin to that of a computer: cognition (perceiving, thinking, etc.) is conceived as data-processing in that it involves manipulation of symbolic (braininstantiated) tokens representing the features of the outside world. In other words, the mind is a symbol-manipulating machine whose role is to internally portray external reality. For our purposes, it is especially important that GOFAI models presuppose the subject-object dichotomy, i.e., the idea that the “world” is “‘objective’ in the sense that it is made up of substances, properties and events whose way of being is ‘independent’ of any subject of experience,” and that the “individual cogniser” can “arrive at knowledge of an objective reality only when the states that are internal to his mind match those of the external world” (Kiverstein 2012: 5). « 24 » The 4EA models conceive of cognition in radically different terms: as extended, i.e., “cognitive states and processes can extend beyond the boundaries of the cognizing organism,” embedded, i.e., dependent on “facts about our relationship to the surrounding environment,” embodied, i.e., dependent on “facts about our embodiment,” enactive, i.e., “dependent on aspects of the activity of the cognizing organism,” and affective, i.e., “dependent on the value of the object of cognition to the cognizer” (Ward & Stapleton 2012: 89). The 4EA cognitive science is not a uniform field, but encompasses a diverse range of heterogeneous approaches (for a more in-depth analysis see: Fingerhut, Hufendiek & Wild 2013: 7–102; Kiverstein 2012). A comprehensive overview would greatly transcend the scope of this paper, so in what follows, 4EA will (for simplicity’s sake) be referred to as a unified position, and focus will only be placed on the topics that are most relevant to our discussion.8 8 | Preference will be given to embodied/ enactive approaches (those that draw on Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991), as these seem to have gained the widest currency in recent debates, and are especially pertinent for our purposes.

Embodiment

« 25 » Unlike GOFAI, which construes cognition as a “disembodied eye looking objectively at the play of phenomena” (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991: 4), 4EA argues that human cognition is shaped by the features of the body. In short, there is no abstract “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986): every viewpoint presupposes a certain standpoint, every gaze is an embodied gaze. The idea of embodiment was inspired by phenomenological distinction between “lived body” (Leib) – a pre-reflective awareness of the body that shapes our experiential landscape (body as a feeling and living being) – and “physical body” (Körper) – reflective awareness of the body (body as a material thing). This distinction cuts through the typical mind-body duality as it anchors experience in materiality and materiality in experience (Hanna & Thompson 2003): the human being “is a body” (Leibsein) and “has a body” (Körperhaben), its fundamental mode of being is shaped by modes of its corporeality.

Enaction

« 26 » GOFAI construes cognition as a tripartite linear process (the so-called “Classical Sandwich”; cf. Susan Hurley 1998), consisting of perception (input)–cognition (data processing)–agency (output): cognitive processes are basically problemsolving processes, involving the collection and manipulation of input data and the production of appropriate output (Ward & Stapleton 2012: 95). 4EA, on the other hand, understands cognition as a skilful exercise of know-how in which perception, cognition, and agency form a dynamically interconnected whole. The background idea is Merleau-Ponty’s (1963: 13) conception of the inseparability of action and perception: how we perceive determines how we act, and how we act determines how we perceive. Cognitive processes thus emerge against the background of recurrent sensorimotor patterns of perception and action (Thompson 2007: 12f).

Anti-representationalism

« 27 » In contrast to the classical idea of cognition as (internal) symbol manipulation that represents the features of the independent (outside) world, 4EA conceives of


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cognition as an enactment or bringing forth of the world, as a co-determination and coemergence of the cogniser and the world. The anti-representationalist stance draws heavily on phenomenological criticism of representationalism, on Maturana’s and Varela’s theory of autopoiesis, and secondorder cybernetics’ critique of naïve realism: there is no objective reality with pre-given features that need to be picked up by subjective cognitive processes; instead, the world emerges in and through the agent’s active engagement with her environment. It is a “surplus of significance” or “meaning” (Thompson 2011) that is brought forth by the agent’s self-constituting activity.

Non-dualism

« 28 » The differences in the way the two models conceptualise the nature of cognition (abstract/discrete/representationalist vs. embodied/enactive/non-representationalist) already hint at what seems philosophically to be the most important distinction between the two approaches, namely their basic epistemic framework. Whereas GOFAI tacitly embraces subjectobject dichotomy, in that it posits an (independently existing) subject as a symbol-manipulating machine representing features of the (independently existing) objective world, 4EA rejects this view and argues instead for subject-object co-dependence and co-determination. As mentioned above, Husserlian phenomenology brackets the natural (realist) attitude and its underlying assumption that consciousness is “in here,” whereas the world is “out there.” Husserl’s followers have brought the idea of the inseparability of subjectivity and objectivity, of “inside” and “outside,” even more to the forefront. Merleau-Ponty for instance writes: “Inside and outside are inseparable. The world is wholly inside and I am wholly outside myself ” (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 402). Similar ideas echo through Heidegger’s work, especially his portrayal of Dasein: Self and world belong together in the single “ entity, the Dasein. Self and world are not two beings, like subject and object, or like I and thou, but self and world are the basic determination of the Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-world. (Heidegger 1982: 297f)

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The objective/subjective, the inside/outside mutually codetermine and coenact each other: a human being is always already embedded or “thrown” into the world, it is always already a being-in-the-world (Inder-Welt-sein). « 29 » This view represents a radical departure from predominant views on mind and nature. It is not dualist, as it posits a fundamental interconnection between mind and nature, but it is also not monist (a fact that is all too often lost on some researchers working in the field), as it explicitly rejects any attempts to reduce the former to the latter (reductive physicalism), or the latter to the former (naïve constructivism). Its non-duality is both epistemological and metaphysical, which does not mean that it tries to incorporate some spooky/fluffy stuff into the edifice of nature, but that nature (to be comprehensible at all) is as equally dependent on the mind as the mind is dependent on nature. There is no “outside world,” no “material stuff ” in itself; but neither is it merely a figment of our cognitive apparatus. One cannot speak about the former without speaking about the latter – there are no mindless worlds and no worldless minds. In the words of Merleau-Ponty: The world is inseparable from the subject, but “ from a subject which is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world which the subject itself projects. (Merleau-Ponty 1963: 430)

”

« 30 » The goal is not to opt for this or that part of the dualist equation and then subsume one under the other (or posit an unbridgeable gap between them), but to steer clear of all traditional metaphysical impasses – to find ways to think and live the non-duality of the self and the world. That is why the theoretical reconceptualisation of mind and nature is but one (albeit a very important) element in the overall transformation of our approach to consciousness: it remains – regardless of how profound it might be – limited to conceptual reasoning, to the realm of letters, and as such, restricted to inquiry about experience, but not in and through experience (Bitbol 2012: 169).

The phenomenologisation of Nature II: Neither one nor two « 31 » This brings us to the last part of our discussion – to the question of the potentially far-reaching effects of phenomenology on our mode of being and our existential stance towards mind, nature, and consciousness. It would seem that the significance of these implications has not been lost on Husserl: Perhaps it will even become manifest that the “ total phenomenological attitude and the epoché belonging to it are destined in essence to effect, at first, a complete personal transformation, comparable in the beginning to a religious conversion, which then, however, over and above this, bears within itself the significance of the greatest existential transformation which is assigned as a task to humankind as such. (Husserl 1970: 137)

”

« 32 » The existential implications of phenomenological research has also been arguably one of the main driving forces for the subsequent shift or progression from transcendental to existential phenomenology,9 from the fundamental structures of consciousness to the fundamental structures of human being. And according to Varela, this transformation of (practical) being is no less important than the transformation of (theoretical) seeing, if we are truly to break through the deeply entrenched ways of thinking about mind and nature (Varela 1976: 67). Thompson elaborates:

9 | Briefly, and somewhat (over)simplistically: transcendental phenomenology examines the fundamental structures of consciousness, while existential phenomenology studies the pre-reflective world of everyday experience. There is a lively debate between phenomenologists as to whether Heidegger’s philosophy is a shift away from or a continuation of Husserl’s phenomenology. The details of the debate need not concern us here, since what is crucial for our present purposes is not when the move towards the pre-reflective mode of being in the world occurred (was it already present in Husserl or did it emerge with Heidegger), but that it did, in fact, occur (and on this point most authors seem to be unanimous).



{

It’s one thing to have a scientific representation “ of the mind as ‘enactive’ – as embodied, emergent, and relational; as not homuncular and skullbound; and thus in a certain sense insubstantial. But it’s another thing to have a corresponding direct experience of this nature of the mind in one’s own first-person case. (Thompson 2004: 382)

”

« 33 » This point seems to be silently passed over by most advocates of enactivism. It is often forgotten that the point of proposing an alternative (enactive/embodied) account of consciousness and the mindbody problem is not to substitute one metaphysical model or reality for another, but to underline the conceptual and therefore derivative nature of all metaphysical models, including one’s own (cf. Bitbol 2012): Concepts such as embodiment or structural “ coupling are concepts and as such are always historical. They do not convey that at this very moment – personally – one has no independently existing mind and no independently existing world. (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991: 228)

”

« 34 » The non-dualistic stance of enactivism/embodiment is a theoretical derivation (abstraction) from the non-dualistic stance of (transformed) lived experience. If it solidifies into a rigid metaphysical position – if it becomes the solution to the problem of consciousness – it runs the risk of mistaking the map for the territory and thus falling into the same trap as previous models. This does not mean that the 4EA models should not be conceptually honed and developed into detailed research proposals, but merely that one should not forget their embeddedness in a greater “narrative of being.” In other words, one should resist the allure of the abstract, and consciously cultivate the “re-enchantment with the concrete” (Varela 1995).

