Yet from this one inconsistency, Tillich's Systematic Theology is not torn asunder.
Rather, I will ... Tillich's systematic theology presents one moment of dialectical.
Trevor Knapp HCT III Prof. Charles Wilson 11/29/12 Thou art just, oh Lord! A paradox, according to Tillich, is not irrational or illogical. Paradox is that which contradicts the whole of human experience. Tillich argues that there is only one fundamental paradox of the Christian faith: “Jesus who is the Christ.” It is completely contrary to human experience that essence and existence could be combined into a New Being, yet this marvelous event has occurred in Jesus. Jesus suffered, doubted, and was tempted, all without breaking unity with God. The paradox, according to Tillich, is that Jesus could be real and sinless at the same time. In contrast, Tillich argues that sin is “irrational, not paradoxical.”1 Presumably the meaninglessness of sin makes it irrational: it is completely unintelligible for Tillich that what is (existence) could be separated from what ought to be (essence). I will argue in this paper that Tillich presents a seeming inconsistency in his work by categorizing sin as irrational, and then attempting to provide theodicy. If Tillich truly believed that sin was irrational, he would not attempt to rationalize sin via a theodicy. Yet from this one inconsistency, Tillich’s Systematic Theology is not torn asunder. Rather, I will argue that the seeming inconsistency in Tillich’s work foreshadows a more complex and nuanced position. Tillich’s systematic theology presents one moment of dialectical conversation, from the perspective of a contrite sinner. Certainly sin appears irrational from the perspective of a contrite sinner, and certainly the New Being appears paradoxical from that perspective. Yet for those unrepentant sinners, it is the other way around. For an unrepentant sinner, sin is paradoxical and the New Being is illogical and unnecessary. Accordingly, there are really two paradoxical moments in the Christian faith: sin and the New Being. Once it is recognized that both sin and the New Being have paradoxical moments, a third perspective develops. While Tillich’s system shows an apparent tension between the inexplicable nature of sin and an attempted theodicy, this tension quickly resolves itself into a more complex and nuanced position. The third perspective goes beyond that of the unrepentant sinner, and the contrite sinner. In a dialectic move, the third position erases all paradoxes, finding a synthetic unity between sin and the New Being. The third perspective might be recognized as mature 1
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Christian faith, or equivalently the faith of those who have actually begun to participate in the New Being. Borrowing the terminology of 1 John 2, if unrepentant sinners are but “babes” in faith, and contrite sinners are “young men” of faith, then the third perspective must be “fathers” of faith. This paper will first argue that Tillich’s categorization of sin as irrational is inconsistent with his theodicy. By attempting a theodicy, Tillich has presented a rational view of sin, and accordingly ought not to also present sin as irrational. Second, this paper will explore the nature of paradox in Tillich’s theology, and explain why both the New Being and sin have a paradoxical dimension. Third, I will propose a third synthetic position as the resolution of Tillich’s inconsistency in which neither sin nor the New Being is properly a paradox. Part I – It is inconsistent to view sin as irrational and also compatible with a just God Tillich argues that sin is “irrational,” but also proposes a rational defense of God’s noninvolvement in sin. This section will show that it is inconsistent to accept the irrationality of sin and also attempt to explain it. Essentially, if sin has no ultimate purpose (i.e. sin is irrational), then one cannot escape the problem of evil, and accordingly one cannot rationally justify the ways of God before man. If sin is irrational, the problem of evil is an efficacious argument, and theodicy fails. On the other hand, if there is a teleological value to sin, then sin is compatible with a just God. There is no middle ground on this issue: either sin is rational and can be reconciled with a just God, or sin is irrational and cannot be reconciled with a just God. Tillich more often speaks of estrangement than of sin. According to Tillich “The state of existence is the state of estrangement.”2 Estrangement is the deviation of what is (existence) from what ought to be (essence). Tillich chooses to use the language of estrangement because it more properly reflects the metaphysical meaning of sin: “the word ‘estrangement’ itself implies a reinterpretation of sin from a religious point of view.”3 Tillich would not advise Christians to stop using the language of sin altogether, though, because sin implies the “personal act of turning away from that to which one belongs.”4 Ultimately, Tillich defines sin as falling short of what was meant to be.
