To hypothesize or not to hypothesize?

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Contents Martin on Mahrer . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page on Mould and Duncan . . . . . Cone and Foster on Aiken, West, Sechrest, and Reno . . . . . . . . . . . Becker on Reporting Results . . . . . Hartley on Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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To Hypothesize or Not to Hypothesize? Jack Martin

Simon Fraser University, Burnaby" British Columbia, Canada Mahrer (September 1988) interpreted recent developments in the philosophy of science concerning the relationship between theory and empirical research as support for the discovery-oriented approach t o psychotherapy research. Although he did not deny theory as the "end game" of programs of psychotherapy research, Mahrer argued that the framing of theory-embedded research hypotheses should follow upon "a closer, in-depth look at psychotherapy" (p. 697) that would "discover what is there to be discovered" (p. 697)• More radically, he concluded that "hypothesis-testing research is poorly equipped for and disappointingly ineffective either in confirming or disconfirming theoretical propositions or in contributing to the supposed cumulative body of knowledge in psychotherapy" (p. 697). In adjudicating Mahrer's (1988) more radical thesis, it is important to distinguish between two claims that he tended to conflate. The first is that hypotheses (and theories) that have guided much, perhaps most, psychotherapy research are inadequate for advancing knowledge of psychotherapy. (In Mahrer's words, "in the field of psychotherapy so-called theories are little m o r e than loose collections of beliefs, ideologies, and second-rate mythologies whose qualifications as scientific theories are amateur at best," p. 695.) The second claim was that hypothesis-testing research is inadequate as a paradigm of inquiry for advancing knowledge of psyJ u n e 1991 • A m e r i c a n Psychologist

chotherapy. (In Mahrer's words, "Hypothesis-testing research is inadequate • . . for contributing to a purportedly cumulative body of psychotherapeutic knowledge," p. 701.) The first of these claims may be accepted without prejudicing acceptance or rejection of the second. As others have done, Mahrer provided numerous reasons to question, and perhaps to reject, much of what passes for theory and theory-embedded hypotheses in psychotherapy research (see Martin, 1988; Meehl, 1978).He did not, however, establishan adequate case for the rejection of hypothesis-testing research as a paradigm for inquiry. There are at least three kinds of arguments that support the retention of hypothesis-testing research on psychotherapy. These arguments simultaneously raise critical questions concerning the adequacy of discovery-oriented research. Data and Knowledge Since the classic work of N. R. Hanson (1958), many philosophers of science (e.g., Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1970; Toulmin, 1972) have concluded that data are inevitably theory laden, that theories always are underdetermined by data, that all theoretical claims are fallible, and that there are no ultimate sources or criteria for knowledge. In short, data must be interpreted, and knowledge comes from the interpretation of data in context, not from the accumulation of "facts." However, these same philosophers generally did not (as did Mahrer, 1988, p. 701) conclude that scientists should abandon rigorous hypothesis testing as a vehicle for scientific inquiry. To the contrary, one obvious way of attempting to ensure that data are not treated as facts (independent of the values, theories, and motives of researchers) is to require that researchers articulate their hypotheses a priori, fully, and explicitly. So long as a priori hypotheses, and the theories in which they are embedded, are not held dogmatically, there probably is no better way known to guard against the possible tyranny of theory. Of course, the crucial factor here is researchers' cultivation of a critical, skeptical faculty concerning their theories and hypotheses--a

condition that Popper (1965), among others, viewed as the hallmark of the scientific enterprise. Parenthetically, it should be noted that many of the phenomenologieal and antiformaiist positions that undergird current discovery-oriented research on psychotherapy were articulated before the widespread acceptance of the "new philosophy of science" (i.e., post-Hanson). As Phillips (1987) has argued, the new philosophy of science raises grave questions concerning the possibility that phenomenological (e.g., Husserrs, 1929/1960, method of "bracketing") or qualitative (e.g., Glaser & Strauss's, 1967, "constant comparison methods" and "double back steps") methods of inquiry actually can succeed in providing "presuppositionless" bases that permit "data to speak for themselves" (Phillips, 1987, pp. 102-113).

Epistemology and Scientific Tests As Mahrer (1988, p. 694) noted, a determined advocate of any decent theory can always defend a selected core of propositions on logical grounds in the face of falsified empirical examples or results. This point was made repeatedly by Lakatos (1970, 1976), who rejected nonproblematic forms of Popperian falsificationism, and was developed fully by both Duhem (1906/1954) and Quine (1951/1961). However, given that such theoretical gymnastics can occur even when researchers' theories and hypotheses are made explicit a priori, imagine the riot of contortions that can ensue when the theoretical presuppositions, assumptions, and hypotheses of researchers are not articulated or receive only post hoc revelation. When researchers' findings are put into hypotheses and enshrined in theoretical contexts only after the fact (as is the case in discovery-oriented research), no theories get tested, even in the nondefinitive manner that l_akatos and others have described as the best that can be expected from any sort of empirical undertaking. Pragmatics of Scientific Tests

A major problem facingany socialscience research program is the impossibility of conducting experiments largeor numerous 651

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enough to instantiate all possible cells that arise when relevant individual, temporal, and contextual factors (and their various levels) interact with the experimental or treatment factors and levels being studied (see Cronbach, 1975). This pragmatic difficulty must be faced by both hypothesistesting and discovery-oriented researchers. A priori theorizing and hypothesis testing permit researchers to follow suggestive paths through labyrinths of factorial grids of unknown size and complexity, without the necessity of sampling each separate cell. The pragmatic difficulty is at least managed, if not resolved. Pop. perian or Darwinian emphasis on refutation of hypotheses (even if somewhat blunted by the considerations of l_akatos, Duhem, and Quine) carves up the research space into manageable slices. The welldocumented pitfalls of Baconian or Lamarkian induction are avoided. A major challenge to discovery-oriented researchers is to demonstrate how their approach avoids these well-known difficulties.