Sebastjan Vörös

graduated in 2008 with a joint MSc in English Language and Literature and Philosophy (double-major study programme). From 2010 to 2013, he was employed as a Junior Researcher at the Philosophy Department at the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, where he successfully defended his doctoral thesis, which was later published as a book (The Images of the Unimaginable: (Neuro)Science, Phenomenology, Mysticism). He has published several articles and translations in the fields of philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and philosophy of religion. He is currently employed as an independent researcher and cultural worker at the Faculty of Arts and is finishing a parallel MSc study in History.

« 35 » Precisely therein lies the rub: the classical phenomenological authors might have paved the (conceptual/theoretical) way towards the experiential/existential transformation, but they failed to provide (pragmatic) tools to carry it out in a disciplined fashion (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991: 19). Trying to overcome this impasse, Varela turned to Buddhist meditation as a time-tested method for disciplined cultivation of lived/embodied experience. An even more daring claim could be ventured, opting for a broadening of Varela’s proposal to include all mystical traditions, an idea that many might find strange, if not downright bizarre. I have argued elsewhere at length (Vörös 2013a, 2013b) how and why mystical traditions might be of use in the study of experience; here it merely merits mention that there seems to exist a peculiar and severely understudied convergence in the depth structure of different contemplative/ meditative techniques and their ability to bring about the experiential changes alluded to above. The realm of mysticism is a murky terrain, indeed, and one should tread carefully when trying to approach it. Here, one can but concur with Ernst von Glasersfeld (1998), who warned against the dangers of trying to account for “the mystic’s wisdom” with “the tools of reason.” Yet the point is precisely not to try to explain (away?) mystical knowledge, but to establish a platform for a productive dialogue between scientific and contemplative/meditative approaches and to develop rigorous research strategies for an efficient cultivation of lived experience. Note that in much of the recent discussion on the possibility of actively employing meditative/ contemplative techniques, the emphasis has been on their potential to provide accurate phenomenological descriptions of the experiential landscape, whereas little attention

has been given to the experiential/existential changes that they may bring forth. « 36 » Let us sketch very briefly why and how this might be of importance, by drawing on Wolfgang Fasching’s (2008)10 refreshingly lucid account of what we might call the “basic anatomy of meditation.” Fasching characterises “meditation” as a set of practices aimed at producing a “no longer object-directed state of mind” (Fasching 2008: 463) or “a special way of becoming aware of consciousness itself as such” (ibid: 465). This is realised by “stilling the mind” and a “withdrawal from intentional activity dealing with objects” (ibid: 464), which results in “becoming aware of what makes any phenomenon that is present to us present in the first place: presence as such” (ibid: 468). Note that it is wrong to assume that “consciousness” or “presence” is “a subjective phenomenon” that can be found “inside,” i.e., by withdrawing one’s attention from the outside towards the “inner world” (ibid: 466). Instead, it denotes “the taking place of the phenomenality of phenomena,” “the being-there of whatever kind of phenomena – whether ‘subjective’ or ‘objective’” (ibid: 467). In meditation, one therefore “looks neither inwardly nor outwardly,” but rests in “consciousness as [sheer] presence,” in the “neither-inner-nor-outer” (ibid: 469), in the betwixt between subject and object. However, this awareness of “presence as such” is not the goal in itself; the final goal is to bring this non-dual attitude into everyday life: 10 | The only bone I have to pick with Fasching’s account is its stringently transcendentalist flavour – what is lacking is the explication of meditation in terms of full-blown embodiment, i.e., as a practice that involves the human being as a whole (i.e., carried out with “muscles, bones, and sinews,” as Zen Buddhists might say).


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lived experience

Existential Genetic/ generative

Phenomenology

Transcendental

cognitive science

Static

Praxis

theoria

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Phenomenology

Ge

ne ti

c/

Ex ist

en tia ge l ne ra tiv e

l ta en nd ce ic ns at Tra St


Figure 1 • Dynamic interrelation between lived experience and cognitive science via phenomenology.

lived experience

Lebenswelt Scientific research

cognitive science

Figure 2 • Circular interrelation between lived experience and cognitive science via phenomenology. Yet meditative practice ultimately aims at “ transformation of precisely this everyday worldexperiencing. With persistent practice the experience of presence as such remains present within activity. The daily object-experience is re-structured. (ibid: 480)

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« 37 » In other words, meditative/contemplative techniques enable one to en-live the non-duality (the beyond-subject-objectdichotomy) that is conceptualised in enactive/embodied approaches. In this way, they allow us not only to theorise differently about nature, mind, and consciousness, but also to live and experience them differently. The phenomenologisation of nature therefore entails not only the re-conceptualisation of the notion of nature, but also, if not primarily, the radical transformation of being and our experiential relation to nature.

Conclusion So where does all this leave us? Our main goal, it will be remembered, was to


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provide a broad outline of what it would mean to take the integration of phenomenology into cognitive science seriously. Here, two things deserve special mention. First, there are good reasons to believe that the process of integration cannot be carried out on the cheap, i.e., that the proper naturalisation of phenomenology requires an analogous complementary process, namely the phenomenologisation of naturalism. Second, the scope of phenomenologisation has so far been chronically undervalued, for it entails not only a radical reconceptualisation of nature, mind, and consciousness, but also an equally radical existential transformation in how we attend to these conceptualisations. The field of phenomenology covers a wide ground, from the improved first-person accounts (“transcendental” and “static” phenomenology) to experiential analyses bordering on the ineffable (here-and-now) cultivation of experience (“existential” and “genetic”/“generative” phenomenology).11 It 11 | Static phenomenology “analyzes the formal structures of consciousness, whereby con-

is especially important for future interdisciplinary research to develop, incorporate, and improve pragmatic tools for examining the elusive, yet highly important, interface between cultivation (ineffable praxis) and conceptualisation (liminally effable theoria). « 38 » The Janus-faced process of integration is systematically depicted in Figure 1. « 39 » Note, however, that the process is not linear, but circular and dialectical:, as depicted in Figure 2. « 40 » Lived experience and phenomenology not only co-inform, but co-determine each another. On the one hand, science cannot afford to neglect the pre-reflective Lebenswelt into which it is embedded, but on the other hand, it would be wrong to assume that this Lebenswelt is a fixed and predetermined something. In other words, our lived experience (way of being) determines our general attitude towards the natural sciences, whereas the latter – via their theories, experiments, technical findings, etc. – project directly onto our experiential landscape. Conditions of being/experiencing change – sometimes to a radical extent – and science plays no small role in these alterations. Thus conceived, cognitive-science-cumphenomenology provides for a genuine second-order science, with scientific endeavours deeply rooted in the existential horizon of the observer, and the modes of being reflectively open for the contributions from scientific inquiry. Drawing back on our initial metaphor: a better insight into the background dynamics of this dialectical process could be a small, but important, step towards pacifying the epistemic fury of Uroboros (the vicious circle of the hard problem of consciousness) and transforming it into the epistemic felicity of ensō (the virtuous circle of lived experience and natural sciences), a hand-drawn circle in Zen calligraphy, representing harmony and enlightenment. Received: 7 July 2014 Accepted: 28 September 2014 sciousness is able to constitute (…) its objects;” genetic phenomenology is concerned with how these formal structures “emerge through time;” while generative phenomenology focuses on “the cultural, historical, and intersubjective constitution of our human world” (Thompson 2007: 17).


Putting Phenomenology to Work “Seriously” Anna Ciaunica

Open Peer Commentaries on Sebastjan Vörös’s “The Uroboros of Consciousness”

Putting Phenomenology to Work “Seriously”– Deep Brain Stimulation and Mental Disorders Anna Ciaunica

University of Porto, Portugal ciaunica/at/yahoo.com

> Upshot • I present a concrete example of how phenomenology might “seriously” contribute to our understanding of certain aspects of the human mind, by drawing on recent research in psychopathology.

« 1 » Sebastjan Vörös’s target article addresses the controversial issue of integrating phenomenological insights and methods into the cognitive science explanatory framework. It covers a wide range of topics, going from cognitivism, the explanatory gap and the phenomenological tradition to so-called 4E cognition (extended, embedded, embodied, enactive) and mystical knowledge/ meditation. This highly ambitious attempt to reconcile such various and difficult issues builds upon the premise that a proper naturalization of phenomenology requires an analogous complementary process, namely the phenomenologisation of naturalism.1 It starts with a synthetizing survey of the crucial phases of the debate regarding the very 1 | It is not clear whether the author has in mind the phenomenologisation of “nature” (as stated in the title and in the most part of the paper) or the phenomenologisation of “naturalism” (as stated in §38). The two terms convey very different meanings and further clarification on this point would be very helpful for the reader.

possibility of a systematic and rigorous study of consciousness from a first-person perspective. Vörös insightfully argues that disclaimers of phenomenology in tackling the problem of phenomenal experience miss the point. Indeed, phenomenological approaches are not concerned with the “experiential atoms” of a private subjective experience, but with the invariant structure of the experience (§11), which can be addressed via rigorous and scientific methods. As such, phenomenology is not a mere “recycled version of introspectionism” (§12) but a distinct and promising research program. « 2 » After presenting the challenging issue of incorporating the transcendental aspect into the discussion regarding the structure of subjectivity and the essential condition of the possibility of experience, Vörös undertakes the difficult task of “grabbing the serpent by its tail,” namely indicating the path one has to follow in order to move from naturalization to “phenomenologisation.” Here, too, he offers a broad review of the main understandings of the key term “naturalism” and he concludes that attempts to redefine the very basis of our understanding of the concept “naturalism” are needed in order to bridge phenomenological descriptions and neurocognitive approaches. Vörös then goes on to argue that the most promising attempts to uncover this new “radical reconceptualisation” (§21) of our understanding of naturalism are currently inspired by the 4E cognition research paradigm. Again, he provides a short presentation of these models (extended, embedded, embodied and enactive) and claims that, importantly, any reconceptualization of conscious experience must not be restricted to inquiry about experience, but have to include “inquiry […] in and through experience” (§30, original emphasis).