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Tillich, pg 44 Tillich, pg 46 4 Tillich, pg 46 3
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For those who have fallen victim to another’s sin, the idea of a just and loving God may seem irreconcilable with the actuality of sin. A good example of this can be found from amongst the atrocities committed during World War II. Many of the survivors of Nazi internment refuse to attribute any ultimate purpose to their suffering. It is unthinkable that the extreme suffering caused during World War II could somehow be ultimately “worth it.” In fact, the mere idea of reconciliation is an affront to justice. No one expresses the agony of this position better than Ivan Karamozov: When the mother embraces the fiend who threw her child to the dogs, and all three cry aloud with tears “thou art just, O Lord!” then, of course, the crown of knowledge will be reached and all will be made clear. But what pulls me up here is that I can’t accept that harmony… I, too, perhaps, may cry aloud with the rest, looking at the mother embracing the child’s torturer, “thou art just O Lord!” but I don’t want to cry aloud then.5 Like Ivan Karamazov, if we find that sin cannot be ultimately justified, we have decided that sin is irrational. Sin is completely inscrutable, undirected, and without meaning. Any attempt to give meaning to sin is an affront to justice. To think that sin might somehow, some day, be reconciled is unfathomable, unjustifiable, and ultimately irrational. It appears that Tillich agrees with this account: The transition from essence to existence, from the potential to the actual, from dreaming innocence to existential guilt and tragedy, is irrational. In spite of its universality, this transition is not rational; in the last analysis it is irrational. We encounter the irrationality of this transition from essence to existence in everything, and its presence is irrational, not paradoxical. It is undeniable fact which must be accepted, although it contradicts the essential structure of everything created6 For Tillich, sin is only known through experience. Sin is irrational because it is meaningless, and without purpose. In the final analysis, sin is inscrutable and unexplainable. Certainly Tillich’s argument would be consistent if it ended there. If Tillich were content to admit the irrationality of sin, thus admitting the irresolvable nature of the problem of evil, it might retain some semblance of consistency. At least then Tillich would have sidestepped the problem of evil by admitting a lack of understanding. But Tillich does no such thing! Tillich endorses the affront to justice which Ivan Karamazov finds so detestable. Tillich attempts a
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Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, pg 268, italics added Tillich, pg 91
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theodicy through freedom, which completely undermines the irrationality of sin. By explaining sin, Tillich treats sin as something which can be examined rationally. Tillich writes: If one is asked how a loving and almighty God can permit evil, one cannot answer in terms of the question as it was asked. One must first insist on an answer to the question “How could he permit sin?” – A question which is answered the moment it is asked. Not permitting sin would mean not permitting freedom; this would deny the very nature of man, his finite freedom.7 According to Tillich, sin is unexplainable and irrational, but sin is also compatible with a just and loving God. It seems that Tillich is attempting to have his cake and eat it too: if sin can be reconciled with a just and omnipotent God, then sin is rational. On the other hand, if sin cannot be reconciled with a just and omnipotent God, then sin is incomprehensible. Tillich attempts to argue that sin is irrational AND that God is just and omnipotent. Both of these tasks simply cannot be done coherently and consistently! Part II – For unrepentant sinners, sin has paradoxical dimensions and the New Being is unnecessary. For repentant sinners, sin is irrational and the New Being is paradoxical. For many theologians, a paradox is something irrational or absurd. In response to the absurdity of the Christian faith, Tertullian is vicariously8 famous for saying “credo quia absurdum,” or I believe because it is absurd. Yet as a rational theologian, talking about the absurd is always painful and potentially excruciating. If Christianity is absurd or irrational, why believe it? Even asking the question “why?” seeks a logical justification, thereby making impossible any contentment between rational folk and absurdist theologians. In comparison, Tillich seeks to reclaim the etymological roots of the word paradox, as an attempt to salvage the paradox for rational theological use. Paradox comes from the root words of para and doxa, meaning “contrary to popular opinion.” Accordingly, Tillich relexicalizes a paradox as that which contradicts “the whole of human experience.”9 Under Tillich’s redefinition, paradox is neither irrational nor absurd. In fact, Tillich differentiates a paradox from 5 other logical categories; the paradox needs to be differentiated from “the reflective-rational, the