Conclusion Mahrer (1988) was right to question the adequacy of theories and hypotheses that have guided much psychotherapy research. He also deserves attention when he demands a much more careful, intensive grounding of psychotherapy theory and research in the perceptions, experiences, and actions of participants in actual therapeutic interactions. New, better theoretical frames eventually may issue from such work. However, Mahrer (1988) was wrong to eschew a prioi theorizing and hypothesis-testing research in psychotherapy. Theory-driven, hypothesis-testing research is both inevitable and indispensable to progress in any social science. We must take care that the Promethean gift of discovery-oriented psychotherapy research is examined with care, and that the established virtues of hypothesis-testing research are not forgotten. REFERENCE~ Cronbach, L. J. (1975). Beyond the two disciplines of scientific psychology. American Psychologist, 30, 116-127. Duhcm, P. (1954). Aim and structure ofphysical theory. New York: Anthenenm. (Original work published 1906) Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. (1967). Thediscovery of grounded theory: Strategiesfor qualitative research. Chicago: Aldine. Hanson, N. R. (1958). Patterns of discovery. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University PresS. Husserl, E. (1960). Cartesian meditations. (D. Cairns, Trans.). The Hague, The Netherlands: Nijhoff. (Original work delivered 1929) 652

Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodolngy of scientific research programs. In I. Lakatos & A, Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge(pp. 91-196). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Lakatos, I. (1976). Proofs and refutations. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Mahrer, A. R. (1988). Discovery-oriented psychotherapy research: Rationale, alms, and methods. American Psychologist, 43, 694702. Martin, J. (1988). A proposal for researching possible relationships between scientific theories and personal theories of counselors and clients. Journal of Counseling and Development, 66, 261-265. Meehl, P. E. (1978). Theoretical risks and tabular asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the slow progress of soft psychology.Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46, 806834. Phillips, D. C. (1987). Philosophy, science, and social inquiry. New York: Pergamon. Popper, K. R. (1965). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge(2nd ed.). New York: Harper & Row. Quine, W.V. O. (1961). Two dogmas of empiricism. In W. V. O. Quine (Ed.), From a logical point of view (2nd ed., pp. 20-46). New York: Harper & Row. (Original work published 1951) Toulmin, S. (1972). Human understanding. Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press.

Reply to Mould and Duncan on Pornography Research: Some Important Issues for Psychology Stewart Page University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada In the March 1989 issue of the American Psychologist, I criticized the position of Linz, Donnerstein, and Penrod (1987) and of Wilcox (1987). Their articles, wrongfully in my view, had accused the Meese Commission (Attorney General's Commission on Pornography: Final Report 1986) of overgeneralizing from available evidence on the effects of pornography. I drew attention, for example, to what I felt was a disparity between the previous evidence and conclusions offered by pornography researchers and the recent portrayal of this evidence by the aforementioned authors. Mould (June 1990; also Duncan, June 1990) argued against my position and described the Meese Commission as a "farce." I feel that some distortions in the comments of Mould and of Duncan should be identified. In my view, these re-

late to (a) issues of importance for psychology as a discipline and (b) debate about this particular topic. First, Mould (1990) took my comments as an "endorsement" of the Meese Commission. My intention, however, was not to endorse the moral perspective of the Commission, nor its particular strategies for dealing with pornography. I was trying to point out that much of the existing evidence, provided by pornography researchers in recent years, did not seem inconsistent with the Commission's basic conclusions. I thus identified several instances in which pornography researchers appeared previously to have supported a causal connection between exposure to various pornographic materials and various negative effects, including less positive attitudes toward women. Second, Mould (1990) pointed out that Penthouse magazine recently ran a cartoon featuring a female character engaged in fantasy aggression against a male. I do not find it credible that this could be seen as reflecting the prevailing situation in pornographic material, nor the reality of violence against women and their treatment primarily as sexual objects by many men. In fact, the main source of"humor" in Penthouse's comic strip, which Mould seemed somehow to accept as an indicator of violence by women against men, resides not in its literal, that is, in its apparent, meaning, but rather in its deliberate and contrived reversal of reality. Third, Mould (1990) claimed that the Commission had to resort to semantic trickery in order to "circumvent the lack of scientific evidence" for the negative effeels of pornography. It seems inconsistent, however, for previous researebers to support relationships between pornographic material and negative effects, yet accuse the Commission of baying to play semantic tricks in order to do the same thing. Fourth, as I commented previously, it is possible that the issue of pornography cannot be completely evaluated or approached solely through empirical research and a value system oriented around "data," "causation," and "basic scientific principles," to use Mould's (1990) terminolngy. Many feminists and others believe that pornography itself is inherent violence ao~iust women. As such, it reinforces messages about the normality of male domination and of contempt for the dignity of women. Traditional criteria for evaluation of research thus become incomplete and even irrelevant, that is, if one holds this perspective about pornography. Such a perspective cannot and should not rule out attempts to evaluate existing research. It is nevertheless iraJ u n e 1991 • A m e r i c a n Psychologist