« 3 » At this point of the discussion, it seems important, in my opinion, to provide an example of how exactly this reconceptualization “in and through experience” might look like. Indeed, Vörös introduces what I take to be the key point of the present article, namely the potentially fruitful collaboration between the “serious scientific study of experience” and Buddhist meditation. He claims that the upshot is to provide a “platform for a productive dialogue between scientific and contemplative/meditative approaches” in order to “develop rigorous research strategies for an efficient cultivation of lived experience” (§35). Since the role of “mystical” approach is crucial in Vörös’s account, further development of its precise integration into ongoing scientific research would add extra value to his argumentation. Moreover, whereas I do agree with Vörös in his attempts to highlight the importance of taking the “integration of phenomenology into cognitive science seriously” (§38, original emphasis), I believe that an example of how exactly this implementation is supposed to work might add significant weight to Vörös’s proposal. For example, one might point out that there are currently several ongoing empirical attempts to “grab the serpent by its tail” – to use Vörös’s metaphor again – i.e., to integrate phenomenological methods into the framework of cognitive science. I provide hereafter one case study taken from research in psychopathology, and more specifically in investigating obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), but there are other contributions in the field (see Gaebler et al. 2013). « 4 » In a recent paper, Sanneke de Haan and colleagues (2013) argued that the methods and concepts as developed in phenomenology may be of particular use to account for some patients’ experiences.


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For example, people suffering from OCD do things they do not want to do, such as endlessly washing their hands, checking the oven, counting their steps, or tidying up their room. Unlike previous approaches, the phenomenological method requires us to start from the patients’ actual experience, rather than from theory or from established categories (such as, for instance, presented by the DSM IV). In other words, the upshot is to get beyond merely describing individual changes, in order to elucidate changes in the structure of experiences. Consequently, de Haan and colleagues’ research combined qualitative interviews with phenomenological analysis. The interviews serve to get an overview of the patients’ experiences, whereas the phenomenological analysis in turn helps to

“

distinguish common patterns, or structural changes among the wide range of individual changes. The phenomenological tradition also provides a set of concepts that are helpful to articulate (pre-reflective) experiences. (ibid: 2)

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Given that in about 10% of OCD patients, none of the available treatment options is effective, a new treatment has been proposed, 2 based on deep brain stimulation (DBS). Their findings show that patients may experience profound changes as a result of DBS treatment. Crucially, patients report experiencing a different way of “being in the world” (Heidegger 1978). As de Haan and colleagues pointed out, these global effects are insufficiently captured by traditional psychiatric scales, which mainly consist of behavioral measures of the severity of the symptoms. Consequently, they propose to capture the changes in the patients’ phenomenology and make sense of the broad range of changes they report. « 5 » It is not my intention here to provide a detailed examination of their proposal. For the purposes of this commentary, suffice it to say that, as Vörös rightly pointed out, an enactive, affordance-based model seems more successful in fleshing out the dynamic interactions between person and 2 | DBS involves the implantation of electrodes in the brain. These electrodes give a continuous electrical pulse to the brain area in which they are implanted.


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world in four aspects. Indeed, the first aspect is the patients’ experience of the world. For example, de Haan et al. propose specifying the OCD patients’ world in terms of a field of affordances, with the “three dimensions of broadness of scope (‘width’ of the field), temporal horizon (‘depth’) and relevance of the perceived affordances (‘height’)” (de Haan et al. 2013: 1). Another crucial aspect is the person-side of the interaction, that is, the patients’ self-experience, in other words their moods and feelings. Crucially, there are different characteristics of the way in which patients relate to the world. Finally, the existential stance refers to the “stance that patients take toward the changes they experience: the second-order evaluative relation to their interactions and themselves” (ibid: 1). Their model explicitly aims to specify the notion of being in the world in order to do justice to the phenomenological effects of DBS treatment. « 6 » To conclude: any further empirically-based research example fleshing out in a similar vein a fruitful connection between meditation and conscious lived experience on the one hand, and a cognitive science framework on the other hand, will add a valuable contribution to Vörös’s groundbreaking proposal. Anna Ciaunica is a Postdoctoral FCT Research Fellow at the Mind, Language and Action Group, Institute of Philosophy, Porto and Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Senses, School of Advanced Study, London. Her main expertise is the role of embodiment in cognition and conscious experience. She is particularly interested in how our perceptions of our own body and the bodies of others are involved in structuring social cognition/interaction. Received: 17 October 2014 Accepted: 19 October 2014

The Small Change of Nonidealistic Correlationism Peter Gaitsch

University of Graz, Austria peter.gaitsch/at/uni-graz.at

> Upshot • In my commentary, I focus on

the main claim that naturalizing transcendental phenomenology should lead to a phenomenologisation of nature. I suggest that this could be spelled out in a non-idealistic correlationism of mind and nature and, more specifically, in a phenomenological investigation into living beings based on the analysis of the embodied mind/lived body. « 1 » As Shaun Gallagher recently stated, naturalizing phenomenology is not only about “integrating phenomenological data, methods, and insights into natural scientific experiments in cognitive science” (Gallagher 2012: 88), but rather a more ambitious task remains, namely

to pursue what Merleau-Ponty called the ‘truth “ of naturalism’ and the idea that ‘it would be necessary to define transcendental philosophy anew in such a way as to integrate with it the very phenomenon of the real’ [Merleau-Ponty 1983: 224]. The ‘truth’ of naturalism is not the naturalism which Husserl cautioned against, but a redefined non-reductionist naturalism that correlates with a redefined phenomenology. (Gallagher 2012: 89)

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« 2 » In this line of thought, Sebastjan Vörös is looking for the truth of a phenomenologically respectable naturalism. Transcendental phenomenology is a first-person methodology meant to investigate the system of invariant structures of consciousness that are constitutive of observed nature. In his article, the author is concerned with the meaning of the naturalization program of consciousness that has dominated the recent debates between transcendental phenomenology and cognitive science. To my mind, the paper makes two different claims, both of which would deserve a wider discussion. First, a sensible way of naturalizing transcendental phenomenology (without reducing its transcendental status) leads to


The Small Change of Non-idealistic Correlationism Peter Gaitsch

a transformation (“phenomenologization”) of the concept of nature implied in the term naturalism. Second, this transformation has its existential background in a non-dualistic experiential relation to nature. In what follows, I will focus mainly on the first claim, closing with a remark on the second claim. « 3 » The author argues that the phenomenologization of nature is just the flipside of a legitimate way of naturalizing transcendental phenomenology. Therefore, a sensible criterion for phenomenologizing nature is that it should not violate the basic claim of transcendental phenomenology, namely the mind-dependence of nature, which implies the delimitation of empirical and human consciousness into transcendental subjectivity (Meixner 2010: 190). An important first result for the record is that such a phenomenologization must be associated with a nonreductive naturalism (§19). However, the assertion of a nonreductive naturalism is typically built on dualistic concepts such as “emergence” and “supervenience” (Weber 2005; Stephan 2005). With regard to this, Vörös goes one step further by holding a non-dualistic view, but without yielding to any kind of monism (§29). He calls this position non-dualism of mind and nature, but I suggest also naming it – using a term recently coined by Quentin Meillassoux (2009) and tracing back to Edmund Husserl (1970: 165) – correlationism of mind and nature, in order to also keep track of the non-monist connotation. « 4 » My first question concerns the metaphysical significance of such a phenomenological correlationism of nature: Is it associated with a kind of idealism? It is long- and well-established that Husserl is a transcendental idealist who holds that the physical is supervenient on the mental (Meixner 2010). Transcendental idealism refers to the basic claim that everything is relative to consciousness but consciousness itself, in which everything else is constituted. In other words, nature is relative to consciousness while the opposite does not apply. Therefore, this approach “removes the transcendental subject from the correlation by making it an absolute” (Barbaras 2012: 95). By following Husserl, Vörös seems thus prima facie to plead for transcendental idealism, provided that his recourse to transcendental subjectivity (§13) and his

rejection of a merely heuristic use of transcendental phenomenology in different versions of phenomenological psychology (§§12–15) imply an idealistic stance. Therefore, in order to maintain the transcendental significance of naturalized phenomenology, a further elaboration on the relation of transcendental correlationism to transcendental idealism is required: Are they one and the same, or is there a way of proceeding from correlationism other than idealism? « 5 » Indeed, there are a number of indications in the article that clearly point to a non-idealistic correlationism or transcendental realism. Phenomenologizing nature does not end in the conclusion that nature is dependent on the mind. The opposite also applies: mind is dependent on nature; there are “no worldless minds” (§29). The most interesting point would be to spell out the particular type of this dependence. Is it just phenomenology’s standard reference to intentionality as the essential property of consciousness? Or is the author willing to say, as Renaud Barbaras does, that “intentionality presupposes a deeper co-belonging between consciousness and world” (Barbaras 2012: 95), a co-belonging that should not only be expressed in terms of consciousness? « 6 » Vörös gives us several hints in this direction. In §21, he mentions that a phenomenological transformation of the concept of nature should have room for meaning within nature. Furthermore, and most importantly, he introduces the 4EA approach to cognition as a legitimate way of phenomenologizing nature (§§23–30). In this context, he lays emphasis on the high relevance of embodiment (§25, see also particularly footnote 10 in §36): Being a lived body (“Leibsein”) is more basic than any mindbody duality. This recourse to the lived body as a basic phenomenon should be read as a way of substantiating the concept of a meaningful nature. Regarding the lived body, Husserl seems, by the way, to have mitigated his “categorical anti-naturalism” mentioned in the text (§7 and §12), as Rudolf Bernet (2013) has recently shown.In my view, this should give us an important insight into how it is possible to naturalize phenomenology without renouncing its transcendental dimension: what nature means phenomenologically cannot be learned by an intentional analysis of nature; instead, we learn it from