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Tillich, pg 61 Apparently Tertullian is not the originator of the expression “credo quia absurdum,” though he made similar statements. For instance, Tertullian wrote “certum est, quia impossibile” or “the fact [of Christ’s resurrection] is certain because it is impossible” (Placher 47). 9 Tillich, pg 92 8
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dialectical-rational, the irrational, the absurd, and the nonsensical.”10 We will paraphrase and enlarge upon Tillich’s aforementioned categories. In so doing, it will become clear that sin and the New Being are very similar categorically. Depending on the perspective from which sin and the New being are approached, I will show that each has both a paradoxical dimension and an irrational dimension. Paradox is not reflective-rational: Something is reflective-rational if it is subject to the tools of rational thought. For instance, mathematics is reflective-rational. The closed system of mathematical axioms and conclusions is only subject to the rules of formal logic, and needs no outside verification or proof. A paradox, in contrast, uses the tools of formal logic to show the inadequacies of formal logic. A paradox does not entirely reject the rules of formal logic, but is also not subject to the rules of formal logic. Accordingly, paradoxes are not reflective-rational. Both sin and the New Being must be differentiated from the reflective-rational. Sin and the New Being can only be known through experience. Sin cannot be rationally predicted, not can it be rationally accounted for. In the same way, one cannot expect the New Being, nor can one rule out the possibility of New Being entirely. Any attempt to constrain sin or the New Being into a closed system of logic ultimately fails. Sin will always overcome our greatest hopes, and the New Being will always overcome our greatest despair. At best, as will be suggested in the next section, sin and the New Being might be dealt with in a dialectical-rational manner. As sin and the New Being destroy our previously constructed rationalizations, dialectic processes remain flexible. Regardless, sin and the New Being cannot be treated from a reflexive-rational perspective. Paradox is not dialectical-rational: Paradox illustrates the downfall of formal logic, whereas the dialectical-rational seeks to reconcile the rational with itself. Paradox is the first move, whereby the weakness of formal logic is established. The dialectical-rational is the precarious reestablishment of formal logic, where logic is employed to resolve the “inner tensions” of reality.11 Tillich believes that the doctrine of the trinity is a good example of dialectical doctrine: It must be stated with great emphasis that Trinitarian thinking is dialectical and in this sense rational, not paradoxical. This implies a relation in God between the infinite and the finite. God is infinite insofar as he is the creative ground of the finite and eternally produces the finite potentialities in himself. The finite does not 10 11
Tillich pg 90 Tillich, pg 90
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limit him but belongs to the eternal power of his life. All this is dialectical and rational in character.12 Trinitarian thinking is dialectical because it provides a rational reinterpretation of what would otherwise be contradiction. Paradox is the problem, whereas dialectics are the attempted solution. Paradoxes reveal the continual inadequacy of formal logic, whereas the dialecticalrational attempts to reconcile that inadequacy. From this vein of thought, it is clear that neither sin nor the New Being is properly dialectical-rational. Instead, both sin and the New Being function as paradoxes. For the unrepentant sinner, sin is the paradox not the solution to a paradox. For the repentant sinner, the New Being is the paradox not the solution to a paradox. While neither sin nor the New Being should be considered a dialectical, the two paradoxes work together to inspire paradoxical thinking. As I will later argue, the only way to reconcile sin with the New Being is through dialectical thinking. If it is indeed possible to approach sin and the New Being in a dialectical manner, the paradoxical and irrational dimensions of each can be recast in a new light wherein the two appear semi-rational. Paradox is not the absurd, and paradox is not non-sense: The absurd lies in contradiction of the meaningful order of reality; it is “the neighborhood of the grotesque and the ridiculous.”13 Non-sense is merely a meaningless combination of words and phrases. Instead paradox illuminates reality through the downfall of formal logic. Sin and the New Being are not meaningless words, nor things which contradict the order of reality. Instead, sin and the New Being are only realized through experience, thereby separating them from the absurd and nonsensical. Paradox is not the irrational: If something is irrational, it does not merely resist rationalization. Instead, the irrational completely nullifies the rational, making it useless, making it tragedy. Tillich’s primary example of the irrational is sin, though I have already argued that this is inconsistent with his theodicy. Tillich argues that: the transition from essence to existence, from the potential to the actual, from dreaming innocence to existential guilt and tragedy, is irrational. In spite of its universality, this transition is not rational; in the last analysis it is irrational. We encounter the irrationality of this transition from essence to existence in everything, and its presence is irrational, not paradoxical. It is undeniable fact 12 13
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which must be accepted, although it contradicts the essential structure of everything created.14 This paragraph is written for all of the Ivan Karamazovs of this world. Tillich is willing to admit that the state of estrangement cannot be explained; Tillich is willing to concede that the problem of evil argument is an unsolvable problem. As humans, we know that sin exists through experience and observation, though we cannot offer any suitable explanation for why sin exists. Man’s continual existence in sin and continual inability to rationalize sin is what Tillich calls the tragic destiny of man. From the tragic vantage point, any attempt to reconcile sin is an affront to justice. Ivan Karamazov is the prime example of humanity’s tragic destiny because he longs for sin to be reconciled, yet finds his own hope of reconciliation atrocious and unjustifiable. Yet for every Ivan Karamazov there is a Fyodor Karamazov; for every person who fully recognizes sin, there is someone completely oblivious to sin. Before the Christian realizes his existence in sin, pride is the overwhelming reality. For the unrepentant sinner, sin is the paradox. Fyodor Karamazov is perhaps the best example of the unrepentant sinner. Fyodor Karamazov is so oblivious to his own sin that every attempt to reveal it only convinces him of his own humility. In speaking before a group of pious monks, Fyodor explains his buffoonery by saying “I play the fool … to make myself agreeable.”15 At first Fyodor Karamazov appears comical, though the comedy quickly turns to tragedy as Fyodor takes a false position of humility before a group of pious monks: When you said just now, ‘don’t be ashamed of yourself, for that is at the root of it all,’ you pierced right through me by that remark, and read me to the core. Indeed, I always feel when I meet people that I am lower than all, and that they all take me for a buffoon. So I say, ‘Let me really play the buffoon. I am not afraid of your opinion, for you are every one of you worse than I am.’ That is why I am a buffoon. It is from shame, great elder, from shame; it’s simply oversensitiveness that makes me rowdy. If I had only been sure that every one would accept me as the kindest and wisest of men, oh, Lord, what a good man I should have been then!16 Though Fyodor Karamazov’s rhetoric appears humble, the intelligent reader pierces through his false sense of humility. While Fyodor Karamazov might appear to be humble in admitting his sin, Fyodor’s words are actually a sign of pride: he claims that “for you are every one of you 14
Tillich, pg 91 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, pg 39 16 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, pg 42 15
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worse than I am.” Fyodor blames external circumstances for his buffoonery: he thinks that if he were loved and respected first, he would be capable of virtue. Yet the monks do treat him with respect, and he still plays the buffoon. In a strange twist of irony, Fyodor’s false sense of selfrighteousness is revealed through his exterior sense of humility. By pretending to be humble, Fyodor is actually claiming superiority over the monks. He later has the gall to ask “Is there room for my humility beside your pride?”17 Fyodor is the only person who cannot see his pride for what it is; in some sense, it might be said that Fyodor is lying to himself. When the priests attempt to show Fyodor Karamazov his pride, Fyodor remains entirely oblivious to his own sin, and only receives the monk’s best intentions with contempt: “Above all, [Fyodor Karamazov,] don’t lie to yourself … The man who lies to himself can be more easily offended than anyone. You know it is sometimes very pleasant to take offense, isn’t it? A man may know that nobody