attention to the embodied mind and to the lived body as a transcendental basic fact. In this way, by further elaborating on the lived body, phenomenology provides a paradigm for analyzing all natural (or at least all living) beings (Husserl 1954: 482–484; Heidegger 1989: 159; Jonas 1966). For instance, one could take up the analysis offered by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, which shows that living (with) a body amounts not only to being a body, but also, and primarily, to having a body (“Leibhaben”) as a “vehicle of being-inthe-world” (Merleau-Ponty 1945: 97), as the natural and yet essential medium of existential projective movement (Merleau-Ponty 1945; see especially page 203 for a note on his use of the term “to have”). After elaborating a rich account of the phenomenon of embodiment based on human experience, one would be prepared to analyze all natural (living) beings in a phenomenological manner with respect to indicating features of the lived body. It is particularly important that this phenomenological naturalization program could offer in a transcendental setting the mentioned “small change” Husserl demanded from doing phenomenological research (§12; it is unclear if the demanded small change refers only to applied phenomenology, as Vörös argues). In this setting, transcendental phenomenology should be more than just a heuristic tool (cf. §§11–12, 15). It would be of interest to learn how Vörös relates to such a specific program of naturalizing transcendental phenomenology by doing phenomenological biology. « 7 » Ultimately, the metaphysical status of the 4EA approach the author refers to is as yet unclarified. It is certainly not an idealistic approach, therefore some would question whether it were a transcendental project after all. It seems crucially important to be able to offer a clear conceptual distinction between a transcendental and an idealistic alignment of a phenomenological naturalism. In this respect, the approach of Barbaras (e.g., 2012) on the transcendental phenomenology of life starting from universal correlationism and identifying desire as the very being of every living subject could prove to be of great help. This reference, however, brings up a further problem: Can we address nature on the whole and as such? What about the difference between animate and inanimate systems: is the scientific re-


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duction of the vital to the chemico-physical so well-established? Phenomenologically, there seem to be some fundamental doubts, which a program of the phenomenologization of nature must take into account. « 8 » My final remark concerns the existential background of the phenomenologization of nature, namely the non-dualistic experiential relation to nature. Non-idealistic correlationism is not limited to thinking about the correlation of mind and nature, but, on a more fundamental level, it also involves experiencing it. Vörös pleads, apparently alongside Varela’s neurophenomenology, for a cultivation of embodied experiences (§35). However, the specific configuration of the interrelation between the cultivation of a proper attitude and the ability to have conceptual insights remains unclear. Of course, (phenomenological) thinking is to a great extent based on cultivating a specific attitude (Gaitsch 2014). However, it is uncertain what meditation or similar practices could provide for the more specific task of phenomenologizing nature: What kind of “small change” may we expect from it? In this regard, the sketch of a “circular interrelation” (§40) in the conclusion seems like an afterthought, and deserves further elaboration. Peter Gaitsch gained his PhD from the University of Vienna in 2013 with a thesis in philosophy (published Gaitsch 2014). He is a faculty member at the Department of Theology, University of Graz. His current research interests are in the fields of phenomenology, philosophy of biology and philosophy of religion. Received: 16 October 2014 Accepted: 16 October 2014

Cognitive Science and Phenomenology: A Step Towards the Epistemic Enso¯ Camila ValenzuelaMoguillansky

Instituto de Sistemas Complejos de Valparaíso, Chile • cvalenzuela/at/ sistemascomplejos.cl

> Upshot • This commentary highlights

the contribution of “The Uroboros of Consciousness” to the integration of phenomenology with cognitive sciences by replacing the question of how we want to make such integration. In a very pertinent manner, this article looks at the other side of a coin that until now has been turned to the requirements and criteria of validity of the naturalistic paradigm. This movement allows us to come back to the original intention of this dialogue and to ask ourselves what we can do to make it more satisfactory.

« 1 » The target article by Sebastjan Vörös deals with one of the key questions of the opening process towards the understanding of experience in the field of cognitive sciences. This question is of how we understand the integration of cognitive science and phenomenology. While this question should be at the basis of this opening process, curiously, it has been poorly addressed so far. In this sense, “The Uroboros of Consciousness” is a great contribution to the current discussion about the development of the cognitive sciences. « 2 » The central idea developed in this paper is that the integration of cognitive science and phenomenology involves a double movement: on one hand, a naturalization of phenomenology, and on the other, a phenomenologization of nature. With this, the author emphasizes that… the introduction of phenomenology into cog“ nitive science is […] not merely a quantitative addition to and extension of a pre-determined framework of natural sciences, but involves a qualitative transformation of our fundamental understanding of nature and science […] (§1)

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« 3 » As pointed out by the author, so far the debate on the integration of cognitive science and phenomenology has focused on the discussion of whether phenomenology is a research program in itself and whether it meets the requirements imposed by what he calls the “naturalistic” paradigm. « 4 » After reaching the conclusion that phenomenology does have a methodology of its own that is compatible with the naturalistic paradigm, the author sets out the following questions: Have the research programs which have so far tried to carry out this integration been managed successfully? Or do they correspond to small changes of secondary importance in the “transcendental project” proposed by Edmund Husserl? At this point the author presents, from the perspective of phenomenology, the objections to integrating with the cognitive sciences. This is, in my view, the major contribution of this paper since it looks at the other side of a coin that until now has been turned to the requirements and criteria of validity of the naturalistic paradigm. « 5 » The first objection has to do with the difference in the objects of study addressed by phenomenology and the natural sciences. Phenomenology deals with no exact essences, therefore it cannot be subject to formalization, which is a fundamental process of the natural sciences. Thus phenomenology would not be subject to naturalization. The second objection has to do with the fact that the natural sciences assume the existence of a natural world independent from the observer. In contrast, in phenomenology this assumption is bracketed and its interest focuses on the structure of the experience as such. « 6 » While these concerns appear to question strongly the possibility of a successful integration between phenomenology and cognitive science, the author foresees a possible outcome. This could be a transformed naturalism, based on a re-conceptualization of the concept of nature that includes “issues such as meaning, context, perspective, affordances and cultural sediments” (Zahavi 2010: 15, cited by Vörös §21). He proposes a two-step process to integrate satisfactorily phenomenology and cognitive science. « 7 » The first step would be a conceptual shift towards a way of understanding cognition characterized by what he calls


The Enkinaesthetic Betwixt Susan A. J. Stuart

the “4EA” (extended, embedded, embodied, enactive, and affective), in contrast to the “traditional” way of understanding the problem of cognition or GOFAI (“Good Old fashioned Artificial Intelligence”). The main difference between these two approaches would be a way to understand the mind-body problem and in particular the relationship between the nervous system and consciousness. In general terms, while GOFAI adheres to the idea of a preexisting world that is independent from the observer and understands cognition as the computation of symbols that represent the outside world, the 4EA approach rejects this view and argues instead for the co-dependency and co-determinations of subject-object. « 8 » This conceptual shift certainly seems fundamental. If at one point we believed that we could find the solution of all human mysteries in our genes, today we seek “the truth” in our brains; the explosion of disciplines such as “neuroeconomics,” “neuroart” and “neuromanagment” somehow represent the hope of finding a solution to social and cultural issues in our neurons. There is much confusion in how we understand the relationship between the nervous system and consciousness. Perhaps the biggest problem is not in doing research that focuses only on studying neural activity without integrating subjective experience, which is therefore “reductionist,” but in the interpretation of the results thus obtained. The problem is the reductionist interpretation, and solving that it is necessarily a conceptual change. « 9 » The second step is to translate this conceptual transformation into a change, not only in the way of understanding, but also in how to experience our relationship with nature and with our mental life. The author argues that despite the reception and development that the vision represented by 4EA has had, this has not necessarily been “embodied” by its supporters. « 10 » This step seems central to me: conceptualizing differently the body-mind problem is not the same as actually living it differently. Without this change of attitude, we risk defending an approach superficially, by fashion, without understanding what its transformative character is. This can make us operate from the same reductionist and

dualistic paradigm as before, but this time, for instance, putting electrodes on the monks’ heads when we try to understand their skills in exploring their mental experience. « 11 » While this article fully complies with its main objective, which is to provide a general idea of what it means to take seriously the integration of phenomenology into cognitive science, it concludes with a proposal that, in my view, has already been made. In essence, the invitation given by the author does not differ much from what Varela proposed 20 years ago (Varela 1996a): a conceptual change from representationalism to the enactive approach, and a pragmatic attitude that develops tools to incorporate the study of experience to the scientific field. Hence, we may ask: (a) why did Varela’s original proposal lead to adaptations, interpretations or readings in which phenomenology is subjugated to the criteria of validity of the natural sciences? (b) How can we, in fact, implement this paradigm shift? « 12 » Regarding the first question, I think that an interesting exercise that could shed light on finding a response would be to conduct an analysis of the historical roots that explain the need for control, certainty and objectivity that characterizes the current way of doing science. « 13 » Regarding the second question, I think one hint might be to embody research about experience through the analysis of practices that facilitate direct contact with the experience. These practices might well be meditation and the phenomenological reduction, but not only these. For instance, improvisation skills in music (Nachmanovitch 1990), dance (Ravn 2010) or drawing (Eslava 2014) are practices that can teach us, through direct contact with our experience, about our cognitive processes and consciousness. One could identify through tools such as the elicitation interview (Petitmengin 2006) the peculiar and common features of practices that promote openness and flexibility and encourage this attitude in different contexts. « 14 » Since Varela made his proposal, his heirs have been responsible for paving the theoretical way of the phenomenological approach to be considered in the scientific field. Perhaps, this is a turning point, where

instead of trying to adapt the phenomenological approach to the naturalistic paradigm, we should take another step and expand the limits of the naturalistic paradigm. The target article is a great contribution in this direction. Camila Valenzuela is a Doctor in cognitive sciences of the University of Pierre et Marie Curie, Master in cognitive sciences of the Ecole de Hautes Etudes de Sciences Sociales (EHESS) of Paris and graduate in biology of the University of Chile. Currently, she is carrying out a postdoctoral research on the interoceptive and exteroceptive aspects of body perception in people who suffer fibromyalgia at the Institute of Complex Systems of Valparaiso. Camila is also a dancer and a yoga practitioner and teacher. Received: 14 October 2014 Accepted: 16 October 2014


University of Glasgow, UK susan.stuart/at/glasgow.ac.uk

> Upshot • Vörös proposes that we phe-

nomenologise nature and, whilst I agree with the spirit and direction of his proposal, the 4EA framework, on which he bases his project, is too conservative and is, therefore, unsatisfactory. I present an alternative framework, an enkinaesthetic field, and suggest further ways in which we might explore a non-dichotomised “betwixt” and begin to experience our world in a non-individuating, non-dual aspect.