has insulted him, but that he has invented the insult for himself, has lied and exaggerated to make it picturesque, has caught at a word and made a mountain out of a molehill- he knows that himself yet he will be the first to take offense, and will revel in his resentment till he feels great pleasure in it, and so pass to genuine vindictiveness” … Fyodor Pavlovitch skipped up, and imprinted a rapid kiss on the elder’s thin hand. “It is, it is pleasant to take offense. You said that so well, as I never heard it before. Yes, I have been all my life taking offense, to please myself, taking offense on esthetic grounds, for it is not so much pleasant as distinguished sometimes to be insulted- that you had forgotten, great elder, it is distinguished!”18 Even in his humility, Fyodor is impossibly captivated by sin! When the elder rebukes him, Fyodor Karamazov completely misses the point of the rebuke, taking the rebuke as an insult and thereby justifying his sin to himself! Fyodor Karamazov is possibly the ultimate example of sin’s paradoxical dimension. Nothing can shake Fyodor’s unshakeable sense of humility, not even reproach. For the Christian who is captivated by pride, sin is unexpected and contrary to experience. For the unrepentant sinner, sin is the paradox, not the New Being! As we have said, the irrational is that which utterly destroys reason. While sin might appear irrational to the unrepentant sinner, and not paradoxical, sin takes on a paradoxical dimension for the unrepentant sinner. On the other hand, the New Being appears illogical to the unrepentant sinner. For Fyodor Karamazov’s extreme pride, what purpose could a New Being serve? To Fyodor Karamazov, the New Being would only appear like the pious monks who he 17 18
Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, pg 45 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, pg 43
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holds in contempt, except all the more contemptible. By taking a true posture of humility, the New Being unmasks Fyodor’s posture of false humility, forcing Fyodor to confront his own sin or to find insult in the New Being. Fyodor Karamazov could only resent a New Being. Fyodor Karamazov can no more understand the New Being than Ivan Karamazov can understand the teleological value of sin. In the final judgment, Fyodor Karamazov would find the entire concept of the New Being irrational and unnecessary. In summary, the irrational is that which completely destroys the work of reason. Tillich lists sin as the prime example of the irrational, which is true for the repentant sinner. But for the proud, the New Being is irrational and sin is the paradox. What Paradox is: Tillich provides a positive definition of paradox. “We must state in affirmative terms that the concept [of paradox] should be understood in terms of the literal sense of the word. That is paradoxical which contradicts the doxa, the opinion which is based on the whole of ordinary human experience, including the empirical and the rational.”19 Accordingly, a paradox is that which consistently affronts the human experience, that which consistently forces humans to rethink themselves. I have argued that sin and the New Being are paradoxical to differing audiences. To the unrepentant sinner, sin is a paradox. Sin is constantly a surprise to the proud, and perpetually contrary to common opinion. To the unrepentant sinner, the New Being is illogical. Being unable to recognize his own sin, the unrepentant sinner sees the New Being as unnecessary, and in that sense illogical. To the contrite sinner, the New Being is a paradox. For the humble, the New Being contradicts the ubiquitous experience of sin. When convinced of sin, participation in the New Being is contrary to the known. Yet out of compassion, the contrite sinner must maintain the illogicality of sin. To do otherwise would be an affront to justice. We find that there are irrational and paradoxical dimensions to both the New Being and sin. Considered from the perspective of a contrite sinner, the New Being is paradoxical and sin is irrational. Considered from the perspective of an unrepentant sinner, sin is paradoxical and the New Being is irrational. Having identified these two perspectives we seek a third position which goes beyond the unrepentant and contrite sinner. 19
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Part III – There are three stages of Christian life, which are separated by the two paradoxical dimensions of Christianity: sin and the New Being. The first stage is the unrepentant sinner. The second stage is the contrite sinner. The third stage is mature Christianity. We have thus far spoken of two stages of Christian development, the “babes” in faith and the “young men” of faith. We have compared the “babes” in faith to the character of Fyodor Karamazov, and the “young men” of faith to Ivan Karamazov. From each of these perspectives, Christianity presents a paradox. For Fyodor Karamazov, the paradox is sin. For Ivan Karamazov, the paradox is the New Being. From the dialectical process, we expect a third synthetic stage to emerge from the first two stages. This section of the paper will explicate the synthetic stage of the Christian response to the problem of evil, showing that both of the Christian paradoxes disappear in the third stage. To complete Dostoevsky’s triad, Alyosha Karamazov will serve to illustrate the synthetic response. Before I begin to explicate the three stages of Christian life, it must be admitted that the three “stages” are merely archetypes. While I liken the Fyodor Karamazov archetype to “babes” of faith and the Ivan Karamazov archetype to “young men” of faith, there is no reason to assume physical age corresponds to archetype. Obviously the oldest of the Karamazov’s is the youngest in faith, and the youngest Karamazov has the most mature faith. There also might be a question as to whether education determines which category a person falls into: Alyosha Karamazov, who shall represent the synthetic position, is often described as a simpleton. In contrast, Ivan Karamazov is well educated. While there might be reason to say that education is correlated with Ivan Karamazov’s position, I reject the notion that education makes one an Ivan Karamazov. Alyosha’s mentor, the elder Zossima, is both well educated and a “father” of faith.20 Ultimately, one cannot use facts of education or age to predict which of the three stages of Christian life a person inhabits. Ultimately, it must be admitted that no person perfectly fits into any of the three categories. I simply hope that the three categories form a tool for analyzing Christian responses to the problem of evil, and the reconciliation of the New Being. We now begin our argument by explicating the first stage of Christian life, and the paradox therein. The first paradox of Christianity is sin. Humans, in their pride, avoid 20
Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, pg 325
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acknowledging their own sinfulness at all costs. The first task of Christianity is to convince Christians that they are sinful. For those who might be termed “babes” in faith, sin always contradicts the whole of human experience, which is Tillich’s own definition for paradox. Fyodor Karamazov is a perfect example of one who cannot admit his own sin. Even when confronted with his own buffoonery, Fyodor Karamazov never truly considers himself sinful. Fyodor Karamazov can only resent the New Being for unmasking his false piety. Like Fyodor, babes in faith can only resent Christianity for unmasking the sin of the world. Yet we hope that the true Fyodor Karamazovs are few and far between, for theirs is a cruel race. Instead, the responsible Ivan Karamazov represents the second stage of Christian life. As the “young men” of faith, individuals in the second stage of Christian faith have overcome the first paradox of Christian faith. Ivan Karamazov has been convinced of the overwhelming residue of sin in the world, and accordingly he inverts the position of his father. Fyodor Karamazov found sin paradoxical, and the New Being to be irrational. Ivan Karamazov finds sin to be irrational, and finds the New Being to be paradoxical. Tillich argues that there is only one paradox in Christianity. Tillich is completely correct from the perspective of a contrite sinner; the second paradox can only be understood by someone fully convinced of sin, but from that perspective the first paradox is not a paradox at all. For someone who is not yet convinced of sin, then the New Being is unexpected and the only paradox is sin. Yet once a sinner has internalized a conviction of his own sin, forgiveness seems ludicrous. Only after a Christian has fully accepted the reality of sin does the paradoxical dimension of the New Being arise. And only then, after the sinner has accepted the reality of his sin, that sin seems irrational and incapable of explanation. Tillich’s position in Systematic Theology almost matches the perspective of “young men” in faith, and yet a tension appears when he attempts a half-hearted theodicy. It is clear that Tillich has one foot in the Ivan Karamazov stage, and one foot in a higher stage. We have not yet properly explicated the highest stage of Christianity, but we now turn to it. At first, Tillich seems to agree with the existentialists that essence and existence cannot be reconciled: The common point in all existentialist attacks [on Hegel] is that man’s existential situation is a state of estrangement from his essential nature. Hegel is aware of this estrangement, but he believes that it has been overcome and that man has been reconciled with his true being. According to all the existentialists,