« 1 » There are many things to like about Sebastjan Vörös’s target article, not least of which is the clarity of style and presentation of some very subtle and complex ideas; but more than this, it is the way in which the article stretches imaginatively over a broad range of interdisciplinary material and provides a really very good account of the recent revival of phenomenological approaches in cognitive science. The ultimate aim of his article is to demonstrate that, if we are to have a thoroughgoing grasp of


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conscious experience, the current emphasis on naturalising phenomenology must be complemented by a systematic attempt to phenomenologise nature and the naturalistic framework. « 2 » Vörös concludes with an appeal to the ways in which we might access the “betwixt between subject and object,” ways that would prompt us

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not only to theorise differently about nature, mind, and consciousness, but also to live and experience them differently. The phenomenologisation of nature therefore entails not only the reconceptualisation of the notion of nature, but also, if not primarily, the radical transformation of being and our experiential relation to nature (§37)

”

and, it follows, our relation to how we attend to these reconceptualisations. He claims further that in doing this we will have taken a very large step towards pacifying the epistemic fury of “ Uroboros (the vicious circle of the hard problem of consciousness) and transforming it into the epistemic felicity of ensō (the virtuous circle of lived experience and natural sciences), a hand-drawn circle in Zen calligraphy, representing harmony and enlightenment. (§41)

”

« 3 » An air of optimism breathes through the paper and I find myself agreeing with a great deal, but not with everything. So there are a number of things I would like to address; these include: 1 | the assumption that 4EA (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended, and affective) is a satisfactory model on which to base his project, 2 | the continued predominance of individuating theories, which lead to a skewed set of practical implications, 3 | the disappointment of the old chestnut of meditation as our means of access to the “betwixt,” and 4 | the Uroboros metaphor. « 4 » So, to the first concern: the 4EA assumption that sits at the heart of the work. The advantages of adopting the 4EA framework for thinking about consciousness are many, but one of the foremost is that it is a model, conceived gradually over a number of years and from a range of


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perspectives, developed in response to the limitations of first-order cybernetics and to the classical – disembodied, representational, and symbolic or connectionist – information-processing model of cognition at the core of GOFAI. As such, it puts the agent back into its experience as a perceiving, sensing, feeling living body, embedded in a world brought forth through its activity, and where that activity is facilitated by the agent’s ability to exploit objects in its environment as a means of extending its cognitive processes. Additionally, 4EA begins to address some of the issues raised by secondorder cybernetics about the observing system as different in kind from the observed system of first-order dynamics. Finally, its development as a theory has been motivated by the phenomenological tradition, both descriptive and existential, and phenomenological theory works well with the concerns of second-order cybernetics. « 5 » These are all good reasons to adopt a 4EA framework and, despite Peter Hacker’s widespread disgruntlement (Hacker 2010), it is a framework that has provided a way in which we might better understand the mind and experience. And yet I wish to take issue with Vörös’s use of 4EA as a satisfactory starting point from which he can develop his intriguing and provocative proposal, not only to access the non-dual betwixt, but also to bring the experience of the non-dual attitude into our everyday life (§36). « 6 » One of the central limitations of 4EA is that it continues to individuate, and although the mind extends its cognitive actions and requirements, the individual qua individual still remains within its particular body or “skin-bag” (Clark 2008: xxviii). But we are not isolated individuals. We act in our worlds, as conscious, socially and culturally embedded, phenomenal agents, rich in our unique experiential histories, but also rich in our greatly distributed, complex array of felt affective relations and interrelations with other agents, entities and things. We routinely transgress our own bodily boundaries, spilling over into the bodily experience of others and in this way maintaining the primordial community and reciprocity of felt co-engagement. Maurice MerleauPonty (1962: vii) presents this as the “always “already there” before reflection begins”; it

is an always already there that is not as individuated beings, but as beings that dwell within the perpetual felt community and reciprocity of an enkinaesthetic field, where “field” is used to refer to the region in which a particular condition prevails; in this case, “field” refers to the topologically complex, affectively-laden dialogical field of our being-with our world. « 7 » In Stuart (2010, 2012, 2013), I have described our plenisentient – tactile, auditory, visual, gustatory, olfactory, kinaesthetic, nociceptive and proprioceptive – possibly naturally synaesthetic, affectivelyentangled living being-with our world as “enkinaesthesia.” It is an attempt to flesh out the always already there as “that primordial being which is not yet the subject-being nor the object-being” (Merleau-Ponty 1970: 65). As primordial being, enkinaesthesia emphasises both the felt neuromuscular dynamics of the agent, the givenness and ownership of its experience (Henry 1973), and the entwined and situated co-affective immanence of the other and all others (agential – horse, caterpillar, mould, human beings, and non-agential – book, glasses, chair, coffee). This enkinaesthetic experience of other agents brings with it our anticipated arc of their intentional action, which is to say that our enkinaesthetic experience appresents the affectively-rich lived (intentional) experience of the other, and vice versa. Or put another way, in our enaction, or bringing forth, of our world we are always simultaneously enacting, or bringing forth, the world of the other, and yet it is not restricted to the other in some simple dyadic relationship; in bringing forth our world we are also anticipating (not necessarily correctly) the being and becoming of everything within our experiential sphere. We are “always “already there” before reflection begins,” and it is unfortunate that through our customs and practices, through our language use in science, we have become accustomed to dividing and individuating through our dual attitude in everyday life. « 8 » Through his systematic eidetic reduction, Edmund Husserl (1983) identifies consciousness of oneself and others as an essential structure of conscious experience; he speaks of our intentional transgression, of our having a pre-reflective, non-inferential apperceptive analogizing experience



of the other (agential) as an animate being (Husserl 1982). Merleau-Ponty takes this up saying: [A]t the same time the other who is to be per“ ceived is himself not a ‘psyche’ closed in on himself, but rather a conduct, a system of behavior that aims at the world, he offers himself to my motor intentions and to that ‘intentional transgression’ (Husserl) by which I animate and pervade him. (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 118)

”

« 9 » Whilst Merleau-Ponty’s refers to the conduct and the system of behaviour of the other, he is also implying the felt neuromuscular dynamics of both agents in their enkinaesthetic experiential entanglement. Just as there is no principled distinction between mind, body, and environment for the coupled system in extended mind theory, I suggest that there is no principled distinction between affective agents. Through a “passive synthesis” (Husserl 2001) – a preconceptual sense-making that is the mark of our practical bodily, kinaesthetic engagement with our world – the other is given in our experience and we in theirs. « 10 » So, whilst 4EA claims to be radical in its embodiment, one might object that it is not radical enough. What is needed is a theory – I recommend enkinaesthesia – that recognises and supports the claim that sensorimotor affective experience is extended, direct, and immediate. In our enkinaesthetic experiential entanglement, we are amidst a way of being with our world that is not selfdwelling; nor is it other-dwelling, it is a way of being reciprocally folded into the being of things and other agents and organisms in my world. It is not an optional way of being, though it is one we frequently fail to grasp, possibly because we are in its midst, but possibly also because we are more usually equipped with reductionist strategies rather than ampliative and generative ones. « 11 » Now let us turn and look at an example of an alternative methodology through which we might inhabit the betwixt and begin to experience our world, that is, to “en-live,” in a non-individuating, nondual aspect. « 12 » It is a little disappointing to see meditation come up again as our way to enlightenment in these sorts of contexts. I do not intend to be dismissive of medita-

tive practice or of its rich potential as a part of a strategy to understand conscious experience, but there are other methods that we might also investigate, especially in the context of our enkinaesthetic experiential entanglement. The one that comes most readily to mind is that of the non-manipulative manual listening techniques in osteopathy.1 In this practice, the therapist uses their hands not to manipulate the patient’s body, but as the focal point of the listening process when attending to it; crucially, the osteopath’s hands do not need to touch the patient or even be in constant contact with the patient’s body. « 13 » The defining characteristic of this listening process is that it derives first and foremost from the osteopath’s ability to sense the inner space in which organic life develops, one might even say that it is to sense this organic life itself, even though we are educated to believe that such a perception is impossible because of the visual opacity of the appearance of the body.2 « 14 » They go on to say that as a result of our education, in which we treat others as bodies distinct from ourselves as subject, we think it is impossible for us to have a sensed access to and knowledge of the inner life of another living organism. Yet the process of osteopathic listening demonstrates that this is false. The osteopath must first develop a silence in her own psychic life, calming and quieting the continuous chatter and play of words and images; once a quiet is achieved, in this way they become receptive to the bodily experience of their patient. There is no physical manipulation, no searching with the hands for disharmony, just quiet, openness, and listening, and when this resonance is achieved their experience is of a between, neither subject nor object. « 15 » Other methodologies would include, but are certainly not limited to, the enkinaesthetic resonance and attunement