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this belief is Hegel’s basic error. Reconciliation is a matter of anticipation and expectation, but not of reality.21 If the existentialists are correct, and there is no reconciliation between essence and existence, then the third stage is impossible. At first it would appear that Tillich’s perspective is utterly pessimistic about the possibility of a New Being, and yet he is not willing to give up on the possibility of transcending the impasse between essence and existence. In his utter hopelessness, Tillich is completely hopeful about the possibility of reconciliation. Like Ivan Karamazov, Tillich is held between longing for reconciliation, and knowing that reconciliation is completely paradoxical. In that respect, the whole of Tillich’s systematic theology is aimed at the Ivan Karamazov audience. By simultaneously retaining hope in and despairing of a reconciliation between essence and existence, Tillich stands between the second and third stages of Christian faith. What is the third stage of Christian faith? If the first stage is being a “babe in Christ,” and the second stage is being a “young man in Christ,” then the third stage must be being a “father in Christ.” The third stage of Christian faith is the final ability to transcend the divide between essence and existence. The third stage of Christian faith is participation in the New Being. In certain ways, Tillich’s Systematic Theology appears to conform to the third stage of Christianity. And yet Systematic Theology is written for those in the second stage. It is as if Tillich knows the road ahead, and by leaving a breadcrumb trail of tensions within his system, leads readers to the finally synthetic destination. Upon reaching this final destination, the paradoxical dimensions of sin and the New Being both disappear. For a Christian who accepts sin and the New Being all at once, who finds a synthetic unity between the seeming opposites, neither sin nor the New Being can properly be called a paradox: a synthetic perspective has been attained.22 Alyosha Karamazov is the best example of a Christian in the third stage of faith. When Ivan Karamazov explains all of the reasons he cannot believe in a final reconciliation between justice and sin, Alyosha responds with a simple kiss.23 This kiss is not a shrug of the shoulders! 21
Tillich, pg 25 The student of Kierkegaard will likely notice similarities between my proposed three stages of ethical life, and Kierkegaard’s aesthetic/ethical/religious stages. There are many similarities between Kierkegaard’s work and what I have proposed, yet I do not think they are reducible to each other. Kierkegaard’s knight of faith is based upon the absurd, whereas I have made no claims about the absurdity of the mature Christian faith. Contrary to Kierkegaard’s position, I argue that the mature Christian faith may appear absurd from the outside though does not admit of being absurd internally. This is, perhaps, a topic for another paper. 23 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, pg 290 22
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Alyosha is not merely brushing off Ivan’s complaints as incorrect, or somehow insubstantial. No, Alyosha’s kiss is a sign of deepest respect and sympathy for Ivan’s concerns. And yet, Alyosha’s kiss is also a sign of transcendence. Alyosha recognizes that Ivan’s concerns are not ultimately efficacious, and that the problem of evil is not ultimately problematic. While Ivan’s presentation of the problem of evil appears to devour all hope of reconciliation, Alyosha recognizes that the hearts of men do not have the last word. And in the silence of defeat, Alyosha’s kiss is the thundering triumph. Conclusion: Tillich’s Systematic Theology presents an apparent tension between theodicy and the irrationality of sin. This tension does not destroy Systematic Theology, but perhaps foreshadows a more mature theological position. By declaring that sin is irrational, Tillich panders to those who find Ivan Karamazov’s formulation of the problem of evil to be efficacious. Yet Tillich refuses to give up on theodicy, ultimately attempting to rationalize sin. By reflecting on the tension between theodicy and the irrationality of sin, it appears that Tillich presents one moment of a dialectical argument. The first moment of this argument is that of an unrepentant sinner. The second moment of that argument is Tillich’s outward intellectual position, that of a contrite sinner. The third moment of this dialectical conversation, which is foreshadowed by the tensions in Systematic Theology, is that of mature Christian faith. While sin and the New Being each have both paradoxical and irrational dimensions, these dimensions are both recast in the light of a mature Christian faith. All at once the mature Christian recognizes the paradoxical and irrational dimensions of sin and the New Being, and yet still he cries “Thou art just, oh Lord!”
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