that can develop between pupil and teacher in the practice of the Alexander Technique (Stuart 2013) or between horse and rider in natural horsemanship or in the practice of dressage when an extraordinary affective extension can occur, even down to the hooves and tail end of the rider. In the context of natural horsemanship, the betwixt word “partnership” is used to refer to the sensitivity of mutual respectful listening and communication between horse and human, and is characterised by the kind of openness and quiet we find in osteopathic listening. « 16 » Finally, to the claim at the end, that the motivation of the article is to pacify the “epistemic fury of Uroboros (the vicious circle of the hard problem of consciousness).” Whilst I agree that cognitive science has been repeatedly stymied in its progress by encountering something that its, frequently dualist, metaphysics compels it to simultaneously conclude yet fail to resolve – from Jack Smart’s (1959) “nomological danglers” to David Chalmers’s (1995) “hard problem” and beyond – the uroboros metaphor, a metaphor of rebirth, renewal, and reemergence, is not representative of a vicious circle. If anything, it is Vörös’s own work that fits this metaphor, presenting for the reader the enlightenment of a re-beginning, with a freshly-conceived model for understanding nature and consciousness. Susan A. J. Stuart is a senior lecturer at the University of Glasgow. Her research centres on developing the notion of enkinaesthesia as a transcendental condition that must exist if conscious experience is to be possible. Her work provides an alternative way of interpreting the world and doing science; thus, instead of using science to explain the world, the enkinaesthetic field of lived experience can be used to explain science and situate the grounds of our moral discourse. Received: 24 October 2014 Accepted: 25 October 2014

1 | See, for example, William Sutherland at http://www.cranialacademy.com/cranial.html 2 | See also the presentation “The emergence of feeling in osteopathic manual listening” by Emmanuel Roche and Jean-Claude Gens at the conference “Investigating somatic consciousness: Beginning with three methodologies,” Sidney Sussex College, University of Cambridge, 4–6 September 2014.


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Author’s Response: Of Roses, Serpents, and Circles: Fleshing out the Bones of Contention Sebastjan Vörös


> Upshot • Following a brief reflection

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on some terminological issues, I discuss the question of the (ir)rationality of nondualism, the two aspects of the conceptual dimension of phenomenologisation, and the potential of meditative/contemplative practices in cultivating its experiential/existential dimension. Also, I (re) emphasise that the two-pronged project of phenomenologisation is closely associated with the establishment of secondorder science, and purport to show why it might be an important addition to, and elaboration of, the overarching attempt to think and live the fundamental circularity between subject and object.

« 1 » I am not one to argue about words: philosophers tend to waste too much breath on matters of terminology and semantics, which – albeit important – all too often lead to disputes akin to the proverbial scholastic debate about how many angels can sit on the head of a pin. “What’s in a name?,” as Shakespeare so eloquently put it, and how right he was! Thus, I think it does not matter that much whether we designate the conceptual and paradigmatic shift within cognitive science as 4EA or 4E (Anna Ciaunica §1). Personally, I prefer the former version, as it explicitly mentions “affective,” an important, if frequently overlooked aspect of cognition, but some authors simply include the idea of “affectivity” under the heading of “embodiment” or “enaction,” so one might – for reasons of aesthetics or simplicity – also opt for the second version. In the last instance, there is not that much of a difference after all, and precarious historical circumstances will determine which of the two is likely to prevail. « 2 » But in one particular case, in the case of non-dualism, I feel that terminology does matter (although, admittedly, it still is not decisive), and would therefore insist on keeping the original notion and not substituting it (pace Peter Gaitsch §3) with the


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term “correlation.” Why? For at least two related reasons. First, the term “non-dualism” emphasises the pre- or trans-metaphysical nature of existential/experiential alterations that I allude to in this paper, and is therefore used as a nom de guerre (as Varela might have put it), standing in an explicit opposition to the line of thought insisting that “what there is” (“the Reality”) must be exhausted by one of the metaphysical alternatives that are currently on offer. Non-dualism, as the very name suggests, challenges this view, steering clear from both monist and dualist approaches to metaphysics and epistemology and insisting on radical metaphysical openness1. It is precisely for this reason that, as Gaitsch (§5) correctly assumes, my proposal is not to be interpreted in idealist terms (of any flavour). In fact, I strongly sympathise with the motivation behind, but not necessarily with the concrete realisation of, the “Heideggerian turn” from Husserlian phenomenology on the grounds that, due to the latter’s Cartesian overtones, it is bound to entangle itself in metaphysical speculations from which it so desperately tried to escape. But unlike Heidegger, I do not think that the move from transcendental to existential phenomenology necessitates a radical break, and see the two approaches as not only compatible, but as (in line with Merleau-Ponty) mutually enriching. In this perspective, the essential “cobelonging” between me and the world (the “co-emergence” and “co-arising” in Varelian terminology) occurs at the very level of being, at the level that precedes the subjectobject split of traditional metaphysics and epistemology. « 3 » This brings us to the second, and arguably more important, reason why I would like to retain the notion of nondualism. Namely, I propose that it be used as an umbrella term for a particular (and chronically understudied, but see Loy 1997) approach to philosophizing, an approach that can be found in disparate Western and Eastern traditions (if I may be permitted such 1 | Note that this does not mean that it is necessarily anti-metaphysical, as it may or may not conceive of metaphysical speculation as (probably) unavoidable, but not necessarily harmful or false, as long as one pays heed not to conflate “the map with the territory.”

a crude dichotomy), and whose main motivation is to circumvent the dichotomies that dominate the prevalent philosophical discourse. These traditions do not conceive of philosophy as an exclusively rational activity, but maintain that there is a close connection between thinking and being, conceptualisation and action: to philosophise, in this sense, is not so much, or at least not exclusively, a matter of thinking differently, but much more a matter of living and/or acting differently. This, of course, does not mean that such an approach is essentially ir- or antirational, for it might very well be that thinking differently is one of the most important (maybe even privileged?) means of initiating the more far-reaching experiential and existential changes. That is to say, it may, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, help us “rediscover the world in which we live, yet that we are always prone to forget” (MerleauPonty 2004: 39). This new (old?) way of seeing the world reminds us that metaphysics, as a fundamentally rational endeavour, is always a derivative phenomenon, drawing its sustenance from the more fundamental existential relations between a human being and the world, relations that are inextricably associated with the pre-reflective, embodied being-in-the-world, and form the crux of the non-dualist “betwixt”/“in-between” that I refer to in the paper. “Non-dualism,” in both its negative (signifying a move away from the traditionally legitimate conceptions of “Reality”) and positive aspects (emphasizing the existential dimension that precedes all metaphysical and epistemological thought), might thus serve as the minimal designation for a general (metaphysically open) background/horizon, against which the theoretical and practical dimensions of phenomenologisation are to take place.

Tertium non datur: Between rationality and irrationality

« 4 » This, however, raises an important question, one that is closely related to the issues posed by Camila Valenzuela-Moguillansky §12 and Susan Stuart §7, as to whether such endeavours are even compatible with the currently prevalent standards of rationality and the predominant conceptions of knowledge and truth, etc. To exemplify what I have in mind here, take Shunryu Suzuki’s portrayal of the relationship between mind


Author’s Response Sebastjan Vörös

and body, that old bone of contention within the contemporary philosophy of mind: This is the most important teaching: not two, “ and not one. Our body and mind are not two and not one. If you think your body and mind are two, that is wrong; if you think that they are one, that is also wrong. Our body and mind are both two and one. We usually think that if something is not one, it is more than one; if it is not singular, it is plural. But in actual experience, our life is not only plural, but also singular. (Suzuki 1995: 25)

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« 5 » Statements like these are likely to strike someone versed in Western (particularly analytic) philosophical tradition as utter nonsense. Why should anyone take them seriously? Do they have anything of relevance to teach us or are they merely cunning attempts at dodging metaphysical and epistemological bullets? « 6 » Let me try to address these questions with a short aside. I have always been surprised by the nonchalant air with which most analytic philosophers – a tradition I myself have been forged in – discredit the so-called “continental philosophy” in general and “phenomenology” in particular.2 How could anyone who has actually taken the time to read, say, Husserl or Merleau-Ponty claim that their work is impenetrable and obscure, while at the same time proclaiming the work of such authors as Quine or Kripke as clear and lucid? To be sure, all traditions have their ugly ducklings, and there are, indeed, some authors within the “continentalist camp,” who might be said to revel in “wilful obscurantism for the sake of an appearance of profundity” (Braver 2007: 7), but exceptions do not constitute the norm. Braver’s words are especially poignant in this context: Talk of analytic monopoly on such virtues as “ clarity or common sense is foolish; characteristics such as these are a matter of training and familiarity, not natural kinds. What one finds clear depends on one’s education and background knowledge; Samuel C. Wheeler writes of his surprise when Derrida told him that he had trouble following Kripke’s Naming and Necessity whereas he found Heidegger ‘very clear’. (ibid: 29)

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2 | A good example is Daniel Dennett’s Philosophical Lexicon, where the word “merleau-ponty” apparently stands for “confusion” (Hass 2008: 1).

« 7 » For the most part, authors – both inside and outside of the “continental tradition” – who resort to language that might seem, or even actually is, obscure, irrational, and even paradoxical do this for a special reason: having tested the more well-trodden paths of common sense and/or canons of legitimate forms of reasoning, and having established that they lead to philosophical precipices, crags, and other dead-ends, they set out to find new paths – paths that will probably strike those unfamiliar with the itinerary of previous travels as exotic and strange. But once the itinerary, along with its byways and detours, is brought out into the open, the seemingly cryptic terminology becomes much clearer. It is for this reason that, for instance, Merleau-Ponty, that avid opponent of “everything dualistic,” chose to (re) introduce such seemingly arcane notions as “the indeterminate,” “ambivalent presence,” “motor intentionality,” “physiognomy,” etc.; and the same might be said of Heidegger’s conceptions of “present-at-hand,” “readyto-hand,” “being-in-the-world,” “being-toward-death,” etc. One cannot expect to be able to cut into the “living flesh” – the preconceptual, pre-reflective fabric of being – and come up with the same neat structure that embellishes the rational edifice of contemporary science and philosophy. Further, one of the main reasons why all such attempts are bound to be labelled elusive and vague is that they were chosen in order to unearth the very foundations of this edifice, i.e., that which “rational thought,” with its need for “control, certainty, and objectivity” (Valenzuela-Moguillansky §12), always tacitly presupposes and accepts as self-evident. « 8 » Thus, instead of saying that the ideas of authors engaged in such a critical and reformative endeavour are vague, it would be more appropriate to say that they are as clear as the “subject matter” they are trying to address permits them to be. Is Heidegger being obscure and irrational when he searches for new ways of thinking and talking about our relationship with the world, a relationship more profound and elementary than the subject-object split of the classical metaphysics? He might perhaps be criticised for not having succeeded in solving the task he had set out to solve – i.e., by pointing out that Heideggerian terminology, although initially a legitimate

attempt to find a balance between “revealing” and “concealing,” ultimately ended up as a prisoner of its own phrasemes and philosophemes – but it would be intellectually unfair to discredit it as “irrational.” In fact, “norms of rationality” seem to be based on an array of tacit metaphysical and epistemological positions (e.g., in the analytic tradition, a tacit acceptance of epistemological dualism based on “commonsense empiricism” and a tout court denial of historicist tendencies prevalent in most strands of “continental thought,” cf. Braver 2007; Hylton 1990). If anything, the criticism could be reversed: is it not philosophically naïve and scientifically suspect to not only ignore one’s basic presuppositions, but actively conceal them, and impose them upon others as the only (and this, I think, is the major issue) valid standard of doing science and philosophy? Merleau-Ponty, in his relentless criticism of the “prejudice of objective thought,” points out that philosophers and scientists who “take for granted, without explicitly mentioning it, the other point of view, namely that of consciousness, through which from the outset a world forms itself round me and begins to exist for me,” have embraced a “form of perception that loses sight of its origins and believes itself complete” (Merleau-Ponty 2002: ix, 66). Note that this does not necessarily entail a radical relativism of the Feyerabendian “anything goes” type3: it is true that, given the historicity of knowledge, the task of uncovering the experiential and existential structures of a human being may, indeed, be endless, but this does not mean that it is arbitrary. What is called for, is not a de(con)struction of all traditional modes of, and approaches to, knowledge, truth, and so on, but a constructive (perhaps even constructivist?) criticism of their background assumptions, with an 3 | But let us not throw out the baby with the bath water: it has become commonplace to discredit a given position by the mere mention of Feyerabend’s name; and although I disagree with the air of radical relativism that pervades his work and find some of his provocative claims uncalled for, I still believe that Feyerabend’s criticism has a lot of merit. It is all too easy to discredit truths uttered by a saint or a madman on account of their being conveyed in an incomprehensible, offensive, and/or vulgar manner.


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explicit aim of broadening and incorporating them into a more coherent picture of human being and the world. « 9 » Returning to the example quoted at the beginning of the section, I believe Varela et al. are right in pointing out that from Descartes on


the guiding question in Western philosophy “ has been whether body and mind are one or two

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distinct substances (properties, levels of description, etc.) and what the ontological relationship between them is. […] We are suggesting that Descartes’ conclusion that he was a thinking thing was the product of his question, and that question was a product of specific practices – those of disembodied, unmindful [i.e., rational, abstract] reflection. […] [But] theoretical reflection need not be mindless and disembodied […] the mindbody relation or modality is not simply fixed and given but can be fundamentally changed. (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991: 28)

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« 10 » Standards of rationality determine not only what counts as legitimate answers, but also, and more importantly, what counts as legitimate questions. A real “dodging of the bullet” is thus not taking recourse in seemingly (?) paradoxical (non-dualist) language à la Suzuki, but in adopting a strategy that precludes all possibility of critically reflecting upon, and engaging with, one’s presuppositions, or of modifying or supplementing them appropriately.

The two faces of phenomenologisation

« 11 » In light of these considerations, I would now like to (re)turn to the problem of phenomenologisation, focusing first on its conceptual/theoretical aspects, and then, in the next section, briefly expanding upon its experiential/existential dimensions. A good starting point would be a question raised by Ciaunica (§1, footnote 1) about what exactly does the idea of phenomenologisation refer to – “nature” or “naturalism”? My answer would be: both. « 12 » Firstly, and more narrowly, phenomenologisation as pertaining to nature entails the reconceptualisation of the concept of nature (roughly) along the lines of, but not necessarily limited to, the reconceptualisation of cognition that is being currently carried out under the aegis of the 4EA approach


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in cognitive science. The exact nature of this reconceptualisation (pun, again, intended) is, of course, unclear, but some of the proposals made by Varela (Weber & Varela 2002), Thompson (2007, 2011), and Barbaras (2008, 2012, 2013),4 drawing on phenomenological authors such as Merleau-Ponty, Jonas, and Simondon (another name worth exploring in this context would be Plessner), seem to offer a promising starting point. Note that the prospect of the phenomenologisation of nature (pace Stuart §3.1, §§5–10) does not depend on the absolute validity of the 4EA approach: I have no intention of arguing that 4EA portrays the “correct picture of things” – in fact, I have strong inprinciple reservations about any absolutist claims of this nature – but merely that (as acknowledged in §4) it provides a move in the right direction (if compared to previous [GOFAI] conceptions of cognition). So, should it turn out that the 4EA model completely misses the mark, this would not change the major points of the article, but would merely lay more stress on the need to construct appropriate models for conceptualizing the “non-dualist betwixt” of the lived experience. However, I do not think that such a dire scenario is very likely: in fact, I feel that the theoretical openness characteristic of the current 4EA movement is not directly (at least not in all of its segments) opposed to, but might actually find room for, the highly interesting “enkinaesthetic field” model proposed by Stuart (§§7–10). Namely, differences between the two approaches do not seem to be a matter of type, but of degree, with Stuart’s proposal opting for a radicalisation of the notion of embodiment (“So, whilst 4EA claims to be radical in its embodiment, one might object that it is not radical enough” [my emphasis]), and not for a radical departure from its fundamental presuppositions. « 13 » Secondly, and more importantly, phenomenologisation as pertaining to naturalisation entails: (i) the integration of the modified (“phenomenologised”) concept of nature into the edifice of natural sciences and the examination of how this would af4 | Cf. also the presentation “Skizze zur phänomenologische Biologie” by Peter Gaitsch at the Werkstatt Phänomenologie, Vienna 24 October 2014.

fect its different (sub)disciplines and areas of research, i.e., what implications would the reconceptualisation of nature at large have for individual disciplines and their objects of study; and (ii) an in-depth critique of metaphysical and epistemological foundations of the scientific edifice. It is crucial that this last step be carried out in a systematic, productive, and interdisciplinary fashion. First, it needs to be systematic in the sense that it should not be exhausted by paying customary lip service to Husserl’s and/or Merleau-Ponty’s laments about the dishonesty and naïveté of science. Instead of clichéd references to such sentiments, they should be used as a starting point for rigorous analyses of the sciences, i.e., the discussion should not revolve around the question of what Husserl and Merleau-Ponty (actually) said about natural sciences, but should focus on how their insights might be creatively integrated into a more comprehensive and far-reaching critical endeavour (for instance, in the vein sketched by Thompson 2007; Zahavi 2010). Secondly, the criticism must be productive in the sense that, unlike Heidegger’s radical rejection of science, the goal should be more akin to Merleau-Ponty’s vision of a productive interrelationship between phenomenology and natural sciences, paving the way towards a conception of science that is mindful of its presuppositions, origins, and limitations, as well as of its embeddedness in other modes of knowing and being (cf. Zahavi 2010). And thirdly, it is important for such a critique to be carried out in an interdisciplinary fashion, i.e., that it pay heed to other traditions and disciplines that have dared to undertake such perilous errands. One of these traditions, as I have tried to point out in the target article, is second-order cybernetics, whose sharp criticism of the classical conception of natural sciences as a via regia to “the view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) seems to be of special relevance in this context (see also Stuart, §5). I believe that there are several intriguing, and as of yet unexplored, points of contact (as there are, of course, major differences) between the insights of phenomenology and second-order cybernetics that might provide for stimulating further research. « 14 » Thus construed, the process of phenomenologisation seems to be closely related to the general idea of second-order


Author’s Response Sebastjan Vörös

science. On the one hand, phenomenologisation as pertaining to nature entails a radical shift from “the science of observed systems” to the “science of observing systems,” as it puts the “observer” (however construed) at the centre of the “epistemic stage.” On the other hand, phenomenologisation as pertaining to natural sciences emphasises the need for a meta-reflection on the basic assumptions of natural sciences (the so-called “science of science”). What is more, the process of phenomenologisation might – by introducing some useful insights from the field of phenomenology (especially about how to conceptualise and approach the pre-reflective life-world) – help to flesh out the occasionally vacuous or ossified calls of this nature. It would, of course, be naïve to expect that a project of phenomenologisation – the “second-order turn” – could be “carried out on the cheap,” as Chalmers might put it, and a critical engagement with the received conceptions of nature and natural sciences is likely to bring about important changes in how we understand and approach them. Needless to say, concrete studies incorporating phenomenological and neuroscientific approaches, such as the one mentioned by Ciaunica (§4), are a welcome contribution to the overall project, but as rightly pointed out by Gaitsch (§6), it is only after a more radical (fundamental) reconceptualisation will have taken place that we will be able to “cash in” such “small change.”

Mysticism de-mystified: Steps towards a lived epoché

« 15 » In this last section I would like to expound briefly on some of the suggestions about the possibility of existentially anchoring the non-dualist betwixt. For even if the reconceptualisation of nature and natural sciences were to prove successful, on a personal level – i.e., for me (as a philosopher, scientist, human being of flesh and blood) – the old dualities that haunt traditional metaphysics and epistemology would continue to be a problem. A conceptual shift might be the first, and perhaps crucial, step in the existential transformation, but it remains merely the first step; and as long as this modification is not realised at the level of the whole being, there is bound to remain an “experiential/existential chasm” that I

will find myself constantly sliding into. To quote Thompson once again: It’s one thing to have a scientific representa“ tion of the mind as ‘enactive’ – as embodied, emergent, and relational; as not homuncular and skull-bound; and thus in a certain sense insubstantial. But it’s another thing to have a corresponding direct experience of this nature of the mind in one’s own first-person case. (Thompson 2004: 382)

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« 16 » In searching for ways of instantiating these experiential/existential changes, I took recourse to meditative/contemplative (mystical) traditions. I am well aware that, for some, bringing forth the “old chestnut of meditation” (Stuart §3.3) might be a bit of a disappointment, but there are at least two good reasons for my doing so. First of all, meditative/contemplative traditions were at the centre of my previous studies (see Vörös 2013a, 2013b), and are therefore something I am fairly familiar with. This is not, of course, to say that there are no other practices that might be of use in bringing about similar experiential/existential changes, e.g., “improvisation skills in music,” “dance” or “drawing” (Valenzuela-Moguillansky §13), and even “non-manipulative [osteopathic] listening techniques,” “the Alexander technique” or “natural horsemanship” (Stuart §§12–15). If I do not mention these, it is not out of spite, but out of ignorance: I know too little about them to be able to offer a competent assessment of their potential merits. « 17 » Secondly, I believe that, despite all the “mindfulness hype” that we have witnessed in the past few years, the essential nature of these practices – their embodied and existential aspects – has not yet been sufficiently explored. Too much emphasis has been placed on conceiving of meditation as a set of techniques aimed at pacifying the mind, and not as a set of dynamic practices for embodying profound (and potentially unsettling, even terrifying) experiential/existential insights. Careful phenomenological and existential studies, drawing on e.g., Husserl’s ideas about epoché and phenomenological reduction, Heidegger’s views on anxiety and being-in-the-world, and Merleau-Ponty’s conceptions of embodiment, coupled with in-depth analyses

of traditional contemplative/meditative texts, might yield a much more coherent picture of these practices and their corresponding experiential/existential changes. « 18 » Let me just very briefly illustrate what I have in mind by means of the first example. Husserl, it will be remembered, emphasised the need to “bracket” the socalled “natural attitude” of our everyday engagement with the world, and adopt the “unnatural attitude” that would enable us to penetrate the thick layers of our unreflected (common-sense, scientific, etc.) presuppositions and “return to the things themselves” (to what is originally given). However, not only was his proposed solution, the (in)famous phenomenological reduction, believed to be incredibly strenuous (thus its un-naturalness), but it also remained primarily an intellectual endeavour (or, put more mildly, there was a pronounced “intellectualist air” about it). Meditative/contemplative traditions seem to have established a platform for a prolonged and sustained cultivation of this “unnatural attitude,” construed not only as an intellectual exercise, but predominantly as an experiential tapping into the non-dual mode of existence, i.e., as a transformed mode of experiencing/being that enables us to not only think epoché (phenomenological “bracketing”), but actually live it. Moreover, mystical texts often contain claims to the effect that what might prima facie seem to be an unnatural attitude (living/experiencing in-and-through nonduality) is, in fact, our most fundamental (primordial?) existential attitude, whereas the natural (naïve, everyday) attitude that most of us feel so comfortable with turns out to be derived and secondary. « 19 » By mentioning the old chestnut of meditation, I was thus also trying to hint at the need to crack yet another (chest)nut that has been rolling about in the academic basket, namely the (chest)nut of mysticism. All too often the word “mysticism” is used as a synonym for “everything irrational,” thereby precluding the much needed critical inquiry into the phenomenon. But given the potential of mystical traditions to shed light on the existential/experiential aspects mentioned above, I feel that this bias will eventually have to be overcome and superseded by comprehensive studies on the matter (cf. Vörös 2013b).


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Conclusion: “Ensoing” the uroboros

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« 20 » The process of phenomenologisation can be summed up as an attempt to (re)think and (re)live the fundamental circularity between the human being and the world. In a sense, of course, it is neither particularly novel nor particularly original – but then again, all (Western) philosophy is said to be nothing but a footnote to Plato. Yet what might perhaps set it apart from certain other proposals of a similar nature is its insistence on “going back to the beginnings” and to explicate, or at least emphasise the need to explicate, what has so far been mostly noted in passing (the image of “Socratic gadfly” comes to mind). Approximately 10 years ago, in his tribute article to Varela, Thompson wrote the following: If I may be bold, I think that although the ideas “ about embodied cognition in this book [The Embodied Mind; a book he co-authored with Varela and Rosch] have been widely acknowledged and assimilated by the field, the book’s central theme has yet to be fully absorbed. That theme is the need for back-and-forth circulation between scientific research on the mind and disciplined phenomenologies of lived experience. (Thompson 2004: 382)

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« 21 » A scientist who is trying to penetrate the secrets of nature is a central part of that very nature she is trying to study; her studies of nature are thus always also selfstudies. This is reminiscent of the main postulate of second-order cybernetics: First order cybernetics separates the subject “ from the object and refers to an assumed world ‘out there.’ Second order cybernetics or cybernetics of cybernetics is itself circular. You learn to un-


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derstand yourself as a part of the world that you wish to observe […] [D]escriptions always contain an element of self-description. (Foerster & Poerksen 2002: 110)

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« 22 » Phenomenology, with its thorough accounts of, and ingenious methods of gaining access to, the experiential/existential structure of the “observer” (a topic that has not received enough attention in the classical second-order cybernetics), could thus be seen as an important addition to, and elaboration of, the overarching project of trying to think about and live the fundamental circularity between subject and object. As already mentioned, the two-pronged process of phenomenologisation might help to construct a second-order science that would be both “observer-dependent” (phenomenologisation of nature) as well as “selfreferential” (phenomenologisation of naturalism). But even more importantly, it might do this not only on the conceptual, but also on the existential/experiential level. « 23 » Before there can be a (separate) object of study, there is a (prereflective) unity that underlies any such (theoretical) separation. For this reason, it is crucial not only to bring into the open, but also to reflect upon and cultivate, the existential flesh and bones that underlie the theoretical attitude embraced by the natural sciences, and to elucidate how they impinge on their construal of nature, mind, and consciousness. In other words, for us to be able to truly appreciate the fundamental circularity between scientia and experientia, it is imperative that we really “grab the [epistemic] serpent by its tail”: in addition to the “small change” that has been steadily accumulating in the 4EA movement, it is important not to lose sight of this much more elemental and

radical philosophical undertaking. The idea of non-duality that lies at the centre of this paper is not to be construed as yet another model (of cognition, life, etc.), but as the “groundless ground” or the infinite horizon from which all models (even the model of phenomenologisation) emerge. The existential cultivation of non-duality thus does not purport to be able to produce any special type of “small change” (cf. Gaitsch §8), but merely wants to (groundlessly) “ground” the validity (“evidentiality”) of all such small change. « 24 » Construed in this sense, phenomenologisation is to be understood primarily as engagement with in-betweens. The view from nowhere, conceived as the annihilation of the subjective and the absolutisation of the objective part of the epistemic equation, must give way to the view in and through nowhere, conceived as ways of conceptualising and cultivating the lived betwixt – that vibrant nothingness in which the on-going existential dance between the subject and the object takes place. While it might perhaps be granted that the metaphor of Uroboros, “a metaphor of rebirth, renewal, and re-emergence,” captures some aspects of this circular, dynamic process, as claimed by Stuart (§16), I would still maintain that, at best, it captures its conceptual aspects, i.e., the absence of all epistemic/metaphysical Archimedean points and the corresponding need for perpetual re-beginnings, while its existential aspects, i.e., the experiential situatedness in this non-dualist vacuo, elude it, and are much more poignantly depicted by the metaphor of the ensō. But then again – what’s in a name? Received: 3 November 2014 Accepted: 6 November 2013


Combined References Sebastjan Vörös

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of Related interest Naturalizing Phenomenology This book aims to shed new light on the relations between Husserlian phenomenology and the presentday efforts toward a scientific theory of cognition – with its complex structure of disciplines, levels of explanation, and conflicting hypotheses. What clearly emerges is that Husserlian phenomenology cannot become instrumental in developing cognitive science without undergoing a substantial transformation. Therefore, the central concern of this book is not only the progress of contemporary theories of cognition but also the reorientation of Husserlian phenomenology. Naturalizing Phenomenology. Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science edited by Jean Petitot, Franscisco J. Varela, Barnard Pacoud & Jean-Michel Roy. Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, 1999. ISBN 978-0804736107. 672 pages.


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